World Investment Report 2014

U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T
WORLD
INVESTMENT
REPORT2014
NewYorkandGeneva,2014
INVESTING IN THE SDGs: AN ACTION PLAN

World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Planii
NOTE
The Division on Investment and Enterprise of UNCTAD is a global centre of excellence, dealing with issues
related to investment and enterprise development in the United Nations System. It builds on four decades
of experience and international expertise in research and policy analysis, intergovernmental consensus-
building, and provides technical assistance to over 150 countries.
The terms country/economy as used in this Report also refer, as appropriate, to territories or areas; the
designations employed and the presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country,
territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. In
addition, the designations of country groups are intended solely for statistical or analytical convenience and
do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage of development reached by a particular country or
area in the development process. The major country groupings used in this Report follow the classification
of the United Nations Statistical Office. These are:
Developed countries: the member countries of the OECD (other than Chile, Mexico, the Republic of Korea
and Turkey), plus the new European Union member countries which are not OECD members (Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania), plus Andorra, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, Monaco
and San Marino.
Transition economies: South-East Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia.
Developing economies: in general all economies not specified above. For statistical purposes, the data for
China do not include those for Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR), Macao Special
Administrative Region (Macao SAR) and Taiwan Province of China.
Reference to companies and their activities should not be construed as an endorsement by UNCTAD of
those companies or their activities.
The boundaries and names shown and designations used on the maps presented in this publication do not
imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
The following symbols have been used in the tables:
• Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. Rows in tables have
been omitted in those cases where no data are available for any of the elements in the row;
• A dash (–) indicates that the item is equal to zero or its value is negligible;
• A blank in a table indicates that the item is not applicable, unless otherwise indicated;
• A slash (/) between dates representing years, e.g., 1994/95, indicates a financial year;
• Use of a dash (–) between dates representing years, e.g., 1994–1995, signifies the full period involved,
including the beginning and end years;
• Reference to “dollars” ($) means United States dollars, unless otherwise indicated;
• Annual rates of growth or change, unless otherwise stated, refer to annual compound rates;
Details and percentages in tables do not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.
The material contained in this study may be freely quoted with appropriate acknowledgement.
UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION
Sales No. E.14.II.D.1
ISBN 978-92-1-112873-4
eISBN 978-92-1-056696-4
Copyright © United Nations, 2014
All rights reserved
Printed in Switzerland

iii

BAN Ki-moon
Secretary-General of the United Nations
PREFACE
This edition of the World Investment Report provides valuable analysis that can inform global discussions
on how to accelerate progress toward the Millennium Development Goals and shape a long-range vision
for a more sustainable future beyond 2015.
The Report reveals an encouraging trend: after a decline in 2012, global foreign direct investment flows
rose by 9 per cent in 2013, with growth expected to continue in the years to come. This demonstrates the
great potential of international investment, along with other financial resources, to help reach the goals of
a post-2015 agenda for sustainable development. Transnational corporations can support this effort by
creating decent jobs, generating exports, promoting rights, respecting the environment, encouraging local
content, paying fair taxes and transferring capital, technology and business contacts to spur development.
This year’s World Investment Report offers a global action plan for galvanizing the role of businesses in
achieving future sustainable development goals, and enhancing the private sector’s positive economic, social
and environmental impacts. The Report identifies the financing gap, especially in vulnerable economies,
assesses the primary sources of funds for bridging the gap, and proposes policy options for the future.
I commend this Report to all those interested in steering private investment towards a more sustainable
future.

World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Planiv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The World Investment Report 2014 (WIR14) was prepared by a team led by James X. Zhan. The team
members included Richard Bolwijn, Bruno Casella, Joseph Clements, Hamed El Kady, Kumi Endo,
Masataka Fujita, Noelia Garcia Nebra, Thomas van Giffen, Axèle Giroud, Joachim Karl, Guoyong Liang,
Anthony Miller, Hafiz Mirza, Nicole Moussa, Jason Munyan, Shin Ohinata, Sergey Ripinsky, William Speller,
Astrit Sulstarova, Claudia Trentini, Elisabeth Tuerk, Joerg Weber and Kee Hwee Wee.
Jeffrey Sachs acted as the lead adviser.
Research and statistical assistance was provided by Mohamed Chiraz Baly, Bradley Boicourt, Lizanne
Martinez, Tadelle Taye and Yana Trofimova. Contributions were also made by Amare Bekele, Kwangouck
Byun, Chantal Dupasquier, Fulvia Farinelli, Natalia Guerra, Ventzislav Kotetzov, Kendra Magraw, Massimo
Meloni, Abraham Negash, Celia Ortega Sotes, Yongfu Ouyang, Davide Rigo, John Sasuya, Christoph
Spennemann, Paul Wessendorp and Teerawat Wongkaew, as well as interns Ana Conover, Haley Michele
Knudson and Carmen Sauger.
The manuscript was copy-edited with the assistance of Lise Lingo and typeset by Laurence Duchemin
and Teresita Ventura. Sophie Combette and Nadege Hadjemian designed the cover. Production and
dissemination of WIR14 was supported by Elisabeth Anodeau-Mareschal, Evelyn Benitez, Nathalie Eulaerts,
Rosalina Goyena, Natalia Meramo-Bachayani and Katia Vieu.
At various stages of preparation, in particular during the experts meeting organized to discuss drafts of
WIR14, the team benefited from comments and inputs received from external experts: Azar Aliyev, Yukiko
Arai, Jonathan Bravo, Barbara Buchner, Marc Bungenberg, Richard Dobbs, Michael Hanni, Paul Hohnen,
Valerio Micale, Jan Mischke, Lilach Nachum, Karsten Nowrot, Federico Ortino, Lauge Poulsen, Dante
Pesce, Anna Peters, Isabelle Ramdoo, Diana Rosert, Josef Schmidhuber, Martin Stadelmann, Ian Strauss,
Jeff Sullivan, Chiara Trabacchi, Steve Waygood and Philippe Zaouati. Comments and inputs were also
received from many UNCTAD colleagues, including Santiago Fernandez De Cordoba Briz, Ebru Gokce,
Richard Kozul-Wright, Michael Lim, Patrick Osakwe, Igor Paunovic, Taffere Tesfachew, Guillermo Valles and
Anida Yupari.
UNCTAD also wishes to thank the participants in the Experts Meeting held at the Vale Columbia Center
on Sustainable International Investment and the brainstorming meeting organized by New York University
School of Law, both in November 2013.
Numerous officials of central banks, government agencies, international organizations and non-governmental
organizations also contributed to WIR14. The financial support of the Governments of Finland, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland is gratefully acknowledged.

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE..............................................................................................................iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.........................................................................................iv
KEY MESSAGES....................................................................................................ix
OVERVIEW.......................................................................................................... xiii
CHAPTER I. GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS .......................................................... 1
A. CURRENT TRENDS............................................................................................ 2
1. FDI by geography ........................................................................................................................2
2. FDI by mode of entry....................................................................................................................7
3. FDI by sector and industry...........................................................................................................9
4. FDI by selected types of investors ...........................................................................................17
B. PROSPECTS ................................................................................................... 23
C. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION ...................................................... 29
CHAPTER II. REGIONAL INVESTMENT TRENDS..................................................... 35
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 36
A. REGIONAL TRENDS ........................................................................................ 37
1. Africa ..........................................................................................................................................37
2. Asia ............................................................................................................................................45
3. Latin America and the Caribbean .............................................................................................61
4. Transition economies ................................................................................................................70
5. Developed countries .................................................................................................................77
B. TRENDS IN STRUCTURALLY WEAK, VULNERABLE AND SMALL ECONOMIES....... 82
1. Least developed countries .......................................................................................................82
2. Landlocked developing countries ............................................................................................88
3. Small island developing States ................................................................................................94

World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Planvi
CHAPTER III. RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND KEY ISSUES......................... 105
A. NATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES ................................................................ 106
1. Overall trends ..........................................................................................................................106
2. Recent trends in investment incentives .................................................................................109
B. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES ....................................................... 114
1. Trends in the conclusion of international investment agreements .......................................114
2. Megaregional agreements: emerging issues and systemic implications .............................118
3. Trends in investor–State dispute settlement ..........................................................................124
4. Reform of the IIA regime: four paths of action and a way forward........................................126
CHAPTER IV. INVESTING IN THE SDGs: AN ACTION PLAN FOR
PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS ................................................. 135
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 136
1. The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals and implied investment needs.........136
2. Private sector contributions to the SDGs...............................................................................137
3. The need for a strategic framework for private investment in the SDGs..............................138
B. THE INVESTMENT GAP AND PRIVATE SECTOR POTENTIAL............................... 140
1. SDG investment gaps and the role of the private sector.......................................................140
2. Exploring private sector potential...........................................................................................145
3. Realistic targets for private sector SDG investment in LDCs...............................................146
C. INVESTING IN SDGs: A CALL FOR LEADERSHIP............................................... 150
1. Leadership challenges in raising private sector investment in the SDGs............................150
2. Meeting the leadership challenge: key elements...................................................................150
D. MOBILIZING FUNDS FOR INVESTMENT IN THE SDGs....................................... 153
1. Prospective sources of finance...............................................................................................153
2. Challenges to mobilizing funds for SDG investments............................................................157
3. Creating fertile soil for innovative financing approaches.......................................................158
4. Building an SDG-supportive financial system........................................................................161

vii
E. CHANNELLING INVESTMENT INTO THE SDGs................................................. 165
1. Challenges to channelling funds into the SDGs.....................................................................165
2. Alleviating entry barriers, while safeguarding public interests..............................................166
3. Expanding the use of risk-sharing tools for SDG investments ............................................167
4. Establishing new incentives schemes and a new generation of
investment promotion institutions...........................................................................................170
5. Building SDG investment partnerships...................................................................................173
F. ENSURING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF
INVESTMENT IN THE SDGs............................................................................ 175
1. Challenges in managing the impact of private investment in SDG sectors..........................175
2. Increasing absorptive capacity................................................................................................177
3. Establishing effective regulatory frameworks and standards................................................179
4. Good governance, capable institutions, stakeholder engagement......................................181
5. Implementing SDG impact assessment systems .................................................................182
G. AN ACTION PLAN FOR PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN THE SDGs................ 185
1. A Big Push for private investment in the SDGs......................................................................186
2. Stakeholder engagement and a platform for new ideas........................................................189
REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 195
ANNEX TABLES ................................................................................................ 203

