SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Truly Secure: The Steps a Security Practitioner Took to Build a Secure Public Cloud Session #8  Wednesday, November 16, 2011 10:45am John Kinsella Founder, Stratosec
Intro BoD, co-founder – Silicon Valley Chapter, CSA Co-chair, CSA Portability and Application Security Founder, Stratosec Secure IaaS Large background in information security and datacenter operations
Overview Why Architecture Building Operations
Ground rules Focused around IaaS, but ideas good elsewhere No finger-pointing at specific brands
Why this talk? Cloud management platforms: Relatively new software From relatively new software teams Frequently relatively immature engineering standards
Focus of this talk
Why?
Why? From http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~koopman/des_s99/sw_reliability/
Architecture & Design Software Worries Benefits Pieces
Focus of this talk
What is a Secure Public Cloud? What are people worried about? What are we giving them for their money?
Worries “ Standard” issues: Data security Resource availability Bad neighbors
Benefits “ Secure clouds” provide “ Standard” cloud benefits, plus… Data security (encryption and integrity) Heightened security posture
Required functionality “ Basic” pieces: Highly available infrastructure (HVM+Net+Storage) Security pieces: Encryption Intrusion detection Security monitoring
Encryption Several forms to choose from: Database encryption SAN encryption Pass-through device
IDS With all these moving parts, you really need multiple layers of IDS: Network IDS Host-based IDS WAF
Security Monitoring Centralized log management is a must. As the cloud grows, the amount of data to process will be huge. You need a system with relatively low false-positive rate.
Building Practice Trust Test Review Repeat
Building a secure cloud Setup hardware – lab first, if possible Select software Trial period Move to production
Practice Makes Perfect If you do this right, you will build, tear down, and rebuild this cloud several times as you learn from your (and your vendors) mistakes.
Trust Who do you trust to build your secure cloud? Yourself Your staff 3 rd  party security/cloud professionals Vendor support staff?
Trust From a vendor’s website:
Setup Basics Harden Hypervisor OS Consider a automation suite
Selecting a Cloud Platform Create a list of possible packages Look for security features in each Legwork – how have the maintainers treated security? Pick one or two to test out Trial period is  mandatory .
Trial Period Incorrect: Get software Install software Test functionality
Trial Period Incorrect: Get software Install software Test functionality Correct: Get software Review software Install while monitoring Understand results of installation Test functionality Test security … Profit
Review Software If you’re lucky, your chosen software is either open-source or is at least human-readable. Some things to look at: Installer scripts Startup scripts Default configurations Cronjobs or other automated processes Main application Inter-system connectivity
Me? Code review? Basic code review doesn’t require huge expertise Complete, thorough review vs. targeted review Not suggesting using commercial tools (Fortify, Ounce, Veracode) Several quick “ greps ”  will disclose much info
Review Software Ask: What does this code do to my already hardened system? Are firewalls disabled, or security measures removed? What new software (and potential vulnerabilities) does it install? What exactly is the code doing? Is the application more trusting than it should be? Where was the developer lazy?
Review Software Keywords to search for: ipconfig, ifconfig mkdir, rm, chown, chmod, exec service rpm, yum, apt sysconfig, sysctl, reboot mysql, pgsql
Code Review email sent to vendor after code review:
Monitored Installation The installation environment is yours – control it. Capture a log of the installation process Make sure IDS capture any changes made during installation With your initial security configuration, the initial installation will probably not be successful.
Review Gathered Intelligence Review the results of the install Look for errors during installation Some can be fixed by loosening security controls Some must be fixed by vendor
Test Functionality Marketing is wonderful. So what does this thing really do for me?
Test Security Standard security testing scenario: The app is insecure, question is if you have enough resources to find the weakness. Low-hanging fruit: SQL Injection, XSS, lack of encryption, default values Higher fruit: buffer overflows, non-standard (read: “bad”) encryption, bad resource handling
Test Security Network scan – Do a thorough scan, not just looking for known ports. Make sure you know where the application is listening, and what your firewall is allowing. Vulnerability Scanner – applications that leverage open-source packages may come with known vulnerabilities Don’t just perform network-based tests – test from on the box as well. Fuzzing – when you find a particular input that looks like it was developed in-house without common libraries, throw a fuzzer at it.
Test Security
Sound familiar? I’ve basically described a Secure Software Development Lifecycle (Secure SDLC) As your organization grows in size, you’ll want to adopt several standardized processes: Security reviews Test, build, and release processes
Operations
Operations – Who Do You Trust? How do you keep your new cloud running smoothly? Monitor security and performance Keep systems up-to-date Troubleshoot issues as they arise
Operations – Who Do You Trust?
Operations – Who Do You Trust?
Follow a SSDLC (design, build, test, and run with security in mind) Be confident in your security – have statistics and test results to confirm your state of security. Do not trust vendors Summary
Stay in Touch Email –  [email_address] Twitter - @johnlkinsella

