URANIUM MINING, PROCESSING AND NUCLEAR ENERGY — OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUSTRALIA?

URANIUM MINING, PROCESSING
AND NUCLEAR ENERGY
— OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUSTRALIA?

ii
URANIUM MINING, PROCESSING AND NUCLEAR ENERGY — OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUSTRALIA?
ISBN 0-9803115-0-0 978-0-9803115-0-1
© Commonwealth of Australia 2006
This work is copyright. The Copyright Act 1968 permits fair dealing for study, research, news reporting,
criticism or review. Selected passages, tables or diagrams may be reproduced for such purposes
provided acknowledgment of the source is included. Major extracts or the entire document may not
be reproduced by any process without the written permission of the Secretary, Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet.
The Secretary,
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
3–5 National Circuit
Barton ACT 2600
Commonwealth of Australia 2006, Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy — Opportunities
for Australia?, Report to the Prime Minister by the Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy
Review Taskforce, December 2006.
Design and layout by the Couch.

iii
Table of contents
Table of contents
Summary and looking ahead 1
Chapter 1 Introduction 15
1.1 Context of this review 15
1.2 Conduct of this review 15
1.3 Structure of this report 16
1.4 Australia’s involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle 16
1.5 Introduction to nuclear energy 16
Chapter 2 Uranium mining and exports 21
2.1 Australian uranium mining industry 21
2.2 World uranium demand and supply 26
2.3 Capacity to expand 28
2.4 Other nuclear fuel sources 30
2.5 Conclusion 31
Chapter 3 Conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication 33
3.1 Value-adding in the nuclear fuel cycle 33
3.2 Conversion 34
3.3 Enrichment 36
3.4 Fuel fabrication 41
3.5 Opportunities for Australia 42
3.6 Conclusion 43
Chapter 4 Electricity generation 45
4.1 Australian electricity demand 45
4.2 Electricity supply in Australia, current and future 46
4.3 The role of nuclear power 50
4.4 Economics of nuclear power 52
4.5 Conclusion 58
Chapter 5 Radioactive waste and spent fuel management 59
5.1 Radioactive waste and spent fuel 59
5.2 Reprocessing 69
5.3 Future prospects 70
5.4 Conclusion 71
Chapter 6 Health and safety 73
6.1 Introduction 73
6.2 Health impacts of the nuclear fuel cycle 73
6.3 Acceptable risk? 82
6.4 Health and safety performance 84
6.5 Conclusion 85
Chapter 7 Environmental impacts 87
7.1 Introduction 87
7.2 Climate change 87
7.3 Electricity generation technologies compared 92
7.4 Other environmental impacts 99
7.5 Conclusion 103

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Chapter 8 Non-proliferation and security 105
8.1 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 105
8.2 Other elements of the non-proliferation regime 107
8.3 Challenges to the non-proliferation regime 108
8.4 Expanding the non-proliferation regime 109
8.5 Safeguards 110
8.6 Australia’s uranium export policy 112
8.7 Nuclear security 114
8.8 Conclusion 116
Chapter 9 Regulation 117
9.1 Australia’s international commitments 117
9.2 Australia’s existing regulatory regime 118
9.3 Overseas regulatory experience 122
9.4 Regulatory reform in Australia 125
9.5 Conclusion 126
Chapter 10 Research, development, education and training 127
10.1 International and Australian nuclear research
and development 127
10.2 Education and training 131
10.3 Conclusion 136
Appendix A Terms of reference 137
Appendix B Taskforce members 138
Appendix C Submissions received by the Taskforce 140
Appendix D Consultations 144
Appendix E Site visits 146
Appendix F Chief Scientist’s expert panel 147
Appendix G Electric Power Research Institute — commissioned study 151
Appendix H Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource
Economics (ABARE) — commissioned study 153
Appendix I ISA, The University of Sydney — commissioned study 155
Appendix J Frequently asked questions 160
Appendix K Enrichment 164
Appendix L Nuclear reactor technology 166
Appendix M Biological consequences of radiation 186
Appendix N The Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear reactor
accidents and impacts 196
Appendix O Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions 209
Appendix P Non-proliferation 227
Appendix Q Australia’s nuclear-related international commitments 238
Appendix R Australian R&D, education and training 243
Appendix S Depleted Uranium 254
Acronyms and Abbreviations 255
Glossary 259
References 268

1
Summary and looking ahead
On 6 June 2006, the Prime Minister announced
the appointment of a taskforce to undertake an
objective, scientifi c and comprehensive review
of uranium mining, value-added processing and
the contribution of nuclear energy in Australia
in the longer term. This is known as the Review
of Uranium Mining Processing and Nuclear
Energy in Australia, referred to in this report
as the Review.1
The Prime Minister asked the Review to report
by the end of 2006.2 A draft report was released
for public comment on 21 November 2006 and
was also reviewed by an expert panel chaired by
the Chief Scientist (see Appendix F). The Review
is grateful for comments provided on the draft
report by members of the public. The report has
been modifi ed in the light of those comments.
In response to its initial call for public comment
in August 2006 the Review received over 230
submissions from interested parties. It also
conducted a wide range of consultations with
organisations and individuals in Australia and
overseas, and commissioned specialist studies
on various aspects of the nuclear industry.
Participating in the nuclear fuel cycle is a
diffi cult issue for many Australians and can
elicit strong views. This report is intended
to provide a factual base and an analytical
framework to encourage informed
community discussion.
Australia’s demand for electricity will more
than double before 2050. Over this period,
more than two-thirds of existing electricity
generation will need to be substantially
upgraded or replaced and new capacity
added. The additional capacity will need
to be near-zero greenhouse gas emitting
technology if Australia is just to keep
greenhouse gas emissions at today’s levels.
Many countries confront similar
circumstances and have therefore considered
the use of nuclear power for some of the
following reasons:
the relative cost competitiveness of nuclear
power versus the alternatives
security of supply and independence
from fossil fuel energy imports
diversity of domestic electricity production
and reduction in volatility arising from input
fossil fuel costs; and
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
and subsequent effects on global climate.
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The world’s fi rst civilian nuclear reactor
commenced operation in 1955. According
to the International Energy Agency (IEA),
today there are 443 nuclear reactors operating
in 31 countries, producing 15 per cent of the
world’s electricity.
As a substantial holder of recoverable reserves
(38 per cent of known low cost global reserves)
and producer of uranium (23 per cent of global
production), Australia is well positioned to
increase production and export of uranium
oxide to meet market demand. There is an
opportunity for Australia to be a participant in
the wider nuclear fuel cycle given international
confi dence in the quality of our production
processes, our sophisticated technology
community (although no longer with a
signifi cant presence in the nuclear fuel cycle)
and the strength of our commitment to nuclear
non-proliferation.
Nuclear power has a much lower greenhouse
signature than Australia’s current major energy
sources for electricity; namely brown and black
coal, and gas. Although the priority for Australia
will continue to be to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions from coal and gas, the Review sees
nuclear power as a practical option for part
of Australia’s electricity production.
1 http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/media_Release1965.html
2 http://www.dpmc.gov.au/umpner/reports.cfm

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Key fi ndings of the Review
Consultations revealed support for the
expansion of Australian mining and export
of uranium. Skill shortages, government
policies and legal prohibitions restricting
the growth of the industry would need to
be urgently addressed.
The rationalisation of uranium mining
regulation would ensure a consistent
approach to environmental and radiation
protection, and the maintenance of high
standards throughout the industry.
Downstream steps of uranium conversion,
enrichment and fuel fabrication could add
a further $1.8 billion of value annually if all
Australian uranium was processed
domestically. However, high commercial
and technology barriers could make market
entry diffi cult. Current legal and regulatory
impediments would need to be removed,
but there may be little real opportunity for
Australian companies to extend profi tably
into these areas.
Nuclear power is likely to be between 20
and 50 per cent more costly to produce than
power from a new coal-fi red plant at current
fossil fuel prices in Australia. This gap may
close in the decades ahead, but nuclear
power, and renewable energy sources,
are only likely to become competitive in
Australia in a system where the costs of
greenhouse gas emissions are explicitly
recognised. Even then, private investment
in the fi rst-built nuclear reactors may
require some form of government support
or directive.
The earliest that nuclear electricity could be
delivered to the grid would be 10 years, with
15 years more probable. At the outset, the
establishment of a single national nuclear
regulator supported by an organisation with
skilled staff would be required.
In one scenario, deployment of nuclear
power starting in 2020 could see 25 reactors
producing about a third of the nation’s
electricity by 2050 (a position already
surpassed by France, South Korea,
Sweden, Belgium, Bulgaria and Hungary,
among others).
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Since Three Mile Island in 1979 and
Chernobyl in 1986, the nuclear industry
has developed new reactor designs which
are safer and more effi cient and produce
lower volumes of radioactive waste, and
has standardised its operating procedures.
The future holds the promise of signifi cant
further innovation.
The challenge to contain and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions would be
considerably eased by investment in nuclear
plants. Australia’s greenhouse challenge
requires a full spectrum of initiatives and its
goals cannot be met by nuclear power alone.
The greenhouse gas emission reductions
from nuclear power could reach 8 to
17 per cent of national emissions in 2050.
Many countries have implemented
straightforward solutions for disposal of low-level
radioactive waste. A national repository
involving burial of low-level waste from all
sources including a future nuclear power
industry is logical for Australia.
Disposal of high-level waste including
spent nuclear fuel remains an issue in
most nuclear power countries. There
is a consensus that disposal in appropriately
engineered deep (500–1200 metres
underground) repositories is the answer
and such facilities are under development in
many countries. Australia has areas suitable
for such repositories, which would not be
needed until around 2050 should nuclear
power be introduced.
Countries with successful nuclear power
generation programs have a strong and
transparent regulatory environment.
Australia starts from a robust, albeit
decentralised, framework that would need
to be integrated and consolidated into
a national structure.
While proliferation of nuclear weapons
remains a critical global issue, increased
Australian involvement in the nuclear fuel
cycle would not change the risks; nor would
Australia’s energy grid become more
vulnerable to terrorist attack.
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3
Uranium mining and export
(Chapter 2)
Australia has the capacity to expand
its production and exports of uranium,
and global growth in uranium demand
provides a timely opportunity
for Australia.
Skill shortages and restrictive policies
(regulation, land access and transport)
are the major constraints on industry
expansion in Australia.
Conventional reserves of uranium
worldwide are suffi cient to meet current
demand for 50 to 100 years. There is high
potential for future discoveries.
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Australia has 38 per cent of the world’s low-cost
reserves of uranium with most in a small
number of deposits. Olympic Dam is the largest
deposit in the world and contains approximately
70 per cent of Australia’s known reserves.
Little exploration was undertaken in the 30 years
to 2003 but from 2004 exploration expenditure
has increased dramatically, with dozens of
companies now active. Many prospective areas
in Australia have the potential to yield further
exploitable deposits.
In 2005, Australia’s uranium oxide exports
earned $573 million with a record production
of over 12 000 tonnes. Those exports are enough
to generate more than twice Australia’s current
annual electricity demand. Exports are forecast
to increase strongly both from rising prices and
rising production, reaching over 20 000 tonnes
by 2014–2015.
Australia will increase production over the
medium and longer term by expanding existing
mines. Each of the three operational mines
(Olympic Dam, Ranger and Beverley) can
expand production or extend their lives through
the discovery of further reserves on already
approved mine leases. Many smaller known
deposits could be developed relatively quickly,
but are currently not accessible under state
or territory government policy.
Most analysts predict signifi cantly increased
global demand for uranium due to planned new
nuclear power plants, increased capacities of
existing plants and a reduction in secondary
uranium supplies. Demand from India, Russia
and China will grow and will add to the existing
large demand from the United States, France
and Japan.
Canada and Australia produce more than
50 per cent of the world’s natural uranium
supply, with fi ve other countries accounting
for a further 40 per cent. A number of new mines
and mine expansions can be expected in the
medium term, while increases in uranium
production can be expected from Canada,
Kazakhstan, Namibia, Russia and the United
States. Forecasts show suffi cient capacity
over the medium term (to about 2015), but after
this time there will be greater uncertainty over
both supply and demand. On current forecasts,
demand exceeds existing capacity. Thus, there
is an excellent opportunity for Australia to fi ll
the gap.
Uranium prices are expected to continue to
increase in the short term, refl ecting strong
demand and uncertainties of uranium supply.
The main factors affecting uranium mining in
Australia over the past few decades have been
historically low prices and restrictive (no new
mines) government policies. With a stronger
price outlook, impediments to growth are skills
shortages (particularly radiation safety offi cers
and geologists with uranium experience), the
complexity of the regulatory regime (which
differs for each of the three existing mines),
access to land for exploration and mining
(prohibited by government policies), and
restrictions on uranium transport (caused
primarily by more stringent constraints than
those imposed on other dangerous goods).

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Conversion, enrichment and
fuel fabrication (Chapter 3)
Australia’s exports of uranium oxide
of $573 million in 2005 could be
transformed into a further $1.8 billion
in value after conversion, enrichment
and fuel fabrication. However,
challenges associated with the
required investment levels and
access to enrichment technology
are very signifi cant.
Centrifuge technology will dominate
enrichment in the medium term
as gaseous diffusion is replaced.
SILEX, an Australian developed laser
enrichment technology, offers promise,
but is yet to be commercially proven.
Enrichment technology is used for civil
and weapons purposes. Any proposed
domestic investment would require
Australia to reassure the international
community of its nuclear non-proliferation
objectives.
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Uranium oxide must fi rst be converted into
uranium hexafl uoride (UF6) for enrichment.
The international market for conversion is highly
concentrated, with four companies supplying
more than 80 per cent of the world’s uranium
conversion services. The market has not seen
new investment or real production expansion
and has been characterised by instability on
the supply side since 2000. Conversion capacity
is adequate to meet demand in the near to
medium term. Beyond this, the situation is
more diffi cult to ascertain given the uncertainty
surrounding secondary supply.
Enrichment increases the share of U-235 in
uranium from its naturally occurring 0.7 per cent
to between 3 and 5 per cent. Enrichment is
classed as a nuclear proliferation-sensitive
technology because of its potential to be
used to produce weapons grade material.
As with conversion, the enrichment market
is also very concentrated, structured around
a small number of suppliers in the United
States, Europe and Russia. It is characterised
by high barriers to entry, including limited and
costly access to technology, trade restrictions,
uncertainty around the future of secondary
supply and proliferation concerns.
Centrifuge technology currently dominates
the industry. While there is potential for General
Electric to enter the market with SILEX laser
technology within the next 10 years, this
technology is still being proven. Given the
new investment and expansion plans under
way around the world, the market looks to
be reasonably well balanced in the medium
term. Although capital intensive, the modular
confi guration of centrifuge technology enables
enrichment capacity to be expanded
incrementally to meet increases in demand.
The enriched uranium is fabricated and
assembled into reactor fuel. The fuel fabrication
market is characterised by customisation,
with the specifi cations dependent upon reactor
design and the fuel management strategy of
each power utility. However, there is a trend
worldwide towards standardising around
a small number of designs. Currently, three
main suppliers provide approximately 80 per
cent of the global fuel demand and indications
are that capacity signifi cantly exceeds demand.
The possibility of Australia being involved in
conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication
presents some challenges. The commercial
viability and international competitiveness
of new plant will depend on factors such as
capital investment cost, operating costs, the
ability to access technology on competitive
terms, the state of the international market,
access to the required skill base and regulatory
environment and, in the case of enrichment,
nuclear non-proliferation issues.

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Electricity generation
(Chapter 4)
Electricity demand in Australia is
expected to continue to grow strongly,
more than doubling by 2050.
Nuclear power is an internationally
proven technology that is competitive
with fossil fuel baseload generation
in many parts of the world and
contributes 15 per cent of global
electricity generation.
Cost estimates suggest that in
Australia nuclear power would
on average be 20–50 per cent more
expensive to produce than coal-fi red
power if pollution, including carbon
dioxide emissions, is not priced.
Nuclear power is the least-cost low-emission
technology that can provide
baseload power, is well established,
and can play a role in Australia’s future
generation mix.
Nuclear power can become competitive
with fossil fuel-based generation in
Australia, if based on international
best practice and with the introduction
of low to moderate pricing of carbon
dioxide emissions.
The cost of nuclear power is strongly
infl uenced by investor perceptions
of risk. Risk is highly dependent on
regulatory policy and the certainty of
licensing and construction timeframes.
A stable policy environment and
a predictable licensing and regulatory
regime would be a necessary precursor
to the development of nuclear power
in Australia.
Accumulated funds deducted from
nuclear power revenues are the best
practice method to cover waste disposal
and plant decommissioning costs.
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Australian electricity consumption has
increased more than threefold over the last 30
years and is projected to grow at approximately
2 per cent each year until at least 2030, and to
double before 2050. This will require signifi cant
additional baseload and peak generating
capacity. Projections suggest the need for over
100 GW of capacity by 2050 (compared to the
current Australian installed capacity of 48 GW).
Under current policy settings, the Australian
generating portfolio is expected to remain
dominated by conventional fossil fuel (coal
and gas) technologies. If there is a shift to
low-emission technologies, nuclear power will
compete with other low-emission technologies,
some of which are still in the development
stage. These include advanced fossil fuel
technologies with carbon capture and storage
(geosequestration), geothermal (hot dry rocks)
and a variety of renewable technologies
including wind, hydro, biofuel, solar
photovoltaic and solar thermal. The costs and
timescales for many of these are more uncertain
than for nuclear power and will depend
substantially on greenhouse policies. Non-hydro
renewables will undoubtedly play an important
and growing role in those parts of the overall
generation portfolio where they are best suited.
In many countries, nuclear power is already
competitive with other baseload technologies,
although it is not cost competitive with
Australia’s very low cost generation from
abundant coal reserves. Nevertheless, costs are
close enough to indicate that nuclear power will
be competitive in carbon constrained electricity
supply scenarios. Cost additions to fossil fuel-based
generation in the (low to moderate) range
of $15–40 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent
(CO2-e) would make nuclear electricity
competitive in Australia.

6
Radioactive waste and spent
fuel management (Chapter 5)
Safe disposal of low-level and short-lived
intermediate-level waste has been
demonstrated at many sites throughout
the world.
There is a high standard of uranium
mining waste management at
Australia’s current mines. Greater
certainty in the long-term planning
at Olympic Dam is desirable,
coupled with guaranteed fi nancial
arrangements to cover site
rehabilitation.
Safe disposal of long-lived
intermediate and high-level waste
can be accomplished with existing
technology. The fi rst European
repository is expected to commence
operating around 2020.
Reprocessing of spent fuel in Australia
seems unlikely to be commercially
attractive, unless the value of recovered
nuclear fuel increases signifi cantly.
Australia has a number of geologically
suitable areas for deep disposal of
radioactive waste.
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Radioactive wastes arise from a wide range
of uses for radioactive materials as well as from
nuclear power generation. They are broadly
classifi ed as low, intermediate and high-level
wastes, according to the degree of containment
and isolation required to ensure human and
environmental safety.
Conventional hard rock uranium mining
operations generate signifi cant volumes of
low-level waste tailings (solid residues from
ore processing), which require particular
attention in planning the operation and
closure of uranium mines.
The strict Australian regulatory regime
requires mines to be planned and developed
with a view to eventual rehabilitation. This
demands very high standards of tailings
management. This low-level waste problem
is signifi cantly reduced, and indeed virtually
eliminated, with in-situ leaching technology
where the host rock is barely disturbed.
Australia produces small amounts of low and
intermediate-level waste from medical research
and industrial uses of radioactive materials.
Much of this waste arises from the production
of medical radioisotopes by the research
reactor of the Australian Nuclear Science
and Technology Organisation (ANSTO)
at Lucas Heights. ANSTO waste will be
managed at the Commonwealth Radioactive
Waste Management Facility, to be established
in the Northern Territory.
While safe management of all categories
of radioactive waste has been demonstrated
for decades, no country has yet implemented
permanent underground disposal of high-level
radioactive waste. The broad consensus of
scientifi c and technical opinion is that high-level
waste can be safely and permanently
disposed of in deep geological repositories.
Several countries are now proceeding with
well-developed and thoroughly researched
plans for deep geological disposal of high-level
radioactive waste.
Should Australia move to nuclear power
generation, provision would be needed for
management of high-level radioactive waste,
including eventual disposal. In line with
best overseas practice, radioactive waste
management and reactor decommissioning
costs would need to be included (ie internalised)
in the price of nuclear electricity. Cost estimates
for nuclear power in the Review are made on
this basis.

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Health and safety (Chapter 6)
Ionising radiation and its health
impacts are well understood and
there are well established international
safety standards that are refl ected
in Australian practice.
An effi cient, effective and transparent
regulatory regime achieves good health
and safety outcomes, and provides
assurance to the public that facilities
are being properly managed.
The nuclear and uranium mining
industries have achieved good
performance under these stringent
physical and regulatory controls.
Nuclear power has fewer health and
safety impacts than current technology
fossil fuel-based generation and hydro
power, but no technology is risk free.
There are legacy problems associated
with the nuclear industry. The most
signifi cant are the impacts of the
Chernobyl accident. However, the
Chernobyl reactor is not representative
of modern reactor designs.
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All human activities, even domestic living,
working and travelling, involve risks to health
and safety. The whole life cycle of any activity
must, therefore, be examined to assess its
overall impacts. Any technology choice must
inevitably require balancing of the full life
cycle costs and the benefi ts of competing
alternatives. The health and safety costs of
uranium mining and nuclear fuel use, including
waste disposal, are signifi cantly lower, on a unit
of energy produced basis, than current fossil
fuel-based energy generation when coal
mining, preparation and eventual waste
disposal are considered.
There are radiation health legacies from the
Chernobyl disaster and for some uranium
miners who worked underground prior to the
1960s. These will require careful monitoring.
As a result of modern operating methods and
safety requirements, current uranium mines
and the new generation of nuclear power plants
pose signifi cantly lower levels of risk.
The health and safety performance of nuclear
power facilities has improved signifi cantly
over time, and is expected to improve even
further with new generation reactors. The
current good performance of the nuclear and
uranium mining industry is associated with
its stringent physical and regulatory control.
An effi cient, effective and transparent regulatory
regime achieves the desired health and safety
outcomes and provides assurance to the public
that facilities are properly managed.
There is every reason to be confi dent that
Australia’s health and safety systems will
continue to provide a sound framework for the
management of the uranium mining industry
and would enable any other parts of the nuclear
fuel cycle envisaged for Australia to be equally
well regulated, ensuring the highest levels of
health and safety.

8
Environmental impacts
(Chapter 7)
Deep cuts in global greenhouse
gas emissions are required to avoid
dangerous climate change. No single
technology can achieve this — a
portfolio of actions and low-emission
technologies is needed.
Nuclear power is a low-emission
technology. Life cycle greenhouse gas
emissions from nuclear power are more
than ten times lower than emissions
from fossil fuels and are similar to
emissions from many renewables.
Nuclear power has low life cycle
impacts against many environmental
measures. Water use can be signifi cant
in uranium mining and electricity
generation depending on the
technology used.
The cost of reducing emissions from
electricity generation can be minimised
by using market-based measures to
treat all generation technologies
on an equal footing.
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Greenhouse gas emissions, especially carbon
dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel combustion, are
changing the make-up of the atmosphere and
contributing to changing climatic conditions
around the world. About 40 per cent of global
CO2 emissions arise from electricity generation.
As a result, there is renewed worldwide interest
in nuclear power and other low-emission
generation technologies.
The Review assesses the environmental impacts
of nuclear power on a whole-of-life cycle basis,
from uranium mining to fi nal waste disposal
and reactor decommissioning, and compares
the environmental performance of nuclear
with other electricity generation technologies.
Nuclear power plants, unlike fossil fuel plants,
do not directly generate greenhouse gas
emissions. Nevertheless, some greenhouse gas
emissions are generated through mining and
processing of the fuel, construction of the plant,
waste management and decommissioning
activities. On a life cycle basis, greenhouse
gas emissions from nuclear power are roughly
comparable to renewable technologies, and
more than an order of magnitude lower than
conventional fossil fuel technologies. Other
environmental impacts of the nuclear fuel
cycle, including air pollution emissions, land
use and water use are either comparable
to or signifi cantly lower than conventional
fossil fuels.
Australia has a broad range of technology
options to cut greenhouse gas emissions from
electricity generation. No single technology,
nuclear or any other, is likely to be able to meet
projected demand and achieve the necessary
cuts. Nevertheless, nuclear power could
contribute signifi cantly to the overall task.
Non-proliferation and security
(Chapter 8)
Export of Australian uranium takes
place within the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
Australia has the most stringent
requirements for the supply of uranium,
including the requirement for an
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Additional Protocol, which
strengthens the safeguards regime.
An increase in the volume of Australian
uranium exports would not increase the
risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Actual cases of proliferation have
involved illegal supply networks,
secret nuclear facilities and undeclared
materials, not the diversion of declared
materials from safeguarded facilities
such as nuclear power plants.
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The security threat posed by the proliferation
of nuclear weapons has led to the establishment
of the multifaceted and evolving international
nuclear non-proliferation regime, which
comprises a network of treaties, institutions
and the safeguards inspection regime.
The cornerstone of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime is the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
supported by IAEA safeguards inspections.
Australia’s uranium export/safeguards policy
complements the international regime.

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Australia’s uranium supply policy reinforces
the international non-proliferation regime
and verifi es that Australian obligated nuclear
material does not contribute to nuclear weapons
programs. The requirement that non-nuclear
weapons states receiving Australian uranium
have in place an Additional Protocol
strengthens the non-proliferation regime
by ensuring that the IAEA has broad access
and inspection rights in the recipient country.
Increasing Australian uranium exports in line
with Australia’s uranium supply requirements
would not increase the risk of proliferation
of nuclear weapons. The amount of uranium
required for a nuclear weapon is relatively small
and, since uranium is ubiquitous in the earth’s
crust, any country that wished to develop
a weapon need not rely on diverting uranium
imported for or used in power generation.
The greatest proliferation risk arises from
undeclared centrifuge enrichment plants
capable of producing highly enriched
uranium for use in weapons.
Regulation (Chapter 9)
An effi cient and transparent regulatory
regime achieves good health, safety,
security and environmental protection
outcomes for uranium mining,
transportation, radioactive waste
management, and exports and imports.
Regulation of uranium mining needs
to be rationalised.
A single national regulator for radiation
safety, nuclear safety, security
safeguards, and related impacts on
the environment would be desirable
to cover all nuclear fuel cycle activities.
Legislative prohibitions on enrichment,
fuel fabrication, reprocessing and
nuclear power plants would need to be
removed before any of these activities
can occur in Australia.
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The establishment of nuclear fuel cycle
facilities — specifi cally enrichment plants,
fuel fabrication plants, power plants and
reprocessing facilities — is prohibited under
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) and the
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear
Safety Act 1998 (ARPANS Act). Before Australia
could consider establishing businesses in
uranium conversion, enrichment, fabrication
or nuclear power plants these prohibitions
would need to be repealed.
There would also need to be a signifi cant
investment in an appropriate Australian
regulatory system to oversee the establishment
of nuclear fuel cycle activities other than
mining. The IAEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency
(NEA), and countries which have existing
regulatory systems could provide valuable
guidance in this area.
Once the legal and administrative framework
was established, the regulator would need to
recruit highly skilled professionals. As Australia
has limited experience in some parts of the fuel
cycle, additional personnel would need to be
trained or recruited from overseas to ensure
that the regulator is up to date with international
best practice.
Australia currently has several Commonwealth
regulatory entities as well as state and territory
authorities. Safeguards and security are
regulated by the Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Offi ce (ASNO) while health
and safety is regulated by state and territory
radiation protection authorities or, in the case
of Commonwealth entities, by the Australian
Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
(ARPANSA). Some of these regulatory functions
could be consolidated.
While the existing regulation of uranium mining,
transportation, radioactive waste disposal and
nuclear research facilities in Australia is of a
high standard, signifi cant overlaps in regulatory
responsibility exist, and reform to streamline
existing arrangements would improve
regulatory effi ciency and transparency.
For Australia to expand its role in the
nuclear power industry it is essential that an
appropriate and rigorous regulatory framework
is established at an early stage. Adequate
provision would need to be made for its
implementation.

10
Research, development,
education and training
(Chapter 10)
Given the minimal Australian
investment in nuclear energy related
education or research and development
(R&D) over the last 20 years, public
spending will need to increase if
Australia is to extend its activities
beyond the uranium mining sector.
Signifi cant additional skilled human
resources will be required if Australia
is to increase its participation in the
nuclear fuel cycle.
In addition to expanding our own R&D
and education and training efforts,
Australia could leverage its nuclear
research and training expertise through
increased international collaboration.
•
•
•
Public funding for nuclear energy related
research and development in Australia has
been very low over the last decade. Nuclear
engineering and nuclear physics skills have
seriously declined and limited skills in
radiochemistry now exist in this country.
However, ANSTO remains as a national
centre of excellence with an important
research program and many relevant skills.
Its international connections along with others
will need to be exploited and expanded if
Australia wishes to be an able, well-educated
and well-informed nuclear industry participant.
Given the relatively long lead times to develop
an Australian nuclear industry, our own national
training and educational resources could be
mobilised to provide the next generation of
nuclear engineers and technologists in a timely
fashion. In doing so, Australia could take
advantage of existing opportunities for
international collaboration on nuclear education
and training. The attraction of interesting, well-paid
jobs would encourage universities to create
suitable courses and students to enrol in those
courses. Increased support for nuclear R&D
would undoubtedly also stimulate student
enrolments in nuclear energy-related courses.
Looking ahead
Nuclear power has been an important part of
the energy supply of 17 out of 24 high income
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries over the past
30 years, and represents approximately
22 per cent of OECD electricity generation.
Australia is ranked fourth lowest for cost
of electricity generation in the OECD, based
on its extensive gas and black and brown coal
resources. As a result, Australia is one of the
few OECD countries that has not used nuclear
electricity as part of its energy mix.
Along with the rest of the world, Australia faces
important challenges in climate change. Cutting
global greenhouse emissions will be a major
national priority. Some of the biggest decisions
for Australia will come in relation to the energy
sector and electricity generation, although other
sectors will need to make similar contributions.
Figure S1 illustrates the challenge for the
electricity sector. Just to constrain emissions
in 2050 to current levels will require a large
share of Australia’s electricity to come from
zero or low-emission sources. A key question for
Australia will be how much of the low-emission
electricity will be nuclear power.
For Australia, priority will need to be given to
applying the technologies that enable clean and
effi cient use of our large coal and gas resources
(ie without emitting large volumes of
greenhouse gases).
However, with electricity demand projected to
grow, it is clear that Australia will need to add
considerably to current electricity generation
capacity, as well as to replace the existing
capital stock as it reaches retirement. It is also
clear that Australia will continue to rely on an
array of electricity generating technologies. This
mix of technologies will need to be capable of
delivering fl exible and reliable power, including
large-scale baseload, on a competitive basis and
with a much lower greenhouse gas signature.

11
Figure S1 Electricity generation and greenhouse emissions — a scenario to 2050
Hydro (16)
Brown Coal (50)
Waste (11)
Land use (35)
Agriculture (97)
Industrial (32)
Primary energy
supply (104)
Transport (80)
234 TWh
Mt = megatonnes; CO2-e = carbon dioxide equivalent; TWh = terawatt hours
2030
Figure S2 Range of timetables for nuclear build in Australia
Planning
approvals
Vendor
selection
Accelerated 10 years
Average 15 years
Slow 20 years
554 TWh
Reactor
operations
Reactor
construction
Community support
and national
strategy regarding
nuclear power
Creation of
regulatory
framework
Greenhouse
gas emissions 2003
(550 Mt CO2-e)
Electricity
generation
2003 (TWh)
Electricity
generation
2050 (TWh)
2003 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Gas (34)
Zero emissions
and energy
efficiency
Hydro
Gas
Black Coal (128) Coal
Electricity
generation (190)
Electricity demand
Notional emissions
profile
190 Mt CO2-e 190 Mt CO2-e
While established renewable technologies (such
as hydro and wind) will continue to contribute,
it is expected that other energy technologies
will be required. Some of these technologies
are promising, but are still in the development
phase and have not been proven under
commercial conditions.
Australia faces a social decision about whether
nuclear, which has operated commercially in
other parts of the world, would need to be part
of the mix. The steps for establishing nuclear
power in Australia are refl ected in timelines
shown in Figure S2. All up, the period for
planning, building and commissioning the fi rst
nuclear power plant, including establishing the
associated regulatory process, is somewhere
between 10 and 20 years. On an accelerated
path, the earliest that nuclear electricity could
be delivered to the grid is around 2016.

12
Figure S3 Potential emission cuts from nuclear build — illustrative scenario to 2050
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
30
25
20
15
10
5
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
900
800
700
600
500
400
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Business
as usual
Emissions (Mt CO2-e) Nuclear capacity (GW)
Share of total electricity production
0
0
Capacity
% share
Nuclear displaces
25GW coal
1990 emissions
Under a scenario in which the fi rst reactor
comes on line in 2020 and Australia has in place
a fl eet of 25 reactors by 2050, it is clear that
nuclear power could enhance Australia’s ability
to meet its electricity needs from low-emission
sources. By 2050 nuclear power could be
delivering about one third of Australia’s
electricity needs and, if it displaces
conventional coal-fi red generation, be reducing
Australia’s total emissions by approximately
17 per cent relative to business as usual.
This represents a saving of roughly one-half
of the projected emissions from electricity
generation (see Figure S3).

13
Community acceptance would be the fi rst
requirement for nuclear power to operate
successfully in Australia. This would require
informed discussion of the issues involved,
including the potential costs and benefi ts of
nuclear power. Important aspects to explain
would be the full cost basis for nuclear power,
including a suitable mechanism to set aside
funds progressively over the life of the operation
of a power station, in order to make provision
for decommissioning and waste management
and disposal.
To address climate change there needs to be
a level playing fi eld for all energy generating
technologies to compete on a comparable
whole-of-life basis. In a world of global
greenhouse gas constraints, emissions pricing
using market-based measures would provide
the appropriate framework for the market and
investors to establish the optimal portfolio
of energy producing platforms.
Most studies suggest that the current cost
gap between conventional fossil fuel electricity
generation and nuclear generation would be
closed at modest levels of carbon prices.
Essentially this would enable nuclear electricity
to compete on its commercial and
environmental merits.
Legislation would be necessary to establish
a reliable and effi cient regulatory framework to
oversee nuclear fuel cycle activities and nuclear
electricity generation in Australia. This would
include a national regulatory agency to approve
the construction and monitor the operations of
nuclear power facilities, and to provide public
assurance on health, safety and environment
matters. The agency could also monitor and
verify compliance with Australia’s nuclear
non-proliferation safeguards. Based on overseas
experience, the agency would need a staff
of several hundred.
There is a plethora of overlapping
Commonwealth and state regulations
covering uranium mine safety and environment
conditions. Consideration could also be
given to establishing a single national body
to regulate the safety and environmental
performance of mining operations. This
body could be modelled on arrangements
for the National Offshore Petroleum Safety
Authority (NOPSA).
An effi cient and predictable regulatory process
is an essential prerequisite for a nuclear power
industry. With its high capital costs, nuclear
power is very sensitive to delays and uncertainty
in obtaining approvals. The United Kingdom
government has recognised this and has
proposed a streamlined approach to attract
investment into nuclear electricity. Similarly,
in the United States a streamlined regulatory
procedure has been introduced and an incentive
package (limited to the fi rst six new nuclear
power plants) has been offered to stimulate
construction.
If Australia is to extend its nuclear energy
activities beyond uranium mining, there
would need to be a substantial addition to
the education and research skills base. In the
short term, most nuclear-specifi c skills could be
acquired on the international market although
there is expected to be strong competition for
qualifi ed people. International collaboration
and sharing of resources would help to
establish a nuclear electricity industry.
The expected development of Australia’s
national electricity network will reduce the
business risk associated with investing in
large generating assets such as nuclear power
stations. The Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) study commissioned by the Review
indicated that the fi rst plants built in Australia
could expect to have a higher cost than similar
plants built in an established market like the
United States. This is because Australia has no
physical or regulatory infrastructure for nuclear
power. While carbon pricing could make nuclear
power cost competitive on average, the fi rst
plants may need additional measures to kick-start
the industry.
Nuclear power today is a mature, safe, and
clean means of generating baseload electricity.
Nuclear power is an option that Australia would
need to consider seriously among the range
of practical options to meet its growing energy
demand and to reduce its greenhouse
gas signature.

14

15
1. Introduction
1.1 Context of this review
Australia’s electricity demand is expected to
continue to grow at an average rate of 2 per cent
per year from 2005,[1] more than doubling by
2050. According to the International Energy
Agency (IEA), Australia is ranked fourth lowest
cost for electricity production among OECD
countries due to abundant high-quality coal
reserves. Extensive reserves of coal, gas and
uranium also make Australia a net energy
exporter. However the consumption of fossil
fuels (including coal, oil and gas) contributes
more than 60 per cent of Australia’s greenhouse
gas (primarily CO2) emissions. There is a
scientifi c consensus that greenhouse gas
emissions are causing the world’s climate
to change signifi cantly faster than previously
expected.[2]
The 2004 white paper, Securing Australia’s
Energy Future, set out three priorities —
prosperity, security and sustainability —
recommending policies that aim to:
attract investment in the effi cient discovery
and development of our energy resources
for the benefi t of all Australians
deliver a prosperous economy while
protecting the environment and playing
an active role in global efforts to reduce
greenhouse emissions
encourage development of cleaner, more
effi cient technologies to underpin Australia’s
energy future
develop effective and effi cient energy
markets that deliver competitively priced
energy, where and when it is needed
into the future
minimise disruptions to energy supplies
and respond quickly and effectively when
disruptions occur
establish an effi cient energy tax base,
restricting fuel excise to end-use
and applying resource rent taxes
to offshore projects
ensure Australia uses energy wisely.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Moreover, the IEA World Energy Outlook 2006[3]
described the global energy market in the
following terms:
‘Current trends in energy consumption
are neither secure nor sustainable —
economically, environmentally or socially.
Inexorably rising consumption of fossil
fuels and related greenhouse-gas emissions
threaten our energy security and risk
changing the global climate irreversibly.
Energy poverty threatens to hold back the
economic and social development of more
than two billion people in the developing
world.’ (page 49)
It is in this context that the Prime Minister
established the Taskforce to conduct the Review
of Uranium Mining Processing and Nuclear
Energy in Australia (the Review). The terms
of reference are shown in Appendix A. Overall,
the purpose of the Review is to help stimulate
and contribute to a wide ranging and
constructive public debate on Australia’s
future energy needs.
1.2 Conduct of this review
The Taskforce members were announced by
the Prime Minister on 6–7 June and 28 August
2006 as follows: Dr Ziggy Switkowski (Chair),
Prof George Dracoulis, Dr Arthur Johnston,
Prof Peter Johnston, Prof Warwick McKibbin
and Mr Martin Thomas. Brief biographical
details of the taskforce members can be found
in Appendix B.
The Review received more than 230 submissions
from individuals and organisations (Appendix C).
These have been carefully considered and used
in formulating the views set out in this report.
In addition, the Review conducted numerous
consultations with individuals and organisations
(Appendix D) and visited a number of sites
in Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Japan,
South Korea, Ukraine, the United Kingdom
and the United States (Appendix E). Three
expert studies were commissioned to assist
with the Review (Appendixes G, H and I). There
are also a number of technical appendixes
discussing various aspects of the subject matter
of this report in more detail (Appendixes K–S).
Chapter 1. Introduction

16
1.3 Structure of this report
The structure of this report and the chapter
in which each of the terms of reference is
discussed is outlined in Table 1.1. Chapters
2 to 5 deal with the nuclear fuel cycle as
described in Section 1.5 below. The remaining
chapters address important issues of public
interest including health, safety and a
discussion of nuclear radiation (Chapter 6),
environmental impacts including greenhouse
gas emissions (Chapter 7), and aspects of
security including the prevention of proliferation
of nuclear weapons (Chapter 8). Infrastructure
matters are discussed in the fi nal chapters —
the regulatory regime governing the conduct
of uranium mining and nuclear activities
in Australia and internationally (Chapter 9)
and a discussion of research, development,
education and training issues relevant to the
industry (Chapter 10).
1.4 Australia’s involvement
in the nuclear fuel cycle
The nuclear fuel cycle is the term used to
describe the way in which uranium moves
from existing as a mineral in the earth,
through to use as nuclear reactor fuel
and fi nal permanent disposal.
Box 1.1 lists Australia’s involvement in the
nuclear fuel cycle, ranging from uranium mining
and milling to the operation of world-class
research facilities.[4]
1.5 Introduction to
nuclear energy
Nuclear technology has a wide range of
peaceful and commercially important uses,
including health and medical, environmental
and industrial, as well as electricity generation.
Current nuclear activities in Australia include
uranium mining, health and medical, industrial
and scientifi c research.
This Review examines the potential for Australia
to use nuclear energy for electricity generation.
It takes into account both economic and social
issues raised by nuclear energy, including
safety, the environment, weapons proliferation
and spent fuel issues. The Review also
acknowledges opportunities to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, particularly
carbon dioxide.
Nuclear power uses a controlled fi ssion
reaction to generate heat. In nuclear power
reactors the heat produces steam that drives
conventional turbines and generates electricity.
Except for the processes used to generate the
steam, nuclear power plants are similar to
conventional coal-fi red generation plants.
Fission occurs when an atom of fi ssile material
(in this case a specifi c isotope of uranium called
U-235) is hit by a ‘slow’ neutron and divides into
two smaller nuclei, liberating energy and more
neutrons. If these neutrons are then absorbed
by other uranium nuclei, a chain reaction
begins. In a nuclear reactor the reaction process
is precisely controlled with materials called
moderators that slow and absorb neutrons in
the reactor core. A controlled chain reaction
takes place when approximately 40 per cent
of the neutrons produced go on to cause
subsequent reactions.
Figure 1.1 shows the steps of the nuclear fuel
cycle. Following mining and milling, in the
nuclear fuel cycle, uranium goes through
production steps of chemical conversion,
isotopic enrichment and fuel fabrication.
The steps of the cycle are described in
more detail below.
1.5.1 Mining and milling
Uranium is a naturally occurring radioactive
element and radioactivity is a normal part
of the natural environment. Uranium ore is
usually mined using open-cut or underground
techniques, depending on the location
of reserves.
The mineralised rock is ground and leached
to dissolve the uranium. That solution is further
treated to precipitate uranium compounds
which are ultimately dried and calcined to
form uranium ore concentrate, conventionally
referred to as U3O8. Approximately 200 tonnes
of concentrate is required annually to produce
the fuel for a 1000 MWe reactor (1 MWe is one
million watts of electrical power).[5]
An alternative to conventional mining is in-situ
leaching, where uranium is brought to the
surface in solution by pumping liquid through
the ore body.
A more detailed discussion of uranium mining
is provided in Chapter 2, which examines the
existing resource base and mining capacity,
global demand and the scope to expand mining
in Australia.

17
1. Introduction
Table 1.1 Report structure
Chapter Term of reference Issue
1 – Introduction.
2 1a The capacity for Australia to increase uranium mining and exports in response
to growing global demand.
3 1b The potential for establishing other steps in the nuclear fuel cycle in Australia.
4 1c The extent and circumstances in which nuclear energy could be economically
competitive with other existing electricity generation technologies in the long
term in Australia, and implications for the national electricity market.
5, 6, 8,10 3a The potential of ‘next generation’ nuclear energy technologies to satisfy safety,
waste and proliferation concerns.
5 3b Waste processing and storage issues associated with nuclear activities and
current global best practice.
6 3d Health and safety implications relating to nuclear energy.
7 2a The extent to which nuclear energy may make a contribution to the reduction
of global greenhouse gas emissions.
7 2b The extent to which nuclear energy could contribute to the mix of emerging
energy technologies in Australia.
7 – Other environmental impacts of the nuclear fuel cycle.
8 3c Security implications relating to nuclear energy.
9 – The existing Australian regulatory regime and international regulatory frameworks.
10 1d The current state of nuclear energy research and development, and potential
contributions to international nuclear science in Australia.
Box 1.1 Australia’s involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle
1894 Uranium is discovered in Australia.
1944–1964 The UK government asks Australia to help fi nd uranium for defence requirements. Australian
Government incentives for the discovery and mining of uranium are announced. Some 400 deposits
found in the Mt Isa–Cloncurry region in Queensland and the Katherine–Darwin region of the Northern
Territory. Mining begins in the Rum Jungle area, followed by Radium Hill, Mary Kathleen and others.
Australia exports approximately 7300 tonnes of uranium ore over this period.
1953 The Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) is established, with Lucas Heights selected
as the site for research facilities.
1958 The high-fl ux research reactor (HIFAR) is commissioned at Lucas Heights.
1967 Policy for controlling exports of uranium is announced.
1969–1971 A nuclear power plant is proposed at Jervis Bay; plans are abandoned in 1971.
1973 Australia ratifi es the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
1974 Commercial exports begin. The Australian Safeguards Offi ce is established, which later becomes
the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Offi ce (ASNO).
1977 The Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry (Fox Inquiry) makes its report and the Australian
Government decides to proceed with uranium mining in the Alligator Rivers Region.
1978 The Offi ce of the Supervising Scientist is established.
1983 An Australian Science and Technology Council inquiry reports on the nuclear fuel cycle
(Australia’s Role in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle) and the Australian Government limits uranium
mining to three existing sites.
1987 The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) is established.
1996 The Australian Government removes restrictions on the number of mines.
1998 The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) is established.
2006 A replacement research reactor, the Open Pool Australian Light water reactor (OPAL)
is commissioned at Lucas Heights.

18
1.5.2 Conversion
In order for uranium to be enriched, the U3O8
must be purifi ed and chemically converted to
uranium hexafl uoride (UF6) gas. This process
uses standard industrial chemical steps, some
of which use hazardous gases, and the
application of moderate heat.
1.5.3 Enrichment
Most nuclear power plants require fi ssile
material that is more concentrated than the
level present in natural uranium, in order to
sustain a reaction. Natural uranium contains
approximately 0.7 per cent of the fi ssile U-235
isotope, the balance being non-fi ssile U-238.
Enrichment increases this proportion to
3–5 per cent, producing low-enriched
uranium (LEU).
Established commercial processes for
enrichment include gas centrifuge, the current
method of choice, and gaseous diffusion, which
is very energy intensive and is being phased
out. New technologies under development
include laser activated isotope separation.
Figure 1.1 Schematic of the nuclear fuel cycle
1.5.4 Fabrication
Enriched uranium in the form of UF6 is
transferred to a fuel fabrication plant where
it is transformed to another oxide of uranium,
UO2. UO2 is a black powder that is compressed
into small pellets, which are sintered (baked)
and then ground to a precise shape and loaded
into thin zirconium alloy or steel tubes
(cladding) to create fuel rods. These rods are
then bundled into fuel assemblies for insertion
into the reactor.
A more detailed discussion of uranium
conversion, enrichment and fabrication
is provided in Chapter 3. Other sections
of the nuclear fuel cycle are discussed below.
1.5.5 Fuel cycles
Most current reactors use an ‘open fuel cycle’
also known as ‘once through’ cycle. Fuel is used
in the reactor to generate power, then removed
from the reactor during periodic refuelling. As
spent fuel is highly radioactive and self-heating,
it is stored in dedicated water ponds for some
Conversion
Milling
Enrichment
Fuel fabrication
Power Plant
Reprocessing
High-level waste
Electricity
Spent fuel storage
For natural uranium fuels
Recycle
Mining

19
1. Introduction
years to allow the radioactivity to decline and
the material to cool suffi ciently for long-term
storage. After a period of three years or more,
the spent fuel assemblies may be moved to ‘dry
storage’ to await fi nal deep geological disposal.
The reactor core for a 1000 MWe plant requires
approximately 75 tonnes of low-enriched
uranium at any one time. Approximately 25
tonnes of fuel is replaced each year, although
fuel cycles have been getting longer and are
approaching 24 months. Approximately 1 tonne
(the U-235 component) of nuclear fuel is
consumed during the cycle, with 95 per cent
of the remaining spent fuel being U-238 and a
small proportion of U-235 that does not fi ssion.
In a ‘closed fuel cycle’, nuclear fuel is supplied
in the same way as in an open fuel cycle, but
when the fuel rods are removed from the reactor
they are reprocessed. This step involves
separating the radioactive spent fuel into two
components — uranium and plutonium for
re-use and waste fi ssion products. This process
leaves approximately 3 per cent of the fuel as
high-level waste, which is then permanently
immobilised in a stable matrix (eg borosilicate
glass or Synroc) making it safer for long-term
storage or disposal. Reprocessing spent fuel
signifi cantly reduces the volume of waste
(compared to treating all used fuel as waste).
Fast breeder reactors have been under
development since the 1960s. These reactors
have the potential to derive nearly all of the
energy value of the uranium mined. Overall,
approximately 60 times more energy can be
extracted from uranium by the fast breeder
cycle than from an open cycle.[6] This extremely
high energy effi ciency makes breeder reactors
an attractive energy conversion system. The
development of fast breeder reactors has been a
low priority due to high costs and an abundance
of uranium, so they are unlikely to be
commercially viable for several decades.[6]
1.5.6 Nuclear power plants
Nuclear power plants are used to harness
and control the energy from nuclear fi ssion.
All plants operate on the same principle, but
different designs are currently in use throughout
the world. More than 50 per cent of power
reactors in use today are pressurised water
reactors (PWRs), followed in number by boiling
water reactors (BWRs) and pressurised heavy
water reactors (PHWRs). The three types vary
in operating conditions and fuel mixes used,
but the basic principles are similar.
The nuclear power industry has been
developing and improving reactor technology
for fi ve decades. The next generation of
reactors is expected to be built in the next
5–20 years. These so-called third-generation
reactors have standardised designs for each
type in order to expedite licensing and reduce
capital costs and construction time. Many
employ passive safety systems and all are
simpler and more rugged in design, easier
to operate, capable of higher capacity factors,
have extended lives of at least 60 years and
will have a lower decommissioning burden.
Small, modular high temperature gas reactors
are also under development in several countries.
Due to the nature of their fuel, they have
inherent safety advantages, higher fuel burnup
and better proliferation resistance compared
with conventional reactors. These reactors
have the potential to provide high temperature
process heat for hydrogen production and
coal liquefaction as well as electricity and their
small size makes them suitable for smaller and
remote electricity grids, such as in Australia.
The Generation IV International Forum (GIF),
representing ten countries, is developing six
selected reactor technologies for deployment
between 2010 and 2030. Some of these systems
aim to employ a closed fuel cycle to minimise
the amount of high-level wastes that need
to be sent to a repository.
Figure 1.2 shows the basic operation of
a standard PWR nuclear power plant.
The buildings housing the turbines and the
control centre are separate from the reactor
containment area. Current and future nuclear
power plant technologies are discussed further
in Appendix L.
Electricity generation is discussed in
Chapter 4, including current electricity demand,
projections for future demand, consideration
of nuclear energy for electricity generation
and cost issues.

20
1.5.7 Radioactive waste and
spent fuel management
All fuels used in the generation of electricity
produce wastes and all toxic wastes need to
be managed in a safe and environmentally
benign manner. However, the radioactive
nature of nuclear fi ssion products — in particular
long-lived by-products — require special
consideration. Principles for the management
of potentially dangerous wastes are:
concentrate and contain
dilute and disperse
delay and decay.
•
•
•
The delay and decay principle is unique
to radioactive waste strategies.
Low-level waste (LLW), intermediate-level
waste (ILW) and high-level waste (HLW) are
the classifi cations for nuclear waste. LLW is
generated widely in the health and industrial
sectors, and comprises potentially
contaminated materials such as paper towels,
scrap metal and clothing. By far the largest
volume of waste materials is LLW, but it is
relatively easy to handle due to the very low
level of radioactivity.
ILW is more radioactive, but unlike HLW,
does not have self-heating properties. ILW
includes fuel cladding or reactor components,
and is of special relevance in nuclear facility
decommissioning. ILW is sometimes
categorised according to its half-life.
HLW is normally defi ned by its self-heating
properties caused by radioactive decay.
It may consist of spent fuel or liquid products
from reprocessing. Spent fuel assemblies
from nuclear reactors are extremely hot from
decay heat and are still highly radioactive.
Chapter 5 provides further details about
radioactive waste and spent fuel management.
Figure 1.2 Schematic of a pressurised water reactor
Containment structure
Pressuriser
Turbine
Generator
Condenser
Steam
generator
Control
rods
Reactor
vessel
Source: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)[7]

21
Chapter 2. Uranium mining and exports
Australia has the capacity to expand
its production and exports of uranium,
and global growth in uranium demand
provides a timely opportunity
for Australia.
Skill shortages and restrictive policies
(regulation, land access and transport)
are the major constraints on industry
expansion in Australia.
Conventional reserves of uranium
worldwide are suffi cient to meet current
demand for 50 to 100 years. There is
high potential for future discoveries.
•
•
•
2.1 Australian uranium
mining industry
Australia has a long history of uranium mining
— mines at Radium Hill and Mount Painter
operated in the 1930s. There are currently three
uranium mines in Australia — Ranger in the
Northern Territory, and Olympic Dam and
Beverley in South Australia. A fourth mine,
Honeymoon in South Australia, has all the key
approvals and is scheduled to begin production
in 2008. Uranium mine locations are shown
in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 Uranium mines and areas of uranium exploration, 2005
Port Hedland
Manyingee
Source: Geoscience Australia[8]
Jabiluka
Darwin
Rum Jungle
Deposit or prospect
Operating mine
Former producer
Areas of uranium
exploration in 2005
Nabarlek
Ranger
Koongarra
S.Alligator
Valley
Pandanus Creek
Tennant Creek
Westmoreland
Maureen
Skal
Valhalla
Ben Lomond
Cairns
Townsville
Andersons Lode
Mount Isa Mary Kathleen
5 6
NORTHERN
TERRITORY
Alice Springs
Oobagooma
Kintyre Bigrlyi
Angela
Derby
Turee Creek
Lake Way
Yeelirrie
Thatcher Soak
Prominent Hill Mt Painter
Olympic Dam
0 500 km
1. Gawler Craton – Stuart Shelf Province & Tertiary palaeochannels
2. Frome Embayment & Mt Painter
3. Arnhem Land
4. Rum Jungle
5. Granites – Tanami
6. Tennant Creek
7. Ngalia & Amadeus Basins, Arunta Complex
8. Paterson Province
9. Carnarvon Basin & Turee Creek area
10. Calcrete deposits
11. Tertiary palaeochannel sands – Kalgoorlie Esperance and Gunbarrel Basin
12. Westmoreland – Pandanus Creek
13. Mt Isa Province
14. Georgetown – Townsville area
QUEENSLAND
Beverley
Goulds Dam
Honeymoon
Broken Hill
Brisbane
Sydney
VICTORIA
NEW SOUTH
WALES
Melbourne
State Govt. legislation
prohibits uranium exploration
in NSW and Victoria
Hobart TASMANIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
9
8
10
11
1 2
7
4
3
12
13 14
Radium Hill
Adelaide
Mulga Rock
Kalgoorlie
Perth

22
2.1.1 Uranium exports
Australian uranium exports in 2005 earned
a record A$573 million, making uranium the
eighteenth largest mineral and energy export
by value (2005–2006),[9] as shown in Figure 2.2.
Production in 2005 was also a record 12 360
tonnes U3O8.[10],3 In a once-through fuel cycle,
this amount of U3O8 would generate more than
double Australia’s current electricity demand.
Uranium export earnings are forecast to
increase in the future due to rises in production
and average price as new contracts are signed
at higher prices. Forecasts suggest that
Australian uranium production could increase
to more than 20 000 tonnes U3O8 by 2014–2015,[11]
and may exceed A$1 billion annually before the
end of 2010.
In 2005, Australia delivered uranium to ten
countries, including the United States (36 per
cent), some members of the European Union
(31 per cent; including France, 11 per cent),
Japan (22 per cent) and South Korea (9 per
cent).[10],4 The United States, the European
Union, Japan and South Korea have all been
long term buyers of Australian uranium.
Uranium is sold in accordance with Australia’s
uranium export policy (see Chapter 8), with
eligible countries accounting for approximately
90 per cent of world nuclear electricity
generation.5 Contracts for U3O8 are between
producers and end utilities (see Chapter 3).
2.1.2 Economic benefi ts
Mining in Australia employs approximately
130 000 people,[12] 1200 in uranium-related jobs.
Most of these jobs are in remote areas with
limited employment opportunities. Indigenous
employment in uranium mining is low at around
100 people. At least 500 people are employed in
uranium exploration,[8] and more than 60 people
are employed in regulation.
Uranium mines generate approximately
A$21.0 million in royalties for state and territory
governments and indigenous communities,
with different royalty rates in each jurisdiction.
Ranger generated A$13.1 million in royalties
(A$10.2 million to indigenous groups and
A$2.9 million to the Northern Territory
Government in 2005),[13] Beverley generated
approximately A$1.0 million (2004–2005), and
the uranium share of Olympic Dam generated
approximately A$6.9 million (2005–2006).[14]
Uranium mining companies also contribute
taxes and other payments. In 2005, Energy
Resources of Australia (ERA), which operates
the Ranger mine, paid A$19.7 million in income
tax.[15] BHP Billiton’s taxation contribution for
uranium at Olympic Dam is approximately
A$23.0 million.[14]
2.1.3 Uranium reserves
Uranium is a naturally occurring element found
in low levels within all rock, soil and water and
is more plentiful than gold or silver. It is found
in many minerals, particularly uraninite, as
well as within phosphate, lignite and monazite
sands. Figure 2.3 shows the abundance of
various elements in the earth’s crust.
Australia has the world’s largest low-cost
uranium reserves. Geoscience Australia
estimates that Australia’s total identifi ed
low-cost resources (less than US$40/kg, or
approximately US$15/lb) are 1.2 million tonnes
U3O8, which is approximately 38 per cent of the
global resources in this category. At recent spot
prices, Australia’s recoverable reserves increase
to 1.3 million tonnes U3O8, about 24 per cent of
the world’s resources (at less than US$130/kg).
The lack of mid-cost identifi ed reserves in
Australia may refl ect the low levels of
exploration over the last 30 years.
Table 2.1 shows the total identifi ed uranium
resources in Australia and the world.
Australia’s seven largest deposits account for
approximately 89 per cent of Australia’s total
known reserves. Olympic Dam is the world’s
largest known uranium deposit, containing
70 per cent of Australia’s reserves. While
Olympic Dam uranium grades are low,
averaging 600 parts per million,[17] co-production
with copper and gold makes its recovery viable.
The other major deposits are Jabiluka, Ranger,
Yeelirrie, Kintyre, Valhalla and Koongarra.
3 Note: deliveries do not equal production fi gures due to a lag between production and when uranium reaches the end user
(ie after conversion, enrichment and fabrication into fuel for use by the power plant).
4 Figures are percentages of total exports of uranium.
5 Countries with nuclear power plants that Australia cannot currently sell to include Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, India, Pakistan,
Romania, Russia, South Africa and Ukraine.

23
Figure 2.2 Value of selected Australian mineral and energy exports, 2005–2006
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Metallurgical coal
Iron ore
Thermal coal
Gold
Crude oil
Copper
Aluminium
LNG
Nickel
Titanium
Diamonds
Uranium
Manganese
Zircon
Note: Mineral and energy exports were worth more than A$91 billion in 2005–2006.
Source: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE)[9]
Figure 2.3 Abundance of various elements in the earth’s crust
12 000
10 000
8000
ppb by weight Element
6000
4000
2000
100
ppb = parts per billion
Source: WebElements[16]
A$ billion
10 000
6000
2200
1800
80 37 3.1
0
Lead Thorium Tin Uranium Silver Platinum Gold

24
2.1.4 Outlook for additional
reserves to be discovered
Of the 85 currently known uranium deposits and
prospects in Australia, approximately 50 were
discovered from 1969–1975, with another four
discovered from 1975–2003. Little exploration
was undertaken in the 30 years until 2003,
due to low uranium prices and restrictive
government policies. Since 2004, uranium
exploration expenditure has increased, with
dozens of companies exploring actively. Given
the paucity of systematic modern exploration,
Geoscience Australia estimates that there
is signifi cant potential for the discovery of
additional deposits. Modern techniques mean
that exploration at greater depths is becoming
more comprehensive and less costly. Australia
has many areas with high or medium uranium
mineralisation potential.
2.1.5 Outlook for Australian suppliers
to increase production
Australia is unable to expand uranium
production in the short term at existing mines
as plant capacity is fully utilised. The new
Honeymoon mine is forecast to add only
400 tonnes U3O8 in 2008 (or 3 per cent of
total production).
Australia can expand production over the
medium and long term by increasing output
at existing mines and/or by opening new mines.
There are opportunities at each of the three
current mines to expand production or extend
the lives of projects through further reserve
discoveries on mine leases. For example, the
proposed Olympic Dam expansion (currently
subject to a commercial decision by BHP
Billiton and government approvals) will increase
uranium production from 4300 tonnes per year
to 15 000 tonnes per year of U3O8 from 2013.
In October 2006, the Ranger project life was
extended by six years to 2020. The discovery
of an adjacent prospect (Beverley 4 Mile) could
also increase production at Beverley. Many
smaller deposits could be developed relatively
quickly, although development would require
a change in government policy.
As shown in Figure 2.4, the overall production
capability of Australia’s existing and approved
mines is forecast to increase to more than
20 000 tonnes U3O8 by 2015. When new mines
from already identifi ed deposits are included
in the calculation, the increase may be to more
than 25 000 tonnes U3O8.[11] Forecasts beyond
2020 do not provide for the commercialisation
of new discoveries from current and future
exploration activities. (The ABARE forecast
to 2015 includes the development of a number
of small to medium sized new mines in Western
Australia and Queensland, but is reliant on
policy changes in those states. Their forecast
does not include Jabiluka or Koongarra deposits
in the Northern Territory, for which development
requires approval by the Traditional Owners.)
Table 2.1 Total identifi ed uranium resources for Australia and the world, 2005a
Total identifi ed resources (’000 tonnes U3O8)b
< US$40/kg < US$80/kg < US$130/kg
World 3239 4486 5593
Australia 1231 1266 1348
Australian share 38% 28% 24%
a Resource fi gures for Australia and the World are as at 1 January 2005; resource estimates are expressed in terms of tonnes of U3O8 recoverable
from mining ore (ie the estimates include allowances for ore dilution, mining and milling losses).
b Total identifi ed resources = reasonably assured resources + inferred resources (see note).
Note: The international convention for reserve reporting divides estimates into two categories based on the level of confi dence in the quantities
reported: reasonably assured resources (RAR), which are known resources that could be recovered within given production cost ranges, and inferred
resources, which is uranium that is believed to exist based on direct geological evidence. These resources are further divided into categories on the
basis of cost of production of U3O8 — less than US$40/kg U (approximately US$15/lb U3O8), US$40-80/kg U (approximately US$15–30/lb U3O8), and
US$80-13o/kg U (approximately US$30-50/lb U3O8).
Source: adapted from NEA–IAEA.[18]

25
Figure 2.4 Australian uranium production 2000–2005 and forecast production 2006–2030
30 000
25 000
20 000
15 000
10 000
5000
0
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
New mines —
change policy
Honeymoon
Beverley
Ranger
Note: The ‘new mines’ forecast is based on a number of assumptions.
Sources: Geoscience Australia,[8], [19] ABARE,[11] World Nuclear Association (WNA),[20] Ux Consulting (UxC),[21] NEA–IAEA,[18] ERA[22]
Figure 2.5 World projected uranium requirements by region, 2005–2030
140 000
120 000
100 000
80 000
60 000
40 000
20 000
Source: ABARE,[11] WNA[20]
Year
U3O8 tonnes
Long-term forecasts
Olympic Dam
0
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Year
U3O8 tonnes
Long-term forecasts
Other
India
China
Russia
North Asia
European Union
North America

26
2.2 World uranium demand
and supply
2.2.1 World uranium demand
Forecasts for global uranium demand include
those by the WNA,[20] UxC,[21] NEA–IAEA,[18]
ABARE[11] and IEA.[3] Most commentators predict
an increase in demand due to the construction
of new power plants, increased capacity in
existing plants and a reduction in secondary
supplies (secondary supplies include stockpiles,
reprocessing of spent fuel and down-blending
of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from
weapons. These have accounted for more
than 40 per cent of the uranium market in recent
years; see Box 3.3). As shown in Table 2.2,
new plants are planned in Asia — particularly
in China, India, Japan and South Korea, as well
as several western countries such as the United
States. The current largest uranium users —
the United States, France and Japan — are
expected to continue to be the major buyers,
although India, Russia and China will become
larger buyers in the future (Figure 2.5).6
Table 2.2 Nuclear power reactors planned and proposed (on available information)
Country/region Capacity
(MW)
No.
reactors Comments
China 48 800 63 The Chinese Government plans to have 40 GW
of additional nuclear capacity by 2020.
Russia 31 200 26 The Russian Government plans to have 40 GW
of nuclear capacity by 2030.
United States 26 716 23 The US Government is actively pursuing nuclear power
for energy security; expect new reactors to 2020.
Japan 16 045 12
The Japanese Government forecast is to maintain
or increase the share of nuclear power in electricity
generation (30–40 per cent) beyond 2030.
India 13 160 24 The Nuclear Power Corporation of India plans to have
20 GW by 2020.
Western Europe (other) 12 135 13
Turkey (4500 MW), Romania (1995 MW), Bulgaria
(1900 MW), Czech Republic (1900 MW), Lithuania
(1000 MW) and Slovakia (840 MW).
Middle East/South Asia (other) 9350 11 Iran (4750 MW), Pakistan (1800 MW), Israel (1200 MW),
Armenia (1000 MW) and Egypt (600 MW).
South Korea 8250 7 Seven reactors are planned for existing sites and
are expected to be operational by 2015.
Asia (other) 6950 7 Indonesia (4000 MW), Vietnam (2000 MW)
and North Korea (950 MW).
North and South America (other) 6245 7 Canada (2000 MW), Mexico (2000 MW), Brazil
(1245 MW) and Argentina (1000 MW).
South Africa 4165 25
South Africa is developing pebble bed modular reactor
(PBMR) technology. If successful, the plan is to
commercialise and build plants in coastal regions.
France 3230 2 –
Eastern Europe other 2200 3 Ukraine (1900 MW) and Kazakhstan (300 MW).
Total 188 446 223 –
Planned = the approvals are in place or the construction is well advanced, but suspended indefi nitely.
Proposed = clear intention, but still without funding and/ or approvals.
Note: For further information on nuclear power plans in selected countries see ABARE.[11]
Source: WNA[23]
6 The United States, Japan and France are important customers for Australian uranium. Australia will shortly fi nalise a safeguards agreement
with China and does not sell uranium to India or Russia.

27
2.2.2 World uranium supply
Uranium production is concentrated in very
few countries. Canada and Australia produce
more than 50 per cent of global natural uranium
(ie excluding secondary supplies). A second
group of countries — Niger, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Namibia and Uzbekistan — account for
approximately 40 per cent.[18] As shown in Figure
2.6, in the medium term (up to 2015), a number
of new mines and expansions to current mines
are projected. The increase in uranium
production is expected to come from Canada and
Australia in particular, but also from Kazakhstan,
Namibia, Russia and the United States. Price
increases (see Figure 2.7) have encouraged
exploration and will lead to more new mines,
particularly in existing production centres
where they can be brought on line quickly.
2.2.3 Outlook for uranium prices
As shown in Figure 2.7, over the last two decades
the price of uranium has only increased since
2003 — from approximately US$10/lb U3O8
(approximately US$27/kg U3O8) in early 2003
to more than US$60/lb (approximately
US$160/kg) in November 2006. The uranium
price is linked to energy prices and the crude
oil price was also relatively low over this period.
Forecasts show that supply will meet demand
over the medium term and the price is expected
to continue to increase in the short term and
then stabilise. This projected increase in the
short term is being driven by uncertainties over
uranium supplies, including secondary supplies
and mine production (see Box 3.1 on contractual
arrangements). Uranium is mainly sold under
long term contracts (90 per cent of the market
in recent years) and as new contracts are
negotiated, producer prices are expected
to increase.
After 2013 when the availability of HEU from
Russia is expected to cease, there will be
greater uncertainty over both supply and
demand, but on current forecasts, demand is
expected to exceed supply. Normally this would
lead to further increases in price or investment
in new capacity. Each of these circumstances
represents an opportunity for Australia.
Figure 2.6 Projected uranium supply by country, 2005–2030
120 000
100 000
80 000
60 000
40 000
20 000
0
Long-term forecasts
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Year
U3O8 tonnes
Note: Australia only includes current and approved mines (ie excluding the ‘new mines’ in Figure 2.4).
Sources: WNA,[20] ABARE,[11] UxC,[21] NEA–IAEA[18]
Other secondary
supplies
HEU
Rest of world
Africa
Russian
Federation
Kazakhstan
Australia
Canada

28
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
US$/lb U3O8
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
US$/bbl
Uranium
spot price
Crude oil
price
Figure 2.7 Uranium and crude oil prices, 1970–2006
2.3.2 Regulation
Extensive regulatory requirements apply to
uranium mining and milling to meet acceptable
community standards on environmental, health
and safety issues. In addition to general mining
regulations, there are requirements to ensure
that radiation risks to workers, the public
and the environment are properly managed.
Australia’s three uranium mines each operate
under different regulatory regimes and
signifi cant advantages could accrue from
rationalising and harmonising regulatory
regimes across all jurisdictions (see Chapter 9
for more information on regulation).
2.3.3 Land access
Land access is an ongoing issue for Australian
exploration and mining, with uranium mining
facing additional restrictions due to government
and community attitudes. The governments
of New South Wales and Victoria prohibit
uranium exploration and mining, while
Queensland, Western Australia, South
Australia and the Northern Territory still
have a ‘no new mines’ policy.
Source: UxC,[21] Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)[24]
2.3 Capacity to expand
The main impediments to the development
of Australia’s uranium reserves have been low
uranium prices and restrictive government
policies. Other impediments identifi ed by the
Uranium Industry Framework are as follows.[25]
These impediments were also identifi ed in the
report of the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Industry and Resources Inquiry
into developing Australia’s non-fossil fuel
energy industry.[26]
2.3.1 Skills
In addition to a general nationwide skills
shortage faced by the Australian mining
industry, the uranium industry faces a shortage
of radiation safety professionals required for
industry and government regulators, as well
as geologists with uranium experience to
meet the increased demand for exploration
(see Chapter 10 for a discussion of how to
address skills shortages).

29
A number of uranium companies work closely
with local communities and have negotiated
cooperative agreements. For instance,
Heathgate Resources, operator of the Beverley
mine, has mining agreements in place with
local indigenous groups that provide for
benefi ts including employment and training,
royalties and other community payments, as
well as protection of cultural sites. Uranium
exploration and mining is seen favourably
by some communities as a means for economic
development, while other communities are
not supportive.
2.3.4 Transport
U3O8, which is classifi ed as a Class 7 Dangerous
Good, is transported by rail, road and sea in
200 litre drums packed into shipping containers
(Class 7 is a United Nations classifi cation
for Dangerous Goods applying to radioactive
materials). Australian regulatory standards
for transport meet international standards.
However, uranium transport restrictions arise
from: negative public perceptions; regulations
that exceed international standards; and
consolidation in the international shipping
industry that limits the scheduled routes
and ports where vessels carrying uranium can
call (and Australia requires trans-shipment
countries to have agreements in place). The
effect is to reduce the choice of shipping fi rms
and routes, increasing delays and costs. Higher
levels of security in transport modes apply in
the current heightened security environment.
Such factors contribute to the reluctance of
some transport companies, local councils,
and the federal and state governments, to
be involved in or allow transport of uranium.
For example, governments in New South Wales,
Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia
have refused permission to allow export of
uranium through their ports,[25] leading to
scheduling diffi culties, higher costs and
extended delivery times. Restrictions on
transport may limit expansion of Australian
uranium exports.
2.3.5 Other impediments
The Uranium Industry Framework also identifi es
further areas for improvement, including
uranium stewardship, indigenous engagement,
communication and a uranium royalty regime
in the Northern Territory.[25]
Figure 2.8 Drums of U3O8 being loaded into a shipping container for transport
Source: Heathgate Resources

30
2.4 Other nuclear fuel sources
The majority of uranium is the isotope U-238,
which does not directly contribute to fi ssion
energy in thermal reactors. However, U-238
can produce fi ssile plutonium, which can be
extracted for use as fuel in a nuclear reactor
with advanced cycles using reprocessing
(for example see Appendix L for a discussion
on thermal MOX). Fast breeder reactors have
a capability of producing a higher volume of
Pu-239 than the volume of U-235 consumed in
the original process, allowing the exploitation
of much larger reserves of U-238. In an
analogous fashion, natural thorium (100 per
cent non-fi ssile Th-232) can be used to breed
the fi ssile isotope U-233, opening up thorium
as a potential resource.
The thorium fuel cycle (discussed in more detail
in Appendix L) has several advantages including
that it does not produce plutonium or minor
actinides in signifi cant quantities, thus reducing
long lived isotopes in waste. The cycle is
potentially more proliferation resistant than
the uranium fuel cycle. The disadvantages
include the need for reprocessing, which is
a proliferation-sensitive technology, and the
fact that reprocessing is more diffi cult than for
the uranium cycle. There are several attendant
technological diffi culties which need to be
addressed. No commercial thorium reactor
is operating in the world today.
Thorium is contained in small amounts in most
rocks and soils and averages 6–10 ppm in the
earth’s upper crust (three times the average
content of uranium).[27] As there is only a very
small market for thorium, there are no
signifi cant active exploration programs
(Australia currently exports thorium in small
quantities as a by-product in some mineral
sands). Current estimates are 2.4 million tonnes
worldwide with a further 1.8–2.3 million tonnes
undiscovered.7 Turkey, India, Brazil, the United
States, Australia, Venezuela and Egypt have the
largest resources. For countries having limited
access to uranium resources thorium-fuelled
reactors may be an option.[27] The use of thorium
has been a central part of India’s nuclear
energy strategy.
Uranium is widespread throughout the earth’s
crust and the oceans. Unconventional reserves
are found in phosphate rocks, black shales,
coals and lignites, monazite and seawater.[28]
The seawater concentration is low — less
than 2 parts per billion (ppb). One estimate
suggests that approximately 4.5 billion tonnes
is contained in seawater. Some research has
been done into the extraction of uranium
from seawater; however, scaling up may prove
impractical.[29] These unconventional sources
are estimated to be substantially larger than
known reserves.
The NEA–IAEA estimates that there are
approximately 22 million tonnes of uranium
in phosphate deposits. This estimate is
conservative as many countries do not report
phosphate reserves. The recovery technology
is mature and has been used in Belgium and
the United States, but historically this has not
been viable economically.[18]
Box 2.1 How long can nuclear last?
Is there suffi cient uranium to supply the industry
in the long term, given that high-grade uranium ore
resources could be limited?
The IEA estimates that at the current rate of demand,
known conventional supplies are suffi cient to fuel
nuclear power for 85 years.[30]
Exploration activity is expected to identify new reserves.
In the long term, new fuel cycles using fast breeder
reactors could enable the use of the very abundant
U-238, increasing the energy value of uranium
resources by 30–60 times.[30] This would make known
supplies suffi cient to fuel nuclear power at current
rates of use for thousands of years. This would also
allow the exploitation of alternatives such as thorium,
which can be used to breed fuel.
By comparison with other energy sources, the world’s
proven reserves of oil at current rates of production will
last 42 years. This has been around the same level for
the past 20 years. Proven reserves of gas at current
rates of production will last 64 years. Worldwide proven
gas reserves have grown by over 80 per cent in the last
20 years.[3]
The IEA concludes that uranium resources are not
expected to constrain the development of new nuclear
power capacity and that proven resources are suffi cient
to meet world requirements for all reactors that are
expected to be operational by 2030.[3]
7 Total identifi ed thorium resources at less than US$80/kg thorium; fi gures in Geoscience Australia,[8] derived from NEA–IAEA.[27]

31
2.5 Conclusion
Projections for the supply and demand
of uranium at a global level over the next
25 years suggest that there is an opportunity
for Australia to increase uranium exports
signifi cantly. Current Australian ore processing
capacity is effectively fully utilised and capacity
expansion in the very short term is highly
constrained. However a doubling of uranium
exports by 2015 is realistic.
Any industry expansion would need concurrent
programs to address skills shortages,
particularly in relation to radiation protection,
and would benefi t from a rationalisation of
regulatory regimes across all jurisdictions.
There is scope for local communities to
benefi t more from uranium mining, including
employment, training and community support.
This is particularly important given the location
of reserves on indigenous land.
Global uranium reserves at current prices and
generating technologies can sustain current
power production for 50–100 years. Technology
improvements such as breeder reactors would
extend this period signifi cantly.
Issues associated with uranium mining, such
as environmental impacts, safety, proliferation
and waste management are addressed in
subsequent chapters.