World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Planviii

KEY MESSAGES ix
KEY MESSAGES
GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
Cautious optimism returns to global foreign direct investment (FDI). After the 2012 slump, global FDI
returned to growth, with inflows rising 9 per cent in 2013, to $1.45 trillion. UNCTAD projects that FDI flows
could rise to $1.6 trillion in 2014, $1.7 trillion in 2015 and $1.8 trillion in 2016, with relatively larger increases
in developed countries. Fragility in some emerging markets and risks related to policy uncertainty and
regional instability may negatively affect the expected upturn in FDI.
Developing economies maintain their lead in 2013. FDI flows to developed countries increased by 9 per
cent to $566 billion, leaving them at 39 per cent of global flows, while those to developing economies
reached a new high of $778 billion, or 54 per cent of the total. The balance of $108 billion went to transition
economies. Developing and transition economies now constitute half of the top 20 ranked by FDI inflows.
FDI outflows from developing countries also reached a record level. Transnational corporations (TNCs) from
developing economies are increasingly acquiring foreign affiliates from developed countries located in their
regions. Developing and transition economies together invested $553 billion, or 39 per cent of global FDI
outflows, compared with only 12 per cent at the beginning of the 2000s.
Megaregional groupings shape global FDI. The three main regional groups currently under negotiation (TPP,
TTIP, RCEP) each account for a quarter or more of global FDI flows, with TTIP flows in decline, and the
others in ascendance. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) remains the largest regional economic
cooperation grouping, with 54 per cent of global inflows.
The poorest countries are less and less dependent on extractive industry investment. Over the past decade,
the share of the extractive industry in the value of greenfield projects was 26 per cent in Africa and 36 per
cent in LDCs. These shares are rapidly decreasing; manufacturing and services now make up about 90
per cent of the value of announced projects both in Africa and in LDCs.
Private equity FDI is keeping its powder dry. Outstanding funds of private equity firms increased to a
record level of more than $1 trillion. Their cross-border investment was $171 billion, a decline of 11 per
cent, and they accounted for 21 per cent of the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As),
10 percentage points below their peak. With funds available for investment (“dry powder”), and relatively
subdued activity in recent years, the potential for increased private equity FDI is significant.
State-owned TNCs are FDI heavyweights. UNCTAD estimates there are at least 550 State-owned TNCs
– from both developed and developing countries – with more than 15,000 foreign affiliates and foreign
assets of over $2 trillion. FDI by these TNCs was more than $160 billion in 2013. At that level, although
their number constitutes less than 1 per cent of the universe of TNCs, they account for over 11 per cent of
global FDI flows.
REGIONAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
FDI flows to all major developing regions increased. Africa saw increased inflows (+4 per cent), sustained by
growing intra-African flows. Such flows are in line with leaders’ efforts towards deeper regional integration,
although the effect of most regional economic cooperation initiatives in Africa on intraregional FDI has been
limited. Developing Asia (+3 per cent) remains the number one global investment destination. Regional
headquarter locations for TNCs, and proactive regional investment cooperation, are factors driving increasing
intraregional flows. Latin America and the Caribbean (+6 per cent) saw mixed FDI growth, with an overall
positive due to an increase in Central America, but with an 6 per cent decline in South America. Prospects
are brighter, with new opportunities arising in oil and gas, and TNC investment plans in manufacturing.

World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Planx
Structurally weak economies saw mixed results. Investment in the least developed countries (LDCs)
increased, with announced greenfield investments signalling significant growth in basic infrastructure and
energy projects. Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) saw an overall decline in FDI. Relative to the
size of their economies, and relative to capital formation, FDI remains an important source of finance there.
Inflows to small island developing States (SIDS) declined. Tourism and extractive industries are attracting
increasing interest from foreign investors, while manufacturing industries have been negatively affected by
erosion of trade preferences.
Inflows to developed countries resume growth but have a long way to go. The recovery of FDI inflows in
developed countries to $566 billion, and the unchanged outflows, at $857 billion, leave both at half their
peak levels in 2007. Europe, traditionally the largest FDI recipient region, is at less than one third of its 2007
inflows and one fourth of its outflows. The United States and the European Union (EU) saw their combined
share of global FDI inflows decline from well over 50 per cent pre-crisis to 30 per cent in 2013.
FDI to transition economies reached record levels, but prospects are uncertain. FDI inflows to transition
economies increased by 28 per cent to reach $108 billion in 2013. Outward FDI from the region jumped by
84 per cent, reaching a record $99 billion. Prospects for FDI to transition economies are likely to be affected
by uncertainties related to regional instability.
INVESTMENT POLICY TRENDS AND KEY ISSUES
Most investment policy measures remain geared towards investment promotion and liberalization. At the
same time, the share of regulatory or restrictive investment policies increased, reaching 27 per cent in 2013.
Some host countries have sought to prevent divestments by established foreign investors. Some home
countries promote reshoring of their TNCs’ overseas investments.
Investment incentives mostly focus on economic performance objectives, less on sustainable development.
Incentives are widely used by governments as a policy instrument for attracting investment, despite
persistent criticism that they are economically inefficient and lead to misallocations of public funds. To
address these concerns, investment incentives schemes could be more closely aligned with the SDGs.
International investment rule making is characterized by diverging trends: on the one hand, disengagement
from the system, partly because of developments in investment arbitration; on the other, intensifying and
up-scaling negotiations. Negotiations of “megaregional agreements” are a case in point. Once concluded,
these may have systemic implications for the regime of international investment agreements (IIAs).
Widespread concerns about the functioning and the impact of the IIA regime are resulting in calls for
reform. Four paths are becoming apparent: (i) maintaining the status quo, (ii) disengaging from the system,
(iii) introducing selective adjustments, and (iv) undertaking systematic reform. A multilateral approach could
effectively contribute to this endeavour.
INVESTING IN THE SDGs: AN ACTION PLAN FOR PROMOTING PRIVATE
SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Faced with common global economic, social and environmental challenges, the international community
is defining a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs, which are being formulated by the
United Nations together with the widest possible range of stakeholders, are intended to galvanize action
worldwide through concrete targets for the 2015–2030 period for poverty reduction, food security, human
health and education, climate change mitigation, and a range of other objectives across the economic,
social and environmental pillars.
The role of the public sector is fundamental and pivotal, while the private sector contribution is indispensable.
The latter can take two main forms, good governance in business practices and investment in sustainable
development. Policy coherence is essential in promoting the private sector’s contribution to the SDGs.

KEY MESSAGES xi
The SDGs will have very significant resource implications across the developed and developing world.
Global investment needs are in the order of $5 trillion to $7 trillion per year. Estimates for investment needs
in developing countries alone range from $3.3 trillion to $4.5 trillion per year, mainly for basic infrastructure
(roads, rail and ports; power stations; water and sanitation), food security (agriculture and rural development),
climate change mitigation and adaptation, health, and education.
The SDGs will require a step-change in the levels of both public and private investment in all countries.
At current levels of investment in SDG-relevant sectors, developing countries alone face an annual gap of
$2.5 trillion. In developing countries, especially in LDCs and other vulnerable economies, public finances
are central to investment in SDGs. However, they cannot meet all SDG-implied resource demands. The role
of private sector investment will be indispensable.
Today, the participation of the private sector in investment in SDG-related sectors is relatively low. Only a
fraction of the worldwide invested assets of banks, pension funds, insurers, foundations and endowments,
as well as transnational corporations, is in SDG sectors. Their participation is even lower in developing
countries, particularly the poorest ones.
In LDCs, a doubling of the growth rate of private investment would be a desirable target. Developing
countries as a group could see the private sector cover approximately the part of SDG investment needs
corresponding to its current share in investment in SDG sectors, based on current growth rates. In that
scenario, however, they would still face an annual gap of about $1.6 trillion. In LDCs, where investment
needs are most acute and where financing capacity is lowest, about twice the current growth rate of private
investment is needed to give it a meaningful complementary financing role next to public investment and
overseas development assistance (ODA).
Increasing the involvement of private investors in SDG-related sectors, many of which are sensitive or of
a public service nature, leads to policy dilemmas. Policymakers need to find the right balance between
creating a climate conducive to investment and removing barriers to investment on the one hand, and
protecting public interests through regulation on the other. They need to find mechanisms to provide
sufficiently attractive returns to private investors while guaranteeing accessibility and affordability of services
for all. And the push for more private investment must be complementary to the parallel push for more
public investment.
UNCTAD’s proposed Strategic Framework for Private Investment in the SDGs addresses key policy
challenges and options related to (i) guiding principles and global leadership to galvanize action for private
investment, (ii) the mobilization of funds for investment in sustainable development, (iii) the channelling of
funds into investments in SDG sectors, and (iv) maximizing the sustainable development impact of private
investment while minimizing risks or drawbacks involved.
Increasing private investment in SDGs will require leadership at the global level, as well as from national
policymakers, to provide guiding principles to deal with policy dilemmas; to set targets, recognizing
the need to make a special effort for LDCs; to ensure policy coherence at national and global levels; to
galvanize dialogue and action, including through appropriate multi-stakeholder platforms; and to guarantee
inclusiveness, providing support to countries that otherwise might continue to be largely ignored by private
investors.
Challenges to mobilizing funds in financial markets include start-up and scaling problems for innovative
financing solutions, market failures, a lack of transparency on environmental, social and corporate
governance performance, and misaligned rewards for market participants. Key constraints to channelling
funds into SDG sectors include entry barriers, inadequate risk-return ratios for SDG investments, a lack
of information and effective packaging and promotion of projects, and a lack of investor expertise. Key
challenges in managing the impact of private investment in SDG sectors include the weak absorptive
capacity in some developing countries, social and environmental impact risks, and the need for stakeholder
engagement and effective impact monitoring.

xii World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
UNCTAD’s Action Plan for Private Investment in the SDGs presents a range of policy options to respond to
the mobilization, channelling and impact challenges. A focused set of action packages can help shape a
Big Push for private investment in sustainable development:
• A new generation of investment promotion and facilitation. Establishing SDG investment development
agencies to develop and market pipelines of bankable projects in SDG sectors and to actively facilitate
such projects. This requires specialist expertise and should be supported by technical assistance.
“Brokers” of SDG investment projects could also be set up at the regional level to share costs and
achieve economies of scale. The international investment policy regime should also be reoriented
towards proactive promotion of investment in SDGs.
• SDG-oriented investment incentives. Restructuring of investment incentive schemes specifically to
facilitate sustainable development projects. This calls for a transformation from purely “location-based”
incentives, aiming to increase the competitiveness of a location and provided at the time of establishment,
towards “SDG-based” incentives, aiming to promote investment in SDG sectors and conditional upon
their sustainable development contribution.
• Regional SDG Investment Compacts. Launching regional and South-South initiatives towards the
promotion of SDG investment, especially for cross-border infrastructure development and regional
clusters of firms operating in SDG sectors (e.g. green zones). This could include joint investment promotion
mechanisms, joint programmes to build absorptive capacity and joint public-private partnership models.
• New forms of partnership for SDG investments. Establish partnerships between outward investment
agencies in home countries and investment promotion agencies (IPAs) in host countries for the purpose
of marketing SDG investment opportunities in home countries, provision of investment incentives and
facilitation services for SDG projects, and joint monitoring and impact assessment. Concrete tools that
might support joint SDG investment business development services could include online tools with
pipelines of bankable projects, and opportunities for linkages programmes in developing countries. A
multi-agency technical assistance consortium could help to support LDCs.
• Enabling innovative financing mechanisms and a reorientation of financial markets. Innovative financial
instruments to raise funds for investment in SDGs deserve support to achieve scale. Options include
innovative tradable financial instruments and dedicated SDG funds, seed funding mechanisms, and new
“go-to-market” channels for SDG projects. Reorientation of financial markets also requires integrated
reporting. This is a fundamental tool for investors to make informed decisions on responsible allocation
of capital, and it is at the heart of Sustainable Stock Exchanges.
• Changing the business mindset and developing SDG investment expertise. Developing a curriculum
for business schools that generates awareness of investment opportunities in poor countries and that
teaches students the skills needed to successfully operate in developing-country environments. This
can be extended to inclusion of relevant modules in existing training and certification programmes for
financial market actors.
The Action Plan for Private Investment in the SDGs is meant to serve as a point of reference for policymakers
at national and international levels in their discussions on ways and means to implement the SDGs. It has
been designed as a “living document” and incorporates an online version that aims to establish an interactive,
open dialogue, inviting the international community to exchange views, suggestions and experiences. It
thus constitutes a basis for further stakeholder engagement. UNCTAD aims to provide the platform for such
engagement through its biennial World Investment Forum, and online through the Investment Policy Hub.

