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Fact Sheet SEN-112




               Understanding Senetas
                 layer 2 encryption




Copyright Senetas Corporation 2012 - All rights reserved. Permission to reproduce and distribute this document is
granted provided this copyright notice is included and that no modifications are made to the original. Revisions to this
document may be issued, without notice, from time to time.
Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption


      Introduction
      CN encryption devices are purpose built hardware appliances that have been developed in Australia
      by Senetas Corporation since 1997 and provide secure transport across layer 2 network services.

      The CN product range is mature; Federal government endorsed (it has achieved both the Common
      Criteria EAL4+ accreditation and the FIPS140-2 level 3 certifications); and has been deployed to
      protect critical infrastructure in thousands of locations in more than thirty-five countries.

      The CN platform is optimised to secure information transmitted over a diverse range of network
      protocols including: Ethernet, Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) and Fibre Channel networks at
      data rates up to 10 Gigabits per second (Gbps). The CN series latency and overhead are lower than
      competing solutions available in the marketplace.

      Encryption occurs at the data link layer (layer 2); the payload of the received network traffic is
      scrambled and the protocol header is left in the clear so that it can be switched through the network
      as intended.

      Encryption at layer 2 solves many of the underlying problems of traditional layer 3 encryption such
      as complexity, performance and support for multiple traffic types.

      CN encryptors are fully autonomous and operate independently in point to point or large meshed
      environments with no reliance on external servers.

      Supporting fully automatic key management with unique encryption keys per connection the devices
      offer the most secure, resilient and highest performance method of securing sensitive voice, video
      or data.

      This remainder of this document focuses on the CN series Ethernet encryptor to describe the layer 2
      approach to securing information.




      Product architecture
      The CN encryptor is an inline device that is located on the edge of a network between a local private
      network, and a remote public network.
      CN encryptors provide access control, authentication and confidentiality of transmitted information
      between secured sites. The encryptors can be added to an existing network providing complete
      transparency to the end user and network equipment. An example installation is shown in Figure 1.




      __________________________________________________________________________________
      Page 1
Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption




                                    Figure 1 – Ethernet Mesh Deployment

      The encryptor receives frames on its ingress port; valid frames are classified according to the
      Ethernet header then processed according to the configured policy.
      The frame processing policy is highly configurable and supports operation in point-point, hub and
      spoke or fully meshed environments. In a meshed environment each encryptor supports over 500
      concurrent connections to peer devices with per connection policy tied to either remote MAC
      address or to VLAN ID.
      Allowable policy actions are:
        • Encrypt – payload of frame is encrypted according to the defined policy
        • Discard – drop the frame, no portion is transmitted
        • Bypass – transmit the frame without alteration
      Selective policy control allows mixed traffic profiles which permits specified traffic types to be
      bypassed or discarded through the device (for example, bypass core switch operation or
      maintenance frames) with policy resolution down to the ethertype level.
      The Ethernet transmitter module calculates and inserts the Frame Check Sequence (FCS) at the end
      of the frame. The frame is then encoded and transmitted.


      Multicast traffic and VLANs

      Multicast encryption is used to encrypt traffic that is sent from a host to all members of a multicast
      group and operates at layer 2 with no requirement to modify core switch operation. Policy is tied to
      a multicast MAC address.
      VLAN encryption is used to encrypt all members of a VLAN community and to provide cryptographic
      separation between VLANs. Policy is tied to the VLAN identifier(s).




      __________________________________________________________________________________
      Page 2
Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption

      In both cases a group key encryption scheme is used to ensure that encrypted data from a single
      sender can be successfully received and decrypted by all members of the VLAN or multicast
      community. Group key encryption uses the AES CTR encryption mode.
      The Senetas group key management scheme is responsible for ensuring group keys are maintained
      across the visible network and is designed to be secure, dynamic and robust; with an ability to
      survive network outages and topology changes automatically. It does not rely on an external key
      server to distribute group keys as this introduces both a single point of failure and a single point of
      compromise.
      For robustness and security a group key master is automatically elected amongst the visible
      encryptors within a mesh based on the actual traffic. Using an elected key master from within the
      group allows:
            • Automatic discovery of multicast/VLAN encryption groups
            • Automatic ageing/deletion of inactive groups
            • Secure distribution and updates of keys to all members of multicast groups
            • New members to securely join or leave the group at any time
            • Fault tolerance to network outages and topology changes



