![5 For this and the following argument see Kohler-Koch et al. (2002).
6 See as an example Piening (1997: ch 2).
7 See Piening (1997), Rhodes (1998); Meunier and Nicolaïdis (1999), Meunier (2000).
8 For a discussion of current literature on EU foreign policy studies according the
distinction between sui generis or comparative phenomenon see Tonra (2000). For a
treatment of the EU foreign policy as sui generis, see Bretherton and Vogler (1999).
9 As observed by Allen and Smith, ‘[al]though there are few who would explicitly argue
that the EC is on the verge of emerging as a “European state”, it is the ideal type of a
state-based foreign policy which lies behind much contemporary analysis of Western
Europe’s international status’ (Allen and Smith 1990:19).
References
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Baden: Nomos: 141–164.
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External Commercial and Associated Policies: A Research Agenda’, Journal of European
Public Policy, 6, 2:206–224.
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June 1999.
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Common Commercial Policy of the EU 1985–1997’, Hamburg: Lit.
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Paper presented at the AEI-conference ‘EU as an international actor’, Mannheim.
ECJ (1994) ‘Opinion 1/94’, European Court Reports, I-5267.
INTRODUCTION: PUZZLES AND PROSPECTS 13](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/819124-250526022952-cc3665d2/85/Understanding-The-European-Unions-External-Relations-Michle-Knodt-34-320.jpg)
![Notes
1 The real argument with Kenneth Waltz must be one of whether the EU is developing
into simply another state, a development which Waltz’s neo-realism can accommodate,
or whether the EU is becoming a post-modern, neo-medieval type of polity that falls
outside the neo-realist universe.
2 For an overview see Rose (1998). The idea, stripped to its core, is to add state
motivation to state capabilities. This comes out very clearly in the analysis of Schweller
(1998) and is rooted in the classical realist discussion of varying foreign policy goals:
‘power, glory, and idea’ in the words of Raymond Aron ([1966], 1984: ch 3). For an
introduction and critical discussion see Donnelly (2000).
3 Analysing the meeting between ideas and material factors is difficult, and it is not
obvious, judging from the theory’s track record, that constructivism is a powerful
perspective. To Andrew Moravscik (1999:670), constructivists work on their proper
meta-theory but ‘contribute far less to our empirical and theoretical understanding of
European integration’ because they fail to ‘place their claims at any real risk of
empirical disconfirmation’. Mark Pollack (no date) likewise notes that he can think of
two constructivist studies ‘that pose testable hypotheses and come away with negative
findings, i.e. results that show no clear effect of EU institutions on actor identities and
preferences, at least for some actors in some issue-areas’. Finally, John Duffield (2001:
109), who is critical of realism, notes that shifts in beliefs or identities are difficult to
establish with ‘any degree of confidence’, and that their causes are equally difficult to
discern.
4 Zakaria’s vision of a strong and wealthy state resembles—not coincidentally—that
which underpins the realist analysis of ‘grand strategy’ (cf. Posen 1984; Rosecrance and
Stein 1993).
5 It should be emphasized that ‘strategic’ here, with reference to the literature of
strategic studies, refers to an actor capable of using military force in its external action.
Some people use the concept of ‘strategy’ to refer to rational-instrumental behaviour,
as when an actor applies means to obtain a goal, and ‘communities’—as I define them
here—can thus be thought of as strategic. However, as noted, ‘strategic’ in this analysis
refers to action involving military means as an instrument of coercion (whether applied
or threatened).
6 These operations were consequently circumscribed in May 1994 by a strict set of
rules, in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25: see White House 1994), that
guide the US deployment of forces. This circumscribed approach to low intensity
operations was also reiterated in the 1999 national security strategy (White House
1999:19–20). In fact, since the mid-1990s, the US has focused on using military force
primarily for strategic purposes (forward deterrence, major conflicts), while low
intensity conflict planning is limited to specific operational roles (embargoes, raids,
shows of force, disaster relief) that deliberately are very loosely connected to the
rebuilding of local government. See the Pentagon’s ‘Doctrine for Joint Operations’
(1995).
7 Richard Holbrooke (1998:68) recalls stating to a surprised President Clinton in June
1995: ‘NATO has already approved the withdrawal plan. While you have the power to
stop it, it has a high degree of automaticity built into it, especially since we have
30 STEN RYNNING](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/819124-250526022952-cc3665d2/85/Understanding-The-European-Unions-External-Relations-Michle-Knodt-51-320.jpg)
Understanding The European Unions External Relations Michle Knodt
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- 6. Understanding the European Union’s External Relations The European Union is one of the world’s biggest economies. However, its role as an international actor is ambiguous and it is not always able to transform its political power into effective external policies. The development of an ‘assertive’ European Union challenges the image of an internal project aimed at economic integration and international relations theories based on unitary state actors. The contributors explore a wide range of issues and policy areas in all three pillars of the Union—the European Community and its legislation, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs. In doing so they unravel the dynamics that led to EU co-operation on external policies, the internal decision- making on external policies and the effects these policies have on other countries and the international arena. This book systematically links the European Union’s external relations to existing political theories, showing how existing theories need to be modified in order to deal with specific characteristics of the EU as an international actor. It will appeal to students and researchers of the EU as well as those with a general interest in political science discourse. Michèle Knodt is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Mannheim and director of a research project based at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. Sebastiaan Princen is working as a postdoctoral researcher at the Utrecht School of Governance at the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands.
- 7. Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science Edited by Jan W.van Deth University of Mannheim, Germany on behalf of the European Consortium for Political Research The Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research—the leading organization concerned with the growth and development of political science in Europe. The series presents high-quality edited volumes on topics at the leading edge of current interest in political science and related fields, with contributions from European scholars and others who have presented work at ECPR workshops or research groups. 1 Regionalist Parties in Western Europe Edited by Lieven de Winter and Huri Türsan 2 Comparing Party System Change Edited by Jan-Erik Lane and Paul Pennings 3 Political Theory and European Union Edited by Albert Weale and Michael Nentwich 4 Politics of Sexuality Edited by Terrell Carver and Véronique Mottier 5 Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations Edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek 6 Social Capital and European Democracy Edited by Jan W.van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Ken Newton and Paul Whiteley 7 Party Elites in Divided Societies Edited by Kurt Richard Luther and Kris Deschouwer 8 Citizenship and Welfare State Reform in Europe Edited by Jet Bussemaker 9 Democratic Governance and New Technology Technologically mediated innovations in political practice in Western Europe Edited by Ivan Horrocks, Jens Hoff and Pieter Tops 10 Democracy without Borders Transnationalisation and conditionality in new democracies Edited by Jean Grugel 11 Cultural Theory as Political Science Edited by Michael Thompson, Gunnar Grendstad and Per Selle 12 The Transformation of Governance in the European Union Edited by Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising
- 8. 13 Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies Political parties behind closed doors Edited by Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole 14 Survival of the European Welfare State Edited by Stein Kuhnle 15 Private Organisations in Global Politics Edited by Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider 16 Federalism and Political Performance Edited by Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt 17 Democratic Innovation Deliberation, representation and association Edited by Michael Saward 18 Public Opinion and the International Use of Force Edited by Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia 19 Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe Edited by David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel 20 Estimating the Policy Position of Political Actors Edited by Michael Laver 21 Democracy and Political Change in the ‘Third World’ Edited by Jeff Haynes 22 Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform Edited by B.Guy Peters and Jon Pierre 23 Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life Edited by Paul Dekker and Eric M.Uslaner 24 Development and Democracy What do we know and how? Edited by Ole Elgström and Goran Hyden 25 Do Political Campaigns Matter? Campaign effects in elections and referendums Edited by David M.Farrell and Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck 26 Political Journalism New challenges, new practices Edited by Raymond Kuhn and Erik Neveu 27 Economic Voting Edited by Han Dorussen and Michaell Taylor 28 Organised Crime and the Challenge to Democracy iii
- 9. Edited by Felia Allum and Renate Siebert 29 Understanding the European Union’s External Relations Edited by Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen Also available from Routledge in association with the ECPR: Sex Equality in Western Europe, Edited by Frances Gardiner; Democracy and Green Political Thought, Edited by Brian Doherty and Marius de Geus; The New Politics of Unemployment, Edited by Hugh Compston; Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe, Edited by Percy B.Lehning and Albert Weale; Private Groups and Public Life, Edited by Jan W.van Deth; The Political Context of Collective Action, Edited by Ricca Edmondson; Theories of Secession, Edited by Percy Lehning; Regionalism Across the North/South Divide, Edited by Jean Grugel and Wil Hout iv
- 10. Understanding the European Union’s External Relations Edited by Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen LONDON AND NEW YORK
- 11. First published 2003 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor and Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2003 Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen for selection and editorial material; individual contributors their contributions All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-39144-6 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-39183-7 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-29697-8 (Print Edition)
- 12. Contents List of illustrations ix Notes on contributors x Series editor’s preface xiii Preface xv Acknowledgements xvi Introduction: Puzzles and prospects in theorizing the EU’s external relations MICHÈLE KNODT AND SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN 1 PART I The development of the EU’s external role: Between co- operation and fragmentation 17 1 A fragmented external role: the EU, defence policy, and New Atlanticism STEN RYNNING 18 2 Understanding the common foreign and security policy: analytical building blocks HELENE SJURSEN 34 3 What game? By which rules? Adaptation and flexibility in the EC’s foreign economic policy ALASDAIR R.YOUNG 53 PART II Internal decision-making on external policies: The challenges of multiple levels and multiple pillars 72 4 Framing an American threat: the European Commission and the technology gap ULRIKA MÖRTH 73 5 European external relations fields: the multi-pillar issue of economic sanctions against Serbia YVES BUCHET DE NEUILLY 90
- 13. 6 Negotiating when others are watching: explaining the outcome of the association negotiations between the European Community and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–1991 DIMITRIS PAPADIMITRIOU 106 PART III Promoting European norms, values and ideas: The EU as an exporter of models 124 7 Exporting ‘values’? EU external co-operation as a ‘soft diplomacy’ FRANCK PETITEVILLE 125 8 Exporting regulatory standards: the cases of trapping and data protection SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN 140 9 The export of the fight against organized crime policy model and the EU’s international actorness FRANCESCA LONGO 156 10 A challenge for the commons: EU fisheries management in international arenas MARTA A.BALLESTEROS 172 PART IV Conclusion 192 11 Understanding the EU’s external relations: the move from actors to processes SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN AND MICHÈLE KNODT 193 Index 207 viii
- 14. Illustrations Figures 3.1 Depiction of a two-level game 54 3.2 Depiction of a three-level game 55 6.1 Timetable of the EC’s Multiple Games, 1990–1992 110 10.1 Decision-making process in the fisheries policy 179 Tables 1.1 EU futures 20 1.2 New Atlanticism 27 3.1 Flexibility in EC external negotiations 64 5.1 Adoption timing of the first economic sanctions against Serbia 94 9.1 Intensity and extension of JHA co-operation agreements 166 10.1 EU and member states’ participation in international fisheries 185 10.2 EU and member states’ participation in major international fisheries agreements 186 Boxes A The scope of the common commercial policy prior to Nice (Article 133) 57 B The scope of the common commercial policy in the Treaty of Nice (Article 133) 66