OVERVIEW xiii
Figure 1. FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1995–2013 and projections, 2014-2016
(Billions of dollars)
52%
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
World total
Developing
economies
Transition
economies
Developed
economies
Projection
OVERVIEW
GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
Cautious optimism returns to global FDI
In 2013, FDI flows returned to an upward trend. Global FDI inflows rose by 9 per cent to $1.45 trillion
in 2013. FDI inflows increased in all major economic groupings − developed, developing, and transition
economies. Global FDI stock rose by 9 per cent, reaching $25.5 trillion.
UNCTAD projects that global FDI flows could rise to $1.6 trillion in 2014, $1.75 trillion in 2015 and $1.85
trillion in 2016. The rise will be mainly driven by investments in developed economies as their economic
recovery starts to take hold and spread wider. The fragility in some emerging markets and risks related to
policy uncertainty and regional conflict could still derail the expected upturn in FDI flows.
As a result of higher expected FDI growth in developed countries, the regional distribution of FDI may tilt
back towards the “traditional pattern” of a higher share of developed countries in global inflows (figure 1).
Nevertheless, FDI flows to developing economies will remain at a high level in the coming years.
Developing economies maintain their lead
FDI flows to developing economies reached a new high at $778 billion (table 1), accounting for 54 per
cent of global inflows, although the growth rate slowed to 7 per cent, compared with an average growth
rate over the past 10 years of 17 per cent. Developing Asia continues to be the region with the highest
FDI inflows, significantly above the EU, traditionally the region with the highest share of global FDI. FDI
inflows were up also in the other major developing regions, Africa (up 4 per cent) and Latin America and the
Caribbean (up 6 per cent, excluding offshore financial centres).

xiv World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
Although FDI to developed economies resumed its recovery after the sharp fall in 2012, it remained at a
historically low share of total global FDI flows (39 per cent), and still 57 per cent below its peak in 2007.
Thus, developing countries maintained their lead over developed countries by a margin of more than $200
billion for the second year running.
Developing countries and transition economies now also constitute half of the top 20 economies ranked by
FDI inflows (figure 2). Mexico moved into tenth place. China recorded its largest ever inflows and maintained
its position as the second largest recipient in the world.
FDI by transnational corporations (TNCs) from developing countries reached $454 billion – another record
high. Together with transition economies, they accounted for 39 per cent of global FDI outflows, compared
with only 12 per cent at the beginning of the 2000s. Six developing and transition economies ranked among
the 20 largest investors in the world in 2013 (figure 3). Increasingly, developing-country TNCs are acquiring
foreign affiliates of developed-country TNCs in the developing world.
Megaregional groupings shape global FDI
The share of APEC countries in global inflows increased from 37 per cent before the crisis to 54 per cent
in 2013 (figure 4). Although their shares are smaller, FDI inflows to ASEAN and the Common Market of the
South (MERCOSUR) in 2013 were at double their pre-crisis level, as were inflows to the BRICS (Brazil, the
Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa).
Table 1. FDI flows, by region, 2011–2013
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
Region FDI inflows FDI outflows
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
World 1 700 1 330 1 452 1 712 1 347 1 411
Developed economies 880 517 566 1 216 853 857
European Union 490 216 246 585 238 250
North America 263 204 250 439 422 381
Developing economies 725 729 778 423 440 454
Africa 48 55 57 7 12 12
Asia 431 415 426 304 302 326
East and South-East Asia 333 334 347 270 274 293
South Asia 44 32 36 13 9 2
West Asia 53 48 44 22 19 31
Latin America and the Caribbean 244 256 292 111 124 115
Oceania 2 3 3 1 2 1
Transition economies 95 84 108 73 54 99
Structurally weak, vulnerable and small economiesa
58 58 57 12 10 9
LDCs 22 24 28 4 4 5
LLDCs 36 34 30 6 3 4
SIDS 6 7 6 2 2 1
Memorandum: percentage share in world FDI flows
Developed economies 51.8 38.8 39.0 71.0 63.3 60.8
European Union 28.8 16.2 17.0 34.2 17.7 17.8
North America 15.5 15.3 17.2 25.6 31.4 27.0
Developing economies 42.6 54.8 53.6 24.7 32.7 32.2
Africa 2.8 4.1 3.9 0.4 0.9 0.9
Asia 25.3 31.2 29.4 17.8 22.4 23.1
East and South-East Asia 19.6 25.1 23.9 15.8 20.3 20.7
South Asia 2.6 2.4 2.4 0.8 0.7 0.2
West Asia 3.1 3.6 3.0 1.3 1.4 2.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 14.3 19.2 20.1 6.5 9.2 8.1
Oceania 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Transition economies 5.6 6.3 7.4 4.3 4.0 7.0
3.4 4.4 3.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
LDCs 1.3 1.8 1.9 0.3 0.3 0.3
LLDCs 2.1 2.5 2.0 0.4 0.2 0.3
SIDS 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1
Source: UNCTAD, FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a
Without double counting.

OVERVIEW xv
Figure 3. FDI outflows: top 20 home economies, 2012 and 2013
2013
2012
2013
2012
3
-4
8
0
22
26
13
27
32
37
Taiwan Province
of China
Austria
Norway
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
Ireland
Spain
Singapore
Republic of Korea
Italy
Sweden
Netherlands
Canada
Germany
Switzerland
Hong Kong, China
Russian Federation
China
Japan
United States
Developing and
transition economies
Developed
economies
17
14
13
14
20
18
35
19
23
19
31
29
29
33
55
43
80
58
45
60
88
92
49
95
88
101
123
136
367
338
Figure 2. FDI inflows: top 20 host economies, 2012 and 2013
Colombia
Italy
Indonesia
Chile
Netherlands
Germany
India
Luxembourg
Ireland
United Kingdom
Mexico
Spain
Australia
Canada
Singapore
Brazil
Hong Kong, China
Russian Federation
China
188
0
16
19
29
10
13
24
10
38
46
18
26
56
43
61
65
75
51
121
17
17
18
20
24
27
28
30
36
37
38
39
50
62
64
64
77
79
124
2013
2012
2013
2012
Developing and
Developed
economies
161
United States

xvi World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
Figure 4. FDI inflows to selected regional and interregional groups, average 2005–2007 and 2013
(Billions of US dollars and per cent)
Share in world Share in world
G-20 59% 54% -5
APEC 37% 54% 17
TPP 24% 32% 8
TTIP 56% 30% -26
RCEP 13% 24% 11
BRICS 11% 21% 10
NAFTA 19% 20% 1
ASEAN 4% 9% 5
MERCOSUR 2% 6% 4
Regional/inter-
regional groups
Average 2005–2007 2013
FDI Inflows ($ billion) FDI Inflows ($ billion)
31
65
279
157
195
838
363
560
878
85
125
288
304
343
434
458
789
791
Change in share
(percentage
point)
The three megaregional integration initiatives currently under negotiation – TTIP, TPP and RCEP – show
diverging FDI trends. The United States and the EU, which are negotiating the formation of TTIP, saw their
combined share of global FDI inflows cut nearly in half, from 56 per cent pre-crisis to 30 per cent in 2013.
In TPP, the declining share of the United States is offset by the expansion of emerging economies in the
grouping, helping the aggregate share increase from 24 per cent before 2008 to 32 per cent in 2013. The
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is being negotiated between the 10 ASEAN
member States and their 6 free trade agreement (FTA) partners, accounted for more than 20 per cent of
global FDI flows in recent years, nearly twice as much as the pre-crisis level.
Poorest developing economies less dependent on natural resources
Although historically FDI in many poor developing countries has relied heavily on extractive industries, the
dynamics of greenfield investment over the last 10 years reveals a more nuanced picture. The share of the
extractive industry in the cumulative value of announced cross-border greenfield projects is substantial in
Africa (26 per cent) and in LDCs (36 per cent). However, looking at project numbers the share drops to 8
per cent of projects in Africa, and 9 per cent in LDCs, due to the capital intensive nature of the industry.
Moreover, the share of the extractive industry is rapidly decreasing. Data on announced greenfield
investments in 2013 show that manufacturing and services make up about 90 per cent of the total value
of projects both in Africa and in LDCs.
Shale gas is affecting FDI patterns in the Unites States and beyond
The shale gas revolution is now clearly visible in FDI patterns. In the United States oil and gas industry,
the role of foreign capital is growing as the shale market consolidates and smaller domestic players need
to share development and production costs. Shale gas cross-border MAs accounted for more than 80
per cent of such deals in the oil and gas industry in 2013. United States firms with necessary expertise in
the exploration and development of shale gas are also becoming acquisition targets or industrial partners
of energy firms based in other countries rich in shale resources.
Beyond the oil and gas industry, cheap natural gas is attracting new capacity investments, including
greenfield FDI, to United States manufacturing industries, in particular chemicals and chemical products.

