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Single loss expectancy (SLE) is the value you expect to lose each time a risk
occurs. You calculate SLE by using the following formula: SLE = AV x EF




                                                                                8
Single loss expectancy (SLE) is the value you expect to lose each time a risk
occurs. You calculate SLE by using the following formula: SLE = AV x EF




                                                                                9
Annual loss expectancy (ALE) is the value you expect to lose to a given risk
each year. You calculate ALE by using the following formula: ALE = SLE x
ARO




                                                                               10
Annual loss expectancy (ALE) is the value you expect to lose to a given risk
each year. You calculate ALE by using the following formula: ALE = SLE x
ARO




                                                                               11
Annual loss expectancy (ALE) is the value you expect to lose to a given risk
each year. You calculate ALE by using the following formula: ALE = SLE x
ARO




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Microsoft says:
Provides a consistent methodology for objectively identifying and evaluating
threats to applications.
Translates technical risk to business impact.
Empowers a business to manage risk.
Creates awareness among teams of security dependencies and assumptions.




                                                                               19
20
Step 1: Identify security objectives.
Clear objectives help you to focus the threat modeling activity and determine
how much effort to spend on subsequent steps.


Step 2: Create an application overview.
Itemizing your application's important characteristics and actors helps you to
identify relevant threats during step 4.


Step 3: Decompose your application.
A detailed understanding of the mechanics of your application makes it easier
for you to uncover more relevant and more detailed threats.


Step 4: Identify threats.
Use details from steps 2 and 3 to identify threats relevant to your application
scenario and context.


Step 5: Identify vulnerabilities.
Review the layers of your application to identify weaknesses related to your
threats. Use vulnerability categories to help you focus on those areas where
mistakes are most often made.

                                                                                  21
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Would prefer to use a diagram here




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Define Locations, Interfaces & Users (Trust Levels) But not “assets”, as
organizations are too complex
Create a map showing how Locations, Users and Interfaces relate
       Users are restricted to locations
       Interfaces are exposed to locations




                                                                           37
Risks are gleamed from three sources
       Analyst Experience
       Organizational History
       Group Brainstorming
Each Risk has key elements
       Likelihood
       Impact
Use an iterative process to describe the Risk, apply it to an Interface, then
         refine as required
A new Risk is added if:
       Likelihood or Impact differs
       The required defense is likely to differ




                                                                                38
This creates a Threat Vector

       Directly linked:

               What Interfaces could this Risk Impact?

       Indirectly linked:

               What Trust Level is required?
               At which location would such Users be found?




                                                              39
The Threat Vector therefore becomes a 4-Tuple

       Risk, Interface, Location, User

       A many-to-many relation means the number of Threat Vectors scales
       linearly




                                                                           40
Tests could be any of
      Focused Technical Tests
              E.g. Penetration Test
      Sample Data
              Drawn from existing monitoring systems e.g. Incident Logs or
              previous assessments
      Interviews
              Conducted with relevant individuals or teams
      Policy and procedure reviews
      Research
              Drawing on external sources
The more tests are conducted the more certainty we have

However, the most ‘efficient’ tests are easily calculated by considering the
Weights of all the Threat Vectors
impacted




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Corporate Threat Modeling v2

  • 1. 1
  • 2. 2
  • 3. 3
  • 4. 4
  • 5. 5
  • 6. 6
  • 7. 7
  • 8. Single loss expectancy (SLE) is the value you expect to lose each time a risk occurs. You calculate SLE by using the following formula: SLE = AV x EF 8
  • 9. Single loss expectancy (SLE) is the value you expect to lose each time a risk occurs. You calculate SLE by using the following formula: SLE = AV x EF 9
  • 10. Annual loss expectancy (ALE) is the value you expect to lose to a given risk each year. You calculate ALE by using the following formula: ALE = SLE x ARO 10
  • 11. Annual loss expectancy (ALE) is the value you expect to lose to a given risk each year. You calculate ALE by using the following formula: ALE = SLE x ARO 11
  • 12. Annual loss expectancy (ALE) is the value you expect to lose to a given risk each year. You calculate ALE by using the following formula: ALE = SLE x ARO 12
  • 13. 13
  • 14. 14
  • 15. 15
  • 16. 16
  • 17. 17
  • 18. 18
  • 19. Microsoft says: Provides a consistent methodology for objectively identifying and evaluating threats to applications. Translates technical risk to business impact. Empowers a business to manage risk. Creates awareness among teams of security dependencies and assumptions. 19
  • 20. 20
  • 21. Step 1: Identify security objectives. Clear objectives help you to focus the threat modeling activity and determine how much effort to spend on subsequent steps. Step 2: Create an application overview. Itemizing your application's important characteristics and actors helps you to identify relevant threats during step 4. Step 3: Decompose your application. A detailed understanding of the mechanics of your application makes it easier for you to uncover more relevant and more detailed threats. Step 4: Identify threats. Use details from steps 2 and 3 to identify threats relevant to your application scenario and context. Step 5: Identify vulnerabilities. Review the layers of your application to identify weaknesses related to your threats. Use vulnerability categories to help you focus on those areas where mistakes are most often made. 21
  • 22. 22
  • 23. 23
  • 24. 24
  • 25. 25
  • 26. 26
  • 27. Would prefer to use a diagram here 27
  • 28. 28
  • 29. 29
  • 30. 30
  • 31. 31
  • 32. 32
  • 33. 33
  • 34. 34
  • 35. 35
  • 36. 36
  • 37. Define Locations, Interfaces & Users (Trust Levels) But not “assets”, as organizations are too complex Create a map showing how Locations, Users and Interfaces relate Users are restricted to locations Interfaces are exposed to locations 37
  • 38. Risks are gleamed from three sources Analyst Experience Organizational History Group Brainstorming Each Risk has key elements Likelihood Impact Use an iterative process to describe the Risk, apply it to an Interface, then refine as required A new Risk is added if: Likelihood or Impact differs The required defense is likely to differ 38
  • 39. This creates a Threat Vector Directly linked: What Interfaces could this Risk Impact? Indirectly linked: What Trust Level is required? At which location would such Users be found? 39
  • 40. The Threat Vector therefore becomes a 4-Tuple Risk, Interface, Location, User A many-to-many relation means the number of Threat Vectors scales linearly 40
  • 41. Tests could be any of Focused Technical Tests E.g. Penetration Test Sample Data Drawn from existing monitoring systems e.g. Incident Logs or previous assessments Interviews Conducted with relevant individuals or teams Policy and procedure reviews Research Drawing on external sources The more tests are conducted the more certainty we have However, the most ‘efficient’ tests are easily calculated by considering the Weights of all the Threat Vectors impacted 41
  • 42. 44
  • 43. 45
  • 44. 46
  • 45. 47
  • 46. 48
  • 47. 49
  • 48. 50
  • 49. 51
  • 50. 52
  • 51. 53
  • 52. 54
  • 53. 55
  • 54. 56
  • 55. 57
  • 56. 58
  • 57. 59
  • 58. 60
  • 59. 61
  • 60. 62
  • 61. 63
  • 62. 64
  • 63. 65
  • 64. 66