32

33
Chapter 3. Conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication
Chapter 3. Conversion, enrichment
Australia’s exports of uranium oxide
of A$573 million in 2005 could be
transformed into a further A$1.8 billion
in value after conversion, enrichment
and fuel fabrication. However,
challenges associated with the
required investment levels and
access to enrichment technology
are very signifi cant.
Centrifuge technology will dominate
enrichment in the medium term
as gaseous diffusion is replaced.
SILEX, an Australian developed laser
enrichment technology, offers promise,
but is yet to be commercially proven.
Enrichment technology is used for
civil and weapons purposes. Any
proposed domestic investment would
require Australia to reassure the
international community of its
nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
•
•
•
and fuel fabrication
3.1 Value-adding in the
nuclear fuel cycle
Unlike coal, natural uranium cannot be fed
directly into a power station but must be
prepared as special fuel. For the majority of
reactors8, the production steps involved are
conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication.
The uranium oxide (U3O8) is fi rst purifi ed and
then converted into uranium hexafl uoride
(UF6), which in gaseous form is required for
the enrichment stage. Enrichment increases
the proportion of U-235 from 0.7 per cent to
between 3 and 5 per cent.[6] The enriched UF6
is subsequently converted to uranium dioxide
(UO2) and transferred to a fabrication plant
for assembly into fuel (commonly pellets
and fuel rods).
Figure 3.1 is a diagram showing approximate
relative volumes of uranium as it moves through
the nuclear fuel cycle.
Additional value-adding can take place in later
stages of the fuel cycle such as reprocessing
and waste management (Chapter 5).
Figure 3.1 Relative volumes of uranium in the nuclear fuel cycle
Depleted uranium tails
146 tonnes of
uranium as tails
Conversion
170 tonnes of
uranium as UF6
Mining and milling
200 tonnes of uranium
oxide (U3O8)
(needs around 150 000
tonnes of rock and ore)
Enrichment
24 tonnes of uranium
as enriched UF6
Fuel fabrication
24 tonnes as UO2 fuel
(roughly equivalent
to the amount of fresh
fuel required annually
by a 1000 MW reactor)
8 Enriched uranium is required for most nuclear power plants, however, heavy water reactors such as CANDU power reactors can use natural uranium
as fuel (Appendix L).

34
Box 3.1 Contractual arrangements in the
nuclear fuel cycle
Electricity utilities contract directly with mining
companies for the supply of U3O8, then contract with
other nuclear fuel cycle participants for conversion,
enrichment and fuel fabrication.[20]
Typically, each participant in the nuclear fuel cycle
organises and pays for transport of the processed
uranium to the next participant that has been
contracted by the utility.
Contract periods vary in length, but are usually
medium to long term (between three and fi ve years),
although they can be longer than 10 years.[31]
A diversifi ed set of suppliers is usually preferred by
electricity utilities to ensure security of supply. In some
cases (eg in the European Union), this is a requirement.
As a result no single supplier is likely to dominate the
world market for any of the production steps.
The World Nuclear Association (WNA)
estimated that in January 2006, the price for
1 kg of uranium as enriched reactor fuel was
US$1633 (A$2217)9.[32] It takes approximately
8 kg of U3O8 to make 1 kg of reactor fuel.
Conversion, enrichment and fabrication of
uranium are included in the cost of the fuel.
WNA fi gures (January 2006) assumed that 8 kg
of U3O8 was required at a price of US$90.20/kg,
which is below the mid-2006 spot price, but
greater than average 2005 contract prices.
The U3O8 is then converted into 7 kg of UF6
at US$12/kg and then enriched using 4.8
separative work units (enrichment is measured
in separative work units or SWU) at US$122
per SWU. Finally, the uranium is fabricated
into 1 kg of fuel at US$240/kg.10
The disaggregated cost elements are depicted
in Figure 3.2, which shows the January 2006
WNA estimate, the total fuel cost and shares
using average 2005 uranium contract prices,
and those same shares using mid-2006 spot
prices for uranium, conversion and enrichment.
At mid-2006 spot prices, Australian miners
would have captured more than half of the
available value.11,12
If all Australian current uranium production
(approximately 12 000 tonnes U3O8 in 2005)
was transformed into fuel, a further A$1.8 billion
in export revenue could be derived. The net
economic benefi t would require a full
consideration of costs.
3.2 Conversion
Conversion is a chemical process whereby
U3O8 is converted into UF6, which can be
a solid, liquid or gas, depending on the
temperature and pressure. At atmospheric
pressure, UF6 is solid below 57°C and gaseous
above this temperature. It is stored and
transported as a solid in large secure cylinders.
When UF6 contacts water, it is highly corrosive
and chemically toxic.[33] Transport costs can be
up to fi ve times those of transporting natural
uranium,[31] and shipping lines tend to be
reluctant to carry Class 7 material.
The siting, environmental and security
management of a conversion plant is subject
to the same regulations as any industrial
processing plant involving fl uorine-based
chemicals.[34] Radiological safety requirements
must be met, as with uranium mining and
processing.
Conversion comprises only approximately
5 per cent of the cost of reactor fuel (depending
on the relative prices of U3O8, enrichment and
fabrication), which is the lowest fraction of all
of the steps in the nuclear fuel cycle. Figure
3.3 shows the conversion plant at Port Hope
in Canada.
9 The WNA updates these fi gures regularly.
10 8 kgs at US$90.20 + 7 kg at US$12 + 4.8 SWU at US$122 + 1 kg at US$240 = US$1633 (may not add up exactly due to rounding)
11 Average uranium prices in 2005: 8 kg at US$43 + 7 kg at US$12 + 4.8 SWU at US$122 + 1 kg at US$240 = US$1255
12 Mid-2006 spot prices: 8 kg at US$150 + 7 kg at US$12 + 4.8 SWU at US$130 + 1 kg at US$240 = US$2149

35
3.2.1 The existing conversion
market and outlook
The market for conversion services is highly
concentrated with four companies (Tenex,
Areva, Cameco and Converdyn) supplying
more than 80 per cent of conversion services
globally. The main suppliers are shown in
Table 3.1. Current suppliers have a capacity
of more than 66 000 tonnes per year; however,
conversion capacity is diffi cult to estimate
for Russia as Russian conversion services
are not directly exported (see Box 3.3 on
the United States–Russia HEU deal).
The market has not seen new investment
or real production expansion for a considerable
period and has been characterised by instability
since 2000, due to supply-side factors. Prices
have nearly doubled in the last two years.
In mid-2006, the conversion price was
approximately US$12/kg of uranium as UF6.[35]
Figure 3.2 Component costs of 1 kg of uranium as enriched reactor fuel
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
19%
47%
6.8%
27%
4%
Jan 2006 WNA estimate Average 2005 uranium prices Mid-2006 spot prices
U3O8 Conversion Enrichment Fabrication
Figure 3.3 The Cameco conversion plant at Port Hope, Canada
11%
29%
56%
15%
36%
5%
44%
US$
$US1633
US$1255
US$2149
Source: Cameco

36
Table 3.1 Conversion suppliers and capacities
Country Company Start of operation Capacity
Conversion to UF6
Russia Tenex 1954 15 000
France Comurhex (Areva) 1961 14 000
Canada Cameco 1984 12 500
USA Converdyn 1959 14 000
UK BNFL (Westinghouse) 1974 6000
China CNNC 1963 1500
Total UF6 63 000
Conversion to UO2
a
Canada Cameco 1983 2800
Others (Argentina, India
and Romania) n/a n/a 762
Total UO2 3562
Total UF6 and UO2 66 562
n/a = not applicable.
a: UO2 supplies are used in CANDU reactors and other heavy water reactors.
Source: WNA,[20] IAEA[36]
In terms of market outlook, there have recently
been announcements for future plant expansion
and renewal. These include a toll agreement
between Cameco and BNFL, expansion plans
by Converdyn and preliminary plans by Areva
for a new plant.[20] The expansion plans and
possibility of new investment have given the
market renewed confi dence in the stability
of conversion supply.
Analysis of future demand and supply by Ux
Consulting (UxC) suggests conversion supply
is likely to meet and possibly exceed demand
through to 2013.[35] After 2013, the situation
is diffi cult to ascertain given the uncertainty
surrounding secondary supply and the
Russia–USA HEU deal. Russian suppliers
are pushing for direct access to the world
(and United States) markets, but this can
only take place if trade restrictions are lifted.
(tonnes UF6/year)
Establishment of conversion in Australia is only
likely to be attractive if it is associated with local
enrichment, partly due to transport costs, the
complexity associated with the handling of toxic
chemicals and constraints applying to Class 7
Dangerous Goods (which also apply to U3O8).13
3.3 Enrichment
The enrichment process involves increasing the
proportion of U-235 from 0.7 per cent to between
3 and 5 per cent. In the process, approximately
85 per cent of the feed is left over as depleted
uranium (tails). Typically, the depleted uranium
remains the property of the enrichment plant.
While depleted uranium has some industrial
uses, most is stored for possible re-enrichment
or future use as fuel in fast breeder reactors.[37]
Although several enrichment processes have
been developed, only the gaseous diffusion
and centrifuge processes operate commercially.
13 Class 7 Dangerous Goods apply to material containing radionuclides above set levels. Examples of items include smoke detectors, isotopes used
in nuclear medicine for cancer treatment, U3O8, through to spent fuel.

37
Enrichment is expressed in terms of kilogram
separative work units, which measure the
amount of work performed in separating
the two isotopes, U-235 and U-238 (referred
to as SWU, see Appendix K for more detail).[36]
Approximately 100 000–120 000 SWU are
required to enrich the annual fuel loading for
a typical 1000 MW light water reactor (LWR).[34]
Box 3.2 A proliferation-sensitive technology
Enrichment is classed as a proliferation-sensitive technology. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is defi ned as containing
20 per cent or more of U-235 and has research (used in some research reactors) and military uses (such as naval
propulsion). Weapons-grade uranium is enriched to more than 90 per cent of U-235 (see Figure 3.4).[39,40]
Special attention is given to enrichment internationally because of the potential for the technology to be adapted
to produce weapons-grade materials. The essential ingredients for nuclear weapons can be obtained by enriching
uranium to very high levels using the same technology as for low-enriched uranium for electricity generation,
with only minor modifi cations. Thus, vigilance regarding the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
is paramount (see Chapter 8).
Figure 3.4 Levels of enrichment
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Enrichment adds the largest value to uranium
in its transformation into nuclear fuel.
Enrichment prices have increased steadily
from approximately US$80/SWU in 1999–2000
to approximately US$130/SWU in mid-2006.[38]
0.7% 0.6–1.8%
Natural uranium Low-enriched
uranium
Highly-enriched
uranium
Weapons-grade
uranium
Power reactor
% of fissile U-235
3%
more than
20%
20%
up to
20%
more than
90%
more than
20%
spent fuel

38
New centrifuge enrichment plants are capital
intensive, requiring investment well above
A$1 billion. However, the technology is modular
in construction, with individual centrifuges
arranged in ‘cascades’ (Figure 3.5). This
arrangement enables enrichment services to
begin before plant completion, and production
capacity to be adjusted incrementally in
response to market demand.
Operational enrichment costs are related
to plant electrical energy consumption.
Gaseous diffusion consumes approximately
2500 kWh/SWU, while centrifuge technology
consumes 50 times less at 50 kWh/SWU.[34]
For example, at the Areva gaseous diffusion
enrichment plant at Tricastin in France,
electricity represented approximately
60 per cent of production costs in 2005.14
Areva provides enrichment services to
approximately 100 reactors worldwide and
consumes 3–4 per cent of the entire electricity
generation in France.[41] Tradetech estimates
that electricity consumption is approximately
6–7 per cent of production costs at Urenco’s
centrifuge plants.[42]
Figure 3.5 Gas centrifuges
Areva has been reported as paying Urenco
€500 million (A$833 million) for access to
Urenco technology through an equity share
in the Enrichment Technology Company
(jointly owned by Urenco and Areva), plus
€2.5 billion (A$4.2 billion) for centrifuges
with a capacity of 7.5 million SWU, plus
an unknown ongoing royalty amount.
This amounts to a total capital investment
of approximately €3 billion (A$5 billion).[38,43]
The National Enrichment Facility (NEF)
in New Mexico in the United States is
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Urenco.
It will have a capacity of three million
SWU and is estimated to cost US$1.5 billion
(A$2 billion).[44]
The United States Enrichment Corporation
(USEC) American Centrifuge Plant in Ohio
in the United States is expected to cost more
than US$1.7 billion (A$2.3 billion) and will
have a capacity of 3.5 million SWU.[45]
•
•
•
Enriched uranium outlet
Enriched uranium scoop
Depleted uranium scoop
Source: Westinghouse presentation to the Review, United Kingdom, 5 September 2006.
Depleted uranium outlet
Feed inlet
Rotor
Case
Motor
14 Electricity for the Areva gaseous diffusion enrichment plant is provided by nuclear power plants.

39
In a study on multinational approaches to
limiting the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel
cycle capabilities, LaMontagne[46] states that,
according to USEC offi cials, high capital costs
make small facilities economically unattractive.
However data surrounding enrichment
economies of scale are closely held within
the industry.
There is also potential for a new entrant into
the enrichment market with a new technology
if General Electric (GE) successfully completes
the research and development and
commercialisation of the SILEX laser
enrichment technology. Although still in
development, this technology could reduce
capital and energy costs, and has the potential
to infl uence the global enrichment market
in the next decade. The SILEX technology
is an Australian invention and is the only
third-generation laser enrichment process being
developed for commercial use. GE owns the
exclusive commercialisation rights in return
for milestone payments and royalty payments
if the technology is successfully deployed.[47]
3.3.1 The enrichment market
and outlook
Similar to the conversion market, the enrichment
market is highly concentrated and is structured
around a small number of suppliers in the
United States, Europe and Russia.
Current suppliers of enrichment services have
a capacity of approximately 50 million SWU
per year, depending on the estimate of Russian
capacity (Table 3.2). A few countries have more
limited enrichment capacities or are in the
process of developing indigenous enrichment
technologies15 including Argentina, Brazil, India,
Iran, Pakistan and North Korea.
The enrichment market is characterised by
high barriers to entry, including limited and
costly access to technology, trade restrictions,
uncertainty due to the impact of secondary
supply, security of supply and nuclear
non-proliferation issues. It is also undergoing
a technology shift as gaseous diffusion
technology is replaced by centrifuge technology.
Restrictions imposed by the United States
on the importation of Russian uranium
effectively prevents Russia from selling both
natural and enriched uranium directly to the
United States market. The exception to this
is the 5.5 million SWU imported by USEC
as part of the HEU agreement (see Box 3.3).
The diversifi cation of supply policy pursued
by the European Union limits the amount
of uranium imports per utility from any one
source (eg it is limited to approximately 20
per cent for Russian enrichment services).[50]
The United States–Russian HEU agreement
ends in 2013. It is uncertain whether it will
be replaced or whether trade restrictions
will be lifted to allow Russia direct access
to the United States market.
Three major enrichment projects are in early
development stages.
USEC is replacing gaseous diffusion plant
technology with indigenous centrifuges,
still in development, and is expected to
begin in 2010 with an initial capacity
of 3.5 million SWU per year.
•
•
•
•
Box 3.3 The USA–Russia HEU agreement
Since 1987, the United States and former Soviet
countries have concluded a series of disarmament
treaties to reduce nuclear arsenals. In 1993, the
United States and Russian governments signed
an agreement known as the Megatons to Megawatts
program, designed to reduce HEU from nuclear
stockpiles. Under this agreement, Russia is to
convert 500 tonnes of HEU from warheads and
military stockpiles to low-enriched uranium (LEU)
which is bought by the United States for use in civil
nuclear reactors.
The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
and Russia’s Technabexport (Tenex) are executive
agents for the United States and Russian governments.
USEC is purchasing a minimum of 500 tonnes of
weapons-grade HEU (which Russia blends down to
LEU) over 20 years from 1999. USEC then sells the
LEU to customers.
In September 2005, the program reached its halfway
point of 250 tonnes of HEU; at this point it had
produced approximately 7500 tonnes of LEU and
eliminated approximately 10 000 nuclear warheads.
The United States Government has declared that
it has 174 tonnes of surplus military HEU, with about
151 tonnes planned to be blended down eventually for
use as LEU fuel in research and commercial reactors,
and 23 tonnes for disposal as waste. Approximately
46 tonnes of HEU has been transferred to USEC for
down-blending.
The agreement ends in 2013. In the fi rst half of 2006,
Russia indicated that it did not wish to enter into
a second HEU deal after 2013.
Source: UIC,[48] WNA[49]
15 In the late 1970s, the Uranium Enrichment Group of Australia (UEGA) developed plans for the establishment of enrichment in Australia based
on Urenco technology, but the project was terminated.

40
• Urenco is building a centrifuge enrichment
Areva is replacing gaseous diffusion plant
technology with Urenco centrifuges and will
have an initial capacity of 7.5 million SWU
by 2013.
facility in the United States with a capacity
of 3 million SWU by 2013. In addition,
Urenco, Tenex and JNFL have plans to
expand existing capacity.[20,38]
•
n/a = not applicable.
a: Russia has enrichment facilities at four sites, each with different start dates ranging between 1949 and 1964.
Sources: WNA,[20] IAEA[36]
As shown in Figure 3.6, supply is forecast to
exceed demand until 2014. This forecast
includes a build-up of inventory by Areva to
facilitate a smooth transition to centrifuge
technology,[38] and USEC moving to their own
centrifuge technology with a smaller capacity
than the current plant. However, enrichment
plants do not run at full capacity continuously.
Production estimates reduce capacity by
between 10 and 25 per cent; the main difference
being supply by Tenex and USEC.[38]
Taking into account reduced production
estimates, if new investment and expansion
plans proceed as expected, the market will
be reasonably well balanced in the medium
term. However, supply and demand becomes
progressively more diffi cult to ascertain in
the longer term. In particular, UxC makes the
assumption that the HEU deal is not replaced.
While this looks likely, it is not known whether
Russia will continue to down-blend HEU, use
the down-blending capacity to supply their
own internal requirements, or begin to export
SWU directly.[323]
Table 3.2 Enrichment suppliers and capacity
Country Supplier Start of operation Capacity (’000 SWU/year)
Gaseous diffusion
USA USEC 1954 11 300
France Areva 1979 10 800
Centrifuge
Russiaa Tenex 1949–1964 15 000–20 000
Germany Urenco 1985 1700
Netherlands Urenco 1973 2500
UK Urenco 1976 3100
China CNNC 2002 500
CNNC 1999 500
Japan JNFL 1992 600
JNFL 1997 450
Others (Argentina, Brazil,
India & Pakistan)
n/a n/a 300
Total 46 750–51 750

41
90 000
80 000
70 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
10 000
0
2000 2005 2010 2015
WNA Demand Upper WNA Demand Ref WNA Demand Lower
’000 SWU
2020
Supply held
constant at
2015 level
(not forecasts)
Reprocessed fuel
Russian HEU
Tenex
Other
Areva
USEC
NEF
Urenco
Figure 3.6 Forecast world enrichment demand and potential supply
HEU = highly-enriched uranium; NEF = National Enrichment Facility; USEC = United States Enrichment Corporation; WNA = World Nuclear Association
Source: UxC,[38] WNA[20]
3.4 Fuel fabrication
Fuel fabrication is a process by which reactor
fuel assemblies are produced. Enriched uranium
is manufactured into uranium dioxide (UO2) fuel
pellets (Figure 3.7).
Typically, the pellets are loaded into zirconium
alloy or stainless steel tubes to form fuel rods
that are then made into fuel assemblies
(Figure 3.8) to form the reactor core.
Fuel fabrication comprises approximately
15 per cent of the cost of reactor fuel at a price
of approximately US$240 per kg in early 2006
(see Figure 3.2). A 1000 MW reactor operates
with approximately 75 tonnes of fuel loaded
at any one time, with approximately 25 tonnes
replaced each year.[52] However, fuel cycles
vary and used fuel may be replaced from every
12 to 24 months.
Five fuel pellets meet the electricity needs of
a household for one year. A large Westinghouse
pressurised water reactor contains 193 fuel
assemblies, nearly 51 000 fuel rods and
approximately 18 million fuel pellets.[53]
Figure 3.7 Fuel pellet Figure 3.8 Boiling water reactor fuel assembly[51]
Source: Cameco

42
3.4.1 The fuel fabrication
market and outlook
The fuel fabrication market differs from the
conversion and enrichment markets because
each fuel assembly is customised to a specifi c
reactor. There are at least 100 different fuel rod
specifi cations for nuclear reactors around the
world. In addition, required enrichment levels
can differ within reactor cores, based on the
fuel management strategy of each utility.
The fuel fabrication industry has reorganised
and consolidated several times over the past
few years.[36] As a result, three main suppliers
provide 80 per cent of global enriched fuel
demand: Areva, BNFL-Westinghouse and Global
Nuclear Fuels (GE, Toshiba and Hitachi).[20]
Fuel fabricators are typically associated with
reactor vendors, who supply the initial core
and in many cases refuel the reactor. Although
a highly customised product, LWRs have
become increasingly standardised, enabling
fabricators to supply fuel assemblies for several
LWR designs. Standardisation of reactor design
is likely to increase in future.
Fuel fabrication is affected by factors such
as fuel assembly design and increased cycle
length. Fuel assembly design has improved and
the time between refuelling is increasing from
12 months to 24 months. These factors have
reduced the number of fuel assemblies required.
The WNA forecasts that global fuel fabrication
capacity for all types of LWRs signifi cantly
exceeds demand and suggests that industry
consolidation and reorganisation will
continue.[20]
3.5 Opportunities for Australia
The possibility of Australia becoming involved
in one or more of the stages of conversion,
enrichment and fuel fabrication presents both
signifi cant challenges and some opportunities.
The integrated nature of the industry worldwide
makes entry diffi cult. While Australia may have
the capability to build an enrichment plant, any
such decision would need to be a commercial
one. The presumed high returns from
enrichment services would need to be balanced
against the high barriers to entry and the large
technological, economic and political
investments required.16
Submissions from both BHP Billiton[17] and
Rio Tinto[15] state clearly that they are not
contemplating entry into the nuclear fuel
value-added market and discuss the challenges
involved in so doing. BHP Billiton states that
the development of a conversion or enrichment
capability will need to clear signifi cant
regulatory, diplomatic and public perception
hurdles, as well as provide a commercial return.
There is no case for the Australian Government
to subsidise entry into this value-adding
industry. On the other hand, neither is there
a strong case to discourage the development
of the industry in Australia, and hence, legal
and regulatory prohibitions would need to
be removed to enable normal commercial
decision-making.
3.5.1 Nuclear fuel leasing
Nuclear fuel leasing refers to the supply
of fuel to reactors and the subsequent
management of reactor spent fuel, essentially
a whole-of-life concept.
Proposed scenarios (including those by the
Australian Nuclear Fuel Leasing Group)[54]
involve the utility leasing the fuel from an
internationally-approved source and returning
the spent fuel to that source for storage and
ultimate disposal after use. In exchange, utilities
would be assured of secure fuel supplies and
disposal, but ownership of nuclear fuel
materials would remain with the leasing
company rather than the utility.
16 Submissions to the Review that noted these challenges included those from Areva, ANSTO, Silex, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto.

43
As well as an additional means of value-adding,
it has been proposed that nuclear fuel leasing
could enhance the international nuclear
non-proliferation and safeguards regimes.
This proposal is one of several nuclear
non-proliferation frameworks discussed
in Chapter 8.
The nuclear fuel leasing concept in Australia
relies on the appropriate local disposal of
high-level waste that would arise from the use
of Australian uranium leased by overseas
utilities. Regional and international waste
repositories are discussed in Chapter 5.
3.5.2 Legal and regulatory regime
Current statutory prohibitions prevent further
stages of the nuclear fuel cycle beyond mining
being established in Australia. A robust national
legal and regulatory framework would need to
be established, as discussed in Chapter 9,
before any commercial development in the
nuclear fuel processing sector.
3.5.3 Employment and
skills formation
Entry into the value-added sector will create
professional, skilled and unskilled employment,
both directly and indirectly. However, it must be
noted that companies in the nuclear fuel cycle
worldwide are grappling with a shortage of
skilled personnel, partly due to the lack of
growth in the nuclear industry over the last
20 years (see Chapter 10 for further detail
on skills formation).
3.6 Conclusion
Participation in the conversion, enrichment
and fuel fabrication industries could
signifi cantly increase the value of Australian
uranium exports.
The potential for additional export revenues
must be balanced against the costs associated
with entering and operating in the market.
While there are signifi cant challenges
associated with entering the value-add industry,
the Government would need to remove the
legal prohibitions to enable commercial
decision-making. The commercial viability and
international competitiveness of a new plant
in any part of the nuclear fuel cycle will depend
on factors such as capital cost, operating costs,
the ability to access technology on competitive
terms, the state of the international market,
access to the required skill base and the
regulatory environment. In the case of
enrichment, there are also issues associated
with the storage of depleted uranium and
nuclear non-proliferation. Some or all of these
factors may change over the medium term.

44

45
Chapter 4. Electricity generation
Electricity demand in Australia is
expected to continue to grow strongly,
more than doubling by 2050.
Nuclear power is an internationally
proven technology that is competitive
with fossil fuel baseload generation
in many parts of the world and
contributes 15 per cent of global
electricity generation.
Cost estimates suggest that in
Australia nuclear power would
on average be 20–50 per cent more
expensive to produce than coal-fi red
power if pollution, including carbon
dioxide emissions, is not priced.
Nuclear power is the least-cost low-emission
technology that can provide
baseload power, is well established,
and can play a role in Australia’s future
generation mix.
Nuclear power can become competitive
with fossil fuel-based generation in
Australia, if based on international
best practice and with the introduction
of low to moderate pricing of carbon
dioxide emissions.
The cost of nuclear power is strongly
infl uenced by investor perceptions
of risk. Risk is highly dependent on
regulatory policy and the certainty of
licensing and construction timeframes.
A stable policy environment and a
predictable licensing and regulatory
regime would be a necessary precursor
to the development of nuclear power
in Australia.
Accumulated funds deducted from
nuclear power revenues are the best
practice method to cover waste disposal
and plant decommissioning costs.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
4.1 Australian electricity
demand
Australian electricity consumption has
increased more than threefold over the period
1974–1975 to 2004–2005, to approximately 252
TWh.17 [55] Consumption in 2004 was just under
1.4 per cent of the world total.[56]
Although energy consumption per unit of gross
domestic product (GDP) is declining, economic
and population growth are driving up the
demand for electricity. With the increasing
reliance on electrically powered technologies,
consumption is projected to grow at around
2 per cent per year to 2030. The bulk of the
electricity will continue to be used in industry
and commerce, but domestic consumption is
also expected to increase.
Electricity consumption is projected to reach
approximately 410 TWh by 2029–2030.[55] Figure
4.1 shows the projection to 2050, with an annual
electricity demand of more than 550 TWh.
Servicing such demands would require over
100 GW of generating capacity by 2050. Large
baseload plant may provide two-thirds or more
of this capacity.
The scenario shown in Figure 4.1 assumes
that electricity demand will grow more slowly
than total economic output, refl ecting relatively
faster growth in less energy-intensive sectors
and improved energy effi ciency.18 Under-utilised
generating capacity exists, but from 2010
growing demand will require signifi cant
investment in new capacity.
Peak demand is growing faster than average
demand. This is leading to investment in
fast-response gas turbine plants where the
high fuel cost is not an impediment in
meeting system peaks. Under current retail
arrangements, electricity prices for most
consumers are averaged and regulated, thus
providing no incentive to reduce demand
when high-cost peak generators are dispatched
(supplying). With advanced metering this
situation will change.
17 A TWh is a unit of energy equal to 1000 gigawatt hours (GWh) or 1 million Megawatt hours (MWh). It is equivalent to the energy delivered
by a 1000 MW power station operating for 1000 hours.
18 While improved energy effi ciency can delay investment in generation, it also has a rebound effect. The effi ciency gain may not result
in an equivalent reduction in consumption. Historically, effi ciency improvements have been offset by increased electricity use through
extended applications and larger appliances.

46
Upgrades and new
generation required
Existing electricity
generators
Figure 4.1 Demand–supply balance for electricity (TWh)
TWh
600
500
400
300
200
100
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Year
0
91% 72% 48% 22% 12%
Source: ABARE,[57] Energy Task Force,[58] UMPNER estimates
4.2 Electricity supply
in Australia, current
and future
4.2.1 The Australian electricity
supply industry
Electricity supply contributes approximately
1.5 per cent to GDP. The industry has
approximately 48 gigawatts (GW) of installed
capacity,[59,60] controls around A$100 billion in
assets and employs more than 30 000 people.[1]
Baseload plant capacity comprises
approximately 70 per cent of the generating
fl eet, but supplies 87 per cent of electricity
delivered. Baseload plant, with low marginal
costs, is generally dispatched for much longer
periods than peak and intermediate plant.[1]
Figure 4.2 shows the sources of electricity
generation for 2004–2005. Black and brown
coals are currently the major fuel sources,
contributing approximately 75 per cent of the
total. The share contributed by gas has been
increasing due to its use in peaking plant, and
also the 13 per cent Gas Scheme in Queensland.
Several features defi ne the electricity market.
As bulk electricity cannot be stored
economically, reliable supply requires
generation to match demand. Furthermore,
demand varies daily and seasonally (Box 4.1).
Thus the system must include some generating
capacity able to follow load changes quickly.
Box 4.1 Variability of electricity demand
and supply
As electricity is diffi cult and costly to store beyond
small amounts, once generated it must be delivered
and used immediately (although ‘pumped storage’
hydro-electric plant, where it is available, allows for
a modicum of supply/demand fl exibility). During
demand troughs (notably overnight) signifi cant
generating capacity is idle. Figure 4.3 compares
electricity demand in the National Electricity Market
for a typical summer and winter week.19
Depending on location, demand may be highest
in summer or winter, corresponding to changing
seasonal power requirements, especially heating and
airconditioning. Demand also fl uctuates throughout
the day due to varying industrial and domestic patterns
of usage.
19 The National Electricity Market (NEM) is a wholesale market where electricity is supplied to electricity retailers in Queensland, New South Wales,
the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania.

47
Black coal, 54.3%
Brown coal, 21.6%
Gas, 14.8%
Hydro, 6.7%
Oil, 1.3%
Wind, 0.6%
Biomass, 0.4%
Biogas, 0.2%
Figure 4.2 Australian electricity generation by fuel, 2004–2005
Source: ABARE[1]
Figure 4.3 Electricity demand over summer and winter days (MW)
35 000 Summer demand
30 000
25 000
20 000
15 000
10 000
5000
0
Source: National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO)[61]
pattern
Winter demand
pattern
Monday 12.00am
Tuesday 12.00pm
Tuesday 12.00am
Wednesday 12.00pm
Wednesday 12.00am
Thursday 12.00pm
Thursday 12.00am
Friday 12.00pm
Friday 12.00am
Saturday 12.00pm
Saturday 12.00am
Sunday 12.00pm
Sunday 12.00am
Monday 12.00pm
Monday 12.00am
MW

48
Intermittent generators (principally wind
power and some other renewables) require
complementary generation capacity that can
be called upon when the intermittent capacity
is unavailable.20 ‘Spinning reserve’ (provided
by conventional power plant) can help to cope
with sudden load changes and unplanned loss of
generation. Some spare capacity is also required
to allow for planned maintenance and outage.
Generating plant with the lowest operating costs
(eg coal-fi red boiler/steam turbine) is the least
responsive to load change, while those that are
more responsive (eg open cycle gas turbines)
are more expensive to run continuously.21
Plants with high capital costs generally have
low operating costs and vice versa.
Market niches for a wide range of electricity
supply technologies are created by differing
capital costs, ability to respond to fl uctuating
demand, location-specifi c needs, fuel sources,
and the need for safety, security and reliability.
A comparison of technologies based only on
cost per MWh would be misleading, given that
a portfolio of generating technologies will form
the basis of any national electricity supply
system. The most fl exible and effi cient system
is likely to include numerous technologies,
each economically meeting the portion of the
system load to which it is best suited. In a well-functioning
system, a diversity of sources can
also provide greater reliability and security of
electricity supply. The Australian electricity
market provides price signals to help the
portfolio evolve towards an effi cient solution.22
4.2.2 Future prospects for Australian
electricity generation
The dynamics for investment in electricity
generation capacity are as follows: demand
grows; reserve capacity decreases and wholesale
electricity price peaks are of longer duration.
Peak and intermediate generators are then
dispatched for longer periods. Wholesale price
increases encourage investment in new baseload
(low-cost, large-scale) plant; wholesale prices are
driven down; peak and intermediate plants are
then dispatched less.
Without a change in emissions policy
(see Box 4.2), Australian baseload generation
will continue to be dominated by conventional
fossil fuel, albeit with progressive technology
advances. Figure 4.4 shows fuels and
technologies expected to be used in 2029–2030,
based on current policies. Black coal will
continue to dominate, although natural gas
is expected to increase its share by 50 per cent.
Renewables will also increase their market share
slightly; however, growing off a low base means
that even by 2030 they will probably still
contribute less than 10 per cent of electricity
supply. Wind and biofuel generation are forecast
to triple their market share, although the hydro
share is expected to decrease. Nuclear power
is not shown.
4.2.3 Electricity generating
technologies
In Australia, electricity generating technologies
include: sub critical pulverised coal, supercritical
pulverised coal, open cycle gas turbines (OCGT),
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT), and hydro.
Major new technologies still at the demonstration
or research and development stage include:
integrated gasifi cation combined cycle (black
coal), integrated de-watered gasifi cation
combined cycle (brown coal), ultra supercritical
coal, and fossil fuel generation as above
combining geosequestration or carbon capture
and storage (CCS). Other promising technologies
include geothermal (hot dry rocks) and
renewables such as small-scale hydro-electric,
wind, biofuel, solar photovoltaic, solar thermal,
tidal and wave power.
Coal fi red generation is nearly always used
in baseload applications due to large thermal
inertia. Gas may be used for base, intermediate
or peak generation, although the technologies
are application specifi c. With its high cycle
effi ciency a CCGT plant is best suited for base
and intermediate load applications. An OCGT
plant provides near instantaneous power but
suffers high fuel costs, making it economically
suitable only for peak load applications.
20 While the inclusion of intermittent sources can increase the need for complementary gas peaking or open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) plants and the
requirement for spinning reserve capacity, industry estimates suggest wind could meet up to 20 per cent of demand without undue disruption to the
network. As wind power is dispatched fi rst in the merit order and also drives greater uptake of OCGT peaking plants, the net effect of incorporating
greater levels of wind power into the system is to displace unresponsive baseload plant, including coal and nuclear power. However, the
displacement of baseload plant could raise the average cost of electricity supply.
21 Hydro-electricity tends to be an exception to this rule, being almost instantly variable but with costs determined almost entirely by capital,
rather than operating costs, which are minimal.
22 See for example, CRA International.[62]

49
Figure 4.4 Projected Australian electricity generation in 2029–2030 under current policy settings
Black coal, 51.4%
Gas, 21.8%
Brown coal, 17.4%
Hydro, 4.4%
Wind, 1.9%
Biomass, 1.6%
Oil, 1.0%
Biogas, 0.5%
Source: ABARE[1]
Fossil fuel plants could be combined with CCS.
However, CCS remains to be proven except in
highly specifi c applications (notably oil recovery
from ageing wells). Uncertainties remain about
the cost of CCS, and its reliability and security
over the long term. CCS may be less effective
in reducing emissions when retrofi tted to
existing plants.[63,64]
While offering the prospect of lower greenhouse
emissions from coal and gas fi ring, CCS
technologies suffer two disadvantages
compared to nuclear power. First, CCS uses
signifi cant extra energy and additional
complex plant. This increases the cost
of electricity dispatched.
Second, policies that price greenhouse and
other emissions would further reduce the
competitiveness of CCS compared to nuclear
power because CCS technologies, even on
optimistic scenarios, are expected to remain
more emissions intensive.23 (Pricing greenhouse
emissions does, however, increase the
competitiveness of CCS technology relative
to conventional fossil fuel based power.)
Most renewable technologies deliver very low
emissions in operation. Over the longer term,
some emerging technologies could displace
a proportion of fossil fuel based generation.
However, even though renewable technologies
are competitive in some situations (eg a well-sited
wind farm or off-grid applications of solar
power) these low emission and less mature
technologies are typically not competitive with
conventional fossil fuel and are likely to remain
so even over the medium to longer term. In the
absence of technical breakthroughs or the
pricing of greenhouse and other emissions,
substantial uptake of renewables will continue
to require subsidies.[65–67]
Nuclear power could become less expensive
than fossil fuel electricity, should fossil
fuel prices rise or nuclear capital costs
fall suffi ciently through standardised and
modular designs.
23 For further discussion on CCS technologies see Ecofys/TNO.[64]

50
4.3 The role of nuclear power
4.3.1 Nuclear power
in other countries
Nuclear power now supplies 15 per cent
of the world’s electricity from 443 reactors,
which provide 368 GW of generating capacity
(ie over seven times Australia’s total from all
sources).[68] The United States is the biggest
user with 104 reactors, followed by France with
59, Japan with 56 and the United Kingdom with
23. 31 countries were producing electricity from
nuclear reactors in 2005, according to the IEA.
Table 4.1 shows key nuclear statistics.
Approximately 80 per cent of the commercial
reactors operating are cooled and moderated
with ordinary water and are known as light
water reactors (LWRs). The two major LWR
types are pressurised water reactors (PWRs)
and boiling water reactors (BWRs). Most of
the remaining 20 per cent of reactors are
cooled by heavy water or gas.[37] Within each
type, different designs result from differing
manufacturer and customer specifi cations
and regulatory requirements.
Many reactors built in the 1970s and 1980s are
expected to continue to operate beyond 2015.
Studies reveal no major technical obstacles to
long operational lives and operators are fi nding
refurbishment profi table. As of 2006, 44 power
reactors in the United States have been granted
20-year licence extensions by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Eleven power reactors
are being considered for licence extension and
others are likely to follow.[69]
According to the World Nuclear Association
(WNA) in 2006, 28 power reactors were being
constructed in 11 countries, notably China,
South Korea, Japan and Russia.[23] No new
power reactor has been completed in the
past decade in either Europe or North America,
but one is being constructed in Finland (for
completion in 2010) and construction will soon
commence on another in France (for completion
in 2012). In the United Kingdom, the
government has stated that nuclear power
is back on its agenda, but within a policy
framework that does not mandate particular
technologies. As outlined in Chapter 9, the
United Kingdom has begun to reform its nuclear
licensing system to facilitate private investment
in nuclear power.
Figure 4.5 shows the historical growth of
nuclear power from 1965 to 2005 and scenarios
of future growth to 2030. Growth has been
extended based on the two (hypothetical)
scenarios described in the IEA World Energy
Outlook 2006.[3]
IEA World Energy Outlook 2006 scenarios
suggest that in 2030 installed nuclear power
capacity worldwide could be between 416 GW
and 519 GW.24
4.3.2 Characteristics
of nuclear power
As a technology, nuclear power is typically
characterised by high capital costs, signifi cant
regulatory costs, low operational costs, high
capacity factors, long operational life and
relative insensitivity to fuel price variations.
Scale economies dominate and current
Generation III technologies do not appear to be
economic for power plants of capacities much
below 1000 MW.25 South Korean and French
experience suggests that the cost of building
nuclear reactors decreases as subsequent
plants of standardised design are built.[37,70,71]
Nuclear power also involves decommissioning,
and radioactive waste management and
disposal. However, these costs are a relatively
small component of the total life cycle costs
(partly because most are incurred long after
reactor construction). Amounts are typically
deducted from electricity revenues throughout
the operating life of a plant to accumulate
suffi cient funding for post-shutdown activities.
This issue is discussed in greater detail below.
The key advantages of nuclear power include
very low greenhouse and other gas emissions
and an ability to provide electricity generation
on a large scale, at high capacity factors over
many years. Nuclear fuel is easy to stockpile,
low fuel costs lead to relative insensitivity to
fuel price variations and there is a need to refuel
only periodically (eg one-third of the reactor
core might be replaced every 12–18 months).
The ease of fuel management is important
to countries concerned with energy security.26
24 The reference scenario assumes that current government policies remain broadly unchanged. The alternative policy scenario assumes the adoption
of policies to promote nuclear power.
25 Small-scale designs (around 200 MW) such as the South African Pebble Bed Modular Reactor or the General Atomics Gas Turbine-Modular Helium
Reactor are being developed, but these may not be commercialised for some years.
26 Australia’s coal reserves provide a very high degree of energy security for electricity generation.[56]

51
Table 4.1 Key nuclear statistics, 2005
Country No. reactors Installed
capacity (GW)
Gross nuclear
electricity
generation
(TWh)
Share of nuclear
power in total
generation (%)
GW = gigawatts; TWh = terrawatt hours; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Source: IEA[3]
No. nuclear
operators
OECD 351 308.4 2333 22.4 68
Belgium 7 5.8 48 55.2 1
Canada 18 12.6 92 14.6 4
Czech Republic 6 3.5 25 29.9 1
Finland 4 2.7 23 33.0 2
France 59 63.1 452 78.5 1
Germany 17 20.3 163 26.3 4
Hungary 4 1.8 14 38.7 1
Japan 56 47.8 293 27.7 10
South Korea 20 16.8 147 37.4 1
Mexico 2 1.3 11 4.6 1
Netherlands 1 0.5 4 4.0 1
Slovak Republic 6 2.4 18 57.5 2
Spain 9 7.6 58 19.5 5
Sweden 10 8.9 72 45.4 3
Switzerland 5 3.2 23 39.1 4
United Kingdom 23 11.9 82 20.4 2
United States 104 98.3 809 18.9 26
Transition
Economies 54 40.5 274 17.0 7
Armenia 1 0.4 3 42.7 1
Bulgaria 4 2.7 17 39.2 1
Lithuania 1 1.2 10 68.2 1
Romania 1 0.7 5 8.6 1
Russia 31 21.7 149 15.7 1
Slovenia 1 0.7 6 39.6 1
Ukraine 15 13.1 84 45.1 1
Developing
Countries 38 19 135 2.1 11
Argentina 2 0.9 6 6.3 1
Brazil 2 1.9 10 2.2 1
China 9 6.0 50 2.0 5
India 15 3.0 16 2.2 1
Pakistan 2 0.4 2 2.8 1
South Africa 2 1.8 12 5.0 1
World27 443 367.8 2742 14.9 86
27 World totals include six reactors in Taiwan with an installed capacity of 4.9 GW, gross nuclear electricity generation of 38 TWh, a 16.9 per cent share
of nuclear power in total generation and one nuclear operator.

52
Figure 4.5 World growth of nuclear power, 1965–2030
Number of reactors
600
500
400
300
200
100
Source: NEA[37], IEA[3]
Number of reactors
Capacity (GW)
IEA reference scenario (GW)
IEA alternative scenario (GW)
519
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
Year
45
81
167
243
365
419
435 436 443
5
16 72
136
253
326
345
352
367.8
416
600
500
400
300
200
100
GW
0
0
Current disadvantages of nuclear power include
investment (fi nancing) risks, long construction
times compared with most other electricity
generating technologies, persistently negative
perceptions, especially regarding the safety
of nuclear waste disposal and a possibility
of accidents releasing harmful radiation. The
nuclear power industry has been working to
reduce these disadvantages. (Nuclear reactor
technology is discussed in Appendix L) There
is also a need to provide specialist regulatory
agencies and detailed safety regimes.
Modelling by ABARE and others suggests that
the inclusion of nuclear power in the mix of
technologies for Australia would reduce the
costs of achieving large cuts in greenhouse
emissions.[65,67] (Climate change and the role
of nuclear power in greenhouse gas abatement
are discussed in Chapter 7.)
4.4 Economics of nuclear power
4.4.1 Comparative costs of electricity
generation technologies
Electricity generation costs need to be
evaluated consistently across all generation
technologies, although it is diffi cult to make
precise comparisons among widely-differing
alternatives. The magnitude and timing of
construction, fuel use, operating and
maintenance costs, as well as environmental
regulations vary across technologies. Many
site-specifi c factors also affect electricity
generation costs. Ultimately, the choice of
technology is made by investors looking at a
specifi c opportunity under specifi c investment
criteria. For this Review it is appropriate to
compare technologies by considering their
costs only within wide ranges.

53
International evidence confi rms that in many
countries nuclear power is competitive.[37,72,73]
The evidence shows that nuclear power costs
have fallen since the 1980s due to increased
capacity factors, extended lifetimes and
improved reactor designs.[37] Given higher fossil
fuel prices in recent years, nuclear power has
become attractive in countries lacking access
to easily exploitable coal and gas.
While the nuclear power industry has been in a
hiatus in the United States and Europe following
the accidents at Three Mile Island in the United
States and Chernobyl in the former Soviet
Union, construction has continued in Asia.
Efforts in the United States and Europe have
focused on fi nding ways to reduce costs while
improving safety. These efforts have also
produced new, standardised, simplifi ed designs,
and the development of modular construction
techniques to reduce construction times.
However, the extent to which a new generation
of reactors will reduce the cost of nuclear power
remains to be confi rmed through experience.[74]
Historical cost overruns and construction delays
for nuclear power plants may be attributed,
among other things, to:
‘design as you go’ approaches
delays in approval processes
‘preference engineering’ (ie a regulator’s
preference for a new system to be similar
to a familiar one, rather than assessing a
new system against relevant safety criteria)
a tendency to modify designs with each
new plant, reducing the scope for economic
prefabrication (modularisation) and
perpetuating on-site, ‘fi rst of a kind’
(FOAK) construction
a ‘cost plus’ culture in regulated markets
changing political, legislative and regulatory
requirements.[75]
•
•
•
•
•
•
By contrast, emerging best practice in nuclear
power plant construction involves adopting
a design approved by international experts
and building identical units as a series.
The Taskforce commissioned the Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI) to examine
several recent studies that compare the costs
of generating electricity using different
technologies, including nuclear energy.[74]
The studies all used levelised cost of electricity
(LCOE) estimates to calculate a constant cost
for each generation option. The levelised cost
is the constant real wholesale price of electricity
that recoups owners’ and investors’ capital,
operating, and fuel costs including income
taxes and associated cash-fl ow constraints.
The LCOE approach is widely used and easy to
understand, but often produces widely varying
results mainly because of differences in the
assumptions and inputs used in calculations.
EPRI found that the studies show broad
cost ranges for all generating technologies.
The studies with very low LCOE estimates
for nuclear power use very low discount
rates. This may be justifi ed in some cases
(eg Tarjanne)[73] because the owners of the
plant are also customers and are prepared
to fi nance the plant at low interest rates.[73,74]
In other cases, assuming a lower than
commercial discount rate may be justifi able
from the utility’s perspective if the utility is
partly fi nanced by a government, as in the
low end scenario of Gittus,[71] or if it is
government-owned and operating in a regulated
environment, where it can borrow near the
government bond rate and pass all costs on
to customers through regulated prices. Such
an environment does not reduce fi nancial risk,
but instead transfers costs from the utility to
taxpayers or customers.28
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) (2005) low-end LCOE
estimates use a 5 per cent discount rate,
which would equate to a government bond
rate. At a 10 per cent discount rate, the
OECD estimate for nuclear power begins
at approximately A$40/MWh.[76]
28 The national electricity market (NEM) is a liberalised wholesale market open to competitive bidding. Prices are not guaranteed to generators.
In such a market, the risk surrounding the economics of nuclear power would be borne by investors, not consumers.

54
The studies more oriented toward a commercial
environment for new nuclear builds, according
to EPRI, are Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT)[77] and University of
Chicago[70], where LCOE estimates for nuclear
power range from A$75–105/MWh. These
numbers are high partly due to assumptions
that new plants will suffer from FOAK costs
(common in complex engineering projects) and
initial learning curves. Both the University of
Chicago and MIT illustrate sensitivities where
the ‘settled down’ LCOE could be in the range
of A$40–65/MWh, although EPRI notes that
such settled down costs are yet to be proven
in practice.
There is no reason why Australia could not
avoid some FOAK costs if Australia becomes
a late adopter of new generation reactors,
according to EPRI, but nuclear power plants
are initially likely to be 10–15 per cent more
expensive than in the United States because
Australia has neither nuclear power
construction experience, nor regulatory
infrastructure. This would put nuclear power
in the A$44–70/MWh range for the fi rst
Australian plant, assuming it was not FOAK,
and that investor perception of commercial
risk was akin to the risk perceived for other
baseload technologies. In practice, investors
may consider nuclear power to be more
commercially risky.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the estimates from various
studies and shows how costs vary according
to perceptions of risk (and therefore the cost
of capital) and whether the plant is a FOAK
or a settled down build. This shows that for
settled down costs and moderate commercial
risk akin to other baseload investment,
nuclear power could fall within the cost
range of A$40–65/MWh.
Figure 4.6 Indicative ranges of nuclear power cost
Tarjanne
Gittus
$120
$100
$80
$60
$40
$20
Source: EPRI study[74], Mayson[78] and Howarth[79]
RAE
MIT
MIT
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
$0
3% 5% 7% 9% 11% 13% 15%
Levelised cost of electricity generation
(A$ 2006 /MWh)
Weighted average cost of capital
Settled down costs
Low commercial risk
Settled down costs
Moderate commercial risk
First of a kind costs
Higher commercial risk

55
This cost range would still be uneconomic
compared to Australia’s cheap coal generation,
but overlaps with the higher end of CCGT
electricity and would likely be lower on average
than CCS cost estimates and renewables.
Levelised cost ranges likely to be applicable for
Australia for different generation technologies
are shown in Figure 4.7.
Nuclear power could become economic even
with conventional coal-based electricity at low
to moderate prices for carbon emissions —
at approximately A$15–40/t CO2-e.29
If investors perceive high fi nancial risk
or if FOAK plants were planned, higher
carbon prices or other policies would be
required before investment in nuclear power
would occur. Naturally, projects need to be
evaluated on their specifi c merits and this
Review cannot substitute for such an evaluation.
Beyond the costs of production, other features
of nuclear power may make it relatively
unattractive for Australian investors. The
learning by doing that is a feature of complex
technologies means nuclear power is most
economic if a fl eet of several plants is built.
Yet a single 1000–1600 MW plant would be
a sizeable investment for existing private
generating companies in the Australian market
(although it would not be a large investment
in the context of Australian fi nancial markets).
Such investors usually have less than 4000 MW
of total generating capacity spread over several
units.30 Private generators in liberalised markets
have typically shown a preference for faster lead
times and more fl exible technologies.
4.4.2 Other considerations
for nuclear plants in the
Australian market
Other issues raised during the Taskforce’s
consultations and in submissions include:
The risk of competing against state-owned
generating assets within the national
electricity market (NEM) may deter
private investment in large power plants
(including nuclear).
•
A move to larger baseload plants will
increase the reserve capacity requirement
needed to allow for larger plants being taken
off line. (Currently, the largest units in the
NEM are approx. 750 MW, although it is not
unknown for several of these to go off line
at once due to maintenance, plant failure
or transmission outage.)
Australia’s transmission network is
considered to be ‘long and thin’, with
generators located far from load and links
between different regions capacity
constrained. Network congestion can occur
with large power transfers between regions.
This may happen if, for example, excess
capacity in New South Wales is needed
in Queensland. The network is being
progressively upgraded, but the economic
case becomes stronger as larger generation
plants are built.31
Baseload technologies, including nuclear,
typically use large volumes of water for
cooling (eg from rivers, estuaries or the
ocean), although dry cooling can be used
at marginally higher cost if adequate water
is not available (as at the large Kogan
Creek coal-fi red plant).[81] Restrictions
on the quantities of water that generators
may draw already limit baseload supply in
some states during the hotter months.[82]
Water use is discussed in Chapter 7.
There is greater fl exibility in siting nuclear
plants insofar as they are independent
of fuel and waste disposal locations.
Plants could be sited near current coal
fi red plants to use existing transmission
networks, or close to demand to minimise
transmission costs.
•
•
•
•
Some of these comments suggest possible
impediments to nuclear power in Australian
electricity networks, but none would be
insurmountable, given the period over
which nuclear power may be introduced.
29 While there is considerable debate about what an appropriate price of carbon should be, a range of A$15–40 CO2-e is at the low to moderate
end of the range commonly used in economic modelling of policy options.
30 Some of these considerations are likely to apply large scale CCS applications as well.
31 For further discussion on issues of network congestions see the ACIL Tasman report.[80]

56
Figure 4.7 Levelised cost ranges for various technologies
$120
$110
$100
$90
$80
$70
$60
$50
$40
$30
$20
Levelised cost estimates ( A$ 2006/MWh )
Nuclear
Nuclear costs are settled down costs for new plant
CCS estimates are indicative only
Renewables have large ranges and substantial overlaps
MWh = megawatt hours; PV = photovoltaic
Source: EPRI study[74]
Coal
Coal — supercritical
pulverised coal
combustion + CCS
Gas — combined
cycle gas turbine
+ CCS
Coal — integrated
gasification combined
cycle + CCS
Renewables
Solar PV
Solar thermal /
Biomass
High capacity
factor wind /
small hydro
Gas — combined
cycle gas turbine
4.4.3 External costs of electricity
generation technologies
Externalities are costs or benefi ts that affect
a third party, rather than the immediate
participants in a market transaction. All forms
of electricity generation involve externalities
of one type or another. From a societal point
of view, externalities need to be accounted for
(internalised) through policy instruments as far
as possible so that decisions are made taking
into account all the societal costs and benefi ts.
Where externalities are substantial, policies that
internalise them can change market decisions.
The external costs of electricity generation
in Europe are reproduced from the European
Union ExternE report in summary form
in Figure 4.8.[83] Other studies on the external
costs of nuclear power are reported in Table 4.2.
While the cost estimates should not be directly
translated to Australia, some general
conclusions can be drawn. For fossil fuel
powered generation, external costs are around
the same order of magnitude as direct costs,
principally due to greenhouse emissions.
For nuclear power, wind power and solar
photovoltaic (not shown), external costs are
approximately one order of magnitude lower
than the direct costs. Nuclear, solar photovoltaic
and wind power produce no direct greenhouse
emissions. When measured on a life cycle
basis, which takes into account upstream
and downstream processes, their emissions
are still very low.

57
Figure 4.8 External and direct costs of electricity generation in the European Union (€/MWh)32
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
Direct costs
External
cost added
Direct costs
cost added
External
Direct costs
External
cost added
Direct costs
External
cost added
Direct costs
cost added
External
Coal and lignite Gas Nuclear Biomass Wind
¤/MWh
Source: ExternE[83]
The relatively low estimates from the ORNL,
Pearce et al and Friedrich and Voss studies
when compared with the ExternE study can be
attributed mainly to narrower defi nitions of the
boundaries of the system.
The very high PACE study estimate of external
costs is attributable to a number of factors,
including treating decommissioning costs as
an external cost (whereas such costs are today
usually included in direct generation costs).[4]
In addition, the PACE estimate for the cost of
nuclear accidents was based on a major core
release to the environment, on the scale of
Chernobyl, occurring once every 3300 reactor
years. This is far higher than the probability
that experts consider appropriate for new
nuclear plants in the OECD.[87] Worldwide, there
are now over 10 000 reactor-years of operating
experience and modern nuclear power plants
have multiple safety features and employ
entirely different designs to that used at
Chernobyl.[37,87]
Within OECD countries, the nuclear power
industry operates under regulations that set
stringent limits for atmospheric emissions and
liquid effl uents, as well as regulations requiring
the containment of solid radioactive waste to
ensure its isolation from the biosphere. Thus,
nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities
already internalise the major portion of their
potential external costs.
The fi ndings of studies on the externalities of
electricity generation support the conclusion
that pricing greenhouse emissions would alter
the relative competitiveness of generating
technologies, with nuclear and most renewables
gaining strongly.
32 €1 = A$1.66, approximately
Table 4.2 External costs of the nuclear fuel cycle
Study External Cost (A$/MWh)
ORNL[83] 0.33–0.50
Pearce et al[84] 1.33–2.99
Friedrich and Voss[85] 0.17–1.16
PACE[86] 48.3

58
The environmental performance of generating
technologies is discussed further in Chapter 7.
4.4.4 Financing waste disposal
and plant decommissioning
OECD countries using nuclear power typically
establish special accounts or trust funds
designed to accumulate suffi cient amounts
to cover waste disposal and decommissioning
costs. Financing systems sometimes involve
the collection of fees related to the amount
of nuclear electricity generated. In some
countries, owners of nuclear facilities need to
provide other fi nancial guarantees and give fi rst
priority to nuclear waste and decommissioning
liabilities. This helps to ensure that producers
of nuclear power take into account virtually
all life cycle costs.[87]
For example, in Finland nuclear waste
management fees are collected from nuclear
power producers. These fees cover the costs
of spent fuel disposal, operating waste and
the management of decommissioning waste.
The funds are accumulated in the State Nuclear
Waste Management Fund and ultimately
reimbursed to meet the costs of waste
management as they arise.
Decommissioning programs may have recourse
to other funds. The decommissioning of ‘legacy’
nuclear reactors (eg those used in early R&D
and defence activities) is generally funded by
governments.
Nuclear decommissioning is costly, but how
much so depends on the extent and timing
of site restoration, and to a large extent the
vintage of the reactors. The United Kingdom
Sustainable Development Commission
considers that modern reactors will have
substantially lower decommissioning costs.[89]
Early generation reactors tend to have very
large cores and dismantling creates a much
larger volume of high and intermediate level
radioactive wastes than a modern reactor would
create. Modern reactors are also designed from
the outset to facilitate decommissioning.
OECD member country estimates suggest
that undiscounted decommissioning costs
range between 15 and 20 per cent of initial
construction. When discounted and amortised
over the useful plant life, the cost is typically
below 3 per cent.[87]
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the potential
competitiveness of nuclear power in
Australia. The technology is well established
internationally. Under appropriate policy
settings, the inclusion of nuclear power
in the portfolio of generating technologies
could reduce the economic costs of achieving
large scale greenhouse emission cuts. However,
a range of technical and policy steps, as well
as public confi dence and acceptance, would
be needed before nuclear power could
be introduced.
Box 4.2 Pricing greenhouse emissions
Driving greenhouse emission reductions across
the economy is a complex problem. There are many
possible ways to encourage abatement, including
technical regulation, environmental subsidies, sectoral
emissions caps, emissions capping with trading, a
carbon tax, or a hybrid of permit trading and emissions
charges. Market-based measures such as the latter
three are designed to make greenhouse emissions
an explicit cost of production.[88]
Once emissions are priced, they become an additional
cost of production either directly or through higher
prices for emissions intensive goods and services
used in production. Emission prices could become
a signifi cant cost in generating electricity if carbon
emissions are high.
Once emissions become a cost, generators and fossil
fuel-intensive industries will have an incentive to
reduce emissions or substitute into low-emission
technologies wherever possible. A carbon price
therefore makes low-emission technologies such
as nuclear power and renewables more competitive
with energy generated by fossil fuels. It also makes
technologies that remove emissions more economically
viable. In contrast to subsidising particular
technologies, a carbon price will also encourage the
development and deployment of clean technologies
across the economy, allow the market to fi nd the
lowest cost way of doing so, as well as changing the
behaviour of individuals and fi rms throughout the
economy to demand less emissions intensive energy,
goods and services.

59
Chapter 5. Radioactive waste and spent fuel management
Chapter 5. Radioactive waste and
Safe disposal of low-level and short-lived
intermediate-level waste has been
demonstrated at many sites throughout
the world.
There is a high standard of uranium
mining waste management at
Australia’s current mines. Greater
certainty in the long-term planning
at Olympic Dam is desirable,
coupled with guaranteed fi nancial
arrangements to cover site
rehabilitation.
Safe disposal of long-lived
intermediate and high-level waste
can be accomplished with existing
technology. The fi rst European
repository is expected to commence
operating around 2020.
Reprocessing of spent fuel in Australia
seems unlikely to be commercially
attractive, unless the value of recovered
nuclear fuel increases signifi cantly.
Australia has a number of geologically
suitable areas for deep disposal of
radioactive waste.
•
•
•
•
•
spent fuel management
5.1 Radioactive waste
and spent fuel
Radioactive wastes arise from a wide range
of uses of radioactive materials. Those
originating from nuclear power production
are more signifi cant in terms of volume
and concentrations of activity, while medical,
research and industrial uses of radioactive
materials give rise to relatively small amounts
of waste with comparatively moderate levels
of activity. A number of countries have
a signifi cant legacy of radioactive waste
arising from weapons development activities.
The volume of radioactive waste is small
compared with the volume of other industrial
waste. Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries produce
some 300 million tonnes of toxic wastes each
year compared with 81 000 m3 of conditioned
radioactive wastes. In countries with nuclear
power, radioactive wastes comprise less than
1 per cent of total industrial toxic wastes
(Figure 5.1).[90]
Radioactive waste is characterised by its
physical, chemical, radiological and biological
properties. It is classifi ed to facilitate its safe
management, for example, according to the
degree of containment and isolation required
to ensure that it does not adversely impact on
people or the environment. It can be classifi ed
in terms of the following.
Low-level waste (LLW) — the level of
radioactivity is suffi ciently low that it does
not require special shielding during normal
handling and transport (it is customary
to exclude waste that contains more than
very minor concentrations of long-lived
radionuclides). LLW comprises materials
that may be lightly contaminated, such
as paper, glassware, tools and clothing.
Intermediate-level waste (ILW) — long
and short-lived waste, including reactor
components, chemical residues, sealed
radioactive sources from medicine and
industry and used metal fuel cladding.
ILW requires special handling and
shielding of radioactivity, but not cooling.
High-level waste (HLW) — contains large
amounts of radioactivity and requires
cooling and special shielding, handling
and storage. HLW includes spent nuclear
fuel intended for disposal and the
solidifi ed residues from reprocessing
spent nuclear fuel.
•
•
•
Radioactive waste management includes
all activities, administrative and operational,
in handling, treatment, conditioning, transport,
storage and disposal. The fi nal step of disposal
involves safely isolating waste from people and
the environment in purpose-built facilities while
it decays to harmless levels.

60
Figure 5.1 Waste produced in fuel preparation and plant operations (GW.year)
for fossil fuels, wood and nuclear[91]
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Coal Oil Natural
gas
Wood Nuclear
Flue gas sulphurisation
Ash
Gas sweetening
Radioactive
Million tonnes per GW.year
5.1.1 Uranium mining waste
By far the greatest component of nuclear fuel
cycle waste is LLW from mining and milling of
uranium ores. The most signifi cant wastes are
tailings (fi nely crushed, solid residues from ore
processing), liquid waste from the processing
plant, and radon gas.
The major task in managing radioactive waste
from uranium mining and milling is safe
disposal of tailings, since they contain most
of the radioactivity originally in the ore. Tailings
are signifi cant because of their volume, rather
than their specifi c radioactivity, which is
generally low. During the operational phase
of uranium mines, tailings are managed to
minimise the potential hazard from release
of radioactive radon gas into the atmosphere.
This often involves deposition under water
in tailings dams.
While signifi cant within the nuclear fuel cycle,
the volume of tailings is minor in comparison
to waste from many other mining and industrial
operations that produce materials with the
potential to harm health and the environment.
These include waste from heavy metal or coal
mining, fl y ash from coal combustion and toxic
industrial waste.
The nature of rehabilitation of uranium mines
varies with site and regulatory requirements.
Under best practice management, tailings
impoundments are covered with earth or rock
to prevent dispersal and to reduce release of
radon gas. Tailings management is site-specifi c
and involves assessment of ground and surface
water movement. Choice of disposal site is
aimed at maximum tailings isolation. Some
approaches involve returning tailings to the
mined out pits (as, for example, at Ranger)
or disposal in the stopes of underground
mines (as was planned for Jabiluka).
5.1.2 Low and intermediate level
radioactive waste
Although it contains only a small fraction
of the total activity of all radioactive waste,
short-lived low and intermediate level
radioactive waste (LILW) is an important
category because it represents more than
90 per cent of the global volume (excluding
mining and milling waste). The amount of LILW
in countries with nuclear power will increase
signifi cantly with the growing number of
reactors due to be decommissioned.
LILW, with limited amounts of long-lived
radionuclides, is disposed of in near-surface
repositories. Disposal units are constructed
above or below the ground surface up to several
tens of metres in depth, depending on site
characteristics. Extensive experience in
near-surface disposal has been gained from
construction and operation of facilities at over

61
100 sites in more than 30 countries in a range of
geographic conditions (Figure 5.2). Repository
designs refl ect site and waste characteristics
and regulatory requirements.
Operating experience has shown that
releases of radioactivity from properly sited
and constructed LILW repositories are so small
that the impact on people and the environment
is insignifi cant. The design goal for these
repositories is to isolate and retain radioactive
materials so that estimated radiological
doses are well below limits set by regulatory
authorities; limits which themselves are
below normal background radiation.
5.1.3 Spent nuclear fuel
Spent fuel management is an issue common
to all countries with nuclear reactors. It has
been addressed by the construction of spent
fuel stores (Figures 5.3 and 5.4), which have
operated safely for decades.
Storage of spent fuel in reactor cooling ponds
for several years after its removal from the
reactor is necessary to allow residual heat
to decline to levels that facilitate handling.
This is usually followed by longer term storage
away from the reactor, pending reprocessing
or eventual disposal. Wet or dry storage is
used, but ultimately, spent fuel has to be
reprocessed or prepared for disposal.
Figure 5.2 Intermediate waste repository, Olkiluoto, Finland (Markku Korpi-Hallila TVO)

62
5.1.4 High-level radioactive waste
High-level radioactive waste (HLW) produces
considerable heat and contains radioactive
isotopes with very long half-lives (see Box 5.1)
requiring high management standards.
Reprocessing of spent fuel produces a
concentrated solution of HLW from which
the residual uranium and plutonium have
been separated. Alternatively, spent fuel
can be disposed of without recovery
of uranium and plutonium.
The two main characteristics of HLW
addressed in its long-term management are the
contributions to overall radioactivity of relatively
short-lived fi ssion products and long-lived
alpha-emitting transuranic elements. During
the fi rst few hundred years, as radioactivity
levels fall, radioactivity and heat generation
are dominated by decay of short-lived fi ssion
products, which are effectively eliminated after
approximately 600 years. Thereafter, and over
a much longer period, radioactivity is largely
due to the decay of transuranic elements,
although some long-lived fi ssion products
continue to contribute to overall radioactivity.
As illustrated in Figure 5.5, fi ssion products
that initially dominate activity decay relatively
quickly but the decay time for actinides
comprised of plutonium (Pu) and minor
actinides is long.
As the potential hazard from HLW is greatest
in the fi rst few hundred to 1000 years, the
geological repository must isolate waste from
the biosphere over this period. A geological
repository would need to provide complete
isolation of waste within the engineered
containment until short-lived fi ssion products
decay to harmless levels.
The HLW waste from reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel presents a greatly decreased
potential hazard beyond 1000 years.
At around 10 000 years, the level of activity is
approximately the same as that in the original
uranium ore body. However, protection is still
required from long-lived transuranic elements
and actinides. This is provided by engineered
multiple barriers to the release of radioactive
materials and by the geological environment,
which ensure that any released radioactive
materials move slowly from the repository. In
the more sophisticated fuel cycles incorporating
fast reactor systems, the transuranics will not
be separated in reprocessing and can be burnt
as fuel, thus signifi cantly reducing the long-lived
burden.
In spent nuclear fuel radioactivity does not
decline to that of the original uranium ore body
for about 200 000 years because of the time
required for decay of actinides and long-lived
fi ssion products in the fuel.
Box 5.1 Half-life
A crucial factor in managing wastes is the time that
they are likely to remain hazardous. This depends
on the kinds of radioactive isotopes present, and
particularly the half-life characteristic of each of the
isotopes. The time that radioactive materials take to
decay and lose their excess energy is measured in
half-lives. One half-life is the average time for half of the
atoms in a quantity of a radioactive material to decay.
After two half-lives, only one-quarter of the original
atoms will remain. After three half-lives, only one-eighth
of the original atoms will remain. As time goes
on, more and more of the unstable atoms will change
into the stable decay product.

63
Figure 5.3 HABOG store for spent fuel and reprocessing waste, the Netherlands
Source: COVRA
Figure 5.4 Dry concrete canister storage of spent nuclear fuel — Wolsong nuclear power plant, Republic of
Korea. Eleven canisters are required to store the spent fuel discharged from one reactor over a year

64
Figure 5.5 Decay with time of radioactivity in high level waste (from Bernard 2004)[92]
10
10 000
1000
100
10
1
0.1
100
Time (years)
FP
Natural
uranium ore
MA + FP
Relative radiotoxicity
Spent fuel
(Pu + MA + FP)
1000 10 000 100 000 1 000 000
FP = fi ssion products; MA = minor actinides; Pu = plutonium
Geological disposal of HLW
There is broad scientifi c and technical
consensus that HLW can be safely disposed
of at depths of hundreds of metres in stable
geological formations. Refl ecting this
consensus, the UK Royal Society recently
stated: ‘it is important to acknowledge that
the consensus among the scientifi c community
is that geological disposal is a feasible and low
risk option’.[93]
Host geological formations are selected on
the basis of long-term stability, capacity to
accommodate the waste disposal facility and
ability to prevent or severely attenuate any long-term
radioactivity releases. The combination of
natural barriers and engineered barrier systems
provides a long lasting, passively safe system
ensuring that signifi cant radioactivity will not
return to the surface environment, with no
burden of care on future generations.
Ideally, geological repositories will be sited
in tectonically stable areas away from the
mobile edges of tectonic plates. In such areas
the threat of formation of new volcanoes,
geothermal activity and large scale uplift
or subsidence is very low.
Signifi cant advances are being made
towards constructing geological disposal
facilities for HLW:
underground facilities are operating
at intermediate depths (more than tens
of metres deep) for disposal of low and
intermediate level radioactive wastes
in Finland and Sweden
geological disposal of transuranic waste has
been demonstrated at the Waste Isolation
Pilot Project (WIPP) in the United States
site characterisation data is being collected
and thoroughly analysed at potential
repository sites (such as Olkiluoto in
Finland, Oskarshamn in Sweden and
Yucca Mountain in the United States33)
underground laboratories have been
constructed in various countries in a range
of geological media to obtain data to test
models used to assess the performance
of potential repository systems
licensing of deep disposal facilities will
commence in the next few years, with
the fi rst likely to be established in Finland
and Sweden.
•
•
•
•
•
33 Yucca Mountain, the site selected for the fi rst HLW repository in the United States has been the subject of intensive investigation since 1988.
The future of the project will depend on legislation currently before the United States Congress.

65
Assessing the safety of geological disposal
In the licensing of geological repositories,
a comprehensive safety case is required by
regulatory authorities that includes the results
of qualitative and quantitative scientifi c and
technical analyses.
Qualitative arguments in the safety case may
refer to natural analogues of radioactive waste
repositories such as uranium ore bodies
(Figure 5.6). A number of deep uranium ore
bodies are so effectively contained by their
geological environment that they have no
detectable chemical or radiometric signature
at the surface. The existence of such ore bodies
for over a billion years shows that radioactive
materials can be effectively confi ned in
favourable geological environments.
The safety case is supported by quantitative
assessments of long-term performance of
repository systems, which take into account the
probability and consequences of radionuclide
releases and compare them with regulatory
standards. The safety case evaluates
uncertainties in estimates of long-term
repository performance.
There is substantial international expert
analysis supported by computational models
of the long-term performance and safety
of geological repositories. Experts in the
radioactive waste management community
agree that quantitative assessments of
repository safety can describe repository
performance with suffi cient precision.
Figure 5.7 shows how possible exposures
from a repository relate to natural background
radiation. The units of exposure are millisieverts
(mSv), which are a measure of the amount
of radiation absorbed, adjusted to take into
account different radiation properties and
reactions in the body. This is a logarithmic
plot with each division of radiation exposure
ten times higher than the one to the left.
The overall range of natural background
exposures, a more typical range and the
global average value can be seen on the
right. Ramsar (a town in Iran) has among the
highest observed natural background radiation
exposures. Calculated impacts from the
repositories are tens of thousands of times
lower than the doses that people get from
natural background radiation. They are also
much lower than the radiation dose received
by an airline passenger in a long airline trip —
something many people do several times a year.
Figure 5.6 A uranium deposit as a natural analogue of a spent fuel repository[94]
Uranium ore deposit Spent fuel repository
Glacial deposits
450 m
500–1000 m
‘Host rock’ (sandstone)
Quartz rich cap
Altered host rock
Clay-rich halo
Uranium ore
Metamorphic basement
Glacial deposits
‘Host rock’ (granite)
Backfill
Clay-rich buffer
UO2 fuel in container

66
Figure 5.7 Estimated radiological impact of a geological repository compared with background radiation
Individual annual radiation doses in millisieverts (mSv)
0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100
HLW = high-level waste
Source: modifi ed from Chapman and Curtis.[95]
Progress towards implementation
A recent survey of 39 countries with civil nuclear
power or other signifi cant sources of radioactive
waste shows that 19 have decided in favour of
deep geological disposal and 10 have expressed
a preference for this approach.[96] Several have
fi rm plans in place for developing facilities,
in some cases supported by national legislation.
Some are advanced in establishing facilities
and have developed underground laboratories,
usually at prospective repository sites.
While there is a strong consensus at the
scientifi c and technical level supporting
geological disposal of HLW, surveys of
public opinion confi rm that this consensus
is generally not matched by public perceptions.
For example, European Commission surveys
show that some Europeans are sceptical about
the availability of a safe method of disposing
of HLW.[97]
Deep underground disposal in stable geological
structures is seen as the most appropriate
solution, but one which currently has the
support of less than half of the citizens of the
Natural background Ramsar
European Union. Doubt may arise from the
slow pace of development of HLW disposal
facilities in some countries. Some European
Union citizens believe that because no disposal
of HLW has taken place, there is no solution
to the problem. Nevertheless, some countries
have identifi ed potential disposal sites in
regions where there is support for nuclear
power. Finland’s selection of the Olkiluoto HLW
site has been facilitated by positive views based
on the safe operation of the Olkiluoto nuclear
power plants. In Sweden the two candidate sites
are near nuclear power plants.
Effective community engagement is a common
element in successful siting of HLW repository
investigation sites. In France, identifi cation of
the Bure research site followed a consensus
with territorial communities. In Sweden,
identifi cation of the Oskarshamn investigation
site was based on close engagement with
communities by the proponent and regulators.
The decision to focus siting studies for Finland’s
HLW repository at Olkiluoto followed interaction
between the proponent (Posiva) and local
residents, businesses and representatives.[98]
Typical calculated
impacts of a HLW
repository
Return flight,
London to Tokyo
10-6/year risk
Global average
Typical range

67
It is widely accepted that a host community
should be compensated for accepting a facility
which benefi ts an entire country. This is part of
siting strategies in countries including South
Korea, France, Sweden, Finland, the United
States, Switzerland and Canada.
International HLW repositories
While a number of countries with signifi cant
nuclear industries are moving to build national
HLW repositories, this may be diffi cult in
countries lacking suitable geology. The high
fi xed costs of geological repositories for HLW
will also make them less attractive for countries
with small waste inventories.
These considerations have led to international
discussion of multinational or regional
repositories. For example, the International
Atomic Energy Agency established a working
group to examine multinational approaches
to the fuel cycle including HLW disposal. This
group concluded that multinational repositories
offer major economic benefi ts and substantial
nuclear non-proliferation benefi ts, but raise
signifi cant legal, political and public
acceptance issues.[99]
At present there is no specifi c institutional
and legal framework for the operation of
international repositories and no country
has established such a facility. As national
governments will have to accept the ultimate
responsibility for international repositories,
funding arrangements must ensure there
is adequate compensation for accepting
this liability.
5.1.5 Australia’s radioactive wastes
Australia has accumulated approximately
3800 m3 of low-level and short-lived intermediate
level radioactive waste from over 40 years of
research, medical and industrial uses of
radioactive materials.34 Over half of this
inventory is lightly contaminated soil from
research on the processing of radioactive ores
by the Commonwealth Scientifi c and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO) during the
1950s and 1960s.
Each year, Australia produces less than 50 m3
of LILW — approximately the volume of a
shipping container. By comparison, Britain
and France each produce around 25 000 m3
of low level waste annually.
Much of Australia’s radioactive waste arises
from ANSTO’s operations (Figure 5.8). This
is stored at the ANSTO Lucas Heights site
or, in the case of long-lived ILW arising from
treatment of Australian research reactor
fuel, at overseas facilities pending return to
Australia. Australia relies on overseas spent fuel
management facilities to convert spent research
reactor fuel into a stable waste form suitable for
long-term storage in Australia pending ultimate
disposal deep underground.
Figure 5.8 Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation low-level waste including lightly
contaminated paper and plastic items
34 This volume of waste would occupy the area of a football fi eld to a depth of less than 1 metre.