OVERVIEW xvii
The United States share in global announced greenfield investments in these sectors jumped from 6 per
cent in 2011, to 16 per cent in 2012, to 25 per cent in 2013, well above the average United States share
across all industries (7 per cent). Some reshoring of United States manufacturing TNCs is also expected.
As the cost advantage of petrochemicals manufacturers in other oil and gas rich countries is being eroded,
the effects on FDI are becoming visible also outside the United States, especially in West Asia. TNCs like
Chevron Phillips Chemical, Dow Chemical and ExxonMobil Chemical are returning their focus to the United
States. Even Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) petrochemical enterprises such as NOVA chemicals (United
Arab Emirates) and Sabic (Saudi Arabia) – are investing in North America.
Pharmaceutical FDI driven by the “patent cliff” and emerging market
opportunities
Pharmaceutical TNCs have been divesting non-core business segments and outsourcing RD activities
in recent years, while engaging in MA activity to secure new revenue streams and low-cost production
bases. Global players in this industry have sought access to high-quality, low-cost generic drugs through
acquisitions of producers based in developing economies, in response to growing demand. They have
also targeted successful research firms and start-ups there. The share of cross-border MA deals in the
sector targeting developing and transition economies increased from less than 4 per cent before 2006, to
10 per cent between 2010 and 2012, jumping to more than 18 per cent in 2013.
The availability of vast reserves of overseas held retained earnings in the top pharmaceutical TNCs facilitates
such deals, and signals further activity. During the first quarter of 2014, the transaction value of cross-
border MAs ($23 billion in 55 deals) already surpassed the value recorded for all of 2013.
Private equity FDI keeps its powder dry
In 2013, outstanding funds of private equity firms increased further to a record level of $1.07 trillion, an
increase of 14 per cent over the previous year. However, their cross-border investment – typically through
MAs – was $171 billion ($83 billion on a net basis), a decline of 11 per cent. Private equity accounted for
21 per cent of total gross cross-border MAs in 2013, 10 percentage points lower than at its peak in 2007.
With the increasing amount of outstanding funds available for investment (dry powder), and their relatively
subdued activity in recent years, the potential for increased private equity FDI is significant.
Most private equity acquisitions are still concentrated in Europe (traditionally the largest market) and the
United States. Deals are on the increase in Asia. Though relatively small, developing-country-based private
equity firms are beginning to emerge and are involved in deal makings not only in developing countries but
also in more mature markets.
FDI by SWFs remains small, State-owned TNCs are heavyweights
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) continue to expand in terms of assets, geographical spread and target
industries. Assets under management of SWFs approach $6.4 trillion and are invested worldwide, including
in sub-Saharan African countries. Oil-producing countries in sub-Saharan Africa have themselves recently
created SWFs to manage oil proceeds. Compared to the size of their assets, the level of FDI by SWFs is
still small, corresponding to less than 2 per cent of assets under management, and limited to a few major
SWFs. In 2013, SWF FDI flows were worth $6.7 billion with cumulative stock reaching $130 billion.
The number of State-owned TNCs (SO-TNCs) is relatively small, but the number of their foreign affiliates
and the scale of their foreign assets are significant. According to UNCTAD’s estimates, there are at least
550 SO-TNCs – from both developed and developing countries – with more than 15,000 foreign affiliates

xviii World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
and estimated foreign assets of over $2 trillion. Some are among the largest TNCs in the world. FDI by
State-owned TNCs is estimated to have reached more than $160 billion in 2013, a slight increase after four
consecutive years of decline. At that level, although their number constitutes less than 1 per cent of the
universe of TNCs, they account for over 11 per cent of global FDI flows.
International production continues its steady growth
International production continued to expand in 2013, rising by 9 per cent in sales, 8 per cent in assets,
6 per cent in value added, 5 per cent in employment, and 3 per cent in exports (table 2). TNCs from
developing and transition economies expanded their overseas operations faster than their developed-
country counterparts, but at roughly the same rate of their domestic operations, thus maintaining – overall
– a stable internationalization index.
Cash holdings by the top 5,000 TNCs remained high in 2013, accounting for more than 11 per cent of their
total assets. Cash holdings (including short-term investments) by developed-country TNCs were estimated
at $3.5 trillion, while TNCs from developing and transition economies held $1.0 trillion. Developing-country
TNCs have held their cash-to-assets ratios relatively constant over the last five years, at about 12 per
cent. In contrast, the cash-to-assets ratios of developed-country TNCs increased in recent years, from an
average of 9 per cent before the financial crisis to more than 11 per cent in 2013. This increase implies that,
at the end of 2013, developed-country TNCs held $670 billion more cash than they would have before – a
significant brake on investment.
Table 2. Selected indicators of FDI and international production,
2013 and selected years
Value at current prices
Item 1990
2005–2007
pre-crisis
average
2011 2012 2013
FDI inflows 208 1 493 1 700 1 330 1 452
FDI outflows 241 1 532 1 712 1 347 1 411
FDI inward stock 2 078 14 790 21 117 23 304 25 464
FDI outward stock 2 088 15 884 21 913 23 916 26 313
Income on inward FDI 79 1 072 1 603 1 581 1 748
Rate of return on inward FDI 3.8 7.3 6.9 7.6 6.8
Income on outward FDI 126 1 135 1 550 1 509 1 622
Rate of return on outward FDI 6.0 7.2 6.5 7.1 6.3
Cross-border MAs 111 780 556 332 349
Sales of foreign affiliates 4 723 21 469 28 516 31 532 34 508
Value added (product) of foreign affiliates 881 4 878 6 262 7 089 7 492
Total assets of foreign affiliates 3 893 42 179 83 754 89 568 96 625
Exports of foreign affiliates 1 498 5 012 7 463 7 532 7 721
Employment by foreign affiliates (thousands) 20 625 53 306 63 416 67 155 70 726
Memorandum:
GDP 22 327 51 288 71 314 72 807 74 284
Gross fixed capital formation 5 072 11 801 16 498 17 171 17 673
Royalties and licence fee receipts 29 161 250 253 259
Exports of goods and services 4 107 15 034 22 386 22 593 23 160

OVERVIEW xix
REGIONAL TRENDS IN FDI
FDI to Africa increases, sustained by growing intra-African flows
FDI inflows to Africa rose by 4 per cent to $57 billion, driven by international and regional market-seeking
and infrastructure investments. Expectations for sustained growth of an emerging middle class attracted
FDI in consumer-oriented industries, including food, IT, tourism, finance and retail.
The overall increase was driven by the Eastern and Southern African subregions, as others saw falling
investments. In Southern Africa flows almost doubled to $13 billion, mainly due to record-high flows to
South Africa and Mozambique. In both countries, infrastructure was the main attraction, with investments
in the gas sector in Mozambique also playing a role. In East Africa, FDI increased by 15 per cent to $6.2
billion as a result of rising flows to Ethiopia and Kenya. Kenya is becoming a favoured business hub, not
only for oil and gas exploration but also for manufacturing and transport; Ethiopian industrial strategy may
attract Asian capital to develop its manufacturing base. FDI flows to North Africa decreased by 7 per cent
to $15 billion. Central and West Africa saw inflows decline to $8 billion and $14 billion, respectively, in part
due to political and security uncertainties.
Intra-African investments are increasing, led by South African, Kenyan, and Nigerian TNCs. Between 2009
and 2013, the share of announced cross-border greenfield investment projects originating from within
Africa increased to 18 per cent, from less than 10 per cent in the preceding period. For many smaller, often
landlocked or non-oil-exporting countries in Africa, intraregional FDI is a significant source of foreign capital.
Increasing intra-African FDI is in line with leaders’ efforts towards deeper regional integration. However, for
most subregional groupings, intra-group FDI represent only a small share of intra-African flows. Only in two
regional economic cooperation (REC) initiatives does intra-group FDI make up a significant part of intra-
African investments – in EAC (about half) and SADC (more than 90 per cent) – largely due to investments
in neighbouring countries of the dominant outward investing economies in these RECs, South Africa and
Kenya. RECs have thus so far been less effective for the promotion of intraregional investment than a wider
African economic cooperation initiative could be.
Intra-African projects are concentrated in manufacturing and services. Only 3 per cent of the value of
announced intraregional greenfield projects is in the extractive industries, compared with 24 per cent for
extra-regional greenfield projects (during 2009-2013). Intraregional investment could contribute to the build-
up of regional value chains. However, so far, African global value chain (GVC) participation is still mostly
limited to downstream incorporation of raw materials in the exports of developed countries.
Developing Asia remains the number one investment destination
With total FDI inflows of $426 billion in 2013, developing Asia accounted for nearly 30 per cent of the global
total and remained the world's number one recipient region.
FDI inflows to East Asia rose by 2 per cent to $221 billion. The stable performance of the subregion was
driven by rising FDI inflows to China as well as to the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. With
inflows at $124 billion in 2013, China again ranked second in the world. In the meantime, FDI outflows from
China swelled by 15 per cent, to $101 billion, driven by a number of megadeals in developed countries.
The country’s outflows are expected to surpass its inflows within two to three years. Hong Kong (China)
saw its inflows rising slightly to $77 billion. The economy has been highly successful in attracting regional
headquarters of TNCs, the number of which reached nearly 1,400 in 2013.
Inflows to South-East Asia increased by 7 per cent to $125 billion, with Singapore – another regional
headquarters economy – attracting half. The 10 Member States of ASEAN and its 6 FTA partners (Australia,
China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand) have launched negotiations for the RCEP.

xx World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
In 2013, combined FDI inflows to the 16 negotiating members of RCEP amounted to $343 billion, 24 per
cent of world inflows. Over the last 15 years, proactive regional investment cooperation efforts in East
and South-East Asia have contributed to a rise in total and intraregional FDI in the region. FDI flows from
RCEP now makes up more than 40 per cent of inflows to ASEAN, compared to 17 per cent before 2000.
Intraregional FDI in infrastructure and manufacturing in particular is bringing development opportunities for
low-income countries, such as the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar.
Inflows to South Asia rose by 10 per cent to $36 billion in 2013. The largest recipient of FDI in the
subregion, India, experienced a 17 per cent increase in FDI inflows to $28 billion. Defying the overall trend,
investment in the retail sector did not increase, despite the opening up of multi-brand retail in 2012.
Corridors linking South Asia and East and South-East Asia are being established – the Bangladesh-China-
India-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This will help enhance
connectivity between Asian subregions and provide opportunities for regional economic cooperation. The
initiatives are likely to accelerate infrastructure investment and improve the overall business climate in South
Asia.
FDI flows to West Asia decreased in 2013 by 9 per cent to $44 billion, failing to recover for the fifth
consecutive year. Persistent regional tensions and political uncertainties are holding back investors, although
there are differences between countries. In Saudi Arabia and Qatar FDI flows continue to follow a downward
trend; in other countries FDI is slowly recovering, although flows remain well below earlier levels, except in
Kuwait and Iraq where they reached record levels in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
FDI outflows from West Asia jumped by 64 per cent in 2013, driven by rising flows from the GCC countries.
A quadrupling of outflows from Qatar and a near tripling of flows from Kuwait explained most of the increase.
Outward FDI could increase further given the high levels of GCC foreign exchange reserves.
Uneven growth of FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean
FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean reached $292 billion in 2013. Excluding offshore financial
centres, they increased by 5 per cent to $182 billion. Whereas in previous years FDI was driven largely by
South America, in 2013 flows to this subregion declined by 6 per cent to $133 billion, after three consecutive
years of strong growth. Among the main recipient countries, Brazil saw a slight decline by 2 per cent,
despite an 86 per cent increase in flows to the primary sector. FDI in Chile and Argentina declined by 29
per cent and 25 per cent to $20 billion and $9 billion, respectively, due to lower inflows in the mining sector.
Flows to Peru also decreased, by 17 per cent to $10 billion. In contrast, FDI flows to Colombia increased
by 8 per cent to $17 billion, largely due to cross-border MAs in the electricity and banking industries.
Flows to Central America and the Caribbean (excluding offshore financial centres) increased by 64 per
cent to $49 billion, largely due to the $18 billion acquisition of the remaining shares in Grupo Modelo by
Belgian brewer AB InBev − which more than doubled inflows to Mexico to $38 billion. Other increases were
registered in Panama (61 per cent), Costa Rica (14 per cent), Guatemala and Nicaragua (5 per cent each).
FDI outflows from Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding offshore financial centres) declined by 31
per cent to $33 billion, because of stalled acquisitions abroad and a surge in loan repayments to parent
companies by foreign affiliates of Brazilian and Chilean TNCs.
Looking ahead, new opportunities for foreign investors in the oil and gas industry, including shale gas in
Argentina and sectoral reform in Mexico, could signal positive FDI prospects. In manufacturing, automotive
TNCs are also pushing investment plans in Brazil and Mexico.
The growth potential of the automotive industry appears promising in both countries, with clear differences
between the two in government policies and TNC responses. This is reflected in their respective levels and
forms of GVC participation. In Mexico, automotive exports are higher, with greater downstream participation,