         Encrypted      Header                   Decryption                      Decrypted      Header
          Payload                                                                 Payload
                                      Network                    Local
        Header       Encrypted                   Encryption                     Header       Decrypted
                                        Port                       Port
                      Payload                                                                 Payload
                                     Interface                  Interface

                                                  Control &
                                                 Management




                                 Figure 2 - Data flow through the Encryptor




      Performance
      Encryption is implemented in dedicated silicon using a cut-through encryption architecture; this has
      the benefit that only a portion of the frame needs to be received before encryption and re-
      transmission of the frame can begin. This approach ensures consistently low latency (in the order of
      7uS for a 1Gbps Ethernet encryptor) independent of frame size.
      In Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) encrypted frames are the same size as plaintext frames and no
      packet expansion is performed.
      In Counter mode (CTR) an 8 byte shim is appended to encrypted frames to ensure counter values are
      synchronised at both ends.
      The encryptors are capable of full duplex, full line rate operation independent of packet size or
      higher layer protocol.


      __________________________________________________________________________________
      Page 3
Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption




                                Figure 3 - Internal Architecture




      __________________________________________________________________________________
      Page 4
Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption

      An encryptor will also generate a very small amount of traffic between devices for key updates and
      management purposes. To distinguish it from other network frames this traffic is sent using the
      Senetas registered ethertype (0xFC0F).



      Compatibility
      The CN encryptors have proven interoperability with Ethernet switches from all the well known
      vendors and provide transparent support for:
              all Ethernet frame formats
              MPLS shims (multiple nested)
              VLAN tags (multiple nested)
              802.1P class of service priority



      Key Management
      The encryption algorithm used is AES in cipher feedback mode (CFB) or counter mode (CTR) with a
      key size of 256 bits.
      Encryption keys are derived internally to FIPS standards from true hardware random number
      generators.
      Public key cryptography and X.509 certificates are used to provide a fully automated key
      management system. Master (key encrypting) keys are transferred between encryptors using
      authenticated RSA public key cryptography. Session (data encrypting) keys are transferred
      periodically between encryptors using master keys.

      Any combination of encrypted or unencrypted virtual circuits can be configured up to a maximum of
      509 active connections for a standard Ethernet frame format.

      Interoperability with 3rd party Certificate Authorities and OCSP/CRL servers is permitted and a full CA
      capability is also provided in the companion management tool CypherManager.



      Tamper Protection
      The CN series is provided in a tamper proof 19” steel case suitable for rack mounting.




      __________________________________________________________________________________
      Page 5
Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption




                                       Figure 4 - CN3000 Rear View




      Physical security is ensured by an active tamper protection mechanism that operates in the presence
      or absence of power. The tamper detection mechanism is triggered if an attempt is made to remove
      the interface card or remove the lid of the enclosure.

      A tampered encryptor will actively delete all sensitive material such as encryption keys and user
      passwords and will revert to a known factory default configuration.

      Holographic tamper evident seals are used to provide visibility of tampered units.



      Management
      Role based management access is used for both local (RS232 CLI) and remote (SNMPv3)
      management. All users must be authenticated before being granted access to the encryptor.

      The user role model has three privilege levels: Administrator, Supervisor and Operator and up to
      thirty different accounts are supported.

      The encryptor logs all configuration changes to a non-volatile audit log and also records all events to
      a non-volatile event log. Any alarm conditions are reported in the logs and in the alarm table, they
      are also indicated on the front panel LEDs and may optionally trigger SNMP trap messages that can
      be sent to 8 independent trap handlers (e.g. OpenView, NetView) as well as being received by
      CypherManager.

      The encryptor can be managed securely and remotely using SNMPv3 via a dedicated management
      port on the front panel, this being referred to as out-of-band management. Remote management
      can also be enabled over the encrypted network itself so that the encryptor is managed over the
      network interface port; this is called in-band management.




