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Turn up to Learn:
Leadership in High-Hazard Industries
By David Uhl
I
n 2003 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board
(CAIB) released a final report on the causes of the
disastrous loss of the Space Shuttle on February
1 of that year. The commission found a number of me-
chanical fixes, but ultimately concluded that NASA’s
management system “is unsafe to manage the shuttle
system beyond the short term and that the agency does
not have a strong safety culture.” The Board determined
that physical and organizational causes played an
In retrospect, most cata-
strophic industrial disas-
ters are...a perfect storm.
But also in retrospect, so
many of those storms did
not have to happen.
– David Uhl
TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES
© 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 2
equal role in the Columbia accident: “the NASA
organizational culture had as much to do with the
accident as the foam that struck the Orbiter on as-
cent.”
In February 2008, in Port Wentworth, Geor-
gia, 14 people were killed and 42 injured (many
severely burned) when a dust explosion occurred
at the Imperial Sugar Factory, the second-largest
sugar factory in America. The refinery was often
described as antiquated and used decades-old
equipment. The inferno, resulting from unsafe op-
eratingmethods,lastedforsevendays.Firefighters
attributed the fire’s longevity to the use of creosote
(commonly known as fat lighter, due to its volatil-
ity) as a sealant throughout the wooden tongue-
and-groove structure of the facility’s ceiling. The
U. S. Chemical Safety Board report stated that
thecompany’smanagementhadlongknownofthe
hazards associated with combustible sugar at the
plant, had neglected to correct unsafe conditions,
and that the accident was entirely preventable.
OSHA subsequently fined Imperial for more than
200 safety violations in its refineries.
According to the Japanese news source Asahi
Shimbun, a senior official of a sub-contracting
construction company admitted that he instructed
four workers to use lead plates to shield their do-
simeters—required safety equipment that monitors
radio-logical exposure. He wanted the devices to
report lower radiation readings inside the Fuku-
shima No. 1 nuclear power plant in the months
following the March 2011 meltdown disaster. Even
following the disaster, he circumvented safety so
the crew could work longer
without exceeding the an-
nual limit of radiation expo-
sure set by the government.
At first glance, the
questions that come to
mind after reading these
few industrial accident
examples are simply,
“Why in the world would
someone do such a thing? Why would a com-
pany make such poor decisions that affect
the safety and lives of others?” Yet, there are
thousands of such examples throughout histo-
ry and in current times from which to choose.
After almost every major industrial acci-
dent, investigators discover that an overreli-
ance or overconfidence existed in the systems
in place to prevent catastrophic events and
hazardous work environments. In most cata-
strophic events, people would assert on the
day before, that what happens the next day is
not even physically possible. Such themes ap-
pear common to nearly every major accident.
Another common theme found in major acci-
dent investigations is that bad news doesn’t
travel up the chain of command, meaning that
for quite some time people have concerns or
they’ve noticed something but for whatever
reason that news doesn’t reach the executive
level. In fact, often the front-line workers are
well aware of potential calamity, when peo-
ple in leadership roles are not.
Investigations have shown that major in-
dustrial accidents also share this common
thread: a whisper at the top of the house be-
comes a shout at the front line. This means
that concerns about expense control, for
Our technological
powers increase, but
the side effects and
potential hazards
also escalate.
— Alvin Toffler
TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES
© 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 3
example, are interpreted as we can’t spend any
money on preventative maintenance or production
takes precedent over safety.
Since these common factors have shown
up time and again in these investigations, it’s
time that senior leaders recognize their key
role in preventing such events, because in
most cases they are reading the wrong script.
In a high-hazard industry, this confusion of
leadership’s role in safety is also high stakes.
A high-hazard industry is any industry or
venture that operates using specialized pro-
cesses with significant, inherent risks of harm
to people or the environment. Some of the
most prominent such industries that fit that
category are aerospace, nuclear energy, pet-
rochemicals and mining. In retrospect, most
catastrophic industrial disasters are a unique
combination of major systems failures and
human error that come together in a perfect
storm. But also in retrospect, so many of
those storms did not have to happen.
INTENTION VERSUS IMPACT
A specific kind of safety leadership is required
in high-hazard industries and that is that
senior leaders need to
work to ensure that their
systems and processes
are working effectively.