- 15. Notes on contributors Marta A.Ballesteros is researcher at the Departamento de Ciencia Política y de la Administración, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas e Sociais, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela. Area of work or area of specialization: Fisheries management; Common Pool Resource management in the European Union. Publications: Losada, A., Ballesteros, M.A., and Mahou, X.M. (2000): ‘A Información Agraria e Pesqueira na Voz de Galicia’, in Identidade Colectiva e Medios de Comunicación en Galicia 1977–1996, Instituto Ramón Piñeiro, Santiago de Compostela; VVAA (2001) ‘Ponencia Pesca’ in Asociación Proyecto Galicia 2010 (ed.) Galicia 2010, Santiago de Compostela, chapter 10, 439–485. Yves Buchet de Neuilly is Maître de conference (Senior lecturer) at the University of Lille II, France. He is working on the institutionalization process of EU external action. Main publications: ‘L’irrésistible ascension du Haut représentant pour la PESC. Une solution institutionnelle dans une pluralité d’espaces d’action européens’ (2002), Politique Européenne, (8), 13–31; ‘Des professionnels de l’innovation institutionnelle. La crèation d’une unitè de planification de la politique et d’alerte rapide pour la PESC’, in Didier Georgakakis (dir.), Les Métiers de l’Europe Politique. Acteurs et Professionnalisations de la Construction Européenne (2002), Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 121–144; La Politique Étrangère et de Sécurité Commune. Dynamique d’un Système d’Action (1999), Politix, (46), 127–146. Michèle Knodt is Assistant Professor at the Chair of Political Science II, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim. In addition she is directing the research project ‘Governance in an expanded multi-level system’ at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) and is head of the Research Area 5 (International Embeddedness of European Governance) within Department B of the MZES. Her main research areas are the external relations of the EU and general questions of governance in the EU. Main publications: Tiefenwirkung Europäischer Politik. Eigensinn oder Anpassung Regionalen Regierens? (1998), Baden-Baden: Nomos; ‘Europäisierung Regionalen Regierens: Mit Sinatra zum “autonomieorientierten Systemwechsel” im deutschen Bundesstaat?’ (2002), in: PVS, 2/02, 211–234; (mit Markus Jachtenfuchs, eds), Regieren in Internationalen Institutionen (2002), Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- 16. Francesca Longo is Professor of EU Politics, Faculty of Political Science, University of Catania. Her main research areas: Theories of European Union, Internal security policy of European Union. Her latest publications: The EU and the fight against organized crime: towards a common police and judicial approach (ed.) (2002), Milan: Giuffrè; ‘Italy’, in M.Den Boer (ed.) Organised Crime: A Catalyst in the Europeanisation of National Police and Prosecution Agencies? (2002), Maastricht: EIPA; Criminalità senza Frontiere. Le Istituzioni Internazionali di Lotta al Crimine Organizzato (co-author) (1999). Catania: Bonanno Ed. Ulrika Mörth is an Associate Professor in Political Science in the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University and also researches at the Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research (SCORE) at the same University in Sweden. Her main research area is European politics. Her publications include ‘Europeanisation as interpretation, translation and editing of public policies’, in The Politics of Europeanisation: Theory and Analysis (2002), Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds), Oxford: OUP; ‘Competing Frames in the European Commission—The Case of the Defence Industry/Equipment Issue’ (2000), The European Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2; Interdependens, konflikt och säkerhetspolitik—Sverige och den amerikanska teknikexportkontrollen (1998), (co- author with Professor Bengt Sundelius), Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus. Dimitris Papadimitriou is a Research Fellow at the European Institute of the London School of Economics. He is the author of Negotiating the New Europe (2002), Ashgate, and has written in the areas of the EU’s relations with the Balkans, administrative reform in Eastern Europe and EU enlargement. He has also published on Greece’s relations with the EU. Franck Petiteville is Maître de conferences de science politique (Senior lecturer) at the Université de Paris V-René Descartes Chercheur associé au CERI (Associate Researcher at the Centre d’Études des Relations Internationales, Paris). His research areas are the external economic relations of the EU, EU trade policy, regulation of globalization and WTO. Main recent publications: ‘La Cooperation Économique de l’Union Européenne, entre Globalisation et Politisation’, Revue Française de Science Politique, vol. 51, no. 3, June 2001; ‘L’Union Européenne, Acteur International Global? Un Agenda de Recherche’, Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, no. 47, September 2002. Sebastiaan Princen is working as a postdoctoral researcher at the Utrecht School of Governance, University of Utrecht (The Netherlands). He has studied the effects of trade measures on domestic regulatory standards in fields like environmental policy and consumer protection. His most recent publication is EU Regulation and Transatlantic Trade (2002), The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Sten Rynning is Associate Professor at the Institute for Political Science, University of Southern Denmark. His research areas are the theories of Security and International Relations; Strategy and Civil-Military Relations; the EU’s CFSP and ESDP; NATO and Transatlantic Relations. Main publications: xi
- 17. Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958–2000 (2002), New York: Praeger; ‘Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decision-Makers Between International Power and Domestic Interests’, Security Studies, vol. 11, no. 1, 2002; ‘Why Not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, 2003. Helene Sjursen is Senior Researcher at ARENA, University of Oslo. Her research areas are the European foreign and security policy and EU enlargement. Main publications: The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis. International Relations in the Second Cold War (2002), Basingstoke: Palgrave; ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 3, 2002:491–513; (co-ed. with John Peterson) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP (1998), London: Routledge. Alasdair R.Young is a lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Glasgow. His teaching and research focus on the interaction between trade and regulatory policies and politics, with particular reference to the European Union. His most recent publications are Extending European Cooperation: The European Union and the ‘New’ International Trade Agenda (2002), Manchester University Press; and (with Helen Wallace) Regulatory Politics in the Enlarging European Union: Weighing Civic and Producer Interests (2000), Manchester University Press. xii
- 18. Series editor’s preface Travelling in Europe is easy nowadays. On high-speed trains from London to Cologne via Brussels, or from Turin to Paris via Geneva, borders are passed virtually unnoticed. In Porto the Euro is as common as it is in Utrecht and the same rules regulate many aspects of economic and social processes in many countries. Growing European unification means increasing competence of the EU as well as a further weakening of the member states. In just a few decades the European nation-state seems to have lost its relevance. ‘Europe’ has taken the place of the old national entities, as any traveller will notice right away. As usual, common-sense notions should not be taken for granted. While the internal economic, political, social, and geographical borders are indeed closed down rapidly, the external position of the EU is less clear. Ever since the debacle of the plan for a European Defence Community in the early 1950s, the development of joint external positions and policies has been difficult. The development of a common market and the disappearance of borders, then, seem to be mainly restricted to internal European processes. These parallel processes of internal collaboration and external differentiation result in the paradoxical situation that the EU—one of the strongest economic blocks in the world—plays a rather minor role in international politics; be it forced interventions in Afghanistan or redefining UN- environmental policies. In order to understand the external relations of the EU, detailed knowledge about the interdependencies of national, international, and European policy-making processes is required. The painstaking practice of collecting and interpreting information about such complex and complicated matters as the implementation of the Treaty of Nice, the arming of the Eurofighter, the negotiations with central- European membership candidates, or the management of world fishery disputes is but one of the aims of the contributions to this volume. As a second task, the authors all aim to examine the available theoretical approaches and to develop additional research strategies. Are existing approaches—which still rely on the concept of the nation-state—useful for understanding the external relations of the EU? The contributors to this volume differ clearly in their study designs, selected material, and the scope of their analyses, but they all cope with claims about the uniqueness of the EU as the crucial explanatory factor for its external relations. The three major parts of this volume address the central aspects of this project: co-
- 19. operation and fragmentation in the EU, the challenges of multiple-levels and areas, and the relevance of EU-policies for the rest of the world. Before specific treatments of these three themes are presented, Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen offer an overview of the main approaches and contested conclusions in this area (Introduction). The first part of the volume consists of three contributions mainly addressed to theoretical issues. Sten Rynning observes the rise of new tensions as a consequence of the introduction of defence co-operation in Europe (Chapter 1). As Helene Sjursen shows, understanding common institutions and capabilities in defence and security requires the enlargement of ‘realist’ approaches with deliberative strategies (Chapter 2). Alasdair R.Young pays attention to the Treaty of Nice as the most significant change in the formal foreign economic policy institutions in Europe (Chapter 3). The next three contributions focus on the consequences of fragmented policy-making processes. Ulrika Mörth starts this second part with a discussion of the technology gap between the EU and the USA (Chapter 4). Dealing with a very different situation, Yves Buchet de Neuilly examines the distinction between tough political declarations and the ‘empty shell’ of economic sanctions against Serbia (Chapter 5). Dimitris Papadimitriou discusses the various obstacles in the early association negotiations between the EU and Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (Chapter 6). The third part of the volume addresses the EU’s opportunities to promote European ideas. Franck Petiteville defends the idea that EU economic co-operation is an attempt to export European values through ‘soft diplomacy’ (Chapter 7). In a remarkable comparison of European, US, and Canadian regulations Sebastiaan Princen shows how EU- policies induced a shift in US and Canadian regulatory standards (Chapter 8), while Francesca Longo reveals that the EU exports policy models that target transnational crime and influences national police and law-enforcement systems outside the EU (Chapter 9). In the last contribution to this part Marta A. Ballesteros discusses the crucial role of the EU in world fishery controversies and their management (Chapter 10). Finally, Sebastiaan Princen and Michele Knodt return to the central questions of this volume—the EU’s external relations and the merits of available approaches and explanations—in their extensive concluding chapter (Chapter 11). Understanding the EU’s external relations is not easy. The many policy areas are multifaceted and highly complicated. Institutional, historical, economic, and political factors for different states as well as for the international community have to be analysed in order to understand the challenges and opportunities for the EU. Beside, various theoretical approaches offer controversial analytical strategies and are still focused on nation-states. The unique character of this volume is that it offers a critical assessment of available approaches on the basis of careful empirical analyses. It promotes our understanding of the EU and European integration. The traveller between London and Cologne might be grateful for the disappearance of borders in Europe; in the long run it will be the strengthening of its common external position that will be decisive for the success of the EU. Jan W.van Deth, Series Editor Mannheim, September 2002 xiv
- 20. Preface The development of an increasingly important and ‘assertive’ EU in the world arena, coupled with the EU’s distinct and in many ways unique characteristics, poses interesting puzzles, not only for policy-makers but also for students of European integration and international relations. It challenges the image of the EU as a predominantly internal project aimed at economic integration, as well as theories of international relations based on unitary state actors as the main units of analysis. As a result, the EU’s external relations have proven to be a fertile area of investigation for political scientists. At the same time, it has proven difficult to formulate adequate theories of the EU as an international actor. Whereas the EU’s distinctive features have received ample attention, the attempts to link the EU’s role and character to more general theories of international relations are still at their earliest stages. Our book aims to contribute to the understanding of the EU’s external relations in two ways. First, the book will link issues in the EU’s external relations to existing political science theories. Second, the book will cover the EU’s external relations in all three pillars. It will thus bring together debates from the literature on the CFSP and first pillar policies, as well as include a discussion of external policies under the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs). Moreover, a number of chapters will deal explicitly with issues that fall under more than one pillar and focus on ‘multi-pillar’ processes. This book resulted from our workshop ‘Understanding the EU’s International Presence’, held at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, March 2001 in Grenoble. We would like to thank all participants of the workshop for their fruitful discussion on the papers. Among them, we owe a special thanks to the contributors to this book for their first-rate co-operation. In addition we would like to thank Sebastian Brünger and Rebecca Steffenson for technical help and language editing. We would also like to thank the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) for their financial support in editing this volume. Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen Mannheim and Utrecht, January 2003
- 21. Acknowledgements The authors and publishers would like to thank Ashgate Publishers for granting permission to reproduce Chapter 4, originally published in Threat Politics, edited by Johan Eriksson (2001).
- 22. Introduction Puzzles and prospects in theorizing the EU’s external relations Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen The evolving role of the EU in the international arena Over the last years of deepening European integration, the role of the European Union as an international actor has become more obvious. Although at times the EU seems to be ‘a silent global player’1 rather than an openly assertive one (Rummel 1990), the EU shows an increasing and expanding presence in world affairs. Nevertheless, the active international role of the EU stays problematic. The European Union’s role in the international arena has always been ambiguous: on the one hand, the EU represents one of world’s largest economies, which (potentially) gives it considerable political clout. On the other hand, the EU lacks a number of attributes that have traditionally been associated with actors in the international arena. Most conspicuously, as a regional co-operation scheme between sovereign states, the EU lacks the kind of centralized authority that ‘traditional’ nation-states usually possess. Still, the EU has never been able to confine itself to internal matters. From the beginning, the process of European integration has had significant external ramifications, if only for the sheer size of the European market and the importance of the EU’s trade relations with third countries. Since the EU has always been a predominantly economic union, it has been able to assume the greatest role in policies that are now associated with Pillar I, that is in issues that are covered directly by the EC Treaty. External trade policies have been conducted at the EC level since the 1960s, and the EC has become a member of several international organizations and a party to a number of international treaties (often alongside its member states). In Pillar I, the EU has some exclusive powers (for instance in external trade policies), as well as a number of powers it shares with its member states (for instance in the field of external environmental policies). In all these policy areas, EU institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament, play an important role, although to a varying extent according to the issue at hand. As a result, the EU member states have relinquished part of their sovereignty over Pillar I issues, giving a much greater role to European-level representation.
