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MODSECURITY 
ELK 
If we do not wish to fight we can prevent! 
{
ModSecurity 
Security Bootcamp 2014 2
*log 
Security Bootcamp 2014 3
ELK 
Security Bootcamp 2014 4
ModSecurity 
Ryan C. Barnett 
ModSecurity is an open source, cross-platform web application firewall (WAF) module. Known 
as the "Swiss Army Knife" of WAFs, it enables web application defenders to gain visibility into 
HTTP(S) traffic and provides a power rules language and API to implement advanced 
protections. 
Blackhat Arsenal 2014 
Security Bootcamp 2014 5
Surviving D-Day Omaha Beach 1944 
Security Bootcamp 2014 6
Surviving D-Day Omaha Beach 1944 
 Fake tank 
 Fake aircraft 
 Fake Napoli (Egypt) 
 Fake …… 
Security Bootcamp 2014 7
HoneyTraps with ModSecurity 
http://map.honeycloud.net/ 
Security Bootcamp 2014 8
1.Real-time Application Profiling 
Security Bootcamp 2014 9
Real-time Application Profiling 
 Request method(s) 
 Number of parameters (minimum/maximum range) 
 Parameter names 
 Parameter lengths (minimum/maximum range) 
 Parameter types 
 Flag (such as /path/to/foo.php?param) 
 Digits (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=1234) 
 Alpha (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=abcd) 
 Alphanumeric (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=abcd1234) 
 E-mail (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=foo@bar.com) 
 Path (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=/dir/somefile.txt) 
 URL (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=http://somehost/dir/file.txt) 
 SafeText (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=some_data-12) 
Security Bootcamp 2014 10
Real-time Application Profiling 
Security Bootcamp 2014 11
Post-Process Profiling 
Security Bootcamp 2014 12
4 scenarios 
 If the HTTP response code is 404, the resource doesn’t exist. In this 
case, not only do we skip the profiling, but we also remove the resource 
key, so we delete the persistent storage. This is achieved by using the 
setvar:!resource.KEY action. 
 If the HTTP response code is either level 4xx or level 5xx, the 
application says something is wrong with the transaction, so we won’t 
profile it in this case either. 
 The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) can use anomaly scoring. 
We can check this transactional anomaly score. If it is anything other 
than 0, we should skip profiling. 
 Finally, we have already seen enough traffic for our profiling model and 
are currently in enforcement mode, so we skip profiling. 
Security Bootcamp 2014 13
2. Hacker Traps 
Security Bootcamp 2014 14
Hacker Traps 
 Unused Web Ports 
 Fake robots.txt Disallow Entries 
 Fake HTML comments 
 Fake hidden form fields 
 Fake cookies 
Security Bootcamp 2014 15
Hacker Traps 
Unused Web Ports 
Security Bootcamp 2014 16
Hacker Traps 
Fake robots.txt Disallow Entries 
Security Bootcamp 2014 17
Hacker Traps 
Fake HTML comments 
Security Bootcamp 2014 18
Hacker Traps 
Fake HTML comments 
Security Bootcamp 2014 19
Hacker Traps 
Fake hidden form fields 
Security Bootcamp 2014 20
Hacker Traps 
Fake cookies 
Security Bootcamp 2014 21
Hacker Traps 
Fake cookies 
Security Bootcamp 2014 22
3a. Self-Contained vs. Collaborative Detection 
Security Bootcamp 2014 23
Self-Contained vs. Collaborative Detection 
Self-Contained Collaborative 
Security Bootcamp 2014 24
Anomaly Scoring Threshold Levels 
Security Bootcamp 2014 25
3b. Inbound/Outbound Correlation 
Security Bootcamp 2014 26
Correlation 
 Did an inbound attack occur? 
 Did an HTTP response status code error (4xx/5xx level) occur? 
 Did an application information leakage event occur? 
Security Bootcamp 2014 27
Correlation 
If an inbound attack was detected, and either an outbound application 
status codeerror or information leakage event was detected, the overall 
event severity is raised to one of the following: 
 • 0, EMERGENCY, is generated from correlation of anomaly scoring 
data where an inbound attack and an outbound leakage exist. 
 • 1, ALERT, is generated from correlation where an inbound attack and 
an outbound application-level error exist. 