68
Siting radioactive waste
management facilities
Since the mid-1980s, successive Australian
governments have sought to identify sites
for management of Australia’s radioactive
waste. State and territory governments have
welcomed the establishment of national
facilities, while generally opposing use
of sites in their own jurisdictions.
A siting process initiated in 1992 identifi ed
a highly suitable national low-level repository
site near Woomera (South Australia). Following
legal action in 2003 by the South Australian
Government precluding access to the site, the
Australian Government abandoned the project.
In 2004, the Australian Government announced
that it would establish a single facility for safe
management of all Commonwealth radioactive
waste, leaving the states and territories to make
their own arrangements in accordance with
Australia’s international obligations.
The Australian Government is currently
assessing the suitability of three properties
in the Northern Territory as the site for the
Commonwealth Radioactive Waste
Management Facility. This facility will also
accept LILW produced by Northern Territory
Government agencies. The Western Australian
Government operates a LLW disposal facility
at Mount Walton East in the Goldfi elds. The
Queensland Government operates a purpose-built
store at Esk while other states store LILW
in non-purpose built facilities.
Uranium mining
Between 1954 and 1971, Australia produced
more than 7000 tonnes of uranium from the
Northern Territory (South Alligator Valley and
Rum Jungle), Queensland (Mary Kathleen) and
South Australia (Radium Hill). Like other mines
at this time, these were not subject to formal
environmental regulations. Consequently, some
left a legacy of environmental damage and
physical hazards, which is still being addressed.
In contrast, Mary Kathleen in Queensland was
the site of Australia’s fi rst rehabilitation project.
Following completion in 1985, the site was
opened for unrestricted use.
Uranium mining resumed in 1979 under a strict
regulatory regime that required mines to be
planned and developed with a view to eventual
rehabilitation. Nabarlek in the Northern Territory
was the fi rst to undergo rehabilitation according
to these principles. It operated from 1979 until
1989 and was decommissioned in 1994–1995.
Rehabilitation is proceeding and ongoing
monitoring will establish when the site returns
to the custody of the Traditional Owners.
Plans for fi nal restoration of the Ranger mine
are well established, based on a fully costed
plan. Mandatory rehabilitation objectives
include ecosystem viability, radiological safety,
and landform stability. Costings are amended
annually to update the guarantee by Energy
Resources of Australia, which is held by the
Australian Government.
Best modern practice requires a whole-of-life
mine plan including proposed plans for
rehabilitation. A bank bond is normally required
to cover the estimated costs of rehabilitation.
Such plans are revised regularly to take into
account changing conditions. However, the
legislation under which Olympic Dam operates
does not put in place an arrangement to
guarantee that fi nance will be available
to cover rehabilitation costs.
The Beverley in-situ leach mine in South
Australia does not produce conventional tailings
or waste rock. The lined evaporation ponds used
to dispose of the small volume of waste solids
will be closed and revegetated at the end of the
life of the mine. This is covered by fi nancial
guarantees to the South Australian Government,
which will determine the adequacy of
rehabilitation plans in consultation with
Australian Government agencies.

69
Figure 5.9 Constituents of spent nuclear fuel
100
80
60
20
Note: Spent fuel is nearly 96 per cent U-238. Removal of uranium by reprocessing greatly reduces the volume of HLW requiring geological disposal.[100]
5.2 Reprocessing
Reprocessing is the physical and chemical
processing of spent fuel to enable the
separation of its components (Figure 5.9).
The principal reason for reprocessing has been
to recover unused uranium and plutonium for
use as nuclear fuel, thereby closing the fuel
cycle. Reprocessing also reduces the volume
of HLW for disposal by a factor of between fi ve
and ten, compared to direct disposal of spent
nuclear fuel,[101] although it leads to a signifi cant
increase in the volume of ILW and LLW.
Commercial reprocessing plants use the
PUREX process in which plutonium, uranium
and fi ssion products are separated. Thus
reprocessing plants, like uranium enrichment
plants, are nuclear proliferation sensitive.
Other processes (UREX, UREX+), which
do not separate out plutonium or other
actinides are under development.
For most fuels, reprocessing occurs 5–25 years
after its removal from the reactor. The HLW
liquid remaining after plutonium and uranium
are removed contains approximately 3 per cent
of the used fuel as minor actinides and highly
radioactive, heat producing fi ssion products.
HLW liquids are conditioned by drying and
incorporating the dry material into a durable
waste form which is stored pending disposal.
Commercial reprocessing plants operate in
France (Cap La Hague), the United Kingdom
(Sellafi eld) and Russia (Ozersk), with a further
plant set to commence operation in Japan
(Rokkasho) during 2007.
5.2.1 Reprocessing costs
Reprocessing plants have very high
capital costs and charges for spent fuel
reprocessing are correspondingly high.
At present, reprocessing does not appear
to be commercially attractive (although mixed
oxide [MOX] fuels are used in some countries,
eg France and Japan) unless a signifi cantly
increased value is given to the recovered
plutonium and uranium.
Attributed costs and prices of reprocessing
are widely considered to be lower than long-run
costs because of the favourable terms under
which the two largest plants (THORP and UP3)
were fi nanced. Both had pay-ahead contracts
with overseas reprocessing customers who
were required to reprocess spent fuel in
accordance with national policy.
0
%
40
Fission
products
Uranium Plutonium and
other actinides

70
The complexity of reprocessing plants involving
remote handling of highly radioactive and
corrosive materials requires expensive facilities
and many highly trained staff. For example, the
UP2 and UP3 facilities at Cap La Hague, the
world’s largest commercial reprocessing plant,
employ up to 8000 people and cost 90 billion
francs (over US$16 billion) to build. The only
recently constructed commercial-scale
reprocessing plant (Rokkasho) is estimated
to have cost approximately US$18 billion.[102]
5.3 Future prospects
5.3.1 Impact of ‘waste burning’
reactors on waste strategies
Current consideration of HLW repositories is
based on HLW from the ‘once through’ nuclear
fuel cycle and reprocessing of spent fuel that
requires isolation from the biosphere for some
thousands of years. This situation would change
if development and deployment of Generation IV
reactors and advanced fuel processing are
successful. There is uncertainty as to the time
frame for application of Generation IV
technologies and the extent of their adoption.
Widespread use of Generation IV fast neutron
reactors would dramatically alter the nature and
scale of the HLW disposal task, by substantially
reducing the volume of HLW and the period
over which it requires isolation from the
environment, from thousands of years to
hundreds of years.[103]
It is not clear what approach will be adopted
to managing the shorter-lived HLW arising from
Generation IV reactors. Reducing the heat and
toxicity of HLW will enable much more effective
use of geological repositories in which the
waste inventory is limited by heat generation.
These technologies could reduce the need for
geological repositories, with spent fuel disposed
of in near-surface burial facilities or above-ground
stores to decay to harmless levels.
A number of countries are interested in using
accelerator-driven reactor systems.35 These
produce power and also reduce the actinide
and long-lived fi ssion product content of
radioactive waste by transmuting much of
it into harmless isotopes. While there are
technical challenges to be overcome, these
technologies could play a useful part in future
HLW management strategies.
5.3.2 Managing radioactive
wastes from an Australian
nuclear industry
Establishing a nuclear power industry would
substantially increase the volume of radioactive
waste to be managed in Australia and require
management of signifi cant quantities of HLW.
Based on current light water reactors, for
each GW of nuclear power there would be an
additional 300 m3 of LLW and ILW and less than
10 m3 (30 tonnes) of spent fuel each year.[105]
Assuming an installed nuclear power capacity
of 25 GW, a disposal facility would be required
for the more voluminous LLW wastes soon after
start-up. The much smaller volume of ILW and
HLW could be managed initially through interim
storage, perhaps for up to 50 years. Assuming a
reactor lifetime of 60 years, up to 45 000 tonnes
of spent fuel would be produced by a 25 GW
nuclear industry in Australia over this period.
Long-term HLW management options for
Australia could include disposal in a national
geological repository or an international
geological repository. Australia has large areas
with simple, readily modelled geology in stable
tectonic settings and favourable groundwater
conditions potentially suitable for nuclear waste
disposal. Geoscience Australia identifi es the
Precambrian granite-gneiss terrain and clay-rich
sedimentary strata of Australia as potentially
suitable for waste disposal.[8]
Australia’s strengths in earth sciences and
mining suggest that a geological repository
project could be executed with Australian
resources. However, some capabilities would
need to be scaled up, if Australia were to
proceed with a repository. In particular, the
number of regulatory staff in the jurisdiction
responsible for the project would need
to be increased.
The multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms
for spent fuel are critical in determining
Australia’s management arrangements. Should
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (see
Chapter 8) be fully implemented, there may
be opportunities for Australia to dispose of
its spent fuel in an international repository in
a fuel supplier nation such as the United States.
35 These reactors use a proton accelerator to produce additional neutrons to approach criticality.

71
5.4 Conclusion
The volume of wastes arising from nuclear
power production and other uses of radioactive
materials is small compared to wastes produced
by many other industrial activities, including
coal-fi red electricity generation.
Safe management of all categories of
radioactive waste has been demonstrated for
decades, but no country has yet implemented
permanent underground disposal of HLW.
There is a scientifi c and technical consensus
that HLW can be safely disposed of in deep
geological repositories, and several countries
are proceeding with well-developed and
thoroughly researched plans for such disposal.
Australia already manages radioactive wastes
arising from uranium mining and the medical,
research and industrial use of radioactive
materials. Australia will soon build a
management facility for Commonwealth LLW
and ILW and will ultimately require a deep
repository. Should Australia move to nuclear
power generation, facilities will eventually be
required for management of HLW, including
its eventual disposal. In line with best overseas
practice, radioactive waste management costs
would need to be included in the price of
nuclear electricity.

72

73
Chapter 6. Health and safety
Ionising radiation and its health
impacts are well understood and
there are well-established international
safety standards that are refl ected
in Australian practice.
An effi cient, effective and transparent
regulatory regime achieves good health
and safety outcomes, and provides
assurance to the public that facilities
are being properly managed.
The nuclear and uranium mining
industries have achieved good
performance under these stringent
physical and regulatory controls.
Nuclear power has fewer health and
safety impacts than current technology
fossil fuel-based generation and hydro
power, but no technology is risk free.
There are legacy problems associated
with the nuclear industry. The most
signifi cant are the impacts of the
Chernobyl accident. However, the
Chernobyl reactor is not representative
of modern reactor designs.
•
•
•
•
•
6.1 Introduction
All industrial activities, including mining
and energy production, involve risks to human
health and safety. No means of generating
electricity is risk free. The choice of any
technology or mixture of technologies will
inevitably be a matter of balancing different
costs and benefi ts. Operating safely and
protecting the health of workers and the public
must be a high priority for every industry.
This Chapter examines the whole life cycle of
the nuclear energy industry and compares it
with other sectors, particularly the fossil fuel
energy industry, which could to some extent
be displaced by nuclear energy. It considers
the risks posed by normal operation of nuclear
facilities, and the possibility and consequence
of a major accident at a nuclear power plant.
The question facing society as a whole is how,
based on an objective appraisal of the facts,
and in the face of major threats to global
climate from fossil fuel burning (described
in Chapter 7), do the risks posed by nuclear
energy compare with those posed by fossil
fuel use, and are they acceptable.
6.2 Health impacts of
the nuclear fuel cycle
The European Commission ExternE study
examined the external costs of electricity
generation using a form of life cycle
assessment.[83,106] The study describes
the process steps in each energy chain
and provides information on material
and energy fl ows, and associated burdens
(eg emissions and wastes). This output
is then used to estimate the health and
environmental impacts and the costs resulting
from the burdens. External costs are those
incurred in relation to health and the
environment that can be quantifi ed, but are
not built into the cost of the electricity to
the consumer. They include the effects of
air pollution on human health, as well as
occupational disease and accidents. The study
calculates the dispersions and ultimate impact
of emissions, and the risk of accidents is taken
into account, as are estimates of radiological
impacts from mine tailings and emissions
from reprocessing.
The ExternE results indicate that the health
and safety costs of uranium mining and nuclear
fuel use, including waste disposal, are lower
than fossil fuel-based energy generation, on a
unit of energy produced basis. Comprehensive
studies undertaken by Dones et al on the life
cycle impacts of energy generation systems in
Europe also rate nuclear energy as performing
much better in a range of health areas than
fossil fuel-based systems.[107,108]
The nuclear fuel cycle produces far lower
amounts of greenhouse gas emissions
(discussed in Chapter 7) and other pollutants
than conventional fossil fuel systems per
unit of electricity produced. This includes
emissions of air pollutants of major health
concern: sulphur dioxide (SO2), particulate
matter (PM) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx).
At concentrations that are common in
many parts of the world, these pollutants
have signifi cant health impacts.

74
Globally, an estimated 2 million deaths occur
each year as a result of air pollution, indoors
and out.[109] In the European Union, the smallest
particulate matter (PM2.5), particles 2.5 μm
in diameter or less, causes an estimated loss
of statistical life expectancy of 8.6 months for
the average European.[110] Power generation
and the transport sector are major contributors
of PM2.5.
The biggest source of emissions of health
concern arising from using nuclear power
is the burning of fossil fuels to generate
electricity used in the fuel cycle, for example,
in mining and enrichment. The fundamental
reason for the comparatively good life cycle
performance of nuclear power is that while
a 1000 MW coal plant annually requires
approximately 2.6 million tonnes of good-quality
black coal (or signifi cantly more brown coal
due to its much lower energy content),
a comparable size nuclear power plant
requires between 25 and 30 tonnes of
low-enriched uranium. Taking the Ranger
mine as an example, approximately
150 000 tonnes of rock and ore is extracted,
moved and/or processed to produce the
25 tonnes of low-enriched uranium.
Nonetheless the comparative energy density
advantage of uranium remains very high.
Coal mining, involving the removal of
overburden (the soil and rock overlying
the coal seam), and the handling and burning
of much larger volumes of material, inevitably
leads to greater risk of accidents and health
impacts per unit of electricity produced.
6.2.1 Radioactivity measurement
and impact
Using uranium to produce electricity involves
radioactivity and this has potential health
impacts. Ionising radiation is produced
when the nucleus of an atom disintegrates,
releasing energy in the form of an energetic
particle or waves of electromagnetic radiation.
Radiation exposure (see Box 6.1) can arise
from sources outside the body (external
exposure) or from radioactive material inside
the body (internal exposure). Radioactive
material can enter the body (exposure pathway)
by inhalation or ingestion in water or food.
Background radiation
People are continuously exposed to natural
background radiation (ie cosmic radiation
and terrestrial radiation sources, such as soils
and building materials, and radon gas that
comes from rocks, soil and building materials).
The average natural background radiation
at sea level in Australia is approximately
1.5 mSv/year, below the world average of
2.4 mSv/year, because of the relatively low
radon exposures.[111] In Denver Colorado,
in the United States, the average background
radiation dose is approximately 11.8 mSv/year
due to local geology and altitude.[112]
The average annual individual radiation
dose to members of the public from
background sources and the nuclear industry
are summarised in Figure 6.1. The fact that
background radiation varies substantially from
place to place provides some reassurance on
the risks associated with low doses of radiation,
since no study has shown any difference
between high and low background radiation
areas in terms of impacts on human health.

75
Box 6.1 Dose and effect
Effective dose
Some parts of the body are more sensitive to the effects of radiation than others, and some types of radiation are
inherently more dangerous than others, even if they ‘deposit’ the same level of energy. To take these characteristics
into account, tissue weighting factors and radiation weighting factors have been developed. These can be combined
with a measurement of absorbed dose of radiation to give ‘effective dose’. The unit of dose is the sievert (Sv).
The millisievert (mSv), one thousandth of a sievert, is a more useful unit for the sorts of exposures found in
day-to-day life.
Deterministic health effects
Low doses of radiation do not produce immediate clinical effects because of the relatively small number of cells
destroyed. However, at high doses, enough cells may be killed to cause breakdown in tissue structure or function.
There is a threshold below which deterministic effects do not occur, which varies with the tissues involved.
Stochastic effects
Ionising radiation also damages cells by initiating changes in the DNA of the cell nucleus. If the damage is not
repaired and the cell remains viable and able to reproduce, this event may initiate the development of a cancer.
If the damaged cell is in the genetic line (egg, sperm or sperm-generating cell) then the damage may result in
genetic disease in the offspring. This genetic effect has been seen in animal studies, but there is only limited
evidence from studies of humans. These effects — the initiation of cancer or genetic disease — are called stochastic
effects. This means that the effect is governed by chance. An increase in the size of the dose will increase the
probability of the effect occurring, but not the severity of the effect. Stochastic effects do not generally become
apparent for many years after exposure, and in most cases there is no way of distinguishing a particular cancer
or genetic effect that might have been caused by radiation from an effect arising for other reasons. Although there
is debate on this issue, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends the
assumption that there is no threshold for stochastic effects as the basis of the system for radiological protection.
Radiation impact
In order to defi ne the impacts of radiation doses, the ICRP recommends the use of a risk for fatal cancer in
the whole population of one per 20 000/mSv.[113] In comparison the chance of contracting fatal cancer from
all causes is around one in four.
ICRP recommended limits on exposure to ionizing radiation
The following recommended limits on exposure to ionizing radiation have been incorporated into relevant
Australian regulations:
• the general public shall not be exposed to more than 1 mSv/year (over and above natural background radiation)
• occupational exposure shall not exceed 100 mSv over 5 years.
These limits exclude exposure due to background and medical radiation. (See Appendix M for further discussion)
Assessing collective dose
The impact of very small doses to many people
is often assessed through the use of the concept
of collective dose. This tool is frequently used to
estimate fatalities by summing small doses over
large populations. However the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
advises that: ‘…the computation of cancer
deaths based on collective doses involving
trivial exposures to large populations is not
reasonable and should be avoided’ (p. 42).[114]
(See Appendix M for further discussion.)
6.2.2 Radioactive emissions
from the nuclear fuel cycle
An important issue for this Review is to assess
the extent to which members of the public
and workers could be exposed to radiation
during the nuclear fuel cycle.

76
International guidance
Ionising radiation and its impacts on health
are well understood. There is a long-established
international system for reviewing the scientifi c
literature on radiation and its biological effects,
and for developing and issuing guidelines on
relevant matters. Nuclear and radiation safety
standards and criteria are recommended
by the ICRP. The ICRP is a non-government
organisation that has the objective of producing
standards for radiation protection and
minimising the risks from radiation.
ICRP activities are supported by the work of
the United Nations Scientifi c Committee on
the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR),
which reviews the emerging scientifi c
information on a continuing basis and publishes
a major review of the sources of radiation
and its effects on health every fi ve years.
The recommendations of the ICRP form the
basis of safety standards issued by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
which is the world’s major nuclear forum.
Operational fuel cycle emissions
Radiation exposure at all parts of the nuclear
fuel cycle has been assessed in international
studies conducted for the United Nations.
Dose rates for workers and members of the
general public from these UNSCEAR studies
can be used to estimate fatality rates.[115]
The estimated fatality rate for workers in the
nuclear energy industry based on UNSCEAR
radiation dose estimates is approximately
0.06 per 100 000 worker years. By way of
comparison, this is far lower than the fatality
rate for the coal industry in the United States
or for the business sector as a whole in
Western Australia.36
The dose rate expected for individual
members of the public is very low, an average
0.005 mSv/yr for people resident within 50 km
of a pressurised water reactor (PWR) power
station.[115] To place radiation exposure to the
public in perspective, a person taking a return
fl ight from Sydney to London would receive the
same dose (approx. 0.25 mSv) as someone living
50 years in the vicinity of such a power reactor.
Figure 6.1 Worldwide average annual radiation dose from natural and other sources, 2000
1.2
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.005 0.002 0.0002
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Radon from
ground and
buildings
Gamma
rays from
ground and
buildings
Cosmic
rays
Ingestion Medical Nuclear
tests
Chernobyl Nuclear
power
Average annual dose (mSv)
Source: United Nations Scientifi c Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR)[115]
36 The United States coal industry fatality incidence per 100 000 full-time employees was just over 28.7 in 2004. In Western Australia,
the fatality incidence across all industries (including education, fi nance and insurance, retail trade and a range of other activities)
in the fi nancial year 2004–2005 was 2.2 per 100 000 workers. The highest fatality incidence was 13.9 per 100 000 workers in the electricity,
gas and water supply industry. Figures for one year have to be interpreted with caution as they are based on small numbers.
These fatality incidents are actual deaths, not estimates based on modelling as is the case for the nuclear industry.

77
Radioactive emissions from
fossil fuel combustion
It is not widely appreciated that burning coal
releases quantities of radioactive materials
to the environment that are similar in magnitude
to the routine releases from the nuclear industry
for comparable electrical output.[116] This is
because coal is an impure fuel, containing
large amounts of sulphur, signifi cant amounts
of aluminium and iron, and trace quantities
of many other metals, including uranium
and thorium, although the levels vary widely.
In the United States, it has been estimated that
citizens living near coal-fi red power plants are
exposed to higher radiation doses than those
living near nuclear power plants that meet
government regulations. In either case, the
amount of radiation released is very small
compared to background radiation.[117,118]
6.2.3 Energy industry accidents
As with any human activity such as air, car and
rail travel, large scale electricity generation
is associated with accidents that cause injury
and death to workers and the public. There are
mine explosions, dam collapses and fi res at
gas and chemical plants. The record of such
accidents shows that the nuclear power
industry is signifi cantly safer than other
large scale energy-related industries.
Table 6.1 shows energy industry related severe
accidents between 1969 and 2000. The number
of deaths caused serves as an indication of
the level of impact. In terms of the number of
deaths per unit of electricity produced (taking
only immediate (also known as prompt or early)
deaths into account), nuclear power is less
dangerous than all fossil fuel electricity
generation systems, and also safer than hydro.
Renewable energy sources have a good safety
record although wind farms have caused at
least 37 fatalities in accidents since 1970.[329]
One notable feature from Table 6.1 is the
31 fatalities attributed to Chernobyl. According
to the Chernobyl Forum, immediate and delayed
fatalities to date have been less than 100.[119]
Further explanation is given in Box 6.2.
Table 6.1 Fatal accidents in the worldwide energy sector, 1969–2000*
No. accidents Direct fatalities Direct fatalities
per GWe/year
Coal 1221 25 107 0.876
Oil 397 20 283 0.436
Coal (China excluded) 177 7090 0.690
Natural gas 125 1978 0.093
LPG 105 3921 3.536
Hydro 11 29 938 4.265
Hydro (Banqiao/Shimantan
10 3938 0.561
dam accident excluded)a
Nuclear reactorb 1 31 0.006
a The Banqiao/Shimantan dam accident occurred in 1975 and resulted in 26 000 fatalities.
b See Box 6.2 for information on long-term impacts of nuclear reactor accidents.
Source: derived from Burgherr et al[120] and Burgherr and Hirschberg.[121]
* These fi gures do not include latent or delayed deaths such as those caused by air pollution from fi res, chemical exposure or radiation exposure
that might occur following an industrial accident.

78
Box 6.2 Chernobyl
The uncontained steam/chemical explosion and subsequent fi re at Chernobyl in 1986 released radioactive gas and
dust high into the atmosphere, where winds dispersed it across Finland, Sweden, and central and southern Europe.
Within a month, many of those living within a 30 km radius of the plant — approximately 116 000 people — had been
relocated. The area remains essentially unoccupied.
Twenty-eight highly exposed reactor staff and emergency workers died from radiation and thermal burns within four
months of the accident. Two other workers were killed in the explosion from injuries unrelated to radiation, and one
person suffered a fatal heart attack. Nineteen more died by the end of 2004, not necessarily as a result of the accident.
More than 4000 individuals, most of whom were children or adolescents at the time of the accident, have developed
thyroid cancer as a result of the contamination, and fi fteen of these had died from the disease by the end of 2002.
Possibly 4000 people in the areas with highest radiation levels may eventually die from cancer caused by radiation
exposure. Of the 6.8 million individuals living further from the explosion, who received a much lower dose, possibly
another 5000 may die prematurely as a result of that dose.[119] The small increase in radiation exposure caused by the
accident for the population of Europe and beyond should not be used to estimate future likely possible cancer
fatalities. The ICRP states that this approach is not reasonable. (See discussion ‘Collective dose’ at Section 6.2.1)
The Chernobyl Forum report in 2006 clearly identifi es the extensive societal disruption in the region as the most
signifi cant impact resulting from the accident, compounded by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.
As with Three Mile Island, the lack of emergency response planning and preparedness, plus poor communication
between offi cials and the community, added signifi cantly to the social disruption and some of the health consequences
of the Chernobyl accident. (See Appendix N for further discussion.)
6.2.4 Accidents at nuclear facilities
The risk of a serious accident at a nuclear
power plant is a very important issue for
the community. The accidents at Three Mile
Island and Chernobyl have come to symbolise
the risk of nuclear power.
In fact the health and safety performance
of the nuclear industry is good. Apart from
Chernobyl (see Box 6.2), there have been few
accidents and only minor releases of radioactive
elements from civilian nuclear installations,
both power plants and fuel cycle installations,
since the introduction of nuclear power.
The design of the Chernobyl reactor (known
as the RBMK) was intrinsically unstable
and, unlike most reactors, lacked a massive
containment structure. The operators were
also attempting an experiment which involved
overriding many safety systems including vital
cooling pumps, actions completely contrary
to the operating procedures laid down for
the facility. Such a plant would not have been
permitted to operate in the western world and
is not representative of modern reactor designs.
The Three Mile Island accident, while a large
fi nancial cost to the company involved, injured
no one and led indirectly to the release of only
minor amounts of radioactive elements which,
in the opinion of experts, had no measurable
impact on health. It demonstrated the
robustness of the reactor design and the value
of containment structures. (See Appendix N
for further discussion of the Three Mile Island
and Chernobyl accidents and impacts,
and Appendix L for information on nuclear
reactor technology.)
There has been comprehensive reporting of
incidents at nuclear power plants and other
nuclear facilities, although the information
from the former Soviet Union was sparse
before 1990. Some of the most signifi cant
incidents are summarised in Table 6.2.
Since 1999 (in August 2004) there has been
an accident at the Mihama No. 3 nuclear
power plant in Japan involving a steam leak.
Neither the reactor nor radioactive materials
were involved. There were four fatalities and
seven people were injured.
In the nuclear industry, there are risks
associated with handling corrosive chemicals
and dealing with materials under extremes
of pressure or temperature, as is the case
in many other industries. In enrichment,
reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants
handling fi ssile materials, there is the risk
of criticality accidents, which are potential
causes of serious radiation-related accidents.
To avoid this, plants have physical and
administrative controls. A review of all
criticality accidents by the Los Alamos

79
National Laboratory found that the majority
(38) occurred at research or experimental
facilities such as research reactors, which
were purposefully planning to achieve
near-critical and critical confi gurations.[122]
Operating personnel in research facilities
are usually expert in criticality physics and
experiments are performed under shielded
conditions or in remote locations. In these
situations, accidents are not totally unexpected
and have very limited impacts (confi ned to the
facility and workers in it). The other 22 accidents
occurred in commercial process facilities; thus
they were unexpected and had generally greater
impacts. One resulted in measurable fi ssion
product contamination (slightly above
background levels) beyond the plant boundary
and one resulted in measurable, but low,
exposures to members of the public.
6.2.5 Transport risks
The global record of transporting all categories
of nuclear materials is good. Very few accidents
have involved any release of radioactive
material. A recent review of transport accidents
involving radioactive materials in the United
Kingdom between 1958 and 2004 presents
fi ndings that are representative of OECD
countries (Figure 6.2).[123] In transporting an
average half a million packages per year of
all sorts there were 806 incidents of which
19 resulted in individual whole-body doses
of over 1 mSv.37
6.2.6 Developments in technology
and safety culture
International safety guidance
The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 led to
a re-examination of reactor design, and more
importantly, as the basic design had proved
sound, to a review of the operational and
training systems, management culture and
regulatory regime for nuclear power plants,
as well as the need for improved and more
transparent community engagement, both
in the United States and internationally.
The Chernobyl accident added to the impetus
for international cooperation in promoting
safety performance.
Table 6.2 Signifi cant nuclear facility incidents, 1966–1999
Country Year Fatalities INESa level
Fermi-1 USA 1966 Nil 3
Sellafi eld reprocessing plant UK 1973 Nil 4
Three Mile Island USA 1979 Nil 5
Saint Laurent A1 France 1980 Nil 4
La Hague reprocessing plant France 1981 Nil 3
Chernobyl 4 Ukraine 1986 31 7
Vandellós 1 Spain 1989 Nil 3
Sellafi eld reprocessing plant UK 1992 Nil 3
Tokaimura reprocessing plant Japan 1997 Nil 3
Tokaimura nuclear fuel
Japan 1999 2 4
conversion plant
a INES, International Nuclear Event Scale. Events at levels 1–3 are incidents, above level 3 are accidents and level 7 is the most severe.
Events with no safety signifi cance (level 0 or below scale) are deviations. Only levels 4 and above involve unplanned radioactive releases
off-site above regulated levels.
Source: OECD/IEA[124]
37 In the worst incident, caused by an improperly shielded source, a radiographer transporting the material received an estimated very serious
whole-body dose of 2 Sv (5 Sv would normally be fatal). The estimated worst case dose to any member of the public however was 2 mSv.

80
Figure 6.2 Transporting spent nuclear fuel in the United Kingdom
Source: photo courtesy of World Nuclear Transport Institute and Direct Rail Services Limited
There is now an international consensus
on the principles for ensuring the safety
of nuclear power plants and international
cooperation through bodies such as the
International Nuclear Safety Group established
by the IAEA. In addition to publishing safety
standard guidance documents, the IAEA
provides safety services and runs seminars,
workshops, conferences and conventions
aimed at promoting high standards of safety.
There is also an international regime of
inspections and peer reviews of nuclear
facilities in IAEA member countries, which has
legislative backing through the international
Convention on Nuclear Safety which entered
into force on 24 October 1996. The Convention
on Nuclear Safety aims to achieve and maintain
high levels of safety worldwide. All IAEA
member states with operating nuclear power
reactors are parties to the convention.
Safety assessments and quantifi ed risk
The protective systems of nuclear power plants
are required to demonstrate ‘defence in depth’.
The objective is to ensure that no single human
error or equipment failure at one level of
defence, or a combination of failures at more
than one level of defence, can lead to harm to
the public or the environment.[125] Another key
element used to demonstrate that operation
of a proposed nuclear power plant will not pose
signifi cant risk is the preparation of a detailed
safety assessment as part of the regulatory
licensing process. Safety assessments cover
all aspects of the siting, design, construction,
operation and decommissioning that are
relevant to safety.[126]
A study of reactor safety was published by
the US NRC in 1990.[127] Five existing PWR
and boiling water reactors (BWR) at nuclear
plants were examined using the probabilistic

81
safety assessment (or probabilistic risk
assessment) method. The PWR is the most
common type of reactor in operation at present
with more than 50 per cent of the global fl eet.
The study found that the average probability
of core damage per plant from all potential
internal accident scenarios is 4 x 10–5 per year
or one core damage accident in 25 000 years
of operation.
The next step in the analysis involved
calculating the chances that, if core damage
were to occur, could radioactive material escape
from the fuel rods into the containment and
if so how much. In turn, if this was to occur,
the possible routes by which that radioactivity
might escape or be released from the
containment were examined. The off-site
consequences, which depend on weather
conditions, surrounding population density,
the extent and timing of any evacuation, and
the damage to health due to exposure to the
various radionuclides that might reach people,
were then modelled. The fi nal step involved
the assessment of the impacts of radiation
on humans including fatal cancer risk using
the linear no-threshold model of radiation
dose-response.
For a representative PWR the average
probability of an individual early direct fatality
(or prompt fatality, that is a death directly
attributable to the nuclear accident, usually
occurring immediately, but including those
occurring up to one month after the event)
was 2 x 10–8 (1:50 000 000) per operating year.
The average probability of an individual latent
cancer death from an accident was 2 x 10–9
(1:500 000 000) per year.
A similar probabilistic risk assessment has
been undertaken in relation to the likelihood
and consequences of a terrorist ground attack
on a representative US 1000 MWe nuclear
power plant.[128] (See also Chapter 8).
It found that the risks to the public from
terrorist-induced accidental radioactive
release are small. Sixty fi ve per cent of
attempted attacks would probably be
thwarted prior to plant damage. About
5 per cent of attempted attacks would result
in core damage, and about 1 per cent would
result in some release of radiation. Overall
the chance of one immediate fatality as
a result of a terrorist attack was calculated
to be below one per 600 000 reactor years.
The frequency of events resulting in 20 or
more immediate fatalities is less than one
per million reactor years. The chance of
one latent cancer fatality is less than one
in 300 000 reactor years.
The likelihood of any terrorist related accident
leading to land contamination beyond the site
of the nuclear plant is less than one in 170 000
reactor years. However, if such an event did
occur an area of land of up to 208 km2 could
be rendered unusable for agriculture for
between one and 30 years, with a further area
of around 2 km2 rendered unusable for farming
for more than 30 years. Any other affected
land could be decontaminated without
signifi cant loss of use.
A more signifi cant accident with a release
of radiation suffi cient to render a land area
of up to 11 km2 unusable for more than 30
years is expected to occur no more than once
in a million reactor years. The areas involved
are comparable to the land contamination risk
from other types of radiological accidents
analysed in the design and licensing of US
commercial nuclear plants to date.
The probabilities for events and the associated
radiation doses and areas of contamination
calculated in these probabilistic risk
assessments are very conservative, that is
the calculated frequency of accidents is higher
than is likely to be the case in reality. Safety
analysts make assumptions in creating
accident scenarios that assume the worst
outcome at every step, and the calculations
of the movement of radioactivity to nearby
people are precautionary.
These assessments consider only biophysical
contamination of land. They do not take into
account the likelihood that a much larger
area would also probably be effectively
unusable because of public perception of
contamination, with subsequent economic
and social impacts.
As is clear from the discussion above, one
of the quantitative safety performance criteria

82
is the frequency of occurrence of severe
reactor core damage. The target for existing
nuclear power plants built in the 1970s
was a frequency of occurrence below
10–4 (1 in 10 000) events per plant operating
year. Severe accident management and
mitigation measures should reduce by a
factor of at least ten the probability of large
off-site releases, even following such an
event. Improvements in design for future
nuclear power plants are expected to lead
to the achievement of a frequency of not
more than 10–5 (1 in 100 000) severe core
damage events per plant operating year.
The certifi cation application for the new
Westinghouse AP 1000 nuclear power
plant design for example, estimates the risk
of core damage to be one in two million
(5 × 10–7) per year and large release
frequency to be considerably lower
at 6 × 10–8 per year.The new generation
reactors are designed to be very safe.
They have fewer components than older
designs, are more effi cient and need less
maintenance. All refl ect the defence in
depth approach and many of them include
‘passive safety’ features — systems that
close down the reactor automatically in
an emergency using natural processes such
as gravity and convection that need no external
intervention or power supplies. This reduces
very signifi cantly the probability of core
damage or any radioactivity escape from
the core, let alone the containment facility.
In one scenario, were Australia to have
25 operating reactors with the above
(10–5) design features, then there could be
one serious core-damaging incident per
4000 years of operations and a one in
40 000 years event that might see off-site
release of radioactive material. Were Australia
to comply with the 5 × 10–7 standard, the risks
would be lowered further by a factor of 20.
6.3 Acceptable risk?
Hazard and risk assessment is used
extensively in Australia and overseas
to assist government decision making on
major project acceptability. A hazard is an
unwanted event that may cause harm to
workers, the public or the environment.
Risk is the probability of an unwanted event
happening and is often expressed as the
product of consequence and frequency.
Risks can be defi ned to be acceptable
or tolerable if the public will bear them
without undue concern.
Regulatory limits are set at points deemed
‘acceptable’ by the regulator, taking into
account objective evidence of harm and
the general views of society. Risks are
unacceptable if they exceed a regulatory
limit, or cannot otherwise be accepted.
Negligible risks are those so small that
there is no cause for concern, or are so
unlikely that there is no valid reason to
take action to reduce them.
Humans continually expose themselves
to, or have imposed upon them, the risk of
injury or fatality. Self-imposed risk is known
as voluntary risk and includes everyday
events such as smoking, swimming and
driving. Each has an associated risk that
people voluntarily accept when weighed
against the perceived benefi ts. A range of
examples are listed in Table 6.3.

83
Table 6.3 Examples of everyday risks in Australia
Hazard Risk of fatality per
million person years
Smoking
(20 cigarettes/day) 5000
Motoring 144
Accidents in the home 110
Owning fi rearms 30
Drowning 15
Fire 12
Electrocution 4
Aircraft accident 3
Unexpected reaction
to medicine 1
Lightning strike 0.1
Snake bite 0.13
Shark attack 0.065
Nuclear industry
contribution to
0.018
background radiationa
a Based on the application of the ICRP risk factor to the contribution
of nuclear industry operational emissions, plus those of the Chernobyl
accident, to the average annual dose from global background radiation
(approx. 0.0022 mSv; see Figure 6.1). This sort of calculation of cancer
deaths based on trivial exposures to large populations is questionable
and should normally be avoided. (See discussion ‘Assessing collective
dose’ Section 6.2.1 and Appendix M.)
Source: adapted from Environment Australia.[129]
6.3.1 Risk assessment and planning
For formal planning purposes, risks are often
assessed through quantifi ed risk-assessment
techniques. The acceptability of risk is
determined against existing regulatory
standards or existing background levels.
Most Australian states have set limits on
tolerable risk levels based on the frequency
of individual death due to an accident
(individual fatality risk). For example,
New South Wales specifi es an individual
fatality risk of 1 in 1 000 000 years as being
the acceptability limit for industry in
residential areas. Risks may also be
calculated by aggregating the risk to
all individuals who may be affected
(societal or collective risk), for example,
from explosions, fi res or toxic fumes.
6.3.2 Risk perception
Perceptions are important in determining
whether risks for hazardous facilities are
acceptable. Risks of greatest concern
are ones borne involuntarily, especially
human activities (rather than natural events)
that could have potentially catastrophic
consequences. Nuclear accidents are in
this category. While risk assessments can
help to quantify risk levels, it is a highly
subjective issue and the level of risk acceptable
to the community or to some individuals
may be zero. This is particularly so for a new
development that may appear to offer little
individual or community benefi t. While some
risk perceptions are commonly understood,
confl icts can arise between ‘experts’ and
the community about acceptability. Research
suggests that these arise from differences in
the way the public and experts perceive risk.[130]
This is of particular concern to policy makers
basing decisions on scientifi c advice.
To determine the acceptable risk level for
hazardous facilities, a sound approach is
to make a comparison with background
exposure levels. Against this measurement,
decisions can be made as to the acceptability
of additional risks.

84
6.4 Health and safety
performance
Australian industrial experience in the nuclear
fuel cycle is limited to uranium mining and
milling and the research reactor at Lucas
Heights. In these areas the health and
safety performance is of a high standard.
For the Australian minerals industry overall,
the average fatal injury frequency rate (the
number of fatal injuries per 1000 employees
for a 12-month period) for the 10-year period
1994–1995 to 2003–2004 was 0.08. This compares
well with the United States, which recorded
a rate of approximately 0.16 for this period.
Lost time injury data are diffi cult to compare
internationally because of the different systems
and defi nitions that are used. Nonetheless,
for the past few years the Australian minerals
industry performance appears to be
comparable with that of the United States.[131]
Uranium mining operations are undertaken
under the Code of Practice on Radiation
Protection in the Mining and Milling of
Radioactive Ores, administered by state
and territory governments. Radiation dose
records compiled by mining companies under
the scrutiny of regulatory authorities have
shown consistently that mining company
employees are not exposed to radiation doses
in excess of the limits. The most exposed group
receives doses that are approximately half of
the 20 mSv per year limit. Uranium mining does
not discernibly increase background levels of
radiation for members of the public, including
communities living near uranium mines.
At the open cut Ranger mine, because of good
natural ventilation, the radon level seldom
exceeds 1 per cent of the levels allowable
for continuous occupational exposure. In an
underground mine, a good forced-ventilation
system is required to achieve the same result.
At the underground Olympic Dam mine,
radiation doses to designated workers in
the mine in 2004 averaged 3.7 mSv per year.
Strict hygiene standards are imposed
on workers handling U3O8 concentrate.
If it is ingested it has a chemical toxicity
similar to that of lead oxide. At Olympic Dam,
the packing of uranium oxide concentrate
is automated, so no human presence is
required. Beverley is an in-situ leach uranium
mine so there are no conventional ‘tailings’,
waste rock or similar wastes. This means
potential radioactive emissions are very low.
In addition to routine worker exposure,
however, there may be incidents at the
mines that give rise to non-routine radiation
exposure. At Ranger such incidents occurred
in 1983 and 2004. There were three incidents
at Olympic Dam and four at Beverley in
South Australia in 2004–2005 alone, involving
spillages of slightly radioactive materials.
While all of these incidents could have been
avoided, the actual doses received range
from trivial to relatively low and are unlikely
to have signifi cant long-term health effects.
In common with all workplaces non-radiological
accidents have occurred at
Australian uranium mines involving vehicles,
machinery, explosives and so on. Although
there was a fatality in 2005 at Olympic Dam
(an explosives accident, the fi rst fatal accident
at the site since 1998), and the death of a
contractor as a result of an excavator accident
in 1996 at the Ranger mine, the overall health
and safety performance at uranium mines is
at least as good as other mines in Australia.

85
6.5 Conclusion
Using nuclear energy to generate electricity
involves fewer health and safety impacts than
current technology fossil fuel-based generation
and hydro power, taking into account both
emissions during normal operation and the
impact of accidents.
As Chapter 7 makes clear, climate change poses
a real and grave risk that, if unchecked, would
have signifi cant impacts on the world, including
Australia. Nuclear energy has the capacity
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions globally.
The (small) risks associated with Australia
having a greater involvement in nuclear energy
needs to be considered in the context of the
real risks of not taking this action.
There is a long established international
system for reviewing the scientifi c literature
on radiation and its biological effects, and for
developing and issuing guidelines on relevant
matters, key elements in achieving ever safer
operation. Australia is already an integral
part of this system and our health and safety
requirements refl ect best international practice
(see Chapters 8 and 9). There is every reason
to be confi dent that Australia’s health and
safety systems will continue to provide a sound
framework for the management of the uranium
mining industry and would enable any other
parts of the nuclear fuel cycle envisaged for
Australia to be equally well regulated, ensuring
the highest levels of health and safety.

86

87
Chapter 7. Environmental impacts
Deep cuts in global greenhouse
gas emissions are required to avoid
dangerous climate change. No single
technology can achieve this — a
portfolio of actions and low-emission
technologies is needed.
Nuclear power is a low-emission
technology. Life cycle greenhouse gas
emissions from nuclear power are more
than ten times lower than emissions
from fossil fuels and are similar to
emissions from many renewables.
Nuclear power has low life cycle
impacts against many environmental
measures. Water use can be signifi cant
in uranium mining and electricity
generation depending on the
technology used.
The cost of reducing emissions from
electricity generation can be minimised
by using market-based measures to
treat all generation technologies on
an equal footing.
•
•
•
•
7.1 Introduction
Concerns about human-induced climate
change are driving renewed worldwide interest
in nuclear power and other low-emission
technologies. Greenhouse gas emissions,
especially carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil
fuel combustion, are changing the make-up
of the atmosphere and contributing to changing
weather patterns around the world. It is widely
accepted that climate change is real and
global greenhouse gas emissions need
to be cut dramatically.[132–134] This chapter
focuses on the potential of nuclear power
to contribute to that task.
This chapter also reviews the non-greenhouse
environmental impacts of the nuclear fuel
cycle. The analysis is necessarily broadly
based, and allows some of the generic impacts
of different generation technologies to be
compared. It must be stressed that any
specifi c proposal for Australia (eg building
an enrichment plant) would be the subject
of an environmental impact assessment that
would be much more detailed than the
assessment presented here.
Emissions and impacts are assessed across
the full life cycle of nuclear power, from uranium
mining to plant decommissioning and fi nal
waste disposal.
Environmental impacts are strongly related
to health and safety issues (eg human health
is affected by environmental factors, and an
accident at a nuclear facility could damage
fauna and fl ora), which are dealt with further
in Chapter 6. The risks arising from nuclear
waste, and management controls applied to
minimise adverse impacts, are addressed in
Chapter 5. Regulatory issues are discussed
in Chapter 9. A detailed discussion of climate
change and greenhouse gas emissions is
provided in Appendix O.
7.2 Climate change
7.2.1 Emissions and projections
Global emissions of greenhouse gases have
grown since the beginning of the industrial
revolution, driving a rapid increase in the
concentration of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere. The pre-industrial atmospheric
concentration of CO2 was 280 ppm. It is now
380 ppm, and rising by approximately
1.8 ppm each year.[135] This is higher than
it has been in at least 650 000 (and likely
20 million) years.[2,136,137] While the global
climate is naturally variable, this new and
rapid increase in atmospheric concentrations
could trigger shifts at a scale and rate far
beyond natural variation. Indeed, impacts are
already observable in rising temperatures
and sea levels, loss of ice cover, changing
weather patterns and consequent impacts
on ecosystems.[134,136]

88
Scientists project that CO2 concentrations could
grow to between 540 and 970 ppm by the end
of the century if the world does not act to cut
emissions.[134] Under these conditions, the
Earth’s average surface temperatures could rise
by 1.4–5.8°C and global mean sea levels could
rise between 9–88 cm. Changes would vary
signifi cantly across regions. For example,
it is very likely that nearly all land areas
would warm more than the global average,
and Australia’s annual average temperatures
are projected to increase by between 1–6°C
by 2070.[135]
Figure 7.1 shows how the surface temperature
of the Earth has increased since the
mid-nineteenth century and projections
for the coming century.
Figure 7.1 Earth’s temperature, 1000–2100
Northern hemisphere Global
Scientists project that the
world will warm by 1.4ºC
to 5.8ºC by the year 2100
1861
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
Year
Departures in temperatures (°C) from the 1961–1990 average
1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100
Note: Projections for the period 2000–2100 are based on illustrative scenarios.
Source: Australian Greenhouse Offi ce (AGO)[137] adapted from IPCC[2]

89
Recent research has examined other processes
in the climate system that could dampen
or amplify climate change. Aerosols in the
atmosphere, carbon cycle dynamics and the
ice-albedo effect are all associated with
feedback loops that affect the degree of
warming.[136] Studies of these feedbacks
suggest a greater risk of reaching or exceeding
the upper end of the 1.4–5.8°C temperature
rise by 2100.[136]
The 0.6°C warming observed over the past
100 years has been associated with increasing
heat waves, more intense droughts, coral
bleaching and shifts in ecosystems.[137]
Additional warming of only 1°C could see
60 per cent of the Great Barrier Reef regularly
bleached and cause considerable loss of coral
biodiversity.[135,138,139] The larger and faster the
change, the greater the risk of adverse impacts.
Above 3°C, serious risk of large scale system
disruption is more likely, such as destabilisation
of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets.
Collapse of these sheets would lead to
centuries of irreversible sea level rise and
coastal inundation around the world.[133–135]
7.2.2 Emissions from
electricity generation
Globally, approximately 60 per cent of current
greenhouse gas emissions arise from the
production and use of energy.[140] The electricity
sector is a particularly important source.
CO2 emissions from electricity generation have
grown by 170 per cent since 1971, and in 2003
electricity generation accounted for 40 per cent
of global CO2 emissions. Of this, coal-fi red
electricity plants accounted for some
70 per cent, natural gas-fi red plants for
approximately 20 per cent and oil-fi red
plants for approximately 10 per cent.[30]
The International Energy Agency (IEA)
projects that under current policy settings
(ie ‘business as usual’), global electricity
production will almost triple between 2003
and 2050 (see Figure 7.2). Related CO2 emissions
are projected to rise by more than 2.5 times.
The share of fossil fuels increases, eg coal-fi red
generation is projected to grow from 40 to
47 per cent and gas-fi red generation from
19 to 28 per cent of total generation output.[30]
Figure 7.2 Global electricity production by generation type
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
10 000
0
2003 2050
Electricity production (TWh)
Other
renewables
Biomass
Hydro
Nuclear
Gas
Oil
Coal
TWh = terawatt hours
Source: IEA.[30] Projections for 2050 are under current policy settings.

90
Figure 7.3 Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions, 2004
The situation in Australia is similar.
Total national emissions in 2004 were
564.7 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent
(CO2-e).38 Energy production and use (including
electricity generation and transport) was
the largest source, accounting for more than
68 per cent. Agriculture was the next largest
contributor. The remainder of emissions were
from land use, forestry, industrial processes
and waste (see Figure 7.3).[141]
32% Electricity — coal fired
3% Electricity — other
13% Transport
21% Energy — other
(direct combustion,
fugitive emissions etc)
16% Agriculture
15% Remainder (industrial,
land use, waste)
Note: Figures were calculated using the Kyoto Protocol accounting provisions (those applying to the Australian 108 per cent emissions target).
Estimate for land use (includes land use change and forestry) is interim only.
Source: AGO[141]
Emissions from electricity generation in
Australia grew by more than 50 per cent
between 1990 and 2004, to approximately
195 million tonnes of CO2-e. Of this, 92.2 per cent
was attributable to coal, 7 per cent to gas,
and 0.8 per cent to oil and diesel. As discussed
in Chapter 4, demand for electricity is projected
to grow over the coming decades. If this demand
is met by conventional fossil fuel technologies,
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions will also
continue to grow.
7.2.3 Abatement task
The scale and pace of emission reductions
required to avoid or at least minimise dangerous
climate change is vigorously debated.
Nevertheless, the balance of scientifi c opinion
is that avoiding dangerous climate change will
require deep cuts in global emissions. To avoid
more than doubling pre-industrial levels of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, cuts in
the order of 60 per cent are required by the end
of the century.[58] Limiting future atmospheric
concentrations to this level could limit twenty-fi
rst century warming to an estimated 1.5–2.9°C,
potentially avoiding the more extreme projected
impacts.[135] Deeper cuts are required sooner
to achieve lower stabilisation levels.[134]
38 CO2-equivalent (CO2-e) aggregates the impact of all greenhouse gases into a single measure. It adjusts for the fact that each gas
has a different global warming potential, for example, 1 tonne of methane has an equivalent effect to 21 tonnes of CO2.

91
Climate change is a global problem and
emissions arise from everyday activities across
all sectors of the economy. As a result, no single
country, action or technology alone can deliver
deep cuts. An effective response to climate
change will require action across the board
— by all major emitters, and across all sources
of emissions.
Box 7.1 Stabilisation wedges: a pathway to avoiding dangerous climate change?
The ‘stabilisation wedges’ concept developed by Princeton scientists Robert Socolow and Stephen Pacala helps
to illustrate the overall abatement task.[142,143]
Socolow and Pacala suggest that, at the present rate of growth, emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels will double
by 2056. Even if the world then takes action to level them off, the atmospheric concentration will be headed to
more than double pre-industrial levels. But if the world can fl atten emissions now and then ramp them down,
it should be possible to stabilise concentrations substantially below 560 ppm.
Between the growth and fl atline pathways is the ‘stabilisation triangle’, which represents the minimum emission
reductions the world would need to achieve in the coming 50 years. The triangle grows over the next 50 years to a total
of 7 billion tonnes of carbon in 2056. The stabilisation triangle is then divided into seven ‘wedges’. Each wedge cuts
annual emissions by 1 billion tonnes of carbon39 in 2056. The wedge is a useful unit because its size and time frame
match what specifi c technologies and actions can achieve (Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4 The stabilisation triangle and wedges
Historic
Delay action until 2056
Begin action now
Stabilisation triangle
7 wedges
14
7
0
1956 2006
Year
Emissions from fossil fuels (Gt C/year)
2056 2106
Source: Socolow and Pacala[143]
Socolow and Pacala have identifi ed 15 technologies and actions that could achieve a wedge of abatement, including:
• effi ciency improvements (eg double the fuel effi ciency for 2 billion cars; cut electricity use in homes,
offi ces and stores by 25 per cent)
• CO2 capture and storage (eg introduce at 800 GW of coal plants)
• alternative energy sources replacing coal (eg add 700 GW of nuclear; add 2 million 1 MW windmills;
add 1400 GW of gas)
• forestry and agricultural practices (eg stop all deforestation; apply conservation tilling to all cropland).
The list is not exhaustive, and not all options would be required to avoid doubling CO2 concentrations.
Many combinations of technologies and practices can fi ll the triangle. This work makes it clear that substantial
reductions are possible, even if some options do not deliver or are excluded.
39 1 tonne of carbon is equivalent to 3.67 tonnes of CO2-e, so 7 billion tonnes of carbon is equivalent to 25.7 billion tonnes of CO2-e.

92
Numerous studies have attempted to quantify
the cost of stabilising atmospheric levels of
greenhouse gases. This is a diffi cult task, as it
is hard enough to forecast the evolution of the
global energy and economic system over the
coming decade, let alone the coming century.
Therefore, projections must be treated with
considerable caution. Their value lies more
in the insights they provide than the
specifi c numbers.
Overall, the costs of reducing emissions are
lower in scenarios involving a gradual transition
from the world’s present energy system towards
a less carbon-intensive one. This minimises
costs associated with premature retirement
of existing capital stock and provides time for
technology development. On the other hand,
more rapid near-term action increases fl exibility
in moving towards stabilisation, reduces
environmental and human risks and costs
associated with changes in climate, and may
stimulate more rapid deployment of existing
low-emission technologies.[144]
Delaying emission reductions can result in
more rapid warming, increasing the risk of
exceeding critical climate thresholds and
making dangerous impacts more likely.[145]
At a global economy-wide level, studies suggest
deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions could
be achieved while maintaining economic growth
over the coming century. A review by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
found that deep cuts could be achieved at a
cost of between 1 and 2 per cent of global gross
domestic product (GDP) at 2100. Absolute GDP
levels would still be substantially higher than
today, as a result of the anticipated economic
growth.[144] The small fall in future GDP needs
to be set against the costs of climate change
impacts, which are not factored into
these studies.
A major assessment of the costs of climate
change impacts was published in October 2006.
This review, conducted by Sir Nicholas Stern for
the United Kingdom Government, found that
if the world does not act to cut emissions, the
overall costs and risks of climate change will
be equivalent to losing at least 5 per cent of
global GDP each year. If a wider range of risks
and impacts is taken into account, the costs
could rise to 20 per cent of GDP or more, far
more than the estimated cost of reducing
emissions. The Stern review concluded that
urgent and strong action to reduce emissions
is clearly warranted.[132]
7.3 Electricity generation
technologies compared
7.3.1 Nuclear power
Nuclear power, unlike fossil fuel, does not
generate greenhouse gases directly. While
nuclear fuels release energy through fi ssion,
fossil fuels release energy through combustion:
the fuel (eg coal, gas, oil) combines with
oxygen, releasing heat and producing CO2.
Nevertheless, greenhouse gases are generated
during the nuclear fuel cycle. Emissions
arise from mining and processing of the fuel,
construction of the plant, disposal of spent
fuel and by-products, and waste management
and decommissioning.
Emission estimates vary widely due to
the plant characteristics (eg type, capacity
factor,40 effi ciency, lifetime) assessed. To enable
meaningful comparisons, greenhouse gas
emissions are expressed relative to the amount
of electrical energy generated — either as
grams of CO2-e per kilowatt hour (g CO2-e/kWh);
or (scaled up) kilograms of CO2-e per megawatt
hour (kg CO2-e/MWh).
40 The capacity factor of a plant measures its actual electricity output relative to its theoretical maximum output (ie if it ran at full power
all the time). In general, intermittent sources such as wind and solar have lower capacity factors (approx. 10–35 per cent), while baseload
coal and nuclear plants have higher capacity factors (approx. 80–90 per cent). Peaking plants (typically open cycle gas turbines) tend
to have low capacity factors.

93
Most published studies estimate that on a life
cycle basis the emissions intensity of nuclear
power is between 2 and 40 kg CO2-e/MWh.41
The average for Western Europe is estimated
at 16 kgCO2/MWh for a pressurised light water
reactor.[147] Higher estimates generally assume
that enrichment is done using diffusion
technology, which uses a lot of electricity.
If this electricity is generated from fossil fuels,
it increases the overall greenhouse gas
emissions. As discussed in Chapter 3, diffusion
is being progressively replaced by centrifuge
technology, which uses much less electricity.
Over time this will reduce the emissions
intensity of nuclear power.
The Taskforce commissioned the University
of Sydney to conduct an independent study
of the potential life cycle emissions of nuclear
power in Australia.[146] Using a comprehensive
methodology and conservative assumptions,
this study estimated the life cycle emissions
intensity of nuclear electricity in Australia
to be between 10 and 130 kg CO2-e/MWh.
The lower end of this range would be seen
if only centrifuge enrichment (rather than a
mix of centrifuge and diffusion technology)
was used, or if the overall greenhouse intensity
of the Australian economy was lower. The
higher end of this range would only be seen
if extremely low grade uranium ores (ie much
lower than current grades) were mined.[146]
7.3.2 Fossil fuel and renewables
Generally, fossil fuel technologies have the
highest emissions intensity. Of these, natural
gas is the lowest, black coal is intermediate
and brown coal is the highest. Hydro and wind
power, on the other hand, have the lowest
greenhouse gas emissions intensity (depending
on the technology and location42) while solar
power is in between.
The University of Sydney developed emission
intensity estimates for a range of currently
available best practice electricity generation
technologies under Australian conditions.
These estimates are set out in Table 7.1 and
Figure 7.5. As existing technologies improve
and new technologies are developed, these
fi gures will change. The effi ciency of solar cell
manufacturing and performance is improving
rapidly; carbon capture and storage could
potentially deliver 70 to 90 per cent reductions
in emissions to atmosphere from fossil fuel
technologies; and geothermal (hot dry rocks),
tidal and wave generation technologies
show promise.
Table 7.1 Estimated life cycle greenhouse gas emissions intensity of different technologies
Technology Emissions intensity (kg CO2-e/MWh)
Best estimate Range
Brown coal (subcritical) 1175 1011–1506
Black coal (subcritical) 941 843–1171
Black coal (supercritical) 863 774–1046
Natural gas (open cycle) 751 627–891
Natural gas (combined cycle) 577 491–655
Solar photovoltaics 106 53–217
Nuclear (light water reactor) 60 10–130
Wind turbines 21 13–40
Hydro (run-of-river) 15 6.5–44
Source: University of Sydney[146]
41 See summary of life cycle studies in the University of Sydney report.[146]
42 Hydro exhibits very low emissions in temperate regions; however, emissions may be much higher in tropical regions due to biomass decay
(eg see Dones et al).[108]

94
Figure 7.5 Estimated life cycle greenhouse gas emissions intensity of different technologies
Brown coal
(subcritical)
1175
Black coal
(supercritical)
863
Wind
21
Hydro
15
Gas
(CCGT)
577
Solar PV
106
Nuclear
60
Shows best estimate
Shows range
Emissions (kg CO2-e/MWh)
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
CO2-e = carbon dioxide equivalent; MWh = megawatt hour; PV = photovoltaic; CCGT = combined cycle gas turbine. Source: University of Sydney[146]
Taking into account full life cycle contributions,
greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear power
are roughly comparable to renewables and
between 10 and 100 times less than natural
gas and coal (see Box 7.2). This indicates there
is great scope, both domestically and globally,
to reduce growth in emissions by replacing
fossil fuel plants with lower emission
technologies such as nuclear.

95
Box 7.2 Is nuclear really a low emission technology?
Many submissions to this Review referred to the work of two physicists, Jan-Willem Storm van Leeuwen and
Philip Smith, who estimate that life cycle CO2 emissions of nuclear power in the United States are between
93 and 141 kg/MWh, and claim that nuclear power has limited potential to contribute to global emission
reductions.[148,149]
This estimate is signifi cantly higher than other published estimates. The University of Sydney identifi ed 39 other
studies with estimates ranging from 2 to 84 kg/MWh. Almost all were below 40 kg/MWh. Unlike Storm van Leeuwen
and Smith’s estimate, many of these were published in peer-reviewed journals, and some were independently verifi ed.
The Storm van Leeuwen and Smith study was the only one exceeding 100 kg/MWh.[146]
Figure 7.6 Estimated emissions for nuclear power
37
2 1
40
30
20
10
0
0 –50 50–100 100–200
Emissions estimate (kg CO2-e/MWh)
Number of studies
CO2-e = carbon dioxide equivalent, MWh = megawatt hour
The University of Sydney found that while Storm van Leeuwen and Smith’s input data is largely sound,
the methodology used is not appropriate and tends to infl ate energy use. This is particularly the case
for construction and decommissioning; for example their estimate for energy used in construction is
many times higher than other studies.
Life cycle emission estimates are strongly affected by the energy source. Fossil fuel energy inputs give higher
emissions, while nuclear and renewable energy inputs give lower emissions.[108,146,150] Storm van Leeuwen and
Smith assume almost all energy inputs are provided by fossil fuels. While this may be a reasonable assumption
for some current operations in the United States, it is not true globally and will change in the future if there is
a shift to lower carbon fuels.
Storm van Leeuwen and Smith also draw attention to the energy used to extract uranium from ore. They contend
that once high quality uranium reserves are exhausted, it will take more energy to produce uranium than you get
from nuclear power. Their calculations for energy use are not based on actual mining operations, rather they
estimate energy use for hypothetical mines operating at unnecessarily high standards which are well beyond world’s
best practice. In addition, they dismiss in-situ leaching mines as wholly unsustainable.
The energy balance of nuclear power is a complex issue, as it is affected by a range of factors including ore grade
and location, mining technology and fuel cycle. However it is clear that nuclear power currently produces far more
energy than it uses. The University of Sydney, using conservative assumptions, found that nuclear power currently
generates at least fi ve times more energy than it uses.[146] The IEA estimates that known uranium reserves — which
are of suffi cient quality to give a net energy benefi t — could fuel nuclear power for 85 years.[30] In contrast,
the estimated lifetime of proven oil reserves is 43 years, and proven gas reserves is 64 years.[3] Uranium reserves
are discussed further in Chapter 2.

96
7.3.3 Global abatement potential
By providing 15 per cent of the world’s
electricity, nuclear is already making an
important contribution to constraining global
greenhouse gas emissions. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that
nuclear power annually avoids more than
2 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions that would
otherwise have been produced through
burning fossil fuels.[151,152]
Future emissions from electricity generation
can be reduced by reducing the amount of
electricity used, and by accelerating the uptake
of lower-emission generation technologies such
as nuclear. Socolow and Pacala estimate that
if 700 GW of nuclear power is installed over the
next 50 years instead of conventional coal-fi red
plants, it could deliver a wedge of abatement
(ie it could reduce global emissions by
3.67 billion tonnes of CO2 in 2050).
Globally, the IEA suggests that expansion
of nuclear power could reduce greenhouse
gas emissions in 2050 by between 1.9 and
2.9 billion tonnes of CO2.[30] This is based on
emission reduction scenarios for the electricity
generation sector in which nuclear generation
grows by between 18 and 170 per cent
(to 3100–7300 TWh) by 2050. In the most
optimistic scenario nuclear provides
22 per cent of total electricity generation
in 2050.
The IEA analysis indicates that nuclear could
make an important contribution to the global
abatement task in the energy sector — it
delivers between 6 and 10 per cent of the total
abatement achieved under the scenarios
analysed to 2050. In combination with other
measures it could help achieve deep cuts
in emissions over the longer term.
It is generally accepted that no single
technology or action can deliver the emission
cuts required to avoid dangerous climate
change. There is no ‘silver bullet’. In the IEA
scenarios, energy effi ciency improvements
make the greatest contribution (one-third to
half of total abatement achieved). Carbon
capture and storage technologies make a
major contribution (more than 20 per cent
of total abatement in most scenarios), while
renewable energy, fuel switching, biofuels and
nuclear also make signifi cant contributions.[30]
7.3.4 Potential contribution
in Australia
If Australia was to use nuclear power rather
than conventional fossil fuel technologies to
meet future electricity demand, then nuclear
power would help reduce emissions growth.
Figure 7.7 plots the total greenhouse gas
emissions from different generation
technologies and fuels over time.
This illustrates how the greenhouse gas
advantage of nuclear power grows over time.

97
Figure 7.7 Cumulative emissions from different generation fuels and technologies
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Years of operation
Cumulative emissions (Mt CO2-e)
Brown coal
(subcritical)
Black coal
(supercritical)
Natural gas
(CCGT)
Nuclear
(LWR)
CCGT = combined cycle gas turbine; LWR = light water reactor; Mt CO2-e = megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent
Note: Assumes 1000 MW plant and 85 per cent capacity factor for all plants.
Source: UMPNER analysis based on University of Sydney life cycle emission estimates in Table 7.1.[146]
Emissions for a subcritical brown coal-fi red
power plant would be approximately
8.7 Mt CO2-e/year, and for a supercritical black
coal plant approximately 6.4 Mt CO2-e/year.
Combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant
emissions would be approximately 4.3 Mt
CO2-e/year. In contrast, nuclear power
emissions would be less than 0.5 Mt CO2-e/year.
Over a lifetime of 40 years, the emissions
savings from nuclear power would be
332 Mt CO2-e relative to a brown coal plant,
239 Mt CO2-e relative to a black coal plant,
or 154 Mt CO2-e relative to a CCGT plant.
As a reference point, Australia’s total
electricity sector greenhouse gas
emissions in 2004 were 195 Mt CO2-e.
The potential contribution of nuclear power
to Australia’s overall abatement task depends
in part on our ‘business as usual’ emissions
trajectory and desired level of emission
reductions. For the purpose of this analysis
the business as usual case is taken
from projections by the Australian Bureau
of Agricultural and Resource Economics
(ABARE).[55] Using this data, in 2050 under
current policy settings Australia’s total
emissions (excluding land use change
and forestry) are projected to be 869 Mt CO2-e
(ie more than double 1990 levels).
Electricity generation is projected to
contribute 320 Mt CO2-e in 2050, 37 per cent
of the total.
Figure 7.8 shows the business as usual case
(black line) and 1990 emissions (dotted line).
Figure 7.8 also illustrates two alternative
scenarios to business as usual. In the ‘fast
build’ case (represented by the red line),
the fi rst nuclear plant comes on line in 2020.
Additional plants are added from 2025,
growing to total capacity of 25 GW by 2050.
This reduces annual emissions by almost
150 Mt CO2-e in 2050, as indicated by
the red arrow.

98
In the slow build case (blue line), the fi rst
nuclear plant comes on line in 2025, additional
capacity is added from 2030, and total capacity
is 12 GW in 2050. This reduces emissions by
over 70 Mt CO2-e in 2050, as indicated by the
blue arrow.
These two scenarios reduce Australia’s total
emissions in 2050 by between 8 and 17 per cent
relative to business as usual. This represents
roughly one-fi fth to almost one-half of the
projected emissions from electricity generation.
The estimates assume that nuclear displaces
supercritical black coal generation and
are based on current performance fi gures,
so each 1 GW nuclear plant reduces annual
emissions by approximately 6 Mt CO2-e.
If nuclear displaces gas, emission savings
would be lower.
A number of recent studies examine the
potential costs of cutting greenhouse gas
emissions in Australia, and how costs vary
under different policy approaches and
technology mixes.[65,153,154] While the results
of these studies are affected by the particular
scenarios, assumptions and input data used,
they provide some useful insights.
A report by CRA International which focused
on the electricity generation sector found
that the cost of reducing emissions from
this sector are signifi cantly lower if nuclear
technology is available. Under one scenario,
in which emissions were reduced to 25 per cent
below 1990 levels by 2050, adding nuclear
to the technology mix reduced total capital
expenditure between 2010 and 2050 by
15 per cent (from $150 billion to $128 billion).[154]
Similarly, ABARE modelling found that
economy-wide costs are lower if a wider range
of generation technologies is available. Under
a scenario with quite limited deployment of
nuclear, in 2050 costs were reduced by $2 billion
(0.1 per cent of GDP) and annual emissions
were cut by an additional 4 Mt of CO2-e.
Figure 7.8 Potential to reduce Australia’s emissions — illustrative scenarios to 2050
900
800
700
600
500
400
0
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Emissions (Mt CO2-e)
Business
as usual
Nuclear
(12 GW in 2050)
Nuclear
(25 GW in 2050)
1990 emissions
GW = gigawatts; Mt CO2-e = megatonnes of carbon dioxide-equivalent
Note: Emissions exclude land use change and forestry.
Source: UMPNER analysis, based on ABARE projections[55] and University of Sydney emission intensities.[146]

99
While precise numbers depend on the specifi c
technology, location and fuel source, studies
indicate that over the full life cycle nuclear
power and fossil fuel technologies use
signifi cantly less land than renewable
technologies. Wind and biomass technologies
have larger land requirements — 10 to 100 times
more than nuclear power.[157]
However simplistic comparisons may overstate
the land requirements for renewables, many
of which allow multiple concurrent uses of
the land (eg wind turbines can be located on
agricultural land, and solar photovoltaic cells
can be installed on building roofs and facades).
In addition, land area is just one aspect of
location-related impacts. The value of a
particular site — in environmental, aesthetic,
cultural and economic terms — is also
important. These values were at the forefront
of concerns regarding the proposed Jabiluka
mine in the Northern Territory.
Air pollution
In terms of air pollution, the performance of
nuclear power and renewable technologies
is signifi cantly better than that of conventional
fossil fuel plants. Fossil fuel combustion
produces pollutants with environmental and
health impacts, including sulphur oxides (SOx),
nitrogen oxides (NOx) (which also contribute
to climate change) and particulate matter
(eg droplets or particles from smoke and dust).
At high concentrations, these pollutants have
signifi cant health impacts, and some contribute
to acid rain. These problems are generally less
signifi cant in Australia because of our relatively
low population density, low sulphur content
in coal, and greater distances between
power stations.
Figure 7.9 illustrates the estimated relative
levels of emissions of SOx and NOx from nuclear,
fossil fuel and wind generation technologies
from an Australian study. Emissions from
nuclear power generation are substantially
lower than coal, and somewhat higher than
wind. In this study, SOx emissions from natural
gas were very low.
CRA also analysed a number of carbon price,
technology benchmark and mandatory emission
limitation policies. It found that policies that
expose all emissions to the same incentives
for reduction (eg carbon price) provide the
most effi cient means to reduce emissions.[154]
A report by Allen Consulting showed that
to achieve the same climate outcome, early
introduction of policies to reduce emissions
was less costly than later action which
required more abrupt reductions.[153]
These studies show that no single technology
can alone deliver deep cuts in emissions
and highlight that a broad suite of technologies
and actions will be required to stabilise and
then reduce Australia’s emissions by 2050.
They demonstrate that technology-neutral
policy approaches can stimulate cost-effective
action on both the demand and supply side
of electricity generation. As a result, these
approaches have great scope to stimulate
emission reductions at least cost.
7.4 Other environmental
impacts
7.4.1 Resource use and emissions
Comparisons of the impacts of electricity
generation technologies indicate that the life
cycle environmental impacts of nuclear power
are signifi cantly less than conventional fossil
fuel technology, and on many measures similar
to renewable energy.[108,155,156]
Energy density and land use
A key determinant of overall life cycle impacts
is the energy density of different sources.
Nuclear fi ssion generates very high amounts
of energy compared to fossil fuel combustion
(over a year, a 1 GW nuclear plant would use
approx. 1 tonne of U-235, while an equivalent
coal-fi red plant would use approx. 3 million
tonnes of black coal). Both nuclear and fossil
fuels have high energy densities relative
to renewables.