Unfortunately, most
leaders interpret this as
going out and inspecting
the front-line workers.
Because of this propen-
sity on the part of leader-
ship, most people out in
the field don’t experience interactions with
senior leadership as the slightest bit help-
ful. They view these visits as an audit during
which the senior leadership shows up looking
for something wrong: they’re checking, evalu-
ating, and investigating until they can find a
problem. Very probably the reinforcement
history of many leaders includes coming back
with the symbolic shiny medal of “Look what
I found!” This does not say to the performers
that leadership is trying to help or that leader-
ship is concerned about the workforce’s well-
being or safety.
Leaders will never know what is really go-
ing on until they are able to establish trusting
relationships demonstrated through credible
action, rather than simply working on their
own agendas. Did you ever watch the televi-
sion show, Undercover Boss? In each episode
of the program, the head of a large corpora-
tion joins his or her own workforce disguised
as a new-hire or trainee. During a very short
period of time he or she learns much more
about the reality of the company and its em-
ployees out in the field than ever learned from
the comfort of corporate headquarters.
Again there’s a commonality: all of those
senior leaders tend to be flabbergasted by
what folks have to go through, how hard they
Often the front-line
workers are well
aware of poten-
tial calamity, when
people in leadership
roles are not.
TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES
© 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 4
work, and how they are negatively impacted by
systems, policies, and procedures that leader-
ship has put in place. The key factor here is
that theleadermustappearindisguise to ob-
tain critical information that is freely shared
between peers, who in order to get their
jobs done, must often
work around some
company-imposed
policies that are irrel-
evant. Doesn’t having
to be in disguise indi-
cate a lack of trust be-
tween employees and
leadership?
Leadership should
not be in the role of
auditing the perform-
er but rather listening
to the performer, and asking questions such
as, “Are there elements of your job that just
don’t make any sense to you?” But to get a
helpful answer to that question, there’s got
to be some trust that you’re not out trying to
make trouble. Trust must be built, and that
takes time, systematic effort, and consistently
positive consequences.
Management by Walking Around some-
times does more harm than good. This hap-
pens when a leader gets the idea that he/she
should go out and resolve performance prob-
lems. Leave that to local management! Lead-
ership’s role when talking with employees is
not to send a message but to receive one. As
one oilfield worker put it, “I know how to an-
swer their questions. I’ve been in this game
long enough to tell them exactly what they
want to hear. I don’t have to be dishonest; I’ll
just tell them the minimum they need to know
and then they’ll move on. But if somebody is
really interested, I’ll tell them whatever they
need to know all day long.” It’s leadership’s
job to convince employees that they really do
want to know about the reality of the work
from the people who do the work. As Aubrey
Daniels, Founder of ADI, says, “One of the
best ways to build relationships or reinforce
somebody is to let them teach you.”
SMALL STEPS TO BIG CHANGE
Most organizations’ leaders recognize the
value of being more proactive, being in a
preventative mode rather than a reactive
mode, and yet they continue to fall into the
trap of being urgent responders. Russell
Justice, retired Performance Management
guru from Eastman Chemical, explains it
this way: “The performance an organization
is getting today is perfectly in line with the
consequences in place in the environment.”
If your leadership team is chronically in a
firefighting mode, it’s because somehow
they’ve been reinforced for that behav-
ior, and you need to recognize and accept
your contributions to that. While working
with a large plastics plant, we did an anal-
ysis on the rewards of firefighting there.
They soon realized they had just promoted
somebody to corporate who was a great
The fishermen know
that the sea is danger-
ous and the storm terri-
ble, but they have never
found these dangers
sufficient reason for
remaining ashore.
— Vincent Van Gogh
TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES
© 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 5
firefighter only to find out he was also an
arsonist, or fire-starter. His poor plan-
ning generated more fires to fight but he
emerged as the hero when he rushed to put
the fires out.
I encourage leaders to use ADI’s PIC/NIC
Analysis® (an exercise that categorizes con-
sequences as positive/negative, immediate/
future, and certain/uncertain) when they do
root cause analyses. Very often a root cause
analysis following an event targets “individu-
al choice” or “lack of attention to detail” or
other things that make it easy to park the is-
sue in the problem-of-the-performer space.