OVERVIEW xxi
and higher imported value added. Brazil’s producers, many of which are TNCs, serve primarily the local
market. Although its exports are lower, they contain a higher share of value added produced domestically,
including through local content and linkages.
FDI to transition economies at record levels, but prospects uncertain
FDI inflows to transition economies increased by 28 per cent to reach $108 billion in 2013. In South-East
Europe, flows increased from $2.6 billion in 2012 to $3.7 billion in 2013, driven by the privatization of
remaining State-owned enterprises in the services sector. In the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), the 28 per cent rise in flows was due to the significant growth of FDI to the Russian Federation.
Although developed countries were the main investors, developing-economy FDI has been on the rise.
Prospects for FDI to transition economies are likely to be affected by uncertainties related to regional
instability.
In 2013, outward FDI from the region jumped by 84 per cent, reaching a record $99 billion. As in past years,
Russian TNCs accounted for the bulk of FDI projects. The value of cross-border MA purchases by TNCs
from the region rose more than six-fold, and announced greenfield investments rose by 87 per cent to $19
billion.
Over the past decade, transition economies have been the fastest-growing host and home region for
FDI. EU countries have been the most important partners in this rapid FDI growth, both as investors and
recipients. The EU has the largest share of inward FDI stock in the region, with more than two thirds of the
total. In the CIS, most of their investment went to natural resources, consumer sectors, and other selected
industries as they were liberalized or privatized. In South-East Europe, EU investments have also been
driven by privatizations and by a combination of low production costs and the prospect of association with,
or membership of the EU. In the same way, the bulk of outward FDI stock from transition economies, mainly
from the Russian Federation, is in EU countries. Investors look for strategic assets in EU markets, including
downstream activities in the energy industry and value added production activities in manufacturing.
Inflows to developed countries resume growth
After a sharp fall in 2012, inflows to developed economies recovered in 2013 to $566 billion, a 9 per cent
increase. Inflows to the European Union were $246 billion (up 14 per cent), less than 30 per cent of their
2007 peak. Among the major economies, inflows to Germany – which had recorded an exceptionally
low volume in 2012 – rebounded sharply, but France and the United Kingdom saw a steep decline. In
many cases, large swings in intra-company loans were a significant contributing factor. Inflows to Italy and
Spain rebounded sharply with the latter becoming the largest European recipient in 2013. Inflows to North
America recovered to $250 billion, with the United States – the world’s largest recipient – recording a 17
per cent increase to $188 billion.
Outflows from developed countries were $857 billion in 2013 – virtually unchanged from a year earlier.
A recovery in Europe and the continued expansion of investment from Japan were weighed down by a
contraction of outflows from North America. Outflows from Europe increased by 10 per cent to $329 billion.
Switzerland became Europe’s largest direct investor. Against the European trend, France, Germany and the
United Kingdom registered a large decline in outward FDI. Outflows from North America shed another 10
per cent to $381 billion, partly because United States TNCs transferred funds from Europe, raised in local
bond markets, back to the United States. Outflows from Japan grew for the third successive year, rising to
$136 billion.
Both inflows and outflows remained at barely half the peak level seen in 2007. In terms of global share,
developed countries accounted for 39 per cent of total inflows and 61 per cent of total outflows – both
historically low levels.

xxii World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
Although the share of transatlantic FDI flows has declined in recent years, the EU and the United States are
important investment partners – much more so than implied by the size of their economies or by volumes
of bilateral trade. For the United States, 62 per cent of inward FDI stock is held by EU countries and 50 per
cent of outward stock is located in the EU. For the EU, the United States accounts for one third of FDI flows
into the region from non-EU countries.
FDI inflows to LDCs up, but LLDCs and SIDS down
FDI inflows to least developed countries (LDCs) rose to $28 billion, an increase of 14 per cent. While
inflows to some larger host LDCs fell or stagnated, rising inflows were recorded elsewhere. A nearly $3
billion reduction in divestment in Angola contributed most, followed by gains in Bangladesh, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, Myanmar, the Sudan and Yemen. The share of inflows to LDCs in global inflows remains
small at 2 per cent.
The number of announced greenfield investment projects in LDCs reached a record high, and in value
terms they reached the highest level in three years. The services sector, driven by large-scale energy
projects, contributed 70 per cent of the value of announced greenfield projects. External sources of finance
constitute a major part of the funding behind a growing number of infrastructure projects in LDCs. However,
a substantial portion of announced investments has so far not generated FDI inflows, which can be due to
structured finance solutions that do not translate into FDI, long gestation periods spreading outlays over
many years, or actual project delays or cancellations.
FDI flows to the landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) in 2013 fell by 11 per cent to $29.7 billion.
The Asian group of LLDCs experienced the largest fall in FDI flows of nearly 50 per cent, mainly due to a
decline in investment in Mongolia. Despite a mixed picture for African LLDCs, 8 of the 15 LLDC economies
increased their FDI inflows, with Zambia attracting most at $1.8 billion.
FDI remains a relatively more important factor in capital formation and growth for LLDCs than developing
countries as a whole. In developing economies the size of FDI flows relative to gross fixed capital formation
has averaged 11 per cent over the past decade but in the LLDCs it has averaged almost twice this, at 21
per cent.
FDI inflows to the small island developing States (SIDS) declined by 16 per cent to $5.7 billion in 2013,
putting an end to two years of recovery. Mineral extraction and downstream-related activities, business and
finance, and tourism are the main target industries for FDI in SIDS. Tourism is attracting increasing interest
by foreign investors, while manufacturing industries − such as apparel and processed fish − that used to be
a non-negligible target for FDI, have been negatively affected by erosion of trade preferences.
INVESTMENT POLICY TRENDS AND KEY ISSUES
New government efforts to prevent divestment and promote reshoring
UNCTAD monitoring shows that, in 2013, 59 countries and economies adopted 87 policy measures affecting
foreign investment. National investment policymaking remained geared towards investment promotion and
liberalization. At the same time, the overall share of regulatory or restrictive investment policies further
increased from 25 to 27 per cent (figure 5).
Investment liberalization measures included a number of privatizations in transition economies. The majority
of foreign-investment-specific liberalization measures reported were in Asia; most related to the telecom-
munications industry and the energy sector. Newly introduced FDI restrictions and regulations included

OVERVIEW xxiii
Figure 5. Changes in national investment policies,
2000−2013
(Per cent)
0
25
50
75
100
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Restriction/regulation
Liberalization/promotion
94
6
73
27
a number of non-approvals of foreign investment
projects.
A recent phenomenon is the effort by governments
to prevent divestments by foreign investors. Af-
fected by economic crises and persistently high
domestic unemployment, some countries have
introduced new approval requirements for reloca-
tions and lay-offs. In addition, some home coun-
tries have started to promote reshoring of overseas
investment by their TNCs.
More effective use of investment incentives requires improved monitoring
Incentives are widely used by governments as a policy instrument for attracting investment, despite
persistent criticism that they are economically inefficient and lead to misallocations of public funds. In 2013,
more than half of new liberalization, promotion or facilitation measures related to the provision of investment
incentives.
According to UNCTAD’s most recent survey of investment promotion agencies (IPAs), the main objective
of investment incentives is job creation, followed by technology transfer and export promotion, while the
most important target industry is IT and business services, followed by agriculture and tourism. Despite
their growing importance in national and global policy agendas, environmental protection and development
of disadvantaged regions do not rank high in current promotion strategies of IPAs.
Linking investment incentives schemes to the SDGs could make them a more effective policy tool to remedy
market failures and could offer a response to the criticism raised against the way investment incentives have
traditionally been used. Governments should also carefully assess their incentives strategies and strengthen
their monitoring and evaluation practices.
Some countries scale up IIA treaty negotiations, others disengage
With the addition of 44 new treaties, the global IIA regime reached close to 3,240 at the end of 2013
(figure 6). The year brought an increasing dichotomy in investment treaty making. An increasing number of
developing countries are disengaging from the regime in Africa, Asia and Latin America. At the same time,
there is an “up-scaling” trend in treaty making, which manifests itself in increasing dynamism (with more
countries participating in ever faster sequenced negotiating rounds) and in an increasing depth and breadth
of issues addressed. Today, IIA negotiators increasingly take novel approaches to existing IIA provisions
and add new issues to the negotiating agenda. The inclusion of sustainable development features and
provisions that bring a liberalization dimension to IIAs and/or strengthen certain investment protection
elements are examples in point.
“Megaregional agreements” – systemic implications expected
Negotiations of megaregional agreements have become increasingly prominent in the public debate,
attracting both criticism and support from different stakeholders. Key concerns relate to their potential
impact on contracting parties’ regulatory space and sustainable development. Megaregionals are broad
economic agreements among a group of countries that have a significant combined economic weight and

xxiv World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
Figure 6. Trends in IIAs signed, 1983–2013
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
0
50
100
150
200
250
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
CumulativenumberofIIAs
AnnualnumberofIIAs
Annual BITs Annual other IIAs All IIAs cumulative
Figure 7. Participation in key megaregionals and OECD membership
RCEP
Bulgaria,
Croatia,
Cyprus,
Latvia,
Lithuania,
Malta,
Romania
and the EU
Austria,
Belgium,
Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France,
Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy,
Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom
Israel,
Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland,
Turkey
Australia,
Japan,
New Zealand
Canada,
Mexico,
Chile
United
States
Peru
Cambodia,
China, India,
Indonesia,
Lao People’s
Democratic Republic,
Myanmar,
Philippines,
Thailand
Brunei,
Malaysia,
Singapore,
Viet Nam
TTIP
OECD
TPP
Republic of Korea