- 23. At the same time, policies under Pillars II and III (foreign and security policies, and justice and home affairs, respectively) have remained firmly intergovernmental. Even though they have been brought under the umbrella of ‘the’ European Union and the European Commission has often actively sought to gain a foothold in these areas, the formal role of EU-level institutions in them is limited. Decision-making and implementation remain completely under the member states’ remit, even if they try to act together as ‘the EU’. As a consequence, the EU has developed a unique set of institutions that differ not only from those found in ‘traditional’ states and international organizations, but also among themselves depending on the issue or policy area at hand. The development of an increasingly important and assertive EU in the world arena, coupled with the EU’s distinct and in many ways unique characteristics, poses interesting puzzles, not only for policy-makers but also for students of European integration and international relations. Scholars have grappled with the way in which the EU can best be conceptualized and how the EU’s external conduct can best be explained. Thus, the scientific occupation with the topic has been as heterogeneous as the EU’s involvement in external policies itself. Shortcomings of the existing literature on the EU’s external relations An overview of the literature on the EU’s external relations (see Conzelmann and Knodt 1999) reveals a clear separation according to pillars and a concentration on Pillar II, as well as an approach that is either descriptive or limited in its theoretical focus, and struggling with the special character of the EU. Separation by pillars and focus on Pillar II First of all, the literature is clearly divided by research on each pillar of the EU. In addition, much of the relevant literature tends to focus on developments in Pillar II, that is, on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).2 This literature tends to discuss the shortcomings of the CFSP in the face of crisis, its poor external representation and the largely symbolic institutional reforms in the Amsterdam Treaty.3 The focus on Pillar II poses the danger of neglecting some equally important dimensions of the external activities of the Union, namely those dealt with within Pillar I. Theoretical focus in studies on Pillar II A large part of the literature on the CFSP is more descriptive than theoretically guided research with sometimes very useful thick descriptions on the emerging CFSP as well as the common defence policy.4 Often, however, the authors fragmented cumb to the seductive political rhetoric of the Council and the Commission’s official documents. There, a common foreign policy is presented as 2 MICHÈLE KNODT AND SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN
- 24. ‘self-evident’ and more over as ‘imperative’.5 Two concepts are central to the discussion. First, ‘the coercion to act’, which refers to the argument that Europe has to face challenges that can only be coped with in a common foreign policy. Second, ‘the logic of development’, which describes the history of the CFSP as a natural process towards an ever closer co-operation. The notion that the EU is ‘forced to act’ is based on three assumptions. The first is the realist assumption of the international system as an anarchic world where the struggle for interests and power is a potential threat for a political community. Second, as a result of the size of the challenges and the limited power of the individual states, the Europeans are forced to bundle up their power. Third, the world is divided into ‘the others’ and ‘we Europeans’. The others are anonymously appearing as a challenge or threat. This vagueness of the others makes it easier to create a common identity. Thus, all elements to legitimize a European CFSP are available: the evidence of a need to act, the argument for why it is necessary to act, and the construction of the identity of the actors. This argumentation is found in most of the official Council and Commission documents, most of the times in an explicit way (cf. European Commission 1999: 59), but also in political scientists’ explanations of the CFSP. Thus, Stanley Hoffmann states that ‘new threats were arising, or being perceived, by the Europeans’ (Hoffmann 2000:191) and describes how the Europeans react towards them. Similarly, Ginsberg argues that, in the period between 1972 and 1985, EC foreign policy actions were increasingly driven by responses to global economic interdependence and an emerging sense of an EC mission in world politics (Ginsberg 1989:4). The second concept of the ‘logic of development’ suggests an inevitable development in the direction of a CFSP. The argument is concentrated, first, on the message that the concept of the CFSP has always existed: at regular intervals, European states launched new initiatives to work together, which sometimes failed, but in the early years of the 1990s started to succeed.6 A more detailed historical analysis would show that the intervals described were not turning inevitably into a kind of dynamic and that the label of a European foreign and security policy has covered different contents. The second implicit message is that the development of a European foreign and security policy is a question of competence. It begins with a constitutional step: shifting foreign and security competence from the member states and the establishment of common institutions, which should ensure efficient common actions. The new institutions are then provided with strategies and resources. The quality of these institutions is not at the centre of the discussion, which is focused on whether, from a subjective point of view, the EU carried out the ‘right’ policy. This could be observed in the Kosovo case, where the visible outcome of the common policy, the flood of refugees, made the European observer expect common European action to solve the problem. Compared to these expectations, the criticism on the CFSP is harsh and leads rapidly to the judgement that the effectiveness of the EU leaves much to be desired. This view found its entrance into the political science literature under the heading of the ‘capability- INTRODUCTION: PUZZLES AND PROSPECTS 3
- 25. expectation gap’ (Hill 1993, 1998) and turned into a questionable scientific measure as well as part of the dynamic of the CFSP development. Both concepts are not satisfactory from a political scientist’s point of view. Too vague are the mechanisms of explanation as well as the explanandum of the analyses, and too veiled are the theoretical concepts of the work. Theoretical focus in studies on Pillar I While with respect to Pillar II there is an ample discussion on the interconnection and co-operation between the CFSP, NATO and the OSCE, the discussion on the EU’s relations with international organizations relevant to Pillar I policies (such as the WTO, the OECD and some branches of the UN) tends to receive less attention in the political science work. The available literature is often written by lawyers, which may account for the high salience of the topic of representation and membership of the EU in these organizations (cf. Sack 1995). If at all, the political science literature focuses on the intergovernmental perspective on European preference-formation at the international level, as well as the question of political consequences for the EC polity and the relations between supranational institutions and member states.7 The analysis on Pillar I also presents us with another limitation in the EU’s external relations literature. Most authors working on the external economic relations of the EU are using a multi-level game framework which is based on the ‘two-level games’ approach presented by Putnam in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Putnam 1988). According to his approach, domestic groups pursue ‘their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians are seeking power by constructing coalitions among those groups’ (Putnam 1988:430). On the international level national governments try ‘to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments’ (Putnam 1988:430). Putnam assumes that, in international negotiations on international co-operation, domestic actors put pressure on national governments to gain leverage on the international level. Moreover, national governments use international negotiations to meet or escape domestic constraints. Both levels are simultaneously involved in negotiations, and cannot be treated separately as a two-step process but as a reciprocal process of influence. Multi-level games, as Putnam describes them, focus exclusively on negotiations between governments at the international level. Negotiations are carried out by rational actors, which have to take into account the interests of domestic actors. Hence, it can be argued that Putnam’s two-level games fit into Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). In this approach, the levels are clearly distinct from each other. Most authors modelling multi-level interactions between the EU and the international level are analysing these multi-level games based on Putnam’s assumption. Authors such as Edwards (1990), Patterson (1997), Collinson (1999), 4 MICHÈLE KNODT AND SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN
- 26. Moyer (1993), Deutsch (1999) and von Schöppenthau (1999) started from Putnam’s two-level games and extended them to three-level games. They did so by dividing the second, the international, level into an EU and an international level. The authors focus especially on the fact that negotiations are taking place simultaneously at all the three levels. Thus, interactions are influencing negotiations on each of those levels. However, all of these attempts are limited to bargaining situations, trying to explain the outcome of the negotiation by analysing actors’ preferences and the type of negotiation situation. Combining three-level games with an historical institutionalist approach, Alasdair R.Young (2000:94) is one of the first authors who tries to go beyond a purely rationalist analysis of these multi-level games. In his work, the European level is constructed as an interface between the multi-lateral and the national level: on the one hand is the level of aggregation and formulation of the interests and positions of member states and on the other hand is an institution that is passing over multi- lateral agreements to the member states. This dual character as an ‘international institution’ and an ‘international actor’ is influencing the shape and content of member state positions, as well as the implications of multi-laterally agreed regimes for European and national rules. Analytically, he treats the acquis communautaire as an institution that is framing the interaction between member states and the European level. Member state preferences in respect of co-operation and their negotiation power are shaped by extra-EU and intra-EU interdependence (Young 1999, 2000; and Young in this volume). The special character of the EU Studies analysing the EU’s external relations from a theoretical perspective have to come to terms with the ambiguous sui generis nature of the EU/EC, as the previous section has already indicated.8 The discussion about what status the EC may gain in international organizations and international negotiations often makes a tacit assumption that the EU/EC can be understood as some kind of proto-state, bound to develop a more state-like character in international relations in the future.9 Seen that way, the question of how to treat the EU/EC analytically and legally constitutes a temporary rather than general difficulty. These characteristics of the existing literature have consequences for the structure and content of this volume. It is the separation by pillars, the concentration on the CFSP, the descriptive nature of texts, the legitimizing rhetoric and the theoretical limitation on multi-level games displayed by most publications which we want to overcome. Thus, this volume is going to discuss to what extent existing theories can help us to analyse the external relations of the EU and how we can deal with the special character of this entity just described above. INTRODUCTION: PUZZLES AND PROSPECTS 5
- 27. Challenges and approaches in theorizing the EU’s external policies The EU challenges existing theories of international relations that are based on unitary state actors as the main units of analysis (cf. White 1999). As we have seen, scholars have taken different positions on how to conceptualize the EU as an international actor. From one perspective, we have a strong community working on the implicit (sometimes also explicit) assumption that the EU is becoming a state- like actor. As we have shown, part of this community already treats the EU as a unitary actor, judging its policy-making by state-like criteria. From another perspective, it can be argued that the EU is a unique entity, or an entity sui generis (cf. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996) as it is often called. The question is: why do some authors describe and categorize the EU as unique and what are the main characteristics of this entity? The specific character of the EU There are two developments that require an alternative conception, which is particularly relevant when it comes to the analysis of the EU’s external relations. First, we can observe a tendency of blurring boundaries and transnationalization. The evolving nature of international negotiations shows that the clear territorial boundaries between national and international politics that developed with the rise of modern nation-states cannot be maintained. The same is true of the boundaries between national, European and international politics. Governmental space and the scope of unsolved problems are increasingly diverging to the point that the division between policy-making within the state and the environment is vanishing and the functional capacity of the nation-state is questioned (Albert and Brock 1995; Neyer 1995). Applied to European integration, different authors in Beate Kohler-Koch’s (1998a) publication Regieren in entgrenzten Räumen (Governance in Political Space without Boundaries) deliver a vivid analysis of this process. Kohler-Koch assumes that interaction beyond the national borders, together with the functional differentiation of society, is leading to a functionally (instead of territorially) defined construction of political space and the drawing of new functional boundaries (Kohler-Koch 1998b). As a result, political competencies are shifted and sometimes superimposed across the varying levels. Second, the discussion on multi-level governance within the EU has shown the complexity of European governance. By the end of the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s, acknowledgement of the so-called third (regional) level and the involvement of sub-national actors in the complex system of European decision-making drew attention to policy-making across the levels (Marks 1993; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler- Koch 1996; Kohler-Koch et al. 1998; Knodt 1998; Conzelmann and Knodt 2002). This development led to the conception of the ‘system of governance’ approach for analysing the EU instead of looking at policy-making on separate levels (Kohler- Koch and Knodt 1997). Referring to Sharkansky (1981), Kohler-Koch and Knodt 6 MICHÈLE KNODT AND SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN
- 28. compared this dichotomy with a marble cake as opposed to a layer cake (Kohler- Koch and Knodt 1997:3). The very nature of the European multi-level system—comprising both supranational institutions and member states acting together—gives way to a different kind of governance. The joint exercise of sovereignty in the EU has two consequences: it enlarges the territorial scope for political action ‘beyond the nation- state’ and it incorporates the member states into a complex transnational, multi- level system of decision-making. Being a member of the EU has the consequence that political institutions, that is governing agents, have lost their exclusive privilege of authoritative allocation (Kohler-Koch and Knodt 1997:3f). This phenomenon could be described by Rosenau’s concept of ‘penetrated systems’ (Rosenau 1969), that is where external actors do not just influence but have a share in political decisions. The concept could be applied to governance in the European multi-level system. In acting beyond territorial borders, actors allocate authoritative norms and rules for the European political space. Thus, for governance in the European multi-level system the notion of an ‘interpenetrated system of action’ (Grote et al. 1996) has been used, which helps to analyse the linkage of formerly separated levels. Following this logic, the core characteristics of a European system of governance could be described as follows. 1 A polycentric system, where various centres of decision-making exist that are formally independent of each other (Ostrom et al. 1961; Ostrom 1999). The hierarchical centre of the system is replaced by functional networks (Kohler- Koch 1999). 2 A system split into multiple, overlapping arenas characterized by loose coupling (Benz 2000:152f; Frey and Eichenberger 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2001). These interlocking arenas include different actors, whose interests diverge. Thus, individual interests serve as the constitutive logic of the polity: ‘Governing has to reconcile the competing preferences of self-interested individuals in an institutionalised system of peaceful conflict resolution. The legitimate right to have “voice” is not confined to members of a given community, but is extended to all who are “affected” by a policy’ (Kohler-Koch 1999:22f), that is those who hold certain rights or interests. 3 The organizing principle of political relations within the European system is based on consociation, which helps actors to manage heterogeneity within political communities. Combined with individual interests as the legitimate political unit of action, the governance of the EU could be categorized as ‘network governance’ (Kohler-Koch 1999:23). Policy-making is consensus oriented and gives priority to problem-solving strategies rather than bargaining (Scharpf 1999). 4 Consensual policy-making relies heavily on interaction and communication between its entities (Knodt 2000). Thus accumulation of knowledge, collective learning and the exchange of ideas and concepts are significant. INTRODUCTION: PUZZLES AND PROSPECTS 7