100
Figure 7.9 Estimated life cycle air pollution from different technologies
9.3 8.1
1
0.3
23
0.03
1
0.4
coal gas nuclear wind coal gas nuclear wind
NOx emissions SOx emissions
Emissions per MWh relative to nuclear
100
10
1
0.1
0.01
SOx = Sulphur oxides; NOx = nitrogen oxides; MWh = megawatt hour
Note: This graph uses a logarithmic scale, so each point on the vertical scale is ten times more than the last.
Source: Australian Coal Association[155]
Water
Water use is of particular interest in Australia,
given the limited availability of water in many
regions. The main uses of water in the nuclear
fuel cycle are in mining and milling of uranium
and for nuclear power plant cooling. However,
it is important to note that many of these
processes do not require potable (ie drinking)
water and only a small fraction of the water
used is actually consumed in the process.
In addition, water use is not unique to nuclear
activities and generic approaches to water
resource management, such as allocation
through licences, can be readily applied.
Water requirements and management issues
are technology and location-specifi c. In uranium
mining, underground and open-cut methods
generally require more water than in-situ
leaching (ISL). Overall, the process of ISL
mining has considerably less environmental
impact than other conventional mining
techniques. While re-injection of the leach
solution and liquid waste into the aquifer
at the Beverley mine in South Australia
increases the concentration of soluble ions,
the groundwater affected is not potable and has
no other apparent benefi cial uses. In addition,
it is widely believed that the water chemistry
will return to pre-mining conditions within
a timeframe of several years to decades.[158]

101
The proposed expansion of the Olympic
Dam mine would increase annual water
use four-fold from 12 000 to 48 000 megalitres.
BHP Billiton is investigating the use of a
coastal desalination plant to meet these needs,
given the limited availability of water from the
Great Artesian Basin.[17] The potential impacts
of the desalination plant will be investigated
in detail as part of the environmental impact
assessment of the proposal.[159]
Nuclear power plants have similar water
requirements to fossil fuel plants using steam
turbine generators. Large volumes of water are
used to cool the turbine condensers. The water
can either be recirculated through evaporative
cooling towers or drawn from and released to
a large body of water (eg a river, lake or
ocean).[160] Releases are typically regulated
to minimise adverse heat-related impacts on
the environment. In addition, nuclear and other
steam turbine plants use small volumes of
purifi ed water to generate the steam. Water
in the steam loop is continuously recycled.[161]
Access to water is therefore an important factor
in site selection, both to ensure supply and to
minimise any environmental impacts of the
discharged warm water. If freshwater is not
available, nuclear plants can use sea water for
cooling. Sea water cooling is common in many
countries, including Finland and Korea, and is
also used in fossil fuel power stations such
as the Gladstone power station in Queensland.
Dry-cooling systems are also available, although
these designs increase costs by up to 2 per cent.
These use air as a coolant (like a car radiator),
cutting water consumption by approximately
95 per cent.[161]
7.4.2 Radiation impacts
International radiation protection standards
are primarily designed to protect human health.
Until recently it has been assumed that these
standards would incidentally protect fl ora and
fauna as well. However, it is now agreed that
additional standards and measures are required
to protect other species, and a number of
international organisations including the
International Commission on Radiological
Protection and the IAEA have established
new work programs to this end.
Studies of the impacts of various stages of
the nuclear fuel cycle on biota have generally
concluded that effects on biota are very
small.[162] A specifi c assessment of the impacts
of Australia’s Ranger mine concluded that it
is highly unlikely that the operation of the mine
has resulted in harm to aquatic biota arising
from exposure to ionising radiation.[163]
Nuclear safety issues and the potential
impacts of nuclear accidents are discussed
in Chapter 6.

102
7.4.3 Environmental performance
of Australian uranium mines
The environmental performance of the three
current Australian uranium mines — Ranger,
Olympic Dam and Beverley — has generally
been of a high standard. While there have been
a number of incidents at each mine involving
spills of mildly radioactive fl uids and leaks at
tailings facilities, none have had a signifi cant
impact beyond the mine site.
Perhaps the most contentious environmental
issue is the potential impact of the Ranger mine
and possible future developments at Jabiluka.
Figure 7.10 Ranger uranium mine, Northern Territory
Source: Skyscans/Energy Resources of Australia Ltd.
These ore deposits are surrounded by the
World Heritage-listed wetlands of the Kakadu
National Park (Figure 7.10) and so generate
considerable public concern about possible
contamination of surface and ground water.
As a result, Ranger is one of the most highly
scrutinised mines in the world. The Australian
Government, through the Supervising Scientist
Division, conducts ongoing monitoring and
research programs to assess the mine’s impact
on the surrounding environment and oversees
the regulatory regime implemented by the
Northern Territory.

103
A large number of incidents have been reported
at the Ranger mine over the period of its
operation. This is often cited as evidence that
the mining has had signifi cant environmental
impacts. However, the Supervising Scientist
has analysed each of these incidents and
concluded that, out of a total of 122 incidents
reported since 1979, only one had been
assessed as being of moderate ecological
signifi cance and one other had a signifi cant
impact on people working at the mine.[164]
The large number of incidents refl ects the
rigour of the reporting framework, rather than
the standard of environmental performance.
Two further signifi cant incidents occurred
at Ranger in 2004 and led to the successful
prosecution of Energy Resources of Australia,
the company that runs Ranger. Nevertheless,
the Supervising Scientist concluded that no
harm had resulted to the environment and
no signifi cant long-term health effects would
be expected from these incidents.
Assessment of environmental performance
in the region has not been restricted to
Australian authorities. In 1998, the World
Heritage Committee requested a report
from the Supervising Scientist on the risks
associated with the proposed development
of mining at Jabiluka. The Committee later
established an Independent Scientifi c Panel
(ISP) to assess the Supervising Scientist’s
report. The conclusion of the ISP was:
‘Overall the ISP considers that the
Supervising Scientist has identifi ed
all the principal risks to the natural values
of the Kakadu World Heritage site that can
presently be perceived to result from the
Jabiluka Mill Alternative [JMA] proposal.
These risks have been analysed in detail
and have been quantifi ed with a high
degree of scientifi c certainty. Such analyses
have shown the risks to be very small or
negligible and that the development
of the JMA should not threaten the
World Heritage values of the Kakadu
National Park.’[165]
Legacy issues, tailings management
and provision for mine rehabilitation
are discussed further in Chapter 5.
7.5 Conclusion
The world’s energy systems face the twin
challenges of accelerating climate change
and growing demand for energy. Electricity
generation therefore needs to move to a low
emission footing. Nuclear power has a smaller
environmental footprint than electricity from
conventional fossil fuels, generating much
lower greenhouse gas and air pollutant
emissions and using comparable land
and water resources. These impacts can
be managed in the same way as for other
industrial activities. If all generation
technologies compete on a level playing
fi eld, nuclear could make an important
contribution to the future generation mix,
both globally and in Australia.

104

105
Chapter 8. Non-proliferation and security
Export of Australian uranium takes
place within the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
Australia has the most stringent
requirements for the supply of uranium,
including the requirement for an
(IAEA) Additional Protocol, which
strengthens the safeguards regime.
An increase in the volume of Australian
uranium exports would not increase the
risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Actual cases of proliferation have
involved illegal supply networks,
secret nuclear facilities and undeclared
materials, not the diversion of declared
materials from safeguarded facilities
such as nuclear power plants.
•
•
•
•
The prevention of nuclear war is of utmost
importance. More states acquiring nuclear
weapons would destabilise regional and
international security and undermine global
restraints on nuclear proliferation. The security
threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear
weapons has led to the establishment of the
multi-faceted and evolving international nuclear
non-proliferation regime, which comprises
a network of treaties, institutions and the
safeguards inspection regime.[166] To guard
against their use for nuclear weapons, civilian
nuclear programs and uranium trade are subject
to international controls. Stringent safeguards
are applied to ensure that Australian uranium
is not diverted from peaceful purposes to
weapons or other military purposes.
The cornerstone of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime is the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
supported by International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards. International
instruments and organisations that complement
the NPT and IAEA include: the United Nations
Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. There are a
number of proposals to strengthen the regime
by limiting the spread of proliferation-sensitive
enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
Box 8.1 Nuclear proliferation
Nuclear proliferation is defi ned as an increase
in the number of nuclear weapons in the world.
Vertical proliferation is an increase in the size of
nuclear arsenals of those countries that already
possess nuclear weapons. Horizontal proliferation
is an increase in the number of countries that have
a nuclear explosive device.[28]
Typically, power reactors operate on low-enriched
uranium (LEU, 3–5 per cent U-235), which is not
suitable for use in nuclear weapons, and the plutonium
contained in spent fuel from the normal operation
of power reactors is not weapons grade. In order to
produce weapons grade plutonium, a nuclear power
plant would have to be run on short cycles or with
continuous on-load refuelling, both of which are
readily detectable under IAEA safeguards procedures.
Fissile material for nuclear weapons can be obtained
either by enriching uranium to high levels (90 per cent
of U-235 or above is favoured for use in nuclear
weapons [167]) or by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel
to extract plutonium. Enrichment and reprocessing
are therefore proliferation-sensitive technologies.
While all activities in the nuclear fuel cycle are
monitored by safeguards, enrichment and
reprocessing are given special attention.
8.1 Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
The NPT aims to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons, advance and eventually achieve
nuclear disarmament and facilitate the
peaceful use of nuclear energy. The fi ve
recognised nuclear weapon states (the
United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,
France and China) and all NPT parties commit
to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear
weapons. The NPT nuclear weapon states
still possess nuclear weapons, although most
have substantially reduced their arsenals.
Non-nuclear weapon states forgo nuclear
weapons and accept IAEA safeguards to verify
this commitment. The NPT has been central
in ensuring that only nine countries are
believed to possess or claim to possess
nuclear weapons. A total of 189 countries
have joined the NPT.[168]

106
Figure 8.1 IAEA safeguards inspector checking fuel rods
Source: IAEA
Australia signed the NPT in 1970 and ratifi ed
it in 1973. In the 1950s and 1960s, prior to the
NPT, Australia was one of a number of
countries which had not ruled out the option
of developing nuclear weapons. An important
factor in Australia deciding against the nuclear
weapons option was the strong support the
NPT was attracting. Ratifi cation of the NPT
represents an international legal commitment
by Australia that it will not acquire a nuclear
weapon. The assurance provided by the NPT
and IAEA safeguards that nuclear activities
are peaceful provides the foundation for
responsible trade and cooperation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including
Australia’s uranium exports.[169]
The NPT is the most widely supported arms
control treaty — only India, Pakistan and Israel
have never joined. India and Pakistan have
developed nuclear weapons. Since 1998,
India and Pakistan have maintained

107
a moratorium on nuclear testing. North Korea
joined, but claims to have withdrawn, and
in October 2006 announced it had conducted
an underground nuclear test.[170] Israel has
nuclear activities that are not safeguarded and
there is speculation that it is nuclear weapons
capable.[169] South Africa developed nuclear
weapons outside the NPT but relinquished
these in 1991 when it joined the NPT as a
non-nuclear weapon state. IAEA inspectors
subsequently verifi ed its nuclear
dismantlement.
8.2 Other elements of the
non-proliferation regime
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was created in 1974. Operating
by consensus, the NSG establishes
guidelines that harmonise conditions of supply
to prevent civil nuclear trade contributing to
nuclear weapons. The NSG now comprises
45 states, including all the major suppliers
of uranium, nuclear fuel cycle services and
nuclear technology. Australia is a member
of the NSG. The NSG is working toward
establishing criteria to determine eligibility
for the receipt of proliferation-sensitive
equipment and technology.[171]
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ)
NWFZ contain a more comprehensive
commitment to forgo nuclear weapons than
the NPT. Not only do the parties reject the
acquisition or use of nuclear weapons
themselves, they also preclude others from
producing, storing, installing, testing or
deploying nuclear weapons on their territories.
Australia is a party to the South Pacifi c Nuclear
Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga), which was
established in 1986. The Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone entered into force in 1997
covering countries in Southeast Asia.[169]
United States–India civil nuclear cooperation
United States President Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Singh on 2 March 2006
announced agreement on a plan to separate
India’s civil and military nuclear facilities,
which will allow for the United States to supply
India with nuclear fuel and resume civil nuclear
cooperation with India.[172] The agreement
is seen by some as potentially damaging
the nuclear non-proliferation regime, while
others point to the proliferation benefi ts
because of India’s commitment to place
14 of its 22 thermal power reactors under
permanent IAEA safeguards and align its
export control policies with international
standards.[173] Before the agreement takes
effect, it must be approved by the United
States Congress and the NSG must agree
to create an exception to its guidelines.
8.2.1 Nuclear energy
and proliferation
Most nuclear power plants present a low
proliferation risk, although on-load refuelling
reactors and fast breeder reactors present
a higher risk (see Appendix P). Typical reactors
produce plutonium in spent fuel,43 although
reactor-grade plutonium is not favourable
for use in nuclear weapons.[28,174] While
plutonium from spent power reactor fuel
could theoretically be used to develop a
crude nuclear device such as a dirty bomb
(see Box 8.4), there has been no known
successful nuclear explosion using reactor-grade
plutonium from light water reactor spent
fuel.44 To produce weapons-grade plutonium
in a typical power reactor would require
abnormal operation (a much shorter operating
cycle), which would be apparent under IAEA
safeguards. Further, the reactor spent fuel
must be reprocessed before use in a nuclear
weapon, a signifi cant technical hurdle.[175]
43 The isotope Pu-239 is a key fi ssile component in nuclear weapons. The build up of the heavier isotope Pu-240 when fuel is left in reactors undermines
the suitability of the material for use in weapons.
44 In 1962, the United States conducted a nuclear test using what was thought to be ‘fuel-grade’ plutonium, an intermediate category between
weapons-grade and reactor-grade, but the results of this test are not publicly available.

108
Table 8.1 Nuclear weapons technology development[175]
Countries with
nuclear weapons
Nuclear Weapons Technology and Nuclear Energy
China, France, Russia,
UK, US
The NPT nuclear weapon states developed nuclear weapons before they developed
nuclear energy programs.
India India completed its fi rst energy reactor in 1969, and conducted its fi rst nuclear
explosion in 1974 using plutonium produced in a research reactor, which commenced
operation in 1960.
Pakistan Pakistan developed its KANUPP energy reactor at about the same time as
the development of its uranium enrichment program. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
were based on HEU, while the KANUPP reactor operates on natural uranium.
Israel Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons has never been offi cially confi rmed.
Israel does not have a nuclear energy program.
North Korea North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon. North Korea does not have an operational
nuclear energy industry, but does have a research reactor.
The absence of a civil nuclear industry is not
likely to affect a decision to develop nuclear
weapons. As outlined in Table 8.1, countries
thought to currently possess nuclear weapons
developed them separately from civilian
power programs.
8.3 Challenges to the
The nuclear non-proliferation regime has come
under challenge by countries developing secret
weapons programs while party to the NPT.[169]
IAEA inspections have found that Romania,45
Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Iran have been
in non-compliance with their IAEA safeguards
agreements. Libya subsequently renounced
nuclear weapons, which was verifi ed by the
IAEA.[179] A nuclear weapons program in Iraq
was discovered after the fi rst Gulf War. In 2004,
the United States Central Intelligence Agency
Iraq Survey Group confi rmed that Iraq had
effectively ended its nuclear program.[180,181]
In 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal
from the NPT. This highlighted the risk of states
acquiring or developing sensitive nuclear
technology for ostensibly peaceful use on
the basis of being an NPT member, and
subsequently withdrawing from the NPT to
develop nuclear weapons. Since 1993, the IAEA
has drawn the conclusion that North Korea
is in non-compliance with its safeguards
obligations.[182] In February 2005, North Korea
fi rst claimed that it had produced nuclear
weapons. The six-party talks, comprising North
Korea, the United States, China, South Korea,
Japan and Russia, were established to fi nd
a peaceful resolution to the North Korean
nuclear weapons issue.[183] In October 2006,
North Korea announced that it had conducted
an underground nuclear test.[170] The test was
confi rmed by the United States Government.[184]
In November 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran’s
nuclear program consisted of ‘a practically
complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle.’[185]
The IAEA found that in pursuing these activities
in secret, Iran had failed to meet its obligations
under its safeguards agreement. These sensitive
nuclear activities, which Iran has admitted
conducting in secret for nearly two decades,
have raised international concerns that it may
be seeking to develop nuclear weapons.[186]
Iran has also pursued other activities relevant
to the production of nuclear weapons.
In February 2006, the IAEA referred Iran
to the United Nations Security Council.
On 31 July 2006, the Security Council passed
a resolution mandating the suspension of all
uranium enrichment activities in Iran.[187]
45 In 1992, 470 g of plutonium were discovered in a secret laboratory of the Atomic Energy Institute in Romania. The IAEA was invited to conduct
a special inspection to resolve the matter, which had taken place some years earlier under the previous Romanian regime. Romania is now in
compliance with IAEA safeguards.[176,177] One signifi cant quantity of nuclear material is the amount for which manufacture of a nuclear device
cannot be excluded. The IAEA defi nes this as 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of U-235 in HEU.[178]

109
In 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the architect
of the nuclear weapons program in Pakistan,
admitted that he had organised a clandestine
network to supply Iran, Libya and North Korea
with uranium enrichment technology. Khan
used his senior position to develop his illegal
network, which exploited weak enforcement
of export controls in several countries.
The Pakistani Government has stated that
Khan acted independently and without
the knowledge of authorities (more detail
in Appendix P).[188]
8.4 Expanding the
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) reinforces other elements of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime by banning all nuclear
explosions. By December 2006, the CTBT had
been signed by 177 countries and ratifi ed by
137 countries, including Australia. However,
10 of the 44 specifi ed countries which must
ratify the CTBT to trigger its entry into force
have yet to do so. All nuclear weapon states
have signed, but the United States and China
are yet to ratify. While the Treaty is yet to enter
into force, the Treaty’s International Monitoring
System is in the process of being installed
and is partly operational.[169,189]
A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
would strengthen the non-proliferation regime
by banning the further production of fi ssile
material for nuclear weapons as a means
of capping the amount of fi ssile material
available for nuclear weapons use. The
negotiation of an FMCT has been blocked
for years by deadlock in the United Nations
Conference on Disarmament.[169]
8.4.1 Limiting the spread
of proliferation-sensitive
nuclear technologies
The proliferation cases outlined in 8.3
underscore the dangers of inadequate controls
on international trade and technology transfers,
and the challenge to the NPT posed by the
spread of proliferation-sensitive enrichment
and reprocessing technologies. There are a
number of proposals that aim to limit the spread
of sensitive technologies. These seek to remove
the need for countries to develop sensitive
nuclear technologies by ensuring the supply
of low-enriched nuclear fuel. In 2005, an IAEA
report outlined possible multilateral approaches
to the fuel cycle: multilateral fuel leasing and
spent fuel take-back, a fuel bank under
multilateral control, fuel supply assurances
and conversion of existing proliferation-sensitive
facilities to multilateral control.[99,166]
United States policy opposes the supply
of enrichment and reprocessing equipment
and technology to countries which do not
already possess ‘full scale, functioning
enrichment and reprocessing plants’. [190]
In 2006, the United States proposed the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP),
which envisages a fuel leasing system where
fuel supplier nations that hold enrichment
and reprocessing capabilities would provide
enriched uranium to conventional light water
nuclear power plants located in user nations.
Used fuel would be returned to a fuel supplier
nation and recycled using a proposed
technology that does not result in separated
plutonium, therefore minimising the
proliferation risk. The Generation IV Forum
(GIF) also proposes the development of
more proliferation-resistant nuclear
technologies.[166,174]

110
In 2004, G846 leaders called for a moratorium
on the export of proliferation-sensitive nuclear
technologies to additional states until criteria
‘consistent with global non-proliferation norms’
were developed by the NSG.[191] G8 leaders
agreed in 2005 and again in 2006 to extend the
moratorium. Separately in 2005, IAEA Director
General ElBaradei called for a fi ve year
moratorium on all new enrichment and
reprocessing facilities.[166,192]
Russia has proposed a network of multination
centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services
on a non-discriminatory basis and under
the control of the IAEA. The Nuclear Threat
Initiative, an independent organisation based
in the United States, has pledged US$50 million
towards an IAEA-managed fuel reserve. In June
2006, a group of fuel suppliers (France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom
and the United States) proposed a mechanism
for the reliable access to nuclear fuel.[173]
Separately, Japan has proposed a mechanism
for increased transparency in the international
nuclear fuel market and Germany has proposed
a multination fuel cycle service in a neutral
state, which would guarantee supply of
nuclear fuel.
Nuclear fuel assurance proposals date back
to the 1970s, but none have come to fruition
due to legal, diplomatic and technical hurdles.
Some countries have concerns about
restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing
technology that infringe on what they claim
to be a ‘right’ under the NPT to nuclear
technologies for peaceful purposes.[193]
Others argue these rights are not unqualifi ed
and do not automatically extend to
proliferation-sensitive technologies.[166]
8.5 Safeguards
Safeguards are a system of technical measures
— including inspections, measurements and
information analysis — through which the
IAEA can verify that a country is following its
international commitments to not use nuclear
programs for nuclear weapons purposes.
For the period from the early 1990s to 2003
the IAEA operated under a zero real growth
budget, in line with other United Nations
bodies. In 2003, the IAEA increased the regular
safeguards budget by about 22 per cent over
4 years. Savings in safeguards costs are
expected from the introduction of ‘integrated
safeguards’, which allow the rationalisation of
safeguards activities in states where the IAEA
has concluded there is no undeclared nuclear
material or activity. These savings will be
available to offset increasing costs in other
areas of safeguards implementation.[169]
Weaknesses in the safeguards system identifi ed
by the clandestine nuclear weapons program
in Iraq were addressed by the introduction of
new safeguards methods and technologies
and the Additional Protocol. This extends IAEA
inspection, information and access rights,
enabling the IAEA to provide assurance not
only that declared nuclear activity is peaceful,
but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear
materials and activities (Figure 8.2).
46 The Group of Eight (G8) is an unoffi cial forum of the leaders of large industrialised democracies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union).

111
Figure 8.2 Unattended monitoring stations are designed to provide continuous monitoring
of fresh fuel assemblies in a nuclear fuel fabrication plant
Identification computer
Mechanical scanning
3D laser head
Source: European Commission — Joint Research Centre, Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, Nuclear Safeguards Unit, Ispra, Italy.

112
Adoption of an Additional Protocol is now
a condition for the supply of Australian
uranium to non-nuclear weapon states.
No other uranium exporter has this
requirement. Safeguards measures,
including under Additional Protocols include:[194]
inspections to confi rm that nuclear material
holdings correspond to accounts and reports
provided to the IAEA
short-notice (from 2 to 24 hours) access
to all buildings on a nuclear site
examination of records and other
visual observation
environmental sampling (including
beyond declared locations)
radiation detection and
measurement devices
application of seals and other identifying
and tamper-indicating devices
unattended and remote monitoring
of movements of nuclear material
transmission of authenticated and
encrypted safeguards-relevant data
the right to verify design information
over the life cycle of a facility, including
decommissioning.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
While all fuel cycle activities are covered
by Australia’s safeguards agreement with
the IAEA, a decision to enrich uranium in
Australia would require the management of
international perceptions, given that enrichment
is a proliferation-sensitive technology.
Box 8.2 Uranium
Uranium is an abundant mineral in the earth’s
crust and oceans (see Figure 2.3) and is available
to any country willing to meet the cost of extraction.
Only relatively small quantities are required to produce
nuclear weapons. The minimum quantity of uranium
ore concentrate as U3O8 required for the production
of a nuclear weapon is 5 tonnes. By contrast,
approximately 200 tonnes are required to operate
a 1000 MW nuclear power plant for one year.[195]
All nuclear weapon states have enough indigenous
uranium for their military programs. A country could
develop nuclear weapons irrespective of uranium
supplied for electricity.[28] Publicly available information
states that all the NPT nuclear weapons states ceased
production of fi ssile material for nuclear weapons in
the 1980s or 1990s.[175]
8.6 Australia’s uranium
export policy
Australian uranium exports may be used only
for peaceful, non-weapons and non-military
purposes. For the supply of Australian uranium
and nuclear material derived from its use —
Australian obligated nuclear material (AONM)47
— receiving states must:[196]
be party to and comply with the NPT
have a bilateral safeguards agreement
with Australia
in the case of a non-nuclear weapon state,
have an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
These requirements are verifi ed through IAEA
safeguards inspections. In addition to IAEA
safeguards, Australia’s bilateral safeguards
agreements apply specifi c conditions to AONM,
such that it:
may be used only for exclusively peaceful
non-military purposes
is covered by IAEA safeguards for the full
life of the material or until it is legitimately
removed from safeguards
is covered by fallback safeguards in
the event that IAEA safeguards no longer
apply for any reason
•
•
•
•
•
•
47 Depleted uranium sourced from Australian uranium is covered by Australia’s safeguards requirements and cannot be used
for any military application.

113
cannot be transferred to a third party for
enrichment beyond 20 per cent of U-235
and for reprocessing without prior
Australian consent
can only be received by countries that
apply internationally accepted physical
security standards.
•
•
Bilateral safeguards treaty parties are carefully
selected. A breach of Australia’s safeguards
conditions by a recipient state would result in
international condemnation and the loss of
commercial supplies of Australian uranium,
which would have an impact on nuclear energy
infrastructure. While future diversion might
occur, Australia’s policy and practice on
uranium supply seeks to minimise this risk.[159]
While Australian uranium is fully safeguarded,
it is impossible to track individual atoms of
uranium through the fuel cycle. Australia is able
to verify that its exports do not contribute to
military applications by applying safeguards
obligations to the overall quantity of material
it exports. Tracking quantities rather than atoms
is established international practice, known as
the equivalence principle (Box 8.3).
Box 8.3 Equivalence
Atoms of uranium supplied to conversion, enrichment
and reprocessing plants are not separately tracked
through the facility. Batches of material supplied from
different sources are co-mingled inside the plant during
processing. An equivalent amount of the plant’s output
is then allocated to particular customers on an
accounting basis. This takes into account the quality
of nuclear material. A simple banking analogy
illustrates these principles — bank notes and coins
given to a customer making a withdrawal are not
physically those previously deposited by the same
customer.[197] Australian uranium must be covered
by the recipient’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
In the case of non-nuclear weapon states, all nuclear
material in the country is required to be subject to
safeguards. Therefore Australian uranium will only
be mixed with safeguarded material, and all facilities
are safeguarded.
8.6.1 Fuel leasing
Proponents of nuclear fuel leasing suggest
that in order to enhance safeguards on
Australian uranium exports, some Australian
uranium could be leased to user utilities,
with the spent fuel being returned to Australia
for disposal.[54,174] They argue that this would
reduce the incentives to build additional
uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing plants as Australian ownership
would ensure the use of existing safeguarded
facilities. The Australian Safeguards and
Non-proliferation Offi ce (ASNO) considers
that nuclear fuel leasing does not strengthen
current safeguards arrangements because it
does not ‘… address the real proliferation risk.
Actual cases (Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Iran)
show the danger lies, not with diversion of
declared materials from safeguarded facilities,
but with clandestine nuclear facilities and
undeclared materials. IAEA safeguards have
been demonstrated to be highly effective in
deterring diversion of declared materials.’
ASNO also argues that if it is acceptable to
have our uranium processed at the ‘front end’
by countries we trust, then this should also
be acceptable at the ‘back end’ (eg for
spent fuel).[174]
The non-proliferation credentials of the nuclear
fuel leasing concept need to be tested in the
context of proposals for multilateral approaches
to the nuclear fuel cycle as discussed in section
8.4. The nuclear fuel leasing framework typically
requires the return of spent fuel rods for long
term storage in a host country. Proponents see
signifi cant commercial appeal in providing
such a global repository. However, whether
as part of a leasing model, or simply the
presumed commercial merits of Australia
providing a regional or global nuclear waste
repository, this idea remains contentious.

114
8.7 Nuclear security
According to the IAEA, possible terrorist
scenarios in relation to nuclear material are:
theft of a nuclear weapon, theft of nuclear
or radiological material and sabotage.[198]
There are, however, technical and regulatory
obstacles to terrorists obtaining nuclear
materials or weapons. The ASNO submission
states that ‘it is highly unlikely that al-Qa’ida
or other terrorist organisations have stolen or
purchased a nuclear weapon or the combination
of fi ssile material, physical infrastructure and
technical expertise necessary to build their
own improvised nuclear device’.[174]
Uranium ore concentrate (such as yellowcake)
is of low security concern due to its low levels
of fi ssile U-235. The nuclear materials used in
uranium mining, conversion, enrichment and
fuel fabrication present minimal risk to public
health and safety. The consequences of
sabotage on these facilities would be low
when compared to a similar act against
other industrial facilities, which often use
larger quantities of hazardous materials.
Spent fuel poses a greater potential risk
because it contains highly radioactive fi ssion
products — although this gives it a high degree
of self-protection against theft. Spent fuel is
present in reactor cores, reactor storage ponds,
storage facilities and reprocessing plants.[174]
Over the past 35 years there have been more
than 20 000 transfers of spent fuel worldwide,
by sea, road, rail and air, with no signifi cant
security incident. Spent fuel containers are
designed to withstand accidents or attack.
An Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
evaluation showed that the container body
withstands a direct impact from an aircraft
engine strike without breaching.[199] This
conclusion is supported by other studies.[174,200]
The key for security at a nuclear reactor is
robustness and defence in depth that requires
redundant, diverse and reliable safety systems
(Figure 8.3). Security measures include:
physical barriers and isolation zones
well-trained and well-equipped guards
surveillance and patrols of the
perimeter fence
search of all entering vehicles and persons
intrusion detection aids, such as closed-circuit
television and alarm devices
bullet-resisting barriers to critical areas
coordinated emergency plans with police,
fi re, and emergency management
organisations
regular drills
staff security clearances.[201]
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Studies carried out for the Sizewell B public
inquiry in the United Kingdom concluded that
in a worst case scenario, if a military aircraft
were to strike the reactor building, there would
be a 3–4 per cent chance of signifi cant release
of radioactive material.[202] The United States
Nuclear Energy Institute rule out breach of
US-style reactor containment structures by
large aircraft because an aircraft would be
unlikely to strike at the angles and speeds
necessary to cause suffi cient damage. A study
by EPRI using computer analyses found that
robust containment structures at modern
US power reactors were not breached by
the impact of the largest commercial airliner.
Modern power plant reactor structures are
similarly resistant to rocket, truck bomb or
boat attack.[128,174,199] A new build of reactors
in Australia would incorporate robust physical
protection measures to mitigate against
an attack.

115
Figure 8.3 Security features at the new ANSTO Open Pool Light water (OPAL) research reactor in Sydney
To counter terrorist and other security threats,
international standards of physical protection
are applied to nuclear material and facilities
in Australia. Australia’s bilateral safeguards
agreements include a requirement that
internationally agreed standards of physical
security are applied to nuclear material in the
country concerned. International standards
of security for nuclear facilities are established
by the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and IAEA
guidelines. These standards are administered
in Australia through the permit system under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act
1987. Ratifi cation of amendments broadening
the coverage of the CPPNM from international
transport to domestic use, storage and
transport is under consideration by the
Australian parliament.
Box 8.4 Dirty bombs
Radioactive sources are used widely for a range of
peaceful purposes. While they cannot be developed
into nuclear weapons, some radioactive sources could
be attached to conventional explosive devices to create
radiological weapons or ‘dirty bombs’. There has
been no known use of a dirty bomb. Australia
has strong domestic measures to secure its
radioactive sources.[169,203]
Because dirty bombs seek to disperse radioactive
material, rather than relying on nuclear chain
reactions, the impact would be minor when compared
with a highly destructive nuclear weapon. In most
instances, the conventional explosive itself would have
more immediate lethal impact than the radioactive
material, and would be localised. The Australasian
Radiation Protection Society (ARPS) has determined
that the likely health impacts of the airborne radioactive
dust from a dirty bomb would be minor. However,
there could be signifi cant disruption to the community
and costs associated with decontamination.[169,204]

116
8.7.1 Critical infrastructure
A secure, reliable supply of energy to industry
and households is central to economic
development and community wellbeing.
Australia has taken steps to identify and protect
critical infrastructure, including existing energy
infrastructure. The baseload of a typical nuclear
power plant is similar to that of a typical coal or
gas power plant and there is reserve capacity
to take into account unexpected outages for any
of the power stations in the network. In terms
of maintaining critical energy infrastructure, the
removal from the power grid of a nuclear power
plant for whatever reason would be no different
than the removal of a coal or gas power plant.
8.8 Conclusion
Australia’s uranium supply policy reinforces
the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime and verifi es that Australian obligated
nuclear material does not contribute to
nuclear weapon programs. The requirement
that non-nuclear weapon states receiving
Australian uranium have in place an Additional
Protocol strengthens the non-proliferation
regime by ensuring that the IAEA has broad
access and inspection rights in the recipient
country. The amount of uranium required for
a nuclear weapon is relatively small and, since
uranium is ubiquitous in the earth’s crust,
any country that wished to develop a weapon
need not rely on the import of uranium.
Increasing Australian uranium exports
in line with Australia’s uranium supply
requirements would not increase the risk
of proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The greatest proliferation risk arises
from undeclared centrifuge enrichment
plants capable of producing HEU for use
in weapons.

117
Chapter 9. Regulation
An effi cient and transparent regulatory
regime achieves good health, safety,
security and environmental protection
outcomes for uranium mining,
transportation, radioactive waste
management, and exports and imports.
Regulation of uranium mining needs
to be rationalised.
A single national regulator for
radiation safety, nuclear safety, security,
safeguards, and related impacts on the
environment would be desirable to
cover all nuclear fuel cycle activities.
Legislative prohibitions on enrichment,
fuel fabrication, reprocessing and
nuclear power plants would need to be
removed before any of these activities
can occur in Australia.
•
•
•
•
9.1 Australia’s international
commitments
Australia is a party to the international legal
instruments relevant to its current nuclear
activities and is implementing all current
international obligations through domestic
law and administrative arrangements.[166]
Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Australia has
undertaken to accept International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards set out in
the Agreement between Australia and the
IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in
Connection with the NPT. Australia has
also ratifi ed the Additional Protocol to its
safeguards agreement with the IAEA
(see Chapter 8).
As a member of the Zangger Committee and
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia
has agreed to export controls over nuclear
material, equipment, technology, and dual-use
items and technology. Australia has parallel
export control commitments under the
South Pacifi c Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
Australia is a party to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(CPPNM).48 The Convention establishes the
standards for the physical protection of nuclear
material and nuclear facilities. The IAEA
Information Circular INFCIRC/225/Rev.4
provides detailed guidance on the physical
security standards applicable to nuclear
material and facilities. Australia implements
the standards in the CPPNM and
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4.49
Australia is a party to the Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management. The Joint Convention establishes
a harmonised approach to national waste
management practices and standards.
Australia is also a party to the Convention
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Waste and Other Matter50 and
the Convention for the Protection of the
Natural Resources and Environment of
the South Pacifi c Region.51
International transport of radioactive material
is subject to two sets of rules: transboundary
movement rules and technical standard rules.52
The IAEA Transport Regulations refl ect
international best practice and are incorporated
into Australian domestic legislation
(see Appendix Q for more detail on
Australia’s international commitments).
48 Australia is in the process of ratifying the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material that will strengthen
the Convention.
49 Although IAEA Information Circulars are not directly binding on countries, the standards outlined in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 have been widely
implemented among IAEA member states.
50 Also known as the London Convention.
51 Also known as the SPREP Convention.
52 For example, the standard of packaging for the transportation of radioactive material.

118
9.2 Australia’s existing regulatory regime
Australia’s existing regulatory regime extends to uranium mining and transportation, radioactive
waste management, nuclear research, and export and import control (Table 9.1).
Table 9.1 Regulatory responsibility across levels of government for nuclear activities in Australia
Activity Regulatory
responsibility
Key Legislation/Regulations
Uranium
Mining
Commonwealth Safeguards Act 1987
Atomic Energy Act 1953
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Act 1978
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
Northern Territory
(mining permitted
only at existing
uranium mines)
Mining Act 1980
Mining Management Act 2001
South Australia
(mining permitted
only at existing
uranium mines)
Mining Act 1971
Development Act 1993
Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982
Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratifi cation) Act 1982
Environmental Protection Act 1993
New South Wales
& Victoria
(exploration and
mining prohibited)
Uranium Mining and Nuclear Facilities (Prohibitions) Act 1986 (NSW)
Nuclear Activities (Prohibitions) Act 1983 (Vic)
Queensland & Western Australia
(exploration permitted, government policy prohibits new uranium mines)
Tasmania (no legislative prohibitions on exploration or mining)
Conversion,
enrichment,
fabrication and
nuclear power
generation
Commonwealth
(prohibited)
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998
Safeguards Act 1987
New South Wales
& Victoria
(prohibited)
Uranium Mining and Nuclear Facilities (Prohibitions) Act 1986 (NSW)
Nuclear Activities (Prohibitions) Act 1983 (Vic)
Transportation Commonwealth Safeguards Act 1987
Northern Territory,
South Australia,
Queensland,
Western Australia,
New South Wales,
Tasmania & Victoria
(transportation of
radioactive material
permitted, comply
with the ARPANSA
Transport Code)
Radioactive Ores (Packaging and Transport) Act (NT)
Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982 (SA)
Radiation Safety Act 1999 (Qld)
Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances)
Regulations 1991 (WA)
Radiation Control Regulations 1993 (NSW)
Radiation Protection Regulations 2006 (Tas)
Radiation Act 2005 (Vic) (to come into force September 2007)

119
Activity Regulatory
responsibility
Key Legislation/Regulations
Waste
Management
Commonwealth Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act 2005
States and Territories Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA)
Radiation Control Act 1977 (Tas)
Radiation Safety Act 1999 (Qld)
Radiation Protection and Control Act 2004 (SA)
Radiation Act 1983 (ACT)
Radiation Control Act 1990 (NSW)
Radiation Protection Act 2004 (NT)
Radiation Act 2005 (Vic)
Western Australia,
South Australia &
Northern Territory
(transport and storage
of nuclear waste
prohibited)
Nuclear Waste Storage and Transportation (Prohibition) Act 1999 (WA)
Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Act 2000 (SA)
Nuclear Waste Transport, Storage and Disposal Prohibition Act 2004 (NT)
Nuclear
Research53
Commonwealth Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Act 1987
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998
Safeguards Act 1987
Export and
Import Control
Commonwealth Customs Act 190154
9.2.1 Regulation of uranium mining
Regulatory arrangements applying to mining
operations are complex and vary from site
to site, and across states and territories.
The regulation of mining operations remains
a state and territory government responsibility.
However, certain aspects of uranium mining
involve Australian Government regulation.
Commonwealth legislation
A party seeking to mine uranium must obtain
a permit from the Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Offi ce (ASNO) under the
Safeguards Act 1987. New uranium mines
or signifi cant expansion of existing mines
require assessment and approval under
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act).55 Under
the Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers
Region) Act 1978, the oversight of environmental
aspects of uranium mining operations in
the Alligator Rivers Region in the Northern
Territory is a Commonwealth responsibility,
carried out by the Supervising Scientist.
A mine operator must have a license issued
under the Commonwealth Customs Act 1901
to export uranium ore.
Each state and territory has its own radiation
protection authority. The Commonwealth, state,
and territory governments have moved towards
harmonisation of radiation safety regulation by
developing the National Directory on Radiation
53 Radioactive material generated by ANSTO that is used in medical, research and industrial applications is regulated by state
and territory legislation.
54 As outlined in Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 and the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956.
55 Prior to the enactment of the EPBC Act, mining proposals were assessed under the Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974.

120
Protection (National Directory) and the
Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation
Protection and Radioactive Waste Management
in Mining and Mineral Processing (2005)
(Mining Code).
Compliance with the Code of Practice for
the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material
(2001) and the Recommendations for
Limiting Exposure to Ionising Radiation
(1995), both promulgated by the Australian
Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
Agency (ARPANSA), are requirements for
Authorisations issued by the Northern Territory
Government and licenses issued by the South
Australian Government to mine uranium.
Mining in the Northern Territory
A mine operator requires four approvals to carry
out mining activities in the Northern Territory:
a mineral lease under
the Mining Act 1980 (NT)56
if on Aboriginal land, an Agreement
specifying the conditions for access
to the land with the relevant Land Council
under the Commonwealth Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
an Authorisation under section 35 of
the Mining Management Act 2001 (NT)
an Approval under the EPBC Act.
•
•
•
•
Under the Mining Act 1980, the Northern
Territory Minister for Mines must consult and
give effect to any advice of the Commonwealth
Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources,
before issuing a mining title.
The Authorisation for mining activities
is issued subject to the mine operator
complying with a current mine management
plan that includes particulars of the
implementation of the management
system to address safety and health issues,
environmental issues, a plan and costing
of closure activities, particulars of the
organisation’s structure and plans of
current and proposed mine workings
and infrastructure.[205]
The Mining Management Act 2001 mandates
a regime of audits, inspections, investigations,
monitoring and reporting to ensure compliance
with agreed standards and criteria at mines.[25]
Under the Commonwealth–Northern Territory
Working Arrangements for the regulation of
uranium mining, the Northern Territory Minister
for Mines must consult with the Supervising
Scientist on environmental matters under the
Mining Management Act for mines in the
Alligator Rivers Region.
Mining in South Australia
Mine operators require four approvals to mine
uranium in South Australia:
a mining lease under the Mining Act 1971
(SA), that considers the results of an
environmental assessment and satisfactory
resolution of native title
a license to mine and mill radioactive ores
under the Radiation Protection and Control
Act 1982 (SA), which includes conditions
attached to the licence requiring uranium
mining operators to comply with the
requirements of the four Codes promulgated
by ARPANSA[205] (discussed in section 9.2.1)
a permit under the Water Resources Act 1997
(SA) for the drilling of well holes
an Approval under the EPBC Act.
•
•
•
•
An environmental impact statement is required
as a precursor to any new uranium mine
development.57 Past practice has been
to prepare a joint environmental impact
statement for the purposes of approval
under Commonwealth environmental
protection legislation.[25]
Parties that hold licences to mine or mill
radioactive ores (uranium or thorium) are
required, under conditions on the licences,
to report annually on radioactive waste
production and management.
56 The Australian Government has retained ownership of uranium in the Northern Territory and all discoveries of uranium must be reported
to the Australian Government authorities within one month.
57 Section 75 of the South Australian Development Act 1993.

121
The operation of mines and management
of radioactive wastes on site also involves
approval of facilities such as tailings dams
and evaporation ponds, waste management
plans, and releases of radionuclides into
the environment.[205]
In conjunction with obtaining a mining lease,
an operator must develop a mining and
rehabilitation program to minimise the
environmental effects of mining and milling
and ensure adequate rehabilitation of mining
sites. Under the Mining Act 1971, the South
Australian Minister for Mineral Resources
Development may require a miner to enter into
a bond to cover any civil or statutory liability
likely to be incurred in the course of carrying
out the mining operations, and the present and
future obligations in relation to rehabilitation
of land disturbed by mining operations.
The South Australian Radiation Protection and
Control Act 1982 and the Radiation Protection
and Control (Ionizing Radiation) Regulations
(2000) provide controls for the safety of
radioactive waste management.
All mines in South Australia are also subject
to the Mines and Works Inspection Act 1920
(SA) and the Occupational Health, Safety and
Welfare Act 1986 (SA).
Mining in other states
New South Wales and Victoria prohibit uranium
exploration and mining.58 Western Australia
and Queensland have policies prohibiting
uranium mining, but allow exploration.
There is no restriction on uranium exploration
and mining in Tasmania.
9.2.2 Transport regulation
Commonwealth legislation
The transportation of nuclear material is
regulated by ASNO,59 which issues permits
to transport nuclear material under specifi ed
restrictions and conditions. The permits specify
the requirements to be met to ensure that
nuclear material is secure at all times when
in transit. The permit holder may be required
to have a transport plan detailing the security
procedures to be observed.
State and territory legislation
With the exception of Victoria, all states and
territories have adopted the Code of Practice
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material
(2001).[25] However, there is inconsistency in
the application of uranium transport standards
across jurisdictions and there is regulation
in force that exceeds the standards specifi ed
in the Code, without improved health and
safety outcomes.[25]
9.2.3 Management of
radioactive waste
Radioactive waste comes from two main
sources in Australia, mining activities and
radionuclides used in research, medicine and
industry. Management of radioactive waste
is the responsibility of the government in
whose jurisdiction it is produced.[206]
In December 2005, the Australian Parliament
enacted the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste
Management Act 2005. The law confi rms
the Commonwealth’s power to establish
the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste
Management Facility in the Northern Territory.
A number of states and territories prohibit
the construction and operation of nuclear
waste storage facilities (see Table 9.1).
There are three national codes regulating
radioactive waste management: the Code
of Practice for the Disposal of Radioactive
Wastes by the User (1985), the Code of Practice
for the Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive
Waste in Australia (1992) and the Mining Code.
58 Uranium Mining and Nuclear Facilities (Prohibitions) Act 1986 (NSW) and the Nuclear Activities (Prohibitions) Act 1983 (Vic).
59 Section 16 of the Safeguards Act 1987.

122
9.2.4 Exports and imports regulation
The export of uranium, thorium, monazite and
certain fi ssionable materials requires a permit
issued by the Australian Minister for Industry,
Tourism and Resources.60 Before permits are
issued, safeguards clearances from ASNO must
be obtained. Export permits for ‘high activity
radioactive sources’ are issued by ARPANSA.
Nuclear equipment and facilities that are on the
Defence and Strategic Goods List require export
approval from the Minister for Defence.[207]
Safeguards requirements on imports ensure
that nuclear material is not imported without
being added to the inventory of safeguarded
material in Australia. A permit issued by
ARPANSA is also required for the importation
of medical and non-medical radioactive
substances.61
9.2.5 Regulation of nuclear
research reactors
Australia has two nuclear research reactors,
the High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR)
and the Open Pool Australian Light-Water
reactor (OPAL) at the Australian Nuclear
Science and Technology Organisation
(ANSTO).[208] OPAL is a multipurpose facility
for radioisotope production, irradiation
services and neutron beam research.[209]
HIFAR has operated for over 40 years
and is due for closure in February 2007.[210]
ARPANSA regulates the safe use of nuclear
material by Commonwealth entities, including
ANSTO. ARPANSA is prohibited from licensing
specifi ed nuclear activities: a fuel fabrication
plant, a power plant, an enrichment plant or
a reprocessing facility.62 Commonwealth entities
are prohibited from undertaking these activities.
ASNO issues permits and authorities to ANSTO
covering safeguards (accounting and control)
and security.
9.3 Overseas regulatory
experience
Through the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA), there is a high degree of
cooperation between countries on matters
relating to the regulation of nuclear energy.
Australia would be able to draw on this
expertise to develop a regulatory framework,
if it decided to undertake additional nuclear
fuel cycle activities.
United States: Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC)
The NRC regulates the civilian use of nuclear
material in the United States. The Commission
develops policies and regulations governing
nuclear reactor and materials safety, issues
orders to licensees, and adjudicates legal
matters brought before it. Regional Offi ces
of the NRC implement NRC decisions.[69]
The NRC regulates to protect public health
and safety, and the environment, from the
effects of radiation from nuclear reactors,
materials and waste facilities. This includes
licensing or certifying applicants to use
nuclear materials or operate nuclear
facilities. The public provide input into
all aspects of the licensing process.[211]
Among other functions, the NRC is responsible
for licensing the following:
design, construction, operation and
decommissioning of nuclear plants and
other nuclear facilities, such as nuclear
fuel facilities, uranium enrichment facilities,
test reactors and research reactors
possession, use, processing, handling
and exportation of nuclear materials
siting, design, construction, operation,
and closure of low-level radioactive waste
disposal sites under NRC jurisdiction and
the construction, operation, and closure of
a geologic repository for high-level
radioactive waste
operators of civilian nuclear reactors.
•
•
•
•
60 Regulation 9 in the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958.
61 Regulation 4R in the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956.
62 Section 10 of the ARPANS Act.

123
Canada: Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC)
The CNSC is the leading federal regulator in
Canada. The CNSC regulates almost all uses
of nuclear energy and nuclear materials in
Canada through a licensing process. Interested
parties are given the opportunity to be heard
at public CNSC licensing hearings.[212]
The CNSC regulations apply to nuclear research
and test facilities, nuclear reactors, uranium
mines and mills, processing and fabrication
facilities, waste management facilities,
transportation of nuclear substances, and
imports and exports of nuclear material.
The CNSC is updating its regulatory
framework for nuclear power plants.
The updated framework is intended to align
the CNSC regulatory framework for new
nuclear power plants with international
standards and best practice. The regulatory
framework is intended to ensure that the
regulations do not inappropriately limit
the choice of nuclear energy technologies.[212]
Separate licences are required for each of
the fi ve lifecycle phases of a nuclear power
plant, specifi cally to:
prepare a site
construct
operate
decommission
abandon.
•
•
•
•
•
The CNSC assessment of information submitted
by applicants is carried out with input from
other federal and provincial government
departments and agencies responsible for
regulating health and safety, environmental
protection, emergency preparedness, and
the transportation of dangerous goods.
In addition to the fi ve licensing steps, an
environmental assessment (EA) must fi rst be
carried out to identify whether a project is likely
to cause signifi cant environmental effects
before any federal authority issues a permit or
licence or approves the project. If the decision
on the EA is negative, the project will
not proceed. Both federal and provincial
governments require an EA to be completed.
Finland: Radiation and
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)
STUK is the regulator of radiation and nuclear
safety in Finland. STUK regulates the use of
radiation and nuclear energy, conducts radiation
research, monitors environmental radiation
and provides commercial radiation services.
It issues regulations for the safe use of nuclear
energy and for physical protection, emergency
preparedness and safeguards.[213]
The decision-making process for the
construction of a nuclear facility63 follows
the following steps:
the proponent carries out an environmental
impact assessment on the construction
and operation of a proposed nuclear facility
the operator fi les an application to
the government to obtain a decision-in-principle
on a new nuclear facility
the government requests a preliminary
safety appraisal from STUK and a statement
from the municipality intended to be
the site of the planned nuclear facility,
the municipality has a right to veto
the approval of a new facility
the government makes a decision-in-
principle on the construction
if the decision-in-principle is positive,
the operator applies in due time for a
construction licence from the government
towards the end of the construction,
the operator applies for an operating
licence for the facility.
•
•
•
•
•
•
63 Nuclear facilities include power plants and fi nal waste disposal facilities.

124
United Kingdom: Health and
Safety Executive (HSE)
There are a number of nuclear regulators in
the United Kingdom. The HSE and the Scottish
Environment Protection Agency are responsible
for regulating nuclear safety. The Environment
Agency is responsible for regulating discharges
to the environment and disposal of radioactive
waste. The Department of Transport is
responsible for regulating the transport
of radioactive matter, while the Offi ce for
Civil Nuclear Security, is the security regulator
for the civil nuclear industry. The UK Safeguards
Offi ce facilitates EURATOM safeguards
activities in the United Kingdom.[214-217]
The HSE licenses each nuclear site. Prior to
the construction of a nuclear facility, a licence
from the HSE is required to provide the
necessary checks and controls for the
design, construction, commissioning
and operational stages of installation
and decommissioning.[218]
The HSE is working on a pre-licensing design
acceptance system. The HSE has proposed
a two-phase approach: a reactor design
authorisation process based on a generic
site concept and a site and operator-specifi c
assessment on which to grant a nuclear site
licence. Phase 1 would focus on safety and
take some three years, phase 2 would take less
than a year, (apart from planning permission).[219]
This process is intended to provide a more
transparent, rigorous and robust regulatory
approach to the safety of any new nuclear
reactors.[220]
9.3.1 Drawing on
international experience
If Australia were to pursue additional nuclear
fuel cycle activities, overseas regulatory
systems could provide a useful starting point
to develop its regulatory regime.
The United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission provides advice and assistance
to foreign countries and international
organisations to help them develop effective
regulatory systems. For example, the NRC
is currently working with regulatory authorities
in Finland and France on the Multinational
Design Approval Program (MDAP). The later
stages of the MDAP are intended to foster
the safety of reactors in participating nations
through convergence of safety codes and
standards, while maintaining full national
sovereignty over regulatory decisions.
The IAEA helps countries to comply with
international standards by providing technical
support to develop necessary standards and
regulatory regimes. The NEA, a specialised
agency of the OECD, also assists member
countries to develop effective and effi cient
regulation and oversight of nuclear installations.
Australia has strong relationships with many of
the countries using nuclear energy. During its
consultations the Review found a willingness to
provide technical support to Australia to develop
a regulatory system for further nuclear fuel
cycle activities.

125
9.4 Regulatory reform
in Australia
Australia’s three uranium mines all operate under
different regulatory regimes, for historical and
jurisdictional reasons. Extensive and at times
duplicative regulatory requirements apply to
uranium mining.[25] Adding to this complexity,
across the states and territories the regulatory
responsibility for health and safety, and
environmental standards, is housed in different
agencies, and in some cases across agencies.[25]
There are signifi cant advantages in rationalising
and harmonising regulatory regimes for uranium
mining across jurisdictions.
One option to streamline regulatory
arrangements would be to channel mining
proposals and operations through a single
regulator for mine safety compliance.
The Council of Australian Governments
(COAG) has committed to the reduction of
the regulatory burden in occupational health
and safety. The COAG National Mine Safety
Framework Steering Committee is considering
the option of having a single national authority
for mine safety. This model could be extended
to environmental assessment and approvals
processes for uranium mining. In practice,
environmental assessments and approvals
are conducted in a joint process between
agencies. However, there is uncertainty as
to which regulatory authority is appropriate
on any matter, because of the overlaps in
regulatory responsibility between authorities.
The regulatory responsibilities assigned to
ASNO and ARPANSA are another example
of overlap between authorities. While working
arrangements exist between these bodies to
delineate regulatory responsibilities between
them,64 the existence of such overlaps causes
uncertainty and unnecessary regulatory burden
on those subject to regulation, and is not
consistent with international best practice.[221]
A number of authorities perform a regulatory
function, as well as undertake other functions.
For example, ARPANSA provides services
on a commercial basis, undertakes research,
promotes national uniformity of radiation
protection and regulates the Australian
Government’s use of sources of radiation
and nuclear facilities.[222] Similarly, the Offi ce
of the Supervising Scientist conducts
environmental audits and technical reviews
of uranium mining operations while the
Environmental Research Institute of the
Supervising Scientist conducts research
on the environmental impacts of uranium
mining.[223] The separation of the regulatory
function from other functions performed
by authorities could improve transparency
and would be consistent with international
best practice.
Under the Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, enrichment,
fuel fabrication, reprocessing facilities and
nuclear power plants are prohibited in
Australia.65 These prohibitions would need
to be removed before any of these activities
can be pursued.
64 Memorandum of Understanding between ASNO and ARPANSA Covering Evaluation of Physical Protection and Security Arrangements
for the Replacement Research Reactor at Lucas Heights and the Protection of Associated Information 2001.
65 New South Wales and Victoria also have legislative prohibitions on these activities Uranium Mining and Nuclear Facilities (Prohibitions) Act 1986
(NSW) and Nuclear Activities (Prohibitions) Act 1983 (Vic).

126
9.5 Conclusion
The regulation of uranium mining and
transportation, radioactive waste management
and nuclear research facilities in Australia
is of a high standard. However, there are
opportunities for reform that would
streamline existing arrangements.
Before nuclear fuel cycle activities can
be established in Australia, the existing
legislative prohibitions would need to
be removed.66 Australia would also need
to establish an appropriate body to license
and monitor the construction and operation
of nuclear facilities to ensure that high
standards in health, safety and environmental
performance are maintained.
Should Australia choose to pursue nuclear
energy, there is a clear case for better
integration of health, safety and environment
assessment and licensing processes.
The regulation of nuclear power facilities
would require inputs from a variety of
disciplines. Codes and standards would
need to be developed in relation to nuclear
safety, environmental protection, operational
radiation protection, auditing and inspections
of facility operations, physical protection,
civil liability arrangements and waste
management. To set up regulatory
authorities with the requisite expertise
in each jurisdiction would be ineffi cient.
66 Section 140 A in the EPBC Act 1999.
It would be desirable to establish a national
regulator to regulate nuclear fuel cycle
activities. The Australian Government and
the states and territories could establish
such a national regulator. Australia could
draw on other countries’ experiences
and the support provided by the IAEA
to build an effective national regulator.
Successful regulation would require
a signifi cant increase in the number
of qualifi ed and trained regulators.
(Capacity building needs in relation
to nuclear regulation are discussed
in Chapter 10.)
In summary, the regulation of uranium
mining and transportation, radioactive waste
management and nuclear research facilities
in Australia is of a high standard. However,
there are opportunities for reform that would
streamline existing arrangements. If Australia
were to undertake nuclear fuel cycle activities
a signifi cant investment in new regulatory
arrangements would be required.

127
Chapter 10. Research, development, education and training
Chapter 10. Research, development,
Given the minimal Australian
investment in nuclear energy related
education or research and development
(R&D) over the last 20 years, public
spending will need to increase if
Australia is to extend its activities
beyond the uranium mining sector.
Signifi cant additional skilled human
resources will be required if Australia
is to increase its participation in the
nuclear fuel cycle.
In addition to expanding our own R&D
and education and training efforts,
Australia could leverage its nuclear
research and training expertise through
increased international collaboration.
•
•
•
education and training
10.1 International and
Australian nuclear
research and development
The term nuclear R&D can refer to a wide
range of basic and applied activities, including
research related to the production of nuclear
energy (in Australia such activities are largely
related to uranium mining). However nuclear
R&D can also be conducted in areas that are
not related to energy production, such as
nuclear medicine.
Nuclear R&D is vitally important to all countries
involved in aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Government spending on nuclear R&D among
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries was almost half
of total energy R&D spending in the period 1992
to 2005. Absolute funding for nuclear R&D did
fall slightly over the decade to 2001, but has
since begun to increase.67
Figure 10.1 Spending on nuclear R&D by OECD countries, 1992–2005
Investment (million US$ — 2005)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Australia
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
South Korea
United Kingdom
United States
Other
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Source: IEA Statistics[224]
67 The nuclear R&D spending data for France for 2003–2005 is currently being revised.

128
The level and nature of a country’s nuclear R&D
activities vary with its involvement in the fuel
cycle. Countries with signifi cant nuclear energy
programs have large R&D efforts in place.
However, even countries with smaller nuclear
energy programs can and do support signifi cant
R&D efforts.
International Energy Agency statistics show
that most publicly funded nuclear R&D is on
reactor safety, radioactive waste management
and next-generation technologies, such as
Generation IV reactors and fusion power.
The fi rst two are particularly important
because of their contribution to public
confi dence and acceptance of nuclear
energy, whereas the latter is part of many
governments’ efforts to secure long term
energy supply options to 2050 and beyond.
Companies in the nuclear industry are mainly
large global fi rms. While it is more diffi cult to
obtain information on investment in R&D by
these fi rms, the amounts involved are likely to
be signifi cant.68 Nuclear R&D is essential both
for maintaining the safe and effi cient operation
of existing nuclear power stations and fuel cycle
facilities and for promoting the discovery and
development of new and innovative nuclear
energy systems in the future.
The role of R&D in the nuclear industry is
more important than in many other industries
because the implications of technology failure
relate not only to operational costs of the
industry, but also to safety and ultimately
the industry’s ‘license to operate’.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics
(ABS) collects data on public spending
on energy-related R&D. Survey respondents
can allocate their nuclear related R&D
across four categories of activity, namely:
exploration for uranium
mining and extraction of uranium
preparation and supply of uranium
as an energy source material
nuclear energy.
•
•
•
•
However, these categories do not capture
all of the signifi cant R&D that occurs at
universities and organisations such as
the Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organisation (ANSTO).
For example, research in health and safety,
radiation physics and nuclear physics69
is an important means for ensuring the
availability of appropriately trained people
for a range of policy and regulatory functions,
including health and safety regulators such
as the Australian Radiation Protection
and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA)70
and the Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Offi ce (ASNO).
Australian nuclear energy R&D tends to focus
on exploration and mining of uranium.71 There
has been very little R&D spending on the other
two ABS categories since 1994–1995.72
Notwithstanding these low levels of funding,
Australia has developed research excellence
in several areas, including the following.
Waste conditioning — Synroc (synthetic
rock) technology, invented in 1978 by
Professor Ted Ringwood at the Australian
National University (ANU), is an advanced
ceramic that can immobilise most elements
present in high-level radioactive waste in
its crystal structure.73
Laser enrichment — in May 2006
the private fi rm Silex signed an
exclusive Commercialisation and
License Agreement for their uranium
enrichment technology with the
United States General Electric Company.
High performance materials — the ANSTO
Advanced Nuclear Technologies Group and
various Australian universities have skills
that could contribute to international
research efforts into high-performance
materials. The Generation IV Forum (GIF)
and the International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor (ITER) project
have identifi ed this as an area where
more R&D is required.
•
•
•
68 For example, in 2005 the French fi rm Areva invested €582 million (approx. A$910 million) in R&D. This was equivalent to 5.7 per cent of the sales
revenue of the group.
69 The ABS energy R&D statistics do not capture research activity in these areas as it is not energy-related research.
70 The ARPANSA submission to the Review identifi ed their ongoing interest in R&D directed towards nuclear safety.
71 F unding by mining fi rms for R&D by the ANSTO Minerals Group increased fourfold between fi nancial year 1999–2000 and fi nancial year 2005–2006
and is estimated to increase by a further 50 per cent in fi nancial year 2006–2007.
72 There is a lack of reliable information on Australia’s existing skills base. An audit would help identify areas of both expertise and shortfall.
73 Synroc R&D continues at ANSTO, including collaboration with several overseas partners. See also discussion in Appendix R.

129
Environmental toxicology — the research
programs of the Environmental Research
Institute of the Supervising Scientist and
of Earth, Water & Life Sciences, a subsidiary
of Energy Resources of Australia (ERA),
have been essential to achieving a very high
level of environmental protection during
the operational stage of mining at Ranger
and Nabarlek and also to the planning of
rehabilitation of these mine sites.
•
In addition, Australia has research capacity
in areas such as the analytical tools used in risk
assessment, the modelling of severe accidents,
and human and organisational performance.
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has argued
that research in these areas has spin-off
benefi ts in that it supports effi cient and
effective regulation across a broad spectrum
of nuclear activities.[225]
Figure 10.2 Spending by selected countries on nuclear energy R&D relative to GDP and normalised
to Australian effort, 1992–2005
1.0
49.2
27.5
150.3
36.5 43.6
302.6
86.4
14.3 13.5 17.3
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Australia
Canada
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
South Korea
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
Normalised nuclear energy R&D spending
Source: IEA Statistics[224]
Figure 10.2 shows the nuclear energy R&D
effort relative to GDP by selected countries,
normalised to that of Australia over the period
1992–2005. Australia’s relative R&D effort
is well below that of all other countries
shown. For example, in relative terms,
Sweden spent approximately fourteen times
more than Australia.74 This difference is not
surprising as all the other countries shown,
apart from Italy, have active nuclear power
programs. However, if Australia moves
beyond uranium mining, then public
spending on nuclear energy-related
R&D will need to increase signifi cantly.
74 Note: these spending fi gures have been expressed as a proportion of 2005 GDP.

130
Any increase in R&D spending is likely
to be on topics similar to those pursued
overseas. This suggests that Australia would
need to seek to utilise existing international
collaborative agreements as far as is possible.
The already established expertise of Australian
scientists should make Australia an attractive
research partner.
10.1.1 Opportunities for international
collaboration on nuclear R&D
The resources required for nuclear R&D are
considerable. Therefore, it is not surprising
that collaborative R&D partnerships are
common. The NEA and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) have both established
mechanisms that support international research
collaboration. Australia already participates
in a number of these.
Another example of multilateral collaboration
is the GIF,75 created to support the development
of next-generation nuclear energy systems.
The GIF partners selected six reactor concepts
judged to be the most promising. A 2002
technology roadmap estimated the cost
of required R&D to 2020 at approximately
US$5.8 billion.[226] Australia’s research
and development, particularly in materials
science and waste management, could
make a valuable contribution.
Another major international collaborative
research effort is the experimental fusion
reactor ITER.76 ITER aims to develop the
technologies essential for a future fusion
reactor for power production. The total cost
of the ITER project, to be built at Cadarache
in France, is in the order of €10 billion, half
to construct the reactor over the next seven
years and the remainder to operate it for
20 years and then decommission the facility.
The United States Department of Energy
(DOE) International Nuclear Energy Research
Initiative (I-NERI) encourages collaborative
R&D with international partners in advanced
nuclear energy systems development.77
I-NERI provides a vehicle for cost-shared
international R&D collaboration into the
DOE Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems
Initiative, the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative
(AFCI)78 and the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative
(NHI).79 The contribution by I-NERI participants
to research over the period 2001–2006 was
almost US$152 million.
I-NERI also promotes the education of future
nuclear scientists and engineers. In 2005,
85 students from undergraduate, graduate,
and doctoral programs participated in I-NERI
research projects at 12 universities in
the United States. This illustrates how
R&D collaboration can also help address
education and training issues (see
discussion in section 10.2).
There are undoubtedly many opportunities
for Australian scientists to contribute to
international research programs, and for
overseas scientists to contribute to Australian
programs. It may be necessary to negotiate
new bilateral or multilateral agreements for
research collaboration with international
partners. However, adequate resources
must be provided to enable such collaboration
and to support local research programs.80
75 The current GIF members are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Euratom, France, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States. China and Russia are expected to join by the end of 2006.
76 The ITER partners are the European Union, Japan, Russia, the United States, China, South Korea and India.
77 Current collaborating countries and international organisations include: Brazil, Canada, the European Union, France, Japan, South Korea,
and the OECD/NEA.
78 AFCI aims to develop proliferation resistant spent nuclear fuel treatment and transmutation technologies in order to enable a transition
from the current once through nuclear fuel cycle to a future sustainable closed nuclear fuel cycle.
79 NHI aims to develop the technologies and infrastructure to economically produce, store, and distribute hydrogen.
80 The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources inquiry into developing Australia’s non-fossil fuel energy industry
made a number of recommendations aimed at encouraging increased collaboration between international and Australian researchers.[26]

131
10.2 Education and training
Nuclear education and training provides
science, engineering and technology (SET)
skills needed for activities ranging from
radiation safety and regulation, through to
aspects of the mining industry, spanning
vocational training to postdoctoral studies
relevant to research and policy development.
10.2.1 Nuclear skills needs
The number of personnel required to participate
in various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle
are similar to those needed for many other
industrial processes (Table 10.1). Although the
required skills sets are not unique to the nuclear
sector, their area of application is. Issues such
as quality control and stringent safety standards
also create a need for additional training.
The slow down in nuclear power programs
worldwide since the 1980s, coupled with the
global decline in funding for nuclear R&D,
led to a worldwide drop in the number of
students pursuing nuclear-related courses.
However, the revival of interest in nuclear
energy with signifi cant extensions in the lives
of existing nuclear power plants, and the ageing
of the existing workforce, are ensuring that the
training and retention of an appropriate skills
base has become an increasingly important
concern for policy makers in countries with
nuclear power.
In Finland, the adequacy of human resources
had to be demonstrated before approval could
be given for the construction of the third reactor
at Olkiluoto. One of the main mechanisms for
ensuring that the skills base was available was
the Finnish national research program for the
operational and structural safety of nuclear
power plants (SAFIR).[227] SAFIR courses have
trained approximately 150 young experts over
the period 2003–2006.
A draft report from the United Kingdom
on future nuclear skills needs found that
the industry was currently recruiting about
half the number of SET graduates needed
to maintain its existing strength.[228]
Table 10.1 Overseas examples of employment in various nuclear fuel cycle activities
Activity Workforce (approx. numbers)
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)81 3270
UK Nuclear Safety Directorate (NSD)82 250
Conversion facility, 13 000 tonnes/year (Areva, France) 1600
Enrichment facility, 10 million SWU/year (Areva, France) 1500
Nuclear power plant operation (800 MW, PWR USA)[229] 500
Nuclear power plant operation (1600 MW, PWR Finland)[230] 150–200
Reprocessing facility (similar scale to plant at La Hague)[231] 3900
Central spent fuel storage facility (CLAB, Sweden) [232] 70
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. (SKB, Sweden)[232]83 230
Posiva Oy (Finnish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, Finland)[233] 60
Construction and operation of HLW disposal facility (UK)[228] 275
Note: The history, size and scope of each country’s nuclear industry varies considerably and these factors will affect workforce needs. See Table 4.1.
81 US NRC personnel ceiling for the 2006 fi nancial year.
82 Sixty per cent are technical staff qualifi ed to honours degree level or above and most of them will have ten or more years of industry experience.
83 In addition, approximately 300 university researchers and consultants are contracted for various research projects and studies.

132
A nuclear industry survey from the United
States found that nearly half of the current
nuclear industry workforce was over 47 years
old, and approximately 40 per cent of the total
workforce (23 000 workers) may leave over the
next fi ve years.[234] The United States NRC
has called for a major industry effort to bring
the supply of scientists and engineers into
equilibrium with the escalating demand.
The NRC expects to hire some 300 engineering
and science graduates during 2006. The
minimum requirements for these positions
were a bachelors degree plus at least three
years of fulltime professional engineering
or physical science experience.
10.2.2 Response of the international
education and training sector
The revival of interest in nuclear energy will
make the industry a more attractive career
option. However, a career in the nuclear energy
sector will only become an option if universities
and other educational establishments have
the facilities and places available to provide
relevant nuclear skills and training. Some
overseas initiatives are described below.84
The Dalton Nuclear Institute (DNI),
United Kingdom
The DNI was established to implement the
aim of the University of Manchester to become
a leading domestic and international player
in nuclear research and education.85
The DNI coordinates a consortium of
universities and research institutes to address
the nuclear skills shortage in the United
Kingdom. As one component of this initiative,
in 2005 the Nuclear Technology Education
Consortium began a Masters program in
nuclear science and technology. The program
is designed to meet the future nuclear skills
needs in the United Kingdom in areas such
as decommissioning, reactor technology,
fusion and nuclear medicine. The DNI
expressed interest in collaborating with
appropriate Australian institutions during
discussions with the Review.
The World Nuclear University (WNU)
The WNU was founded by the IAEA, the NEA,
the World Association of Nuclear Operators and
the World Nuclear Association, in September
2003. Its main function is to foster cooperation
among its participating institutions. This
includes facilitating distance learning so that
courses at any WNU university are available
to students throughout the network. The WNU
network consists of 30 nations represented by
universities and research centres with strong
programs in nuclear science and engineering.86
United States Department of Energy
(DOE)
The number of United States institutions
offering nuclear engineering courses fell
50 per cent between 1975 and 2006. However,
since 1997 enrolments have begun to increase.
One reason for increased enrolments is
the improving outlook for employment in
the nuclear sector.87 Another reason is
the introduction of various United States
DOE programs to expand nuclear training
opportunities for students. Figure 10.3
illustrates the lead time between United
States government investment in programs
to encourage nuclear engineering studies
and increasing enrolments.
84 Other collaborative efforts include the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) and the Asian Network for Education
in Nuclear Technology (ANENT).
85 The DNI has strategic collaborative linkages with leading nuclear countries including Canada, the United States (Battelle),
South Africa (North-West University), France, India, China (Tsinghua University) and other Asian networks.
86 Australia is represented by ANSTO and an ANSTO employee attended a six-week course in 2006.
87 For example, the United States NRC is hiring staff to prepare for an expected increase in reactor license applications.

133
Figure 10.3 Nuclear engineering enrolments and US DOE funding in the United States
Enrolments
1997
1998
Year
2000
1600
1200
800
400
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Source: Presentation by Dr José N Reyes Jr to the American Nuclear Society Meeting, June 2006.[235]
10.2.3 Existing Australian human
resources and potential
future requirements
1999 2001
The uranium exploration and mining industry
faces similar human resource needs as other
resource sectors. BHP Billiton estimates that
the proposed Olympic Dam mine expansion
could increase employee numbers by one-third
(or approximately 1000 people).[17] In addition,
some 5000 construction jobs could be
associated with the expansion.88 However,
the industry also faces some unique skills
requirements relating to the specifi c
characteristics of uranium mining, including:
Radiation Safety Offi cers (RSO) — the 2005
Code of Practice and Safety Guide for
Radiation Protection and Radioactive
Waste Management in Mining and Mineral
Processing requires the operator and
employer to appoint a qualifi ed and
experienced RSO.89
•
DOE funding (US$ million)
Undergraduate
Postgraduate
DOE funding
2002
2003
2004
2005
30
24
18
12
6
0
specialised skills in relation to the operation
of the Australasian Code for Reporting of
Exploration Results, Mineral Resources
and Ore Reserves.90 Under the Code,
uranium exploration results must be
reported by persons with at least fi ve
years relevant experience.
persons with highly specialised skills
related to in-situ leaching of uranium.
2000
•
•
Australia currently has no (non-R&D)
involvement in other components of the nuclear
fuel cycle. The submission to the Review by
ANSTO[101] argued that overseas experience has
shown that between 50 and 100 appropriately
qualifi ed professionals are needed during the
pre-project and early implementation phases
of any nuclear power program. This fi gure
was supported by information gathered by
the Review from the DNI.
88 On the basis of revenue, it is estimated that approximately 25 per cent of the workforce is connected with the mining of uranium.
89 The 2006 Uranium Industry Framework report identifi es skills shortages in this area as being among the main factors infl uencing
the international competitiveness of the industry.
90 Often referred to as the JORC Code after the Australasian Joint Ore Reserves Committee.

134
The construction of the new ANSTO OPAL
research reactor at Lucas Heights provides
an insight into the capabilities of Australian
industry in such projects. Design, construction
and commissioning was done by a joint venture
between the Argentine company INVAP SE
and its Australian partners, John Holland
Construction and Engineering Pty Ltd and
Evans Deakin Industries Limited (JHEDI).
The JHEDI consortium had no major diffi culties
in obtaining appropriately skilled personnel
for the project, although some additional
research and training was needed to ensure
that the higher standards associated with
reactor construction were met (for example
in areas such as welding and preparation of
high density concrete). Other issues specifi c
to the OPAL project included the signifi cantly
higher degree of planning required
(approximately twice as many planning
days per construction day as would be
required for a more conventional project).
Quality control and audit trail requirements
were also much higher.
The regulatory sector
ARPANSA currently has 125 full time
equivalent staff, eight of whom are committed
to the regulation of nuclear installations.
Staff have been obtained through a mixture
of international recruitment and on the job
training. Any decision to expand Australia’s
role in the nuclear fuel cycle would require
an early investment in training and recruiting
substantially more human resources with
skills in a wide range of nuclear related areas,
including radiation protection and nuclear
safety.[174,222] The challenge of doing so in
a timely fashion is considerable. An early
step might include measures to facilitate the
training of Australian regulators through staff
exchanges with their overseas counterparts.
10.2.4 Existing Australian training
and education capacity
Australia’s only School of Nuclear Engineering
was operated by the University of New South
Wales between 1961 and 1986. A 2006 survey
found a lack of tertiary education in nuclear
science and technology in engineering
departments in Australian universities,[236]
although a number of courses deal with
nuclear physics and radiation safety.
The ANU plans to offer a Masters of nuclear
science course, with an initial intake of fi ve
to ten students in 2007 and growth anticipated
in subsequent years. The Australian Technology
Network91 identifi ed courses relating to the
reliability, safety, economics and environmental
and societal effects of nuclear energy systems
as an area where they are well placed to
provide education and training.
The Council of the Australian Institute of
Nuclear Science and Engineering (AINSE),
a body that has a mandate to train scientifi c
research workers and award scientifi c
research studentships in nuclear science
and engineering fi elds, has decided to
facilitate the formation of an Australia-wide
nuclear science and technology school.
The intention is to provide education in
a wide range of nuclear-related matters
from technical aspects of the fuel cycle
and reactor operation through to nuclear
safety, public awareness, and other matters
of interest to policy makers.92
Australia’s existing and proposed nuclear
training and education capacity is also
discussed in Appendix R.
91 The Australian Technology Network is an alliance of Curtin University of Technology, the University of South Australia, RMIT University,
the University of Technology Sydney and Queensland University of Technology.
92 Participants in the discussions included the ANU, a consortium of universities in Western Australia, the Universities of Wollongong,
Newcastle, Sydney and Melbourne, Queensland University of Technology and RMIT University.