Security Bootcamp 2014 28
4. Detecting Malicious Links 
Security Bootcamp 2014 29
Detecting Malicious Links 
 URI Blacklist RBL6 
 Google’s Safe Browsing API7 
 ModSecurity 
 @rbl operator 
 @gsbLookup operator 
 @rsub operator 
 SecGsbLookupDb directive 
 SecStreamOutBodyInspection directive 
 SecContentInjection directive 
 STREAM_OUTPUT_BODY variable 
Security Bootcamp 2014 30
5. Normalizing Unicode 
Security Bootcamp 2014 31
Normalizing Unicode 
 Best-Fit Mapping 
 Detecting Use of Full-/Half-Width Unicode 
Security Bootcamp 2014 32
Best-Fit Mapping 
%u3008scr%u0131pt%u3009%u212fval(%uFF07al%u212Frt(%22XSS%22)%u02C8)%u23 
29/scr%u0131pt%u232A 
〈(0x2329) ~= <(0x3c) 
〈(0x3008) ~= <(0x3c) 
<(0xff1c) ~= <(0x3c) 
ʹ(0x2b9) ~= '(0x27) 
ʼ(0x2bc) ~= '(0x27) 
ˈ(0x2c8) ~= '(0x27) 
′(0x2032) ~= '(0x27) 
'(0xff07) ~= '(0x27) 
Security Bootcamp 2014 33
Unicode Mapping 
Security Bootcamp 2014 34
Unicode Mapping 
Security Bootcamp 2014 35
Full-/Half-Width Unicode 
Security Bootcamp 2014 36
6. Abnormal Header Ordering 
Security Bootcamp 2014 37
Passive OS fingerprinting 
Security Bootcamp 2014 38
7. Detecting Page Title Changes 
Security Bootcamp 2014 39
Detecting Page Title Changes 
Security Bootcamp 2014 40
8. Web Client Device Fingerprinting 
Security Bootcamp 2014 41
Web Client Device Fingerprinting 
Security Bootcamp 2014 42
9. Slowing Down Automated Attack Tools 
Security Bootcamp 2014 43
Slowing Down Automated Attack Tools 
Security Bootcamp 2014 44
NSM 
Logstash Elasticsearch Kibana 
No code required 
Real-time analysis of streaming data 
Highly scalable 
Open source, community driven 
Security Bootcamp 2014 45
DEMO 
Security Bootcamp 2014 46
“ 
” 
Thank you! 
Question, huh? 
FPT TELECOM 
Security Bootcamp 2014 47

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Triển khai Modsecurity vào hệ thống NMS - Quan Minh Tâm

  • 1. MODSECURITY ELK If we do not wish to fight we can prevent! {
  • 5. ModSecurity Ryan C. Barnett ModSecurity is an open source, cross-platform web application firewall (WAF) module. Known as the "Swiss Army Knife" of WAFs, it enables web application defenders to gain visibility into HTTP(S) traffic and provides a power rules language and API to implement advanced protections. Blackhat Arsenal 2014 Security Bootcamp 2014 5
  • 6. Surviving D-Day Omaha Beach 1944 Security Bootcamp 2014 6
  • 7. Surviving D-Day Omaha Beach 1944  Fake tank  Fake aircraft  Fake Napoli (Egypt)  Fake …… Security Bootcamp 2014 7
  • 8. HoneyTraps with ModSecurity http://map.honeycloud.net/ Security Bootcamp 2014 8
  • 9. 1.Real-time Application Profiling Security Bootcamp 2014 9
  • 10. Real-time Application Profiling  Request method(s)  Number of parameters (minimum/maximum range)  Parameter names  Parameter lengths (minimum/maximum range)  Parameter types  Flag (such as /path/to/foo.php?param)  Digits (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=1234)  Alpha (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=abcd)  Alphanumeric (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=abcd1234)  E-mail (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=foo@bar.com)  Path (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=/dir/somefile.txt)  URL (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=http://somehost/dir/file.txt)  SafeText (such as /path/to/foo.php?param=some_data-12) Security Bootcamp 2014 10
  • 11. Real-time Application Profiling Security Bootcamp 2014 11