More Related Content

PDF
Applied Security for Containers, OW2con'18, June 7-8, 2018, Paris
 
PDF
Python Web Conference 2022 - Why should devs care about container security.pdf
PPTX
Top 6 Practices to Harden Docker Images to Enhance Security
PDF
Security Patterns for Microservice Architectures - London Java Community 2020
DOCX
Secure your jenkins
PDF
Resin.io contribution to the AGILE-IoT project
PDF
Inconvenience, not security
PDF
$HOME Sweet $HOME Devoxx 2015
Applied Security for Containers, OW2con'18, June 7-8, 2018, Paris
 
Python Web Conference 2022 - Why should devs care about container security.pdf
Top 6 Practices to Harden Docker Images to Enhance Security
Security Patterns for Microservice Architectures - London Java Community 2020
Secure your jenkins
Resin.io contribution to the AGILE-IoT project
Inconvenience, not security
$HOME Sweet $HOME Devoxx 2015

What's hot (14)

PPTX
Contain your risk: Deploy secure containers with trust and confidence
PPTX
Javantura - Securing the JVM
PDF
Disnix: A toolset for distributed deployment
PDF
CSW2017 Scott kelly secureboot-csw2017-v1
PPTX
Denali Sql Server Security
PDF
Developers are from Mars, Security guys are from Venus
PPTX
Code Europe PL - Securing the JVM: Neither for fun nor for profit, but do you...
PPTX
Voxxed Days Athens - Securing the JVM - Neither for fun nor for profit, but d...
PDF
Secure Web Coding
PDF
Integrating Black Duck into your Agile DevOps Environment
PDF
Hacking IoT with EXPLIoT Framework
PDF
XML Interfaces to the popular Nessus Scanner
PDF
Introduction to DevOps and DevOpsSec with Secure Design by Prof.Krerk (Chulal...
Contain your risk: Deploy secure containers with trust and confidence
Javantura - Securing the JVM
Disnix: A toolset for distributed deployment
CSW2017 Scott kelly secureboot-csw2017-v1
Denali Sql Server Security
Developers are from Mars, Security guys are from Venus
Code Europe PL - Securing the JVM: Neither for fun nor for profit, but do you...
Voxxed Days Athens - Securing the JVM - Neither for fun nor for profit, but d...
Secure Web Coding
Integrating Black Duck into your Agile DevOps Environment
Hacking IoT with EXPLIoT Framework
XML Interfaces to the popular Nessus Scanner
Introduction to DevOps and DevOpsSec with Secure Design by Prof.Krerk (Chulal...
Ad

Similar to Truly Secure: The Steps a Security Practitioner Took to Build a Secure Public Cloud (20)