- 29. The question will then be: does this sui generis character defy existing categories and theories and require completely new or distinct approaches? Taken to its extreme, does this position imply that most existing theories are largely irrelevant or useless in relation to the EU’s external relations, and that it is necessary to develop a new set of concepts and theoretical notions specifically geared to understanding the EU? In addition, most of the theories applied to the EU are using a concept of actors as traditional states or at least unitary actors. Thus, the question has to be, how can we deal theoretically with the EU without falling into the trap of conceptionalizing the EU as unique, or as a state-like actor? Consequences for theorizing the EU’s external relations Three general arguments can be made against treating the EU as an entity sui generis. First, each of the traditional actors in world politics also has unique characteristics and can be argued to be sui generis. For example, the role and internal political structure of the United States are quite distinct from those of other states, but this has not inhibited the formulation and application of more general theories that apply to both the US and other states. Second, even if the EU exhibits certain new or distinct characteristics, it may be useful to analyse them in terms of existing theories or to examine how they relate to the characteristics of traditional states in international relations. An analysis in terms of established theories may make certain seemingly unique characteristics look less particular. At the same time, it may also highlight the ways in which the EU does actually differ from traditional states and thereby contribute to a clearer understanding of what exactly differentiates the EU from traditional states and international organizations. Third, using existing theories to analyse the EU’s external relations will also maximize the contribution to theory formation and testing. Only by applying existing theories to the EU’s external relations is it possible to criticize those theories and modify them where appropriate. It is exactly in this process that the EU’s external relations are likely to make the greatest contribution to international relations theory, and political science more generally. The EU’s external relations may challenge existing theories in two ways. 1 By requiring the reformulation of existing theories to take into account the EU’s specific characteristics. 2 By being a laboratory for developing theories about new phenomena that can be observed more widely in the international arena but present themselves most clearly in the context of the EU. The second way offers the most promising new avenues for political science theories. For instance, the EU arguably offers the clearest example of a multi-level governance system, and most studies of this phenomenon have focused on the EU. At the same time, elements of multi-level governance can be discerned in 8 MICHÈLE KNODT AND SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN
- 30. international relations more generally, and are by no means confined to the European Union. As a consequence, studies of the EU can develop new insights that can later be applied to other international systems. Conversely, the EU’s external relations may modify our understanding of traditional states by highlighting dynamics that until recently received little attention. For instance, although the EU’s decision-making processes involving both the European and the member state levels may seem to be unique to the EU, they may point to similar national-subnational dynamics in federal states, such as the US and Canada. These dynamics are not new, but a focus on the EU’s decision-making processes may make them more salient and offer a useful framework for analysing them. In addition the arguments we have made on the characteristics of the EU could lead us to another consequence. We should think about shifting our research focus and questions on our conception of policy-making in the EU (with respect to external relations) away from approaches which focus on the characteristics of actors. Rather, we should place processes at the centre of our research, a point that will be discussed in more detail in our conclusions. Understanding the EU’s external relations: puzzles and prospects The specific characteristics of EU policy-making in respect to its external relations, described in the previous sections, give rise to three claims for uniqueness that would require special theories for understanding the EU’s external relations. These claims relate to: the degree of external co-operation, the internal decision-making about external policies, and the effects that the EU’s external policies have. The decision to co-operate First, the EU differs in the degree to which its member states co-operate externally. As was shown above, the EU’s external competencies differ considerably between policy areas. Even in the most ‘Europeanized’ policy areas, some issues have and others have not been transferred to the EU level. For instance, external trade policies have always been the clearest example of exclusive European competence in external relations. However, in 1994, after the European Commission had negotiated the series of agreements that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization, the European Court of Justice ruled in its 1/94 decision that some forms of trade in services and intellectual property did not fall under the exclusive EU competence, and that those parts of the GATS and TRIPS agreement had to be ratified by the EU as well as the individual member states (ECJ 1994). Meanwhile, with the Nice Treaty, parts of the GATS and TRIPS agreement have moved into exclusive competence of the EU. In other areas, the EU’s external competencies are still less clear. As a result, and unlike in traditional states, the boundaries of the EU’s external conduct and competencies are unclear, often hotly contested, and INTRODUCTION: PUZZLES AND PROSPECTS 9
- 31. continually moving as shown by the WTO example, which may strongly affect the scope and character of the EU’s international conduct. The decision to co-operate externally is addressed in Part I of this volume. The contributions in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 deal with a number of questions: Why and under which conditions does the EU co-operate externally? Can we differentiate between different degrees of co-operation? What effect does the degree of co- operation have on future EU and member state behaviour? Are there differences between the different Pillars? Could there be any kind of cross-fertilization from bringing together research on the different Pillars? As a result, do we have to characterize the EU as an incomplete actor when it comes to co-operation in the international arena? Three contributions elaborate on these questions with regard to Pillars I and II. Sten Rynning and Helene Sjursen are taking a look at the setting up of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy from different theoretical approaches. While Rynning is taking a neo-classical realist approach, Sjursen bases her analysis on an ‘interpretative’ institutionalist approach. Alasdair Young focuses on policies under Pillar I, combining a multi-level game with an institutionalist approach. Internal decision-making on external policies Second, once the EU is acting externally, its internal decision-making processes about external affairs differ from those in traditional states. The EU’s distinctiveness in this regard is arguably most pronounced in two characteristics: its multi-level character, and its multi-pillar character. The EU’s decision-making processes involve actors at different levels and in different arenas. In many areas, both European-level actors and member states play a role, as well as actors that simultaneously operate at more than one level (such as certain interest groups). In general, the role played by EU member states is incomparably larger than that played by subnational units in any ‘traditional’ state. As was discussed above, the EU also operates under different institutional configurations depending on the pillar under which an issue is handled. This is a complication for theories in itself, but it is compounded by the fact that several issues fall partly under one and partly under another pillar. For instance, economic sanctions require a political decision under Pillar II and implementing decisions under Pillar I. Likewise, external justice affairs have partly been dealt with under Pillar III and partly under Pillar II. Thus in addition, we have to cope with cross- pillar or multi-pillar issues in our analyses. Both the multi-level and the multi-pillar characteristics add a degree of complexity to the EU’s decision-making processes. Besides, they cause a degree of incoherence that has often been lamented by commentators and which arguably gives the EU the character of a fragmented actor. In terms of political science theory, they complicate the use of theories that were developed for other kinds of actors. The issues of multi-level and multi-pillar decision-making are especially dealt with in the contributions that form Part II of this volume. The questions relevant 10 MICHÈLE KNODT AND SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN
- 32. here are: what does the multi-level and multi-pillar character mean for the decision- making system of the EU? How does it affect the policies within the EU? How does it affect the roles of the actors? What does the choice of the arena mean for the outcome of negotiations on an issue? What consequences can negotiations on the same issue on different levels have? Ulrika Mörth’s contribution focuses on the issue of defence equipment, which combines military and foreign policy as well as technological and economic aspects. She shows how, through a process of ‘framing’, it is decided within which EU arena the issue will be negotiated and which role the different actors within the European multi-level system can play. In his contribution, Yves Buchet de Neuilly deals with the cross-pillar issue of sanctions. Examining the sanctions against Serbia, he analyses the different outcomes of decisions within the framework of the two pillars. A similar disparity between the statements before negotiations and the outcomes of those negotiations is found by Dimitris Papadimitriou in relations between the EU and the Central and East European Countries (CEECs). In his analysis, he takes a close look at the parallel negotiations on various levels that led to the association agreements between the EU and the CEECs. The effect of the EU’s external policies Third, and finally, if the EU is said to be a distinctive actor, this should also be reflected in the effects it has on other actors or the international system as a whole. Thus, the EU’s external policies may differ in fundamental ways from those of ‘traditional’ states and international organizations. In this volume, we look at this issue from the perspective of ‘exporting models’. Key questions are: how is the EU carrying out a kind of institutional policy at the international level and within international organizations? Does the EU succeed in exporting its models of problem-solving and its norms and values to other countries and the international arena? What factors are crucial for effective institutional policy-making and exporting models, norms and values to external arenas? And, is there a difference between the EU and ‘traditional’ nation-states in carrying out this kind of institutional policy? Four contributions in Part III of this volume examine these effects, showing us that we should look not only at the internal changes within the EU through external representation but also on the changes in the external arenas caused by the appearance of the EU as an actor. Franck Petiteville analyses the instrument of what he calls ‘soft diplomacy’, asking how the EU is exporting European values by the use of economic co-operation. Sebastiaan Princen also examines attempts to export values, but this time focusing on trade measures in transatlantic relations. Using the example of Justice and Home Affairs, Francesca Longo shows how the EU is exporting its model of police and judicial co-operation to CEECs, Russia and the Mediterranean countries. In her work on the EU’s external fisheries policies, Marta INTRODUCTION: PUZZLES AND PROSPECTS 11
- 33. Ballesteros shows how the involvement of the EU in policy-making within different internal and external arenas is affecting the management of fisheries. Examining the three claims The differences, if any, between the EU and ‘traditional’ states and international organizations may have important implications for the applicability of existing theories in international relations and political science, as they contradict several assumptions that underlie them. Still, it is not at all certain whether these differences do indeed undermine existing approaches, or whether these approaches are also useful in the context of the EU’s external relations. This book aims critically to analyse the three claims for a distinctive EU theory discerned above by bringing together a number of theoretical and empirical studies that seek to apply and explore the boundaries of existing international relations and political science theories in the context of the EU’s external policies. In selecting the contributions for this volume, we therefore chose not only theoretical articles but also empirical studies which apply theoretical concepts and can tell us more about difficulties in that application. In the end, we aim to answer three questions. 1 To what extent is the EU a unique or distinct actor in the international arena? 2 To what extent can the EU’s external conduct be explained by existing theories in political science? 3 What does this imply about the future of political science theory? In answering these questions, we will follow the distinction made above between three claims for a distinctive EU theory: the decision to co-operate (Part I), the multi-level and multi-pillar characteristics of the internal decision-making processes about external policies (Part II), and the effects the EU has on other actors and the international system as a whole (Part III). Moreover, we will discern several ways in which the EU may challenge and thereby contribute to existing theories in political science. Notes 1 The notion of a silent global player reflects upon events such as the building of the new airport of Sarajevo, where the EU served as a main sponsor, but where US Foreign Minister Madeleine Albright chaired the opening in the glare of publicity. 2 See among others the recent works by Regelsberger et al. (1997), Peterson and Sjursen (1998), Hill and Smith (2000), White (2001). 3 See the detailed discussion by Cameron (1998). 4 See Regelsberger et al. (1997), Holland (1997), Dembinski (2000), Schwarz (2000), Howorth (2000), Algieri and Emmanouilidis (2000), Duke (2001), Müller-Brandeck- Bocquet (2002). 12 MICHÈLE KNODT AND SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN
- 34. 5 For this and the following argument see Kohler-Koch et al. (2002). 6 See as an example Piening (1997: ch 2). 7 See Piening (1997), Rhodes (1998); Meunier and Nicolaïdis (1999), Meunier (2000). 8 For a discussion of current literature on EU foreign policy studies according the distinction between sui generis or comparative phenomenon see Tonra (2000). For a treatment of the EU foreign policy as sui generis, see Bretherton and Vogler (1999). 9 As observed by Allen and Smith, ‘[al]though there are few who would explicitly argue that the EC is on the verge of emerging as a “European state”, it is the ideal type of a state-based foreign policy which lies behind much contemporary analysis of Western Europe’s international status’ (Allen and Smith 1990:19). References Albert, M. and Brock, L. (1995) ‘Entgrenzung der Staatenwelt. Zur Analyse weltge- sellschaftlicher Entwicklungstendenzen’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 2, 2: 259–285. Algieri, F. and Emmanouilidis, J.A. (2000) ‘Setting Signals for Euorpean Foreign and Security Policy. Discussing Differentiation and Flexibility’, CAP Working-Paper, October. Allen, D. and Smith M. (1990) ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena’, Review of International Studies, 16:19–37. Benz, A. (2000) ‘Entflechtung als Folge von Verflechtung: Theoretische Überlegungen zur Entwicklung des europäischen Mehrebenensystems’, in E.Grande and M. Jachtenfuchs (eds) Wie problemlösungsfähig ist die EU? Regieren im europäischen Mehrebenensystem, Baden- Baden: Nomos: 141–164. Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (1999): The European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge. Cameron, F. (1998) ‘The European Union as a Global Actor: Far from Pushing its Political Weight Around’, in C.Rhodes (ed.) The European Union in the World Community, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 19–43. Collinson, S. (1999) ‘“Issue-Systems,” “Multi-level Games” and the Analysis of the EU’s External Commercial and Associated Policies: A Research Agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6, 2:206–224. Conzelmann, T. and Knodt, M. (1999) ‘Understanding Multilevel Complexity: The European Community’s Role in International Organisations and International Treaties’, Paper for presentation at the 6th Biennial Conference of ECSA/USA, Pittsburgh, PA, 2–5 June 1999. Conzelmann, T. and Knodt, M. (eds) (2002) ‘Regionales Europa—Europäisierte Regionen’, Mannheimer Jahrbuch zur Europäischen Sozialforschung 2001/2002, Bd. 6, Frankfurt/M.: Campus. Dembinski, M. (2000) ‘Perspektiven der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik’, HSFK-Report, 11. Deutsch, K.G. (1999) ‘The Politics of Freer Trade in Europe. Three-Level Games in the Common Commercial Policy of the EU 1985–1997’, Hamburg: Lit. Duke, S. (2001) ‘Autonomy tamed: CESDP’s Evolution and Role in European Security?’, Paper presented at the AEI-conference ‘EU as an international actor’, Mannheim. ECJ (1994) ‘Opinion 1/94’, European Court Reports, I-5267. INTRODUCTION: PUZZLES AND PROSPECTS 13