135
The 2006 SET Skills Audit
The 2006 SET Skills Audit examined trends
in the demand and supply of SET skills
in Australia and the factors affecting this
balance.[237] Audit modelling estimated
a cumulative shortfall of some 20 000 people
with SET skills by 2012–2013. More than
95 per cent of this shortage is in science
professionals, with the remainder in
engineering professionals.
The SET Skills Audit also highlights the
strong link between SET skills and associated
R&D expenditure. The existence of this link
is supported by the NEA.[238] This is not
surprising as the brightest minds will tend to
be attracted to research areas where there is
the opportunity to do leading edge research.
Analysis of unpublished ABS data shows
that the role of the higher education sector
in nuclear energy-related R&D is small and
declining. Annual spending by this sector
averaged around $150 000 in the decade to
2004–05. This low activity level is refl ected
in a lack of higher education opportunities
specifi cally related to the nuclear fuel cycle.
See also discussion in Appendix R.
10.2.5 Training and educational
implications of an expansion
in nuclear-related activity
Although lead times for the construction of
nuclear fuel cycle facilities could be several
years, it would be important to establish the
appropriate skills for planning, regulation and
design at an early stage. The establishment
of a skilled workforce, including local training
of personnel and international recruitment,
would need to be considered at the same time
that Australia’s policy decision about the
nuclear fuel cycle is determined.
People employed in the uranium mining
industry come from diverse backgrounds,
ranging from hard rock mining to specialist
health and environment areas. At present,
the necessary skills are developed through
a combination of specialist courses and on
the job training. While the industry faces
a skills shortage, large international fi rms
have the capacity to draw on worldwide
resources to manage their development
priorities. Smaller local companies may
have no option but to attract skilled staff
away from other fi rms.
One submission to the Review argued that
expanding the Australian nuclear industry
beyond mining may require approximately
20 graduates per year.[101] However, the Chief
Scientist’s Review Panel believes that this
number would be insuffi cient. While the
number of graduates needed per year
will depend upon the nature and level of
Australia’s involvement in the nuclear industry,
the Review notes that, given the low starting
point, the education and training task for
Australia could be considerable.
The Review expects that nuclear education
and training providers will respond to market
signals such as increased funding and employer
demand. Proposals for new nuclear training
courses at the ANU and ANSTO lend some
support for that view. It may be necessary
to encourage Australian educational and
training institutions to coordinate their
responses and to increase collaboration
with their overseas counterparts. In particular,
growing a local nuclear industry will require
a full range of education and research activities
to be developed and supported in Australia.
Having a broad range of groups providing
these services will also help maintain a
diversity of research capability, knowledge
and independent opinion as Australia moves
forward in what is likely to be a very complex
and challenging debate.

136
Direct industry involvement through measures
such as cadetships and joint development of
programs would be a means of ensuring that
the education and training sector meets the
needs of the industry.
Local demand is initially unlikely to be suffi cient
to sustain the re-establishment of a university
school of nuclear engineering in Australia.
As a fi rst step it might be more appropriate
to develop an educational network involving
Australian universities and colleges, industry
and ANSTO. Such a network could build on
the role of AINSE93 and also take advantage
of overseas training opportunities, such as
those available through the WNU and the
European Nuclear Education Network.
There may also be a role for the learned
Academies and professional organisations,
such as Engineers Australia, in developing
such an educational network.
10.3 Conclusion
Many nations are moving to boost education
and training activities to overcome nuclear
skills shortages. Australia will also need to
do this if it decided to expand its role in the
nuclear fuel cycle. Australia should aim to
link in with and take advantage of international
opportunities to supplement its own nuclear
education and training. With the appropriate
educational policies in place, there is little
doubt Australian educational institutions
and students will respond to any increased
demand for skills.
Government support for nuclear energy-related
R&D will likewise need to increase signifi cantly
if Australia expands its nuclear fuel cycle
activities. Again, there are signifi cant
opportunities for Australia to leverage
its research expertise through various
existing international forums for R&D
collaboration. Increased support for nuclear
R&D will undoubtedly stimulate student
enrolments in nuclear energy-related courses.
recommended that university research into aspects of nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle be encouraged through the allocation of research
grants awarded by AINSE.[26]

137
Appendix A. Terms of reference
The Terms of Reference were announced
by the Prime Minister on 6 June 2006.
The Review will consider the following matters:
1. Economic issues
(a) The capacity for Australia to increase
uranium mining and exports in response
to growing global demand.
(b) The potential for establishing other steps
in the nuclear fuel cycle in Australia,
such as fuel enrichment, fabrication and
reprocessing, along with the costs and
benefi ts associated with each step.
(c) The extent and circumstances in which
nuclear energy could in the longer term
be economically competitive in Australia
with other existing electricity generation
technologies, including any implications
this would have for the national
electricity market.
(d) The current state of nuclear energy
research and development in Australia
and the capacity for Australia to make
a signifi cantly greater contribution to
international nuclear science.
2. Environment issues
(a) The extent to which nuclear energy will
make a contribution to the reduction of
global greenhouse gas emissions.
(b) The extent to which nuclear energy could
contribute to the mix of emerging energy
technologies in Australia.
Appendix A. Terms of reference
3. Health, safety and
proliferation issues
(a) The potential of ‘next generation’ nuclear
energy technologies to meet safety, waste
and proliferation concerns.
(b) The waste processing and storage issues
associated with nuclear energy and current
world’s best practice.
(c) The security implications relating to
nuclear energy.
(d) The health and safety implications
relating to nuclear energy.

138
Appendix B. Taskforce Members
Chairman
Zygmunt (Ziggy) Switkowski
Dr Switkowski, formerly the Chief Executive
Offi cer of Telstra Corporation (1999–2005),
is a director of Tabcorp, Healthscope Ltd,
Opera Australia and Suncorp-Metway.
Dr Switkowski holds a PhD in nuclear
physics from the University of Melbourne.
Ziggy Switkowski previously held the position
of Chief Executive Offi cer of Optus Ltd. Prior
to that he worked for Kodak (Australasia)
for eighteen years, serving as the Chairman
and Managing Director from 1992–1996.
Members
Professor George Dracoulis
Professor George Dracoulis is Professor
and head of the Department of Nuclear
Physics in the Research School of Physical
Sciences and Engineering at the Australian
National University. Professor Dracoulis is
an internationally renowned expert on nuclear
physics. He is a Fellow of the Australian
Academy of Science and a Fellow of the
American Physical Society. He was awarded
a Centenary Medal in 2003 and was the
recipient of the Lyle Medal for distinguished
research in physics in 2003 (Australian
Academy of Science) and the Walter Boas
Medal for excellence in research in Physics
in 2004 (Australian Institute of Physics).
Dr Arthur Johnston PSM
Dr Johnston was a research scientist in nuclear
structure physics at the University of Glasgow
and the Australian National University from
1966 until 1982. Over the past 25 years he has
become internationally recognised as an expert
on the effects of uranium mining on people
and the environment through his leadership
of the Environmental Research Institute of the
Supervising Scientist. As Supervising Scientist
from 1999 to 2005 he was responsible for the
supervision of the environmental regulatory
regime for uranium mining in the Northern
Territory. In 2003, he was awarded the Public
Service Medal for his contribution to the
protection of Kakadu National Park.
He is an Adjunct Professor at the University of
the Sunshine Coast, a member of the Australian
Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council
and a member of the Environment Committee
of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection.
Professor Peter Johnston
Professor Peter Johnston is Head of Physics
within the School of Applied Sciences, RMIT.
He is the Registrar and a member of the
National Executive of the Australian Institute
of Physics and a Councillor of the Association
of the Asia Pacifi c Physical Societies and of
the Australian Institute of Nuclear Science and
Engineering. He is a member of the Radiation
Health and Safety Council and the Nuclear
Safety Committee, and a former member of
the Radiation Health Committee. He is also
an independent member of the Alligator
Rivers Region Technical Committee.
Professor Johnston has had considerable
experience in health and safety associated
with environmental radioactivity especially
through his involvement with rehabilitation of
the former British nuclear test site at Maralinga.
Professor Warwick McKibbin
Professor Warwick McKibbin is currently
Director of the Centre for Applied
Macroeconomic Analysis and Professor of
International Economics in the Research School
of Pacifi c and Asian Studies at the Australian
National University. He is a Professorial Fellow
at the Lowy Institute for International Policy,
a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution
in Washington, a member of the Board of the
Reserve Bank of Australia and a member of
the Prime Minister’s Science Engineering and
Innovation Council. Professor McKibbin is an
internationally renowned economist with a deep
understanding of the economics of energy and
issues relating to climate change.

139
Mr Martin Thomas, AM
Mr Martin Thomas is the Chairman of
Dulhunty Power Limited. He was Deputy
Chairman of Australian Inland Energy and
Water and a non-Executive Director of the
Tyree Group of companies from 1993 until 2001.
Mr Thomas was the President of the Institution
of Engineers Australia in 1991, Vice President
of the Australian Academy of Technological
Sciences and Engineering from 1996 to 2000,
Chairman of the NSW Electricity Council from
1988 to 1995 and has held a number of other
senior positions within the energy sector,
concluding his professional career as a
Principal of Sinclair Knight Merz, one of
Australia’s leading consulting engineers.
Mr Thomas has experience in the energy,
science and commercial sectors.
Secretariat
The Review was supported by a secretariat
headed by Mr John Ryan, Deputy Secretary,
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources,
with staff drawn from the following departments
and agencies:
The Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet
The Department of the Treasury
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
The Department of Industry, Tourism
and Resources
The Department of the Environment
and Heritage
The Department of Education, Science
and Technology
Commonwealth Scientifi c and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO)
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organisation (ANSTO)
Appendix B. Panel Members

140
Appendix C. Submissions received
by the Taskforce
Individual submissions
Aldrick, Robyn
Alexander, Karen
Atkinson, Bernardine
Barnes, Julie
Blair, David
Blyth, Judy
Bohnet, Gabriele
Boulton, Liz
Bradbury, David
Brier, David
Broinowski, Richard
Bruinstroop, Frank
Bunch, Enid
Burgess, Michael
Bussenschutt, Joseph
Byass, Rosalind
Byrne, Aiden
Callaghan, Andrea
Cusack, Mary
Daly-King, Betty
Deblaquiere, Julie
Deeley, Diana
Delaney, Craig
Diesendorf, Mark
Dixon, Lorraine
Edwards, S
Faulkner, Peter
Finegan, Pat
Finkel, Alan
Fisher, William
Foster, Jean
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Furuno, Shin
Gambotto, Daniela
Gates, Steve
Gellatly, Peter
Giles, Nick
Glover, Simon
Goldschlager, Les
Gordon, Anna
Green, Dot
Greenhill, John
Grierson, Ian
Hagen, Hans
Harrington, Geraldine
Hassett, Michael
Higson, Don
Holmes, HR
Horner, Pen
Houston, Michael
Humphris, Peter
Hungerford, Keith
Jennings, Philip
Johnson, M
Johnson, Wendy
Jones, Chris
Keeffe, Lisa
Kemeny, Leslie
Keough, Kris
Kerjman, Michael
Kirchhoff, Alana
Kline, Colin
Koch, Cecilie
Laird, Philip
Law, Valerie
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Lawrence, Barry
Le Couteur, Caroline
Lichacz, Wieslaw
Lock, Nicholas
Mabb, John
MacDonald, David
Mackle, Pat
Madigan, Michele
Maiden, Pepita
Malcolm, Clive
McCarthy, Lance
McCarthy, Sidrah
McCormack, John
McDarmont, Ben
McGrath, Michael
McHugh, Gerard
McHugh, Ian
Mehta, Fred
Miller, Joel
Morris, Louise
Mushalik, Matt
Nichols, Kenneth
O’Kelly, Peter
Owen, John
Palmer, Lucille
Parkinson, Alan
Paterson, Duncan
Peters, Donella
Pinkas, Joanna
Pollard, Alex
Rainbird, Wendy
Reid, Don
Ross, Donald
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Rowland, Phillipa
Sanders, George
Schardijn, Irene
Schnelboegl, Peter
Sharp, Nicholas
Smalley, Chris
Smith, Rebecca
Smith, Zane
Stephen, Wendy
Stephens, Irving
Stevenson, Hayley
Suehrcke, Harry
Surveyor, Ivor
Swinton, Richard
Taylor, Daniel
Thomas, Geoff
Thornber, Mike
Thummel, Cindy
Tilbrook, Challis
Tomlinson, Alan
Turtle, Robert
Tutty, Justin
Van Zonneveld, Samantha
Ward, John
Ward, K
Webb, Mandy
Whelan, Cedar & Aja
Wilcox, Michael
William, Lisa
Wood, Peter
Wood, Tony
Wright, William
Wrigley, Derek
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Appendix C. Submissions received by the Taskforce

142
Submissions received
from organisations
Academy of Technological
Sciences and Engineering
Alice Action Group
Alternative Technology Association
Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia
ANU Environment Collective Offi ce
AREVA
Australian Academy of Science
Australian Business Council
for Sustainable Energy
Australian Conservation Foundation
(Sydney Branch)
Australian Greens
Australian Institute of Nuclear
Science and Engineering
Australian ITER Forum
Australian Nuclear Association
Australian Nuclear Forum Inc
Australian Nuclear Science
and Technology Organisation
Australian Radiation Protection
and Nuclear Safety Agency
Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Offi ce
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Australian Student Environment Network
Australian Technology Network
Australian Union of Students
BHP Billiton
Canberra Region Anti Nuclear Campaign
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (WA)
Conservation Council of Western Australia
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CSIRO
Demand Manager Pty Ltd
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Docklands Science Park Pty Ltd
Doctors For the Environment Australia
Energy Networks Association
Energy Resources of Australia
Energy Supply Association of Australia
Engineers Australia
Environment Business Australia
Environment Centre NT
Everyone for a Nuclear Free Future
— Lismore
Food Irradiation Watch
Fremantle Anti-Nuclear Group
Friends of the Earth
Friends of the Earth Adelaide
Friends of the Earth Brisbane
Gecko — Gold Coast and Hinterland
Environment Council
Geoscience Australia
Glen Haven Consulting
Greenpeace Australia Pacifi c
Hunwick Consultants
Institute of Public Affairs
Katherine Nuclear Dump Action Committee
Kim Stephan Consulting
Medical Association for the Prevention
of War
Medical Association for the Prevention
of War (NT)
METTS Pty Ltd
Minerals Council of Australia
Musgrave Design and Engineering Pty Ltd
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National Civic Council (SA)
National Generators Forum
National Toxics Network
NEMMCO
Northern Territory Government
Nuclear Engineering Panel of the
Institute of Engineers Australia
Nuclear Free Queensland and the
Queensland Conservation Foundation
Nuclear Fuel Leasing Group
Nu-Power Green
Peace Organisation of Australia
People for Nuclear Disarmament NSW Inc
Prospect Residents’ Energy Forum (SA)
Queensland Resources Council
Renewable Energy Generators Australia
Rio Tinto
Rylstone District Environment Society
Scientists and Technologists Against
Nuclear Dumping
Silex
Submarine Institute of Australia
Sunshine Coast Environment Council
Sutherland Shire Environment Centre
Inc and People Against Nuclear Reactor Inc
UNSW Environment Collective
Uranium Information Centre
Victorian State Government
Western Australian Sustainable
Energy Association
Women’s International League
for Peace and Freedom
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Appendix C. Submissions received by the Taskforce

144
Appendix D. Consultations
ABN Amro
Alinta
Andra (France)
Areva (France)
Association of Mining
and Exploration Companies
Australian Academy for Technological
Sciences and Engineering
Australian Academy of Science
Australian Council for Infrastructure
Development
Australian Council of Trade Unions
Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organisation
Australian Radiation Protection
Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Offi ce
Australian Technology Network
Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee
BHP Billiton
British Energy
British Nuclear Fuels and
British Nuclear Group
Broinowski, Adjunct Prof Richard
Business Council for Sustainable Energy
Caldicott, Dr Helen
Cameco (Canada)
Chamber of Minerals and
Energy of Western Australia
Cooperative Research Centre
for Greenhouse Gas Technologies
CSIRO Energy Transformed Flagship
Dalton Nuclear Institute (United Kingdom)
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Department of the Environment and
Heritage Offi ce of the Supervising Scientist
Department of Trade and Industry
(United Kingdom)
Duncan, Dr Ian
Eléctricité de France
Energy Supply Association of Australia
Engineers Australia
Environment Centre Northern
Territory (ECNT)
Exelon (United States)
Flannery, Dr Tim
Fortum (Finland)
Friends of the Earth (Australia)
General Atomics (United States)
General Electric
Goldman Sachs JBW
Heathgate Resources
International Energy Agency
Japan Atomic Power Company
Kansai Electric Power Company (Japan)
Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power
McKinsey and Company (Australia)
Medical Association for Prevention
of War (Australia)
Minerals Council of Australia
Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (Japan)
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (Japan)
Ministry of Trade and Industry (Finland)
Morgan, Mr Hugh
National Generators’ Forum
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145
National Security Council (United States)
Northern Land Council
Northern Territory Government
Nuclear Energy Institute (United States)
Nuclear Fuel Leasing Group
Nuclear Industry Association
(United Kingdom)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(United States)
Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development Nuclear Energy Agency
Pacifi c Basin Nuclear Conference meetings
Paladin Resources
Posiva (Finland)
Rio Tinto
Silex Systems Limited
South Australian Government
State Nuclear Regulation Committee
of Ukraine
Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) (Finland)
Tokyo Electric Power Company
Uranium Information Centre
Urenco (United Kingdom)
United States Department of Energy
United States Department of State
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
Wesfarmers Energy
Western Australian Government
World Nuclear Association
World Wildlife Fund Australia
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Appendix D. Consultations

146
AREVA NC La Hague reprocessing plant,
La Hague (France)
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organisation Lucas Heights facilities
(New South Wales)
Beverley in-situ leach uranium mine
(South Australia)
Capenhurst uranium enrichment facility
(United Kingdom)
Chernobyl (Ukraine)
Dalton Nuclear Institute, Manchester
(United Kingdom)
European Underground Research
Infrastructure for Disposal of nuclear waste
In Clay Environment (EURIDICE) High
Activity Disposal Experimental Site,
Mol (Belgium)
General Atomics R&D facilities, San Diego
(United States)
JAEA Tokai-mura R&D facilities (including
spent fuel reprocessing centre) (Japan)
Meuse/Haute-Marne Underground Research
Laboratory (France)
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants and waste
repository (Finland)
Olympic Dam copper and uranium mine
(South Australia)
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Port Hope fuel fabrication facility (Canada)
Port Hope uranium conversion
facility (Canada)
Ranger uranium mine (Northern Territory)
Sellafi eld nuclear facility (United Kingdom)
Springfi elds fuel fabrication facility
(United Kingdom)
Three Mile Island nuclear power facilities
(United States)
Tokai nuclear power facility (Japan)
Wolsong nuclear power facility (Korea)
Yucca Mountain geological waste repository
(United States)
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Appendix E. Site visits

147
Appendix F. Chief Scientist’s Expert Panel
Role and operation
of the Expert Panel
On 6 June 2006 the Prime Minister announced
the appointment of a Taskforce to undertake
an objective, scientifi c and comprehensive
review into uranium mining, processing and
the contribution of nuclear energy in Australia
in the longer term. The Prime Minister also
announced that the Chief Scientist, Dr Jim
Peacock, would chair an Expert Panel that
would review the scientifi c aspects of the
Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear
Energy Review (UMPNER).
The Expert Panel met in Canberra on 21–22
November. During that time the Expert Panel
met with members of the UMPNER Secretariat
and the Review Panel and provided their
comments on the draft report.
Chair
Dr Jim Peacock, Australian Chief Scientist
Dr Jim Peacock was appointed Australian
Chief Scientist in March 2006. Dr Peacock
is an outstanding scientist with a record
of academic excellence and is highly
respected by the science, engineering
and technology community.
Dr Peacock is an award winning molecular
biologist and fervent science advocate.
He is recognised internationally as an eminent
researcher in the fi eld of plant molecular
biology and its applications in agriculture.
In 1994, he was made a Companion of the Order
of Australia for outstanding service to science,
particularly in the fi eld of molecular biology
and to science education. Dr Peacock is a
Fellow of the Australian Academy of Science,
Fellow of The Royal Society of London, the
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences
and Engineering, a Foreign Associate of the US
National Academy of Sciences and a Foreign
Fellow of the Indian National Science Academy.
In 2000 he was a co-recipient of the inaugural
Prime Minister’s Science Prize, for his
co-discovery of the Flowering Switch Gene —
a key gene that determines when plants end
their vegetative growth phase and begin
fl owering. This discovery will help boost the
productivity of the world’s crops by billions
of dollars each year and could also help
increase the nutritional value of crops eaten by
billions of the world’s poorest people.
He was also awarded the BHP Bicentennial
Prize for the pursuit of excellence in science
and technology and the Australian Academy
of Science’s Burnett Medal for distinguished
contributions in the biological sciences.
Dr Peacock has gained valuable experience
working in industry having founded the Gene
Shears biotechnology company and instituted
the GrainGene initiative and the HRZ Wheat
Company — linking research with the
production of new wheat varieties for Australia.
He played a key role in the establishment of
cotton as Australia’s fi rst highly successful
biotech crop.
Dr Peacock is a strong advocate for the
integration of science and global business.
He drives innovative communication efforts
to inform the general public as to the outcomes
and value of modern science. He has brought
the excitement of science to a broad cross-section
of the community and to Australian
school students.
International review panel members
Dr Christine Brown, Head of Strategy, MOX,
British Nuclear Fuels PLC.
Dr Brown joined the United Kingdom Atomic
Energy Authority at Dounreay in 1971 after
completing BSc and PhD degrees at Glasgow
and Oxford Universities. During her early
career she specialised in electron optics
methods to study the effects of irradiation
damage on reactor core structural and fuel
materials, in particular, plutonium containing
fuels. In 1992 she was awarded the Charles
Eichner Medal by the Materials and Metals
Society of France for her contribution to
Fast Reactor materials studies.
From this pure research background,
Dr Brown’s career moved into the more
industrial applications area of nuclear
reactor systems, including fuel fabrication
and performance, plant operations and
decommissioning. By leading development
programmes on advanced fuels for future

148
nuclear fuel cycles and advanced reactor
systems, Dr Brown enjoys an international
reputation for providing technical support and
advice. She was a member of the US DOE Blue
Ribbon Committee reporting to Nuclear Energy
Research Advisory Committee (NERAC) on the
proliferation resistance of recycled nuclear fuels
and was technical advisor to the UK Department
of Trade and Industry on future Generation IV
reactors. She was a member of the BNFL/
Westinghouse team appointed to review the
South African Pebble Bed Moderated Reactor
and for 4 years was technical advisor and
participant in the BNFL National Stakeholder
Dialogue process.
Dr Brown retired as Head of Strategy, MOX
in July 2006 but continues as technical advisor
to British Nuclear Fuels PLC and to other
government organisations.
Professor Gordon MacKerron, Director, Sussex
Energy Group, SPRU, University of Sussex.
Professor MacKerron has been Director, Sussex
Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology
Policy Research), University of Sussex since
April 2005, following four years as Associate
Director, NERA Economic Consulting and
an earlier career for over 20 years at SPRU,
University of Sussex. He is an economist
working in energy and environmental
economics and policy. After early work in
Malawi, Nigeria and as a lecturer at Griffi th
University, Brisbane, his academic career has
specialized in the economics and policy issues
of electricity and especially nuclear power.
He has frequently been Specialist Adviser or
invited witness before UK House of Commons
Select Committee inquiries on energy subjects.
In 2001 he worked for the UK Cabinet Offi ce as
Deputy Leader of the UK Government’s Energy
Review team.
He has advised a wide range of public and
private sector bodies including the European
Commission, the European Parliament, the
European Court of Auditors, the UK National
Audit Offi ce, the Parliamentary offi ce of Science
and Technology, the Brazilian Government,
PowerGen (E.On), and Friends of the Earth.
He has published widely on nuclear economics
and policy, regulatory economics in electricity,
energy security of supply and energy policy as
a whole. Professor MacKerron has also been
the expert witness on economic issues for the
Irish Government in its two international court
cases on the subject of Sellafi eld before the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague
in 2002 and 2003.
Professor MacKerron chaired the Energy
Panel, Department of Trade and Industry/Offi ce
and Science and Technology (DTI/OST)
Technology Foresight Programme (1995–98)
and in December 2003 became the Chair of
the Committee on Radioactive Waste
Management, an independent body charged
with recommending the best approach to
long-term radioactive waste management
to the UK Government.
Dr Richard A. Meserve, President,
Carnegie Institution of Washington.
Dr Meserve became the ninth president of the
Carnegie Institution in April 2003, after stepping
down as chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). Dr Meserve had been
a member of Carnegie’s board of trustees
since 1992.
As Chairman of the NRC, Dr Meserve served
as the principal executive offi cer of the federal
agency with responsibility for ensuring the
public health and safety in the operation of
nuclear power plants and in the usage of
nuclear materials. Before joining the NRC,
Dr Meserve was a partner in the Washington,
D.C., law fi rm of Covington & Burling, and he
now serves as Senior Of Counsel to the fi rm.
With his Harvard law degree, received in 1975,
and his Ph.D. in applied physics from Stanford,
awarded in 1976, he devoted his legal practice
to technical issues arising at the intersection
of science, law, and public policy.
Dr Meserve currently serves as Chairman of
the International Nuclear Safety Group, which
is chartered by the IAEA. Dr Meserve serves
on the Board of Directors of the Universities
Research Association, Inc. and on the Council
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
He is a member of the National Academy of
Engineering and the American Philosophical
Society and is a Fellow of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science,
and the American Physical Society.

149
Australian review panel members
Professor Kurt Lambeck, President,
Australian Academy of Science.
Professor Lambeck is Distinguished Professor
of Geophysics at the Australian National
University. His research interests range through
the disciplines of geophysics, geodesy and
geology with a focus on the deformations
of the Earth on intermediate and long time
scales and on the interactions between surface
processes and the solid earth. Past research
areas have included the determination of the
Earth’s gravity fi eld from satellite tracking data,
the tidal deformations and rotational motion
of the Earth, the evolution of the Earth-Moon
orbital system, and lithospheric and crustal
deformation processes. His recent work has
focussed on aspects of sea level change and
the history of the Earth’s ice sheets during past
glacial cycles, including fi eld and laboratory
work and numerical modelling.
Professor Lambeck has been at the Australian
National University since 1977, including ten
years as Director of the Research School of
Earth Sciences. He is currently also strategic
science advisor to the National Geospatial
Reference System of Geoscience Australia.
Before returning to Australia he was a Professor
at the University of Paris. He has also worked
at the Smithsonian and Harvard Observatories
in Cambridge, USA. He has studied at the
University of New South Wales, the Technical
University of Delft, Netherlands, the National
Technical University of Athens and Oxford
University from which he obtained DPhil and
DSc degrees. He has held visiting appointments
in France, Netherlands, Belgium, Britain,
Norway and Sweden. He was elected to the
Australian Academy of Science in 1984 and
to the Royal Society in 1994. He is a foreign
member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of
Arts and Sciences (1993), Norwegian Academy
of Science and Letters (1994), Academia
Europaea (1999), and the Académie des
Sciences, Institut de France (2005). He has
received a number of international prizes and
awards including the Tage Erlander Prize from
the Swedish Research Council (2001), the Prix
George Lemaître from the Université catholique
de Louvain (2001), and the Eminent Scientist
Award from the Japan Society for the Promotion
of Science (2004).
Mr David Murray, Chairman, Future Fund.
David Murray has 39 years experience in
banking. He retired from the Commonwealth
Bank in 2005 having served 13 years as Chief
Executive, he joined the Commonwealth Bank
in 1966.
In November 2005 the Australian Government
announced that Mr Murray would be Chairman
of the Future Fund. The Fund’s objective is to
invest budget surpluses to meet the long term
pension liabilities of government employees.
Mr Murray holds a Bachelor of Business
from the NSW Institute of Technology and
a Master of Business Administration,
commenced at Macquarie University and
completed at the International Management
Institute, Geneva. He holds an honorary PhD
from Macquarie University and is a Fellow
of the University of Technology, Sydney.
As part of his interest in education Mr Murray
chairs the Business Industry Higher Education
Collaboration Council, is a benefactor of
Schools and a member of Tara Anglican
School for Girls Foundation in Sydney and
a life member of the Financial Markets
Foundation for Children. He is Chairman of
the Global Foundation and is a non-executive
director on the Board of Tenix Pty Ltd.
Dr Leanna Read, Managing Director,
TGR BioSciences Pty Ltd.
Dr Read is a founder of TGR and has been
Managing Director and CEO since the
Company’s incorporation in June 2001.
She is a physiologist by training with over
90 scientifi c papers and more than 20 years
experience in biotechnology research.
Dr Read has been a private member of the
Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and
Innovation Council for four years, has chaired
two PMSEIC working groups and serves on
the SA Premier’s Science and Research Council
as well as the boards of Novogen Ltd and the
Australian Proteome Analysis Facility.

150
Prior to her current position, Dr Read was CEO
of the commercially successful CRC for Tissue
Growth and Repair, a position she took up after
10 years as the inaugural director of the Child
Health Research Institute in Adelaide.
Dr Read is also a member of the National
Collaborative Research Infrastructure Scheme
(NCRIS) Committee. From 1995–2002 she was
a member of the IR&D Board and chaired the
IR&D Board Biological Committee.

151
Appendix G. Electric Power Research Institute — commissioned study
Appendix G. Electric Power Research
Institute* — commissioned study
Review and comparison of
recent studies for Australian
electricity generation planning
Summary
Australia’s future economic growth and
prosperity depend on having ample supplies
of affordable energy. Currently, Australia relies
on coal and natural gas to generate more than
90 per cent of its electricity.
Even though Australia holds 40 per cent of the
world’s known, low-cost, recoverable uranium
reserves, nuclear power has never been a part
of the nation’s power supply portfolio.
Growing concern over the contributions
of fossil fuel combustion to climate change
is one of several factors compelling
policymakers, energy companies,
nongovernmental organisations, and other
stakeholders to look at nuclear energy from
a different perspective: around the world,
nuclear power plants are generating large
quantities of reliable, cost-competitive
electricity without releasing greenhouse gases.
On June 6, 2006, Prime Minister Howard
appointed a taskforce to undertake an
objective, scientifi c, comprehensive, and
long-term review of uranium mining and
processing and of the possible contribution
of nuclear power to Australia’s energy future.
The merits, hazards, and relative economic
costs of various technologies for baseload
electricity generation have been analysed in
many previous studies. The Prime Ministerial
Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear
Energy Review (UMPNER) Taskforce engaged
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
to conduct an independent review and
analysis of selected studies to provide
baseline information on whether nuclear
energy could — in the longer term — be
economically competitive with other electricity
generation technologies in Australia. This
report presents the results of EPRI’s analyses.
Approach
This report compares and contrasts the results
of recent studies examining the economic costs
and other impacts of using nuclear, coal, natural
gas, and renewables for electricity generation.
The previous studies largely address the future
of power generation technologies in the United
States, Australia, United Kingdom, Finland,
other European Union nations, and other
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) nations. They also
consider the status and cost-performance
potential of carbon capture and sequestration
technologies, the economic and non-economic
(external) costs associated with current
generation options, and the possible effect
of climate policies and other government
interventions on technology choice. The studies
were conducted by highly regarded institutions
and are widely referenced in the literature and
in debates regarding governmental policies
on energy and the environment.
This report analyses the fi ndings from these
studies — and how the results were derived
— to provide insights on the possible
competitiveness of nuclear generation in
Australia. It incorporates a summary-level
comparison of the costs of similar coal-fi red
plants in Australia and the south-central
United States to illustrate the use of scaling
factors in transferring cost data from one
country to another. It also employs available
data to examine the current and future
competitiveness of existing fossil and renewable
generation options within Australia. In lieu
of making the many specifi c and detailed
assumptions required to develop accurate
cost estimates for a nuclear power plant in
Australia, EPRI identifi ed fundamental
differences between establishing a commercial
nuclear program in Australia and adding to the
nuclear capacity in the United States, as has
been intensively examined in previous studies
for specifi ed or implied locations. Based on
these differences, scaling factors were
developed for issues relating to regulatory
* Full report available at http://www.pmc.gov.au/umpner/docs/commissioned/EPRI_report.pdf

152
capabilities; design, engineering, and licensing;
siting; fi nancing; construction; construction
duration; production; capacity factor; and spent
fuel, waste, and decommissioning. These
scaling factors were then combined to assess
the potential competitiveness of nuclear power
in Australia.
Findings and recommendations
The previous studies all used the same general
methodology to calculate a levelised cost of
electricity (LCOE) cost for each generation
option within a specifi ed geographical region.
The levelised cost is the constant real wholesale
price of electricity that recoups owners’ and
investors’ capital costs, operating costs,
fuel costs, income taxes, and associated
cash fl ow constraints. The LCOE approach
is widely used and easy to understand,
but the previous studies arrived at very
different conclusions because they employed
different algorithms, assumptions, and inputs.
In two studies, for example, nuclear power was
the least expensive option, while in two others
it was the most expensive. This variability is
illustrated in Figure ES-1 (in the EPRI report),
which shows base-case fi ndings from fi ve
previous studies and sensitivity studies for
a sixth, with all LCOE values reported in year
2006 Australian dollars.

153
Appendix H. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) — commissioned study
Appendix H. Australian Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource
Economics (ABARE)* —
commissioned study
Uranium: global market
developments and prospects
for Australian exports
Summary
World uranium requirements are projected
to increase in the period to 2030:
This projected increase refl ects the expected
construction of new nuclear reactors and
extensions to the operating lives of a number
of existing reactors.
The strongest growth in nuclear capacity
is expected to be in China and India, where
rapid economic expansion has led to a
strong increase in demand for electricity.
The expansion of nuclear capacity in China
and India is seen as a measure to address
electricity supply concerns in areas that are
experiencing rapid economic growth but are
located far from lower cost domestic fossil
fuel supplies.
In other countries, the promotion of nuclear
power also seeks to address energy security
considerations and in some cases
environmental issues including localised
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.
Uranium demand growth in countries
with the largest installed nuclear capacity,
including the United States, France, Japan
and the Russian Federation, is likely to
be supported by increased load factors
and operating life extensions at existing
nuclear power plants, as well as new
and replacement reactor builds.
The longer term outlook for global
enrichment capacity will have an important
infl uence on the demand for uranium.
Enrichment capacity is expected to remain
reasonably steady over the medium term
as approximately 13 million separative work
units (SWU) of gaseous diffusion capacity
is phased out between 2010 and 2015 and
replaced with centrifuge technology.
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Beyond 2015, the outlook for global
enrichment capacity is signifi cantly
more diffi cult to ascertain. One of the
characteristics of centrifuge enrichment
is the ability to allow incremental expansion
of enrichment capacity. Accordingly, global
enrichment capacity is likely to expand in
line with global enrichment demand.
World uranium mine production is projected
to increase in the period to 2030:
Global mine production is expected to
increase substantially over the period to 2015
as increases in the uranium price encourage
the development of new mines and prolong
the operating lives of existing mines.
Over the period 2006 to 2015, global mine
production is projected to increase by
77 per cent to just under 84 400 tonnes
U3O8, with the major increases in global
uranium mine production expected
to occur in Canada, Kazakhstan,
the Russian Federation and Africa.
Beyond 2015, based on uranium resources,
countries that have the potential to
signifi cantly increase uranium mining
capacity include Australia, Kazakhstan,
Canada, the United States, South Africa,
Namibia, Niger, Brazil and the Russian
Federation.
Secondary supplies of uranium are projected
to decline in the period of 2030:
Secondary supplies of uranium are
expected to decline over the period to 2015.
The assumed commencement of sales from
US government uranium stockpiles in 2009
is expected to be offset by the completion
of the US–Russian HEU purchase agreement
in 2013.
Therefore, given the forecast growth in
uranium requirements over the outlook
period, an increase in uranium mine
production will be required to meet demand.
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* Full report available at http://www.abareconomics.com/publications_html/energy/energy_06/uranium.pdf

154
Australia will lose signifi cant uranium mine
production share over the period to 2030 if
the ‘no new mines’ policy is maintained:
Australia has the potential to signifi cantly
increase uranium mine production over
the longer term. It has the world’s largest
resources of low cost uranium and there
has been a substantial rise in domestic
exploration of uranium.
Government policy regarding mine
development, rather than resource
availability, is expected to be the major
factor in determining growth in Australia’s
uranium production and exports.
The outlook for Australia’s exports of
uranium will largely depend on whether or
not the ‘no new mines’ policy is maintained.
Should there be no change to this policy,
Australia’s market share of global uranium
production is expected to decline over the
period to 2030 as countries such as
Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia and
the Russian Federation substantially
increase production.
If the ‘no new mines’ policy is overturned,
Australia’s mine production to 2015 and
beyond is forecast to be substantially higher
in volume terms than under the ‘no new
mines’ scenario.
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155
Appendix I. ISA, The University of Sydney — commissioned study
Appendix I. ISA, The University of Sydney*
— commissioned study
Life cycle energy balance and
greenhouse gas emissions
of nuclear energy in Australia
Summary
This report distils in a condensed yet
comprehensive way a large body of previous
work and knowledge about the energy balance
and life cycle greenhouse gas emissions
associated with the nuclear fuel cycle.
For comparison, a summary of the energy
balance and life cycle emissions for a range
of non-nuclear electricity generation
technologies is also presented.
Certainly, every practical life cycle assessment
is undertaken for particular circumstances,
that is particular locations, ores, or reactor
types. Results from the literature must therefore
be interpreted as valid primarily under these
circumstances. Changing critical parameters
and assumptions will lead to variations of
the results.
Also, every practical life cycle assessment
leaves out some more or less important part
of a theoretically ‘true’ life cycle, be it parts
of the fuel cycle processes, indirect, upstream
inputs into components, or parts of the material
fuel and waste stream.
In bringing together analyses that are all
incomplete with regard to a different aspect
of the nuclear fuel cycle, and in extrapolating
the results from these analyses towards a more
complete ‘integrated’ assessment, this work has
achieved comparisons between nuclear energy
systems that are very different in terms of a
large number of critical technical parameters,
operate in low- and high-carbon economies,
and are assessed using different methods.
This study has also provided an example that
demonstrates both the strength of state-of-the-art
life cycle methods for informing national
policy, and the need for quality data
underpinning this method.
Assumptions and scope of this
life cycle analysis of nuclear
energy in Australia
The assumptions outlined below form the base
case of our assessment. In a sensitivity analysis,
these assumptions were varied, and the energy
balance and greenhouse gas emissions
recalculated.
A spreadsheet calculator was developed
which allows these parameters to be set
to any desired scenario.
An Australian nuclear fuel cycle is — except
for mining and milling — hypothetical, and has
been constructed based on the best knowledge
and overseas experience available. Ideally,
a more detailed life cycle assessment than
the one carried out in this work would exploit
detailed planning and engineering data for
concrete Australian facilities, in conjunction
with an Australian input–output database.
The energy requirements for mining and
milling as well as the recovery rate depend
critically on the grade of the uranium-bearing
ore, and on whether uranium is mined together
with other products. In this study we have
assumed that uranium is recovered from ore
of 0.15 per cent grade (typical grade for Ranger
and Beverley mines), and that no other product
is mined, so that the full energy requirement is
attributable to uranium. This is a conservative
assumption, because had we assumed
conditions as in the Olympic Dam mine, the ore
grade would have been lower (around 0.05 per
cent), however most energy requirements would
have been attributable to the recovered copper.
The energy requirements for enrichment
depend critically on which enrichment
method is employed. In this study we have
assumed the present mix of diffusion and
centrifuge plants (30/70 per cent). For future
scenarios this is a conservative assumption,
because it is expected that in the future
centrifuge plants will substitute diffusion plants.
* Full report available at http://www.pmc.gov.au/umpner/docs/commissioned/ISA_report.pdf

156
The energy requirements for the construction,
operation and decommissioning of nuclear
facilities depend critically on what method
is used for their enumeration. We have based
this study on input–output hybrid life cycle
assessments.
The energy requirements for mine clean-up,
intermediate storage and long-term disposal
of nuclear waste depend critically on which
procedures are deemed acceptable for
suffi ciently isolating radioactivity from the
natural and human environment. At present,
there is no operating fi nal disposal facility, and
hence limited practical experience of containing
radioactivity for very long periods. This study
does not comment on the adequacy of existing
and planned mine clean-up, storage and
disposal procedures, because these aspects
fall outside this study’s scope.
The lifetime of uranium resources for
supplying the world’s nuclear power plants
depends critically on assumptions about future
electricity demand, recoverable resources
and ore grade distributions, by-products
of uranium in mines, future exploration
success, the exploitation of breeder reactors
and plutonium in MOX fuels, and market
conditions. These aspects are outside the
scope of this study.
Results for the nuclear fuel cycle
in Australia
The energy balance of the nuclear fuel cycle
involves trade-offs between material throughput
and fi ssile isotope concentration at various
stages in the cycle. For example, there are
trade-offs between:
using less but enriched fuel in Light
Water Reactors, versus more but natural
fuel in Heavy Water or Gas-cooled
Graphite Reactors
applying more enrichment work to less
fuel, versus less enrichment work to
more fuel, and
investing more energy into uranium and
plutonium recycling, versus higher volumes
of fuel uranium mining, throughput, storage,
and disposal.
•
•
•
The overall energy intensity of nuclear energy
depends critically on:
the grade of the uranium ore mined
the method for enrichment
the conversion rate of the nuclear
fuel cycle (ie fuel recycling).
•
•
•
The energy intensity will increase:
with decreasing uranium ore grades
with increasing proportion
of diffusion plants, and
with decreasing fuel recycling.
•
•
•
Notwithstanding these variations,
it can be stated that:
accepting the qualifi cations and
omissions stated
for grades of average ore bodies mined
today, and
for state-of-the-art reactors and uranium
processing facilities
•
•
•
the energy intensity of nuclear power:
is around 0.18 kWhth/kWhel for light water
reactors, and around 0.20 kWhth/kWhel for
heavy water reactors
is slightly higher than most fi gures reported
in the literature, because of omissions in
the nuclear fuel cycle and upstream supply-chain
contributions
varies within the range of 0.16–0.4 kWhth/
kWhel for light water reactors, and within
0.18–0.35 kWhth/kWhel for heavy water
reactors
is lower than that of any fossil-fuelled
power technology.
•
•
•
•
The energy payback time of nuclear energy
is around 6½ years for light water reactors, and
7 years for heavy water reactors, ranging within
5.6–14.1 years, and 6.4–12.4 years, respectively.

157
The greenhouse gas intensity of nuclear
energy depends critically on:
the energy intensity
the proportion of electric versus thermal
energy in the total energy requirement
whether electricity for enrichment is
generated on-site (nuclear), or by fossil
power plants, and
the overall greenhouse gas intensity
(ie fuel mix) of the economy.
The greenhouse gas intensity will increase:
with increasing energy intensity
with increasing proportion of electricity
in the energy requirement
with increasing proportion of electricity for
enrichment generated by fossil power
plants, and
with increasing greenhouse gas intensity
of the economy.
Similarly,
accepting the qualifi cations and
omissions stated
for grades of average ore bodies
mined today, and
for state-of-the-art reactors and uranium
processing facilities
the greenhouse gas intensity of nuclear
power is:
around 60 g CO2-e/kWhel for light water
reactors, and around 65 g CO2-e/kWhel
for heavy water reactors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
slightly higher than most fi gures reported
in the literature, because of omissions
in the nuclear fuel cycle and upstream
supply-chain contributions
varies within the range of 10–130 g CO2-e/
kWhel for light water reactors, and within
10–120 g CO2-e/kWhel for heavy water
reactors
lower than that of any fossil-fuelled
power technology.
Sensitivity analysis
Signifi cant parameters and assumptions
infl uencing the energy and greenhouse
gas intensity of nuclear energy are:
the grade of the uranium ore mined
the enrichment method and product assay
the nuclear power plant’s load factor,
burn-up, and lifetime
the greenhouse gas intensity and
electricity distribution effi ciency
of the background economy.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
In a sensitivity analysis, these parameters
were varied and the energy and greenhouse
gas intensity of nuclear energy recalculated.
This sensitivity explains the ranges of both
the energy and greenhouse gas intensity of
light water reactors and heavy water reactors.

158
Other electricity technologies
A comparable analysis has been undertaken
for a number of conventional fossil-fuel and
renewable electricity technologies. As with
the methodology for the nuclear case, a range
of literature values and current estimates have
been used to examine the performance of these
technologies in an Australian context, assuming
new capacity is installed at close to world’s
best practice. These results, together with
a summary of the nuclear energy results,
are presented in the table below. The fi gures
in parentheses represent the likely range
of values. It is clear from the results that
the fossil-fi red technologies have signifi cantly
higher energy and greenhouse intensities
than the other technologies.
Methodology and data
Hybrid input–output-based life cycle
assessment is the most appropriate method to
use for the analysis of energy and greenhouse
gas emission balance of nuclear energy.
A comprehensive life cycle assessment of
the nuclear fuel cycle in Australia requires:
cost specifi cations and engineering data
on the mining, milling, enrichment,
power generation, storage and disposal
facilities, and
data on the background economy supporting
such a nuclear industry indirectly.
•
•
The reliability of an input–output-based life
cycle assessment relies critically on the
quality of the underpinning input–output data.
In particular, given that hybrid input–output-based
life cycle assessment is an internationally
accepted standard for investigating resource
issues, it is essential that Australia possesses
a detailed and complete input–output database.
Electricity technology Energy intensity
(kWhth/kWhel)
Greenhouse gas intensity
(g CO2-e/kWhel)
Light water reactors 0.18 (0.16–0.40) 60 (10–130)
Heavy water reactors 0.20 (0.18–0.35) 65 (10–120)
Black coal (new subcritical) 2.85 (2.70–3.17) 941 (843–1171)
Black coal (supercritical) 2.62 (2.48–2.84) 863 (774–1046)
Brown coal (new subcritical) 3.46 (3.31–4.06) 1175 (1011–1506)
Natural gas (open cycle) 3.05 (2.81–3.46) 751 (627–891)
Natural gas (combined cycle) 2.35 (2.20–2.57) 577 (491–655)
Wind turbines 0.066 (0.041–0.12) 21 (13–40)
Photovoltaics 0.33 (0.16–0.67) 106 (53–217)
Hydroelectricity (run-of-river) 0.046 (0.020–0.137) 15 (6.5–44)

159
The need for further analysis
Energy and greenhouse gas emissions analyses
of energy supply systems are not a substitute
for, but a supplement to economic, social,
and other environmental considerations.
If an energy supply system can be shown to
a clear energy loser, then energy analysis is
suffi cient to argue that the program should
be abandoned. If, on the contrary, the system
appears to be an unambiguous energy producer,
the decision whether or not to proceed with
the program must also be based on other
economic, social and environmental criteria.
The project team makes the following
observations:
1. Further analyses of energy scenarios
for Australia would benefi t from an
extended multi-criteria life cycle analysis
incorporating additional social, economic
and environmental indicators spanning
the entire Triple Bottom Line (TBL).
2. Most previous life cycle studies documented
in the literature use static methods that do
not take into account temporal profi les of
energy sources and sinks occurring in the
full energy cycle, and the temporal interplay
of net supply and demand for electricity.
The current study could be enhanced by:
developing a dynamic formulation
of a time-dependent future profi le
of energy supply from a mix of sources, and
undertaking a long-term forecasting
exercise of the transition of Australia’s
electricity generating system to a new mix
of nuclear, advanced fossil, and renewable
technologies, and the economy-wide
TBL implications thereof.
3. In order to enable sound life cycle
assessments of the implications of energy
systems for our environment, our physical
resource base, and our society, it is essential
that these assessments are underpinned by
a detailed and complete information base.
Australian life cycle assessment capability
would benefi t from an enhanced data
collection effort at the national level,
in particular with view to creating a
seamlessly aligned input–output database.
•
•

160
Appendix J. Frequently asked questions
1. Are nuclear reactors safe?
The civilian nuclear industry is more than
50 years old and Chernobyl is the only accident
with serious health and safety impacts.
This accident involved a reactor design not
used outside the former Soviet system.
The current nuclear power industry, with more
than 440 reactors currently operating safely
in over 30 countries, is mature, safe and
sophisticated and compares favourably with
all other forms of electricity production on
key health and safety measures.
Of course, no industrial process is risk-free,
but modern reactor designs aim to contain
the impact of any accident and to prevent
the release of radiation.
2. Can there be another
Chernobyl-like accident?
The Chernobyl reactor lacked many of what are
now regarded as basic safety design systems.
Since that accident in 1986, the nuclear energy
industry has developed and adopted safety and
training practices that have helped achieve
thousands of reactor years of safe operations.
Some current reactor designs use passive
safety systems (where safe shutdown happens
without the need for human intervention).
Current estimates suggest a core meltdown
event would be less than one in a hundred
thousand years in a typical Australian
scenario. Well-engineered containment
systems, a standard feature of modern
reactors, further reduce the risk to the
population. The lack of injury or radiation
exposure resulting from the accident at Three
Mile Island showed that this approach works.
3. If Australia had nuclear power, would
the reactors become attractive targets
for terrorists?
To the extent that a nation’s energy system
is a possible terrorist target, then any electricity
generator shares that risk. However, the designs
of nuclear reactors are specially strengthened
against any unauthorised intervention and
those physical protection measures have
been demonstrated to be effective.
4. Will increasing Australian uranium
production and exports add to the risks
of proliferation of nuclear weapons?
Proliferation remains a serious global issue
and one where Australia has played a positive
leadership role.
Australia’s uranium supply policy, supported
by International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards inspections, ensures that Australian
obligated nuclear material does not contribute
to nuclear weapons programs. Actual cases
of proliferation have involved illegal supply
networks, secret nuclear facilities and
undeclared centrifuge enrichment plants,
not the diversion of declared materials
from safeguarded facilities such as nuclear
power plants.
As the global nuclear industry grows, any
increased role for Australia would be a positive
force for the non-proliferation regime.
5. Will the world run out of uranium?
With present levels of use and current
technologies, existing economic reserves
of uranium are suffi cient to produce nuclear
fuel for 50–100 years. Moreover, uranium is
a relatively abundant element in the earth’s
crust and further discoveries of recoverable
ore bodies are highly likely to extend this time.
The development and deployment of breeder
reactor technology in the decades ahead
could provide suffi cient fuel for potentially
thousands of years.
6. Where would nuclear reactors be located?
There are a number of criteria used for
power plant site selection: proximity to the
source of electricity demand, access to the
transmission grid, access to cooling water,
special applications (eg desalination,
mining operations), and so on. Frequently,
new plants are co-located near existing
baseload generators.
The Review did not consider possible locations
for nuclear power plants.

161
7. Can the radioactive waste be safely
managed and where would it be located?
There is an international consensus at the
scientifi c and engineering level that high-level
radioactive waste, including spent nuclear fuel
can be safely disposed of in suitable deep
geological formations.
A number of countries are developing such
facilities. The fi rst European facility is likely
to come on stream around 2020.
Australia has signifi cant areas where the
geology is favourable for long-term disposal of
high-level waste in deep repositories, enabling
its radioactivity to decay to harmless levels.
Were Australia to deploy nuclear reactors,
a high-level waste repository would not be
needed before 2050.
8. Isn’t the requirement to store spent fuel
for thousands of years an unreasonable
burden upon future generations?
An important and widely adopted principle
is that current users should pay the full costs
of the use of nuclear power and thus avoid
any intergenerational cost transfers.
The need to contain radioactive waste
for thousands of years is recognised in
regulatory standards specifying the design
life of repositories. For example, the United
States EPA recently set an exacting design
life standard for the Yucca Mountain high-level
waste repository. The lifetime costs of waste
disposal at this facility will be met from funds
being raised from current users.
Spent fuel is highly radioactive but the volume
of waste is comparatively small, and well
established processes exist for its safe handling.
After a suffi cient time in a storage or disposal
facility, radioactive materials will decay back to
background levels. Furthermore, it is reasonable
to expect that research into advanced fuel
cycles will develop technologies to render
harmless these by-products of the nuclear
fuel cycle.
9. Might Australia become a dump for
the world’s radioactive waste?
Australia’s large land area and geology combine
to suggest that it could provide highly suitable
sites for national, regional or even global
radioactive waste disposal facilities, if it
were deemed to be in the national interest.
In reality, there have been few instances of
countries accepting the waste from the nuclear
industries of other countries for disposal, and
there are no agreed mechanisms for operation
and control of multinational repositories.
There are advocates of a signifi cant
international waste facility in Australia,
citing commercial and geopolitical benefi ts.
The Review found such proposals still need
to resolve a number of questions.
10. If Australia ‘goes nuclear’ will this
increase tensions in our region, or even
start a nuclear arms race?
Typical nuclear power plants represent a low
proliferation risk. Many countries in our region
plan to deploy civil nuclear energy.
Enrichment is a more proliferation-sensitive
nuclear technology. The Review considered
that there should be no unnecessary regulatory
impediments to commercial involvement in the
nuclear fuel cycle. Any extension by Australia
into enrichment or reprocessing will require
careful explanation to many constituencies
including countries in our region.
Australia has well-accepted non-proliferation
credentials and the transparency of our
processes is excellent.
11. Will investment in nuclear power reduce
the fl ow of funds into renewables such
as solar and geothermal?
No single energy technology can meet
Australia’s forecast growth in electricity
demand and also meet environmental
objectives. A mix of technologies,
including renewables, will be required.
Even if our national energy strategy were to
include nuclear as an option, contributions from
other low-emission sources would probably still
be needed for Australia to achieve its economic,
energy, environmental and climate objectives.

162
All energy technology alternatives should have
the opportunity to compete on a level playing
fi eld and decisions should be market driven.
If a carbon price was introduced then this would
have a favourable impact on all low-emission
technologies (including renewables), and
research into energy technologies that reduce
emissions would become more attractive.
12. Can Australia achieve greenhouse
emission goals without nuclear power?
The scale of greenhouse gas emission
reductions required is so great that a
portfolio of low-emission technologies
together with widespread efforts to use
energy more productively is needed.
The availability of a wider range of technology
options can minimise the cost of achieving
greenhouse gas emission reduction goals.
Nuclear power supplies baseload electricity —
something that key renewables like wind and
solar energy cannot do economically until
practical and affordable energy storage
systems are available.
The Review concluded that the lowest cost
pathway to achieve our greenhouse emission
goals is likely to include nuclear as part of
the future generation mix in Australia.
13. What is the cost of nuclear
electricity versus Australia’s
current electricity costs?
Nuclear power is competitive with fossil
fuels in many countries already.
Based upon full costing (which includes
the cost of waste management and plant
decommissioning), nuclear electricity
generation would be about 20–50 per cent
more expensive. If, as happens in some parts
of the world, power plants using fossil fuels
are required to pay for their emissions,
this cost differential disappears.
A 20–50 per cent higher cost to generate
electricity does not translate into an equivalent
increase in price at the household or retail level.
This is because the cost of generation accounts
for only around one third of the total retail/
household electricity price. The cost of other
signifi cant elements such as transmission
and distribution would be unaffected.
14. Will household electricity costs inevitably
go up in the decades ahead?
The rebalancing of Australia’s energy platforms
to low-emission technologies is a journey of
many decades, notwithstanding the urgency
of the climate change issue.
All low-emission technologies are currently
more expensive than our low-cost coal and gas.
Various models of emission abatement have
been proposed, all of which entail some
increase in electricity costs.
Pollution problems are typically solved through
either regulation, market-based schemes and/or
technological improvements. These usually
involve some additional cost.
15. Does nuclear power require extensive
government subsidies to be cost
competitive?
Many civilian nuclear industries abroad have
started with government support either through
their original nuclear defence programs, or
subsequently via government owned utilities.
A current example is the US Government
subsidy for the fi rst six nuclear plants based
upon next generation technology.
Nuclear power is defi ned by high upfront capital
costs, long lead times, and in the case of fi rst
time deployment, a number of other risks.
Countries relying on nuclear power have
adopted a variety of approaches to deal with
these challenges.
At the end of the day, a level playing fi eld needs
to be created so that all energy technologies
can compete on an equal footing.
16. How much does nuclear power help to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions?
Life cycle studies show that nuclear power
is a low-emission technology.
Greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear power
across the full life cycle, from uranium mining
to fi nal waste disposal, are at least ten times
lower than from conventional fossil fuels, and
are similar to those from many renewables.
Under one scenario considered by the Review,
adoption of nuclear power in Australia in place
of coal could reduce national greenhouse gas
emissions by 17 per cent in 2050.

163
17. Would nuclear power be
an additional user of water?
All thermal power stations (including coal and
nuclear) require cooling either by water or air
cooling systems.
No thermal power station is 100 per cent
effi cient at converting heat to electricity and
so all require cooling to remove the excess heat.
Nuclear plants typically operate at lower steam
temperatures than coal-fi red plants. This makes
them somewhat less effi cient and so they
require more cooling. Either fresh or salt water
or air (as with a car radiator) can be used for
this purpose.
Most power stations are water-cooled and
withdraw water from a river or lake or the ocean
and discharge it a few degrees warmer after
use. Sometimes cooling towers are used and
water is evaporated into the atmosphere and
not returned to the waterway. Nuclear power
plants are frequently located on the coast and
in such cases would use sea water for cooling.
No matter which cooling system is used,
cooling water is isolated from the radioactive
core of the reactor and cooling water discharges
do not contain any radioactivity.
18. What is the timetable for building a
nuclear industry?
Most estimates suggest that were a decision
taken to introduce nuclear power in Australia,
it would be 10 to 15 years before the fi rst nuclear
power plant could be operating.
One scenario would see 25 reactors in
place by 2050 and generating about a third
of Australia’s electricity.
19. What about thorium as an alternative
nuclear fuel? Should Australia be
developing reactors based on thorium
rather than uranium?
Thorium is a naturally occurring element which
is about three times more abundant in the
earth’s crust than uranium. However, thorium is
not a fi ssile material (although like U-238 it is
fertile) and so needs to be used in conjunction
with small amounts of fi ssile material — usually
enriched uranium or plutonium. Reactors based
on thorium signal some advantages over
uranium, namely, fewer long-lived actinides and
claims for improved proliferation resistance.
(There is more information on thorium in
Appendix L.)
The disadvantage of the thorium fuel cycle
lies in the need to produce the initial fuel by
incorporating a fraction of fi ssile material such
as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, both
of which pose a proliferation risk, as well as
complicating the process of fuel fabrication.
Subsequent use of the fi ssile isotope U-233
produced from the thorium also implies the
need for a reprocessing cycle.
Another variant of the thorium based reactor is
the accelerator driven system (ADS) where the
need for fi ssile material is partly replaced by
using a spallation source of neutrons (see
Appendix L).
Currently, commercial thorium based systems
are not available. Considerable development
would be required to engineer and qualify such
systems to the standards required.
20. Do operators of nuclear power stations
have insurance coverage and what
compensation would be available in
the event of an accident?
Private insurance coverage is available for
nuclear power utilities. An international nuclear
insurance pool structure is used by insurers
to obtain large amounts of private capacity to
cover the risk of nuclear accidents. Insurance
markets and private markets in general
have substantial capacity for covering risk.
Governments might be called upon to provide
funds if the amount of damages from an
accident exceeded the covered amount,
or for exclusions that might apply to the
private coverage.
Countries that have nuclear power generally
require their nuclear operators to obtain nuclear
liability insurance. Although not a party to
the international nuclear liability regime,
the United States requires its nuclear operators
to maintain nuclear liability insurance as well
as to contribute to a mutual fund to cover
damage from a major accident. Some other
countries are members of the Paris Convention
which will require nuclear operators to obtain
minimum fi nancial coverage of €700 million,
under an Amending Protocol. Nuclear liability
is discussed further in Appendix Q.

164
K1 What is a SWU?
The enrichment process involves separating
the two isotopes U-235 and U-238 and
increasing the proportion of U-235 from
0.7 per cent to between 3 and 5 per cent
for use as fuel in nuclear power plants.
The output of an enrichment plant is expressed
as ‘kilogram separative work units’, or SWU.
It is indicative of energy used in enrichment
and measures the quantity of separative work
performed to enrich a given amount of uranium
when the feed and product quantities are
expressed in kilograms.
In the enrichment process, approximately 85 per
cent of the feed is left over as depleted uranium
or tails. The amount of U-235 left in these tails is
called the tails assay.
The U-235 tails assay can be varied. The lower
the tails assay, the greater the amount of U-235
that has been separated in the enrichment
process and the greater the amount of energy
or SWU needed. A lower tails assay means
that less natural uranium is required but more
enrichment effort, or SWU is required. A higher
tails assay requires a greater amount of natural
uranium but less SWU.
It takes approximately 8 kilograms of uranium
oxide (U3O8) and 4.8 SWU to produce one
kilogram of enriched uranium fuel (enriched
to 3.5 per cent) at 0.25 per cent tails assay.[32,52]
Table K.1 below shows the natural uranium and
enrichment effort (SWU) required to produce
one tonne of 4 per cent enriched uranium at
various tails assays.
As the tails assay decreases, separating
the two isotopes becomes more diffi cult
and requires more and more energy or SWU.
The SWU formula is complex[322] but calculators
are readily available.
The primary factors in determining the tails
assay are the relative prices paid for uranium
and enrichment. An increase in the price of
uranium will make lower tails assays attractive
as less uranium is required (unless this is offset
by an increase in the price of enrichment) and
vice versa. Given the trend of uranium and
enrichment prices in recent years, Western
enrichment companies have chosen to
re-enrich depleted uranium (or tails) resulting
from previous enrichment processes.[20]
Appendix K. Enrichment
Table K.1 Required natural uranium and enrichment effort for 1 tonne of 4 per cent enriched uranium
Tails assay
(% U-235)
Source: WNA[20]
Natural uranium
requirement (tU)
Enrichment requirement
(SWUs)
0.35 10.11 4825
0.30 9.00 5276
0.27 8.45 5595
0.25 8.13 5832
0.20 7.44 6544
0.13 6.66 8006

165
K2 Enrichment technologies
Gaseous diffusion was the fi rst enrichment
method to be commercially developed. It takes
advantage of the difference in atomic weights
between U-235 and U-238 to separate the
two isotopes.
It involves forcing UF6 gas through a series of
porous membranes. The lighter U-235 molecules
move faster and are better able to pass through
the membrane pores. The UF6 that diffuses
through the membrane is slightly enriched,
while the gas that does not pass through the
membrane is depleted in U-235. This process
is repeated many times in a series of stages
called a cascade. Around 1400 diffusion stages
is needed to produce low-enriched uranium.
Gaseous diffusion technology is energy
intensive and consumes approximately
2500 kWh/SWU. [34,41]
Gaseous centrifuge technology is classifi ed
as a second-generation enrichment technology.
It also uses the difference in atomic weights
between U-235 and U-238, however the
approach is different.
UF6 gas is fed into a vertical cylinder
which spins in a vacuum at very high speed.
The centrifugal force propels the heavier U-238
molecules to the outer edge, separating them
from the lighter U-235 molecules. The gas
enriched with the lighter U-235 fl ows towards
the top of the centrifuge and the gas with
the heavier U-238 fl ows towards the bottom.
Centrifuge stages typically consist of a large
number of centrifuges in parallel and are
arranged in a cascade, similar to gaseous
diffusion. However, the number of stages
may be only 10 to 20 instead of around 1400
for gaseous diffusion. Centrifuge technology
consumes 50 times less energy than gaseous
diffusion, at 50 kWh/SWU.[34,41]
Appendix K. Enrichment
Laser enrichment processes are a
third-generation enrichment technology
that has the potential to deliver lower
energy inputs, capital costs and tails assays.
Most laser enrichment research and
development programs have ceased and
the only remaining laser process being
developed for commercial deployment is SILEX
(Separation of Isotopes using Laser EXcitation),
an Australian innovation. In May 2006, General
Electric (GE) acquired the exclusive rights to
complete the research and development as well
as the commercial deployment of the SILEX
technology in the United States. This includes
building a demonstration facility in the US and
possibly proceeding to full scale commercial
production. If successful, a commercial scale
deployment would take around a decade.[34,47]

166
Appendix L. Nuclear Reactor Technology
Nuclear reactors exploiting the energy released
from nuclear fi ssion for production of electricity
were fi rst built in the 1950s, with a commercial-scale
plant, Calder Hall in the UK, commencing
operation in 1956. A number of early designs
(Generation I) evolved into fi ve (Generation II)
which today are the basis of most of the nuclear
power plants now operating. New reactor build
is presently a mix of Generation II and III
designs, although construction has commenced
on the fi rst Generation III+ reactor in Finland
in 2006. Generation IV designs have been chosen
and are under development, with the fi rst
expected to be deployed sometime after 2015.
This timeline is illustrated in Figure L1 below.
In section L1 below the present day reactor
designs and their evolution are discussed,
information on the current and planned
deployment for the various reactor types
is given in section L2, and current ideas for
designs of future nuclear power plants are
presented in section L3.
L1 Nuclear reactor designs
There are essentially fi ve reactor systems
that have been used for electricity production
around the world, the most common being the
pressurised water reactor, or PWR. It accounts
for about 60 per cent of the world’s current
power reactors. Each of these reactor types
is briefl y described below.
L1.1 Pressurised Water Reactor
(PWR)
PWRs use ordinary water as both coolant and
moderator in the reactor core. The water is
held at pressures around 160 bar94 to prevent
boiling and is heated to 320–330°C by the
fi ssion process as it passes through the core.
It transfers energy to a secondary loop,
producing steam, which drives the steam
turbine and, in turn, a generator to produce
electricity. The overall steam cycle (often
referred to as a Rankine cycle), is typically
33 per cent effi cient.
Figure L1 Diagram illustrating the evolution of nuclear power plant designs
GENERATION I GENERATION II GENERATION III GENERATION III + GENERATION IV
Early Prototype Reactors Commercial Power Reactors Advanced LWRs Near-Term Deployment
Shippingport
Dresden, Fermi I
Magnox
Source: USDoE/GIF[239]
LWR-PWR, BWR
CANDU
VVER/RBMK
ABWR
System 80+
AP600
EPR
94 One bar is equal to approximately one atmosphere pressure (1 bar = 0.98692 atm).
Evolutionary designs
offering improved
economics
Highly economical
Enhanced safety
Minimal waste
Proliferation
resistant
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

167
The second generation PWR that was developed
by the US fi rm Westinghouse95 in the 1960s
formed the basis for numerous international
designs. These can now be found in operation
in the United States, France, Japan, South
Korea, the Ukraine, Russia, Germany, Spain,
Belgium and 15 other countries. Following
this wave of PWRs, built mostly in the 1970s,
evolutionary third generation PWR designs
have been developed in Korea and Japan and
are scheduled for new build in those countries.
These are the Korean APR-1400[240] and the
APWR, a 1500 MWe design by Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries and Westinghouse. Mitsubishi
has submitted a pre-application for licensing
of the APWR design in the US.[241]
A new PWR design, the European Pressurised
Reactor (EPR), promoted by French nuclear
vendor Areva, incorporates improved safety
features, better fuel utilisation and other
features for improved economics that
characterise so-called Generation III+
designs.[242] The EPR has an electrical output
of 1600 MWe and an expected overall effi ciency
of 37 per cent.[230] The design was developed
jointly by the French company responsible
for the French nuclear fl eet, Framatome, and
the German reactor manufacturer, Siemens,
both of which are now incorporated into Areva.
The design was carried out in collaboration
with the French and German regulators to
ensure its licensability. The fi rst EPR is currently
under construction at Olkiluoto in Finland and
is the fi rst Western European build for more
than 15 years. France has announced that it
will construct a second EPR at Flamanville
in Normandy which is scheduled for completion
by 2012[243].
The EPR is being considered for pre-licensing
in the USA[244] and internationally under stage
two of the new, Multinational Design Evaluation
Program (MDEP). MDEP is a program that
aims to pool regulatory information in order
to facilitate standardised designs and expedite
their licensing in many countries.
In the USA, Westinghouse has developed its
own third generation pressurised water reactor,
the AP-1000. It has a simplifi ed design96, passive
safety systems97, improved fuel utilisation and
an electrical output of 1170 MWe. The design
received US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
certifi cation in January 2006. The simplifi ed
design and increased use of modular
construction means that planned build time
for an AP-1000 is now much reduced from
previous generation reactors to only fi ve
years, with only three years from fi rst
concrete on site to completion.
Figure L2 The Areva 1600MWe EPR nuclear reactor; computer generated photomontage of the Olkiluoto site
in Finland with the two existing nuclear power plants
Source: Innovarch/TVO
95 Toshiba of Japan purchased Westinghouse from BNFL for US$5.4 billion in February 2006.
96 With reduced numbers of pumps, safety values, pipes, cables and building volume relative to a standard PWR.
97 These systems rely on natural forces such as gravity, natural circulation and compressed gas for the systems that cool the reactor
core following an accident. No pumps, fans, chillers or diesel generators are used in safety systems.

168
Figure L3 The Westinghouse 1170 MWe AP-1000 nuclear reactor
Source: Westinghouse[245]
L1.2 Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
Boiling water reactors which, like PWRs,
use ordinary water as the coolant and
moderator, were developed in the United States
by General Electric in the 1950s. In a BWR,
water is constantly fed into the bottom of
the primary vessel and boils in the upper
part of the reactor core. The steam generated,
at a pressure of 70 bar and temperature around
290°C, is routed directly to the turbine. Fuel load
and effi ciency are similar to the PWR.
BWRs are the second most common nuclear
reactor in commercial operation today,
accounting for 21 per cent of nuclear reactors
installed. BWRs built to several proprietary
designs are in operation in United States,
Japan, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland,
Spain, Mexico and Taiwan. Of the twelve
reactors commissioned in Japan since the
mid-1990s, ten are of the BWR or ABWR design.
The BWR design has a number of advantages
over the PWR: it does not require separate
steam generators and has reduced reactor
vessel wall thickness and material costs
owing to its lower primary pressure. However,
the BWR primary circuit includes the turbines
and pipework and these components become
radioactive through exposure to small quantities
of activated corrosion products and dissolved
gases over the lifetime of the reactor. This
complicates plant maintenance and increases
the costs of decommissioning. Also, the
reduced power density means that for a given
power output a BWR unit is signifi cantly larger
than a similar PWR unit.
The Advanced BWR (ABWR) was developed
in the 1990s by General Electric, Hitachi98
and Toshiba99. This third generation BWR
is claimed by the manufacturers to have
improved economics, passive safety features,
better fuel utilisation and reduced waste.
98 On 13th Nov 2006, Hitachi and General Electric signed a letter of intent to form a global alliance to strengthen their joint nuclear operations.[246]
99 These three companies signed an agreement to develop, build and maintain Japan’s Generation II BWR fl eet in 1967.

169
Figure L4 The Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
Source: General Electric[247]
Japan has four 1300 MWe ABWR units in
operation. Another three units are under
construction in Taiwan and Japan, and
a further nine are planned for Japan.
General Electric later re-directed its
development program to design a larger
reactor to take advantage of economies
of scale, proven technology and ABWR
components to reduce capital costs.
The resulting 1560 MWe design, known as
the Economic Simplifi ed BWR (ESBWR),
relies upon natural circulation and passive
safety features to enhance plant performance
and simplify the design.[248] It is currently
undergoing NRC design certifi cation.[244]
As with PWR, a Generation III+ BWR has
been proposed in Europe by Areva, namely the
SWR 1000 of 1250 MWe capacity.[249] The design
is an evolution of the German Siemens-designed
BWRs that have been in operation for more
than 20 years and uses a combination of proven
components and additional passive safety
features, as well as an increase in fuel
enrichment to 5 per cent, to reduce capital
and operating costs. The design was developed
in cooperation with the French and German
regulators and so would likely be readily
licensed for construction in those countries.

170
Figure L5 AECL Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR)
Source: AECL[250]
L1.3 Pressurised Heavy Water
Reactor (PHWR/CANDU)
The Canadians developed a unique design
in the 1950s fuelled with natural uranium
and cooled and moderated by heavy water
(the CANada Deuterium100 Uranium (CANDU)
reactor). Forty one CANDU units are in
operation101 with a combined capacity of 21.4 GW,
some 9 per cent of global nuclear capacity.
The PHWR/CANDU design is similar to the
PWR in that fi ssion reactions inside the reactor
core heat coolant — heavy water in CANDU
and normal (light) water in PWR — in the
primary loop. This loop is pressurised to
prevent boiling and steam formation. As in
a PWR, steam is generated in a secondary
coolant loop at reduced pressure to drive
the turbine and generator. CANDU overall
thermal effi ciency is typically about 31 per cent.
A major difference is that, whereas the core
and moderator of a PWR are in a single large,
thick-walled steel pressure vessel, the CANDU
fuel bundles and coolant are contained in some
hundreds of pressure tubes penetrating a large
tank of heavy water moderator. Pressure tube
reactors are inherently safer in so far as they
don’t have the possibility of a single-point
failure of the large pressure vessel.
The key differentiating feature of the CANDU
design is its neutron economy and hence
its ability to use natural uranium dioxide
containing 0.7 per cent U-235 as fuel. This
provides strategic and economic advantages
because it enables the use of indigenous
uranium feed-stocks and independence from
international and potentially expensive uranium
enrichment. These advantages are partially
negated by the increased cost of the moderator
(heavy water is expensive to produce) and the
faster consumption of the non-enriched fuel.
A further advantage of the pressure-tube design
is that it can be re-fuelled while operating at full
power. In contrast, PWRs and BWRs use batch
refuelling and need to shut down for 30–60 days
every 18–24 months to replace approximately
one third of the fuel load. On-load refuelling
improves CANDU availability, capacity factor
and economic performance, although in
practice modern PWRs and BWRs have reduced
their refuelling downtime and have improved
to similar or better levels of performance.
On the other hand, the ability to remove
nuclear material readily from the reactor
gives rise to proliferation concerns102 and
has contributed to a downturn in the projected
uptake of the design.
100 Deuterium is a stable isotope of hydrogen that forms the basis of ‘heavy water’. Its mass is twice that of normal hydrogen and is present
naturally in one in every 6500 hydrogen atoms. Heavy water is used because it absorbs fewer neutrons and therefore offers better neutron
economy than light water.
101 With 18 units in Canada, 13 in India, 4 in South Korea, 2 in both China and Argentina and 1 in both Pakistan and Romania.