PPT
Securing the Cloud
PPTX
Jason Kent - AppSec Without Additional Tools
PDF
AppSec How-To: Achieving Security in DevOps
PDF
Using Anchore and DefectDojo to Stand Up Your DevSecOps Function
PPTX
SplunkLive! Munich 2018: Intro to Security Analytics Methods
PDF
Choosing Cybersecurity Tools for Your Tech Stack
PPTX
SplunkLive! Frankfurt 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics Methods
PPTX
Making Security Agile - Oleg Gryb
PDF
Cyber security webinar 6 - How to build systems that resist attacks?
PDF
10 Steps To Secure Agile Development
PPTX
SCS DevSecOps Seminar - State of DevSecOps
PDF
Pragmatic Pipeline Security
PPTX
Open Source Defense for Edge 2017
PPTX
Cyber security - It starts with the embedded system
PDF
Many products-no-security (1)
PDF
Arved sandstrom - the rotwithin - atlseccon2011
PPTX
What Good is this Tool? A Guide to Choosing the Right Application Security Te...
PPTX
Product Security
PDF
DevSecOps and the CI/CD Pipeline
PPT
AMI Security 101 - Smart Grid Security East 2011
Securing the Cloud
Jason Kent - AppSec Without Additional Tools
AppSec How-To: Achieving Security in DevOps
Using Anchore and DefectDojo to Stand Up Your DevSecOps Function
SplunkLive! Munich 2018: Intro to Security Analytics Methods
Choosing Cybersecurity Tools for Your Tech Stack
SplunkLive! Frankfurt 2018 - Intro to Security Analytics Methods
Making Security Agile - Oleg Gryb
Cyber security webinar 6 - How to build systems that resist attacks?
10 Steps To Secure Agile Development
SCS DevSecOps Seminar - State of DevSecOps
Pragmatic Pipeline Security
Open Source Defense for Edge 2017
Cyber security - It starts with the embedded system
Many products-no-security (1)
Arved sandstrom - the rotwithin - atlseccon2011
What Good is this Tool? A Guide to Choosing the Right Application Security Te...
Product Security
DevSecOps and the CI/CD Pipeline
AMI Security 101 - Smart Grid Security East 2011
Ad

More from John Kinsella (10)

PPTX
Removing the Burden of Securing Microservices Through Automation and Visibility
PPTX
2019 Infosec World Keynote
PPTX
An In-depth look at application containers
PPTX
Understanding container security
PPTX
Docker security configuration
PPTX
A (fun!) Comparison of Docker Vulnerability Scanners
PPTX
CloudStack and the HeartBleed vulnerability
PPTX
Dont break the glass
PPTX
CloudStack Secured
PPTX
What is Cloud Security, and Can I Have Some?
Removing the Burden of Securing Microservices Through Automation and Visibility
2019 Infosec World Keynote
An In-depth look at application containers
Understanding container security
Docker security configuration
A (fun!) Comparison of Docker Vulnerability Scanners
CloudStack and the HeartBleed vulnerability
Dont break the glass
CloudStack Secured
What is Cloud Security, and Can I Have Some?

Recently uploaded (20)