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- 36. Kohler-Koch, B., Conzelmann, T. and Knodt, M. (2002) Europäische Integration— Europäisches Regieren, Studienbrief, Fernuniversität Hagen. Kohler-Koch, B. and Knodt, M. (1997) ‘Multi-Level Governance: the Joy of Theorizing and the Anguish of Empirical Research’, Beitrag für den ECPR Workshop on ‘Regional Integration and Multi-Level Governance’, der Joint Sessions of Workshops, Bern, Switzerland, 27 February to 4 March 1997. Marks, G. (1993) ‘Structural Policy and Multi-level Governance in the EC’, in A.Cafruny G.G.Rosenthal (ed.) The State of the European Community. The Maastricht Debates and Beyond, 2nd edn: S. 391–410. Meunier, S. (2000) ‘What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations’, International Organization, 10, 1:103–135. Meunier, S. and Nicolaïdis, K. (1999) ‘Who Speaks for Europe? The delegation of Trade Authority in the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37, 3:477–501. Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 4:473–524. Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Moyer, H.W. (1993) ‘The European Community in the GATT Uruguay Round: Preserving the Common Agriculture Policy at all Cost’, in W.Avery (ed.) World Agriculture and the GATT, Vol. 7 of International Political Economy Yearbook, Boulder: Lynne Rienner: 95–119. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. (ed.) (2002) Europäische Au enpolitik: GASP- und ESVP- Konzeptionen ausgewählter EU-Mitgliedstaaten, Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag. Neyer, J. (1995) ‘Globaler Markt und territorialer Staat. Konturen eines wachsenden Antagonismus’, in Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 2, 2:287–315. Ostrom, V. (1999) ‘Polycentricity (Part I and II)’, in M.McGinnis (ed.) Polycentricity and Local Public Economies. Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 52–74. Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. and Warren, R. (1961) ‘The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry’, American Political Science Review, 55: 831–842. Patterson, L.A. (1997) ‘Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community: A Three- Level Game Analysis’, International Organization, 51, 1:135–165. Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (1998) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, London: Routledge. Piening, C. (1997) ‘Global Europe. The European Union’ in World Affairs, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Putnam, R.D. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games’, in International Organization, 42:427–60. Regelsberger, E., Shoutheete de Tervarent, P.de and Wessels, W. (ed.) (1997) Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Rhodes, C. (ed.) (1998) The European Union in the World Community, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Rosenau, J.N. (1969) ‘Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’, in B.Farrell (ed.) Approaches to Compamtive and International Politics, 2nd edn, Evanston: S. 27–92. Rummel, R. (1990) The Evolution of an International Actor. Western Europe’s New Assertiveness, Boulder: Westview Press. INTRODUCTION: PUZZLES AND PROSPECTS 15
- 37. Sack, J. (1995) The European Community’s Membership of International Organisations, Common Market Law Review, 32:1227–1256. Scharpf, F. (1999) Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schwarz, K.-D. (2000) ‘Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik: Auf dem Weg zur Realisierung?’, SWP-working-paper, AP 3127, April. Schöppenthau, P.von (1999) Die Europäische Union als Akteur der internationalen Handelspolitik: die Textilverhandlungen der GATT-Uruguay-Runde, Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag. Sharkansky, I. (1981) ‘Intergovernmental relations’, in P.C.Nystrom and W.H.Starbuck (eds) Handbook of Organizational Design, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1: 456–470. Tonra, B. (2000) ‘Mapping EU Foreign Policy Studies’, in Journal of European Public Policy, 7,1:163–69. White, B. (1999) ‘The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis’, European Journal of International Relations, 5, 1:37–66. White, B. (2001) Understanding European Foreign Policy, Palgrave: London. Young, A.R. (1999) ‘Beyond the Final Frontier? Integrating Another Level of Governance’, Paper to the ECSA Sixth Biennial International Conference, Pittsburgh, 2–5 June 1999. Young, A.R. (2000): The Adaptation of European Foreign Economic Policy: From Rome to Seattle, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38, 1:93–116. 16 MICHÈLE KNODT AND SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN
- 38. Part I The development of the EU’s external role Between co-operation and fragmentation
- 39. 1 A fragmented external role The EU, defence policy, and New Atlanticism Sten Rynning The principled decision to craft an EU Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 raises a number of fundamental questions about the political nature of the Union itself. The ESDP can be seen as an example of states seeking to form an alliance, in order to increase their weight in armed conflict. However, the depth of EU centralized decision-making authority and EU policy breadth, make the label ‘alliance’ inadequate. We are then left with two basic options. We may see the ESDP as a linear consequence of past integration and think of the EU as an incipient strategic actor—an emerging pole in international politics. Conversely, one could argue that the ESDP is one of several factors that push the EU in a novel direction, effectively breaking the past trajectory of a seemingly ‘ever closer union’ and pointing to a more fragmented organization of European political authority. This chapter questions whether the EU is a new strategic actor in the making, or whether a fundamental break is occurring with the past idea of ‘one’ community. The question is not whether the EU is already a strategic actor, because it is clearly not. Neither is it the aim of this chapter to rank centralized and hierarchical governance higher than other political models: this is a normative question better left for other contexts. The question is, rather, whether viewing the EU as a strategic actor helps us understand its dynamics. This analysis will search for answers by focusing on the key dimensions of a strategic actor, the extent to which the political centre is endowed with a vision of itself, its purpose, and finally whether it is supported by institutions capable of mobilizing defence resources. The argument is that the EU is not a strategic actor in the making. Rather, the introduction of defence co-operation exposes a number of underlying tensions that likely will lead to a break with past patterns of integration and necessitate new institutional arrangements. The EU will become a more capable ‘civilian actor’ building on the vision of peaceful co-existence that is part of the EU’s foundation. However, defence policy and the use of military means for coercion—peacemaking, intervention, and war—will not be rooted in the EU. Instead, we are likely to witness the development of a new ‘concert’ among the willing and capable—here labelled ‘New Atlanticism’—that will attract notable attention among the old great powers of Western Europe (Great Britain, France, and Germany) along with the US. This development is contingent: it demands of the EU the recognition that ‘flexible
- 40. co-operation’ must be applied to the defence domain, and it demands of the US a willingness to promote, via NATO, a more capable European security and defence pillar. The analysis concludes that these scenarios are likely, and that they invite scholars and observers to assess the nature and scope of a new turning point in the history of European integration. High politics and grand strategy How do we assess the impact of the ESDP on the EU? Realist theory offers itself as a useful tool because it deals primarily with the high politics inherent in the ESDP. It focuses on enduring questions of order (Kissinger 1994:806): what are the basic units; what are their means of interaction; and what are the goals on behalf of which they interact? Realist theory generally does not foresee a qualitative transformation of international politics and has tended to focus on the limitations rather than the potentials of European integration (see for example Wivel 2000:99). A motley crew of constructivist scholars has therefore challenged the fundamental validity of realism, arguing that the EU is either representative of a fundamental transformation in international relations or, alternatively, a phenomenon of international relations so heavily dominated by ideas, as opposed to material power, that realism is reputed. These critics tend to use Waltz’s (1979) abstract Theory of International Politics as a baseline for comparison (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999) and argue that the realist model, ‘based solely on material conceptions of actors’ interests’ (Risse et al, 1999:148), cannot cope with ‘ideas’. Two problems are evident. First, neo-realism is a theory of the international system, not policy,1 and second, realists who do analyse foreign policy—that is neoclassical realists—naturally accept that ideational and material factors interact.2 Moreover, the jury is still out on the issue of whether the EU is an important anomaly in the history of international relations.3 As long as the EU is significantly influenced by states acting autonomously of the EU itself, there is no reason to discard realist theory a priori. Realists have historically demonstrated how states block integration beyond the nation-state, harness economic gains from co- operation and struggle to establish political primacy within common institutions (Hoffmann 1995; Taylor 1983; Milward 1992; Pedersen 1998). Realists also believe that Europe’s future is intimately tied up with the poles of power that emerge on the basis of collective histories and political leadership (Calleo 2001). We may take our analytical clue from here: vision and material power are the key dimensions of a strategic actor. In the vocabulary of Fareed Zakaria’s (1998: 38) ‘state-centred realism’, states will expand political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power. State power has two dimensions. First, decision-makers must define the scope of state responsibility— define a vision for the state—and they must to some extent be autonomous from other social forces in the pursuit of this vision. Second, states must have a central policy-making apparatus capable of articulating and implementing policy, and they A FRAGMENTED EXTERNAL ROLE 19
- 41. must be able to mobilize resources for policy. These dimensions combine into a spectrum where at one end we find states that are cohesive, autonomous, and wealthy, and at the opposite end states that are divided, society-penetrated and poor (Zakaria 1998:39).4 Will the EU find itself at the poor end of the spectrum because states will bicker about ESDP prerogatives, or will the ESDP to the contrary put the EU on a path to become more autonomous and coherent? An answer will emerge from a consideration of (a) the ability of EU leaders to articulate a coherent vision and (b) the ability of the EU institutions to produce policy and mobilize resources. These two questions will be dealt with in the sections below. First, it may be worth noting that we are dealing with more than just a spectrum running from strong autonomy to dependency. I label these opposites ‘strategic actor’ and ‘community’. The former is capable of coercing the environment to respect its ideas, the latter focuses on the task of maintaining cohesion within.5 In addition, centralized institutions may conceivably combine with abstract visions to produce an actor rich in means but with poorly defined and therefore fragile policies. This possibility I label ‘civilian actor’ because it is incapable of generating the policy cohesion necessary to exert violence—to coerce—in a specific conflict. It is conversely conceivable that fragmented institutions co-exist with strong visions. In this case we are dealing with a ‘directorate’ that will emerge whenever the context (i.e. an external crisis) calls attention to the area of common vision, after which the capable and willing will act on behalf of the larger community. The combined image of EU futures is presented in Table 1.1. Turning now to political vision and institutional power, we are capable of tracing the trajectory of the EU and the impact of the ESDP. Many people will argue that Europe has traditionally centralized, but that it has been split between two visions of ‘Europe puissance’ and ‘civilian power Europe’. An analysis of current developments indicates that the EU is following a new path and that a ‘directorate’ is the more likely scenario. Political visions of Europe Table 1.1 EU futures The EU convention outlining a founding treaty, which EU heads of state and government will negotiate in 2004, has provoked a debate on the purpose and destiny of European co-operation. German Foreign Minister Joska Fischer ignited the debate in May 2000 when he outlined his vision of a federal Europe building on a core of proactive states. Federalism was soon opposed by intergovernmental 20 STEN RYNNING
- 42. cooperation based on the ‘democratic nation-state’, first by French President Chirac in June 2000, then by British Prime Minister Blair in October 2000. Hovering above the political fray, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana (2001), has argued that ‘The Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is part of the wider project of building Europe’s political identity’. While recognizing that the ESDP will not be easy, ‘It demands a reorientation of national militaries and wiser spending. It requires new expenditure. And it necessitates a look at other imaginative solutions’. But Solana is optimistic. He argues that, ‘All of these steps are underway’. Observers may not share this optimism. Even in a favourable setting of regional stability, EU governments tend to get bogged down by treaty bickering that provides for, at best, incremental solutions. In the current setting, stability is far from given. This is particularly the case when one considers two external developments: first, the EU is about to enlarge its membership to include up to 27 countries, although 24 is the likely number in the short run; second, the US is waging a global security campaign against sources of terrorism. Realist theory normally points out that ‘external threats’ generate internal cohesion. States band together to provide for their security and wellbeing. However, enlargement is not commonly recognized as a ‘threat’ in the European Union. Some countries, such as France and Spain, have vested interests in the smaller Union and have historically fought to secure ‘deepening’ before ‘widening’. But a significant number of EU countries are strongly supportive of enlargement and believe that a bigger Union will reinforce their European visions. If game theory has taught us that institutionalization is more likely when group membership is held constant over time (Axelrod 1984), then game theory also tells us that the EU’s current ‘opening’—in terms of membership and practical policy—will weaken political cohesion. Enlargement may therefore be a cause of political division rather than a factor of internal unity. The same condition applies to the US security campaign launched in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. All European countries support the campaign against terrorism but they respond differently when it comes to policy detail and the extent to which the US should gain political and military support for operations in the Middle and the Far East. Some EU countries are drawn closer to the US, while some remain at a distance. The EU has responded to terrorism by outlining a strong package of anti-terrorist measures, but a symptom of the EU’s ‘low-intensity’ role is that these measures fall within the third pillar of the EU (Justice and Home Affairs) and the EU has not responded to terrorism through its second pillar (the ESDP). In short, terrorism has reinforced the difficulties of generating a joint EU security and defence vision. The impact of these events is underscored by an inquiry into the history of European security policy in the 1990s and notably the development of a ‘low- intensity’ security role standing in stark contrast to the US focus on global competitors and ‘high-intensity’ warfare. Recent events demonstrate that this supposed division of labour, while once appearing to rest on solid ground, is frail. A FRAGMENTED EXTERNAL ROLE 21
- 43. In the mid-1990s, European unity as a ‘vision’ was encouraged by an aloof American policy and the intractable difficulty of intervening in the Balkan wars while also building an institutional architecture in Western and Central Europe. A political vision took root in Paris, London, and Berlin. Europe—in one shape or another—needed to organize itself in order to deal with a range of new security tasks that notably the US was not interested in handling. Britain and France, along with the Netherlands, therefore spearheaded a Rapid Reaction Force that intervened in Bosnia ahead of the Dayton peace talks in 1995. Later, in 1998, Britain and France joined forces in the St Malo agreement that became the turning point in the creation of the ESDP (Cogan 2001:99). The two countries agreed that if the US does not want to become engaged, the EU must be able to act autonomously. This ambition of European conflict resolution had an instinctive appeal to most EU members (EU Presidency 1999a, 1999b). Germany lacked a national defence policy, for obvious historical reasons, and demonstrated its engagement in mediation during the Kosovo conflict of 1999. The small and neutral EU countries have traditionally supported policies that reinforce the general principles of international order—as opposed to power politics—and they, like Britain, saw in the ESDP an opportunity to maintain the American engagement in European security. Enhancing EU crisis management capacities and US leadership vis-à-vis European great powers were thus mutually supporting goals. For its part, the US focused on its global security posture. An ‘hegemonic impulse’ is present throughout the 1990s, beginning with the new world order in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War and the 1992 Pentagon ‘Planning Guidance’ that urged post-Cold War dominance. But this impulse, however constant, has also given birth to policies that waver between ‘off-shore balancing’ and ‘continental engagement’. Continental engagement is visible in the continued presence of 100, 000 US troops deployed in Europe and US investment in NATO as ‘a means of maintaining and lengthening America’s grip on the foreign and military policies of European states’ (Waltz 2000:20). In contrast, the balancing position is visible not only in the erratic engagement alongside Europeans in the Balkan conflicts, revealing an aversion to missions of ‘nation-building’,6 but also in the policy of discouraging the defence dimension of the EU from developing too far. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott declared in the fall of 1999, the US does not want a European defence capability ‘that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO’ (Talbott 1999). Through the 1990s, then, a transatlantic consensus emerged around the axis of high and low intensity operations. In the words of Pentagon analyst James Thomas (2000), the US prefers ‘high-intensity offensive’ operations and is increasingly willing to let other allies undertake ‘long-term peace-support operations’. Few political leaders have explicitly emphasized this division of labour for fear of promoting a complete Atlantic de-coupling, but through the 1990s it became increasingly clear that the Euro-Atlantic area was in need of a new security deal based on precisely this division. The US does not handle ‘nation-building’ operations, while the Europeans realize their 1992 Petersberg ambition to handle 22 STEN RYNNING