171
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) is
currently developing a Generation III+ Advanced
CANDU Reactor (ACR).[250] The ACR-1000 is an
evolutionary, 1200 MWe pressure tube reactor
that departs from previous CANDU designs
by using slightly-enriched fuel and light water
in the primary cooling loop. It is currently
undergoing pre-licensing in Canada. The fi rst
of its kind is expected to be operation in 2016,
although its US NRC certifi cation is currently
believed to be on hold.[244]
The CANDU design was appropriated by the
Indian nuclear industry following purchase
of an initial reactor from AECL in the late 1960s.
The initial unit of 202 MWe formed the basis of
a series of 10 power plants. The design has been
developed indigenously and two larger units of
490 MWe capacity have been built, with further
units planned to have 700 MWe capacity.
L1.4 Gas Cooled Reactors (GCR)
Gas-cooled reactors have an inherent safety
feature that the cooling properties of the gas
do not change with increasing temperature.
In water-cooled reactors great care must be
taken with design and operation to ensure that
there is no phase change, that is the cooling
water does not turn to steam in the reactor core.
This is because the moderation properties are
affected and, since steam has much poorer
cooling properties than liquid water, the reduced
cooling capability could cause the fuel to
overheat and be damaged.
In the 1950s the United Kingdom chose and
developed the carbon dioxide-cooled graphite-moderated
reactor design. They built two
generations of the GCR. The fi rst of these
designs, known as Magnox after the magnesium
alloy cladding used to contain the natural
uranium metal fuel, became the world’s fi rst
commercial nuclear power station when it
was introduced at Calder Hall in 1956.
The Magnox design was not static but was
continuously refi ned, with coolant pressures
ranging from 7–27 bar, coolant gas outlet
temperatures of 336–412°C and power outputs
from 50–590 MWe.[251] All versions used on-load
refuelling and were a proliferation concern —
earlier units were used to produce weapons-grade
plutonium in the UK. A total of 28 units at
11 sites was constructed in the UK and a further
two were built and operated in Italy and Japan.
Eight units are still operating in the UK, with
a combined capacity of 2284 MWe. The robust
nature of the design and the inherent safety
features meant that a secondary containment
vessel was not required at the time.
The Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR)
was the second generation British gas-cooled
design. It aimed for higher gas temperatures,
improved thermal effi ciencies and power
densities in order to reduce capital costs.
This in turn led to the use of oxide fuel enriched
to 2.5–3.5 per cent U-235. The carbon dioxide
coolant gas is pressurised to 40 bar and is able
to reach temperatures of up to 640°C, well in
excess of that achievable with water. As a result,
the system thermal effi ciency of 41 per cent is
considerably higher than that of conventional
light water reactors and most coal-fi red plant.
However, the physical size of an AGR is larger
than a comparable PWR or BWR reactor
because graphite is a less effi cient neutron
moderator than water. The UK has 14 operating
AGR units each with a power output in the
555–625 MWe range.
The large physical size and issues with chemical
contamination of the graphite used has resulted
in much larger volumes of intermediate and
low-level waste in decommissioning, than
would be required for modern PWR reactors.
In the mid 1980s, with the success of LWRs
elsewhere, Britain’s nuclear industry made
the decision to adopt LWR technology and
gas cooled reactors were no longer built.
102 Early removal of fuel maximises the proportion of fi ssile Pu-239 isotope that is desirable for weapons production. Longer irradiation times, such
as the 12–24 month refuelling cycles in LWRs, increase the amount of the non-fi ssile isotope Pu-240 and make weapons production more diffi cult.

172
L1.5 RBMK (Chernobyl Type Reactor)
The Soviet designed RBMK103 (high power
channel reactor) uses light water as coolant
and graphite as its moderator. The RBMK was
the reactor type used at the Chernobyl power
plant, which was the site of the world’s worst
nuclear accident in April 1986.104
The RBMK was one of two Soviet designs.
It evolved from earlier plutonium production
reactor technology in the mid 1960s and 1970s
and allowed on-load refuelling. While the
technology evolved over time, a typical reactor
uses slightly enriched uranium dioxide fuel
(1.8 per cent U-235) and generates 700–950
MWe. The design uses vertical fuel channels
through which light water is pumped at a
pressure of 68 bar. The water boils in the top
part of the channels and steam at a temperature
of 290oC is then separated in a series of steam
drums for conventional power generation.
Since the Chernobyl accident, the three
remaining Chernobyl reactors have been
shut down, and the one Lithuanian and eleven
remaining Russian RBMK units have been
extensively retrofi tted with safety upgrades.
The Lithuanian reactor will shut down as
a condition of Lithuania’s entry into the EU,
but the Russian units are being considered
for life extension and, in some cases,
power upgrades.[252]
L1.6 VVER
The VVER is the Russian version of the
Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR). The design,
which uses light water as coolant and moderator,
operates with enriched uranium dioxide fuel and
at pressures of 150 bar. The Soviets have three
evolutions of this reactor, being the early 6 loop
VVER-440 Model V230 and VVER Model V213
designs, each of 440 MWe capacity and the
later 4 loop VVER-1000 of 950 MWe capacity.
More than fi fty units operate in the former
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and, most recently,
China. Units are under construction in Russia,
China, India, and Iran.
Since the Chernobyl accident, the IAEA
has made considerable efforts to enhance
regulatory control and nuclear reactor safety
in Eastern Europe and Russia. The fi rst two
VVER designs were not constructed with a
concrete containment structure or space for
regular safety inspections. The third generation
VVER-1000, developed between 1975 and 1985,
adopted new Soviet nuclear standards and
modern international safety practices.
The next generation will be the VVER-1500,
with a 60 year design lifetime and improved
fuel burn-up and economics. It has been
announced[253] that six VVER-1500 nuclear
power stations will be constructed at a cost
of US$10 billion at the Leningrad power
plant to replace the existing RBMK units.
Construction of the fi rst two of these units
is scheduled to begin in late 2007 or early 2008.
103 This design is also commonly classifi ed as a Light Water Graphite Reactor (LWGR).
104 The Chernobyl accident is discussed in Appendix N.

173
L2 Current and
Planned Deployment
L2.1 Existing nuclear power plants
Nuclear power technology is mature and
internationally-proven. The International
Energy Agency[3] records that in 2006
over 440 nuclear power plants (NPPs) are
operating in 31 countries. Nuclear power
plants provide over 368 GW105 of generating
capacity, compared with Australia’s total
installed capacity of 48 GW.
In 2005 NPPs supplied 2742 TWh106, comprising
15 per cent of the world’s total electricity
production. This compares with Australia’s
total production of 252 TWh total electricity
in 2004–5.[55]
The numbers of reactors currently operating
in each country, their capacities, and electrical
output in 2005 are given in Table L1 overleaf.
Data from Table L1 are also plotted in Figure L6
to highlight the number of countries where
nuclear power plants provide a signifi cant part
of the electricity supply.
L2.2 Planned nuclear power plants
Many countries stopped building nuclear
power plants after the Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl nuclear accidents (in 1979 and
1986 respectively). Several European countries
(Italy, Sweden, Austria) held referendums and
decided to close nuclear power plants. In other
countries (US, UK, Canada) programs suffered
a drop in commercial investment and no new
plants were started through the 1980s and 1990s
in most countries. The exception was in Asia
where a steady build of new plants was
maintained in Korea, Japan and China.
The situation in 2006 has changed, with
renewed interest in many countries in building
new nuclear power plants. The numbers
of plants that are planned and under
construction are given in Table L1. Currently
there are 28 power plant reactors in 13 countries
under construction worldwide and a further
62 reactors in 15 countries planned (that is
approvals and funding have been announced).
The designs for the planned build are a mixture
of Generation II, III and III+, the choice often
depending on in-country experience, with
several countries (India, China, Russia)
preferring to stay with older, familiar and
proven designs. Table L2.2 indicates the
status of Generation III and III+ designs
which are the most likely to be offered to
countries contemplating new nuclear build.
Of the 15 countries with plans for new nuclear
plants, three (Iran, North Korea and Turkey)
currently have no plants, although Iran has
one under construction. All three countries do,
however, operate research reactors.
In the US the improved performance of existing
plants and concerns about energy security and
greenhouse emissions has led to a resurgent
interest. This has included government
subsidies for the fi rst six new power plants.
Another factor is a new scheme for staged
decision making that minimises fi nancial risk
to investors.[254] The sole US reactor ‘under
construction’ in Table L1 is the mothballed
Browns Ferry 1, which is scheduled for restart
in 2007. Expressions of interest for construction
and operating licences have been received by
the US regulator for more than 25 new plants.
105 1 GW (gigawatt), or 1000 MW (megawatts), is the capacity of a typical modern NPP.
106 1 TWh (terawatt hour) = 1000 GWh (gigawatt hours) = the output from a 1 GW power plant operating at full power for 1000 hours.

174
Table L1 Current and planned nuclear power plants worldwide
Country
No. of
reactors
Installed
capacity
(GW)
Gross nuclear
electricity
generation
(TWh)
Share of
nuclear in
total
generation
(%)
Reactors
building
(Sep 06)*
Reactors
planned
(Sep 06)*
No. (GW) No. (GW)
OECD 351 308.4 2333 22.4 7 7.44 23 29.55
Belgium 7 5.8 48 55.2
Canada 18 12.6 92 14.6 2 1.54 2 2.0
Czech
Republic 6 3.5 25 29.9
Finland 4 2.7 23 33.0 1 1.6
France 59 63.1 452 78.5 1 1.63
Germany 17 20.3 163 26.3
Hungary 4 1.8 14 38.7
Japan 56 47.8 293 27.7 2 2.285 11 14.95
South Korea 20 16.8 147 37.4 1 0.95 7 8.25
Mexico 2 1.3 11 4.6
Netherlands 1 0.5 4 4.0
Slovakia 6 2.4 18 57.5
Spain 9 7.6 58 19.5
Sweden 10 8.9 72 45.4
Switzerland 5 3.2 23 39.1
United
Kingdom 23 11.9 82 20.4
United States 104 98.3 809 18.9 1 1.065 2 2.72
Transition
Economies 54 40.5 274 17.0 4 3.30 12 13.4
Armenia 1 0.4 3 42.7
Bulgaria 4 2.7 17 39.2 2 1.9
Lithuania 1 1.2 10 68.2
Romania 1 0.7 5 8.6 1 0.65
Russia 31 21.7 149 15.7 3 2.65 8 9.6
Slovenia 1 0.7 6 39.6
Ukraine 15 13.1 84 45.1 2 1.9
Developing
Countries 38 19 135 2.1 17 11.75 27 25.19
Argentina 2 0.9 6 6.3 1 0.69
Brazil 2 1.9 10 2.2 1 1.25
China 9 6.0 50 2.0 5 4.17 13 12.92
India 15 3.0 16 2.2 7 3.08 4 2.8
Pakistan 2 0.4 2 2.8 1 0.3 2 0.6
South Africa 2 1.8 12 5.0 1 0.17
Other 6 4.9 38 16.9 3 3.51 6 7.45
World 443 367.8 2742 14.9 28 22.5 62 68.1
Source: IEA[3]; * WNA[23]

175
Figure L6 Plot of data from Table L1 showing share of nuclear-generated electricity
Percentage of electricity from nuclear power
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
SWEDEN 45%
JAPAN 28%
FRANCE 78%
USA 19%
RUSSIA 16%
SWITZERLAND 39%
France
Lithuania
Slovakia
Belgium
Sweden
Ukraine
Armenia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Switzerland
Hungary
South Korea
Finland
Czech Republic
Japan
Germany
OECD
United Kingdom
Spain
United States
Transition Economies
Other
Russia
World
Canada
Romania
Argentina
South Africa
Mexico
Netherlands
Pakistan
Brazil
India
Developing Countries
China
GERMANY 26%

176
Table L2 Status of new (Generation III and III+) nuclear power reactor designs at end–2006
Reactor Design Output MWe Type Country
of Origin
Lead Developer Deployment
Status
ABWR 1350 BWR US–Japan GE, Toshiba,
Hitachi
Operating in
Japan. Under
construction in
Japan and
Taiwan. Licensed
in USA
CANDU-6 650 PHWR Canada AECL Operating in
Canada, Korea,
China, Romania
VVER-1000 950 PWR Russia Atomstroyexport Operating in
Russia. Under
construction in
Russia, China,
India, Iran
AHWR 490 PHWR India Nuclear Power
Corporation of
India
Two units
operating at
Tarapur. Further
units planned
APR-1400 1400 PWR Korea–USA Kepco Planned for
Shin-Kori, Korea
APWR 1500 PWR Japan Westinghouse
and Mitsubishi
Planned for
Tsuruga, Japan.
Pre-application
for licensing
submitted in
USA
EPR 1650 PWR France, Germany Areva Under
construction in
Finland. Planned
in France
AP1000 1100 PWR USA Westinghouse Licensed in USA
SWR 1250 BWR France, Germany Areva Offered in
Finland
ESBWR 1500 BWR USA GE Submitted for
licensing in USA
ACR 1100 PHWR Canada AECL Under
development
PBMR 165 VHTR South Africa PBMR Ltd Under
development
GT-MHR 280 VHTR USA General Atomics Under
development

177
L3 Technology Development
L3.1 Mixed Oxide Fuel
Closing of the nuclear fuel cycle through
the reprocessing of spent fuel is aimed at
both utilising the energy of the fi ssile material
produced in reactors and minimising the
volume of waste. Such fi ssile material can be
produced in both thermal reactors — the current
deployment of NPPs — and in fast reactors,
which will be discussed later. Pu-239, for
example, is produced in signifi cant quantities
in uranium-fuelled reactors through a two-stage
process beginning with neutron capture on the
more abundant isotope U-238. In principle, the
fi ssile isotope U-233 can be produced in an
analogous process beginning with neutron
capture on Th-232, the naturally occurring
isotope (100 per cent) of thorium, as will
also be discussed below.
Mixed oxide fuel (MOX) is produced from
a mixture of 5–9 per cent plutonium oxide
(comprised predominantly of the isotope
Pu-239) obtained through re-processing of
spent fuel and depleted uranium obtained from
enrichment tails (containing about 0.2 per cent
U-235). The proportions required to produce fuel
that is approximately equivalent to the LEU used
in reactors varies according to the amounts of
Pu-239 (the fi ssile component) and Pu-240 in
the spent fuel. Depending on its history in a
reactor, the Pu-239 content is usually in the
range of 60–70 per cent.
About 20 of the reactors in France use MOX fuel,
usually with about one-third of the fuel rods
loaded containing MOX, the other two-thirds
being standard LEU.[255] This is approximately
the limit that can be accommodated because
of differences in the nuclear properties of
the fi ssile components Pu-239 and U-235.
These differences are manifested in differences
in the neutron energy spectrum, delayed
neutron components and fi ssion product
distributions, all of which affect the reactivity
and reactor operation. The higher energy
neutron spectrum, for example, requires the use
of higher initial levels of the ‘poisons’ such as
soluble boron that are used to control reactivity.
Specifi c reactor modifi cations are necessary for
a LWR to operate with a full load of MOX fuel,
some of which have been incorporated in
recent designs — both the EPR and AP 1000
can run with a full MOX fuel load.
The design of the fuel rods themselves is
adjusted to allow for more free internal
volume to accommodate gaseous fi ssion
products. Also, the presence of contaminants
in the reprocessed fuel (heavy elements such
as Am-241) results in higher radioactivity.
This necessitates additional procedures in
the production, handling and transport of
MOX fuel and fuel rods.
MOX fuel is used extensively in Europe and
there are plans to use it in Japan and Russia.
It currently comprises 2 per cent of new fuel
used and is projected to rise to 5 per cent
by 2010.[256]
L3.2 Thorium
As stated above, thorium or more precisely
the isotope Th-232 is a ‘fertile’ material
analogous to U-238. Since it does not have
a fi ssile component, thorium cannot be used
directly as a substitute for uranium, but it
can be used indirectly, through breeding, as
a source of the fi ssile isotope U-233. Initially
therefore, exploitation of thorium requires
its use in conjunction with a fi ssile material
(U-235 or Pu-239), but then it could itself provide
a source of U-233 to sustain the process,
possibly in-situ in a reactor but more likely
through reprocessing. This increases the
cost and complexity of the nuclear fuel cycle
compared with the current U-235-based
‘once-through’ fuel cycle that is favoured
in most countries.
Thorium’s potential as an (indirect) alternative
to uranium was recognised from the earliest
days of nuclear power and there has been
a large amount of research into using it as
a component of fuel.[257] It has a long history
of experimental use in reactors, for example
the German THTR and the US Fort St Vrain
high temperature reactors, which combined
HEU with thorium, ran as commercial electricity
producing plants for many years in the 1980s.
Current research is aimed at enabling use
of thorium in conventional power reactors
in Russia (VVER) and India (PHWR).[257]

178
Although yet to be exploited, one advantage of
the U-233 produced from thorium that attracted
early attention is that it is the only fi ssile isotope
available for reactors that, in principle, could
form the basis of a thermal breeder reactor,
as opposed to a fast breeder. This is because
the average number of neutrons emitted in
the fi ssion of U-233 by thermal neutrons is
signifi cantly higher than that emitted by
the thermal fi ssion of U-235 or Pu-239.
With appropriate care in design, the neutron
budget in a U-233 fuelled thermal reactor could
allow breeding, that is to have at least two
neutrons available after losses, one to continue
the fi ssion process and at least one to produce
more fi ssionable material than is consumed.
Thorium used to produce U-233 has both
advantages and disadvantages compared
with uranium. The principal ones are:
The use of U-233 together with thorium
produces much less plutonium and
other long-lived actinides than the U-235
based cycle
Thorium is more abundant than uranium,[27]
although it should be borne in mind that
if the U-238 in depleted uranium were also
used as a breeding source, then availability
of fuel would not be an issue
The proliferation sensitivity of U-233 as a
weapons material is lessened to a signifi cant
extent by the higher levels of radioactivity
from normal contaminants
The presence of radioactive co-products
also makes recovery and fabrication of
the fi ssile U-233 as fuel more diffi cult
than plutonium
Thorium is usually irradiated as the oxide
or carbide, both of which are diffi cult to
dissolve or melt in the reprocessing stage
to extract U-233. This would not be an issue
however, in reactors using molten salts.
•
•
•
•
•
L3.3 Fast Reactors
As implied by the name, unlike thermal reactors
in which moderators are used to slow down the
neutrons produced in fi ssion, fast reactors
exploit the high energy neutrons directly.
They are usually designed to activate ‘fertile’
material to create additional fi ssile material,
as well as burning the fi ssile fuel through fast
fi ssion. They can also be confi gured to ‘burn’
long-lived actinides produced as waste from
conventional power reactors. A reactor is
called a ‘breeder’ when it produces more
fi ssile material than it consumes and a ‘burner’
when it is a net consumer of fi ssile material.
Fast breeder reactors (FBRs) were developed to
improve the long term viability of nuclear power,
by producing fi ssile Pu-239 from the abundant
uranium isotope U-238. As indicated above,
an analogous process could be the production
of U-233 from Th-232. The fast neutron reactor
forms the basis of at least three of the
Generation IV reactor systems and may also
play an important role in exploiting depleted
uranium and the management of actinide waste.
Fast breeder reactors have played varying roles
in the nuclear programs of several countries
including US, Russia, France, and India, with
some 29 having been constructed and operated.
They remain of particular strategic importance
to the energy aspirations of Japan and India.
India, for example, is currently constructing
a 500 MWe FBR with a view to using indigenous
thorium as a source of fuel.
Fast neutron reactors have not so far been
commercially competitive with thermal reactors
and thus have not been deployed widely for
electricity generation. Nor has their breeding
capability been exploited because of the
continuing availability of relatively cheap
uranium for commercial power reactor fuel.
To date, four types of breeder reactors have
been proposed or developed; the liquid metal
cooled fast breeder reactor (LMFBR), the gas
cooled fast breeder reactor (GCFR), the molten
salt breeder reactor (MSBR) and the light-water
breeder reactor (LWBR). All large-scale FBRs to
date have been liquid metal (sodium) cooled.

179
The sodium cooled reactor design which was
the subject of early development typically
contains a core comprising several thousand
stainless steel tubes containing 15–20 per cent
plutonium-239 mixed oxide fuel. This is
surrounded by a blanket of rods containing
uranium oxide or thorium where suffi cient
new nuclear fuel is bred to supply another
nuclear reactor. The period taken to breed
the new fuel is known as a doubling time and
can vary from 1–2 decades depending on the
design. The entire assembly is cooled by molten
sodium which transports heat from the system
at temperatures around 550oC. A secondary
sodium loop is used to produce steam for
electricity generation. This reactor family
includes the French Phénix, the Russian BN-600
and the Japanese Monju reactors. The fi rst two
have provided power to the grid since the early
1980s, while the latter has been shut down since
a sodium leak in 1997.
More recently, fast burner reactors have been
proposed as part of the United States-proposed
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).
It envisages a leasing scheme where fuel
supplier nations that hold enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities would provide enriched
uranium to conventional light water nuclear
power plants located in user nations. Used fuel
would be returned to a fuel supplier nation,
reprocessed using a technology that does
not result in separated plutonium (to reduce
proliferation risks) and subsequently burned.
L3.4 High Temperature Gas Cooled
Reactors (HTGR)
Two Generation III+ reactor systems under
development are based on helium cooling and
a Brayton cycle turbine using helium — the
Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the
Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR).
These thermal designs are very similar in
concept. They are helium cooled, graphite
moderated, small- to mid-sized modules, with
greatly improved thermal effi ciencies (around
45 per cent), and higher fuel burn-up rates.
Design operating temperatures and pressures
are around 900°C and 75 bar respectively.
In contrast to light water reactors where the
uranium oxide fuel is in the form of pellets
enclosed in a metal tube, HTGR fuel is in the
form of sub-millimetre diameter spheres.107
These tiny fuel particles have a core of enriched
uranium fuel (or, for example, mixtures of
uranium, plutonium and thorium) coated
with layers of temperature resistant ceramic.
Thousands of the fuel particles are pressed
together and coated with an external layer
of graphite. In PBMR the pressings are in the
shape of tennis-ball size spheres — the ‘pebbles’
in the reactor name — while GT-MHR fuel uses
fi nger-sized cylindrical rods. The fuel is claimed
to have excellent proliferation resistance and is
designed to contain any fi ssion products within
the fuel particles. Its stability means that the fuel
can be taken to much higher burnups than
conventional LWR fuel without releasing fi ssion
products and it is easier to store and transport.
Figure L7 Diagram showing structure of fuel pebbles and constituent fuel kernels
Source: MIT[258]
Fuel kernels
embedded
in graphite
Graphite shell
Uranium dioxide fuel
core (0.5 millimetres)
Porous carbon layer
Silicon carbide barrier
Pyrolitic carbon layers
107 HTGR technology was developed in German (AVR, Oberhausen, THTR) and US (Peach Bottom and Fort St Vrain) reactor programs in the 1970s.
Today, research reactors based on the pebble bed and prismatic fuel designs exist in China (HRT-10, 10MWt, INET/Tsinghua University) and Japan
(HTTR, 30MWt, JAERI).

180
The high temperature characteristics of
HTGRs have a signifi cant effect on the nature
of the nuclear fi ssion reactions and products.
They allow a deep burn of the fuel and heavy
fi ssion products, resulting in less long-lived
waste. They could be used to burn the plutonium
and other actinides contained in LWR spent fuel,
although this would still require a reprocessing
step to convert the used LWR fuel into the
coated fuel particles used in HTGRs.
The PBMR is under development as a
commercial reactor by PBMR Ltd. PBMR Ltd.
is part-owned by the South African government,
South African electric utility, Eskom, and
supported by the Japanese companies Toshiba
(owner of PBMR partner, Westinghouse, since
May 2006) and Mitsubishi. The reactor design
comprises a core containing some 450,000
tennis ball-sized pebbles and a closed-cycle
recuperated helium gas turbine. It is planned
to have a thermal output of around 400 MW
and an electrical output of 165 MWe.
Work on the design is progressing[259] and
a demonstration plant is planned to go on line
at Koeberg near Cape Town by 2011. This is
planned to be followed by commercial offerings
of plants in 2, 4 or 8 modules which could be
commissioned by 2014.
The GT-MHR concept is under development as
a combined private/public sector project. It is
similar to the PBMR, and has a thermal output
of 600 MW, electrical output of 280 MWe and
comparable effi ciency. The design is advanced
by an international consortium led by the United
States’ General Atomics Corporation and
Russia’s Experimental Design Bureau of
Machine Building (OKBM).[260]
Two features differentiate the GT-MHR from
the PBMR. Firstly, the GT-MHR fuel particles
are formed into fuel rods and inserted into
prismatic graphite fuel elements. A typical
design includes over 100 fuel elements with
channels for both the helium coolant and
neutron control rods. Secondly the GT-MHR
uses uranium oxycarbide-based fuel which has
no history in operating reactors, in contrast to
PBMR’s uranium oxide based fuel. The decision
to pursue this new reactor fuel, with intended
higher operating and degradation resistance
temperatures, is believed to be related to the
strong support for the Very High Temperature
Reactor (VHTR) being the Generation IV
successor to the GT-MHR.108
Following international agreement between the
United States and Russia, the fi rst GT-MHR was
scheduled to come on-line at Tomsk in Russia
in approximately 2010. This reactor is planned to
be fuelled by plutonium from decommissioned
weapons. The schedule was set in 2002[260]
but the proposed timeframe for commercial
deployment of around 2015 appears unlikely.
The PBMR and the GT-MHR with their small
capacity (160–300 MWe) and modular design
are believed by many to be well-suited to the
needs of small and/or remote electrical markets,
where the capital cost or technical challenge of
establishing large monolithic reactors has been
prohibitive in the past. This is typical of many
markets in Australia, Africa and parts of South-
East Asia.
As well as their potential for power generation,
PBMR, GT-MHR and other high temperature
reactors such as the European Raphael
project,[262] are being developed with a view
to their supplying process heat. They have
the potential to deliver high grade process
heat (900°C) normally provided by burning fossil
fuels (usually gas) to address the wider energy
issues of transportation fuels and industrial
heat applications for both domestic and
industrial users. Possible applications include
steam reforming of methane to produce syngas
(feedstock for chemical production), hydrogen
production for chemical production or future
transport use, recovery of oil from tar sands
and liquefaction of coal (via the Fischer-Tropsch
process).[258,259] The United States Next
Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is being
developed specifi cally with hydrogen production
in mind — see Figure L8. In the Australian
context, process heat from these reactors could
be used to supply the steam, electricity and
hydrogen for liquefaction of coal to produce
transportation fuels.[263]
108 In October 2006, the US Department of Energy awarded a $8 million USD contract to a consortium led by Westinghouse for a pre-conceptual design
of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP). PBMR, AREVA and General Atomics as part of that consortium will perform complementary
engineering studies in the areas of technology, cost, design and plant confi guration.[261]

181
Figure L8 Artists impression of the US Next Generation Nuclear Plant
A strong case has been made by proponents
of HTGR designs that the inherent safety of
the system, including the absence of phase
changes in the cooling gas, the low levels of
excess reactivity and the proven resistance to
damage of the fuel at very high temperatures,
obviates the need for either an additional
containment vessel or for signifi cant emergency
planning zones external to the reactor site.
These will be issues for regulatory agencies
during the design approval and licensing
stages of development.
L3.5 Generation IV Reactors
The Generation IV International Forum (GIF)
was created to lead the collaborative efforts
of leading nuclear technology nations in
developing next generation nuclear energy
systems. GIF members are Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Euratom, France, Japan, South Korea,
South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States. China and Russia joined
the GIF in November 2006. The GIF program has
eight technical goals:
Provide sustainable energy generation that
meets clean air objectives and promotes
long term availability of systems and
effective fuel utilisation for worldwide
energy production
•
Minimise and manage nuclear waste,
notably reducing the long term stewardship
burden in the future and thereby improving
protection for the public health and
the environment
Increase assurances against diversion
of theft of weapons-usable material
Ensure high safety and reliability
Design systems with very low likelihood
and degree of reactor core damage
Create reactor designs that eliminate
the need for offsite emergency response
Ensure that systems have a clear life cycle
cost advantage over other energy sources
Create systems that have a level of
fi nancial risk that is comparable to
other energy projects.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
In December 2002 the six concepts were
announced that represented the Forum’s best
judgment as to which reactor types held the
greatest promise for the future and the R&D
that would be necessary to advance them to
commercial deployment. The six are listed
in Table L3.
Source: USDoE/GIF[239]

182
Table L3 Generation IV reactor concepts being studied by the GIF[239]
Reactor type Coolant Temp
(oC)
Pressure Waste
recycling
Output Research needs Earliest
delivery
Gas-cooled
fast reactor
(GFR)
Helium 850 High Yes
Electricity
and
hydrogen
Irradiation-resistant
materials, helium
turbine, new fuels, core
design, waste recycling
2025
Lead-cooled
fast reactor
(LFR)
Lead-bismuth
550–800 Low Yes
Electricity
and
hydrogen
Heat-resistant
materials, fuels, lead
handling, waste
recycling
2025
Molten salt
reactor (MSR)
Fluoride
salts
700–800 Low Yes
Electricity
and
hydrogen
Molten salt chemistry
and handling, heat-and
corrosion-resistant
materials,
reprocessing cycle
2025
Sodium-cooled
fast reactor
(SFR)
Sodium 550 Low Yes Electricity
Safety, cost reduction,
hot-fuel fabrication,
reprocessing cycle
2015
Supercritical-water-
cooled
reactor
(SCWR)
Water 510–550 Very high Optional Electricity
Corrosion and stress
corrosion cracking,
water chemistry, ultra
strong non-brittle
materials, safety
2025
Very-high-temperature
reactor (VHTR)
Helium 1000 High
No –
waste
goes
directly to
repository
Electricity
and
hydrogen
Heat-resistant fuels
and materials,
temperature control in
the event of an
accident, high fuel
burn-ups
2020

183
L3.6 Accelerator-driven systems
Accelerator-driven systems (ADSs) are an
alternative concept to fast neutron reactors
for production of electricity, burning of actinide
wastes from conventional fi ssion reactors,
and breeding of fi ssile material from fertile
thorium or depleted uranium[264,265]. Whereas
a conventional fi ssion reactor relies on having
a surplus of neutrons to keep it going (a U-235
fi ssion requires one neutron input and produces
on average 2.43 neutrons, some of which are
absorbed in the reactor material), an ADS uses
a high energy accelerator to generate suffi cient
neutrons to sustain the nuclear reaction in
an otherwise subcritical core. This means that
when the accelerator is switched off, the chain
reaction stops. This confers obvious safety
benefi ts on ADSs, compared with the critical
cores and high power densities of fast reactors.
The concept of an ADS has been around
since the late 1980s but was given a higher
profi le by the support of the Nobel physics
laureate, Carlo Rubbia, in 1993. Rubbia coined
the term ‘energy amplifi er’ for his proposal.
Subsequently, it has been the subject
of relatively low-level research in many
countries.[266] The research has largely
focused on collecting relevant physics
data and defi ning materials requirements.
Accelerator-driven systems consist of three
main units — the accelerator, target/blanket
and separation units. The accelerator generates
high energy (around 1 GeV) charged particles
(usually protons) which strike a heavy material
target. This bombardment leads to the
production of a very intense shower of neutrons
by a process called spallation. The neutrons
enter a sub-critical core (often called a blanket)
where they can be multiplied by fi ssion of
uranium or plutonium in the core. In the core
and blanket, the transmutation (‘burning’)
of actinides and fi ssion products takes place.
After a time, already transmuted nuclei have
to be removed from the fuel in order to avoid
their undesirable activation. In a breeder
system, these could include fi ssile Pu-239
or U-233 bred from U-238 or thorium (Th-232)
respectively. A separation unit is required to
separate fi ssile materials, long-lived fi ssion
products and actinides so that they can be
returned to the blanket. Short-lived and stable
isotopes, as well as fi ssion poisons, are removed
and processed for storage. As with the fast
burner reactors and reprocessing cycles
proposed in recent times under the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), ADSs
could reduce by several orders of magnitude
the storage time needed for the geological
disposal of nuclear wastes.
Conceptual reactor designs are similar
to current reactor designs, with the great
difference that the core is subcritical and
there must be provision for a powerful
accelerator and a feed to an associated neutron
generator within the core, as shown in Figure L9.
Proposals for integrated ADSs argue that such
systems are feasible and could be economic
by combining actinide burning with power
production.[264,267]
A challenge for the ADS concept, however,
is that the power of an accelerator required
for a 1 GW power plant is comparable with
or larger than the most powerful currently
available and both the accelerator and spallation
target technology would require considerable
development. Possible metallurgical diffi culties
with the molten lead-bismuth cooling and target
material and long-term corrosion also need to
be addressed, as does the need for detailed
studies of the nuclear cross-sections for the
wide range of reactions that might occur, and
which could affect the dynamic performance
of the system.
A further issue is that the use of ADSs still
requires separation and reprocessing facilities.
It would seem unlikely that they would be
deployed as stand-alone systems but rather
as part of a nuclear-fuel cycle involving other
reactor technologies.

184
Figure L9 Conceptual design[264] for an accelerator-driven system (ADS) equipped with a long-lived fi ssion
product transmutation (incineration) facility. M-material in the diagram refers to the environment
that acts as neutron and heat storage medium as well as neutron moderator
L3.7 Nuclear Fusion
In contrast to the fi ssion of heavy nuclei,
fusion is a process in which light elements,
such as hydrogen and its isotopes, collide
and combine with each other (ie, fuse) to form
heavier elements and, in the process, release
large amounts of energy. Fusion is the dominant
reaction that powers the sun.
Nuclear fusion offers two major potential
benefi ts relative to other sources of electricity.
First, the reactor fuel (deuterium) can be
obtained easily and economically from the
ocean, providing a virtually unlimited fuel
source, while another fuel component, lithium,
is a common element. Secondly, fusion would
produce no greenhouse gases in operation,
and no long-lived radioactive waste products.
In common with conventional nuclear fi ssion,
it would have a very high power density relative
to renewables.
The most signifi cant international collaborative
fusion research activity currently is the
International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER). ITER partners are the European
Union, Japan and the Russian Federation,
the United States, China, the Republic of Korea
and India. The ITER project is estimated to cost
of the order of US $10 billion over 10 years.[268]
ITER’s aim is to develop the technologies
essential to proceed towards a functioning
fusion reactor, including components capable
of withstanding high neutron and heat fl ux
environments. A sustaining fusion reaction
would require temperatures of several million
degrees, higher than those that prevail in
the sun.
Subject to achieving these challenging
objectives, the next step is construction
of a demonstration fusion power plant
around 2030.[269] The ITER device, shown below,
is to be constructed at Cadarache in the south
of France. The earliest time for the construction
of a commercial fusion reactor is still widely
regarded as being around 2050.

185
Figure L10 The ITER nuclear fusion device
Source: ITER

186
Appendix M. Biological consequences
M1 Summary
This Appendix summarises the core concepts
of radiation and radiation protection.
The four main types of ionising radiation are
alpha, beta, gamma and neutron radiations.
The two main units used are the becquerel (Bq)
for the amount of radioactive substance
(radioactivity), and the sievert (Sv) for the dose
of radiation received by a person. One sievert
is a very large dose and doses in this report are
generally in millisieverts (mSv): one thousandth
of a sievert, and in some cases microsieverts
(μSv): one millionth of a sievert.
Radiation exposure can arise from sources
outside the body (external exposure) or from
radioactive material inside the body (internal
exposure). Radioactive material can enter
the body (exposure pathway) by inhalation
or ingestion.
Radiation exposure can be reduced in a number
of ways. For external exposure, these include:
staying further from the source, spending less
time in the region of the source, or using
radiation shields. For internal exposure, the
main method to reduce exposure is to reduce
the intake of radioactive material, for instance,
the amount of radioactive dust inhaled, or
accidentally ingested via food or drink. This
can be done by reducing the amount of dust
generated, reducing the time spent in dusty
areas, or by using respiratory protection, such
as dust masks and respirators. To minimise the
chance of ingestion washing hands and utensils
prior to eating or drinking is effective.
The health effects of radiation are well known.
Very high doses from external radiation can
cause radiation burns, radiation sickness or
death within a short time (eg within a month).
At lower doses, radiation exposure can result
in an increased risk of developing cancer.
M2 Ionising radiation
Ionising radiation is defi ned as radiation that
has enough energy to ionise matter through
which it passes. Ionisation is the process of
adding or removing one or more electrons from
a neutral atom. The resultant ion can be
positively or negatively charged, and radiation
that has enough energy to cause ionisation is
called ‘ionising radiation’. The health effects
that arise from exposure to ionising radiation
are understood to derive from ionisation taking
place in living cells. This Appendix describes
the main types of ionising radiation, ways in
which radiation exposure can occur, the effects
of ionising radiation, and the ways in which
people can be protected from the potentially
adverse effects of exposure to ionising radiation.
M2.1 Types of ionising radiation
Ionising radiation is of two types: subatomic
particles and electromagnetic radiation.
The subatomic particles of interest in this report
are alpha particles, beta particles and neutrons:
Alpha particles — These consist of two
protons and two neutrons (ie the nucleus
of a helium atom). Alpha particles are
relatively heavy and slow moving, and,
because they lose their energy very quickly,
they have very short ranges — around 3 cm
of air. They cannot penetrate a sheet of
paper, and cannot, therefore, penetrate
the outer dead layers of the skin.
Beta particles — These are high-energy
electrons. They can be moderately
penetrating, up to 1 m or so of air,
or a few millimetres of aluminium,
and a short distance into tissue.
Neutrons — High-energy neutrons can
penetrate several centimetres in concrete.
Neutrons, unlike alpha and beta particles,
can make objects that they irradiate
radioactive. They, like gamma and X-rays,
can pass right through the body.
•
•
•
of radiation

187
Appendix M. Biological consequences of radiation
Types of electromagnetic radiation include
X-rays and gamma rays:
X-rays and gamma rays arise from
different physical phenomena. X-rays come
from atomic processes while gamma-rays
come from nuclear processes, but both
are electromagnetic radiation and are
indistinguishable in their effects.
High energy X-rays and gamma-rays are
strongly penetrating and may penetrate
several centimetres of steel or pass right
through the human body, hence their use
in diagnostic and therapeutic radiology.
M2.2 Quantities and units used
for radiation measurement
The major quantities used in the measurement
of radiation, the measurement of radioactivity
and the measurement of radiation dose and
its radiation effect are:
The radioactivity is the ‘amount’ or quantity
of a radioactive substance, measured by
the rate at which it is undergoing radioactive
decay. The unit is the becquerel (Bq).
One becquerel is defi ned as one radioactive
disintegration per second.
•
•
Figure M1 Penetration of different forms of ionising radiation
Diagram courtesy of ARPANSA
•
The gray (Gy) is the unit of ‘absorbed dose’;
the amount of energy deposited in the form
of ionisation in matter. It is equal to one
joule of energy deposited per kg of matter.
The gray is a purely physical measure of
radiation; it takes no account of biological
effects that the radiation might produce
in living matter.
•
The radiation dose is the amount of radiation
being absorbed by an object. The unit mostly
used in this document is the sievert (Sv).
It is strictly a measure of what is called
the effective dose to a person. The sievert
is a complex unit that allows for the energy
deposited in the organs being irradiated,
the radiosensitivity of the exposed organ and
the radiological effectiveness of the radiation
involved (alpha, beta and gamma).
M2.3 Types of radiation exposure
There are two general ways in which a person
can be exposed to radiation — externally
and internally.
External exposure
External exposure comes from radiation
sources outside the body, such as X-ray
machines or from standing on ground
contaminated by radioactive material.
Alpha
Paper Plastic Steel Lead
Beta
Beta
Gamma

188
External exposure can only arise from radiation
that has suffi cient range and energy to
penetrate any gap or shielding between
the source of radiation and the person,
and then pass through clothes and the outer
dead layers of the skin. Hence, alpha particles
cannot contribute to external dose, nor can
low-energy beta particles.
External exposure to people ceases as soon
as the source is removed or they move away
from the source, although where clothes or
equipment are contaminated a person may
take radioactive material with them.
External radiation is relatively easy to assess.
Instruments such as a Geiger-Müller counter
can measure the radiation level (dose rate)
in an area. The total radiation dose a person
has received can then be calculated from the
time spent in that area.
There are several dosemeters that can measure
total external dose directly, the most common
being the thermoluminescent dosemeter (TLD)
used for personal dosimetry which replaced the
traditional fi lm badge.
Internal exposure
Internal radiation exposure is the accumulation
of radiation dose from radioactive materials
within the body. Most commonly, this arises
from such materials that have entered the body
by inhalation, ingestion (swallowing), entry
through a wound or injection. Other possible
internal pathways are absorption of radioactive
material through the skin, or via the
contamination of wounds. All forms of
radiation can produce internal exposure.
It is considerably more diffi cult to assess
internal exposure than external exposure.
The intake of radioactive material — for
example, by inhalation — can be estimated
from the radioactive content of the air being
breathed, the breathing rate and the time spent
in the area. However, in order to estimate the
radiation dose arising from this intake, it is
necessary to have information on such matters
as the particle size of the material (to determine
where in the respiratory tract it will deposit),
the chemical form (to determine the rate at
which it will be taken up by lung fl uids),
circulation in the body, retention in organs,
radioactive half-life and excretion rate of the
relevant radionuclides (biological half-life).
These values can be obtained from tables
published by bodies such as the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP),
if suffi cient is known about the materials
inhaled or ingested.
Internal exposure will continue until the
radioactive material in the body has either
decayed away radioactively or been excreted.
Thus, exposure can continue for many years
after an initial intake. In the method of
estimating internal dose outlined above,
allowance is made for this extended exposure.
The entire radiation dose that will be
accumulated in the years following an intake
of radioactive materials is calculated, and this
dose is recorded as having occurred in the
year of the intake. If doses are received in
subsequent years, the same procedure is
followed and the doses added.
Direct assessment of internal radiation
exposure can be made by Whole Body
Monitoring where the subject is placed in
a specially shielded unit containing sensitive
radiation detectors, in order to measure the
radiation emitted by the radioactive materials
inside the body. This procedure is only suitable
for gamma-emitting radionuclides and is very
cumbersome and restricted in its availability.
Field methods for measuring the radioactive
uptake are less direct and may involve
sampling of an exposed person’s excreta.
M2.4 Radiation exposure pathways
and their control
In this section, the general principles of
control for both internal and external
exposures are discussed.
External exposure pathway
There are three general methods for the control
of external exposures:
Time — external exposures can be reduced
by decreasing the time spent near radiation
sources or in contaminated areas.
•

189
Distance — external exposures can be
reduced by increasing the distance from the
source of radiation. The reduction generally
follows the inverse square law — the dose
is reduced by the square of the increase in
distance. Thus, doubling the distance will
reduce the dose to a quarter of what it would
be at the original distance, increasing the
distance three times reduces the dose to
one ninth, and increasing distance by a
factor of ten reduces the dose to one
hundredth. Strictly, this law only applies to
point sources, but it can be applied to large
sources when the distance from a source is
much greater than its lineal size. It is not
applicable when close to large area sources,
such as areas of contaminated soil.
Shielding — placing some radiation-absorbing
material (shielding) between
the source and the potentially exposed
person can reduce the resulting external
radiation dose. The amount and nature
of the shielding required depends on the
type of radiation involved. Heavy elements,
such as lead, are very effective for shielding
X and gamma radiations. At high radiation
energies, all materials are approximately
equivalent, and the shielding depends on
the density of the shield. Personal shielding,
such as a lead-rubber apron, is only practical
against low energy X and gamma radiation,
and rapidly becomes totally impracticable
at higher energies.
•
•
Millimetre thin layers of metal, or a centimetre
or so of plastic, are effective for shielding beta
radiation. Neutrons are quite penetrating in
heavy elements. They are more effectively
shielded by materials containing hydrogen
such as water, wax or polythene.
Internal exposure pathway
The procedures for protection against internal
exposure are not as simple as those for external
exposure, given that there are numerous
possible exposure pathways. Protection focuses
on limiting intakes, and some general principles
can be stated.
Isolation from sources — keeping people
away from potential sources of exposure,
such as contaminated areas, means that
the intake of radioactive materials will
be reduced. Ventilation, which removes
contaminated air and provides fresh
air for breathing, is another way of
reducing exposure.
Reduction of sources — activities that
produce potential exposure pathways should
be minimised; for example, dust generation
should be reduced where practicable by
wetting down dusty materials.
Personal protection — common forms
of personal protection include protective
clothing, footwear, gloves and respiratory
protection, which removes contaminants
from inhaled air. This can range from a
relatively simple respirator to a complete
‘air suit’ with its own air supply. Personal
protective equipment which impedes normal
working arrangements is not routinely used
because other means of providing a save
working environment for all (for instance
by ensuring buildings provide adequate
shielding and have appropriate air fi lters)
are given a higher priority in the hierarchy
of occupational health and safety measures.
Personal hygiene — this is important for
reducing ingestion, particularly via hand-to
mouth transfer. Removal of contaminated
clothing and showering after leaving a
contaminated area can reduce the spread
of radioactive material to uncontaminated
work or living areas. It should be noted that
‘radiation protective clothing’ does not
protect against external radiation exposure,
except for low-energy beta radiation, but
it is an aid to decontamination after working
in contaminated areas.
•
•
•
•

190
M2.5 Biological effects
of radiation exposure
The health effects of ionising radiation are
divided into two broad classes. The possible
outcomes of a large dose of radiation received
in a relatively short time are called deterministic
or ‘acute’ effects. The possible longer-term
effects of lower radiation doses delivered over
a longer time period are traditionally called
stochastic effects and include an increased
likelihood of inducing cancer and potential
genetic effects — that is, those that appear
in the person irradiated and those that may
be induced in their offspring, respectively.
Early history
Knowledge of the damaging acute effects of
ionising radiation dates back to 1895 when
Roentgen announced the discovery of X-rays.
By 1897, over 20 cases of X-ray dermatitis had
been reported and symptoms such as sickness
and diarrhoea were recognised as being
associated with radiation exposure. The fi rst
known death from X-rays occurred in 1914:
an Italian radiologist who had worked with
X-rays for 14 years.
Not long after the discovery of radium, it
was realised that radiation from radioactive
materials could also cause harm. Marie Curie
described in her biography how her husband
Pierre had:
…voluntarily exposed his arm to the action
of radium during several hours. This resulted
in a lesion resembling a burn that developed
progressively and required several months
to heal.
Increasingly, evidence accumulated that
exposure to high levels of ionising radiation
is harmful. This evidence came from a range
of activities, including medical and occupational
exposures.
In the 1920s, steps were taken to introduce
some controls on levels of exposure to
ionising radiation. The second International
Congress on Radiology (ICR) issued their fi rst
recommendations in 1928. They were very
generalised, along the lines of:
The dangers of over-exposure to X-rays
and radium can be avoided by the provision
of adequate protection and suitable
working conditions.
By 1934, the measurement of ionising radiation
had become formalised in a unit called the
roentgen (R or r), and an exposure limit
(tolerance dose) of 0.2 R per day (2 mSv/day)
was proposed for work with X-rays. The ICR
noted that: ‘no similar tolerance dose is at
present available in the case of gamma rays’.
By the early 1940s, additional health concerns
were being raised about the long-term
‘stochastic’ effects of lower doses over
a long period of time:
some geneticists were expressing concerns
that the ‘tolerance dose’ of 1 R per week
(10 mSv/week) was too high when
considering possible genetic effects
evidence from the study of radium
dial painters, who had ingested radium
when painting luminous dials, was
showing that ingested radioactive materials
could be just as hazardous as external
radiation exposures.
•
•
In 1950, the ICRP was established.
The commission issued its fi rst set
of recommendations in 1951 and has
continued to do so on a regular basis.
Current knowledge
There is now a large amount of information
available on the effects of exposure to radiation
of all types and at all dose levels. Detailed
studies of the victims of the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombs, combined with studies of
people exposed medically and occupationally,
particularly uranium miners, have led to a
better understanding of the effects of radiation
on the human body as a whole. Developments
in genetics and radiobiology have added to
a greater understanding of the interaction
of ionising radiation with human cells.

191
2.4 250 1000 4000 7000
Radiation dose (mSv)
Fatal within hours.
Medical treatment
usually ineffective
Fatal to about half
those exposed without
medical treatment
Temporary
radiation sickness
Threshold dose,
first effects noticeable
Average annual
dose from natural
sources
Deterministic effects
Deterministic effects from exposure to ionising
radiation arise from the killing of cells by
radiation. Low doses of radiation do not produce
immediate clinical effects because of the
relatively small number of cells destroyed.
However, at high doses, enough cells may be
killed to cause breakdown in tissue structure or
function. One of the most common effects, skin
burn, is sometimes observed following localised
high-intensity X-ray exposure. When the whole
body is irradiated, high doses of radiation can
break down the lining of the gastrointestinal
tract, leading to radiation sickness, and the
breakdown of other body functions, leading
to death.
Deterministic effects are so called because the
effect follows an elevated radiation exposure
and it is ‘determined’ by the size of the
exposure. There is a threshold below which
deterministic effects do not occur. For the
average individual, no immediate deterministic
effects are observed at doses less than 1 Sv
(1000 mSv, 100 rem). Above this dose, nausea,
vomiting and diarrhoea from radiation sickness
may occur within a few hours or so. As the dose
increases, effects will be seen sooner, be more
severe and persist longer.
A dose of approximately 3 to 5 Sv is likely to
cause the death of approximately 50 per cent
of those exposed within 60 days, known as
the lethal dose (LD 50(60)). Medical attention
may improve the outcomes. A dose of 15 Sv
received within a short period of time will cause
unconsciousness within a few minutes and
death within a few days. (See Figure M2.)
For comparison, the current accepted limit
for occupational exposure is 20 mSv per year,
(ie 2 per cent of the dose that may induce
radiation sickness), if received over a short
time period, and at less than 0.5 per cent
of the LD 50(60).
Deterministic effects that may result from
radiation exposure include cataracts, or
temporary or permanent sterility. Opacities
(in the lens of the eye) have not been seen
at doses below approximately 0.5 Sv and are
only severe enough to affect vision at doses
above approximately 5 Sv. Temporary sterility
in males can occur following single doses
above approximately 0.15 Sv, but fertility returns
after a month or so [113].
Figure M2 Effects of varying radiation dose
Source: NEA[37]

192
Stochastic effects
Ionising radiation is capable of not only killing
cells, but also damaging cells by initiating
changes in the DNA of the cell nucleus. If the
damage is not repaired and the cell remains
viable and able to reproduce, this event may
initiate the development of a cancer later in
life. If the damaged cell is in the genetic line
(egg, sperm or sperm-generating cell) then
the damage may result in a genetic effect
in the offspring.
The name ‘stochastic’ means that the effect
is governed by probability. There is a certain
probability that the cell damage will occur,
a probability that it will not be repaired naturally,
and a probability that a cancer, for example,
will develop as a result. An increase in the
magnitude of the dose will increase the
probability of the effect, but not the severity
of the effect. Stochastic effects do not generally
become apparent for many years after exposure,
and there is in most cases no way of
distinguishing a particular cancer or genetic
effect that might have been caused by radiation
from one arising from other origins. There are,
however, some forms of cancer that do not
seem to be caused by radiation exposure.
The ICRP, based on all the available data,
has estimated the probability of radiation
induced fatal cancer to be 5 per cent per
Sievert.[113] Stochastic effects, in particular
cancer, have only been clearly demonstrated
in humans following moderate or high
exposures of the order of 50 mSv and above,
and there is no direct evidence that these effects
can arise at the signifi cantly lower doses
characteristic of present day occupational
exposures. Nevertheless, the ICRP adopts
the Linear No-Threshold (LNT) hypothesis
as the appropriate basis for radiation protection
for ‘prospective’ practices (for instance in
the planning stages of a proposal such as
comparing alternative locations for specifi c
facilities) and this is internationally accepted.
All radiation doses are assumed to carry an
associated risk despite the scientifi c evidence
that this is a conservative assumption for
‘the administrative organisation of
radioprotection’.[270]p2 Radiation protection
standards are set at levels where the risk is
small in comparison to the risks ordinarily
encountered in everyday living.
A large study of exposure and health data on
radiation workers has recently been completed,
with results consistent with the ICRP risk
values.[271] Such a large sample (407 391
individuals, with 5 192 710 person years of
exposure) with good exposure data is very
diffi cult to get, so this is a signifi cant study
that proves one of the best tests to date of
radiation risk estimates at low doses. The study
conclusion states: ‘We have provided radiation
risk estimates from the largest study of nuclear
industry workers conducted so far. These
estimates are higher than, but statistically
compatible with, the current bases for radiation
protection standards’.[271]p5 Radiation exposure
has been shown to cause an increase in genetic
disease in animals. No similar increase has
been demonstrated in human populations, even
amongst the children of Japanese atomic bomb
survivors, however extrapolations from animal
studies are included in the risk estimates for
radiation protection purposes. The overall risk
of ‘severe hereditary disorders’ is estimated
to be approximately 1 per cent per sievert
of exposure.[113]
The impact of very small doses to many people
is often assessed through the use of the concept
of collective dose. This tool is frequently used to
estimate fatalities by summing small doses over
large populations. However the International
Commission for Radiological Protection advises
that: ‘…the computation of cancer deaths based
on collective doses involving trivial exposures to
large populations is not reasonable and should
be avoided’.[114] Nonetheless this is exactly what
is done in some cases to derive very large
fi gures for premature deaths associated with the
extremely low levels of radiation emanating from
the normal operation of uranium mines and
other nuclear energy facilities, not withstanding
the fact that the doses involved are several
thousand times lower than the background
radiation dose from natural sources.

193
M2.6 Radiation dose limits
In this section the current radiation dose
limits are discussed briefl y.
The radiation dose limits used in Australia
promulgated by the Australian Radiation
Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
(ARPANSA) are derived from the
recommendations of the ICRP, most
directly from ICRP publication No. 60.[113]
This publication recommends a ‘system
of dose limitation’, with three elements:
Justifi cation — the radiation practice
must produce suffi cient benefi t to
offset the detriment arising from
any radiation exposure.
Optimisation — radiation protection
measures should be implemented until
the cost of additional protection is not
commensurate with the resulting improved
protection (ie the cost in time, effort
and money outweighs any additional
improvements in radiation safety). This
is often expressed as the ALARA principle
— radiation doses should be As Low As
Reasonably Achievable, with economic
and social factors taken into account.
Limitation — individuals should not be
exposed to radiation doses above specifi ed
dose limits. The currently recommended
annual dose limit for workers is 20 mSv and
for members of the general public is 1 mSv.
•
•
•
It should be recognised that this does not mean
that it is acceptable to expose workers to annual
doses approaching 20 mSv. This would only be
acceptable if it can be demonstrated that the
cost of further radiation protection measures
is not commensurate with the dose reduction
achieved. In practice, in Australia there are
few radiation-related occupations where
workers receive more than a small fraction
of the legislated limits.
M2.7 Cancer incidence in
the Kakadu region
In its comments on the draft report of the
Review, the Australian Institute of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Studies provided
information from an exploratory study
suggesting that the incidence of cancer in
Aboriginal people in the region of Kakadu
National Park is very signifi cantly higher than
that for Aboriginal people in other parts of
the Northern Territory. The possible implication
that such an increase in the incidence of
cancer could be attributable to radiation
exposure arising from the mining of uranium
in the region needs to be addressed.
Estimates of the radiation dose received
by members of the public from the operation
of the Ranger uranium mine have been routinely
assessed by the Supervising Scientist and
the fi ndings published in annual reports.
These results have demonstrated that any
increase in radiation levels is small compared
to both the background radiation and the public
dose limit of 1mSv per year. The health impact
of such increases would not be measurable by
any epidemiological studies.
A summary of these results, which has been
the subject of independent national and
international review, was published in 1999
and gave average dose rate estimates of about
0.03mSv per year and 0.01mSv per year for the
atmospheric and aquatic pathways
respectively.[163] Thus, noting that these dose
estimates refer to people living close to the
mine, the maximum radiation dose expected for
Aboriginal people living in the Kakadu region
over the 25 year operational life of the Ranger
mine is about 1mSv. This dose is lower than that
required to double the incidence of fatal cancers
by a factor of about 5000.
It can be concluded that the reported increase
in cancer incidence in Aboriginal people of
the Kakadu region, if it were to be verifi ed,
cannot be attributed to radiation exposure
arising from the mining of uranium in the
region. Establishment of a social impact
monitoring program agreed to by all
stakeholders would be an important step
in resolving past diffi culties in this area.

194
M2.8 Radiation risk in perspective
The following is known about ionising radiation
and its risks:
Radiation and its effects on health have
been studied by expert bodies for over half
a century and more is known about radiation
risks than about the risks associated with
almost any other physical or chemical
agents in the environment.
The effects of large doses of radiation
on human health are well understood.
The conservative assumption made in
protecting workers and the public is that
the impact of radiation on human health
is proportional to the dose of radiation
received, for both large and small doses
(the linear no threshold model).
Various other models have been proposed
to predict how the health effects of low-level
radiation are related to the radiation dose
received. The differences among these
predictions are so small that they make
it very diffi cult to validate any one model
conclusively.
Radiation does not produce a unique set
of health effects. The effects that can be
attributed to low-level radiation are also
known to be caused by a large number of
other agents. While not disregarding the
risks of radiation, one must recognise that
the health risks posed by some of these
other agents are much greater.
The most important late effect of radiation is
cancer, which is often fatal. The fundamental
process by which cancer is induced by
radiation is not fully understood, but a
greater incidence of various malignant
diseases has been observed in groups of
humans who had been exposed to relatively
high doses of radiation years previously.
Few persons so exposed actually contract
cancer, but each person has a probability
of contracting it that depends largely on
the dose received.
The major technical diffi culty in establishing
an increased incidence of cancers for low
level exposures is caused by the fact that
about 25 per cent of the population in
Western society will eventually die of cancer.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Another important possible late effect
is hereditary damage, the probability of
which depends on dose. The damage arises
through irradiation of the gonads (ovaries,
testes). However, there is no direct evidence,
in human offspring, for hereditary defects
attributable to exposure either from natural
or artifi cial radiation, even among atom
bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
M2.9 Medical uses of radiation
associated with the nuclear
fuel cycle
Ionising radiation has two different uses in
medicine; for diagnosis and for treatment
(therapy). Most procedures involve external
radiation sources. Eg X-rays, CT scans and
External Beam Radiotherapy, but others require
the use of radioactive materials either in the
form of solid sources or materials introduced
into the blood stream.
Some diagnostic procedures involve the
administration of radionuclides, a process
that utilises the metabolic or physiological
properties of radio-labelled drugs, so that
detectors outside the body can be used to
observe how organs are functioning, and the
chemical composition of metabolites in bodily
fl uids can be analysed. This is possible because
some natural elements concentrate in specifi c
parts of the body, for example iodine in the
thyroid, phosphorus in the bones, potassium
in the muscles, so if a radioactive isotope of the
element is administered, orally or by injection,
imaging instruments, eg PET or SPECT cameras,
can generate images of radioactive material
within the body indicating bodily function.
Some isotopes are used for treatment either
by introduction into the blood stream, such as
radioactive iodine to treat thyroid problems,
or by using solid sources outside the body.
The use of solid sources is known as
brachytherapy and is used widely for the
treatment of cervical, prostate and other
cancers. It is also being used in cardiology
in connection with angioplasty.

195
Production
Most radioactive materials for medical
applications are produced commercially
in nuclear reactors or particle accelerators
such as cyclotrons. For example, when the
non-radioactive target element cobalt absorbs
neutrons in a reactor it is transformed into a
radioisotope, cobalt-60, which is used to treat
cancer and sterilise medical and consumer
products such as bandages. Cyclotrons use
electric and magnetic fi elds to accelerate
particles such as protons to induce reactions
that transform nuclei into radioactive isotopes.
Usually only one type of radionuclide can be
produced at a time in a cyclotron, while a
reactor can produce many different
radionuclides simultaneously.
Australian capabilities
The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organisation (ANSTO) is the leading
manufacturer and supplier of radioisotope
products for nuclear medicine in Australia
producing about 70 per cent of the
radiopharmaceuticals.
The radioisotope products are made from
material irradiated in the National Medical
Cyclotron and by the Open Pool Australian
Light-water reactor research reactor (OPAL).
Neutron-rich radioisotopes are produced in
the reactor and neutron-defi cient radioisotopes
in the cyclotron. The reactor is located at the
ANSTO Lucas Heights site and the cyclotron
is close to the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital,
Camperdown, which uses many of its products.
ANSTO also supplies radioisotope products for
medical and other uses to the United Kingdom,
New Zealand, India, Bangladesh, Burma, China,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia and
Papua-New Guinea.
Australia is a regional leader in the medical
applications of radiation, based on the ANSTO
facilities and the cyclotrons and associated
expertise at several other research laboratories,
including those at universities. The expansion of
nuclear energy in Australia, with an associated
increase in education and research skills, would
add to Australia’s base of nuclear expertise.
M2.10 Note on sources
This Appendix is largely based on Australian
Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia,
Dosimetry and Mortality and Cancer Incidence
Study, Commonwealth of Australia 2006
A general text book on radiation protection,
such as Martin A and Harbison SA (1987),
An Introduction to Radiation Protection,
Chapman and Hall, London, can be consulted
for more information on some of the topics
covered in this Appendix.

196
Appendix N. The Chernobyl and
Three Mile Island nuclear
reactor accidents and impacts
N1 Summary
N1.1 Three Mile Island
In 1979 a cooling malfunction caused part of
the core to melt in the number 2 pressurised
water reactor (TMI-2) at Three Mile Island
near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in the USA.
The reactor was destroyed. The accident
occurred because of a false reading
indicating the status of a key valve, and
operator error in diagnosing and responding
to the problem, leading to a loss of coolant
water and partial meltdown. The containment
facility was not breached.
Some radioactive gas was released two days
after the accident, but not enough to cause
any dose signifi cantly above background
levels to local residents.
There were no injuries or adverse health
effects from the accident. The radiation
exposure from the release of a small amount
of radioactive gas may lead to, at the very
most, one potential additional cancer death
in the long term.
N1.2 Chernobyl
On 26 April 1986, a major accident occurred
at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at
Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the former USSR,
during an experiment.
The operators were planning to test whether
the turbine powered generators could
produce suffi cient electricity to keep the
coolant pumps running in the event of a loss
of power until emergency diesel generators
came on line.
The design of the reactor was inherently
unsafe in that moderation was largely due
to fi xed graphite, and any excess boiling
reduced the cooling and neutron absorption
without inhibiting the fi ssion reaction
so that a positive feedback loop could be
easily initiated. There was also no massive
protective containment facility.
•
•
•
•
•
•
To prevent any interruptions to the power
of the reactor, the safety systems were
deliberately bypassed or switched off.
To conduct the test, the reactor output had
to be reduced to 25 per cent of capacity.
This procedure did not go according to plan
and the reactor power level fell to less than
1 per cent. The power therefore had to be
slowly increased. But 30 seconds after the
start of the test there was an unexpected
power surge. The emergency shutdown
procedure failed.
Fuel elements in the reactor ruptured and
there was a violent steam and gas explosion.
The 1000-tonne sealing cap on the reactor
building was blown off. Temperatures rose
to over 2000°C and the fuel rods melted.
The graphite covering of the reactor then
caught fi re. The graphite burned for ten
days, releasing large quantities of
radioactive material into the environment.
Two people were killed in the explosion,
one person suffered a fatal heart attack and
twenty-eight highly exposed reactor staff
and emergency workers died from radiation
and thermal burns within four months of the
accident. Nineteen more people died by the
end of 2004 (from all causes, not necessarily
because of the radiation exposure).
About 4000 individuals, most of whom were
children or adolescents at the time of the
accident, developed thyroid cancer as a
result of the radiation exposure, and by
the end of 2002 15 of them had died from
the disease.
Some 4000 people in the areas with highest
radiation levels could eventually die from
cancer caused by radiation exposure,
and of 6.8 million others living further from
the explosion who received a much lower
dose, another 5000 may die as a result
of that dose.
•
•
•
•
•

197
Appendix N. The Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accidents and impacts
One study suggests that of 570 million
people in Europe at the time of the
Chernobyl accident and exposed to low
levels of radiation from the accident,
16 000 will ultimately die from induced
cancers as a result of the radiation caused
by the accident. This is 0.01 per cent of all
predicted cancer deaths. As cancer causes
about a quarter of all deaths in Europe,
identifying those cases triggered by the
Chernobyl-sourced radioactivity cannot
be done with statistical confi dence.
N2 Three Mile Island 1979
N2.1 Introduction
The Three Mile Island power station is near
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in the USA. It had
two pressurized water reactors (PWR). One of
800 MWe capacity which entered service in
1974 (Unit 1) and Unit 2 (TMI-2) with a slightly
larger capacity at 900 MWe was newer. It had
not long been in operation at the time of
the accident.
The reactor was operating at 97 per cent power
when the accident to unit 2 happened. At about
4 am on 28 March 1979 a relatively minor
malfunction in the secondary cooling circuit
caused the temperature in the primary coolant
• to rise at an abnormal rate. This in turn caused
the reactor to ‘scram’, that is to rapidly and
automatically shut down within seconds.
During the scram a relief valve failed to close
allowing a lot of the primary coolant to drain
away. This in turn meant that that the residual
decay heat in the reactor core was not removed
as it should have been. Heat built up to the point
that the core suffered severe damage.
Instrumentation malfunctioned so that the fact
that the relief valve had failed to close was not
conveyed to operators.
The operators were unable to diagnose or
respond properly to the unplanned automatic
shutdown of the reactor. The primary causes of
the accident can be considered to be defi cient
control room instrumentation and inadequate
emergency response training.
Reactor design
TMI-2 was a Babcock & Wilcox pressurized water
reactor with a once-through steam generator.
The steam circuit is separate from the primary
heating circuit and the turbines are outside the
concrete containment structure which is about
two metres thick (see Figure N1).
Water in the primary loop fl ows around the
reactor core, absorbing heat. The water in the
primary loop becomes radioactive because it
Figure N1 Diagrammatic view of the Three Mile Island TMI 2 reactor
REACTOR BUILDING
Safety valve
Pressuriser
Block valve
PORV
Control rods
Reactor
core
Steam
generator
Reactor coolant pump
Pressurised
relief valve
Pressurised
relief tank
Source: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission[272]
TMI-2
TURBINE
BUILDING
Turbine
Generator
Transformer
Circulating
water pump
Condensate
pump
Main feedwater
pump
COOLING TOWER
SECONDARY
(NON-NUCLEAR)
PRIMARY

198
comes into contact with the core. Pumps move
the water through the primary loop and heat
exchanger where heat transfers from the water
in the primary loop to water in the secondary
loop. The water in the secondary loop turns
to steam which powers a turbine connected to
a generator. Pumps push the water through the
secondary loop and back to where the heat is
exchanged. Water in the secondary loop does
not mix with the water in the primary loop and
is therefore not radioactive.
N2.2 The sequence of events
Within seconds of the automatic shutdown the
pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) on the reactor
cooling system opened as it was designed to do.
About 10 seconds later it should have closed,
but it remained open, allowing vital reactor
coolant water to drain away into the reactor
coolant drain tank.
Instruments in the control room only indicated
that a ‘close’ signal had been sent to the valve
but there was no instrument indicating the
actual position of the valve. For this reason
operators assumed that the PORV was closed
properly and therefore there must be some
other reason for the abnormal behaviour of the
reactor. In response to the loss of cooling water
high-pressure injection pumps automatically
forced water into the reactor system to replace
the lost coolant. As water and steam escaped
through the relief valve, cooling water surged
into the pressuriser, raising the water level in
it. (The pressuriser is a tank which is part of
the reactor coolant system, maintaining proper
pressure in the system. The relief valve is
located on the pressuriser. In a pressurised
water reactor like that used in the TMI-2 plant,
water in the primary cooling system around the
core is kept under very high pressure to keep it
from boiling.)
The response of the operators was to reduce
the fl ow of replacement water. Standard
operator training was that the pressuriser water
level was the only dependable indicator of the
amount of cooling water in the system, and
because the pressuriser level was increasing,
the operators concluded that the reactor system
must be too full of water. If it fi lled completely
pressure in the cooling system would not be
able to be controlled, and the vessel might
even rupture. The highest priority was to do
everything possible to keep the pressuriser
from fi lling with water.
The now low volume of water in the reactor
cooling system began to boil. Pumping a
mixture of steam and water the reactor cooling
pumps, designed to handle water, began to
vibrate. Severe vibrations could have seriously
damaged the pumps and made them unusable
and so they were shut down. With no water
being forced through the reactor, the water still
present began to boil away to the point where
the reactor fuel core was uncovered, making
it even hotter. The fuel rods were damaged and
released radioactive material into the cooling
water. The operators still believed the system
was nearly full of water because the pressuriser
level remained high.
At 6:22 am operators closed a block valve
between the relief valve and the pressuriser.
This action stopped the loss of coolant water
through the relief valve, but by this time
superheated steam and gases had blocked the
fl ow of water through the core cooling system.
Operators then attempted to force more water
into the reactor system to condense steam
bubbles that were thought to be blocking the
fl ow of cooling water. During the afternoon
operators attempted to reduce the pressure
in the reactor system to allow a lower pressure
cooling system to be used and to allow
emergency water supplies to be put into the
system. By late afternoon operators began
high-pressure injection of water into the reactor
cooling system to increase pressure and
eliminate steam bubbles. By 7:50 pm on
28 March they restored forced cooling of
the reactor and enough steam had condensed
to allow one coolant pump to run without
severe vibrations.
As these events unfolded radioactive gases
from the reactor cooling system built up in
the makeup tank in the auxiliary building.
On 29 and 30 March operators used pipes and
compressors to move these gases to gas decay
tanks. (Gas decay tanks are gas tight containers
in which radioactive gases can be temporarily
stored until the radiation level naturally drops
to the level where the gas may be released with
out exceeding regulatory levels). During this
operation the compressors leaked and some
radioactive gas was prematurely released
to the environment.

199
On the morning of 28 March, when the core
of reactor was uncovered, a high-temperature
chemical reaction between water and the
zircaloy metal tubes holding the nuclear fuel
pellets formed hydrogen, a very light and
infl ammable gas. In the afternoon of the same
day a sudden rise in pressure in the reactor
building, as indicated by control room
instruments, suggested a hydrogen burn had
occurred. Hydrogen also collected at the top of
the reactor vessel. From 30 March until 1 April
operators removed this hydrogen ‘bubble’ by
periodically opening the vent valve on the
reactor cooling system pressuriser. For a time,
regulatory (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC)) offi cials believed the hydrogen bubble
might explode. However, such an explosion was
not possible since there was not enough oxygen
in the system.
By 27 April natural convection circulation of
coolant was established and the reactor core
was being cooled by the natural movement
of water rather than by mechanical pumping.
‘Cold shutdown’ had been achieved.
The containment building worked as designed.
Although about one-third of the fuel core
melted in the intense heat, the integrity of
the reactor vessel was maintained and the
damaged fuel contained.
N2.3 Exposure and impacts
Radiation releases during the accident were
minimal, below levels that have been associated
with health effects from radiation exposure.
Nonetheless the accident generated dramatic
media coverage and a mass movement of
people out of the area on the basis of confused
warnings and projections that an explosion
leading to release of large amounts of
radioactive material was possible, if not
imminent. The peak of concern was on
30–31 March. The stressed and anxious
atmosphere of the time is described in
the offi cial history of the role of the
US Department of Energy during the accident
entitled Crisis Contained: The Department of
Energy at Three Mile Island by Philip Cantelon
and Robert Williams.[273]
‘Friday appears to have become a turning
point in the history of the accident because
of two events: the sudden rise in reactor
pressure shown by control room instruments
on Wednesday afternoon (the “hydrogen
burn”) which suggested a hydrogen
explosion — became known to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission [that day]; and the
deliberate venting of radioactive gases from
the plant Friday morning which produced a
reading of 1,200 millirems (12 mSv) directly
above the stack of the auxiliary building.’
‘What made these signifi cant was a series
of misunderstandings caused, in part, by
problems of communication within various
state and federal agencies. Because of
confused telephone conversations between
people uninformed about the plant’s status,
offi cials concluded that the 1200 millirems
reading was an off-site reading. They also
believed that another hydrogen explosion
was possible, that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission had ordered evacuation and
that a meltdown was conceivable. Garbled
communications reported by the media
generated a debate over evacuation.
Whether or not there were evacuation
plans soon became academic. What
happened on Friday was not a planned
evacuation but a weekend exodus based
not on what was actually happening at Three
Mile Island but on what government offi cials
and the media imagined might happen.
On Friday confused communications
created the politics of fear.’[273]P 50
According to Cantelon and Williams hundreds
of environmental samples were taken around
TMI during the accident period by the
Department of Energy (which had the lead
sampling role) and the then-Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources.
There were no unusually high readings, except
for noble gases. Virtually no iodine was present.
Readings were far below health protection
limits. The TMI event nonetheless created
a political storm.

200
N2.4 Radiological health effects
According to the operator and NRC the radiation
releases during the accident were below any
levels that have been associated with the
health effects caused by radiation exposure.
The average radiation dose to people living
within 16 kilometres of the plant was
0.08 millisievert (mSv), with a calculated dose
of no more than 1 mSv to any single individual.
An actual individual located on a nearby island
is believed to have received at most 37 millirem
(0.37 mSv). The level of 0.08 mSv is equivalent
the radiation received from one chest X-ray,
and 1 mSv dose is about a third of the average
background level of radiation received by US
residents in a year.
The TMI-2 accident generated public concern
about the possibility of radiation-induced
health effects, principally cancer, in the area
surrounding the plant. Because of those
concerns and lobbying by local concerned
residents the Pennsylvania Department of
Health initiated and for 18 years maintained
a registry of more than 30 000 people who lived
within fi ve miles of Three Mile Island at the time
of the accident. The registry was discontinued
in June 1997, without any evidence of unusual
radiation-related health problems in the area.
The Department staff and co-authors published
a series of papers on various aspects of health
impact that might be associated with the TMI
accident (see for example [274] [275] [276]). They found
no increased incidence of cancer as a result of
the accident, but did fi nd that there were some
impacts that they considered to be
psychological in nature.
Many studies of the accident and its potential
health impacts have been undertaken since
1979 and almost all have found no evidence
of an abnormal number of cancers around
TMI since the accident, and no environmental
impact. [277] [278] The most recent examination
involved a 13-year study on 32 000 people. [279]
The only detectable effect was psychological
stress during and shortly after the accident.
A number of groups have challenged the offi cial
fi gures for radiation released as a result of the
TMI accident, asserting that the levels were
probably higher, at least in some places, and
suffi cient to cause harm to some members of
the public.
In June 1996, 17 years after the TMI-2 accident,
Harrisburg US District Court Judge Sylvia
Rambo dismissed a class action lawsuit
alleging that the accident caused health effects.
In making her decision, Judge Rambo noted:
Findings that exposure patterns projected by
computer models of the releases compared
so well with data from the TMI dosimeters
(also called dosemeters, small portable
instruments such as fi lm badges or
thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD)
for measuring and recording the total
accumulated personal dose of ionising
radiation) available during the accident
that the dosimeters probably were adequate
to measure the releases.
That the maximum off site dose was
probably 100 millirem (1 mSv), and that
projected fatal cancers based on likely
exposures was less than one.
The failure of the plaintiffs to prove their
assertion that one or more unreported
hydrogen ‘blowouts’ in the reactor system
caused one or more unreported radiation
‘spikes’, producing a narrow yet highly
concentrated plume of radioactive gases.
•
•
•
Judge Rambo concluded: ‘The parties to the
instant action have had nearly two decades
to muster evidence in support of their respective
cases... The paucity of proof alleged in support
of Plaintiffs’ case is manifest. The court has
searched the record for any and all evidence
which construed in a light most favourable
to Plaintiffs creates a genuine issue of material
fact warranting submission of their claims
to a jury. This effort has been in vain.’
There was an appeal against the dismissal of
the case in which a re-appraisal of previous
studies was presented that suggested there
was a link between some cancers and the TMI
accident.[280] However in December 2002 the
Circuit Court declined to hear an appeal of the
second ruling of Judge Rambo to dismiss the
case and legal representatives for the remaining
plaintiffs declared they would take no further
legal action.[281]

201
N2.5 Three Mile Island — post
accident changes to reactor
design and operation
TMI-2 was closed down after a major and
long clean up procedure and is in long-term
monitored storage. No further use of the
plant is anticipated. Ventilation and rainwater
systems are monitored and equipment
necessary to keep the plant in safe long-term
storage is maintained.
TMI-1 was closed down at the time of the
accident and was not allowed to be started
until cleared by all relevant authorities in 1985.
Lessons learned from the TMI-2 accident were
incorporated into minor modifi cations of the
reactor design and, more importantly — as the
basic design had proved sound — changes to
the operational controls, monitoring systems
and operator training and emergency response
procedures. It was also recognised that there
was a need for improve and add transparency
to community engagement, both in the United
States and internationally.
Equipment changes included upgrading
monitoring instrumentation so that it is
capable of withstanding severe accidents
(and also indicates not only what commands
have been sent but also accurately monitors
the status of the equipment in real time) and
the addition of hydrogen recombiners.
(Hydrogen recombiners are used to prevent
hydrogen levels from building up to fl ammable
or explosive concentrations. They use a catalyst
containing platinum and temperatures of
~ 430 to 538 degrees C to chemically combine
the hydrogen with a regulated supply of oxygen
to form water.)
Training became centred on protecting the
cooling capacity of a plant, whatever the
triggering problem might be. At TMI-2, the
operators turned to a book of procedures
to pick those that seemed to fi t the event.
Now operators are taken through a set of
‘yes-no’ questions to ensure that the core
of the reactor remains covered. Only then do
they start to trace the specifi c malfunction.
This is known as a ‘symptom-based’ approach
for responding to plant events. Underlying it
is a style of training that gives operators a
foundation for understanding both theoretical
and practical aspects of plant operations.
The TMI-2 accident also led to the establishment
of the Atlanta-based Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO) and its National Academy
for Nuclear Training. These two industry
organisations have the role of promoting
excellence in the operation of US nuclear
plants and accrediting their training programs.
INPO was formed in 1979. The National
Academy for Nuclear Training was
established under INPO’s auspices in 1985.
TMI’s operator training program has passed
three INPO accreditation reviews since
then. Communications and teamwork,
emphasising effective interaction among
crew members, are now part of the TMI training
program which includes training in a full-scale
electronic simulator of the TMI control room.
The $18 million simulator permits operators
to learn and be tested on all kinds of
accident scenarios.
N3 Chernobyl 1986
N3.1 Introduction
The Chernobyl accident was the product of
a fl awed reactor design combined with human
error. It is the only accident at a nuclear power
plant in the history of commercial nuclear
power generation that has caused direct
and known fatalities from radiation.
There were four operating 1000-megawatt
power reactors at Chernobyl on the banks
of the Pripyat River, about sixty miles north
of Kiev in the Ukraine, at the time of the
accident part of the former Soviet Union.
The accident at Chernobyl Unit 4, on 26 April
1986, did not occur during normal operation.
It happened during a test designed to assess
the reactor’s safety margin in a particular
set of circumstances. The test had to be
performed at less than full reactor power
and was scheduled to coincide with a
routine shut-down of the reactor.