But when we do a PIC/NIC Analysis®, we tend
to unveil broader systemic issues:
Leaders, think of your role, your job when
out in the field as discovering what’s hap-
pening, what’s really going on and to better
understand the impact of some of your deci-
sions, policies and systems. Don’t try to audit
the individual or check up on compliance. You
shouldn’t be a source of discipline or punish-
ment. If you see something wrong then have a
conversation with the site leader rather than
intervening directly. You really should be a
source of reinforcement while you’re there.
That’s difficult to do and it’s so countercul-
tural to what many leaders have learned.
Leaders must ask questions and listen to
the answers. They must show that issues are
then acted upon, that their own policies and
procedures must continually be evaluated,
and that they learn the true workings of the
organization from the people who are imple-
menting the policies. People usually see lead-
ership presence as an indication that some-
thing is wrong or a glad-handing to meet the
masses. As a leader, you can establish your
presence so that when people see you com-
ing they don’t expect that there’s an issue or
problem, but rather there’s a good chance
that things might be going well. It’s not easy,
but without donning a disguise, it might be
your only chance to truly be a proactive lead-
er. If you truly turn up to learn, you can avert
an accident waiting to happen.
• • • • •
[About the Author]
DAVID UHL
As senior vice president
with more than 20 years
of consulting experience,
David is a seasoned ex-
ecutive coach, change
leader and master fa-
cilitator who is adept
at applying behavioral
science technology to accelerate and
sustain organizational change and per-
formance improvement. Known for his
flexibility and adaptability, David has a
track record of enduring successes work-
ing at every organizational level. When
not supporting his clients, David enjoys
coaching his three children in flag and
tackle football, soccer and lacrosse; and
following his Browns and Longhorns.
[About ADI]
Regardless of your industry or expertise,
one thing remains constant: People power
your business. Since 1978 Aubrey Dan-
iels International (ADI) has been dedicat-
ed to accelerating the business and safety
performance of companies worldwide
by using positive, practical approaches
grounded in the science of behavior and
engineered to ensure long-term sustain-
ability. ADI provides clients with the tools
and methodologies to help move people
toward positive, results-driven accom-
plishments. Our clients accelerate strat-
egy execution while fostering employee
engagement and positive accountability
at all levels of their organization.
CONNECT WITH US
aubreydaniels.com/stay-connected
web: aubreydaniels.com
blog: aubreydanielsblog.com
twitter: twitter.com/aubreydaniels
TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES
© 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 6

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TurnUpToLearn_2016

  • 1. Turn up to Learn: Leadership in High-Hazard Industries By David Uhl I n 2003 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) released a final report on the causes of the disastrous loss of the Space Shuttle on February 1 of that year. The commission found a number of me- chanical fixes, but ultimately concluded that NASA’s management system “is unsafe to manage the shuttle system beyond the short term and that the agency does not have a strong safety culture.” The Board determined that physical and organizational causes played an In retrospect, most cata- strophic industrial disas- ters are...a perfect storm. But also in retrospect, so many of those storms did not have to happen. – David Uhl
  • 2. TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES © 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 2 equal role in the Columbia accident: “the NASA organizational culture had as much to do with the accident as the foam that struck the Orbiter on as- cent.” In February 2008, in Port Wentworth, Geor- gia, 14 people were killed and 42 injured (many severely burned) when a dust explosion occurred at the Imperial Sugar Factory, the second-largest sugar factory in America. The refinery was often described as antiquated and used decades-old equipment. The inferno, resulting from unsafe op- eratingmethods,lastedforsevendays.Firefighters attributed the fire’s longevity to the use of creosote (commonly known as fat lighter, due to its volatil- ity) as a sealant throughout the wooden tongue- and-groove structure of the facility’s ceiling. The U. S. Chemical Safety Board report stated that thecompany’smanagementhadlongknownofthe hazards associated with combustible sugar at the plant, had neglected to correct unsafe conditions, and that the accident was entirely preventable. OSHA subsequently fined Imperial for more than 200 safety violations