- 44. crisis management—up to the level of ‘peacemaking’—and thus give impetus to their political identity. Differences in national outlook within Europe presented an obstacle to the realization of the Petersberg agenda, but this fact, as noted by some observers (Heisbourg et al. 2000:21), ‘is not particularly novel, and is of limited helpfulness’. In light of the Kosovo intervention and the fact that ‘half of NATO’s European members were participating in combat operations’, they conclude that ‘differences between the two ends of the spectrum are narrowing’ and furthermore that ‘the centre of gravity of the spectrum is moving to greater, not lesser, acceptance of participation in operations involving the use of military force’. However, the combined impact of enlargement and the campaign against terrorism has cast doubt on this optimistic conclusion. Kosovo may be revelatory of a European willingness to participate in conflicts that are becoming rare because they are fought on the periphery of Europe, thus fairly close to European territories, and moreover to participate in conflicts where defeat, essentially, was not an option. US leadership and its commitment to defending the credibility of NATO (more than the fate of Kosovars) ensured a very favourable context for this supposedly unprecedented European enthusiasm for combat operations. In fact, the European reaction to the American campaign in Afghanistan reveals a different but familiar image of European states dealing mostly bilaterally with the US in the defence domain, and of Europeans warning against a prolonged military campaign and its extension to, for instance, Iraq. Europe seems split once again between states who ‘abhor the idea of power’ and big countries like Britain and France who ‘have the habit of power’ but who are ‘historically antagonistic’ (Védrine 1997:181). While Britain and France indeed did give birth to the ESDP in late 1998, one is well advised not to overlook the distinctiveness of their ulterior motives: respectively an ‘Atlantic’ and an ‘autonomous’ Europe (cf. Howorth 2000). Combined, the disunity in this core of Western Europe along with a stringent US focus on global terrorism will incite most European states to balance between ‘ordinary great national power’ and ‘self-indulgence in self-absorption,’ as Stanley Hoffmann once noted in relation to a united Germany (1995:298). Institutions, policy and resources Why bother to analyse EU policy and resources if the underlying political cohesion is absent? Indeed, why even question that cohesion is a problem? If Ole Wæver (2000:270) is right, then it may be ‘a condition for European stability that the major powers think differently about Europe’. As long as national visions do not collide, each country can live with its comforting, if vain, vision of Europe. Europe will thus be impotent but stable. We should nevertheless go further into the matter because the EU countries, cognizant of their visionary muddle, strive to build institutions that can articulate and implement policies. These policies relate to a set of liberal values, concerning human rights and democracy, and should operate while the member states juggle A FRAGMENTED EXTERNAL ROLE 23
- 45. with the deeper vision. This balancing act is inherently challenging because difficult external crises and deep-rooted internal political dissent simultaneously challenge EU policy. In consequence, the EU has repeatedly built up expectations but failed to produce the necessary policy capabilities (cf. Hill 1994, 1998). European weakness, not strength, drew the US into Bosnian crisis management and the Dayton Peace Accord.7 ‘When confronted with the crisis caused by Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the West used the United Nations to pursue a course of shameless diplomatic compromise mixed with inadequate military responses and well- intentioned but counterproductive humanitarianism’ (Weiss 1999:135). Does the ESDP represent a new departure or old wine in new bottles? In light of the conclusion reached earlier, that a common vision is absent, the question is really related to the lower level of Table 1.1 (p.21). In other words, will the EU become a ‘community’ akin to the view of Ole Wæver, or will it gain enough institutional coherence to become a ‘civilian actor’? Empirical evidence indicates that an actor, albeit civilian, is in the making. Three aspects should be emphasized. First of all, the EU is building a set of institutions that is much more stringent and capable than previously. This achievement is a direct result of the St Malo initiative and the ESDP process. As noted, St Malo brought together the main proponents of Atlanticism and Europeanism and therefore undid the deadlock of the Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997. This treaty brought crisis management operations, notably including their military dimension, into the EU (hitherto they were in the WEU) but also failed to provide an appropriate institutional infrastructure. Atlanticist and neutral countries refused institutional strengthening as long as it appeared that NATO thus would be challenged and the EU might become a ‘strategic actor’.8 Following St Malo and the Kosovo war, the EU decided first in Cologne in June 1999 and then in Helsinki the following December to build the necessary institutions to provide continuity and coherence. The Council of Ministers now relies on two pillars in the ESDP, one bureaucratic, the other political (cf. EU Presidency 2000b; Rynning 2001). The bureaucratic pillar, headed by the High Representative for the CFSP (a post created in Amsterdam), received a new component in the shape of a Military Staff composed of approximately 130 officers tasked with ‘early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks’.9 The political pillar was substantially modified. Access to the Ministers’ meeting is gained through the familiar Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), but underneath COREPER we find first a new Political and Security Committee (PSC) (composed of national representatives) that must draw up policy options, supervise CFSP operations and co-ordinate with NATO. The PSC will in turn draw on the expertise of another new institution, the Military Committee, composed of national Chiefs of Staff and their representatives,10 which is the highest military body of the EU. Second, the EU has come far, from a historical perspective, in planning military capabilities that will sustain the ESDP. The development of these capabilities is attached to the quantitative goal defined in Helsinki, December 1999: the EU must 24 STEN RYNNING
- 46. be able to project up to 60,000 troops (along with 400 ships and 100 aircraft) into a zone of conflict for up to one year. Capability or force planning has now become an integral part of the EU, beginning with the Helsinki announcement that the EU ‘will develop a method of consultation’ through which the Helsinki goals can be met, ‘with a regular review of progress made’ (EU Presidency 1999b: annex IV). The regular review so far consists of a Capabilities Commitment Conference, November 2000, where a first catalogue of national force contributions was assembled, as well as a Capabilities Improvement Conference, November 2001, where major investment areas were identified. Currently, the member states are not planning another such major conference but intend instead to focus on achieving new investments and thus military capabilities. Current efforts are focusing on the establishment of various ‘Action Groups’ composed of countries willing to invest in a certain capability. In line with the Helsinki ambition to respect ‘Member States’ political will’, these groups are coordinated but not centrally directed or distributed. This capability process has potential although one should not overlook inherent difficulties. Budgets illustrate one major difficulty: EU members are spending only half as much on defence as the US, and, even more revealing, less than one third on research and development (R&D), and approximately 35–40 per cent less on acquisitions. Lean budgets significantly increase the need for procurement cooperation. Revealingly, the force catalogue assembled at the November 2000 capabilities conference dealt with existing forces only (cf. Yost 2000). The process of managing new investments has only just begun—in the aforementioned Action Groups—and has so far yielded promises but no capabilities. In addition, the Helsinki figure of 60,000 is an ‘input’ figure. Should the EU actually wish to deploy 60,000 combat troops it would have to calculate with a triple force in order to allow for troop rotation. Thus, a total of 180,000 troops (cf. de Wijk 2000)—a daunting figure for the economically pressed EU ministers of defence—would be needed. A third concern is EU-NATO co-operation. NATO assets (i.e. physical resources such as headquarters) and capabilities (i.e. services such as lift)—some of which are common, some national—have the potential to reinforce EU action, and the Atlantic Alliance has since the mid-1990s sought to define the way in which assets and capabilities could be transferred to the ‘European pillar’ (Lutz 2001). The current agreement, the so-called Berlin Plus Agreement, dates from NATO’s Washington summit (April 1999) and contains four points (NATO 1999): 1 the EU will have ‘assured access’ to NATO planning capabilities; 2 the EU must ‘presume’ the availability of NATO capabilities and assets; 3 NATO’s Deputy SACEUR must prepare a number of European command options; 4 NATO’s defence planning should be adapted to reinforce EU force planning. This agreement remains applicable even though first Turkey and then Greece have blocked its practical implementation for reasons of regional politics. Still, the Berlin Plus Agreement builds on work of previous years, such as in 1996 when NATO’s A FRAGMENTED EXTERNAL ROLE 25
- 47. command structure was made more flexible to accommodate the European pillar (the Berlin agreement), and subsequently in November 1996 when the WEU asked for and was granted the right to contribute to NATO’s defence planning process. WEU ‘Petersberg profiles’ were thus transferred to NATO’s Ministerial Guidance in mid-1997, signalling a minor change to NATO’s very elaborate process but a major rapprochement between the two organizations. Modalities for EU-NATO co- operation are elaborately defined within the ESDP and involve regular and formalized meetings at political as well as technical-military levels. Hubert Védrine (1996:635) once noted in the Bosnian context that bombing only works when all major external powers agree on a peace plan, that is the political purpose of using force. The EU may be approaching a condition where it is not unreasonable to expect that the ESDP process will regularly produce modest doses of such agreement. The EU lacks a unifying vision in strategic affairs but it has gained an institutional infrastructure, access to improving military capabilities and a pragmatic relationship to NATO in its effort to define specific policies. In relation to the past absence of institutions and capabilities and an inflamed relationship to NATO, this is an achievement that probably will lead to the realization of most of the Petersberg ambition. In short, the EU may become a ‘civilian actor’ with an ability to back diplomacy with peacekeeping forces. New Atlanticism I argued in the introduction that the ESDP would produce a rupture in the EU trajectory toward an ever-closer union. Yet, the discussion so far indicates that the ESDP will reinforce a long-standing and widespread ambition to develop the EU into a unique ‘civilian actor’ promoting peace and conflict resolution. However, this image of continuity is only partially an accurate reflection of security trends. We must in fact combine two scenarios from Table 1.1 (p.21): the EU as a ‘civilian actor’ and a parallel defence ‘directorate’. This combination is labelled ‘New Atlanticism’. The engine of New Atlanticism is the tension arising from the meeting of the two analytical dimensions above. There is an increasing ability to articulate policies but also the absence of a unifying political vision. The external role within the EU’s reach, the ‘civilian actor’, will not satisfy a number of Western European countries. Some will fear that the EU’s inability to undertake coercive military operations at the high end of the Petersberg scale (i.e. peacemaking operations) will precipitate a sharp decline in the American engagement in European security. To be sure, the US will handle the conflicts it deems relevant to its national interests, but the US will not invest in Western European security organizations that prove incapable of producing added military weight. Thus, some states will be eager to develop high- end capabilities in order to tie the US to Europe. Other states will pursue the same capabilities for the reason that they wish to influence developments within the EU and ultimately produce a greater European voice in all aspects of world politics. Those who develop high-end capabilities will be able to take part in the informal 26 STEN RYNNING
- 48. directorate, although the directorate’s political strength will depend on the degree to which these ulterior motives can be reconciled on a case-by-case basis. Table 1.2 outlines the contours of New Atlanticism. The EU will become a civilian actor capable of early political and economic engagements in external conflicts, and capable of deploying peacekeeping forces once a conflict has flared but settled down. The EU, in short, will be an actor in the early and late phases of conflict management. The US is the strategic actor par excellence with a specific vision of itself and considerable resources, including military force, to back policy in all phases of conflict management and war. The ESDP directorate will be mobilized only in particular contexts, on a case-by-case basis. In this informal setting almost free of institutional constraints, mobilization will indicate that those participating will share a vision of what must be done. Hence, we can speak of ‘specific’, if momentary visions. Resources will be allocated by participating states and the collective armour is therefore best characterized as ‘fragmented’ rather than ‘centralized’. All in all, New Atlanticism is an appropriate label because the ‘directorate’ will become the operational bridge between US strategy (global and high intensity) and EU security policy (regional and low intensity). Can this bridging directorate develop within current political arrangements (i.e. EU and NATO structures)? Formally, the answer is yes. NATO has already made its European component separable through the flexible command structure and the Berlin Plus Agreement to let this pillar draw on common assets and capabilities. Naturally, most of these belong not to NATO but to the US and assistance will be granted only on a case-by-case basis. Still, within this political context the NATO structure is capable of supporting a directorate. The same is the case for the EU. Article 17 of the Nice Treaty (European Union 2000) introduces the overall ambition of elaborating a policy that includes ‘all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy’. However, further down in Article 17.4 we find the following: The provisions of this article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, provided such co-operation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title. (European Union 2000) Table 1.2 New Atlanticism A FRAGMENTED EXTERNAL ROLE 27
- 49. There is, then, no formal objection to the development of a directorate, as long as it does not actually undermine the EU. However, from a practical political perspective we must raise the question of whether the ‘willing’ will also be ‘capable’? There are two answers to this question. First, those who are willing to work with the US in high intensity operations will be able to do so with fairly modest investments. These countries will not have to invest in all the technology and hardware of the American-driven Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) but may focus on a number of key technologies and skills that allow them to insert themselves in niche operations. European states could choose to focus on electronic surveillance, air-to-ground attack, or special operations, to mention just a few possibilities. Their operational significance will then be as much political as military, but the political significance may be desirable for both parties. Niche specialization can take place on a bilateral level, which is to say in a dialogue between the US and the country in question, and also within NATO where the defence planning process consists of a ‘bilateral’ dialogue between each ally and NATO as such.11 The second answer reveals deeper problems. If the European pillar is to act ‘autonomously’ of the US, and if only a limited number of European countries are willing to act, as the directorate scenario presupposes, then the countries may find that they have either too few capabilities or simply the wrong capabilities. They will have too few capabilities if the coalition is small and the operation major. They will have the wrong capabilities if they have invested narrowly in overlapping or commonly-owned equipment or services. The latter scenario is a real possibility because European governments with no prospect of increasing defence budgets will have to co-ordinate their investments in order to avoid redundancies. In short, they will have to specialize. In consequence, narrow coalitions therefore risk lacking certain capabilities. This leads to the question of whether the coalition or directorate will not have to be, by and large, the size of the EU for it to be capable. In this case, we could simply be content to distinguish between the US operating with niche allies (hence the ‘US +’ label in Table 1.2) and the EU (which remains locked into a collective civilian role). This leads to some concluding remarks in defence of New Atlanticism. The split between political visions within the EU remains valid and the EU is already preparing to allow flexible coalitions of the willing to move ahead of the rest of the Union. The further application of this principle will enhance New Atlanticism, even if it remains a fact that a directorate will have to tailor its missions to its capabilities and simultaneously respect the engagement of the EU, which is likely to come early in conflicts. The autonomy of the directorate vis-à-vis the EU is therefore circumscribed. Still, we witness emerging flexible co-operation in the ESDP. In some ways, flexibility began in 1993 when Denmark was allowed to exercise a defence opt-out in the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, the current ESDP is open to outside participation, particularly from non-EU NATO members and EU applicant countries, in ESDP ‘preparation’ and ‘implementation’ (although not ‘decision-making’) (EU Presidency 2000a: appendix 1 to annex 1; EU Presidency 28 STEN RYNNING