202
Figure N2 Diagram of an RBMK type reactor as installed at Chernobyl
Chernobyl RBMK-Type Reactor
Shielding
bricks
Containment Pump
Pool
Diagram taken from: http://www.fatherryan.org/nuclearincidents/rbmk.htm
Steam separator
Pressure tube
Reactor
vessel
Core
Water
N3.2 Reactor design
The four reactors at the Chernobyl site are all
pressurised water reactors of Soviet design
known as the RBMK (RBMK stands for Reactor
Bolsho Moshchnosty Kanalny, meaning ‘high-power
channel reactor’). The design employs
long (7 metre) vertical pressure tubes running
through a graphite moderator. It is cooled by
ordinary (light) water, which boils in the core
at 290°C. The steam generated goes directly
to the turbine powered generators. The fuel
is low-enriched uranium oxide made up into
fuel assemblies 3.5 metres long. Moderation
is largely due to the fi xed graphite, so any
excess boiling reduces the cooling and neutron
absorption without inhibiting the fi ssion
reaction, and a positive feedback loop can
be initiated. The combination of graphite
moderator and water coolant is found in
no other modern power reactors.
The Chernobyl plant did not have the massive
containment structure common to most, but not
all, nuclear power plants elsewhere in the world.
Without this protection, radioactive material
escaped into the environment during the
1986 accident.
N3.3 The accident
Nuclear power stations produce electricity,
but most conventional current designs also
consume it, for example to power pumps to
circulate coolant. This electricity is usually
supplied from the grid. When power from
the grid is unavailable, most nuclear power
plants are able to obtain the required electricity
from their own production. But, if a reactor is
operating but not producing power, for example
when in the process of shutting down, some
other source of electricity is required. Back-up
generators are generally used to supply the
required power, but there is a delay before they
can be started and begin to supply electricity.
The test undertaken at Chernobyl Unit 4 was
designed to demonstrate that, in an emergency,
a coasting turbine would provide suffi cient
electrical power to pump coolant through the
reactor core while waiting for electricity from
the stand-by diesel generators to come on line
and power the pumps. The circulation of coolant
was expected to be suffi cient to give the reactor
an adequate safety margin.

203
N3.4 The sequence of events
The plan was to idle the reactor at 2.5 per cent
of normal power. Unexpected electrical demand
on the afternoon of 25 April meant that normal
power generation had to continue through to
nightfall and this delayed the experiment until
eleven o’clock that night. The operators then
reduced the power level of the reactor too
quickly. This seems to have caused a rapid
build up of neutron-absorbing fi ssion by-products
in the reactor core, which ‘poisoned’
(slowed down) the reaction. To compensate,
the operators withdrew a majority of the
reactor control rods. However, even with
the rods withdrawn, the power level could
not be increased to more than 30 megawatts.
This is an output level that the Chernobyl
power plant safety rules recommended not
be attempted because it is in the zone where
potential reactor instability was highest.
More control rods were withdrawn and the
power went up to around 200 megawatts.
The reactor was still poisoned, however,
and the output diffi cult to control. At the time
the ‘spinning turbine’ experiment began there
were only six out of 211 control rods inserted
(the minimum for the RBMK reactor is
supposed to be 30). The engineers had
also deliberately bypassed or disconnected
every important safety system, including
backup diesel generators and the emergency
core-cooling system.
The test began early in the morning of
26 April 1986. The turbine was shut down,
reducing the electrical supply to the reactor
water pumps. This in turn reduced the fl ow
of cooling water through the reactor. In the
coolant channels within the graphite-uranium
fuel core the water began to boil.
Graphite facilitates the fi ssion chain reaction in
a graphite reactor by slowing neutrons. Coolant
water in such a reactor absorbs neutrons, thus
acting as a poison. Unfortunately when the
coolant water began turning to steam, that
change of phase reduced its density and made
it a less effective neutron absorber. With more
neutrons becoming available and few control
rods inserted to absorb them, the chain reaction
accelerated. The power level in the reactor
began to rise.
This power surge was noticed by the operators.
To reduce reactivity the emergency power-reduction
system was initiated. All 205 control
rods, plus emergency rods, were driven back
into the reactor core. The control rods were of
an unusual design in that their tips were made
of graphite. The graphite tips were attached
to a hollow segment one metre long, attached
in turn to a fi ve-metre absorbent segment.
When the 205 control rods began driving
into the surging reactor, they entered,
as normal, tip fi rst.
Graphite facilitates the fi ssion chain reaction
by slowing neutrons. Instead of slowing
the reaction, the graphite tips increased it.
The control rods also displaced water from
the rod channels, increasing reactivity further.
The reaction ran out of control, the sudden
increase in heat ruptured some of the pressure
tubes containing fuel. The hot fuel particles
reacted with water and caused a steam explosion.
The explosion lifted the 1000 tonne cover off
the top of the reactor, rupturing the rest of
the 1660 pressure tubes, causing a second
explosion and exposing the reactor core to the
environment. About 50 tonnes of nuclear fuel
evaporated and released into the atmosphere.
The graphite moderator, which was radioactive,
burned for 10 days, releasing a large amount
of radiation. Radioactive caesium and iodine
vapours were released by the explosion and
during the subsequent fi re. It should be
emphasised that there was no nuclear
explosion. No commercial nuclear reactor
contains a high enough concentration of U-235
or plutonium to cause a nuclear explosion.
The Chernobyl explosions were chemical
ones, driven by gases and steam.
What remains of the Chernobyl 4 reactor
is now enclosed in a hastily constructed
concrete structure (‘sarcophagus’) that is
growing weaker over time. Ukraine and the
Group of Eight industrialised nations have
agreed on a plan to stabilise the existing
structure by constructing an enormous new
sarcophagus around it, which is expected
to last more than 100 years.
Offi cials shut down reactor 2 after a building
fi re in 1991 and closed Chernobyl 1 and 3 in
1996 and 2000, respectively.

204
N3.5 Exposure and impacts
The explosion and fi re at Chernobyl lifted
radioactive gas and dust high into the
atmosphere, where winds dispersed it across
Finland, Sweden, and central and southern
Europe. Belarus received about 60 per cent
of the contamination that fell on the former
Soviet Union. A large area in the Russian
Federation south of Bryansk was also
contaminated, as were parts of north western
Ukraine. Radioactive material from the accident
did not spread evenly across the surrounding
countryside but scattered patchily, in response
to local and regional weather conditions.
Immediately following the accident, the main
health concern was radioiodine (iodine-131)
which has a half-life of eight days. If inhaled or
ingested, for example in milk from cows grazing
on contaminated pastures, radioiodine is taken
up and concentrated in the thyroid, signifi cantly
increasing the likelihood of cancer development
in that gland. In the longer term there is concern
about contamination of the soil with cesium-
137, which has a half-life of about 30 years.[282]
Soviet authorities started evacuating people
from the area around Chernobyl 36 hours after
the accident. By May 1986, about a month later,
authorities had relocated all those living within
a 30-kilometre(18-mile) radius of the plant —
about 116 000 people.[283]
According to Soviet estimates, between 300 000
and 600 000 people participated in the clean up
of the 30-kilometre evacuation zone around the
reactor, but many entered the zone two years
after the accident. Twenty-eight highly exposed
reactor staff and emergency workers died from
radiation and thermal burns within four months
of the accident, and 19 more by the end of 2004
(not necessarily as a result of the accident). Two
other workers were killed in the explosion from
injuries unrelated to radiation, and one person
suffered a fatal heart attack.
Soviet offi cials estimated that 211 000
workers participated in clean up activities in
the fi rst year after the accident and received
an average dose of 165 mSv. Some children
in contaminated areas received high thyroid
doses because of an intake of radioiodine from
contaminated local milk. Several studies have
found that the incidence of thyroid cancer
among children under the age of 15 years in
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine has risen sharply.
More than 4000 individuals, most of whom were
accident, have developed thyroid cancer as
a result of the contamination, and 15 of these
had died from the disease by the end of 2002.[284]
The most recent study of the impacts of the
Chernobyl accident, ‘Chernobyl’s Legacy:
Health, Environment and Socio-Economic
Impacts, was published in September 2005
by the Chernobyl Forum. The Chernobyl Forum
comprises the Commission of the European
Communities, United Nations Scientifi c
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR), World Health Organization, Food
and Agriculture Organization, International
Labor Organization, and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), plus the governments
of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The objective
was to examine all the available epidemiological
data to settle the outstanding questions about
how much death, disease and economic fallout
really resulted from the Chernobyl accident.[119]
The main fi ndings are:
Most emergency workers and people living
in contaminated areas received relatively
low whole-body radiation doses, comparable
to natural background levels.
About 4000 individuals, most of whom were
accident, were stricken with thyroid cancer
as a result of the contamination, and 15
of them have died from the disease by the
end of 2002.
The study predicts that some 4000 people
in the areas with highest radiation levels
eventually could die prematurely from
cancer caused by radiation exposure, and
of 6.8 million others living further from the
explosion who received a much lower dose,
the study estimates another 5000 are likely
to die as a result of that dose. However, no
evidence of any increases in the incidence
of leukaemia and other cancers among
affected residents has so far been detected.
The experts found no evidence or likelihood
of decreased fertility or of increases in
congenital malformations that could be
attributed to radiation exposure. (However
critics argue that impacts may not become
apparent for many years.)
•
•
•

205
• The International Commission for Radiological
Poverty, mental health problems and
‘lifestyle’ diseases, such as alcoholism
and tobacco dependency, pose a far greater
threat to local communities than does
radiation exposure. Relocation proved
a ‘deeply traumatic experience’ for some
350 000 people moved out of the affected
areas, the study noted, while persistent
myths and misperceptions about the threat
of radiation resulted in a ‘paralysing
fatalism’ among residents of affected areas.
Seeing themselves as ‘victims’ rather than
‘survivors’ has led to overcautious and
exaggerated health concerns. (In this
context it is interesting to note that other
studies (reported in Walinder[285]) have
estimated that fear of the potential impacts
of Chernobyl radiation exposure impacting
on the health of the individual or their
children led to 1250 suicides among people
who had been initial responders to the
Chernobyl accident, and between 100 000
and 200 000 elective abortions in Western
Europe in the years following the accident.)
Elizabeth Cardis of the International Agency
for Research on Cancer in Lyon, is reported
in a Nature Special Report as about to publish
a study of the pan-European impact. [286] She
concludes that, of 570 million people in Europe
at the time, 16 000 will ultimately die as a result
of the accident. This is 0.01 per cent of all
cancer deaths. As cancer causes about a
quarter of all deaths in Europe, identifying those
cases triggered by the Chernobyl-sourced
radioactivity cannot be done with statistical
confi dence. (To put this in context calculations
for increases in mortality from exposure to air
pollutants suggests that in the 1980s about
100 000 deaths from heart and lung disease,
and 1000 cancer deaths were caused each
year by air pollution in the United States.[287])
Other higher estimates of the long term
impacts have been made, assuming that the
offi cial fi gures underestimate the true release
of radioactive materials by about 30 per cent
and that there was a wider spread of
contamination and exposure. One predicts
30 000 to 60 000 excess cancer deaths in the
longer term, 7 to 15 times greater than
Chernobyl Forum estimates.[288]
This summing of very small doses over
large populations to estimate fatalities
over long periods of time is questionable.
Protection (ICRP) has recently stated:
‘…the computation of cancer deaths based
on collective doses involving trivial exposures
to large populations is not reasonable and
should be avoided’[114](p. 42). Similarly, a recent
French Académie des Sciences and Académie
Nationale de Médecine critical review of the
available data regarding the effects of low doses
of ionizing radiation on health concludes that
‘while LNT may be useful for the administrative
organization of radioprotection, its use for
assessing carcinogenic risks induced by low
doses, such as those delivered by diagnostic
radiology or the nuclear industry, is not based
on valid scientifi c data’.[270] (See Appendix M
for discussion of the linear no threshold (LNT)
hypothesis and radiation protection.)
N3.6 Post Chernobyl accident
changes to the RBMK
To avoid the same sort of accident occurring
again, all RBMK reactors in the former Soviet
Union have been modifi ed since the Chernobyl
accident (and several have been closed down).
There are still 12 RBMK reactors in operation:
11 units in Russia, and one in Lithuania.
The main objective of the changes is to reduce
what is known as the ‘positive void coeffi cient’.
A reactor is said to have a positive void
coeffi cient if excess steam voids lead to
increased power generation. A negative void
coeffi cient is the opposite situation in which
excess steam voids lead to a decrease in power.
As noted above, in a water cooled reactor steam
may accumulate to form pockets or bubbles,
known as voids. If excess steam is produced,
creating more voids than normal, the operation
of the reactor is disturbed, because the water
is a more effi cient coolant than steam and
water acts as a moderator and neutron absorber
while steam does not.
If a reactor has a positive void coeffi cient
power can increase very rapidly, as any
power increase that occurs leads to increased
steam generation, which in turn leads to
a further increase in power and more steam,
a characteristic that can lead to a runaway
feedback loop. On the other hand when the void
coeffi cient is negative, excess steam generation
will tend to shut down the reactor, a built in
safety feature.

206
The majority of power reactors in operation
around the world today have negative void
coeffi cients. In those reactors where the same
water circuit acts as both moderator and
coolant, excess steam generation reduces the
slowing of neutrons necessary to sustain the
nuclear chain reaction. This leads to a reduction
in power. As described above, in the RBMK
design the neutron absorbing properties of
the cooling water are a signifi cant factor in
the operating characteristics. In such cases,
the reduction in neutron absorption as a result
of steam production, and the consequent
presence of extra free neutrons, enhances
the chain reaction.
All operating RBMK reactors have had the
following changes implemented to improve
operating safety:
The effective number of manual control rods
has been increased from 30 to 45 to improve
the operational reactivity margin of control.
80 additional absorbers have been installed
in the core to inhibit operation at low power.
Fuel enrichment has been increased
from 2 per cent to 2.4 per cent to maintain
fuel burn up with the increase in neutron
absorption.
•
•
•
These factors have reduced the positive void
coeffi cient to the extent that the possibility
of a power excursion has been eliminated.
In addition the time taken to shut down in an
emergency has been reduced and the control
rod design has been improved.
N3.7 Could a Chernobyl-type
accident occur elsewhere?
With the modifi cations outlined above having
been made to the 12 RBMK reactors still in
operation the risk of an accident at one of
them leading to a release of radioactivity
on the scale of Chernobyl is considerably
reduced. Nonetheless the RBMK reactor
design is still considered to be less safe
than western reactors.
It should be noted that there are other reactors
in operation, in particular the UK Magnox
design that, like the RBMK, lack massive
containment structures. However they are
considered to be inherently safer, in part
because they use carbon dioxide gas as
the coolant rather than water. This means
there can be no explosive build up of
pressure as can happen when excessively
high temperature or a sudden loss of pressure
allows a phase change such as when water
turns explosively into steam in water cooled
reactors. (Further discussion of nuclear reactor
design is provided in Appendix L)
The US Nuclear Energy Institute[289] has
considered the chances of a Chernobyl-like
accident occurring in the US and concludes
that such an accident could not occur for
four main reasons:
Safer nuclear plant designs
All US power reactors have extensive safety
features to prevent large-scale accidents and
radioactive releases. The Chernobyl reactor had
no such features and was unstable at low power
levels. A large power reactor lacking safety
features, with inherent instabilities, and lacking
a massive containment structure, could not
be licensed in the US. Post-accident analyses
indicate that if there had been a US-style
containment structure at Chernobyl, it is
likely that none of the radioactivity would
have escaped, and there would have been
no injuries or deaths.
Alert and notifi cation
The Chernobyl accident was concealed from
authorities and the local population by the plant
operators. As a result the government did not
begin limited evacuations until about 36 hours
after the accident.
In the United States, nuclear power plant
operators are required to have in place
evacuation and emergency management plans
that have been developed in cooperation with
local communities. They must also alert local
authorities and make recommendations for
protecting the public within 15 minutes of
identifying conditions that might lead to a
signifi cant release — even if such a release
has not occurred.
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission posts
resident inspectors at every nuclear power plant
site to ensure the plants are following federal
safety requirements.

207
Stringent emergency preparedness plans
Even with the design problems with the
Chernobyl reactor, offi cials could have averted
many radioactive exposures to the population
with an effective emergency response.
Key personnel at all US power reactors work
with surrounding populations on an ongoing
basis to prepare for an orderly and speedy
evacuation in the unlikely event of an accident.
Protecting the food chain
Many people consumed contaminated milk
and food because authorities did not promptly
disclose details of the Chernobyl accident.
This would be unlikely to happen in the United
States. For example, following the Three Mile
Island nuclear accident in 1979, the federal
government monitored and tested all food
and water supplies that might potentially be
contaminated. Existing federal programs and
regulations would ensure the government took
similar action to quarantine and remove from
public consumption any unsafe food or water
in the case of an accident.
The majority of these requirements also apply
in other IAEA member countries with
commercial nuclear power plants.
N3.8 International cooperation on
nuclear power plant safety
In part because of the TMI event, and with
increased momentum after the much more
serious Chernobyl accident six years later,
an international consensus on the principles
for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants
has emerged. This is supported by international
cooperation mechanisms, developed through
bodies such as the International Nuclear Safety
Group (formerly the Nuclear Safety Advisory
Group) established by the IAEA. In addition
to publishing safety standard guidance
documents, the IAEA provides safety services
and runs seminars, workshops, conferences and
conventions aimed at promoting high standards
of safety. There is also an international regime
of inspections and peer reviews of nuclear
facilities in IAEA member countries, which has
legislative backing through the international
Convention on Nuclear Safety which entered
into force on 24 October 1996. The Convention
on Nuclear Safety aims to achieve and maintain
high levels of safety worldwide. All IAEA
member states with operating nuclear power
reactors are parties to the convention.
(see Appendix Q).
These developments mean that a Chernobyl
scale accident is extremely unlikely to
occur again.
N3.9 A nuclear power plant
for Australia?
If Australia were to consider establishing
a nuclear power industry, electricity generating
companies would presumably consider the
purchase of an ‘off the shelf’ currently available
reactor design. Ideally the selected reactor
would be one that had already been certifi ed
by the licensing authority in the country
of manufacture or elsewhere, as meeting
or exceeding the safety and operational
requirements legally required. Australia would
no doubt also have in place legislation requiring
performance standards at least as high. In the
health, safety and environmental areas our
current requirements for industrial activities
are considered to be on a par with world
best practice.
There are a number of commercially available
reactors that have been recently, or are currently,
undergoing licensing certifi cation in several
countries. These reactors are discussed in more
detail in Appendix L. For any of these designs
the safety requirements that must be met are
very high.[272] As an example the certifi cation
application to the US NRC for the new
Westinghouse AP 1000 reactor estimates the
risk of core damage to be one in two million
(5 × 10-7) per year of operation and the
probability of a large radioactive release
considerably lower at 6 × 10-8 per year.

208
N3.10 Note on sources
Where not otherwise referenced this Appendix is largely based on technical
descriptions and summaries of the chronology of events at the Three Mile
Island and Chernobyl accidents published by the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, American Nuclear Society, Three Mile Island Alert, and
Australian Uranium Association (previously the Uranium Information Centre)
at the websites listed below.
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html
http://www.tmia.com/accident/NRCFactSheet.pdf
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/chernobyl-bg.html
Three Mile Island Alert:
http://www.tmia.com/
American Nuclear Society:
http://www.ans.org/pi/matters/tmi/healtheffects.html
http://www.ans.org/pi/matters/chernobyl.html
Australian Uranium Association:
http://www.uic.com.au/nip48.htm

209
Appendix O. Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions
Appendix O. Climate change and
greenhouse gas emissions
While the Earth’s atmosphere and climate have
varied with time since the planet was formed,
the term ‘climate change’ refers to changes
due to human activities that are altering the
composition of the global atmosphere.[290]
These changes have accompanied
industrialisation and are outside the range of
historically observed natural variation. Climate
change enhances the natural greenhouse effect,
and results on average in additional warming of
the Earth’s surface and atmosphere (Figure O1).
Over the past 650 000 years, greenhouse gas
concentrations and global average temperatures
have fl uctuated within well-defi ned lower and
upper limits across glacial and interglacial
cycles. For example, atmospheric
Figure O1 How the greenhouse effect works
Source: Australian Greenhouse Offi ce (AGO)[137]
concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2, the chief
heat-trapping greenhouse gas) have varied
between around 180 and 300 parts per million
(ppm),[136,291] while global average temperatures
have fl uctuated by about 10°C.[137]
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution,
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have risen
more than one third from 280 to 380 ppm, and
the growth rate appears to have accelerated
in recent years.[292] The increase is primarily
from the burning of fossil fuels and from
deforestation. Atmospheric concentrations
of methane (CH4), the second leading
greenhouse gas, have more than doubled
over the past two centuries (Figure O2).[137]

210
Figure O2 Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and CH4 over the past 1000 years
Carbon Dioxide
CO2 (ppm)
CO CH4 from ice cores and Cape Grim 2 from ice cores and Cape Grim
1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Year
370
350
330
310
290
270
250
Source: AGO[137] based on Etheridge et al 1996[293] and 1998[294]
The world has, on average, warmed 0.6°C
in the past century.[2] While natural factors
contributed to the observed warming of the
fi rst half of the century, most of the warming
over the past 50 years is probably due to the
human-induced increase in greenhouse gas
concentrations.[137] On current trends, it is
possible that climatic changes comparable
in magnitude to the difference between glacial
and interglacial periods could occur in a mere
100 years, compared with several thousand
years in the past.[138]
If emissions continue to grow, or even just
remain at their present level, climate models
indicate that global average temperatures and
sea levels will rise, rainfall patterns will shift,
sea ice will melt and glaciers will continue their
global retreat. Impacts will vary greatly across
regions. Overall however, rapid climate change
presents fundamental challenges for human
and biological adaptation, especially for natural
ecosystems which typically evolve over
millennia. It also poses fundamental questions
of human security, survival and the stability of
nation states.[295] Climate change is therefore
an issue of major signifi cance for all of us.
Methane
CH4 (ppb)
1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Year
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
1000
O2 Emissions and trends
O2.1 Global emissions
The World Resources Institute (WRI) estimates
that human activity generated over 41.7 billion
tonnes of CO2-equivalent (CO2-e)109 in 2000.[140]
Over 60 per cent of these emissions came
from the production and use of energy.
Land use change (particularly deforestation)
and agriculture were other major sources.
Figure O3 provides a breakdown of global
emissions by source, by activity, and by
greenhouse gas for the year 2000. This shows
that energy-related emissions dominate,
the electricity and heat sector is responsible
for about one quarter of total emissions, and
CO2 is the most signifi cant greenhouse gas.
A small number of nations (or a union of
nations, in the case of the European Union)
account for a large proportion of global
greenhouse gas emissions. The United States,
the European Union, China, Russia and India
account for over 60 per cent of global emissions,
and the United States alone accounts for more
than one-fi fth (see Table O1). Australia accounts
for around 1.5 per cent of global emissions, and
was the world’s twelfth highest emitter in 2000.110
109 Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-e) aggregates the impact of all greenhouse gases into a single measure, adjusted to account for the different global
warming potential of each gas. For example, 1 tonne of methane has the same warming effect as 21 tonnes of carbon dioxide.
110 Note the rank of twelfth counts all EU members as one. If EU members are counted separately, Australia ranks fi fteenth.

211
Figure O3 Flow diagram of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2000
Source: WRI.[140] All calculations are based on CO2 equivalents. Land use change includes both emissions and absorptions.
Dotted lines represent fl ows of less than 0.1 per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions.
Table O1 Top greenhouse gas emitters in 2000
Country Rank Emissions
MtCO2-e
Percentage of
World GHGs
United States 1 6928 20.6
China 2 4938 14.7
EU-25 3 4725 14.0
Russia 4 1915 5.7
India 5 1884 5.6
Japan 6 1317 3.9
Brazil 7 851 2.5
Canada 8 680 2.0
South Korea 9 521 1.5
Mexico 10 512 1.5
Indonesia 11 503 1.5
Australia 12 491 1.5
MtCO2-e = million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent; GHGs = greenhouse gases.
Source: WRI.[140] Gases include CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6. Totals exclude emissions from international bunker fuels
[ie fuels for international shipping and aircraft] and land use change and forestry.

212
Population and economic growth are key drivers
of global emissions growth. Emissions growth
rates are highest among developing countries,
where CO2 emissions increased by 47 per cent
over the 1990–2002 period. CO2 emissions in
developed countries were unchanged over
the 1990–2002 period, although there were
considerable national differences. Emissions
from Russia and Ukraine declined signifi cantly
due in part to their economic transition from
centrally planned economies. Emissions
in the EU declined slightly, led by signifi cant
reductions in the United Kingdom (where coal
industry reforms have played an important role)
and Germany (refl ecting the impact of East
Germany’s economic transition). In contrast,
the United States and Canada witnessed
signifi cant growth.[140]
O2.2 Australian emissions
While there is no offi cial estimate of Australia’s
net greenhouse gas emissions prior to 1990,
rapid growth in fossil fuel extraction, energy
use and industrial and agricultural activity and
extensive land clearing over the past century
would suggest Australia’s emissions history
would mirror global trends.
Australia’s net greenhouse gas emissions
across all sectors totalled 564.7 Mt CO2-e in
2004, an increase of 2.3 per cent from 1990
levels. This overall fi gure masks two opposing
trends: emissions from land use, land use
change and forestry fell by 93.4 Mt (72 per cent)
from 1990 to 2004 (primarily due to controls and
bans on broad scale land clearing) while energy
sector emissions rose by almost 100 Mt (almost
35 per cent) over the same period. Trends in
sectoral emissions are set out in Table O2.
The production and use of energy (including
electricity production and transport) provided
the single largest source, accounting for
over 68 per cent of total emissions in 2004
(Figure O4). Electricity generation directly
generated approximately 195 Mt of CO2-e,
of which 92.2 per cent was attributable to
coal, 7 per cent to gas, and 0.8 per cent to
oil and diesel.
Table O2 Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions by sector in 1990 and 2004
Emissions Mt CO2-e Per cent change
in emissions
1990 2004 1990–2004
Australia’s Net Emissions 551.9 564.7 +2.3
Energy 287.5 387.2 +34.7
Stationary Energy 195.7 279.9 +43.0
Transport and other 91.7 107.2 +16.9
Industrial Processes 25.3 29.8 +18.0
Agriculture 91.1 93.1 +2.2
Land Use, Land Use
128.9 35.5 –72.5
Change and Forestry
Waste 19.2 19.1 –0.7
MtCO2-e = million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent.
Source: AGO.[141] Figures calculated using the Kyoto Protocol accounting provisions (those applying to Australia’s 108 per cent emissions target).
Estimate for land use is interim only.

213
Figure O4 Australia’s emissions by sector in 2004
50%
Stationary
Energy
13%
Transport
16%
300
250
200
150
100
50
MtCO2-e = million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent
Source: AGO.[141] Land use includes land use change and forestry.
5%
Fugitive
Emissions
5%
Industrial
Processes
Agriculture
6%
Land Use
3%
Waste
0
Figure O5 Atmospheric CO2 concentration from year 1000 to year 2000 and projections to 2100
ppm = parts per million
Source: IPCC [134] Figure SPM-10a. Data from ice core and direct atmospheric measurements over the past few decades.
Projections of CO2 concentrations for the period 2000 to 2100 are based on illustrative scenarios.

214
O2.3 Global projections
Emissions
The evolution of future greenhouse gas
emissions and their underlying driving forces
is uncertain. Economic and population growth,
technology development and deployment, and
international and domestic policy settings
all infl uence emission trends. Many possible
future scenarios have been developed and
modelled, resulting in a wide range of future
emission pathways.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) draws on the work of thousands
of experts from all regions of the world to assess
the best available scientifi c, technical and
socio-economic information on climate change.
Under ‘business as usual’ pathways involving
no climate policy intervention, the IPCC’s
Third Assessment Report (TAR)111 projected
total greenhouse gas emissions to rise between
63 and 235 per cent over the fi rst half of this
century. As a result, CO2 concentrations,
globally averaged surface temperature and
sea levels were projected to rise over the 21st
century. For the six illustrative scenarios, the
projected concentration of CO2 by the end of the
century ranged from 540 to 970 ppm (Figure O5).
A number of authors have critiqued the
methodology used to develop the IPCC’s long
term projections, proposed alternative methods,
and argued for more explicit recognition of the
probabilities of different future scenarios.112
These authors do not deny the importance
and reality of climate change, but they do
highlight that future climate projections are very
uncertain and that not all scenarios are equally
likely. Their preliminary assessments suggest
somewhat lower future emission levels, but the
key qualitative message remains the same:
under current policy settings future emissions
are likely to be much higher than current levels.
These issues are the subject of ongoing debate
and analysis in the scientifi c community, and
are likely to be explored further in the IPCC’s
Fourth Assessment Report.
Signifi cance of the energy sector
Demand for energy is projected to rise
substantially, driven largely by population and
economic growth and demographic change in
today’s developing countries: 1.6 billion people
currently have no access to modern energy
services; and the United Nations estimates
the global population will rise from 6 billion
today to 10.4 billion by 2100.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects
that under current policy settings primary
energy use will more than double between
2003 and 2050, with a very high reliance on
coal (Figure O6). This is consistent with IPCC
business as usual scenarios, which project
global primary energy use will grow between
1.7 and 3.7-fold from 2000 to 2050. Electricity
demand grows almost 8-fold in the IPCC’s high
economic growth scenarios, and more than
doubles in the more conservation-oriented
scenarios at the low end of the range.
These scenarios include improvements in
energy effi ciency worldwide of between 1 and
2.5 per cent per year.[297] This growth in energy
use would have major implications for climate
change: energy-related CO2 emissions under
the IEA current policy scenario would be
almost 2.5 times current levels by 2050.
111 The IPCC TAR was published in 2001. The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report is currently being developed and will be published in 2007.
112 For example, see discussion of critiques by Castles, Henderson and Schneider in McKibbin 2004.[296]

215
Figure O6 Past and projected world total primary energy supply by fuel under current policy settings
25 000
20 000
Mtoe
15 000
10 000
5 000
1990 2003 2030 2050
0
Other renewables
Hydro
Nuclear
Coal
Oil
Gas
TPES
Mtoe = million tonnes of oil equivalent.
Source: IEA[30]
Impacts
Climate models using the IPCC emissions
scenarios project an increase in globally
averaged surface temperature of 1.4 to
5.8°C over the period 1990 to 2100. This is
two to ten times more than the observed
warming over the 20th century. Nearly all
land areas are very likely to warm more than
these global averages, particularly those at
northern high latitudes in winter.
Modelling has also projected changes to
precipitation (rainfall and snow), ice cover
and sea level. Under the IPCC scenarios global
average precipitation increases during the 21st
century, however increases and decreases are
projected at regional scales. Glaciers continue
their widespread retreat, while snow cover,
permafrost, and sea-ice extent decrease further
across the Northern Hemisphere. The Antarctic
ice sheet is likely to gain mass, while the
Greenland ice sheet is likely to lose mass.
Global mean sea level is projected to rise
between 9 and 88 cm from 1990 to 2100, but
with signifi cant regional variations. This rise
is due primarily to thermal expansion of the
oceans (water expands as it warms) and
melting of glaciers and ice caps.[134]
A global average temperature increase of up
to 1°C may be benefi cial for a few regions and
sectors, such as agriculture in high latitude
areas.[134] However other regions and sectors
would be adversely affected: even the 0.6°C
average warming in the past 100 years has been
associated with increasing heatwaves and
fl oods, more intense droughts, coral bleaching
and shifts in ecosystems.[137] The larger and
faster the change, the greater the risk of adverse
impacts. For example projections suggest:
With additional warming of less than 1°C,
60 per cent of the Great Barrier Reef would
be regularly bleached causing considerable
loss of species.[135,138,139] With a 1–2°C rise,
hard coral reef communities would be
widely replaced by algal communities.[135]
A sustained global temperature rise
of about 2°C would bring the onset of
irreversible melting of the Greenland
ice sheet (and ultimately result in an
average sea-level rise of about 7m).[134]
Serious risk of large scale, irreversible
system disruption such as destabilisation
of the Antarctic ice sheets and the global
ocean thermohaline circulation is more
likely above 3°C.[133,298] Collapse of the West
Antarctic ice sheets would lead to centuries
of irreversible sea-level rise and coastal
inundation around the world.[135]
•
•
•

216
A rise in global average temperatures of more
than 5°C (equivalent to the amount of warming
that occurred between the last ice age and
today [137] ) is likely to lead to major disruption
and large-scale movement of populations.
These effects are very hard to capture with
current models as temperatures would be so
far outside human experience.[132]
Figure O7 illustrates how the risks of adverse
impacts increase with the magnitude of climate
change. The left panel displays the IPCC’s
temperature projections under business as
usual scenarios to 2100. The right panel displays
the level of risk for fi ve areas of concern,
including impacts on ecosystems and extreme
climate events. White indicates neutral or small
positive or negative impacts or risks, yellow
indicates negative impacts for some systems
or low risks, and red means negative impacts or
risks that are larger and/or more widespread.[299]
Recent science has improved our understanding
of feedback loops in the global climate system,
including:[136]
the cooling effect of aerosols (small particles
suspended in the atmosphere): this has
dampened the effect of greenhouse gases
to date, and suggests enhanced warming
later this century as greenhouse gas
concentrations increase and aerosols
are reduced.
•
a decrease in the refl ectivity of the Earth’s
surface as snow and ice melt (the albedo
effect): this exposes darker underlying land
and ocean surfaces, leading to enhanced
absorption of sunlight and further warming.
changes to terrestrial carbon cycle
dynamics: as temperature rises, soil organic
matter, fi res and carbon pools in wetlands
and frozen soil are likely to release further
greenhouse gases to the atmosphere,
forming a positive feedback loop that
intensifi es the warming.
•
•
These effects increase the risk that the upper
end of the IPCC TAR estimate of a 1.4 to 5.8°C
temperature rise will be reached or exceeded
by 2100.[136]
While uncertainties remain, the most recent
scientifi c analysis indicates some risks are more
serious than they fi rst appeared.[132,136] The world
is already experiencing an unprecedented rate
of change in ice cover and climate models
forecast the Arctic could be ice-free in summer
by the end of the century.[2,136] Likely impacts
include water shortages in Asia and South
America, where hundreds of millions rely on
glacial melt for their water supply; and changes
to the Indian monsoon, which could trigger
severe fl ooding or drought in India, Pakistan
and Bangladesh.[132]
Figure O7 Reasons for concern about projected climate change impacts
I Risks to unique and threatened systems
II Risks from extreme climate events
III Distribution of impacts
IV Aggregate impacts
V Risks from future large-scale discontinuities
Source: IPCC [299] Figure SPM-2. Global mean temperature change is used as a proxy for the magnitude of climate change.

217
O2.4 Australian projections
Emissions
Australia’s emissions are on an upward trend.
Offi cial projections published in 2005 suggest
that under current policy settings emissions
will grow by an average of 1.2 per cent each
year from 2010, reaching 673 Mt CO2-e by 2020
(22 per cent higher than 1990).
Annual emissions from stationary energy
are projected to grow to 333 Mt CO2-e by 2020,
an increase of 70 per cent over 1990 levels
(Figure O8). Electricity generation is projected
to remain the largest source of these emissions,
and is forecast to grow to a total of 222 Mt in
2020, 72 per cent above 1990 levels.[300]
Impacts
Australian average temperatures have risen
by an estimated 0.8°C over the last century
(Figure O9). The past decade has seen the
highest recorded mean annual temperatures,
and 2005 was Australia’s warmest year on
record.[301,302] Rainfall has increased over
the last 50 years over northwestern Australia,
but decreased in the southwest of Western
Australia and in much of southeastern Australia,
especially in winter. Effects on runoff are
potentially serious: water supply to Perth’s
reservoirs has dropped 50 per cent since the
1970s, and water levels in storages in much
of southeastern Australia are at near-record
lows. The cause of these changes remains
under discussion within the scientifi c
community. Nevertheless, in the case of the
southwest of Western Australia a combination
of natural variability and a trend due to the
enhanced greenhouse effect is considered
to be the likely cause.[138]
Figure O8 Australia’s stationary energy emissions since 1990 and projections to 2020
Business
as usual
400
350
300
250
200
150
'With Measures'
best estimate
'With Measures'
high scenario
'With Measures'
low scenario
Increase of
46 per cent of
1990 emissions
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Year
MtCO2-e = million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. Business as usual pathway involves no climate policy intervention.
Source: AGO [300]

218
Figure O9 Variations of Australian mean temperatures, 1910 to 2000
Temperature (°C)
Source: Based on Karoly and Braganza 2005.[303]
Year
Australia’s mean temperature since 1910
Climate models with additional greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
Climate models with no additional greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
1910
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Australia is likely to face some degree of climate
change over the next 30 to 50 years as a result
of past greenhouse gas emissions, irrespective
of global or local efforts to reduce future
emissions. The scale of that change, and the
way it will be manifested in different regions
is less certain, but climate models can illustrate
possible effects. Applying a range of these
models to Australia for the IPCC global
emissions scenarios, CSIRO has identifi ed
a number of possible outcomes:
an increase in annual national average
temperatures of between 0.4 and 2°C by
2030 and of between 1 and 6°C by 2070, with
signifi cantly larger changes in some regions
more heatwaves and fewer frosts
more frequent El Nino Southern Oscillation
events, resulting in a more pronounced cycle
of prolonged drought and heavy rains
more severe wind speeds in cyclones,
associated with storm surges being
progressively amplifi ed by rising sea levels
an increase in severe weather events
including storms and high bushfi re
propensity days.[304]
•
•
•
•
•
O2.5 Costs of impacts
Uncertainty in the scale and rate of climate
change creates formidable challenges for formal
modelling of its overall impact in monetary
terms. Nevertheless scientifi c understanding
of the risks is improving, allowing the potential
costs to be examined through probabilistic
assessment. This incorporates the full range
of possible impacts — including the small risks
of catastrophic change — rather than limiting
analysis to averages.[132]
A major assessment of the potential global
costs of climate change impacts, undertaken
by Sir Nicholas Stern for the United Kingdom
Government, was published in 2006. This
examined potential physical impacts of climate
change on the economy, on human life and on
the environment.[132]
The Stern Review estimated that the total cost
over the next two centuries of climate change
under ‘business as usual’ scenarios involves
impacts and risks that are equivalent to an
average reduction in global per-capita
consumption of at least 5 per cent, now and
forever. This fi gure does not account for direct
impacts on the environment and human health,
feedback loops in the climate system and the

219
disproportionate share of impacts which fall
on poor regions of the world. If these factors
are included, the total cost of business as
usual climate change is estimated to be
around a 20 per cent reduction in consumption
per head, now and into the future.[132]
The Review noted that its results are specifi c to
the model used and its assumptions, and that
there are great uncertainties in the science and
economics. Some economists have criticised
the Review’s assumptions (particularly the use
of a very low discount rate[310]) and suggest a
bias towards the most pessimistic studies.[311]
However in comparison to the estimated costs
of mitigation (ie reducing emissions; discussed
in Section O3.3 below), these probability-weighted
costs of impacts look very large.
Even if the more extreme impacts are diluted
as Stern’s critics suggest, the costs are still
signifi cant and provide a sound argument for
reducing emissions.
Australia has not yet undertaken a detailed
analysis of the potential costs of climate
change. However it is clear that climate change
will impose direct costs, and possibly confer
a smaller number of direct benefi ts, on the
Australian economy. Examples of costs include
possible lost production due to more severe
and frequent droughts, the potential for higher
insurance premiums due to more frequent
extreme weather events,[312] and the potential
for reduced runoff in much of southern Australia
to affect the cost of water. Estimating these
costs is very diffi cult given our current state
of knowledge. Indirect costs such as reduced
environmental amenity and poorer health
outcomes can also be expected, but are even
more diffi cult to estimate.[304]
Agriculture, which accounts for about 3 per cent
of national GDP, is highly dependent on climate.
The 2002–2003 drought demonstrated this
dependence, and provides an indication of the
potential impacts of climate change. Farm
output fell by close to $3 billion, resulting in
an estimated one per cent reduction in GDP.[304]
Tourism is also vulnerable. For example, the
Great Barrier Reef is likely to suffer from more
extensive and regular coral bleaching events,
adding to existing pressures from sediment
and nutrient runoff and commercial fi shing.
Within the Great Barrier Reef catchment,
tourism attracts approximately 1.8 million
visitors and contributes an estimated $5.1 billion
per year.[313,314] Climate model projections
suggest that within 40 years water temperatures
could be above the survival limit of corals, and
cause transformations in coral communities
that could range from cosmetic to
catastrophic.[139,304]
Figure O10 Small change in hazard can lead to large change in damage
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
25% increase in peak gust
causes 550% increase
in building damage claims
Under 20 knots 20–40 knots 40–50 knots 50–60 knots
% increase in damage claims
Source: Allen Consulting Group[304] based on Insurance Australia Group experience.

220
Similarly, our cities are highly exposed to
climate patterns. The majority of Australia’s
population live in coastal zones — areas likely to
be affected by rising ocean levels, more intense
storms and more severe storm surges. Cities
and infrastructure are built to accepted risk
limits based on the expected frequency of
severe weather events. Damage, injury and
death can accelerate in a non-linear way outside
these expected limits. For example, insurance
industry experience indicates that a 25 per cent
increase in peak wind gusts can generate a 550
per cent increase in building damage claims
(Figure O10). Given that a disproportionately
large share of insurance losses come from
extreme weather events, an increase in the
frequency and severity of storms — as is
projected with climate change — could
appreciably alter the price and availability
of insurance.[304]
O3 Response
The current and projected impacts of climate
change suggest the need for action on two
fronts: adaptation and mitigation. Adaptation
involves taking precautions against the
climate changes that have and will occur
(thereby reducing harm and in some cases
exploiting benefi cial opportunities), while
mitigation addresses the root cause of
climate change by reducing greenhouse
gas emissions (thereby reducing the level
of future climate change).
The costs and benefi ts of adaptation and
mitigation efforts operate at different time
scales. Emission cuts now will deliver future
benefi ts by reducing the scale of climate
change. Adaptation, on the other hand, will
occur gradually over time as climatic patterns
shift, and deliver more immediate benefi ts to
those taking the action. Adaptation and
mitigation also operate at different levels:
mitigation requires concerted action by the
global community, whereas adaption will occur
at a local level because different places will
experience different climate change impacts.
Adaptation and mitigation measures are
complementary, as both can reduce the risk
of harm.[134,304,315] Because of the inherently
uncertain nature of climate change, it is
impossible to know precisely what will happen
to the climate, and to determine the costs and
benefi ts of different mitigation and adaptation
policies. Rather than pursuing one or the other
in isolation, a prudent approach combines
both (Figure O11), and revises actions and
priorities as more and better information
becomes available.
As a low emission electricity generation
technology, nuclear power is most relevant
to the mitigation agenda: it provides a way to
reduce emissions from human activities and
thereby help to reduce the scale of future
climate change. The remainder of this section
therefore focuses on the nature, scale, cost
and feasibility of the abatement task.
Figure O11 Combining adaptation and mitigation
Temperature
Source: McKibbin[315]
100% Adaptation
Policy 1
now
Temperature
with no action
Policy 2
Policy 3
100% Mitigation
Adaptation and Mitigation

221
O3.1 Abatement task
Climate change results from the cumulative
impacts of billions of individual actors around
the world, and individual efforts to reduce
emissions will have no appreciable impact
if others continue to emit. Climate change
therefore requires a global response. The
international community has recognised
the need for action, and agreed to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) in 1992.
The objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilise
greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous human-driven interference with
the climate system. Stabilisation should be
achieved within a time-frame that allows
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
change, ensures food production is not
threatened, and enables economic development
to proceed in a sustainable manner.[290]
Numerous studies have attempted to defi ne
thresholds for ‘dangerous interference’ in terms
of global temperature change, atmospheric CO2
concentration, greenhouse gas concentration
or radiative forcing. Results vary widely, and the
issue is unlikely to be resolved for some time.113
However it is clear that deep cuts in emissions
will be required to stabilise emissions at any
likely target.
The Kyoto Protocol builds on the UNFCCC
by creating a framework for specifi c action,
as a fi rst step towards that objective.[316]
The Protocol, which entered into force in
2005, sets binding targets and timelines for
developed countries to collectively reduce their
total emissions to 5 per cent below 1990 levels.
The Protocol does not set binding targets for
developing countries, however it reaffi rms their
obligation — taking account of their specifi c
development priorities and circumstances —
to take action to reduce emissions.[290,316]
While Australia has not ratifi ed the Protocol,
the Australian Government has committed
to meeting its target of constraining annual
emissions during the Kyoto commitment
period (2008–2012) to no more than 108
per cent of its 1990 emissions.[58]
O3.2 Scale of action required
Because of the uncertainty and variability in
the nature, rate and scale of potential impacts,
it is not currently possible to accurately quantify
the costs and benefi ts of particular atmospheric
concentration targets. An accurate assessment
is not likely to be achievable within the required
timeframe, and so action will need to occur in
an uncertain environment.
We do know that if global emissions are
held constant at current levels, atmospheric
concentrations will continue to rise. This is
because greenhouse gases are being added
to the atmosphere faster than they are being
removed (like a bathtub being fi lled faster
than it is draining out). The difference between
stabilising emissions and atmospheric
concentrations is illustrated in Figure O12.
The red line shows the effect of holding
emissions stable at 2000 levels: atmospheric
concentrations and global average temperatures
continue to rise over time. The blue line shows
one pathway to limiting the change in global
temperatures by stabilising atmospheric
concentrations at 550 ppm (around a doubling
of pre-industrial levels): emissions would need
to be reduced signifi cantly over this century,
and further thereafter. However because this
pathway allows further emissions growth before
reductions, it involves more rapid growth in
atmospheric concentrations and temperatures
up to 2100.
113 For example, see summary of fourteen sources in Preston & Jones 2006.[135] Temperature change ranged from 0.9 to 2.9°C;
atmospheric CO2 ranged from 375 to 550ppm.

222
Figure O12 Impact of stabilising emissions versus stabilising concentrations of CO2
CO2 emissions (Gt C yr-1)
12
CO2 concentration (ppm)
Temperature change (°C)
CO2 emissions Atmospheric CO2 concentrations Temperature response
10
8
6
4
2
0
2000 2100 2200 2300
Constant CO2 emissions at year 2000 level
Source: IPCC[134] Figure 5.2
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
2000 2100 2200 2300
4
3
2
1
0
2000 2100 2200 2300
Emissions path to stabilise CO2 concentration at 550 ppm
Inertia in the climate system means that
temperatures will continue to increase long
after emissions are reduced to levels that
stabilise CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere.
Some changes in the climate system, plausible
beyond the 21st century, would be effectively
irreversible. For example, major melting of the
ice sheets and fundamental changes in the
ocean circulation pattern could not be reversed
over a period of many human generations.[134]
The IPCC TAR analysed a range of emission
and stabilisation scenarios. At the lower end,
to achieve stabilisation at 450 ppm and limit
global mean temperature change to between
1.2 and 2.3°C by the end of the century,
emissions would need to peak within the
next 10 to 20 years and then decline rapidly
(to around 30 per cent of 2000 levels by the
end of the century, and even lower after that).
In contrast, if emissions peak later this
century and are then only gradually reduced,
atmospheric levels could stabilise at 1000 ppm,
bringing larger and more rapid increases in
global mean temperature (Table O3).
The balance of scientifi c opinion is that
avoiding dangerous climate change will
require deep cuts in global greenhouse
gas emissions. To avoid more than doubling
pre-industrial levels of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere, cuts in the order of
60 per cent will be required by the end
of the century.[58,134] Deeper cuts are required
sooner to achieve lower stabilisation levels.
Recent analysis indicates that if action to
reduce emissions is delayed by 20 years,
rates of emission reduction may need to
be 3 to 7 times greater to meet the same
stabilisation target.[298]
Table O3 Projected temperature increase for different stabilisation levels
CO2 stabilisation level
(ppm)
Year of stabilisation Temperature increase at
2100 (°C)
Temperature increase at
equilibrium (°C)
450 2090 1.2–2.3 1.5–3.9
550 2150 1.6–2.9 2.0–5.1
650 2200 1.8–3.2 2.3–6.1
750 2250 1.9–3.4 2.8–7.0
1000 2375 2.0–3.5 3.5–8.7
Source: IPCC[134]
Note: To estimate the temperature change for these scenarios, it is assumed that emissions of greenhouse gases other than CO2
would follow the SRES A1B scenario until 2100 and be constant thereafter.

223
450 550 650 750
Atmospheric CO2 (ppm)
20.00
18.00
16.00
14.00
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
Present discounted cost (US$ trillions)
0.00
WG1, FUND
WRE, FUND
WG1, MERGE
WRE, MERGE
WG1, MiniCAM
WRE, MiniCAM
Optimal, MiniCAM
O3.3 Feasibility and cost
The scale of the abatement task is demanding
but not insurmountable. International responses
to other global environmental and resource
management challenges, including the 1970s
oil shock, acid rain and stratospheric ozone
depletion, demonstrate collective action is
possible and that society is willing and able
to bear transition costs to cleaner and more
sustainable practices. They also demonstrate
that great challenges can stimulate innovation
and ingenuity, strengthening our capacity to
respond to the problem and reducing the cost
of solutions. Indeed some solutions can be
delivered at zero cost or with economic benefi ts:
for example effi ciency improvements reduce
input costs, and lower pollution levels improve
health outcomes.
Numerous studies have attempted to quantify
the cost of stabilising atmospheric levels of
greenhouse gases. This is a diffi cult task: it
is hard enough to forecast the evolution of the
global energy and economic system over the
coming decade, let alone the coming century.
Projections must therefore be treated with
considerable caution. Their value lies more
in the insights they provide than the specifi c
numbers. In addition, these studies do not
incorporate the costs of the impacts of climate
change. They typically take the stabilisation
target as a given, and seek to identify the least-cost
pathway to achieve that target. A separate
assessment — which compares the costs
of mitigation (discussed here) with the costs
of impacts (discussed in Section O2.5 above)
— is required to select the ultimate target and
compare the impacts of different pathways.
The IPCC TAR reviewed a range of studies,
fi nding great diversity in the estimated
costs of achieving a given stabilisation
target. Cost estimates differ because of
the methodology used and underlying factors
and assumptions built into the analysis.
As would be expected, mitigation costs
increase with more stringent stabilisation
targets. Incorporating multiple greenhouse
gases, sinks, induced technical change,
international cooperation and market-based
policies such as emissions trading can lower
estimated costs. Some studies suggest
some abatement can be achieved at zero or
negative costs through policies that correct
market failures and deliver multiple benefi ts.
On the other hand, accounting for potential
short-term shocks to the economy, constraints
on the use of domestic and international
market mechanisms, high transaction costs
and ineffective tax recycling measures can
increase costs.[134,144]
Figure O13 illustrates the diversity of abatement
cost estimates for given stabilisation levels (for
example, the estimated cost to achieve 450 ppm
ranges from around US$2.5–17.5 trillion), as well
as the declining abatement cost as stabilisation
levels increase (estimated cost to achieve
750 ppm is less than US$1 trillion).
Figure O13 Projected abatement costs under alternative stabilisation targets
Source: IPCC[144]

224
Overall, costs are lower in scenarios involving
a gradual transition from the world’s present
energy system towards a less carbon-intensive
economy. This minimises costs associated with
premature retirement of existing capital stock
and provides time for technology development.
On the other hand, more rapid near-term action
increases fl exibility in moving towards
stabilisation, decreases environmental and
human risks and the costs associated with
projected changes in climate, may stimulate
more rapid deployment of existing low-emission
technologies, and provides strong near-term
incentives to future technological changes.
An alternative way to frame the task is to focus
on society’s ‘willingness to pay’ to avoid climate
change impacts. Rather than focus on a fi xed
stabilisation level, this approach focuses
on the acceptable cost of mitigation action.
While it does not guarantee a particular level
of emission cuts in the near term, it does
provide a way to manage the inherent
uncertainty about future climate change,
and may facilitate faster and more widespread
action to cut emissions.[317] In addition, as
more and better information becomes available,
the acceptable cost and associated level of
abatement action can be varied in response.
At an economy-wide level, abatement costs
are best measured through changes to
consumption per capita. However most studies
focus on changes to production (particularly GDP)
as a rough proxy. In these studies, stabilisation
scenarios are compared to a ‘business as usual’
baseline with continued emissions growth.
The difference between the two is considered
the cost of abatement. As above, the results
should be treated with caution, particularly
because they do not include the costs of climate
change impacts, and are very sensitive to the
choice of baseline scenario and underpinning
assumptions. The results also require careful
interpretation. GDP reductions relate to future
GDP relative to a hypothetical baseline, not
reductions in current GDP.
The IPCC TAR review found the average GDP
reduction relative to the baseline (across all
scenarios and stabilisation levels) would reach
a maximum of 1.45 per cent in 2050 and then
decline to 1.30 per cent in 2100. The maximum
reduction across all scenarios reached 6.1 per
cent in a given year, while some scenarios actually
showed an increase in GDP compared to the
baseline due to apparent positive economic
feedbacks of technology development and transfer.
The projected reductions in global average GDP
for alternative stabilisation targets under different
scenarios are set out in Figure O14.
Figure O14 Global average GDP reduction in the year 2050 under different scenarios
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
Source: IPCC[134] Figure 7.4
Eventual CO2 stabilisation level (ppm)
Scenarios
Percentage reduction relative to baseline
450 550 650 750
0
A1B
A1T
A1FI
A2
B1
B2

225
The reductions projected are relatively small
when compared to absolute GDP levels, which
continue to grow over the course of the century.
In fact the annual GDP growth rate across all
stabilisation scenarios was reduced on average
by only 0.003 per cent per year, with the
maximum reduction reaching 0.06 per cent
per year.
One to two per cent of global GDP is
undoubtedly a very substantial cost, and would
involve signifi cant dislocation and adjustment
for some industry sectors and regions, and
noticeable changes in consumer prices for
emission-intensive goods and services.
However, with annual GDP growth rates of
two to three per cent, it means that under the
stabilisation scenarios the same fi nal level of
global GDP would be attained just a few months
later than in the baseline case. The small fall in
future GDP needs to be set against the costs
of climate change impacts, which increase for
higher stabilisation levels and would be highest
under the baseline case, which involves no
action to reduce emissions.
O3.4 Abatement opportunities
in the stationary energy sector
Emissions from the energy sector can
be reduced through demand and supply
side measures: reducing the amount of
energy used, and generating energy from
lower-emission sources.
Demand side measures deliver dual benefi ts:
reducing energy use (and costs) as well as
reducing pressure to build new generation
capacity. This can ‘buy time’, allowing for further
technology improvements before new plant
is built. Some studies suggest the global
electricity industry could cut its greenhouse
emissions by over 15 per cent by 2020 and
reduce its costs at the same time.[318] However
the overall emission benefi ts depend on how
the cost savings are used. If these savings are
allocated to other emission-intensive activities,
some of the emission gains will be offset.[319]
As a result, energy effi ciency should not be
pursued in isolation but instead accompanied
by complementary policies to limit emissions.
Analysis by the IEA indicates that, by employing
technologies that already exist or are under
development, the world could be brought
onto a much more sustainable energy path
and energy-related CO2 emissions could be
returned towards their current levels by 2050.
The emission reductions achieved under six
illustrative scenarios are set out in Figure O15.
Each scenario makes different assumptions
about the cost and deployment
of technologies. The ‘Map’ scenario makes
realistic assumptions in light of current
knowledge, and is relatively optimistic in the
four key technology areas of energy effi ciency,
nuclear, renewables and carbon capture and
storage (CCS). The ‘TECH Plus’ scenario makes
more optimistic assumptions about the
progress of promising new energy technologies.
Figure O15 CO2 emission reductions from baseline by contributing factor in 2050
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Map Low
nuclear
Low
renewables
No CCS Low
efficiency
TECH Plus
Other (fuel mix,
biofuels, hydrogen)
Nuclear
Renewables
Carbon capture
& storage
Energy efficiency
0
Abatement (Gt CO2)
Gt CO2 = billion tonnes of carbon dioxide
Source: IEA.[30] Total baseline emissions in 2050 are 58 Gt CO2, so the TECH Plus scenario is the only one to reduce emissions below 2003 levels.

226
The IEA suggests energy effi ciency gains are
of highest priority, and identifi es signifi cant
scope for more effi cient technologies in
transport, industry and buildings. In electricity
generation, main gains are likely to come from
shifting the technology mix towards nuclear
power, renewables, natural gas and coal
with CCS.
This work demonstrates the world has
the technology and capacity to change,
but a huge and coordinated international
effort is required to cut emissions. The IEA
suggests public and private support will be
essential; as will unprecedented cooperation
between developed and developing nations,
and between industry and government.
The IEA further notes the task is urgent,
as it must be carried out before a new
generation of ineffi cient and high-carbon
energy infrastructure is built.[30]
O4 Conclusion
Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases are rising quickly, primarily as a result
of human activities such as burning fossil fuels
for energy. There is widespread acceptance in
the scientifi c community that this is causing
changes to the global climate.
The evidence for a warming Earth is
strengthening and the impacts of climate
change are becoming observable in some
cases.[136] Global average temperatures rose
0.6°C over the past century, and on current
trends are projected to rise by a further
1.4 to 5.8°C by the end of this century. Although
much uncertainty still surrounds the timing,
rate and magnitude of future impacts, the range
of predicted outcomes from plausible scenarios
include some very serious outcomes for the
globe. To reduce the risk of dangerous climate
change, actions to cut future emissions are
clearly warranted.
A wide range of policies could create incentives
to reduce future greenhouse gas emissions.
Nuclear power, together with a portfolio
of other low emission technologies, provides
opportunities to reduce emissions from
energy generation. Although low emission
energy technologies cannot alone solve
the problem of climate change, they are
an essential component of a sensible and
effective climate risk management strategy.

227
Appendix P. Non-proliferation
P1.1 Tracking Australian uranium
The objective of Australia’s bilateral
agreements is to ensure that Australian
Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM) does
not materially contribute to, or enhance,
any military purpose. All Australian uranium
exported since 1977 can be accounted for,
whether it has been converted, enriched,
used in power supply, is in spent fuel rods
or ready for disposal. Australia does not
allow its uranium (and its derivatives) to be
used in the development of nuclear weapons
or for other military uses. This is ensured by
precisely accounting for AONM as it moves
through the nuclear fuel cycle. The Australian
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Offi ce
(ASNO), along with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) administer these
controls. ASNO receives notifi cations and
reports on the disposition of AONM, which
are cross-checked with other sources, including
information from the IAEA. There have been
no unreconciled differences in accounting
for AONM.[25]
Australian uranium is currently exported as
uranium oxide (U3O8), which is then converted,
enriched and fabricated into fuel before it can
be used in reactors. Due to the structure of
the international nuclear fuel market, it is
not unusual for each of these activities to
be undertaken in a different country. Due
to the impossibility of physically identifying
‘Australian atoms’, an equivalence principle
is used: when AONM loses its separate identity
because of mixing with uranium from other
sources, an equivalent quantity is designated
as AONM. AONM is safeguarded throughout
the fuel cycle, including storage and disposal,
unless safeguards are terminated because the
material no longer presents a proliferation risk.
Table P1 Australia’s bilateral safeguards agreements
Country Entry into force
South Korea 2 May 1979
United Kingdom 24 July 1979
Finland 9 February 1980
United States 16 January 1981
Canada 9 March 1981
Sweden 22 May 1981
France 12 September 1981
Euratom 15 January 1982
Philippines 11 May 1982
Japan 17 August 1982
Switzerland 27 July 1988
Egypt 2 June 1989
Russia 24 December 1990
Mexico 17 July 1992
New Zealand 1 May 2000
United States (covering cooperation on Silex technology) 24 May 2000
Czech Republic 17 May 2000
United States (covering supply to Taiwan) 17 May 2000
Hungary 15 June 2002
Argentina 12 January 2005

228
The Euratom agreement covers all 25 member
states of the European Union. In addition,
two agreements with China were signed on
3 April 2006. These have not entered into force.
Australia also has an agreement with Singapore
concerning cooperation on physical protection
of nuclear materials, which entered into force
on 15 December 1989.[174]
P1.2 Reactor types and proliferation
IAEA safeguarded nuclear power plants
are inspected to verify their peaceful use.
Deliberate misuse of a civil power reactor
would be readily identifi able to IAEA inspectors.
Because all reactors (except thorium-fuelled
reactors) produce plutonium, theoretically
any reactor could be used as part of a nuclear
weapon program. In practice, different reactor
types represent different proliferation risks.
There are two routes for obtaining plutonium
— from spent fuel discharged from the reactor,
and from uranium targets introduced into
the reactor for irradiation. The proliferation
potential of various reactor types is briefl y
outlined in table P2.
In addition to a suitable reactor, a reprocessing
plant or plutonium extraction plant would be
required for separating plutonium from the
spent fuel or irradiation targets. This would
not necessarily require a large-scale facility.
‘Weapons grade’ plutonium is defi ned as
containing no more than 7 per cent Pu-240,
ie it will be around 93 per cent Pu-239. This
is also described as ‘low burnup’ plutonium.
By contrast, ‘reactor grade’ plutonium from
the typical operation of a power reactor is
defi ned as containing 19 per cent or more
Pu-240 — and the Pu-240 content is usually
around 25 per cent. This is described as
‘high burnup’ plutonium. The higher plutonium
isotopes (especially Pu-240 and Pu-242) are
not suitable for nuclear weapons because
they have high rates of spontaneous fi ssion,
compared with Pu-239, and this will lead
to premature initiation of a nuclear chain
reaction in super-critical conditions.
Table P2 Reactor types and proliferation risk
Reactor
type
Proliferation
risk
Comments
Research
reactor
low-high,
depending
on power
Research reactors can be ideal plutonium producers, because they are designed
for easy insertion/removal of irradiation targets. However, proliferation potential
depends on power level (which determines the rate of plutonium production).
The safeguards rule-of-thumb is that reactors above 25 MW thermal can produce
1 Signifi cant Quantity (8 kg) of plutonium in a year. Reactors below 25 MW are
of less concern. The ANSTO OPAL reactor in Sydney can operate at up to 20 MW.
LWR
(light water
reactor)
low
LWRs are shut down and refuelled every 12–18 months (when typically 1/3 of
the fuel is replaced). LWRs operate at high pressure and temperature, so removal
of fuel is not possible between shutdowns. A typical fuel cycle is 3–4 years, ie each
fuel element remains in the reactor for 3 operating periods. At the end of this time
the burnup level is high. The most attractive fuel for diversion is the initial start-up
core, where 1/3 will be discharged after only 12 months. The Pu-240 level of this fuel
will be relatively low, though above the weapons grade range.
OLR
(on-load
refuelling
reactor)
eg CANDU,
Magnox
and RBMK
high
OLRs are refuelled during operation. Obtaining low burnup (and hence plutonium)
is a simple matter of refuelling at a faster rate. Hence these reactors can be
a signifi cant proliferation risk, and are given very close safeguards attention.

229
Reactor
type
Proliferation
risk
Comments
PBMR
(pebble bed
modular
reactor)
low
These are a type of OLR — fuel spheres are continuously inserted and removed
from the core. However, reprocessing to extract plutonium would be diffi cult
because of the numbers of spheres involved (100 000s) and because the spheres
are made of a graphite matrix which cannot be dissolved (the spheres would
have to be crushed fi rst).
FBR
(fast breeder
reactor)
high
These comprise a core and an outer blanket of uranium in which plutonium is
produced. The blanket has relatively low neutron activity, hence plutonium with
very high Pu-239 abundance (weapons grade) is produced.
FNR
(fast neutron
reactor)
low
The FNR designs being considered now do not have a blanket, all Pu production
occurs in the core where the burnup levels are always high.
Thorium
reactor
low
These produce U-233 rather than Pu. Theoretically nuclear weapons could be
produced from U-233 but there are practical limitations (radiation levels, heat).
Source: ASNO
P1.3 Incidents involving
nuclear material
There has been no signifi cant terrorist
incident involving nuclear material or
weapons to date. There have been no
reports of the theft of signifi cant quantities114
of nuclear material from the 900
known nuclear installations worldwide,
nor acts of sabotage leading to the release
of signifi cant quantities of radioactive
material.[174]
The IAEA maintains an international
database of illicit traffi cking in nuclear
and radioactive materials since 1993.
Of the 827 confi rmed incidents, 224 incidents
involved nuclear materials (see Table P3),
516 incidents involved other radioactive
materials (mainly radioactive sources).[320]
The only incident that may have involved
enough nuclear material to make a nuclear
bomb reportedly took place in 1998 in
Chelyabinsk Oblast in Russia and involved
18.5 kg of radioactive material. Although
the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
has twice reported an incident in Chelyabinsk,
the National Intelligence Council (NIC)’s
2004 Annual Report to Congress on the
Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear
Facilities and Military stated that the Russian
security services had prevented the theft,
so the material never actually left the grounds.
It also remains unclear whether the material
in question was weapons-grade plutonium.[321]
114 One signifi cant quantity of nuclear material is the amount for which manufacture of a nuclear device cannot be excluded.
The IAEA defi nes this as 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of U-235 in HEU.[178]

230
Table P3 IAEA confi rmed incidents involving HEU or plutonium, 1993–2004[320]
Year Location Material involved Incident
1993 Lithuania HEU/150 g
4.4 t of beryllium including 140 kg contaminated with HEU
was discovered in the storage area of a bank.
1994
Russian
Federation
HEU/ 2.972 kg
An individual was arrested in possession of HEU,
which he had previously stolen from a nuclear facility.
The material was intended for illegal sale.
1994 Germany Pu/ 6.2 g
Plutonium was detected in a building during
a police search.
1994 Germany HEU/ 0.795 g
A group of individuals was arrested in illegal possession
of HEU.
A small sample of PuO2–UO2 mixture was
confi scated in an incident related to a larger
seizure at Munich Airport
1994 Germany Pu/ 363.4 g PuO2–UO2 mixture was seized at Munich airport.
1994
Czech
Republic
HEU/ 2.73 kg
HEU was seized by police in Prague. The material
was intended for illegal sale.
1995
Russian
Federation
HEU/ 1.7 kg
An individual was arrested in possession of HEU, which
he had previously stolen from a nuclear facility. The material
was intended for illegal sale.
1995
Czech
Republic
HEU/ 0.415 g An HEU sample was seized by police in Prague.
1995
Czech
Republic
HEU/ 16.9 g
An HEU sample was seized by police in
Ceske Budejovice.
1999 Bulgaria HEU/ 10 g
Customs offi cials arrested a man trying to smuggle HEU
at the Rousse customs border check point.
Mixed radioactive materials including a minute quantity of
plutonium were stolen from the former pilot reprocessing plant.
2001 France HEU/ 0.5 g
Three individuals traffi cking in HEU were arrested in Paris.
The perpetrators were seeking buyers for the material.
2003 Georgia HEU/ ~170 g
An individual was arrested in possession of HEU attempting
to illegally transport the material across the border.
2005 USA HEU/ 3.3 g
A package containing 3.3 g of HEU was reported lost
in New Jersey.
2005 Japan HEU/ 0.017 g
A neutron fl ux detector was reported lost at a
nuclear power plant.

231
P1.4 Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership
In February 2006, US President Bush proposed
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP). GNEP aims to strengthen the global
non-proliferation regime by establishing a
framework for expanded use of nuclear energy
while limiting the further spread of enrichment
and reprocessing capabilities. GNEP envisages
whole-of-life fuel leasing, where fuel supplier
nations that hold enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities would provide enriched uranium
to conventional nuclear power plants located
in user nations. Used fuel would be returned
to a fuel cycle nation and recycled using
a process that does not result in separated
plutonium, therefore minimising the
proliferation risk.
GNEP fuel supplier nations would operate
fast neutron reactors and advanced spent fuel
separation, in order to recycle plutonium and
to transmute longer-lived radioactive materials.
Reprocessing technology is proliferation
sensitive because it is required to make a
plutonium nuclear weapon. Current PUREX
reprocessing techniques result in separated
plutonium. With the advanced spent fuel
separation techniques envisaged by GNEP,
plutonium would not be fully separated,
but remain mixed with uranium and highly
radioactive materials. GNEP would reduce
holdings of plutonium-bearing spent fuel and
enable the use of plutonium fuels without
production of separated plutonium. If the
longer-lived materials are transmuted this
would reduce the period most HLW has
to be isolated from the environment
from 10 000 years to 300–500 years.
Reprocessing also reduces the volume
of HLW that results from a once through cycle
and potentially increases the lifetime of uranium
reserves. The US hopes to develop the more
proliferation-resistant pyro-processing.
Under GNEP, ‘fuel supplier nations’ would
undertake to supply ‘user nations’ with reactors,
and to supply nuclear fuel on a whole-of-life
basis. This would include spent fuel take-back
— users could return spent fuel to a fuel
supplier, who would recycle the fuel and
treat the eventual high level waste.
User nations would be given assurances
of supply for power reactors and fuel. GNEP
envisages that users will operate conventional
light water reactors, obtain low enriched
uranium fuel from a supplier nation, and
return the spent fuel to a supplier nation
(not necessarily the original supplier).
This provides user nations an incentive
not to develop national enrichment or
reprocessing capabilities.[166,174]
GNEP is a long-term proposal, which has only
recently been launched, so it can be expected
to evolve considerably over time. Some of the
GNEP technologies are already well established,
others require major development. A timeframe
for the introduction of new technologies
as envisaged under GNEP may be around
20–25 years.
P1.5 A.Q. Khan
The seizure in October 2003 of the German-owned
cargo vessel BBC China, which was
carrying container loads of centrifuge parts
(used to enrich uranium) bound for Libya,
led to the exposure of the extensive nuclear
black market network operated by Pakistani
engineer Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan. Libya
renounced its WMD program shortly after
the seizure of the BBC China. Libya’s
subsequent admissions concerning its
procurement activities provided clear cut
evidence against Khan and his network.[179,188]
Khan — a key fi gure in Pakistan’s nuclear
program — used the access he obtained
from his senior position in Pakistan’s nuclear
program to build a global proliferation network
which traded for profi t in nuclear technologies
and knowledge with states of proliferation
concern. The Khan network exploited weak
enforcement of export controls in several
countries and revealed the increasingly
devious and sophisticated methods being
used by proliferators.[169]
Khan’s network is believed to have sourced
nuclear components from up to 30 companies
in 12 countries, including in Europe and
Southeast Asia.

232
Table P4 Activities of A. Q. Khan
Year Activities
1967
• Khan receives a degree in metallurgical engineering in 1967 from the Technical University
in Delft, Holland.
1972
• Khan receives Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium.
• Khan begins work at FDO, a subcontractor to Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), the Dutch
partner in the Urenco uranium enrichment consortium.
• Khan visits the advanced UCN enrichment facility in Almelo, Netherlands to become familiar
with Urenco centrifuge technology.
1974
• 18 May: India conducts its fi rst nuclear test, a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion.’
• September: Khan writes to Prime Minister Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto to offer his services
and expertise to Pakistan.
• Khan is tasked by UCN at Almelo with translations of the more advanced German-designed G-1
and G-2 centrifuges from German to Dutch, to which he has unsupervised access for 16 days.
1975
• August: Pakistan begins buying components for its domestic uranium enrichment program from
Urenco suppliers, including from companies in the Netherlands that Khan is familiar with.
• October: Khan is transferred away from enrichment work with FDO as Dutch authorities become
concerned over his activities.
• 15 December: Khan suddenly leaves FDO for Pakistan with copied blueprints for centrifuges and
other components and contact information for nearly 100 companies that supply centrifuge
components and materials.
1976
• Khan begins centrifuge work with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
• July: Prime Minister Bhutto gives Khan autonomous control over Pakistani uranium
enrichment programs.
1978
• Khan develops working prototypes of P-1 centrifuges, adapted from the German G-1 design Khan
worked with at Urenco. Pakistan enriches uranium for the fi rst time on April 4 at Khan’s enrichment
facility at Kahuta.
1980s
• Khan acquires blueprints for the bomb that was tested in China’s fourth nuclear explosion
in 1966.
1983
• Khan is convicted, in absentia, in Dutch court for conducting nuclear espionage and sentenced
to four years in prison.
1985
• Khan’s conviction is overturned based on an appeal that he had not received a proper summons.
The Dutch prosecution does not renew charges because of the impossibility of serving Khan
a summons given the inability to obtain any of the documents that Khan had taken to Pakistan.
Mid 1980s
• Pakistan produces enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. The A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories
(KRL) continue work on enrichment and is tasked with research and development of missile
delivery systems.
• Khan reportedly begins to develop his export network and orders twice the number
of components necessary for the indigenous Pakistani program.
1986–1987
• Khan is suspected of visiting the Iranian reactor at Bushehr in February 1986 and again
in January 1987.
1980s • Khan and his network of international suppliers are reported to begin nuclear transfers to Iran.