PDF
Architecting across the Boundaries of two Complex Domains - Healthcare & Tech...
PDF
Diabetes mellitus diagnosis method based random forest with bat algorithm
PPTX
20250228 LYD VKU AI Blended-Learning.pptx
PDF
Optimiser vos workloads AI/ML sur Amazon EC2 et AWS Graviton
PDF
The Rise and Fall of 3GPP – Time for a Sabbatical?
PDF
Mobile App Security Testing_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdf
PDF
Blue Purple Modern Animated Computer Science Presentation.pdf.pdf
PDF
KodekX | Application Modernization Development
PDF
cuic standard and advanced reporting.pdf
PPTX
ACSFv1EN-58255 AWS Academy Cloud Security Foundations.pptx
PDF
7 ChatGPT Prompts to Help You Define Your Ideal Customer Profile.pdf
PPTX
Detection-First SIEM: Rule Types, Dashboards, and Threat-Informed Strategy
PDF
Reach Out and Touch Someone: Haptics and Empathic Computing
PDF
Advanced methodologies resolving dimensionality complications for autism neur...
PDF
Peak of Data & AI Encore- AI for Metadata and Smarter Workflows
PPTX
Spectroscopy.pptx food analysis technology
PPTX
sap open course for s4hana steps from ECC to s4
PDF
Encapsulation theory and applications.pdf
PDF
Profit Center Accounting in SAP S/4HANA, S4F28 Col11
PPTX
Cloud computing and distributed systems.
Architecting across the Boundaries of two Complex Domains - Healthcare & Tech...
Diabetes mellitus diagnosis method based random forest with bat algorithm
20250228 LYD VKU AI Blended-Learning.pptx
Optimiser vos workloads AI/ML sur Amazon EC2 et AWS Graviton
The Rise and Fall of 3GPP – Time for a Sabbatical?
Mobile App Security Testing_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdf
Blue Purple Modern Animated Computer Science Presentation.pdf.pdf
KodekX | Application Modernization Development
cuic standard and advanced reporting.pdf
ACSFv1EN-58255 AWS Academy Cloud Security Foundations.pptx
7 ChatGPT Prompts to Help You Define Your Ideal Customer Profile.pdf
Detection-First SIEM: Rule Types, Dashboards, and Threat-Informed Strategy
Reach Out and Touch Someone: Haptics and Empathic Computing
Advanced methodologies resolving dimensionality complications for autism neur...
Peak of Data & AI Encore- AI for Metadata and Smarter Workflows
Spectroscopy.pptx food analysis technology
sap open course for s4hana steps from ECC to s4
Encapsulation theory and applications.pdf
Profit Center Accounting in SAP S/4HANA, S4F28 Col11
Cloud computing and distributed systems.

Truly Secure: The Steps a Security Practitioner Took to Build a Secure Public Cloud