OVERVIEW xxv
in which investment is one of the key subject areas covered. Taking seven of these negotiations together,
they involve a total of 88 developed and developing countries. If concluded, they are likely to have important
implications for the current multi-layered international investment regime and global investment patterns.
Megaregional agreements could have systemic implications for the IIA regime: they could either contribute to
a consolidation of the existing treaty landscape or they could create further inconsistencies through overlap
with existing IIAs – including those at the plurilateral level (figure 7). For example, six major megaregional
agreements overlap with 140 existing IIAs but would create 200 new bilateral investment-treaty relationships.
Megaregional agreements could also marginalize non-participating third parties. Negotiators need to give
careful consideration to these systemic implications. Transparency in rule making, with broad stakeholder
engagement, can help in finding optimal solutions and ensure buy-in from those affected by a treaty.
Growing concerns about investment arbitration
The year 2013 saw the second largest number of known investment arbitrations filed in a single year (56),
bringing the total number of known cases to 568. Of the new claims, more than 40 per cent were brought
against member States of the European Union (EU), with all but one of them being intra-EU cases. Investors
continued to challenge a broad number of measures in various policy areas, particularly in the renewable
energy sector.
The past year also saw at least 37 arbitral decisions – 23 of which are in the public domain – and the second
highest known award so far ($935 million plus interest). With the potential inclusion of investment arbitration
in “megaregional agreements”, investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) is at the centre of public attention.
A call for reform of the IIA regime
While almost all countries are parties to one or several IIAs, many are dissatisfied with the current regime.
Concerns relate mostly to the development dimension of IIAs; the balance between the rights and obligations
of investors and States; and the systemic complexity of the IIA regime.
Countries’ current efforts to address these challenges reveal four different paths of action: (i) some aim to
maintain the status quo, largely refraining from changes in the way they enter into new IIA commitments; (ii)
some are disengaging from the IIA regime, unilaterally terminating existing treaties or denouncing multilateral
arbitration conventions; and (iii) some are implementing selective adjustments, modifying models for future
treaties but leaving the treaty core and the body of existing treaties largely untouched. Finally, (iv) there is
the path of systematic reform that aims to comprehensively address the IIA regime’s challenges in a holistic
manner.
While each of these paths has benefits and drawbacks, systemic reform could effectively address the
complexities of the IIA regime and bring it in line with the sustainable development imperative. Such a
reform process could follow a gradual approach with carefully sequenced actions: (i) defining the areas for
reform (identifying key and emerging issues and lessons learned, and building consensus on what could
and should be changed, and on what should and could not be changed), (ii) designing a roadmap for
reform (identifying different options for reform, assessing pros and cons, and agreeing on the sequencing
of actions), and (iii) implementing it at the national, bilateral and regional levels. A multilateral focal point
like UNCTAD could support such a holistic, coordinated and sustainability-oriented approach to IIA reform
through its policy analysis, technical assistance and consensus building. The World Investment Forum
could provide the platform, and the Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD) the
guidance.

xxvi World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
Investing in the sdgs: an action plan
for promoting private sector contributions
The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals need a step-change in
investment
Faced with common global economic, social and environmental challenges, the international community
is defining a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs, which are being formulated by the
United Nations together with the widest possible range of stakeholders, are intended to galvanize action
worldwide through concrete targets for the 2015–2030 period for poverty reduction, food security, human
health and education, climate change mitigation, and a range of other objectives across the economic,
social and environmental pillars.
Private sector contributions can take two main forms; good governance in business practices and investment
in sustainable development. This includes the private sector’s commitment to sustainable development;
transparency and accountability in honouring sustainable development practices; responsibility to avoid
harm, even if it is not prohibited; and partnership with government on maximizing co-benefits of investment.
The SDGs will have very significant resource implications across the developed and developing world.
Estimates for total investment needs in developing countries alone range from $3.3 trillion to $4.5 trillion
per year, for basic infrastructure (roads, rail and ports; power stations; water and sanitation), food security
(agriculture and rural development), climate change mitigation and adaptation, health and education.
Reaching the SDGs will require a step-change in both public and private investment. Public sector funding
capabilities alone may be insufficient to meet demands across all SDG-related sectors. However, today,
the participation of the private sector in investment in these sectors is relatively low. Only a fraction of
the worldwide invested assets of banks, pension funds, insurers, foundations and endowments, as well
as transnational corporations, is in SDG sectors, and even less in developing countries, particularly the
poorest ones (LDCs).
At current levels of investment in SDG-relevant sectors, developing countries face
an annual gap of $2.5 trillion
At today’s level of investment – public and private – in SDG-related sectors in developing countries, an
annual funding shortfall of some $2.5 trillion remains (figure 8). Bridging such a gap is a daunting task, but
it is achievable. Part of the gap could be covered by the private sector (in a “business as usual scenario”) if
the current growth rate of private investment continues. For developing countries as a group, including fast-
growing emerging economies, the current growth of private investment could be sufficient, approximately,
to cover the part of total SDG-related investment needs corresponding to the private sector’s current
participation in SDG investments. However, at the aggregate level that would still leave a gap of about $1.6
trillion per year, and the relative size of this gap would be far more important in least developing countries
and vulnerable economies. Increasing the participation of the private sector in SDG financing in developing
countries could potentially cover a larger part of the gap.
At a disaggregated level, the relative size of investment gaps will vary by SDG sector – private sector
participation in some sectors is low and likely to remain so – and for different groups of developing countries.
The starting levels and growth rates of private investment in SDG sectors in less developed countries are
such that the private sector will not even cover the part of investment needs to 2030 that corresponds to
its current level of participation.

OVERVIEW xxvii
Potential private sector contribution to bridging the gap
At current level of participation
At a higher rate of participation
3.9
1.4
2.5
Total annual
investment needs
Current annual
investment
Annual
investment
gap
1.8
0.9
Figure 8. Estimated annual investment needs and potential private sector contribution
(Trillions of dollars)
Structurally weak economies need special attention, LDCs require a doubling of
the growth rate of private investment
Investment and private sector engagement across SDG sectors are highly variable across developing
countries. Emerging markets face entirely different conditions to vulnerable economies such as LDCs,
LLDCs and SIDS. In LDCs, official development assistance (ODA) – currently their largest external source
of finance and often used for direct budget support and public spending – will remain of fundamental
importance.
At the current rate of private sector participation in investment in SDG sectors, and at current growth
rates, a “business as usual” scenario in LDCs will leave a shortfall that would imply a nine-fold increase
in public sector funding requirements to 2030. This scenario, with the limited funding capabilities of LDC
governments and the fact that much of ODA in LDCs is already used to support current (not investment)
spending by LDC governments, is not a viable option. Without higher levels of private sector investment,
the financing requirements associated with the prospective SDGs in LDCs may be unrealistic.
A target for the promotion of private sector investment in SDGs in LDCs could be to double the current
growth rate of such investment. The resulting contribution would give private investment a meaningful
complementary financing role next to public investment and ODA. Public investment and ODA would
continue to be fundamental, as covering the remaining funding requirements would still imply trebling their
current levels to 2030.
The potential for increased private sector investment contributions is significant,
especially in infrastructure, food security and climate change mitigation
The potential for increasing private sector participation is greater in some sectors than in others (figure 9).
Infrastructure sectors, such as power and renewable energy (under climate change mitigation), transport
and water and sanitation, are natural candidates for greater private sector participation, under the right
conditions and with appropriate safeguards. Other SDG sectors are less likely to generate significantly
higher amounts of private sector interest, either because it is difficult to design risk-return models attractive
to private investors (e.g. climate change adaptation), or because they are at the core of public service
responsibilities and highly sensitive to private sector involvement (e.g. education and health care). Therefore,
public investment remains fundamental and pivotal. However, because it is unrealistic to expect the public
sector to meet all funding demands in many developing countries, the SDGs have to be accompanied by
strategic initiatives to increase private sector participation.

xxviii World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
Figure 9. Potential private sector contribution to investment gaps at current and high participation levels
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Power
Climate change mitigation
Food Security
Telecommunications
Transport
Ecosystems/biodiversity
Health
Water and sanitation
Climate change
adaptation
Education
Current participation, mid-point
High participation, mid-point
Current participation, range
High participation, range
Increasing the involvement of private investors in SDG-related sectors, many of
which are sensitive or of a public service nature, leads to policy dilemmas
A first dilemma relates to the risks involved in increased private sector participation in sensitive sectors.
Private sector service provision in health care and education in developing countries, for instance, can have
negative effects on standards unless strong governance and oversight is in place, which in turn requires
capable institutions and technical competencies. Private sector involvement in essential infrastructure
industries, such as power or telecommunications can be sensitive in developing countries where this
implies the transfer of public sector assets to the private sector. Private sector operations in infrastructure
such as water and sanitation are particularly sensitive because of the basic-needs nature of these sectors.
A second dilemma stems from the need to maintain quality services affordable and accessible to all. The
fundamental hurdle for increased private sector contributions to investment in SDG sectors is the inadequate
risk-return profile of many such investments. Many mechanisms exist to share risks or otherwise improve
the risk-return profile for private sector investors. Increasing returns, however, must not lead to the services
provided by private investors ultimately becoming inaccessible or unaffordable for the poorest in society.
Allowing energy or water suppliers to cover only economically attractive urban areas while ignoring rural
needs, or to raise prices of essential services, is not a sustainable outcome.
A third dilemma results from the respective roles of public and private investment. Despite the fact that
public sector funding shortfalls in SDG sectors make it desirable that private sector investment increase to
achieve the prospective SDGs, public sector investment remains fundamental and pivotal. Governments –
through policy and rule making – need to be ultimately accountable with respect to provision of vital public
services and overall sustainable development strategy.
A fourth dilemma is the apparent conflict between the particularly acute funding needs in structurally weak
economies, especially LDCs, necessitating a significant increase in private sector investment, and the fact
that especially these countries face the greatest difficulty in attracting such investment. Without targeted
policy intervention and support measures there is a real risk that investors will continue to see operating
conditions and risks in LDCs as prohibitive.