- 50. 2000b: annex VI to annex VI). The EU may choose to apply the principle of ‘enhanced co-operation’ to the defence area, which is currently not the case, in order to tighten the relationship between an informal avant-garde (directorate) and the EU proper.12 However, such an ‘enhanced co-operation’ clause may not be necessary— because a parallel track is already feasible (cf. the Nice Treaty)—nor desirable to the extent that the EU would want to insulate itself from the political responsibility of a crisis gone wrong. In short, the EU construction is likely to include a mechanism that enables parallel co-operation and simultaneously disengages the EU from automatic political responsibility in case the directorate’s operation goes awry. Conclusion Sometimes political leaders and observers of European affairs discuss blindly, but with vigour, the current and unfolding institutional shape of the EU. This article has addressed a key question within this debate, namely whether the inclusion of ‘high politics’ in the shape of ESDP will transform the institutional foundations of the EU. Logically, the EU could either become a more coherent actor, akin to the strategic actor ideal type, or become reshaped, more fragmented perhaps and certainly different in institutional form. The analysis concludes that the simple opposition between ‘unity and fragmentation’ explains little of the ESDP’s impact on the EU. The analysis focused on a distinction between political vision and institutional capacity—both dimensions being drawn from neo-classical realism. It outlined four scenarios and concluded that three will come into play in the future. This amalgam was labelled ‘New Atlanticism’ to capture at one time the continued strengthening of the European pillar and the continued attachment of this pillar to the US. The EU will become a ‘civilian actor’ promoting liberal values of reconciliation and dialogue. The US will operate as a ‘strategic actor’ on a global scale but with the support of selective European allies that offer specialized military services and political support. In between, as a new transatlantic bridge, a directorate will develop. It will be informal (not institutionalized) and its membership will vary from case to case, although France, Britain, and Germany are bound to play decisive roles. The directorate will be able to handle military coercion close to Europe, alleviating pressure on the EU, which is too large and diverse to act forcefully. It will also alleviate pressure on the US, which is not interested in becoming involved in a range of minor conflicts. The gestation of New Atlanticism may prove difficult, and it may not be durable. Still, a directorate with firm roots in Western Europe appears a likely response to the very diverse (the EU) and the global (the US). A directorate weakened by continuing debates over the purpose of ‘autonomy’—vis-à-vis the US, the EU, Russia, and so on—is certainly a likely prospect. But a directorate will also bring us back to the Western European origins of integration and thus be reflective of the symbiosis between historical continuity and change. A FRAGMENTED EXTERNAL ROLE 29
- 51. Notes 1 The real argument with Kenneth Waltz must be one of whether the EU is developing into simply another state, a development which Waltz’s neo-realism can accommodate, or whether the EU is becoming a post-modern, neo-medieval type of polity that falls outside the neo-realist universe. 2 For an overview see Rose (1998). The idea, stripped to its core, is to add state motivation to state capabilities. This comes out very clearly in the analysis of Schweller (1998) and is rooted in the classical realist discussion of varying foreign policy goals: ‘power, glory, and idea’ in the words of Raymond Aron ([1966], 1984: ch 3). For an introduction and critical discussion see Donnelly (2000). 3 Analysing the meeting between ideas and material factors is difficult, and it is not obvious, judging from the theory’s track record, that constructivism is a powerful perspective. To Andrew Moravscik (1999:670), constructivists work on their proper meta-theory but ‘contribute far less to our empirical and theoretical understanding of European integration’ because they fail to ‘place their claims at any real risk of empirical disconfirmation’. Mark Pollack (no date) likewise notes that he can think of two constructivist studies ‘that pose testable hypotheses and come away with negative findings, i.e. results that show no clear effect of EU institutions on actor identities and preferences, at least for some actors in some issue-areas’. Finally, John Duffield (2001: 109), who is critical of realism, notes that shifts in beliefs or identities are difficult to establish with ‘any degree of confidence’, and that their causes are equally difficult to discern. 4 Zakaria’s vision of a strong and wealthy state resembles—not coincidentally—that which underpins the realist analysis of ‘grand strategy’ (cf. Posen 1984; Rosecrance and Stein 1993). 5 It should be emphasized that ‘strategic’ here, with reference to the literature of strategic studies, refers to an actor capable of using military force in its external action. Some people use the concept of ‘strategy’ to refer to rational-instrumental behaviour, as when an actor applies means to obtain a goal, and ‘communities’—as I define them here—can thus be thought of as strategic. However, as noted, ‘strategic’ in this analysis refers to action involving military means as an instrument of coercion (whether applied or threatened). 6 These operations were consequently circumscribed in May 1994 by a strict set of rules, in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25: see White House 1994), that guide the US deployment of forces. This circumscribed approach to low intensity operations was also reiterated in the 1999 national security strategy (White House 1999:19–20). In fact, since the mid-1990s, the US has focused on using military force primarily for strategic purposes (forward deterrence, major conflicts), while low intensity conflict planning is limited to specific operational roles (embargoes, raids, shows of force, disaster relief) that deliberately are very loosely connected to the rebuilding of local government. See the Pentagon’s ‘Doctrine for Joint Operations’ (1995). 7 Richard Holbrooke (1998:68) recalls stating to a surprised President Clinton in June 1995: ‘NATO has already approved the withdrawal plan. While you have the power to stop it, it has a high degree of automaticity built into it, especially since we have 30 STEN RYNNING
- 52. committed ourselves publicly to assisting NATO troops if the UN decides to withdraw.’ 8 France and Germany proposed the integration of the WEU in the EU in December 1996 and later received support from Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Luxembourg. However, the spring of 1997 revealed opposition from Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland. 9 The Military Staff is divided into five sections: (a) politics and planning, (b) intelligence, (c) operations and exercises, (d) logistics and resources, and (e) communication and information. Cf. Jensen (2000:11). 10 Most national representatives in the EU Military Committee are double-hatted and thus also sit in NATO. France is a notable exception. 11 NATO’s defence planning process naturally contains many collective elements, including the strategic Ministerial Guidance that outlines the package of scenarios and threats according to which military authorities plan. The bilateral aspect is visible, however, in the review process when ‘NATO’ confronts each ally, on the basis of a Defence Planning Questionnaire, with its plans and priorities. In other words, two or more allies are never examined collectively. 12 The EU currently allows enhanced co-operation—taking place among at least eight EU members and being open to all—to take place in foreign and security policy but not in defence or military policy (European Union 2000, Article 27.b). Likewise, the Amsterdam Treaty stipulates that ‘joint action’ can take place following a majority vote in the Council of Ministers, providing that it happens within the framework of a ‘common strategy’ elaborated among the heads of government and state in the European Council. However, such a majority vote is prohibited in relation to defence policy (European Union 1997: Article 23.2). References Aron, R. (1984) Paix et Guerre entre les Nations, Paris: Calmann-Lévy. Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Co-operation, New York: Basic Books. Calleo, D.P. (2001) Rethinking Europe’s Future, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cogan, C.S. (2001) The Third Option: The Emancipation of European Defence, 1989–2000, Westport: Praeger. de Wijk, R. (2000) ‘Convergence Criteria: Measuring Input or Output?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 5, 3:397–417. Donnelly, J. (2000) Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Duffield, J.S. (2001) ‘Transatlantic Relations after the Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future’, International Studies Perspectives, 2, 1:93–115. EU Presidency (1999a) Presidency Conclusions: Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, Http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/related.asp?max=1&bid=76&grp=1799&lang=1. EU Presidency (1999b) Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December, Http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/related.asp?max=1&bid=76&grp=2186&lang=1. EU Presidency (2000a) Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June, Http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp? BID=76&DID=62050&LANG=1. A FRAGMENTED EXTERNAL ROLE 31
- 53. EU Presidency (2000b) Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, Http:// ue.eu.int/Newsroom/related.asp?max=1&bid=76&grp=3018&lang=1. European Union (1997) Treaty of Amsterdam http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/treaties/dat/ eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf European Union (2000) Treaty of Nice, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ nice__treaty_en.pdf. Heisbourg, F. et al. (2000) ‘European Defence: Making it Work’, Chaillot Papers, 42, Paris. Hill, C. (1994) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, in S.Bulmer and A.Scott (eds) Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context, Oxford: Blackwell: 103–126. Hill, C. (1998) ‘Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?’, in J.Peterson and H.Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, London: Routledge: 18–38. Hoffmann, S. (1995) The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964–1994, Boulder: Westview Press. Holbrooke, R. (1998) To End a War, New York: Random House. Howorth, J. (2000) ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’, Survival, 42, 2: 33–55. Jensen, F.P. (2000) Opbygningen af en fælles europæisk sikkerheds-og forsvarspolitik: de institutionelle implikationer i EU, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Affairs. Katzenstein, R J. (ed.) (1996) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press. Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster. Lutz, R.A. (2001) Military Capabilities for a European Defence, Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs. Milward, A.S. (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London: Routledge. Moravscik, A. (1999) ‘Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy,6, 4:669–681. NATO (1999) Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April, Http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/ 1999/p99–064e.htm. Pedersen, T. (1998) Germany, France, and the Integration of Europe: A Realist Interpretation, London: Pinter. Pentagon (1995) Joint Pub 3–0: Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, Washington D.C.,www.defenselink.mil/pubs. Pollack, M. (no date) ‘The New Institutionalism, Hypothesis Testing, and the Question of Methods’, Http://jsis.artsci.washmgton.edu/programs/europe/Institutionsp/Pollack2.htm. Posen, B. (1984) The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Risse, T., Engelmann-Martin D., Knopf, H.J. and Roscher, K. (1999) ‘To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union’, European Journal of International Affairs, 5, 2:147–187. Rose, G. (1998) ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 51, 1: 144–172. Rosecrance, R. and Stein A. (1993) The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Rynning, S. (2001) ‘Det europæiske forsvar efter Nice’, Politologiske Studier, 4, 1:50–55. Schweller, R.L. (1998) Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, New York: Columbia University Press. 32 STEN RYNNING
- 54. Solana, J. (2001) ‘European Defence: the Task Ahead’, European Voice, 24 October 2001, http://ue.eu.int/solana/list.asp?BID=108. Talbott, S. (1999) ‘America’s Stake in a Strong Europe’, Remarks at a conference on the future of NATO, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 7 October, www.riia.org/conferences/strobe.zip. Taylor, P. (1983) The Limits of European Integration, London: Croom Helm. Thomas, J.P. (2000) ‘The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions’, Aldephi Paper 333. Védrine, H. (1996) Les Mondes de François Mitterrand, Paris: Fayard. Védrine, H. (1997) ‘France: le Piano ou le Tabouret?’, Le Débat, 95:165–182. Wæver, O. (2000) ‘The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-sovereign Security Orders’, in M.Kelstrup and M.C.Williams (eds) International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration, London: Routledge: 250–294 Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill. Waltz, K.N. (2000) ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25, 1: 5–41. Weiss, T.G. (1999) Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. White House (1994) Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Washington D.C., May www.whitehouse.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc1.html White House (1999) A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington D.C., December. Wivel, A. (2000) ‘The Integration Spiral: International Security and European Integration, 1945–1999’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Copenhagen. Yost, D. (2000) ‘The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union’, Survival, 42, 4: 97–128. Zakaria, F. (1998) From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, Princeton: Princeton University Press. A FRAGMENTED EXTERNAL ROLE 33
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- 56. Isl. roest, raust, aestuaria. To ROUST, v. n. 1. To cry with a rough voice, S. B. Douglas. 2. To bellow; applied to cattle, S. B. Douglas. Isl. raust, vox canora; Dan. roest, a cry. Roust, s. The act of roaring, S. B. Rousty, adj.. 1. Hoarse. Ruddiman. 2. Not refined. Pal. Hon. ROUSTREE, s. The cross bar on which the crook is hung, Aberd. Su. G. roeste, suprema aedificii pars. To ROUT, ROWT, v. n. 1. To bellow, S. Burns. Isl. raut-a, rugire belluarum more. 2. To make a great noise. Douglas. Rout, Rowt, s. 1. The act of bellowing, S. Douglas. 2. A roar, a loud noise, S. Douglas.
- 57. To ROUT, v. a. To strike, S. Ross. Isl. rot-a, percutio; rot, ictus. Rout, Rute, s. A severe blow, S. Barbour. ROUTAND, part. pr. Assembling. Isl. rot-ast, conglobare. Barbour. ROUTH, ROUCH, s. 1. The act of rowing. Douglas. 2. A stroke of the oar. Douglas. A. S. rewete, rowette, remigatio. ROUTH, ROWTH, s. Plenty, S. Ramsay. C. B. rhwth, large, capacious. Routhie, adj. Plentiful, S. Burns. ROUTHLESS, adj. Profane, Fife. E. ruthless used in a particular sense. ROUTHURROK, s. The bernacle goose, Orkn. Leslie.
- 58. Isl. hrota, bernacla. To ROW, v. a. 1. To roll. Douglas. 2. To elapse. Douglas. 3. To revolve. Id. To row about, to be in an advanced state of pregnancy, S. ROWAN, ROWING, s. A flake of wool, S. Edin. Encycl. To Cast a Rowan, to bear an illegitimate child. Gl. Sibb. ROWAN, s. Auld rowan, a bawd, who, by wheedling, endeavours to entice a young woman to marry an old man. Philotus. Germ. rune, Su. G. runa; al-runa, or alte-runa, mulier fatidica. ROWAN, s. A turbot, Fife. Stat. Acc. ROWAR, s. A moveable wooden bolt; q. a roller. Wallace. ROWY, s. King; Fr. roi. Bannatyne P.
- 59. ROWKAR, s. A whisperer, a tale-bearer. Abp. Hamiltoun. Zeland. roeck, delator, Alem. ruog-en, to defame. To ROWME, ROUME, v. n. To roam. Douglas. A. S. ruman, Belg. ruym-en, diffugere. To ROWME, v. a. 1. To clear. Wyntown. 2. To enlarge. Wyntown. Teut. ruym-en, vacuare; ampliare. 3. To place. Keith. Germ. raum-en, in ordine disponere. Rowme, Roume, s. 1. Space. Wyntown. 2. A possession in land. Bellenden. 3. Situation as to preaching. Spotswood. 4. Official situation. Baillie. 5. Ordinal relation. R. Bruce. 6. Place in a literary work. Wodrow. A. S. Su. G. rum, place of any kind.
- 60. Rowme, Roume, Room, adj. 1. Large. Wallace. A. S. Su. G. rum, Teut. ruym, amplus. 2. Clear, empty. Ferguson. Teut. ruym, vacuus. Rowmly, adv. Largely. Wyntown. To ROWMYSS. V. Rummyss. To ROWT, v. n. To snore. Barbour. A. S. hrut-an, Isl. hriot-a, id. ROZET, s. Rosin. V. Roset. RUBIATURE, s. Robber. Leg. St Androis. L. B. rubator, Ital. rubatore, latro. To RUCK, v. n. To belch. Lyndsay. Teut. roeck-en, Lat. ruct-are.