in its refineries. According to the Japanese news source Asahi Shimbun, a senior official of a sub-contracting construction company admitted that he instructed four workers to use lead plates to shield their do- simeters—required safety equipment that monitors radio-logical exposure. He wanted the devices to report lower radiation readings inside the Fuku- shima No. 1 nuclear power plant in the months following the March 2011 meltdown disaster. Even following the disaster, he circumvented safety so the crew could work longer without exceeding the an- nual limit of radiation expo- sure set by the government. At first glance, the questions that come to mind after reading these few industrial accident examples are simply, “Why in the world would someone do such a thing? Why would a com- pany make such poor decisions that affect the safety and lives of others?” Yet, there are thousands of such examples throughout histo- ry and in current times from which to choose. After almost every major industrial acci- dent, investigators discover that an overreli- ance or overconfidence existed in the systems in place to prevent catastrophic events and hazardous work environments. In most cata- strophic events, people would assert on the day before, that what happens the next day is not even physically possible. Such themes ap- pear common to nearly every major accident. Another common theme found in major acci- dent investigations is that bad news doesn’t travel up the chain of command, meaning that for quite some time people have concerns or they’ve noticed something but for whatever reason that news doesn’t reach the executive level. In fact, often the front-line workers are well aware of potential calamity, when peo- ple in leadership roles are not. Investigations have shown that major in- dustrial accidents also share this common thread: a whisper at the top of the house be- comes a shout at the front line. This means that concerns about expense control, for Our technological powers increase, but the side effects and potential hazards also escalate. — Alvin Toffler
  • 3. TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES © 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 3 example, are interpreted as we can’t spend any money on preventative maintenance or production takes precedent over safety. Since these common factors have shown up time and again in these investigations, it’s time that senior leaders recognize their key role in preventing such events, because in most cases they are reading the wrong script. In a high-hazard industry, this confusion of leadership’s role in safety is also high stakes. A high-hazard industry is any industry or venture that operates using specialized pro- cesses with significant, inherent risks of harm to people or the environment. Some of the most prominent such industries that fit that category are aerospace, nuclear energy, pet- rochemicals and mining. In retrospect, most catastrophic industrial disasters are a unique combination of major systems failures and human error that come together in a perfect storm. But also in retrospect, so many of those storms did not have to happen. INTENTION VERSUS IMPACT A specific kind of safety leadership is required in high-hazard industries and that is that senior leaders need to work to ensure that their systems and processes are working effectively. Unfortunately, most leaders interpret this as going out and inspecting the front-line workers. Because of this propen- sity on the part of leader- ship, most people out in the field don’t experience interactions with senior leadership as the slightest bit help- ful. They view these visits as an audit during which the senior leadership shows up looking for something wrong: they’re checking, evalu- ating, and investigating until they can find a problem. Very probably the reinforcement history of many leaders includes coming back with the symbolic shiny medal of “Look what I found!” This does not say to the performers that leadership is trying to help or that leader- ship is concerned about the workforce’s well- being or safety. Leaders will never know what is really go- ing on until they are able to establish trusting relationships demonstrated through credible action, rather than simply working on their own agendas. Did you ever watch the televi- sion show, Undercover Boss? In each episode of the program, the head of a large corpora- tion joins his or her own workforce disguised as a new-hire or trainee. During a very short period of time he or she learns much more about the reality of the company and its em- ployees out in the field than ever learned from the comfort of corporate headquarters. Again there’s a commonality: all of those senior leaders tend to be flabbergasted by what folks have to go through, how hard they Often the front-line workers are well aware of poten- tial calamity, when people in leadership roles are not.