OVERVIEW xxix
UNCTAD proposes a Strategic Framework for Private Investment in the SDGs
A Strategic Framework for Private Investment in the SDGs (figure 10) addresses key policy challenges and
solutions, related to:
• Providing Leadership to define guiding principles and targets, to ensure policy coherence, and to
galvanize action.
• Mobilizing funds for sustainable development – raising resources in financial markets or through financial
intermediaries that can be invested in sustainable development.
• Channelling funds to sustainable development projects – ensuring that available funds make their way to
concrete sustainable-development-oriented investment projects on the ground in developing countries,
and especially LDCs.
• Maximizing impact and mitigating drawbacks – creating an enabling environment and putting in place
appropriate safeguards that need to accompany increased private sector engagement in often sensitive
sectors.
A set of guiding principles can help overcome policy dilemmas associated with
increased private sector engagement in SDG sectors
The many stakeholders involved in stimulating private investment in SDGs will have varying perspectives on
how to resolve the policy dilemmas inherent in seeking greater private sector participation in SDG sectors.
A common set of principles for investment in SDGs can help establish a collective sense of direction and
purpose. The following broad principles could provide a framework.
• Balancing liberalization and the right to regulate. Greater private sector involvement in SDG sectors may
be necessary where public sector resources are insufficient (although selective, gradual or sequenced
approaches are possible); at the same time, such increased involvement must be accompanied by
appropriate regulations and government oversight.
• Balancing the need for attractive risk-return rates with the need for accessible and affordable services.
This requires governments to proactively address market failures in both respects. It means placing
clear obligations on investors and extracting firm commitments, while providing incentives to improve
the risk-return profile of investment. And it implies making incentives or subsidies conditional on social
inclusiveness.
• Balancing a push for private investment with the push for public investment. Public and private investment
are complementary, not substitutes. Synergies and mutually supporting roles between public and private
funds can be found both at the level of financial resources – e.g. raising private sector funds with public
sector funds as seed capital – and at the policy level, where governments can seek to engage private
investors to support economic or public service reform programmes. Nevertheless, it is important for
policymakers not to translate a push for private investment into a policy bias against public investment.
• Balancing the global scope of the SDGs with the need to make a special effort in LDCs. While overall
financing for development needs may be defined globally, with respect to private sector financing
contributions special efforts will need to be made for LDCs, because without targeted policy intervention
these countries will not be able to attract the required resources from private investors. Dedicated private
sector investment targets for the poorest countries, leveraging ODA for additional private funds, and
targeted technical assistance and capacity building to help attract private investment in LDCs are desirable.

xxx World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
Figure 10. Strategic Framework for Private Investment in the SDGs
MOBILIZATION
Raising finance and
reorienting financial markets
towards investment in SDGs
IMPACT
Maximizing sustainable
development benefits,
minimizing risks
LEADERSHIP
Setting guiding principles,
galvanizing action, ensuring
policy coherence
CHANNELLING
Promoting and facilitating
investment into SDG sectors
Increasing private investment in SDGs will require leadership at the global level,
as well as from national policymakers
Leadership is needed not only to provide guiding principles to deal with policy dilemmas, but also to:
Set investment targets. The rationale behind the SDGs, and the experience with the Millennium Development
Goals, is that targets help provide direction and purpose. Ambitious investment targets are implied by
the prospective SDGs. The international community would do well to make targets explicit, and spell out
the consequences for investment policies and investment promotion at national and international levels.
Achievable but ambitious targets, including for increasing public and private sector investment in LDCs, are
desirable.
Ensure policy coherence and creating synergies. Interaction between policies is important – between
national and international investment policies, between investment and other sustainable-development-
related policies (e.g. tax, trade, competition, technology, and environmental, social and labour market
policies), and between micro- and macroeconomic policies. Leadership is required to ensure that the global
push for sustainable development and investment in SDGs has a voice in international macroeconomic
policy coordination forums and global financial system reform processes, where decisions will have an
fundamental bearing on the prospects for growth in SDG financing.
Establish a global multi-stakeholder platform on investing in the SDGs. A global multi-stakeholder body
on investing in the SDGs could provide a platform for discussion on overall investment goals and targets,
fostering promising initiatives to mobilize finance and spreading good practices, supporting actions on the
ground, and ensuring a common approach to impact measurement.
Create a multi-agency technical assistance facility for investment in the SDGs. Many initiatives aimed at
increasing private sector investment in SDG sectors are complex, requiring significant technical capabilities
and strong institutions. A multi-agency institutional arrangement could help to support LDCs, advising
on, for example, the set-up of SDG project development agencies that can plan, package and promote
pipelines of bankable projects; design of SDG-oriented incentive schemes; and regulatory frameworks.
Coordinated efforts to enhance synergies are imperative.

OVERVIEW xxxi
A range of policy options is available to respond to challenges and constraints
in mobilizing funds, channelling them into SDG sectors, and ensuring sustainable
impact
Challenges to mobilizing funds in financial markets include market failures and a lack of transparency on
environmental, social and governance performance, misaligned incentives for market participants, and
start-up and scaling problems for innovative financing solutions. Policy responses to build a more SDG-
conducive financial system might include:
• Creating fertile soil for innovative SDG-financing approaches. Innovative financial instruments and funding
mechanisms to raise resources for investment in SDGs deserve support to achieve scale. Promising
initiatives include SDG-dedicated financial instruments and Impact Investment, funding mechanisms that
use public sector resources to catalyse mobilization of private sector resources, and new “go-to-market”
channels for SDG investment projects.
• Building or improving pricing mechanisms for externalities. Effective pricing mechanisms for social and
environmental externalities – either by attaching a cost to such externalities (e.g. through carbon taxes)
or through market-based schemes – are ultimately fundamental to put financial markets and investors
on a sustainable footing.
• Promoting Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSEs). SSEs provide listed entities with the incentives and
tools to improve transparency on ESG performance, and allow investors to make informed decisions on
responsible allocation of capital.
• Introducing financial market reforms. Realigning rewards in financial markets to favour investment in
SDGs will require action, including reform of pay and performance structures, and innovative rating
methodologies that reward long-term investment in SDG sectors.
Key constraints to channelling funds into SDG sectors include entry barriers, inadequate risk-return ratios
for SDG investments, a lack of information and effective packaging and promotion of projects, and a lack
of investor expertise. Effective policy responses may include the following.
• Reducing entry barriers, with safeguards. A basic prerequisite for successful promotion of SDG
investment is a sound overall policy climate, conducive to attracting investment while protecting public
interests, especially in sensitive sectors.
• Expanding the use of risk-sharing tools for SDG investments. A number of tools, including public-private
partnerships, investment insurance, blended financing and advance market commitments, can help
improve the risk-return profile of SDG investment projects.
• Establishing new incentives schemes and a new generation of investment promotion institutions. SDG
investment development agencies could target SDG sectors and develop and market pipelines of
bankable projects. Investment incentives could be reoriented, to target investments in SDG sectors and
made conditional on social and environmental performance. Regional initiatives can help spur private
investment in cross-border infrastructure projects and regional clusters of firms in SDG sectors.
• Building SDG investment partnerships. Partnerships between home countries of investors, host countries,
TNCs and multilateral development banks can help overcome knowledge gaps as well as generate joint
investments in SDG sectors.
Key challenges in maximizing the positive impact and minimizing the risks and drawbacks of private
investment in SDG sectors include the weak absorptive capacity in some developing countries, social and
environmental impact risks, and the need for stakeholder engagement and effective impact monitoring.
Policy responses can include:

xxxii World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
• Increasing absorptive capacity. A range of policy tools are available to increase absorptive capacity,
including the promotion and facilitation of entrepreneurship, support to technology development, human
resource and skills development, business development services and promotion of business linkages.
Development of linkages and clusters in incubators or economic zones specifically aimed at stimulating
businesses in SDG sectors may be particularly effective.
• Establishing effective regulatory frameworks and standards. Increased private sector engagement
in often sensitive SDG sectors needs to be accompanied by effective regulation. Particular areas of
attention include human health and safety, environmental and social protection, quality and inclusiveness
of public services, taxation, and national and international policy coherence.
• Good governance, strong institutions, stakeholder engagement. Good governance and capable
institutions are a key enabler for the attraction of private investment in general, and in SDG sectors in
particular. They are also needed for effective stakeholder engagement and management of impact trade-
offs.
• Implementing SDG impact assessment systems. Monitoring of the impact of investment, especially along
social and environmental dimensions, is key to effective policy implementation. A set of core quantifiable
impact indicators can help. Impact measurement and reporting by private investors on their social and
environmental performance promotes corporate responsibility on the ground and supports mobilization
and channelling of investment.
Figure 11 summarizes schematically the key challenges and policy responses for each element of the
Strategic Framework. Detailed policy responses are included in UNCTAD’s Action Plan for Private Investment
in the SDGs.
Figure 11. Key challenges and possible policy responses
IMPACT
minimizing risks
CHANNELLING
LEADERSHIP
policy coherence
MOBILIZATION
Raising finance and re-orienting
financial markets towards
investment in SDGs
Key challenges Policy responses
• Need for a clear sense of direction and common
policy design criteria
• Need for clear objectives to galvanize global action
• Need to manage investment policy interactions
• Need for global consensus and an inclusive
process
• Agree a set of guiding principles for SDG investment
policymaking
• Set SDG investment targets
• Ensure policy coherence and synergies
• Multi-stakeholder platform and multi-agency technical
assistance facility
• Build an investment policy climate conducive to investing in
SDGs, while safeguarding public interests
• Expand use of risk sharing mechanisms for SDG
investments
• Establish new incentives schemes and a new generation of
investment promotion institutions
• Build SDG investment partnerships
• Build productive capacity, entrepreneurship, technology,
skills, linkages
• Establish effective regulatory frameworks and standards
• Good governance, capable institutions, stakeholder
engagements
• Implement a common set of SDG investment impact
indicators and push Integrated Corporate Reporting
• Create fertile soil for innovative SDG-financing approaches
and corporate initiatives
• Build or improve pricing mechanisms for externalities
• Promote Sustainable Stock Exchanges
• Introduce financial market reforms
• Start-up and scaling issues for new financing
solutions
• Failures in global capital markets
• Lack of transparency on sustainable corporate
performance
• Misaligned investor rewards/pay structures
• Entry barriers
• Lack of information and effective packaging and
promotion of SDG investment projects
• Inadequate risk-return ratios for SDG investments
• Lack of investor expertise in SDG sectors
• Weak absorptive capacity in developing countries
• Need to minimize risks associated with private
investment in SDG sectors
• Need to engage stakeholders and manage impact
trade-offs
• Inadequate investment impact measurement and
reporting tools