      __________________________________________________________________________________
      Page 6
Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption




                                      Figure 5 - CypherManager




      CypherManager (CM) is a Senetas developed tool that functions as a device manager and that can
      also act as a root Certificate Authority for a network of encryptors.

      CypherManager provides private, authenticated access to encryptors to enable secure remote
      management.

      CypherManager is also used to remotely upgrade firmware in encryptors over the network when
      available.




      __________________________________________________________________________________
      Page 7

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Understanding senetas layer 2 encryption

  • 1. Fact Sheet SEN-112 Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption Copyright Senetas Corporation 2012 - All rights reserved. Permission to reproduce and distribute this document is granted provided this copyright notice is included and that no modifications are made to the original. Revisions to this document may be issued, without notice, from time to time.
  • 2. Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption Introduction CN encryption devices are purpose built hardware appliances that have been developed in Australia by Senetas Corporation since 1997 and provide secure transport across layer 2 network services. The CN product range is mature; Federal government endorsed (it has achieved both the Common Criteria EAL4+ accreditation and the FIPS140-2 level 3 certifications); and has been deployed to protect critical infrastructure in thousands of locations in more than thirty-five countries. The CN platform is optimised to secure information transmitted over a diverse range of network protocols including: Ethernet, Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) and Fibre Channel networks at data rates up to 10 Gigabits per second (Gbps). The CN series latency and overhead are lower than competing solutions available in the marketplace. Encryption occurs at the data link layer (layer 2); the payload of the received network traffic is scrambled and the protocol header is left in the clear so that it can be switched through the network as intended. Encryption at layer 2 solves many of the underlying problems of traditional layer 3 encryption such as complexity, performance and support for multiple traffic types. CN encryptors are fully autonomous and operate independently in point to point or large meshed environments with no reliance on external servers. Supporting fully automatic key management with unique encryption keys per connection the devices offer the most secure, resilient and highest performance method of securing sensitive voice, video or data. This remainder of this document focuses on the CN series Ethernet encryptor to describe the layer 2 approach to securing information. Product architecture The CN encryptor is an inline device that is located on the edge of a network between a local private network, and a remote public network. CN encryptors provide access control, authentication and confidentiality of transmitted information between secured sites. The encryptors can be added to an existing network providing complete transparency to the end user and network equipment. An example installation is shown in Figure 1. __________________________________________________________________________________ Page 1
  • 3. Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption Figure 1 – Ethernet Mesh Deployment The encryptor receives frames on its ingress port; valid frames are classified according to the Ethernet header then processed according to the configured policy. The frame processing policy is highly configurable and supports operation in point-point, hub and spoke or fully meshed environments. In a meshed environment each encryptor supports over 500 concurrent connections to peer devices with per connection policy tied to either remote MAC address or to VLAN ID. Allowable policy actions are: • Encrypt – payload of frame is encrypted according to the defined policy • Discard – drop the frame, no portion is transmitted • Bypass – transmit the frame without alteration Selective policy control allows mixed traffic profiles which permits specified traffic types to be bypassed or discarded through the device (for example, bypass core switch operation or maintenance frames) with policy resolution down to the ethertype level. The Ethernet transmitter module calculates and inserts the Frame Check Sequence (FCS) at the end of the frame. The frame is then encoded and transmitted. Multicast traffic and VLANs Multicast encryption is used to encrypt traffic that is sent from a host to all members of a multicast group and operates at layer 2 with no requirement to modify core switch operation. Policy is tied to a multicast MAC address. VLAN encryption is used to encrypt all members of a VLAN community and to provide cryptographic separation between VLANs. Policy is tied to the VLAN identifier(s). __________________________________________________________________________________ Page 2