- 61. RUCK, s. A heap of corn, S. B. Acts Ja. VI. Isl. hrauk, Su. G. roek, cumulus. RUCK-RILLING. V. Rewelynys. RUD, adj. Red. Wallace. A. S. rude, reod, Alem. ruod. Rude, s. 1. Redness. Douglas. 2. Those parts of the face, which in youth and health have a ruddy colour, S. B. Chr. Kirk. A. S. ruda, rubor, vultus. To RUDDY, v. n. To make a loud reiterated noise, S. B. Isl. hrid, a storm; force in general. RUDE, adj. Strong, stout. Douglas. RUDE, s. Spawn, Ayrs. V. Redd. Kennedy.
- 62. RUDE, RWD, s. The cross. Douglas. A. S. Su. G. rod, Germ. rode. Rude-day, s. The third day of May, S. B. called the Invention of the Cross. RUDE-GOOSE. V. Rood-goose. To RUFE, v. n. To rest. V. Roif. Chron. S. P. Ruff, s. Rest. V. Roif. To RUFF, v. n. To roll a drum, S.; also ruffle. Wodrow. Germ. ruff-er, to cry. 2. To give a plaudit, S. Ruff, s. 1. Roll of the drum, S. R. Galloway. 2. Beating with the feet, as expressive of applause. Ruffe, s. Fame, celebrity. RUFFIE, s. A ruffian, Ang. Lyndsay. Su. G. rof-wa, to rob.
- 63. RUFFY, s. 1. A wick clogged with tallow, Tweed. Stat. Acc. 2. The blaze used in fishing by night, with the lister, S. A. Sw. roe-lius, a rush light. RUFFILL, s. Loss, injury. Dunbar. Teut. ruyffel-en, terere, verrere. RUFLYT, pret. v. Annoyed. Barbour. To RUG, v. a. 1. To pull hastily or roughly, S. Pop. Ball. 2. To tear, S. Douglas. 3. To spoil, to plunder. Teut. ruck-en, Dan. rag-er, to pluck. RUG, s. 1. A rough or hasty pull, S. 2. A great bargain, S. Ruggair, s. A depredator. Monroe. RULLION, s. 1. A shoe made of untanned leather. V. Rewelynys. 2. A coarse-made masculine woman, Fife.
- 64. RUM, adj. Excellent, Loth. Cant E. RUMBLEGARIE, adj. Disorderly, S. Ramsay. Qu. ready (A. S. gear-u) to rumble. RUMGUMPTION, RUMMILGUMTION, s. Common sense, S. Beattie. A. S. rum, rum-well, spatiosus, and geom-ian, curare. To RUMMIL, RUMLE, v. n. To make a noise, S. Douglas. Teut. rommel-en, strepere. To RUMMYSS, RUMMES, ROWMYSS, v. n. To bellow, S. Henrysone. Isl. rym-a, id. RUMPLE, RUMPILL, s. 1. The rump, S. Ramsay. 2. The tail, S. Bellenden. RUNCHES, s. pl. Wild mustard; also, wild radish, S. A. Bor. Polwart. RUND, ROON, s. 1. A border, a selvage, S.
- 65. Burns. 2. A shred, a remnant, S. B. Gl. Shirr. Isl. rond, raund, margo, extremitas. To RUNDGE, v. n. To gnaw. V. Ronged. Evergreen. RUNG, s. 1. Any long piece of wood, S. Chr. Kirk. 2. A coarse heavy staff, S. Maclaurin. 3. Used to denote the stroke of poverty. J. Nicol. Moes. G. hrung, virga; Isl. raung, pl. rungor, the ribs of a ship. To RUNK, v. a. To deprive of, whether by fair or foul means, S. B. Isl. rank-or, fraud; or perh. corr. from E. rook, to cheat. RUNK, adj. Wrinkled, Aberd. Journal Lond. Su. G. rynka, Dan. rincke, a wrinkle. To RUNKLE, v. a. 1. In part. pa. runkled, wrinkled, S. Ramsay. 2. To crease, to crumple, S.
- 66. A. S. wrincl-ian, Su. G. rynck-a, rugare. Runkle, Runkill, s. 1. A wrinkle, S. Douglas. 2. A rumple, S. Abp. Hamiltoun. RUNRIG, lands are said to lie runrig, where the alternate ridges of a field belong to different proprietors, or are occupied by different tenants, S.; qu. ridges running parallel. Erskine. RUNT, s. 1. Trunk of a tree. Pal. Hon. 2. A hardened stalk; as, a kail runt, the stem of colewort, S. Burns. 3. The tail of an animal, Galloway. 4. A contemptuous designation for a female, more generally applied to one advanced in life, with auld prefixed, S. Germ. rinde, bark, crust. Davidson. RUNT, s. An old cow, S. B., one that has given over breeding, Caithn. Germ. rinde, an ox, or cow. RURYK, adj. Rural, rustic. Wallace. To RUSCH, RWYSS, v. a. To drive. Barbour.
- 67. Su. G. rus-a, rusk-a, irruere. Rusche, Rwhys, s. Drive. Wyntown. To RUSE, ROOSE, v. a. To extol; sometimes reese, S. Douglas. Ill rused, discommended. Kelly. Isl. raus-a, jactabundè multa effutio, ros-a, extollere. RUISE, RUSSE, RUSS, s. 1. Boast. Douglas. Isl. raus, gerrae, loquacitas. To mak a tume ruse, to boast where there is no ground for it, but the reverse, Ang. 2. Commendation, praise, S. Ritson. Su. G. ros, roos, praise. Ruser, s. One habituated to self-commendation. Kelly. RUSHIE, s. A broil, Fife. Teut. ruysch, Isl. rusk-a, strepitus. RUSKIE, s. 1. A basket, made of twigs and straw, for carrying corn, Perths. Loth. 2. A vessel made of straw for holding meal.
- 68. Kelly. 3. A bee-hive, S. B. Su. G. rusk, congeries virgultorum; rysia, Germ. reusche, a bee-hive. RUTE, s. A blow. V. Rout. RUTE, s. A fowl. V. Rood-goose. Acts Marie. RUTHER, s. An uproar, S. Ross. A. S. hruth, commotio, C. B. rhuthr, impetus. RUTHER, RUTHYR, s. Rudder. Wallace. RUTILLAND, part. pr. Croaking. Lyndsay. Teut. rotel-en, grunnire, murmurare. RUTOUR, s. A spoiler. V. Roysters. Bellenden. To RUVE, v. a. V. Roove.
- 70. S This letter, as occurring in the beginning of words, cannot, in many instances, be viewed as a radical. While prefixed in some Goth. dialects, it was thrown away in others; especially before k. The same term sometimes appears with s, and sometimes without it; as in cry and scry; creek of day, and skreek. Ss is often used by our old writers as the mark of the pl.; as, horss for horsis, horses. SA, SUA, SWA, conj. 1. So, consequently, S. sae. Gawan and Gal. 2. In such a manner. Barbour. 3. As, in like manner. Barbour. Moes. G. swa, swe, A. S. swa, Su. G. Dan. saa, ita. To SA, v. n. To say. Douglas. Alem. Germ. sag-en, A. S. saeg-an, id. SACKE, s. Sackcloth. Godly Sangs.
- 71. SACK, s. V. Sak. SACKET, SAKKET, s. A small sack, S. B. Complaynt S. To SACRÉ, v. a. To consecrate. Fr. sacrer, id. Douglas. To SACRIFY, v. a. 1. To sacrifice. Fr. sacrifi-er, id. Douglas. 2. To consecrate. Douglas. 3. To appease, to propitiate. Id. SAD, adj. 1. Grave. Wallace. 2. Wise, prudent. Wallace. 3. Firm, steady. Wallace. C. B. sad, firm, wise, discreet, sober. 4. Close, compact, S. C. B. sathru, calcare, to tread; syth, solidus.
- 72. 5. Heavy, S. Sir J. Sinclair. 6. Weighty, applied to evidence. Buchanan. 7. Flat, close to the ground, S. 8. Denoting a grave colour. Inventories. Sadly, adv. 1. Steadily. Wallace. 2. Closely, compactly. Barbour. To Sad, v. n. To become solid, S. To SAD, v. a. To make sad. Baillie. SAEBIENS, SAEBINS, conj. Since, i. e. being sae, or so. Ramsay. SAFER, s. Damages. V. Sefor. Spotsw. SAFT, adj. 1. Opposed to what is fatiguing, S. Ritson. 2. Pleasant. Ritson. 3. Tranquil, at rest, S. Gl. Sibb.
- 73. Teut. saft, suavis, mollis. Saft, Saftly, adv. Softly. Ferguson. 2. Lightly. Minstr. Bord. To Saft, v. n. To mollify. Dunbar. To SAGHTIL, v. n. To be reconciled. A. S. sahtl-ian, reconciliare. Sir Gawan. Saghtlyng, s. Reconciliation. V. Saucht. Ibid. To SAY, v. n. I yow say, I tell you. A. S. sege me, dic mihi. Barbour. To SAY, SEY, v. a. 1. To put to trial, S. Pitscottie. 2. v. n. To endeavour, S. O. Fr. say-er, essayer, tenter. SAY, SAYE, s. A water-bucket, Inverness, Orkn.; a milk-pail, Dumfr. Acts Ja. I. Su. G. saa, vas quo aqua portatur.
- 74. SAYARE, s. A poetical writer. Doug. A. S. saeg-an, narrare; sage, narratio. SAIKYR, HALFSAIKYR, a species of cannon, smaller than a demi- culverine, named from a species of hawk. Complaynt S. Fr. sacre, "the hawk, and the artillerie so called;" Cotgr. SAIKLESS, SAYKLES, adj. 1. Guiltless, S. Douglas. 2. Free, in a general sense. Douglas. A. S. sacleas, Isl. saklauss, sine culpa. SAIL-FISH, s. The basking shark, S., denominated from a large fin which it carries above water. Stat. Acc. SAILYE, s. An assault. Wallace. O. Fr. sail-ir, to assault. SAILL, s. Happiness. V. Seile. SAYN, s. Narrative. Wallace. Dan. sagn, saying.
- 75. To SAIN, v. a. To bless. V. Sane. SAYND, s. Message or messenger. Barbour. A. S. sand, legatio; legatus. Send, an embassy, S. B. Sayndis-man, s. Messenger. Gawan and Gol. A. S. sandes-man, nuntius. SAIP, s. Soap, S. Lyndsay. A. S. Dan. saepe, id. SAIR, SAYR, SARE, adj. 1. Painful, S. 2. Sorrowful; as, a sair heart. 3. Violent. Wallace. 4. Severe; as sair sickness, S. Wallace. Su. G. saar, A. S. sar, gravis, molestus. 5. Niggardly, as, sair master, a sair merchant, S. Sair, s. A sore, a wound, S. Ferguson. A. S. Isl. sar, Su. G. saar, dolor; vulnus. Sair, Sar, Sare, adv. 1. Sorely, S.
- 76. A. S. sare, graviter. Barbour. 2. In a great degree, S. Douglas. Germ, sehr, Belg. seer, valde. Sair Head, a headach, S. A. Nicol. Sairly, adv. Sorely. Douglas. To SAIR, v. a. 1. To serve, S. Ross. 2. To fit, to be large enough, S. 3. To satisfy; as, with food, S. Ross. Sairing, s. What satisfies one, S. Ross. SAIRLES, SARELESS, adj. Tasteless, S. B. V. Sawr. Diallog. SAIT, s. The Court of Session in S. Dunbar. SAK, SACK, s. The privilege of a baron to prosecute, try and judge his vassals in his own court. Reg. Maj. A. S. sac, actio, causa forensis.
- 77. SAKE, s. Blame, guilt. Sir Tristrem. Su. G. sak, guilt, crime. SALE, SAIL, SAILL, s. 1. A palace. Douglas. 2. A hall, a chamber. Gawan and Gol. A. S. Su. G. sal, aula, palatium. SALEBROSITY, s. A rough place. Baillie. SALIKE, SAELIKE, adj. Similar, of the same kind, S. B. Moes. G. swaleiks, Isl. slyke, talis. SALER, s. A salt-cellar. Sir Gawan. SALERIFE, adj. Saleable, S. SALERYFE, adj. Abounding with sails or ships. Douglas. SALL, L. stal, stole. Houlate.
- 78. SALSS, s. Sauce. Barbour. Germ. salz-en, sale condire. SALT, SAWT, s. Assault. Barbour. O. Fr. saut, id. SALT, adj. 1. Having bitter consequences, S. Douglas. 2. Costly, expensive, S. Salt Se, or Sea, the sea; from the ancient use of the term as denoting the sea itself. Douglas. To SALUS, v. a. To salute. Wallace. O. Fr. salus, salutation. SALUT, s. Health, safety; Fr. Compl. S. SAMBUTES, s. pl. Housing for a horse. O. Fr. sambue, id. Sir Gawan. SAMIN, SAMYN, adj. The same, S. Abl. of Moes. G. sama, idem.
- 79. Compl. S. SAMYN, SAMIN, adv. 1. Together. Barbour. 2. At the same time. Douglas. 3. As soon, with as. Douglas. A. S. samne, Belg. samen, simul, una. SANAPÉ, s. Mustard. Sir Gawan. A. S. Dan. senep, Gr. σιναπις, id. SAND-BLIND, adj. Having that weakness of sight which often accompanies a very fair complexion, S. synon. blind-fair. SANDE, part. pa. Girt. Sir Gawan. O. Fr. saint, from saind-re, ceindre, environner. SANDY-GIDDOCK, s. The launce, a fish, Shetl. Neill. Probably a dimin. from Dan. giedde, Isl. gedda, a pike, from its resemblance in shape; q. the little ged or pike. SAND-LARK, The sea lark, Orkn. Barry. Sandy lerrick, or laverock, of S.
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