  • 1. Truly Secure: The Steps a Security Practitioner Took to Build a Secure Public Cloud Session #8 Wednesday, November 16, 2011 10:45am John Kinsella Founder, Stratosec
  • 2. Intro BoD, co-founder – Silicon Valley Chapter, CSA Co-chair, CSA Portability and Application Security Founder, Stratosec Secure IaaS Large background in information security and datacenter operations
  • 3. Overview Why Architecture Building Operations
  • 4. Ground rules Focused around IaaS, but ideas good elsewhere No finger-pointing at specific brands
  • 5. Why this talk? Cloud management platforms: Relatively new software From relatively new software teams Frequently relatively immature engineering standards
  • 9. Architecture & Design Software Worries Benefits Pieces
  • 11. What is a Secure Public Cloud? What are people worried about? What are we giving them for their money?
  • 12. Worries “ Standard” issues: Data security Resource availability Bad neighbors
  • 13. Benefits “ Secure clouds” provide “ Standard” cloud benefits, plus… Data security (encryption and integrity) Heightened security posture
  • 14. Required functionality “ Basic” pieces: Highly available infrastructure (HVM+Net+Storage) Security pieces: Encryption Intrusion detection Security monitoring
  • 15. Encryption Several forms to choose from: Database encryption SAN encryption Pass-through device
  • 16. IDS With all these moving parts, you really need multiple layers of IDS: Network IDS Host-based IDS WAF
  • 17. Security Monitoring Centralized log management is a must. As the cloud grows, the amount of data to process will be huge. You need a system with relatively low false-positive rate.
  • 18. Building Practice Trust Test Review Repeat
  • 19. Building a secure cloud Setup hardware – lab first, if possible Select software Trial period Move to production
  • 20. Practice Makes Perfect If you do this right, you will build, tear down, and rebuild this cloud several times as you learn from your (and your vendors) mistakes.
  • 21. Trust Who do you trust to build your secure cloud? Yourself Your staff 3 rd party security/cloud professionals Vendor support staff?
  • 22. Trust From a vendor’s website:
  • 23. Setup Basics Harden Hypervisor OS Consider a automation suite
  • 24. Selecting a Cloud Platform Create a list of possible packages Look for security features in each Legwork – how have the maintainers treated security? Pick one or two to test out Trial period is mandatory .
  • 25. Trial Period Incorrect: Get software Install software Test functionality
  • 26. Trial Period Incorrect: Get software Install software Test functionality Correct: Get software Review software Install while monitoring Understand results of installation Test functionality Test security … Profit
  • 27. Review Software If you’re lucky, your chosen software is either open-source or is at least human-readable. Some things to look at: Installer scripts Startup scripts Default configurations Cronjobs or other automated processes Main application Inter-system connectivity
  • 28. Me? Code review? Basic code review doesn’t require huge expertise Complete, thorough review vs. targeted review Not suggesting using commercial tools (Fortify, Ounce, Veracode) Several quick “ greps ” will disclose much info
  • 29. Review Software Ask: What does this code do to my already hardened system? Are firewalls disabled, or security measures removed? What new software (and potential vulnerabilities) does it install? What exactly is the code doing? Is the application more trusting than it should be? Where was the developer lazy?
  • 30. Review Software Keywords to search for: ipconfig, ifconfig mkdir, rm, chown, chmod, exec service rpm, yum, apt sysconfig, sysctl, reboot mysql, pgsql
  • 31. Code Review email sent to vendor after code review:
  • 32. Monitored Installation The installation environment is yours – control it. Capture a log of the installation process Make sure IDS capture any changes made during installation With your initial security configuration, the initial installation will probably not be successful.
  • 33. Review Gathered Intelligence Review the results of the install Look for errors during installation Some can be fixed by loosening security controls Some must be fixed by vendor
  • 34. Test Functionality Marketing is wonderful. So what does this thing really do for me?
  • 35. Test Security Standard security testing scenario: The app is insecure, question is if you have enough resources to find the weakness. Low-hanging fruit: SQL Injection, XSS, lack of encryption, default values Higher fruit: buffer overflows, non-standard (read: “bad”) encryption, bad resource handling
  • 36. Test Security Network scan – Do a thorough scan, not just looking for known ports. Make sure you know where the application is listening, and what your firewall is allowing. Vulnerability Scanner – applications that leverage open-source packages may come with known vulnerabilities Don’t just perform network-based tests – test from on the box as well. Fuzzing – when you find a particular input that looks like it was developed in-house without common libraries, throw a fuzzer at it.
  • 38. Sound familiar? I’ve basically described a Secure Software Development Lifecycle (Secure SDLC) As your organization grows in size, you’ll want to adopt several standardized processes: Security reviews Test, build, and release processes
  • 40. Operations – Who Do You Trust? How do you keep your new cloud running smoothly? Monitor security and performance Keep systems up-to-date Troubleshoot issues as they arise
  • 41. Operations – Who Do You Trust?
  • 42. Operations – Who Do You Trust?
  • 43. Follow a SSDLC (design, build, test, and run with security in mind) Be confident in your security – have statistics and test results to confirm your state of security. Do not trust vendors Summary
  • 44. Stay in Touch Email – [email_address] Twitter - @johnlkinsella

Editor's Notes

  • #2: TITLE MIS Training Institute Section # - Page XXXXXX XXX ©
  • #5: Ideas for IaaS, but as Phil Wainewright mentioned this week, “every private cloud has a public face” TITLE MIS Training Institute Section # - Page XXXXXX XXX ©
  • #8: Average age of these platforms is less than 2 years of age. TITLE MIS Training Institute Section # - Page XXXXXX XXX ©
  • #14: “ separation” of customers TITLE MIS Training Institute Section # - Page XXXXXX XXX ©
  • #16: Pass-through device like CipherCloud TITLE MIS Training Institute Section # - Page XXXXXX XXX ©
  • #24: What does harden mean? Tighten down your firewalls, only install necessary packages, use SELinux if you’re really brave… TITLE MIS Training Institute Section # - Page XXXXXX XXX ©
  • #37: Fuzzer examples: Peachfuzz, SPIKE, WebFuzzer, Metasploit… TITLE MIS Training Institute Section # - Page XXXXXX XXX ©
  • #44: TITLE MIS Training Institute Section # - Page XXXXXX XXX ©