  • 4. Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption In both cases a group key encryption scheme is used to ensure that encrypted data from a single sender can be successfully received and decrypted by all members of the VLAN or multicast community. Group key encryption uses the AES CTR encryption mode. The Senetas group key management scheme is responsible for ensuring group keys are maintained across the visible network and is designed to be secure, dynamic and robust; with an ability to survive network outages and topology changes automatically. It does not rely on an external key server to distribute group keys as this introduces both a single point of failure and a single point of compromise. For robustness and security a group key master is automatically elected amongst the visible encryptors within a mesh based on the actual traffic. Using an elected key master from within the group allows: • Automatic discovery of multicast/VLAN encryption groups • Automatic ageing/deletion of inactive groups • Secure distribution and updates of keys to all members of multicast groups • New members to securely join or leave the group at any time • Fault tolerance to network outages and topology changes Encrypted Header Decryption Decrypted Header Payload Payload Network Local Header Encrypted Encryption Header Decrypted Port Port Payload Payload Interface Interface Control & Management Figure 2 - Data flow through the Encryptor Performance Encryption is implemented in dedicated silicon using a cut-through encryption architecture; this has the benefit that only a portion of the frame needs to be received before encryption and re- transmission of the frame can begin. This approach ensures consistently low latency (in the order of 7uS for a 1Gbps Ethernet encryptor) independent of frame size. In Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) encrypted frames are the same size as plaintext frames and no packet expansion is performed. In Counter mode (CTR) an 8 byte shim is appended to encrypted frames to ensure counter values are synchronised at both ends. The encryptors are capable of full duplex, full line rate operation independent of packet size or higher layer protocol. __________________________________________________________________________________ Page 3
  • 5. Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption Figure 3 - Internal Architecture __________________________________________________________________________________ Page 4
  • 6. Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption An encryptor will also generate a very small amount of traffic between devices for key updates and management purposes. To distinguish it from other network frames this traffic is sent using the Senetas registered ethertype (0xFC0F). Compatibility The CN encryptors have proven interoperability with Ethernet switches from all the well known vendors and provide transparent support for: all Ethernet frame formats MPLS shims (multiple nested) VLAN tags (multiple nested) 802.1P class of service priority Key Management The encryption algorithm used is AES in cipher feedback mode (CFB) or counter mode (CTR) with a key size of 256 bits. Encryption keys are derived internally to FIPS standards from true hardware random number generators. Public key cryptography and X.509 certificates are used to provide a fully automated key management system. Master (key encrypting) keys are transferred between encryptors using authenticated RSA public key cryptography. Session (data encrypting) keys are transferred periodically between encryptors using master keys. Any combination of encrypted or unencrypted virtual circuits can be configured up to a maximum of 509 active connections for a standard Ethernet frame format. Interoperability with 3rd party Certificate Authorities and OCSP/CRL servers is permitted and a full CA capability is also provided in the companion management tool CypherManager. Tamper Protection The CN series is provided in a tamper proof 19” steel case suitable for rack mounting. __________________________________________________________________________________ Page 5
  • 7. Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption Figure 4 - CN3000 Rear View Physical security is ensured by an active tamper protection mechanism that operates in the presence or absence of power. The tamper detection mechanism is triggered if an attempt is made to remove the interface card or remove the lid of the enclosure. A tampered encryptor will actively delete all sensitive material such as encryption keys and user passwords and will revert to a known factory default configuration. Holographic tamper evident seals are used to provide visibility of tampered units. Management Role based management access is used for both local (RS232 CLI) and remote (SNMPv3) management. All users must be authenticated before being granted access to the encryptor. The user role model has three privilege levels: Administrator, Supervisor and Operator and up to thirty different accounts are supported. The encryptor logs all configuration changes to a non-volatile audit log and also records all events to a non-volatile event log. Any alarm conditions are reported in the logs and in the alarm table, they are also indicated on the front panel LEDs and may optionally trigger SNMP trap messages that can be sent to 8 independent trap handlers (e.g. OpenView, NetView) as well as being received by CypherManager. The encryptor can be managed securely and remotely using SNMPv3 via a dedicated management port on the front panel, this being referred to as out-of-band management. Remote management can also be enabled over the encrypted network itself so that the encryptor is managed over the network interface port; this is called in-band management. __________________________________________________________________________________ Page 6
  • 8. Understanding Senetas layer 2 encryption Figure 5 - CypherManager CypherManager (CM) is a Senetas developed tool that functions as a device manager and that can also act as a root Certificate Authority for a network of encryptors. CypherManager provides private, authenticated access to encryptors to enable secure remote management. CypherManager is also used to remotely upgrade firmware in encryptors over the network when available. __________________________________________________________________________________ Page 7