  • 4. TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES © 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 4 work, and how they are negatively impacted by systems, policies, and procedures that leader- ship has put in place. The key factor here is that theleadermustappearindisguise to ob- tain critical information that is freely shared between peers, who in order to get their jobs done, must often work around some company-imposed policies that are irrel- evant. Doesn’t having to be in disguise indi- cate a lack of trust be- tween employees and leadership? Leadership should not be in the role of auditing the perform- er but rather listening to the performer, and asking questions such as, “Are there elements of your job that just don’t make any sense to you?” But to get a helpful answer to that question, there’s got to be some trust that you’re not out trying to make trouble. Trust must be built, and that takes time, systematic effort, and consistently positive consequences. Management by Walking Around some- times does more harm than good. This hap- pens when a leader gets the idea that he/she should go out and resolve performance prob- lems. Leave that to local management! Lead- ership’s role when talking with employees is not to send a message but to receive one. As one oilfield worker put it, “I know how to an- swer their questions. I’ve been in this game long enough to tell them exactly what they want to hear. I don’t have to be dishonest; I’ll just tell them the minimum they need to know and then they’ll move on. But if somebody is really interested, I’ll tell them whatever they need to know all day long.” It’s leadership’s job to convince employees that they really do want to know about the reality of the work from the people who do the work. As Aubrey Daniels, Founder of ADI, says, “One of the best ways to build relationships or reinforce somebody is to let them teach you.” SMALL STEPS TO BIG CHANGE Most organizations’ leaders recognize the value of being more proactive, being in a preventative mode rather than a reactive mode, and yet they continue to fall into the trap of being urgent responders. Russell Justice, retired Performance Management guru from Eastman Chemical, explains it this way: “The performance an organization is getting today is perfectly in line with the consequences in place in the environment.” If your leadership team is chronically in a firefighting mode, it’s because somehow they’ve been reinforced for that behav- ior, and you need to recognize and accept your contributions to that. While working with a large plastics plant, we did an anal- ysis on the rewards of firefighting there. They soon realized they had just promoted somebody to corporate who was a great The fishermen know that the sea is danger- ous and the storm terri- ble, but they have never found these dangers sufficient reason for remaining ashore. — Vincent Van Gogh
  • 5. TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES © 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 5 firefighter only to find out he was also an arsonist, or fire-starter. His poor plan- ning generated more fires to fight but he emerged as the hero when he rushed to put the fires out. I encourage leaders to use ADI’s PIC/NIC Analysis® (an exercise that categorizes con- sequences as positive/negative, immediate/ future, and certain/uncertain) when they do root cause analyses. Very often a root cause analysis following an event targets “individu- al choice” or “lack of attention to detail” or other things that make it easy to park the is- sue in the problem-of-the-performer space. But when we do a PIC/NIC Analysis®, we tend to unveil broader systemic issues: Leaders, think of your role, your job when out in the field as discovering what’s hap- pening, what’s really going on and to better understand the impact of some of your deci- sions, policies and systems. Don’t try to audit the individual or check up on compliance. You shouldn’t be a source of discipline or punish- ment. If you see something wrong then have a conversation with the site leader rather than intervening directly. You really should be a source of reinforcement while you’re there. That’s difficult to do and it’s so countercul- tural to what many leaders have learned. Leaders must ask questions and listen to the answers. They must show that issues are then acted upon, that their own policies and procedures must continually be evaluated, and that they learn the true workings of the organization from the people who are imple- menting the policies. People usually see lead- ership presence as an indication that some- thing is wrong or a glad-handing to meet the masses. As a leader, you can establish your presence so that when people see you com- ing they don’t expect that there’s an issue or problem, but rather there’s a good chance that things might be going well. It’s not easy, but without donning a disguise, it might be your only chance to truly be a proactive lead- er. If you truly turn up to learn, you can avert an accident waiting to happen. • • • • •
  • 6. [About the Author] DAVID UHL As senior vice president with more than 20 years of consulting experience, David is a seasoned ex- ecutive coach, change leader and master fa- cilitator who is adept at applying behavioral science technology to accelerate and sustain organizational change and per- formance improvement. Known for his flexibility and adaptability, David has a track record of enduring successes work- ing at every organizational level. When not supporting his clients, David enjoys coaching his three children in flag and tackle football, soccer and lacrosse; and following his Browns and Longhorns. [About ADI] Regardless of your industry or expertise, one thing remains constant: People power your business. Since 1978 Aubrey Dan- iels International (ADI) has been dedicat- ed to accelerating the business and safety performance of companies worldwide by using positive, practical approaches grounded in the science of behavior and engineered to ensure long-term sustain- ability. ADI provides clients with the tools and methodologies to help move people toward positive, results-driven accom- plishments. Our clients accelerate strat- egy execution while fostering employee engagement and positive accountability at all levels of their organization. CONNECT WITH US aubreydaniels.com/stay-connected web: aubreydaniels.com blog: aubreydanielsblog.com twitter: twitter.com/aubreydaniels TURN UP TO LEARN: LEADERSHIP IN HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES © 2015 A U B R E Y D A N I E L S I N T E R N AT I O N A L | W W W. A U B R E Y D A N I E L S . C O M | PAGE 6