  • 13. 4 scenarios  If the HTTP response code is 404, the resource doesn’t exist. In this case, not only do we skip the profiling, but we also remove the resource key, so we delete the persistent storage. This is achieved by using the setvar:!resource.KEY action.  If the HTTP response code is either level 4xx or level 5xx, the application says something is wrong with the transaction, so we won’t profile it in this case either.  The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) can use anomaly scoring. We can check this transactional anomaly score. If it is anything other than 0, we should skip profiling.  Finally, we have already seen enough traffic for our profiling model and are currently in enforcement mode, so we skip profiling. Security Bootcamp 2014 13
  • 14. 2. Hacker Traps Security Bootcamp 2014 14
  • 15. Hacker Traps  Unused Web Ports  Fake robots.txt Disallow Entries  Fake HTML comments  Fake hidden form fields  Fake cookies Security Bootcamp 2014 15
  • 16. Hacker Traps Unused Web Ports Security Bootcamp 2014 16
  • 17. Hacker Traps Fake robots.txt Disallow Entries Security Bootcamp 2014 17
  • 18. Hacker Traps Fake HTML comments Security Bootcamp 2014 18
  • 19. Hacker Traps Fake HTML comments Security Bootcamp 2014 19
  • 20. Hacker Traps Fake hidden form fields Security Bootcamp 2014 20
  • 21. Hacker Traps Fake cookies Security Bootcamp 2014 21
  • 22. Hacker Traps Fake cookies Security Bootcamp 2014 22
  • 23. 3a. Self-Contained vs. Collaborative Detection Security Bootcamp 2014 23
  • 24. Self-Contained vs. Collaborative Detection Self-Contained Collaborative Security Bootcamp 2014 24
  • 25. Anomaly Scoring Threshold Levels Security Bootcamp 2014 25
  • 26. 3b. Inbound/Outbound Correlation Security Bootcamp 2014 26
  • 27. Correlation  Did an inbound attack occur?  Did an HTTP response status code error (4xx/5xx level) occur?  Did an application information leakage event occur? Security Bootcamp 2014 27
  • 28. Correlation If an inbound attack was detected, and either an outbound application status codeerror or information leakage event was detected, the overall event severity is raised to one of the following:  • 0, EMERGENCY, is generated from correlation of anomaly scoring data where an inbound attack and an outbound leakage exist.  • 1, ALERT, is generated from correlation where an inbound attack and an outbound application-level error exist. Security Bootcamp 2014 28
  • 29. 4. Detecting Malicious Links Security Bootcamp 2014 29
  • 30. Detecting Malicious Links  URI Blacklist RBL6  Google’s Safe Browsing API7  ModSecurity  @rbl operator  @gsbLookup operator  @rsub operator  SecGsbLookupDb directive  SecStreamOutBodyInspection directive  SecContentInjection directive  STREAM_OUTPUT_BODY variable Security Bootcamp 2014 30
  • 31. 5. Normalizing Unicode Security Bootcamp 2014 31
  • 32. Normalizing Unicode  Best-Fit Mapping  Detecting Use of Full-/Half-Width Unicode Security Bootcamp 2014 32
  • 33. Best-Fit Mapping %u3008scr%u0131pt%u3009%u212fval(%uFF07al%u212Frt(%22XSS%22)%u02C8)%u23 29/scr%u0131pt%u232A 〈(0x2329) ~= <(0x3c) 〈(0x3008) ~= <(0x3c) <(0xff1c) ~= <(0x3c) ʹ(0x2b9) ~= '(0x27) ʼ(0x2bc) ~= '(0x27) ˈ(0x2c8) ~= '(0x27) ′(0x2032) ~= '(0x27) '(0xff07) ~= '(0x27) Security Bootcamp 2014 33
  • 34. Unicode Mapping Security Bootcamp 2014 34
  • 35. Unicode Mapping Security Bootcamp 2014 35
  • 37. 6. Abnormal Header Ordering Security Bootcamp 2014 37
  • 38. Passive OS fingerprinting Security Bootcamp 2014 38
  • 39. 7. Detecting Page Title Changes Security Bootcamp 2014 39
  • 40. Detecting Page Title Changes Security Bootcamp 2014 40
  • 41. 8. Web Client Device Fingerprinting Security Bootcamp 2014 41
  • 42. Web Client Device Fingerprinting Security Bootcamp 2014 42
  • 43. 9. Slowing Down Automated Attack Tools Security Bootcamp 2014 43
  • 44. Slowing Down Automated Attack Tools Security Bootcamp 2014 44
  • 45. NSM Logstash Elasticsearch Kibana No code required Real-time analysis of streaming data Highly scalable Open source, community driven Security Bootcamp 2014 45
  • 47. “ ” Thank you! Question, huh? FPT TELECOM Security Bootcamp 2014 47