233
Year Activities
1987
• Khan is suspected of having made an offer to Iran to provide a package of nuclear technologies.
• Khan is believed to make a centrifuge deal with Iran to help build a cascade
of 50 000 P-1 centrifuges.
• KRL begins to publish publicly available technical papers that outline some of the more
advanced design features of centrifuge design and operation.
1988 • Iranian scientists are suspected of receiving nuclear training in Pakistan.
1989
• From 1989 to 1995, Khan is reported to have shipped over 2000 components and sub-assemblies
for P-1, and later P-2, centrifuges to Iran.
1992
• Pakistan begins missile cooperation with North Korea. Within Pakistan, KRL is one of the
laboratories responsible for missile research and will develop the Ghauri missile with
North Korean assistance.
Mid 1990s
• Khan starts travel to North Korea where he receives technical assistance for the development
of the Ghauri missile. Khan makes at least 13 visits before his public confession in 2004 and
is suspected of arranging a barter deal to exchange nuclear and missile technologies.
• Khan is suspected to have met with a top Syrian offi cial in Beirut to offer assistance with
a centrifuge enrichment facility.
1997
• Khan begins to transfer centrifuges and centrifuge components to Libya. Libya receives
20 assembled P-1 centrifuges and components for 200 additional units for a pilot enrichment
facility. Khan’s network will continue to supply with centrifuge components until late 2003.
• Khan is suspected of beginning nuclear transfers to North Korea around this time.
1998
• India detonates a total of fi ve devices in nuclear tests on May 11 and 13.
• Pakistan responds with six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30.
2000
• Libya receives two P-2 centrifuges as demonstrator models and places an order for components for
10 000 more to build a cascade. Each centrifuge contains around 100 parts, implying approximately
1 million parts total for the entire P-2 centrifuge cascade.
2001
• Khan is forced into retirement. President Musharraf admits that Khan’s suspected proliferation
activity was a critical factor in his removal from KRL.
2001–2002 • Libya receives blueprints for nuclear weapons plans. The plans are reported to be of Chinese origin.
2002
• From December: Four shipments of aluminium centrifuge components are believed to have
been sent from Malaysia to Dubai before August 2003, en route to Libya.
2003
• October: The German cargo ship BBC China is intercepted en route to Libya with components
for 1000 centrifuges.
• December: Libya renounces its nuclear weapons program and begins the process of full
disclosure to the IAEA, including the declaration of all foreign procurements.
2004
• 4 February: Khan makes a public confession on Pakistani television (in English) of his illegal nuclear
dealings. Khan claims that he initiated the transfers and cites an ‘error of judgment.’
He is pardoned soon after by President Musharraf and has been under house arrest since.
The Pakistani government claims that Khan acted independently and without state knowledge.
Source: Carnegie Endowment, drawing on a range of publications.[188]

234
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
The PSI was announced by the United States
in May 2003 as a practical measure for closing
gaps in multilateral non-proliferation regimes.
The initiative operates as an informal
arrangement between countries sharing
non-proliferation goals to cooperate to disrupt
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related
trade, including nuclear technologies and
material. PSI countries operate within national
and international law to combat WMD
proliferation and to work together to strengthen
these laws. Australia has been one of the
principal drivers of the PSI since its launch
in 2003. The PSI is already supported by
80 countries.[169]
The PSI specifi cally responds to the need
to capture WMD-related transfers between
states of proliferation concern, or to
non-state actors, that breach international
non-proliferation norms or are beyond the reach
of the export control regimes. In October 2003,
Italy, Germany and the United States worked
together to stop the German-owned vessel
BBC China from delivering a cargo of
centrifuge parts for uranium enrichment
destined for Libya’s nuclear weapons
program. Soon after, the Libyan Government
renounced its WMD programs.[169]
P1.6 Security at nuclear facilities
The nuclear materials at the ‘front end’ of the
fuel cycle — natural, depleted and low enriched
uranium — present minimal risk to public
health and safety when properly managed. As
a direct consequence of their inherent low levels
of radioactivity, these materials are of low
concern as sabotage targets and are not suited
to the manufacture of ‘dirty bombs’. Uranium
hexafl uoride (UF6) is a solid material at normal
ambient temperatures, and becomes gaseous
above 60°C, so is not readily dispersed to the
environment. The overall risk to the public from
any release of fl uorine or UF6 would be very
low compared with other widely established
industrial processes which typically involve
much larger quantities of hazardous
chemicals. Uranium mining and milling,
conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication,
and the transport of these materials, do not
present a signifi cant risk to the public even
if subjected to sabotage.
Spent fuel poses a greater potential risk than
materials at the ‘front end’ of the fuel cycle,
because it contains highly radioactive fi ssion
products — although these dangerously high
levels of radioactivity make it self-protecting
against theft. Spent fuel is present in reactor
cores, reactor storage ponds, away-from-reactor
storage facilities, and at reprocessing plants.
Associated with these activities is the transport
of spent fuel from reactors to storage or
reprocessing facilities, and the transport of
radioactive wastes. Consequently, reactors and
reprocessing plants, and associated activities,
are the subject of special attention from the
physical protection perspective.[174]
Uranium enrichment
As with uranium conversion, there are
no particular security concerns with regard
to a uranium enrichment plant. Indeed,
potential risks would be less than with
conversion because smaller stocks of UF6
are likely to be on hand at any one time.
There is no signifi cant radiation risk for
facilities producing low enriched uranium
because the radiation level of enriched
uranium is only slightly higher than natural
uranium. The principal risk comes from the
presence of fl uorine, a corrosive chemical,
in UF6. The risk of release of fl uorine as UF6
mainly relates to UF6 in autoclaves at feeding
and withdrawal stations — for an enrichment
plant large enough to enrich all of Australia’s
current uranium production, the quantity of UF6
in autoclaves at any one time could be of the
order of 100–200 tonnes. The quantities of UF6
in gaseous form undergoing enrichment at
any time would be very small, only a couple
of tonnes.[174]
As with conversion, the overall risk to the
public from any release of UF6 from an
enrichment plant would be very low
compared with other widely established
industrial processes which can involve much
larger quantities of hazardous chemicals.

235
Nuclear power plants
A typical nuclear power plant is protected
by its structure and by guards and access
controls. Modern plants are covered by
a reinforced concrete containment building,
which has the primary function of retaining
any radioactive contamination released in the
event of a reactor accident, but which also
provides effective protection against attack.
The key for security at a nuclear reactor
is robustness and defence in depth.
The scenario with the greatest consequences
is the possibility of an attack causing a loss of
coolant and subsequent reactor core melt-down,
with possible release of radiation to the outside
environment. The reactor safety systems are
designed to minimise the risk of melt-down
and to avoid or contain any radiation release.
Defence in depth requires that the safety of
the plant does not rely on any one feature.
The reactor vessel is robust, the reactor is
contained within an inner reinforced concrete
and steel biological shield, and this structure
and the primary cooling circuit, as well as the
emergency core cooling system, are located
within a massive reinforced concrete
containment structure.
Reactor cores are protected by thick concrete
shields, so breaching the reactor containment
and shielding would require a violent impact
or explosion. Indirectly, a release might occur
if enough critical safety systems were damaged,
but because of defence in depth, this would
require a high degree of access, co-ordination
and detailed plant knowledge. The main risk
of terrorist attack might be to generating units,
electrical switchyards and ancillary equipment,
which are outside the reactor containment
area — in this respect a reactor would be no
more a risk than any other large-scale power
station, and would be far better protected than
a non-nuclear power station, or any other large
industrial activity.[174]
Aircraft attack
In 1988, the United States conducted an
experiment propelling a 27-tonne twin-engine
jet fi ghter into a reinforced concrete structure
at 765 km/h. This experiment, confi rmed by
other studies, showed that the greatest risk
of penetration is from a direct impact by a jet
engine shaft — but the maximum penetration
of the concrete was 60 mm. Reactor
containment structures are typically more
than 1 metre thick. Most of the aircraft’s
kinetic energy goes into the disintegration
of the aircraft.[174, 199]
A study by the US based Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI)[199] using computer
analyses of models representative of US
nuclear power plant containment types found
that robust containment structures were not
breached by commercial aircraft, although there
was some crushing and spalling (chipping of
material at the impact point) of the concrete.
The wing span of the Boeing 767–400 (170 feet)
— the aircraft used in the analyses — is
slightly longer than the diameter of a typical
containment building (140 feet). The aircraft
engines are physically separated by
approximately 50 feet. This makes it impossible
for both an engine and the fuselage to strike
the centreline of the containment building.
Two analyses were performed. One analysis
evaluated the ‘local’ impact of an engine on
the structure. The second analysis evaluated
the ‘global’ impact from the entire mass of
the aircraft on the structure. Even under
conservative assumptions with maximum
potential impact force, the analyses indicated
that no parts of the engine, the fuselage or
the wings — nor the jet fuel — entered the
containment buildings. Similar conclusions
were made about an attack on spent fuel
storage at power plants.[199]
Direct attack
Power plant reactor structures are similarly
resistant to rocket, truck bomb or boat attack.
Further, if terrorists attempted to take over
a reactor, they would have to overcome
the guard force. Even if they succeeded,
it is unlikely that the actions they might
take would result in signifi cant radiation
release to the outside environment.[174]

236
An EPRI study[128] into a direct attack on
a nuclear power plant found that the risks
to the public from terrorist-induced radioactive
release are small. The probabilities of terrorist
scenarios leading to core damage at a given
plant were seen to be low. This was attributable
to several factors:
low likelihood of a threat to a specifi c plant
high likelihood that the threat will
be thwarted before an attack can be
launched that could be successful in
taking over the plant
low likelihood that a successful attack could
ultimately lead to core damage and release.
The study found that given an attack,
the likelihood of core damage (such as
the 1979 Three Mile Island Event) is unlikely
because of nuclear plant capabilities to
detect insider activities, physically deter
the attackers, and prevent the spread of an
accident with operator actions and safety
systems. The likelihood of severe release
is even less because of the inherent strength
of containment and radioactivity removal
capabilities of containment and systems
design. Even if a core damage accident
occurred from terrorist attack, the
consequences to the public are not likely
to be severe. This was attributed to the
following factors:
even for extreme types of scenarios,
the containment is able to remove a
signifi cant fraction of the radioactive
release before it escapes to the environment
core damage tends to occur over several
hours or a longer period, thus allowing
time for emergency response measures
to be taken.
•
•
•
•
•
Reprocessing
Reprocessing plants have inventories of
highly radioactive materials — the fi ssion
products — which are conditioned for disposal,
using vitrifi cation. Countries with reprocessing
plants have conducted studies of the possible
vulnerabilities of these plants to terrorist attack,
including by aircraft. These facilities are
typically of massive concrete construction
which would be resistant to attack.
For particular plants, additional protective
measures have been taken, including structural
upgrades, air exclusion zones, and installation
of anti-aircraft missiles.[174]
Spent fuel and/or high level waste repository
Used reactor fuel is mainly stored in
cooling ponds under several metres of water.
Storage takes place both at reactor sites and
reprocessing plants. The main mechanism
by which large releases of radioactive material
could occur is by loss of cooling water.
This might result in overheating and damage
to fuel elements, releasing radioactive material
into the atmosphere.[202] The spent fuel cooling
ponds at conventional Western power
reactors (PWR and BWR) are sited inside
the containment structure. Therefore, as with
the reactor itself, spent fuel in these ponds
is well protected from attack.
Transport
Over the past 35 years there have been more
than 20 000 transfers of spent fuel and high
level waste (HLW) worldwide, by sea, road,
rail and air, with no signifi cant security
or safety incident. Principles for physical
protection are well established — structurally
rugged containers are used, and transfers
are appropriately guarded. Experiments
have demonstrated that spent fuel and HLW
containers are diffi cult to penetrate, even
using sophisticated explosives, and the risk
of dispersal of radioactive contamination
is limited.[174]

237
The EPRI study into aircraft attack found
that due to the extremely small relative size
of a fuel transport container compared to the
Boeing 767–400, it is impossible for the entire
mass of the aircraft to strike the container.
Its evaluation of the worst case of a direct
impact of an engine on the representative fuel
transport cask showed the container body
withstands the impact from the direct engine
strike without breaching.[199]
Concern has been expressed that an attack on
a road or rail shipment of radioactive material
might be easier to accomplish than at a fi xed
installation, and could take place near major
population centres. However, the amounts of
material involved are smaller and transportation
containers are robust.[202]

238
Appendix Q. Australia’s nuclear-related
international commitments
Q1 Australia’s international
law commitments
Australia is a party to several international
legal instruments relevant to its current
nuclear activities. It is implementing all
current international obligations through
domestic law and administrative arrangements.
If Australia were to expand its nuclear fuel cycle
activities it would need to continue to comply
with existing international law obligations, as
well as consider committing to other relevant
international legal instruments.
Q1.1 Safeguards
Under Article III.1 of the NPT, Australia has
undertaken to accept IAEA safeguards on
all source or special fi ssionable material
in all peaceful nuclear activities within its
territory. These safeguards are set out in
the Agreement between Australia and
the International Atomic Energy Agency
for the Application of Safeguards in connection
with the NPT, ratifi ed by Australia in 1973.
Further commitments forming part of the
IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system are
set out in the Additional Protocol to Australia’s
IAEA safeguards agreement. Australia ratifi ed
the Additional Protocol in 1997.
Australia has also concluded a number of
bilateral agreements on peaceful nuclear
cooperation with other countries to facilitate
the transfer of nuclear material and technology,
and to provide a framework for cooperation in
relation to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The Commonwealth Safeguards Act 1987
establishes the Australian Safeguards and
Non-proliferation Offi ce (ASNO) as the national
authority responsible for safeguards and
the physical protection of nuclear material.
ASNO regulates all persons or organisations
in Australia that have nuclear-related materials,
items or technology. At present, this principally
applies to ANSTO as Australia’s only nuclear
reactor operator, but also covers a diverse
range of other entities including uranium mines,
associated transport and storage operations,
private sector laboratories, educational
institutions and patent attorneys. Persons using
depleted uranium for various purposes are also
subject to ASNO permits.
ASNO’s responsibilities covering nuclear
materials (thorium, uranium and
plutonium) include:
•
the physical protection and security
of nuclear items in Australia
the application of nuclear safeguards in
Australia (ensuring that nuclear materials
and nuclear items in Australia such as
facilities, equipment, technology and
nuclear-related materials are appropriately
regulated, protected and accounted for and
do not contribute to proliferation or nuclear
weapons programs)
the operation of Australia’s bilateral
safeguards agreements
contribution to the operation and
development of IAEA safeguards and
the strengthening of the international
nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well
as ensuring that Australia’s international
nuclear obligations are met.
Q1.2 Export controls
Under Article III.2 of the NPT,
Australia has undertaken:
‘…not to provide:
(a) source or special fi ssionable material, or
(b) equipment or material especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use or
production of special fi ssionable material,
to any non-nuclear-weapon State for
peaceful purposes, unless the source or
special fi ssionable material shall be subject
to the safeguards required by this Article.’
•
•
•
While the NPT establishes a general
commitment, the Zangger Committee
was established to implement Article III.2
to prevent the diversion of exported nuclear
items from peaceful purposes to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,115
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has
established Guidelines for nuclear exports.116
115 http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Zangger/Misssion/default.htm
116 http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/

239
Appendix Q. Australia’s nuclear-related international commitments
Both bodies establish mechanisms to ensure
harmonised national level controls over nuclear
material, equipment and technology and
nuclear dual-use items and technology.
Q1.3 Physical protection
of nuclear material
The international community has established
standards for the physical protection of nuclear
material and nuclear facilities. All of Australia’s
bilateral safeguards agreements include
a requirement that internationally agreed
standards of physical security will be applied
to nuclear material in the country concerned.
As well as being a party to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(CPPNM), Australia is also a signatory to the
International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism
Convention), and is working towards ratifi cation.
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention is aimed at
strengthening the international legal framework
to combat terrorism.
Q1.4 Nuclear power plant safety
Australia became a party to the Convention
on Nuclear Safety (CNS) in March 1997.
While Australia has no nuclear installations
as defi ned, Australia became a party to the
CNS in order to support a strengthened global
nuclear safety norm and the establishment
of fundamental safety principles for
nuclear installations.
Q1.5 Management of spent fuel
and radioactive waste
The 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety
of Radioactive Waste Management entered
into force generally in June 2001. Australia
became a party in 2003. The Joint Convention
establishes an international legal framework
for the harmonisation of national waste
management practices and standards,
together with a periodic peer review process
similar to that under the Convention on Nuclear
Safety. The Convention promotes the safe and
environmentally sound management of spent
fuel and radioactive waste, covering matters
such as the storage, transboundary movement,
treatment and disposal of these materials.
The Australian National Report submitted
under the Joint Convention is made on behalf
of the nine jurisdictions (Commonwealth,
states and territories).
ARPANSA prepares Australia’s National Report
under the Convention. Under section 15 of the
ARPANS Act, the CEO of ARPANSA is
responsible for promoting uniformity of
radiation protection and nuclear safety
policy and practices across jurisdictions.
Q1.6 Transport of
radioactive material
Australia became a party to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
in 1994. The Convention includes some specifi c
rules governing the transport of radioactive
material. Provided that these rules and the
general UNCLOS provisions are complied with,
countries are entitled to transport radioactive
material under the general principles of freedom
of navigation.
The 2001 Waigani Convention (Convention
to Ban the Importation into Forum Island
Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes
and to Control the Transboundary Movement
and Management of Hazardous Wastes within
the South Pacifi c Region) prohibits the
importation of all radioactive wastes into Pacifi c
Island Developing Parties. Australia is a party
to the Waigani Convention.
Australia is also a party to various transport
mode-specifi c international instruments, which
give force to the IAEA Regulations for the Safe
Transport of Radioactive Material (the IAEA
Transport Regulations). The IAEA Transport
Regulations refl ect international best practice
and are incorporated into Australian domestic
legislation governing the transport of
radioactive material.
The International Maritime Dangerous Goods
Code implements the provisions of the IAEA
Transport Regulations relating to maritime
safety. The Code is incorporated into the text
of the International Convention for the Safety

240
of Life at Sea (the SOLAS Convention). Australia
became a party to the 1974 SOLAS Convention
in 1983. The International Code for the Safe
Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel,
Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes
on Board Ships (INF Code) has also been made
mandatory through its incorporation into the
SOLAS Convention.
Australia is a party to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention). A Technical Annex to the Chicago
Convention gives legal force to the IAEA
Transport Regulations for the air transport
of radioactive material.
Q1.7 Emergency
preparedness/response
The Convention on Nuclear Safety imposes
certain obligations with regard to emergency
planning. As a party to the Convention,
Australia is obliged to take appropriate steps
to ensure that it has in place on-site and off-site
emergency plans that cover the actions to be
taken in the event of an emergency. The plans
need to be tested before any nuclear installation
goes into operation and subsequently be
subjected to tests on a routine basis.
The Convention on the Early Notifi cation
of a Nuclear Accident (the Early Notifi cation
Convention) and the Convention on
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident
or Radiological Emergency (the Assistance
Convention) cover situations in which an
accident involving activities or facilities in
one country have resulted or may result in
a transboundary release that could be of
radiological safety signifi cance for other
countries. These Conventions were negotiated
following the 1986 Chernobyl accident.
Australia is a party to both conventions.
The Early Notifi cation Convention requires
countries, in the event of an accident at
a nuclear reactor, nuclear fuel cycle facility,
or radioactive waste management facility,
to notify those States which may be physically
affected by the accident. Parties are obliged to
provide exact information in order to facilitate
the organisation of response measures.
The Assistance Convention is a framework
agreement designed to establish a general
basis for mutual assistance in the event of
a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
Under the Convention, members are required
to cooperate between themselves and with
the IAEA to facilitate prompt assistance in
the event of a nuclear accident or radiological
emergency to minimise its consequences and
to protect life, property, and the environment
from the effects of radiological releases.
Q2 Impact of expanded
domestic nuclear activity
on arrangements for
implementing international
obligations
Any expansion of Australia’s nuclear activities
would need to take into account relevant
international instruments regarding nuclear
activities. It is possible that new obligations
would come into effect under existing
international commitments, if Australia were
to expand its involvement in nuclear activities.
For example, if Australia were to develop
nuclear installations as defi ned by the
Convention on Nuclear Safety it would be
necessary to ensure any obligations are given
effect in domestic law.
As well as making its own laws in relation
to nuclear liability, Australia would also have
to consider whether it should become a party
to the international nuclear liability regime.
It could do so by joining either the Vienna
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage or the Paris Convention on Third
Party Liability for Nuclear Damage, and
possibly also the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which
provides a bridge between the Vienna and
Paris Conventions. The international nuclear
liability regime has the objective of providing
protection for the victims of nuclear accidents.
As mentioned in Appendix J, nuclear power
utilities covered by this liability regime generally
pay commercial insurance premiums.
Depending on the source country, it may also be
necessary to negotiate new bilateral safeguards
agreements, or amend existing agreements to
enable the importation of equipment and
technology for the expansion of Australia’s
nuclear industry.

241
Appendix Q. Australia’s nuclear-related international commitments
Q3 Multilateral legal instruments
The safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy is regulated by a framework of multilateral legal
instruments, including the following:
Table Q1 Nuclear-related Multilateral Legal Instruments to which Australia is a Party
Convention on Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) 1957
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) 1960
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1973
Agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application
of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1974
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982
South Pacifi c Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 1986
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1987
Convention on Early Notifi cation of a Nuclear Accident 1987
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency 1987
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacifi c Region
(the SPREP Convention) 1990
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1993
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter
(the London Convention) as amended by its 1996 Protocol
Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional to the Agreement between Australia
and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1997
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1997
Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and
to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacifi c
Region (Waigani Convention) 2001
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management 2003

242
Table Q2 Nuclear-related Multilateral Legal Instruments to which Australia is not a Party
The 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
The 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
The 1988 Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention
The 1997 Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
The 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage
(signed by Australia on 1 October 1997 but not ratifi ed)
The 2004 Protocol to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
The 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (signed by Australia
on 8 July 2005, Australia is taking steps to ratify)
International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism — [2005] ATNIF 20 (signed by Australia
on 14 September 2005, Australia is taking steps to ratify)
Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation — [2005] ATNIF 30 (signed by Australia on 7 March 2006, Australia will be taking steps to ratify)

243
Appendix R. Australian R&D,
Education and Training
An expanded Australian nuclear energy
industry would have implications for our
education system and our scientifi c research
base. A broad range of skills would be needed
in policy and regulatory fi elds, nuclear
engineering and construction, and basic
research in nuclear science. Vocational training
would be required in areas such as radiation
protection, health and safety, and science and
technology appropriate for specifi c industrial
demands. It is important to note that highly
skilled research personnel not only support
future technological development, but also
contribute to government policy development,
and addressing regulatory issues associated
with the nuclear industry.
R1 Australian nuclear R&D
The term nuclear R&D can refer to a wide
range of basic and applied activities, including
research related to the production of nuclear
energy (in Australia such activities are largely
related to uranium mining). However, nuclear
R&D can also be conducted in areas that are
not related to energy production, such as
nuclear medicine.
Every two years the Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) carries out a survey
of public funding for energy R&D in Australia,
although the defi nition of what constitutes
such R&D may exclude funding for some
legitimate research activities in universities
and government research organisations.
Nevertheless, the surveys show that for
the last decade over 90 per cent of publicly
funded R&D was related to either exploration
or mining of uranium (see Figure R1).
Figure R1 Public funding for nuclear R&D in Australia (by objective)
Constant 2004–05 prices on a chain-volume basis ($ '000)
1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Exploration for uranium
Mining and extraction
of uranium
Preparation and supply
of uranium as an energy
source material
Nuclear energy
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Source: Unpublished ABS data.
Appendix R. Australian R&D, Education and Training

244
Funding for nuclear energy related R&D
has been below $110 000 in all of the years
examined. Public spending on R&D associated
with the preparation and supply of uranium
as an energy source material or nuclear
energy related R&D has averaged below
$20 000 a year over the period examined.
Australian private sector spending on nuclear
R&D is harder to quantify, but it is likely that
the recent increased uranium prices have
led to higher levels of R&D. Certainly, private
sector funding of R&D conducted by the ANSTO
Minerals Group has increased signifi cantly in
recent years and the outlook is for this source
of funding to further grow.
Figure R2 Private sector funding for ANSTO Minerals Group R&D
Annual average
over previous
8 years
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
$1 800 000
$1 600 000
$1 400 000
$1 200 000
$1 000 000
$800 000
$600 000
$400 000
$200 000
2006/07
(est)
Source: Personal communication with ANSTO Minerals Group.
In part, the low level of spending refl ects the
lack of higher education opportunities that are
specifi cally related to the nuclear fuel cycle.
A comparison of FTE (full time equivalent)
human resources against available R&D
funding shows that each FTE person involved
in nuclear R&D is on average associated with
R&D funding of between $120 000 and $130 000
a year. Any signifi cant funding increase for
nuclear energy related R&D is likely to require
a similar increase in researchers. Some of those
researchers could come fairly quickly from
a reallocation of existing resources and others
may come from overseas. However, it is likely
that researcher numbers will take time to
respond to increased funding.
For example, the US experience suggests
that it may take four to six years for
postgraduate researcher numbers to
respond to increased funding. This implies
that a phased increase in research funding
would be the most appropriate course
of action should a signifi cant increase
in funding be judged to be desirable.
Public spending on nuclear R&D has over the
decade to 2004–05 averaged around $2 million
a year. The higher education sector’s role in
nuclear R&D is small and declining. Annual
spending by this sector averaged around
$150 000 in the decade to 2004–05, but as noted
earlier, there may be some relevant university
research that is not captured in these statistics.

245
R2 Australian nuclear
research facilities
Nuclear research covers a wide range of
activities from nuclear physics, the nuclear
fuel cycle, through to applications of nuclear
techniques in a wide range of science and
technology areas, including medicine, geology,
and archaeology. In the sections below we limit
the discussion to those areas that are likely
to be fertile training areas for the kinds of skilled
personnel that would be required if there was
an expansion of nuclear fuel cycle activities
in Australia.
R2.1 Heavy Ion Accelerator Facility,
Australian National University
(ANU)
The Heavy Ion Accelerator Facility at the
Department of Nuclear Physics, ANU has an
Electrostatic Tandem accelerator operating
in the 15MV (million volts) region with the
ability to inject into a modular superconducting
Linear Accelerator. The accelerator produces
a broad range of heavy ion beams that are
delivered to ten experimental stations.
These are instrumented for a range of
national and international users.
The ANU facility is available for basic research
in nuclear physics as well as for selected
applications. The facility maintains and
develops accelerator capabilities for the
research community, and provides a training
ground for postgraduate and postdoctoral
research in nuclear physics and related areas.
The current research programme includes:
fusion and fi ssion dynamics with heavy ions
nuclear spectroscopy and nuclear structure
nuclear reaction studies
interactions applied to materials
accelerator mass spectrometry —
development and application.
•
•
•
•
•
The facility operates as a de facto National
Facility with over twenty per cent of the
Australian users of the facility being based
at institutions besides the ANU.117 There is also
a strong program of international collaboration
with 48 per cent of the users coming from
outside Australia.
R2.2 Australian Nuclear
Science and Technology
Organisation (ANSTO)
ANSTO is Australia’s national centre for nuclear
science and technology.118 It is responsible for
delivering specialised advice, scientifi c services
and products to government, industry, academia
and other research organisations.
ANSTO has approximately 860 personnel and
an annual budget of some $160 million, which
includes $40 million from commercial services.
ANSTO undertakes nuclear related R&D in
a wide range of areas, particularly in relation
to health, the environment, engineering
materials and neutron scattering. Approximately
$30 million is spent annually across these areas.
While ANSTO’s focus is principally on activities
not associated with the nuclear fuel cycle,
it maintains strong R&D interest in areas
such as the development of waste forms
and processes for the management of nuclear
and radioactive wastes. It has also sustained
its research capability in areas such as uranium
mining and the management of uranium
mine sites.[101]
ANSTO’s nuclear infrastructure, much of
which is focussed on applications, includes
the national research reactor, particle
accelerators and radiopharmaceutical
production facilities. Some are described
in more detail below.
ANSTO also operates the National Medical
Cyclotron at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital
in Camperdown, an accelerator facility used
to produce certain short-lived radioisotopes
for nuclear medicine procedures.
117 Although operating as a de facto National Facility, at this stage, that status is not formally recognised and no direct facility funding is provided.
118 ANSTO is located in New South Wales, just outside Sydney.

R2.3 National Research Reactor
ANSTO has operated the 10MW High Flux
Australian Reactor (HIFAR) national research
reactor since 1958. HIFAR produces neutrons
through the fi ssion process. These are used
for a range of purposes, including:
subatomic research, such as neutron
diffraction for the study of matter
neutron activation analysis for forensic
purposes and the mining industry
production of radioactive medicines
for cancer diagnosis and therapy
silicon irradiation doping for
semiconductor use
the production of radioisotopes
for industrial uses.
•
•
•
•
•
HIFAR is being replaced by a new research
reactor, the 20MW Open Pool Australian
Light-water reactor (OPAL) which was granted
an operating license in July 2006 and reached
full power operation in November 2006.
The licence allows ANSTO to load nuclear fuel
and carry out further testing to ensure OPAL’s
performance meets expectations. Subsequent
shutdown of HIFAR is expected to occur early
in 2007.
The neutron scattering facilities at HIFAR and
OPAL are operated by the Bragg Institute.
R2.4 Australian Institute of Nuclear
Science and Engineering (AINSE)
AINSE was established in 1958 to provide
a mechanism for access to the special facilities
at Lucas Heights (now ANSTO) by universities
and other tertiary institutions and to provide
a focus for cooperation in the nuclear science
and engineering fi elds. It has a specifi c mandate
to arrange for the training of scientifi c research
workers and the award of scientifi c research
studentships in matters associated with nuclear
science and engineering.
In June 2006 the AINSE Council decided to
facilitate the formation of an Australia-wide
nuclear science and technology school.
The intention is to provide education in a wide
range of nuclear related matters from technical
aspects of the fuel cycle and reactor operation
through nuclear safety and public awareness to
political matters of interest to policy makers.119
R2.5 Nuclear fusion research
The main areas of Australian research relevant
to the possible long-term development of nuclear
fusion as a source of power are in the fi elds of
basic plasma science and modelling, carried out
partly on the H-1 National Facility at the Australian
National University, the development of diagnostic
tools, and in a variety of materials-related research
aimed at the testing and development of materials
that will be able to withstand high temperatures
and intense neutron fl uxes.
Table R1 summarises the current range of fusion
related research by members of the Australian
ITER120 Forum as at August 2006.121
Table R1 Current fusion energy related research in Australia
Institute Research fi eld
Plasma physics (laboratory, magnetic confi nement,
space physics), surface science.
University of Sydney
Plasma physics (laboratory, astrophysical and space theory),
surface material.
University of Newcastle High temperature materials.
University of Wollongong Metallurgy, welding, surface engineering.
ANSTO Materials, surface engineering.
Source: Australian ITER Forum[269]
119 Stakeholders in the discussions include the Australian National University, a consortium of universities in Western Australia, the Universities
of Wollongong, Newcastle, Sydney, and Melbourne, Queensland University of Technology and RMIT.
120 International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor.
recommended that Australia secure formal involvement in the ITER project and seek to better coordinate its research for fusion energy across
the various fi elds and disciplines in Australia.[26]
246

247
R2.6 Australian Radiation Protection
(ARPANSA)
ARPANSA conducts research in areas such
as improved measurement of environmental
samples for naturally occurring radioactive
materials in mining and mineral sands
production and for man-made radionuclides
disposed of as radioactive waste. Monitoring
equipment for rapid scanning of large areas
following a radiological emergency has been
developed and supplied to other countries.
Research is also conducted into the assessment
of the radiological impact of environmental
contamination for both routine practices
and for potential radiological emergencies.
In many mining operations the most signifi cant
exposures result from internal contamination.
ARPANSA is undertaking research into in-vivo
and biological monitoring techniques as well as
dispersion and biological models necessary to
assess doses from these pathways. ARPANSA
maintains an Australia wide fallout monitoring
network and continues to develop that network.
ARPANSA also undertakes research into dose
calibration techniques and maintains the
Australian standard for absorbed dose.
R2.7 The Environmental Research
Institute of the Supervising
Scientist (ERISS)
The Supervising Scientist plays an important
role in the protection of the environment
and people of the Alligator Rivers Region,
including through research into the possible
impact of uranium mining on the environment
of the Region. Where potential impacts are
identifi ed, research is undertaken to develop
and recommend standards and protocols to
ensure that mining activities are carried out
in accordance with best practice
environmental management.
ERISS carries out research into topics that
include biological diversity, ecological toxicity,
risk assessment and ecosystem protection
relating to mine site emissions via atmospheric,
surface and ground water pathways. ERISS
also conducts monitoring and research into
improvement of environmental monitoring
techniques to ensure protection of the
environment in the Alligator Rivers Region
from the potential effects of uranium mining.
ERISS monitors and investigates radiological
risk arising from present-day and historical
uranium mining operations in the Alligator
Rivers Region, and assists in planning for
rehabilitation from physical landform,
ecological and radiological perspectives.
R2.8 Additional nuclear
research facilities
A number of universities conduct research
involving nuclear techniques of analysis.
The largest group is at the Microanalytical
Research Centre of the University of Melbourne
which has a 5 MV Pelletron ion accelerator
and offers expertise and training in accelerator
based techniques of ion beam analysis with
MeV122 ions including Rutherford Backscattering
Spectrometry, Particle Induced X-ray Emission,
Nuclear Reaction Analysis, Ion Beam Induced
Charge, and Ion Implantation.
These techniques are applied to many materials
science problems including metals, alloys,
minerals, semiconductors, archaeological
and art materials. Other projects involve
nuclear instrumentation for pulse counting
and analysis, nuclear microprobe system
operation including multi-parameter event-by-
event radiation detection and analysis
for imaging and detector development for
nuclear radiation, especially ions.
R&D expertise
Australia is a leader in R&D in several parts
of the uranium supply chain. For example,
Australia has developed research excellence
in areas such as radioactive waste conditioning
technology (Synroc), laser enrichment
technology (SILEX), high performance
materials, and the science of environmental
protection during uranium mining and
rehabilitation of mine sites.
122 Million electron volts. The eV is a unit of energy. It is the amount of kinetic energy gained by a single unbound electron when it passes through
an electrostatic potential difference of one volt, in vacuum.

248
R4 Existing Australian
collaboration in
international nuclear R&D
The following tables provide examples
of existing international collaboration
by Australian researchers. The examples
of collaboration provided below are not
meant to be complete or exhaustive.
R4.1 Multilateral collaboration
Australian participation in international
collaboration on nuclear science and
technology R&D occurs under the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated
Research Projects (CRP) and the International
Energy Agency Implementing Agreements, as
well as under informal collaborative programs
with research institutions. Table R2 provides
examples of multilateral projects.
Table R2 Examples of Australian involvement in multilateral nuclear R&D collaboration
Description of Project Overarching
body
Australian
participant
Start date End date
Neutron based techniques for the detection
of illicit materials and explosives in air cargo.
IAEA–CRP CSIRO 2005 2010
Interpretation of interwell partitioning tracer
data for residual oil saturation determination.
IAEA–CRP
University
of Adelaide
2004 2008
Isotope studies of hydrological processes
in the Murray–Darling Basin.
IAEA–CRP
ANSTO,
ANU
2002 2006
Isotope methods for the study of water and
carbon cycle dynamics in the atmosphere
and biosphere.
IAEA–CRP ANU 2004 2008
Atomic data for heavy element impurities
in fusion reactors.
IAEA–CRP Murdoch University 2002 2006
Nuclear Structure and Decay Data Evaluation. IAEA–NSDD123 ANU 2002 cont.
Avoidance of unnecessary dose to
Western Sydney
patients while transitioning from
IAEA–CRP
2002 2006
Area Health Service
analogue to digital radiology.
Nuclear and isotopic studies of the El Nino
phenomenon in the ocean.
IAEA–CRP
ANSTO, University of
Technology Sydney
2004 2009
New development and improvements in
processing radioactive waste streams.
IAEA–CRP ANSTO 2003 2007
Tracing discharges from nuclear facilities of the
former Soviet Union using Plutonium and U-236.
EU-5th Framework
Program
ANU 2003 2007
Plutonium speciation in marine and estuarine
environments near nuclear reprocessing plants.
EU-5th Framework
Program
University
of Dublin
ANU 2002 2006
Hydrological studies of potential nuclear waste
storage sites.
EPRI–Japan
CEA124-France
ANU 2003 2008
123 Nuclear Structure and Decay Data
124 Commissaria a l’Energie Atomique (French Atomic Energy Commision)

249
Description of Project Overarching
body
Australian
participant
Start date End date
Develop radioisotope separations technologies
based on inorganic and composite organic-inorganic
materials and explore their
application in the wider energy and
environment area.
CEA, EU 6th
Framework
Program
ANSTO, National
Hydrogen Materials
Alliance, University
of SA, Melbourne
University
2005 2007
International Nuclear Information
System (INIS) on the peaceful applications
of nuclear science and technology.
IAEA ANSTO Ongoing
The Stellarator Concept
Implementing Agreement.
IEA ANU Ongoing
Source: IAEA, IEA and personal communications
125 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
R4.2 Bilateral collaboration
Australia also participates in various bilateral collaborative nuclear R&D agreements.
Examples are listed in Table R3.
Table R3 Examples of Australian involvement in bilateral nuclear R&D collaboration
Description of Project Collaboration partner Australian
participant
Start
date
End date
Develop the design and associated
safety case for the Commonwealth
radioactive waste facility and provide
ongoing research capability relating
to environmental impact of nuclear
operations.
NEA ANSTO, DEST 2006 2009
Develop, implement and commercially
exploit ANSTO’s nuclear waste forms
(with various collaborative and
commercial partners).
Nexia Solutions, CEA/Cogema ANSTO Ongoing
Atomic scale processes in nuclear
materials and minerals.
Institute for Transuranium
Elements and University of
Muenster, Germany
ANSTO,
University
of Sydney
2005 2007
Irradiation growth of zircaloy and
in-service inspection of pool-type
research reactors.
KAERI125 ANSTO 2003 2009
Development of uranium molybdenum
research reactor fuel.
US DOE ANSTO 2003 2007
Adaptive response to low-dose
gamma irradiation.
US DOE
Flinders
University,
ANSTO
2003 2005
Source: Personal communication with ANSTO

250
Two key areas where Australian research
has been prominent are in the development
of Synroc for the immobilisation and
management of waste and in laser
enrichment technologies.
The current international program of
collaboration on Synroc includes:
continuing discussions between ANSTO
and the US DOE on the use of Synroc for
immobilising some types of HLW
collaboration with Minatom for treatment
of Russia’s high-level wastes, including
a possible a 20t/yr pilot plant
a collaborative research program with
the French Atomic Energy Commission on
developing Synroc-glass waste forms using
French cold-crucible melting technology
a 2005 agreement between ANSTO and
Nexia Solutions, part of British Nuclear
Group, to use a composite Synroc glass-ceramic
waste form for 5 tonnes of impure
plutonium waste at Sellafi eld in the UK.
•
•
•
•
In the case of enrichment, an agreement for
co-operation between the US and Australian
Governments on the development of SILEX
technology for the laser enrichment of uranium
was signed in 2000. In May 2006 SILEX
announced the signing of an exclusive
Commercialisation and License Agreement
for their uranium enrichment technology
with the General Electric Company (GE).
Subject to the receipt of relevant US
government approvals,126 the agreement
provides for a phased approach to the
commercialisation of the SILEX technology and
the potential construction of a test loop, pilot
plant, and a full-scale commercial enrichment
facility. These operations would be built at GE’s
existing nuclear energy headquarters and
technology site in Wilmington or another
suitable location in the US.
education and
training capacity
R5.1 Existing and proposed
nuclear related courses
Australia does not have a dedicated school
of nuclear science or engineering. However,
courses are available that deal with aspects of
nuclear physics. The ANU, which has the most
extensive range of postgraduate teaching in
nuclear physics, allied partly with the research
activities of the Heavy Ion Accelerator Facility,
plans to offer a Master of Nuclear Science
course starting in 2007. The ANU is aiming for
an intake of between fi ve and ten students in
2007, with the numbers growing in subsequent
years. Table R4 lists some existing and proposed
nuclear related courses in Australia.
126 The US Government confi rmed that GE can proceed with some preliminary activities contemplated in the SILEX Technology development project.
Further approvals for the project are pending.

251
Table R4 Existing and proposed postgraduate nuclear related courses in Australia
University Program details Qualifi cation Enrolments
University of Adelaide
Masters and PhD by research
in medical physics
MSc, PhD 14 (6 Masters)
Australian National
University
Master of Nuclear Science M Nucl Sci
First
enrolments
in 2007
Australian National
University
in nuclear science
M Phil, PhD 10 (2 Masters)
Royal Melbourne Institute
of Technology
Medical and Health Physics M App Sc 20
Royal Melbourne Institute
of Technology
in nuclear science
M Sc, PhD 5 (all Masters)
Queensland University
of Technology
Medical and Health Physics M App Sci 15
Queensland University
of Technology and
WA University
Medical and Health Physics,
Radiochemistry, Mining and
Medical Physics
M App Sci
Under
development
Master of Medical Physics, Graduate
Diploma in Medical Physics
M Med Phys, Grad Dip
Med Phys
20
Masters of Applied Nuclear Science,
Graduate Diploma in Applied
Nuclear Science
M App Nuc Sci, Grad Dip
App Nuc Sci
First
enrolments
in 2008
in Medical Physics
MSc, PhD
20
PhD and MSc
University of Wollongong Master of Medical Radiation Physics MMRP 18
Australian Technology
Network (ATN)127
Masters of Nuclear Engineering M Nucl Eng
First
enrolments
in 2008
Source: Personal communications and AINSE submission.[231]
ANSTO plans to begin a graduate entry programme in 2007/08. This programme will recruit and train
15 graduates a year in nuclear related skills. The programme will include overseas attachments for
the participating students.128
Studies relating to the reliability, safety, economics and environmental and societal effects of nuclear
energy systems can also be undertaken. The Australian Technology Network has identifi ed this as
an area where it believes it is well placed to provide education and training for Australian students.
127 The Australian Technology Network is an alliance of fi ve Australian universities, Curtin University of Technology, University of South Australia,
RMIT University, University of Technology Sydney, and Queensland University of Technology.
128 The House of Representatives Standing Commitee on Industry and Resources inquiry into developing Australia’s non-fossil fuel energy industry
recommended that ANSTO’s research and development mandate be broadened, to allow it to undertake physical laboratory studies of aspects
of the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear energy that may be of future benefi t to Australia and Australian industry.[26]

252
R5.2 Radiation safety related courses
A wide range of radiation safety related courses are available in Australia. Table R5 lists examples of
radiation safety courses provided by ANSTO or universities that have been approved by various state
and territory jurisdictions. There are also a large number of radiation safety courses provided by
private fi rms, hospitals and technical colleges.
Table R5 Examples of State and Territory approved radiation safety courses
Course provider Course
Ionising Radiation Safety
Workshop for XRD/ XRF Operators
Australian Nuclear Science
and Technology Organisation
Advanced Radiation Safety Offi cer Course
General Radiation Safety Offi cer Course
Industrial Radiation Safety Offi cer Course
Safe Use of Soil Moisture Gauges
Safe Use of Nuclear Type Soil Moisture and Density Gauges
Safe Use of Industrial Radiation Gauges
Radiation Safety for Laboratory Workers
Safe Use of X-ray Devices
Safe Use of X-ray Devices in Art Conservation Work
Radionuclides in Medicine
Industrial Applications
Radioisotopes
Protection from Ionizing Radiation
Ionising Radiation Protection
Central Queensland University
Industrial Radiation Safety
General Radiation Safety — Level 1
General Radiation Safety — Level 2
Queensland University of Technology
Radiation Safety for X-ray Technologists
School of Life Sciences, Radioisotopes Facility Induction Program
General Radiation Protection
University of Newcastle Remote Operators Course
University of New England
Safe Use of Nuclear Type Soil Moisture and Density Gauges
Safe Handling of Radioactive Isotopes
University of New South Wales Radiation Protection Training Course
University of Queensland
Safe Use of Soil Moisture and Density Gauges
Introduction to Radiation Protection
Radiation Protection Course
Radiation Safety with Unsealed Sources — An Introductory Course
Safety with Analytical X-ray Equipment
University of Sydney Bone Mineral Densitometry
University of Western Australia Unsealed Radioisotope Course

253
R6 Opportunities for
increased collaboration
R6.1 Research and development
Australia has a relatively low level of effort
in the area of nuclear energy related R&D.
Should Australia decide to expand its level
of participation in the nuclear fuel cycle beyond
the uranium mining sector then it is likely that
public funding for nuclear R&D will need to
increase signifi cantly, including in areas
such as safety, and current and future reactor
technologies. These are areas of research that
already attract considerable support overseas
and Australia could contribute to,
and benefi t from increased overseas
collaboration on these and other topics.
ARPANSA’s submission to the Review identifi ed
their ongoing interest in nuclear safety R&D.
The NEA also argues that such research
supports effi cient and effective regulation
across the spectrum of regulatory activities.[225]
There is little doubt that Australia has
many areas of research expertise making
it an attractive partner for international
collaboration. It is important though that
such collaboration not be seen as an alternative
to increased support for Australian based
research, but rather as a complementary
measure that will increase the effi ciency
and effectiveness of the local research base.
Australia could contribute to international
R&D efforts with its current skills in high
performance materials and nuclear waste
treatment. ANSTO’s submission to the Review
argues that these skills should help Australia
gain entry into the Generation IV International
Forum (GIF).[101] ANSTO argues that this would
enable Australia not only to keep abreast of
new developments, but also to infl uence the
broader Forum to help achieve our national
non-proliferation goals.
ANSTO has created a new Advanced
Nuclear Technologies Group, within its
Institute of Materials and Engineering
Science. It plans to expand this group
to supplement its capabilities in waste
treatment and materials should Australia
decide to be part of international nuclear
research efforts such as the Generation IV
International Forum. ANSTO noted that this
would require agreement at the Government
level. It also notes that high performance
materials research is also relevant to the
international R&D effort into fusion energy.129
R6.2 Education and training
There is a global shortfall of skilled persons
in the nuclear industry. Many countries are
signifi cantly increasing their efforts in nuclear
education and training to address this shortfall.
New educational consortia are being formed,
both within and between countries. Should
Australia decide to expand its involvement
in the nuclear fuel cycle then it will need
to boost its level of nuclear education and
training considerably.
Educational institutions can respond relatively
rapidly to government policy decisions and
employer demand for particular skills by
introducing new courses. However, it will take
time to ramp up Australia’s nuclear education
effort, particularly in the current environment
of strong global demand for nuclear educators.
Furthermore, Australian demand for particular
skills may not be suffi cient to support stand
alone educational facilities in this country.
The building of alliances with education
providers or networks overseas would provide
a mechanism for overcoming diffi culties with
expanding local education and training efforts.
129 Personal communication 31 August 2006.

254
Appendix S. Depleted Uranium
Enrichment of uranium for use as nuclear fuel
produces wastes in the form of low activity
depleted uranium hexafl uoride gas and relatively
small volumes of low activity liquid and solid
waste. While depleted UF6 presents a relatively
low radiological hazard, it is a potentially
hazardous chemical if not properly managed.
As depleted uranium has had only limited uses
to date, depleted UF6 stored in steel cylinders
has accumulated at enrichment plants.
The United States Department of Energy (DOE)
is responsible for managing over 700 000 tonnes
of depleted UF6.[324] Under DOE’s Advanced Fuel
Cycle Initiative this material could become a
signifi cant energy resource, once transmuted
into nuclear fuel for advanced reactors.[100]
Some countries are planning to convert their
depleted UF6 stocks to a more chemically stable
and safer form (depleted uranium oxide and/or
depleted uranium metal) pending decisions on
its use. For example, the US Government plans
to build de-conversion facilities at Department of
Energy uranium enrichment sites.
In decommissioning the former diffusion
enrichment plant at Capenhurst (UK),
Britain’s Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
plans to construct and operate a depleted
uranium conversion and storage facility
from 2015 to 2031.[325] In France AREVA has
considerable experience in deconversion
having processed over 300 000 tonnes of
uranium hexafl uoride over the past 20 years.
Due to uncertainty as to whether depleted
uranium is a waste or a resource in a future
advanced nuclear fuel cycle, no proposals
have yet been developed for its disposal at
a specifi c site. The submission to the Review
by the Australian Conservation Foundation
provided a paper proposing that deep geological
disposal of depleted uranium waste would
be appropriate.[326] The United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission considers that some
form of near surface disposal would
be appropriate.
The case for deep disposal of depleted uranium
is based on a comparison with arrangements
for disposal of plutonium contaminated waste
in the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP)
geological repository in New Mexico.
While the depleted uranium exists in more
concentrated form than the plutonium in waste
disposed of at the WIPP, the radiotoxicity of
plutonium is vastly greater than that of uranium
— the annual limit of intake (ALI) for inhalation
of plutonium is 0.6 micrograms compared with
0.2 grams for U-238, that is Pu-239 is ~300 000
times more radiotoxic than U-238 for a
given mass.[327]
Several submissions to the Review argued
that exposure to depleted uranium, including
depleted uranium weapons, is responsible for
severe health effects. The conclusions of these
submissions are not supported by experts in
the health physics community in Australia
and overseas. These include the experts who
contributed to an extensive review of the
hazards presented by depleted uranium
conducted in the context of an examination
of the possible causes of Gulf War Illnesses.[328]
The paper, ‘A Review of the Scientifi c Literature
As It Pertains to Gulf War Illnesses’, notes that
few previous studies had focused directly on
depleted uranium. Accordingly it based its
conclusions on the veterans who had the
highest exposure to depleted uranium during
the Gulf War as well as the extensive literature
related to natural and enriched uranium. These
materials have the same heavy metal toxicity as
depleted uranium but are more radioactive than
depleted uranium. The paper notes that ‘large
variations in exposure to radioactivity from
natural uranium in the normal environment
have not been associated with negative
health effects’.
Depleted uranium sourced from Australian
uranium is covered by Australia’s nuclear
safeguards requirements and cannot be
used for any military application.

255
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AAEC Australian Atomic Energy Commission (forerunner to ANSTO)
ABARE Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics
ABWR Advanced boiling water reactor
AECL Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
AGO Australian Greenhouse Offi ce
AGR Advanced gas-cooled reactor
AINSE Australian Institute of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Andra National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (France)
ANSTO Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation
ANU Australian National University
AONM Australian obligated nuclear material
ARPANS Act Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998
ARPANSA Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
ASNO Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Offi ce
ASO Australian Safeguards Offi ce (forerunner to ASNO)
BNFL British Nuclear Fuels Limited
Bq Becquerel
BTU British Thermal Unit (or Therm)
BWR Boiling water reactor
CANDU Canadian deuterium uranium reactor
CCGT Combined cycle gas turbine
CCS Carbon capture and storage
CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety
CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CO2-e Carbon dioxide equivalent
CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientifi c and Industrial Research Organisation
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
DNI Dalton Nuclear Institute
EA Environmental assessment
EPBC Act Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
EPR European pressurised water reactor
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
ERA Energy Resources of Australia
FBR Fast breeder reactor

256
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
FOAK First of a kind
GA General Atomics (US privately-owned company)
GDP Gross domestic product
GE General Electric (US privately-owned company)
Gen IV Generation four (the next generation of NPP designs)
GFR Gas-cooled fast reactor
GIF Generation IV International Forum
GNEP Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
GW Gigawatt (109 watts)
GWd/tonne Gigawatt days per tonne
GWe Gigawatts electrical (109 watts)
GWh Gigawatt hours (109 watt hours)
HEU Highly enriched uranium
HIFAR High fl ux Australian reactor
HLW High-level waste
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRP International Commission for Radiological Protection
IEA International Energy Agency
IGCC Integrated gasifi cation combined cycle
ILW Intermediate-level waste
I-NERI International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
INES International Nuclear Event Scale
ISL In-situ leaching
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITER International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
JAEA Japan Atomic Energy Agency
kWe Kilowatts electrical (103 watts)
kWh Kilowatt hours (103 watt hours)
LCOE Levelised cost of electricity
LEU Low enriched uranium
LFR Lead-cooled fast reactor
LILW Low and intermediate level waste
LLW Low-level waste
LNG Liquefi ed natural gas
LWR Light water reactor

257
Ml Megalitre (106 litres)
MOX Mixed oxide fuel
MSR Molten salt reactor
Mt Megatonne (106 tonnes)
MWe Megawatts electrical (106 watts)
MWh Megawatt hours (106 watt hours)
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency (a division of the OECD)
NEM National Electricity Market
NOPSA National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority
NORM Naturally occurring radioactive material
NPP Nuclear power plant
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USA)
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFZs Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones
OCGT Open cycle gas turbines
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPAL Open Pool Australian Light-water reactor
PBMR Pebble bed modular reactor
PHWR Pressurised heavy water reactor
ppb parts per billion
ppm parts per million
PWe Petawatts electrical (1015 watts)
PWh Petawatt hours (1015 watt hours)
PWR Pressurised water reactor
R&D Research and development
RAR Reasonably assured resources
RBMK Reaktor Bolshoi Moschnosti Kanalynyi (light water cooled,
graphite-moderated reactor, Russia)
Rosatom Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (or FAEA)
SCWR Supercritical water reactor
SFR Sodium-cooled fast reactor
SNF Spent nuclear fuel
SPCC Supercritical pulverised coal combustion
SWU Separative Work Unit (kg)
Therm British Thermal Unit (or BTU)
ThORP Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (UK)

258
TVO Teollisuuden Voima Oy (Finnish company)
TWe Terawatts electrical (1012 watt)
TWh Terawatt hours (1012 watt hours)
UF6 Uranium hexafl uoride
U3O8 Uranium oxide (also known as yellow cake)
UMPNE Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy Review
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSCEAR United Nations Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
UO2 Uranium dioxide
UO3 Uranium trioxide
USDOE United States Department of Energy
USEC United States Enrichment Corporation
UxC Ux Consulting
VHTR Very high temperature reactor
WANO World association of nuclear operators
WNA World Nuclear Association
WNU World Nuclear University
Scientifi c numbers and their symbols
Very large and very small numbers are unwieldy to write in the usual decimal notation.
Therefore, scientists recognise ways of printing or communicating them in a shorter format.
Associated with these are abbreviations such as the commonly used ‘kilo’ for thousand.
Decimal numbers and their corresponding abbreviations
Decimal Scientifi c Commonly Prefi x Symbol
1 000 000 000 000 000 1015 – peta P
1 000 000 000 000 1012 trillion tera T
1 000 000 000 109 billion giga G
1 000 000 106 million mega M
1 000 103 thousand kilo k
100 102 hundred hecto h
10 101 ten deca da
0.1 10–1 tenth deci d
0.01 10–2 hundredth centi c
0.001 10–3 thousandth milli m
0.000 001 10–6 millionth micro μ
0.000 000 001 10–9 billionth nano n
0.000 000 000 001 10–12 trillionth pico p
0.000 000 000 000 001 10–15 – femto f

259
Glossary
Glossary
Actinides Elements with between 89 and 102 protons in their nucleus that behave
chemically like actinium. All are radioactive and many are long-lived
alpha emitters. The actinide series includes uranium (92), neptunium (93),
plutonium (94) and americium (95).
Activity
(of a substance)
The number of disintegrations per unit time taking place in a radioactive
material. The unit of activity is the Becquerel (Bq), which is one
disintegration per second.
Alpha particle A positively charged particle emitted from the nucleus of an atom during
radioactive decay. It consists of two protons and two neutrons (a helium-4
nucleus). Although alpha particles are normally highly energetic, they travel
only a few centimetres in air and are stopped by a sheet of paper or the
outer layer of dead skin.
Atom A particle of matter that cannot be broken up by chemical means. Atoms
have a nucleus consisting of positively charged protons and uncharged
neutrons of about the same mass. In a neutral atom the positive charges
of the protons in the nucleus are balanced by the same number of
negatively charged electrons in motion around the nucleus.
Atomic number (Z) The number of protons in the nucleus of an atom, which also indicates
the position of that element in the periodic table.
Availability factor Percentage of time that an electricity generating unit is able to be operated
at full output.
Background radiation The ionising radiation in the environment to which we are all exposed.
It comes from many sources including outer space, the sun, the rocks
and soil under our feet, the buildings we live in, the air we breathe,
the food we eat, and our own bodies. The average annual background
radiation dose in Australia is approximately 2 mSv (see Dose, effective).
Becquerel (Bq) The SI unit of intrinsic radioactivity of a material, equal to one radioactive
disintegration per second. In practice, GBq or TBq are the common units.
Beta particle A particle emitted from the nucleus of an atom during radioactive decay.
Beta particles are either electrons (with negative electric charge) or
positrons (positive charge). High energy beta particles can travel metres
in air and several millimetres into the human body. Low energy beta
particles are unable to penetrate the skin. Most beta particles can be
stopped by a small thickness of a light material such as aluminium
or plastic.
Burn up The percentage of heavy metal in a nuclear fuel that has been ‘fi ssioned’
or the measure of thermal energy released by nuclear fuel relative to its
mass, usually expressed as MWd/tonne or GWd/tonne of uranium.
Capacity factor Percentage of time that an electricity generating unit is producing at full
load output, ie the amount of electricity that it produces over a period of
time, divided by the amount of electricity it could have produced if it had
run at full power over that time period.
Carbon price The cost of emitting carbon into the atmosphere. It can be a tax imposed
by government, the outcome of an emission trading market or a hybrid of
taxes and permit prices. The various ways of creating a carbon price can
have different effects on the economy.

260
Centrifuge
enrichment
A method for enriching uranium that uses a rapidly rotating tube.
The heavier U-238 isotope in the uranium hexafl uoride gas tends
to concentrate at the walls of the centrifuge as it spins and can
be separated from the lighter U-235.
Chain reaction A process in which one nuclear transformation sets up conditions for
a similar nuclear transformation in another nearby atom. Thus, when
fi ssion occurs in uranium atoms, neutrons are released, which in turn
may produce fi ssion in other uranium atoms.
Class 7 Dangerous
Goods
One of nine classes defi ned by the United Nations for the transport
of dangerous goods, relating to radioactive materials including
uranium oxide, uranium hexafl ouride and thorium.
CO2 Carbon dioxide.
CO2-e (carbon
dioxide equivalent)
A standard measure that takes account of the different global warming
potential of different greenhouse gases and expresses the cumulative
effect in a common unit.
Containment,
reactor
The prevention of release, even under the conditions of a reactor accident,
of unacceptable quantities of radioactive material beyond a controlled area.
Also, commonly, the containing system itself.
Contamination Uncontained radioactive material that has been dispersed into
unwanted locations.
Control rods Rods, plates or tubes containing boron, cadmium or some other strong
absorber of neutrons. They are used to control the rate of the nuclear
reaction in a reactor.
Coolant The fl uid circulated through a nuclear reactor to remove or transfer
heat generated by the fuel elements. Common coolants are water,
air and carbon dioxide.
Core, reactor The region of a nuclear reactor in which the fuel and moderator are
located and where the fi ssion chain reaction can take place. The fuel
elements in the core of a reactor contain fi ssile material.
Critical mass The smallest mass of fi ssile material that will support a self-sustaining
chain reaction under specifi ed conditions.
Criticality A nuclear reactor is critical when the rate of neutrons produced is equal
to the rate of neutron loss, and a self-sustaining fi ssion chain reaction
can occur.
Decay, radioactive The spontaneous radioactive disintegration of an atomic nucleus
resulting in the release of energy in the form of particles (eg alpha
or beta), or gamma radiation, or a combination of these.
Decommissioning In relation to a nuclear reactor, its shutdown, dismantling and eventual
removal, making the site available for unrestricted use.
Depleted uranium
(DU)
Uranium having less than the naturally occurring percentage of U-235
(~0.71 per cent). As a by product of enrichment in the nuclear fuel cycle,
it generally has 0.20–0.25 per cent U-235, the rest being U-238.

261
Glossary
Deuterium Also called ‘heavy hydrogen’, deuterium is a non-radioactive isotope
of hydrogen having one proton and one neutron in the nucleus (ie an
atomic mass of two). It occurs in nature in the proportion of one atom
to 6500 atoms of normal hydrogen. (Normal hydrogen atoms contain
one proton and no neutrons).
Dose limits The maximum radiation dose, excluding doses from background
radiation and medical exposures, that a person may receive over a stated
period of time. International recommended limits, adopted by Australia,
are that occupationally exposed workers should not exceed 20 mSv/year
(averaged over fi ve years, no single year to exceed 50 mSv), and that
members of the public should not receive more than 1 mSv/year above
background radiation.
Dose, absorbed A measure of the amount of energy deposited in a material by ionising
radiation. The unit is the joule per kilogram, given the name Gray (Gy).
Dose, effective Effective dose is a measure of the biological effect of radiation on
the whole body. It takes into account the equivalent dose and the differing
radiosensitivities of body tissues. The unit is the sievert (Sv), but doses are
usually measured in millisieverts (mSv) or microsieverts (μSv).
Dose, equivalent Equivalent dose is a measure of the biological effect of radiation on
a tissue or organ and takes into account the type of radiation. The unit
is the sievert (Sv), but doses are usually measured in millisieverts (mSv)
or microsieverts (μSv).
Dosimeter
(or dosemeter)
A device used to measure the radiation dose a person receives over
a period of time.
Electron The negatively charged particle that is a common constituent of all
atoms. Electrons surround the positively charged nucleus and determine
the chemical properties of the atom.
Element A chemical substance that cannot be divided into simpler substances
by chemical means; all atoms of a given element have the same number
of protons.
Enriched uranium In order to be used as fuel for power reactors, uranium usually has to be
enriched — the natural isotopic abundance of the fi ssile isotope U-235
(~0.71 per cent) has to be increased to approximately 3 per cent. Material
with 20 per cent or greater enrichment is called high enriched uranium
(HEU); below 20 per cent is low enriched uranium (LEU).
Enrichment, isotope The elevation of the content of a specifi ed isotope in a sample of
a particular element (or compound thereof). The relative amounts
of isotopes of any element can be changed from the natural
occurrence by isotope enrichment.
Equivalence Where Australian obligated nuclear material (AONM) loses its separate
identity because of process characteristics, an equivalent quantity is
designated as AONM, based on the fact that atoms or molecules of the
same substance are indistinguishable.
Export controls The set of laws, policies and regulations that govern the export of sensitive
items for a country or company.

262
Export trigger list Under Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, a list of nuclear-related
equipment and materials that may be exported only if the recipient
country accepts full-scope IAEA safeguards.
Fast breeder
reactor (FBR)
A fast neutron reactor that is confi gured to produce more fi ssile
material than it consumes, using fertile material such as depleted
uranium or thorium in a blanket around the core.
Fast neutron reactor A reactor with little or no moderator and hence utilising fast neutrons
to sustain the nuclear chain reaction.
Fertile material A material, not itself fi ssionable by thermal neutrons, that can be
converted directly or indirectly into a fi ssile material by neutron
capture. There are two basic fertile materials, U-238 and Th-232.
When these fertile materials capture neutrons they are converted
into fi ssile Pu-239 and U-233 respectively.
Fissile material Any material capable of undergoing fi ssion by thermal (or slow)
neutrons. For example, U-233, U-235 and Pu-239 are fi ssile nuclides.
Fission The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two, accompanied by the emission
of neutrons, gamma radiation, and a great deal of energy. It may be
spontaneous, but in a reactor is due to a uranium nucleus absorbing
a neutron and thus becoming unstable.
Fission fragments The two atoms initially formed from the fi ssion of a heavier atom such
as U-235 or Pu-239. The fi ssion fragments resulting from each fi ssion of
U-235, for example, are not necessarily the same. Various pairs of atoms
can be produced. When initially formed, most fi ssion fragments are
radioactive and emit beta particles and gamma rays and decay into
other atoms.
Fission products The collective term for the various fi ssion fragments and their resulting
decay products formed after fi ssion of a heavy atom.
Flux, neutron The number of neutrons passing through an area per unit time,
for example, the number passing through 1 cm2/s.
Fuel cycle,
nuclear
The series of steps involved in supplying fuel for nuclear reactors and
managing the waste products. It includes the mining, conversion and
enrichment of uranium, fabrication of fuel elements, their use in a reactor,
reprocessing to recover the fi ssionable material remaining in the spent
fuel, possible re-enrichment of the fuel material, possible re-fabrication
into more fuel, waste processing, and long-term storage.
Fuel rod A single tube comprising fi ssionable material encased in cladding.
Fuel rods are assembled into fuel elements.
Fusion The formation of a heavier nucleus from two lighter ones (such as
hydrogen isotopes) with an attendant release of energy (as in a fusion
reactor or in the sun).
Gamma radiation Gamma radiation is short wavelength electromagnetic radiation of
the same physical nature as light, X-rays, radio waves and so on.
However, gamma radiation is highly penetrating and, depending on
its energy, may require a considerable thickness of lead or concrete
to absorb it. Since gamma radiation causes ionisation, it constitutes
a biological hazard. It is commonly used to sterilise medical products.

263
Glossary
Gigawatt (GW) Unit of power equal to one billion (109) watts. GWe denotes electricity
output and GWth denotes thermal heat output from a nuclear or
fossil-fi red power plant.
Gray (Gy) A measure of absorbed dose. Replaces the rad. 1 Gy = 100 rad.
Half-life The period required for half of the atoms of a particular radioactive
isotope to decay and become an isotope of another element. Half-lives vary,
according to the isotope, from less than a millionth of a second to more
than a billion years.
Heavy water Water containing signifi cantly more than the natural proportion (one in
6500) of heavy hydrogen (deuterium) atoms to normal hydrogen atoms.
Heavy water is used as a moderator in some reactors because it slows
down neutrons more effectively than normal (light) water.
Heavy water reactor A reactor that uses heavy water as its moderator (eg Canadian CANDU).
Also PHWR.
High enriched
uranium (HEU)
Uranium enriched to at least 20 per cent U-235. Weapons grade HEU
is enriched to more than 90 per cent U-235.
High-level waste
(HLW)
see Radioactive waste, high level.
Intermediate-level
waste (ILW)
see Radioactive waste, intermediate level.
Ion An atom that has lost or gained one or more orbiting electrons,
thus becoming electrically charged.
Ionisation Any process by which an atom or molecule gains or loses electrons.
Ionising radiation Radiation capable of causing ionisation of the matter through which
it passes. Ionising radiation may damage living tissue.
Irradiated fuel See Spent fuel.
Irradiation Exposure to any kind of radiation.
Isotopes Nuclides that have the same atomic number but different mass numbers.
Different isotopes of the same element have the same chemical properties,
but different physical properties.
Light water
reactor (LWR)
Reactors that are cooled and usually moderated by normal water.
They account for most of the world’s installed nuclear power generating
capacity. Included in this group are pressurised water reactors (PWR)
and boiling water reactors (BWR).
Load factor The ratio of the average load supplied during a designated period to
the peak load occurring in that period, ie the actual amount of kilowatt
hours delivered on a system in a period of time as opposed to the
total possible kilowatt hours that could be delivered on the system
over that time period.

264
Low-enriched
uranium (LEU)
Uranium enriched above the natural level of 0.71 per cent U-235
but to less than 20 per cent U-235. LEU in modern power reactors
is usually 3.5–5 per cent U-235.
Low-level waste (LLW) see Radioactive waste, low level.
Megawatt (MW) Unit of power equal to one million (106) watts. MWe denotes
electricity output and MWth denotes thermal heat output
from a nuclear or fossil-fi red power plant.
Microsievert (μSv) Unit of radiation dose, one millionth of a sievert.
Millisievert (mSv) Unit of radiation dose, one thousandth of a sievert.
Mixed-oxide fuel
(MOX)
Reactor fuel that consists of both uranium and plutonium oxides,
usually approximately 8 per cent plutonium, which is the main
fi ssile component.
Moderator A material used in a reactor to slow down fast neutrons, thus increasing
the likelihood of further fi ssion. Examples of good moderators include
normal water, heavy water, beryllium and graphite.
Monitoring, radiation The collection and assessment of radiological information to determine
the adequacy of radiation protection.
Neutron An uncharged subatomic particle with a mass slightly greater than
that of the proton and found in the nucleus of every atom except ordinary
hydrogen. Neutrons are the links in a chain reaction in a nuclear reactor.
Neutron scattering A technique for ‘seeing’ fi ne details of the structure of a substance.
It involves fi ring a beam of neutrons (usually from a research reactor)
at a sample and observing how it is scattered. Neutrons pass between
atoms, unless they collide with the nucleus. When they do, they don’t
bounce off randomly, but defl ect down a specifi c path; different structures
create different pathways.
Neutrons, fast Neutrons emitted from fi ssion events. They travel thousands of times
faster than slow neutrons and maintain chain reactions in fast reactors.
Neutrons, thermal
or slow
Neutrons travelling with energy comparable to those of everyday atoms,
required as links in the chain reactions in thermal reactors.
Nuclear power
plant (NPP)
A nuclear reactor that converts nuclear energy into useful electrical power.
Nuclear
proliferation
An increase in the number of nuclear weapons in the world.
Vertical proliferation is an increase in the size of nuclear arsenals
of those countries that already possess nuclear weapons. Horizontal
proliferation is an increase in the number of countries that have
a nuclear explosive device.
Nuclear reactor A structure in which a fi ssion chain reaction can be maintained
and controlled. It usually contains fuel, coolant, moderator, control
absorbers and safety devices and is most often surrounded by
a concrete biological shield to absorb neutron and gamma ray emission.

265
Glossary
Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG)
A group of 45 states that agree to certain conditions on the export of
nuclear materials and nuclear-related ‘dual use’ materials, items and
technologies, as defi ned in annexes to IAEA document INFCIRC/254 rev 4.
Nucleus The positively charged core of an atom. It is approximately 1/10 000
the diameter of the atom, but contains nearly all the mass of the atom.
All nuclei contain protons and neutrons, except the nucleus of normal
hydrogen (atomic mass of one), which consists of a single proton.
Nuclide A nucleus of a species of atom characterised by its mass number (protons
and neutrons), atomic number (protons) and the nuclear energy state.
Oxide fuels Enriched or natural uranium in the form of the oxide UO2, used in most
power reactors.
Plutonium (Pu) A heavy radioactive, human-made metallic element. Its most important
isotope is fi ssionable Pu-239, produced by neutron irradiation of U-238.
Pu-239 is used as a fuel for power reactors or explosive for nuclear
weapons. About one-third of the energy in a light water reactor comes
from the fi ssion of Pu-239, and it is the main isotope of value recovered
from reprocessing of spent fuel.
Proton A subatomic particle with a single positive electrical charge and a mass
approximately 1837 times that of the electron and slightly less than that
of a neutron. Also, the nucleus of an ordinary or light hydrogen atom.
Protons are constituents of all nuclei.
Radiation (nuclear) Radiation originating from the nucleus of an atom. It includes
electromagnetic waves (gamma rays) as well as streams of
fast-moving charged particles (electrons, protons, mesons etc)
and neutrons of all velocities.
Radioactive material Any natural or artifi cial material whether in the solid or liquid form,
or in the form of a gas or vapour, that exhibits radioactivity. For regulatory
purposes radioactive substances may be defi ned as radioactive material
that has an activity level of 100 Bq/g or greater.
Radioactive waste Material that contains or is contaminated with radionuclides at
concentrations or radioactivity levels greater than clearance levels
established by the appropriate authority and for which no use is foreseen.
Radioactive waste,
high level (HLW)
Waste which contains large concentrations of both short and long-lived
radioactive nuclides, and is suffi ciently radioactive to require both shielding
and cooling. It generates more than 2 kW/m3 of heat.
Radioactive waste,
intermediate level
(ILW)
Waste material that contains quantities of radioactive material above
clearance levels, requires shielding and has a thermal power below
2 kW/m3.
Radioactive waste,
low level (LLW)
Any waste material that contains quantities of radioactive material above
the clearance level (as determined in regulations) that requires minimum
standards of protection for personnel when the waste is handled,
transported and stored.
Radioactivity The ability of certain nuclides to emit particles, gamma rays or x-rays
during their spontaneous decay into other nuclei. The fi nal outcome
of radioactive decay is a stable nuclide.

266
Radioisotope An isotope that is radioactive. Most natural isotopes lighter than bismuth
are not radioactive. Three natural radioisotopes are radon-222 (Rn-222),
carbon-14 (C-14) and potassium-40 (K-40).
Radionuclide The nucleus of a radioisotope.
Radon (Rn) A radioactive element, the heaviest known gas. Radon gives rise
to a signifi cant part of the radiation dose from natural background
radiation. It emanates from the ground, bricks and concrete.
Ratifi cation The process by which a state expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty.
Repository A permanent disposal place for radioactive wastes.
Reprocessing The chemical dissolution of spent fuel to separate unused uranium
and plutonium from fi ssion products and other transuranic elements.
The recovered uranium and plutonium may then be recycled into new
fuel elements.
Safeguards, nuclear Technical and inspection measures for verifying that nuclear materials
are not being diverted from civil to weapons uses.
Separative work
unit (SWU)
A complex unit,[322] which is a function of the amount of uranium processed
and the degree to which it is enriched (ie the extent of increase in the
concentration of the U-235 isotope relative to the remainder).
The unit is strictly ‘kg separative work unit’, and it measures the quantity
of separative work (indicative of energy used in enrichment) when feed and
product quantities are expressed in kilograms. Approximately 100–120 000
SWU is required to enrich the annual fuel loading for a typical 1000 MWe
light water reactor.
Sievert (Sv) A measurement of equivalent dose and effective dose. Replaces the rem.
1 Sv = 100 rem.
Spent fuel Also called spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or irradiated fuel. It is nuclear fuel
elements in which fi ssion products have built up and the fi ssile material
depleted to a level where a chain reaction does not operate effi ciently.
Stable isotope An isotope incapable of spontaneous radioactive decay.
Synroc A human-made rock-like ceramic material which can be used
to permanently trap radioactive atoms for long-term storage.
An alternative to vitrifi cation of HLW.
Tailings Ground rock remaining after particular ore minerals (eg uranium oxides)
are extracted.
Tails Depleted uranium remaining after the enrichment process, usually with
approximately 0.2 per cent U-235.
Thermal reactor A reactor in which the fi ssion chain reaction is sustained primarily
by thermal (slow) neutrons.
Thorium (Th) A naturally occurring radioactive element. With the absorption of neutrons
Th-232 is converted to the fi ssionable isotope U-233.

267
Glossary
Transuranics Elements with an atomic number above 92. They are produced artifi cially
(eg when uranium is bombarded with neutrons). Some are therefore
present in spent fuel (see also Actinides).
Uranium (U) A radioactive element with two isotopes that are fi ssile (U-235 and U-233
and two that are fertile (U-238 and U-234). Uranium is the heaviest element
normally found in nature and the basic raw material of nuclear energy.
Uranium
hexafl uoride (UF6)
A compound of uranium that is a gas above 56°C and is thus a suitable
form for processing uranium to enrich it in the fi ssile isotope U-235.
Uranium ore
concentrate (UOC)
A commercial product of a uranium mill, usually containing a high
proportion (greater than 90 per cent) of uranium oxide (U3O8).
Uranium oxide (U3O8) The mixture of uranium oxides produced after milling uranium
ore from a mine. Uranium is sold in this form.
Vitrifi cation The incorporation of intermediate and high-level radioactive waste into
glass for long-term storage.
Yellowcake Ammonium diuranate (ADU), the penultimate uranium compound in U3O8
production, but the form in which mine product was sold until about 1970.

268
References
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nuclear fuel cycle: Supply and demand,
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IAEA, 2005.
[5] Uranium Information Centre. Briefi ng
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