OVERVIEW xxxiii
A Big Push for private investment in sustainable development
UNCTAD’s Action Plan for Private Investment in the SDGs contains a range of policy options to respond
to the mobilization, channelling and impact challenges. However, a concerted push by the international
community and by policymakers at national levels needs to focus on a few priority actions – or packages.
Figure 12 proposes six packages that group actions related to specific segments of the “SDG investment
chain” and that address relatively homogenous groups of stakeholders for action. Such a focused set of
action packages can help shape a Big Push for private investment in sustainable development:
1. A new generation of investment promotion strategies and institutions. Sustainable development projects,
whether in infrastructure, social housing or renewable energy, require intensified efforts for investment
promotion and facilitation. Such projects should become a priority of the work of IPAs and business
development organizations.
The most frequent constraint faced by potential investors in sustainable development projects is the
lack of concrete proposals of sizeable, impactful, and bankable projects. Promotion and facilitation of
investment in sustainable development should include the marketing of pre-packaged and structured
projects with priority consideration and sponsorship at the highest political level. This requires specialist
expertise and dedicated units, e.g. government-sponsored “brokers” of sustainable development
investment projects. Putting in place such specialist expertise (ranging from project and structured
finance expertise to engineering and project design skills) can be supported by technical assistance from
a consortium of international organizations and multilateral development banks. Units could also be set
up at the regional level to share costs and achieve economies of scale.
Promotion of investment in SDG sectors should be supported by an international investment policy
regime that effectively pursues the same objectives. Currently, IIAs focus on the protection of investment.
Mainstreaming sustainable development in IIAs requires, among others, proactive promotion of
investment, with commitments in areas such as technical assistance. Other measures include linking
investment promotion institutions, facilitating SDG investments through investment insurance and
guarantees, and regular impact monitoring.
2. SDG-oriented investment incentives. Investment incentive schemes can be restructured specifically to
facilitate sustainable development projects. A transformation is needed from purely “location-based”
incentives, aiming to increase the competitiveness of a location and provided at the time of establishment,
towards “SDG-based” incentives, aiming to promote investment in SDG sectors and conditional upon
sustainable performance.
3. Regional SDG Investment Compacts. Regional and South-South cooperation can foster SDG investment.
Orienting regional cooperation towards the promotion of SDG investment can be especially effective for
cross-border infrastructure development and regional clusters of firms operating in SDG sectors (e.g.
green zones). This could include joint investment promotion mechanisms, joint programmes to build
absorptive capacity, and joint public-private partnership models.
4. New forms of partnership for SDG investments. Cooperation between outward investment agencies
in home countries and IPAs in host countries could be institutionalized for the purpose of marketing
SDG investment opportunities in home countries, provision of investment incentives and facilitation
services for SDG projects, and joint monitoring and impact assessment. Outward investment agencies
could evolve into genuine business development agencies for investments in SDG sectors in developing
countries, raising awareness of investment opportunities, helping investors to bridge knowledge gaps,
and practically facilitate the investment process. Concrete tools that might support SDG investment
business development services might include online pipelines of bankable projects and opportunities
for linkages programmes in developing countries. A multi-agency technical assistance consortium could

xxxiv World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
Balancing
liberalization and
regulation
Balancing the need
for attractive risk-
return rates with the
need for accessible
and affordable
services for all
Balancing a push
for private funds
with the push
for public
investment
Balancing the global
scope of the SDGs with
the need to make a
special effort in LDCs
Action Packages
2
Reorientation of investment
incentives
5
1
New generation of investment
promotion strategies and
institutions
Pro-active SDG investment
promotion and facilitation
 At national level:
– New investment promotion
strategies focusing on SDG
sectors
institutions: SDG investment
development agencies
developing and marketing
pipelines of bankable projects
 New generation of IIAs:
–
– Safeguarding policy space for
sustainable development
6
Guiding Principles
 SDG-oriented investment
incentives
– Targeting SDG sectors
– Conditional on sustainability
contributions
 SDG investment guarantees
and insurance schemes
3
 Regional/South-South economic
cooperation focusing on:
– Regional cross-border SDG
infrastructure development
– Regional SDG industrial
clusters, including development
of regional value chains
– Regional industrial collaboration
agreements
Regional SDG Investment
Compacts
Enabling innovative financing
and a reorientation of
financial markets
 New SDG financing vehicles
 SDG investment impact
indicators
 Investors’ SDG contribution
rating
 Integrated reporting and multi-
stakeholder monitoring
 Sustainable Stock
Exchanges (SSEs)
Changing the global
business mindset
 Global Impact MBAs
 Training programmes for SDG
investment (e.g. fund
management/financial market
certifications)
 Enrepreneurship programmes
in schools
4
 Partnerships between outward
investment agencies in home
countries and IPAs in host
countries
 Online pools of bankable SDG
projects
 SDG-oriented linkages
programmes
 Multi-agency technical
assistance consortia
 SVE-TNC-MDG partnerships
New forms of partnerships
for SDG investment
Figure 12. A Big Push for private investment in the SDGs: action packages

OVERVIEW xxxv
help to support LDCs. South-South partnerships could also help spread good practices and lessons
learned.
5. Enabling innovative financing mechanisms and a reorientation of financial markets. New and existing
financing mechanisms, such as green bonds or impact investing, deserve support and an enabling
environment to allow them to be scaled up and marketed to the most promising sources of capital.
Publicly sponsored seed funding mechanisms and facilitated access to financial markets for SDG projects
are further mechanisms that merit attention. Furthermore, reorientation of financial markets towards
sustainable development needs integrated reporting on the economic, social and environmental impact
of private investors. This is a fundamental step towards responsible investment behavior in financial
markets and a prerequisite for initiatives aimed at mobilizing funds for investment in SDGs; integrated
reporting is at the heart of Sustainable Stock Exchanges.
6. Changing the global business mindset and developing SDG investment expertise. The majority of
managers in the world’s financial institutions and large multinational enterprises – the main sources
of global investment – as well as most successful entrepreneurs tend to be strongly influenced by
models of business, management and investment that are commonly taught in business schools. Such
models tend to focus on business and investment opportunities in mature or emerging markets, with
the risk-return profiles associated with those markets, while they tend to ignore opportunities outside
the parameters of these models. Conventional models also tend to be driven exclusively by calculations
of economic risks and returns, often ignoring broader social and environmental impacts, both positive
and negative. Moreover, a lack of consideration in standard business school teachings of the challenges
associated with operating in poor countries, and the resulting need for innovative problem solving,
tend to leave managers ill-prepared for pro-poor investments. A curriculum for business schools that
generates awareness of investment opportunities in poor countries and that instills in students the
problem solving skills needed in developing-country operating environments can have an important long-
term impact. Inserting relevant modules in existing training and certification programmes for financial
market participants can also help.
The Action Plan for Private Investment in the SDGs is meant to serve as a point of reference for policymakers
at national and international levels in their discussions on ways and means to implement the SDGs and
the formulation of operational strategies for investing in the SDGs. It has been designed as a “living
document” and incorporates an online version that aims to establish an interactive, open dialogue, inviting
the international community to exchange views, suggestions and experiences. It thus constitutes a basis
for further stakeholder engagement. UNCTAD aims to provide the platform for such engagement through
its biennial World Investment Forum, and online through the Investment Policy Hub.
Mukhisa Kituyi
Secretary-General of the UNCTAD

xxxvi World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan

CHAPTER I
GLOBAL
INVESTMENT
TRENDS

World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan2
Global FDI flows rose by 9 per cent in 2013 to
$1.45 trillion, up from $1.33 trillion in 2012, despite
some volatility in international investments caused
by the shift in market expectations towards an
earlier tapering of quantitative easing in the United
States. FDI inflows increased in all major economic
groupings − developed, developing, and transition
economies. Although the share of developed
economies in total global FDI flows remained low,
it is expected to rise over the next three years
to 52 per cent (see section B) (figure I.1). Global
inward FDI stock rose by 9 per cent, reaching $25.5
trillion, reflecting the rise of FDI inflows and strong
performance of the stock markets in many parts of
the world. UNCTAD’s FDI analysis is largely based
on data that exclude FDI in special purpose entities
(SPEs) and offshore financial centres (box I.1).
1. FDI by geography
a. FDI inflows
The 9 per cent increase in global FDI inflows
in 2013 reflected a moderate pickup in global
economic growth and some large cross-border
MA transactions. The increase was widespread,
covering all three major groups of economies,
though the reasons for the increase differed across
the globe. FDI flows to developed countries rose
by 9 per cent, reaching $566 billion, mainly through
greater retained earnings in foreign affiliates in the
European Union (EU), resulting in an increase in
FDI to the EU. FDI flows to developing economies
reached a new high of $778 billion, accounting for
54 per cent of global inflows. Inflows to transition
economies rose to $108 billion – up 28 per cent
from the previous year – accounting for 7 per cent
of global FDI inflows.
Developing Asia remains the world’s largest
recipient region of FDI flows (figure I.2). All
subregions saw their FDI flows rise except West
Asia, which registered its fifth consecutive decline in
FDI. The absence of large deals and the worsening
of instability in many parts of the region have caused
uncertainty and negatively affected investment.
FDI inflows to the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) reached a new high of $125 billion
– 7 per cent higher than 2012. The high level of
flows to East Asia was driven by rising inflows to
China, which remained the recipient of the second
largest flows in the world (figure I.3).
After remaining almost stable in 2012, at historically
high levels, FDI flows to Latin America and the
Caribbean registered a 14 per cent increase to
$292 billion in 2013. Excluding offshore financial
centres, they increased by 6 per cent to $182 billion.
In contrast to the preceding three
years, when South America was the
main driver of FDI flows to the region,
2013 brought soaring flows to Central
America. The acquisition in Mexico of
Grupo Modelo by the Belgian brewer
Anheuser Busch explains most of the
FDI increase in Mexico as well as in the
subregion. The decline of inflows to South
America resulted mainly from the almost
30 per cent slump noted in Chile, the
second largest recipient of FDI in South
America in 2012. The decrease was
due to equity divestment in the mining
sector and lower reinvested earnings
by foreign mining companies as a
result of the decrease in commodity
prices.
A. current TRENDS
Figure I.1. FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1995–2013
and projections, 2014–2016
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
52%
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
World total
Developing
economies
Transition
economies
Developed
economies
Projection

CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 3
FDI inflows to Africa rose by 4 per cent to $57
billion. Southern African countries, especially
South Africa, experienced high inflows. Persistent
political and social tensions continued to subdue
flows to North Africa, whereas Sudan and Morocco
registered solid growth of FDI. Nigeria’s lower levels
of FDI reflected the retreat of foreign transnational
corporations (TNCs) from the oil industry.
In developed countries, inflows to Europe were
up by 3 per cent compared with 2012. In the EU,
Germany, Spain and Italy saw a substantial recovery
in their FDI inflows in 2013. In Spain, lower labour
costs attracted the interests of manufacturing
TNCs. The largest declines in inflows were observed
in France, Hungary, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom.
FDI flows to North America grew by 23 per cent
as acquisitions by Asian investors helped sustain
inflows to the region. The largest deals included
the takeover of the Canadian upstream oil and
gas company, Nexen, by CNOOC (China) for $19
billion; the acquisition of Sprint Nextel, the third
Box I.1. UNCTAD FDI data: treatment of transit FDI
TNCs frequently make use of special purpose entities (SPEs) to channel their investments, resulting in large amounts
of capital in transit. For example, an investment by a TNC from country A to create a foreign affiliate in country B
might be channeled through an SPE in country C. In the capital account of the balance of payments of investor home
and host countries, transactions or positions with SPEs are included in either assets or liabilities of direct investors
(parent firms) or direct investment enterprises (foreign affiliates) – indistinguishable from other FDI transactions or
positions. Such amounts are considerable and can lead to misinterpretations of FDI data. In particular:
(i) SPE-related investment flows might lead to double counting in global FDI flows (in the example above, the
same value of FDI is counted twice, from A to C, and from C to B); and
(ii) SPE-related flows might lead to misinterpretation of the origin of investment, where ultimate ownership is not
taken into account (in the example, country B might consider that its inflows originate from country C, rather
than from Country A).
In consultation with a number of countries that offer investors the option to create SPEs, and on the basis of
information on SPE-related FDI obtained directly from those countries, UNCTAD removes SPE data from FDI flows
and stocks, in order to minimize double counting. These countries include Austria, Hungary, Luxembourg, Mauritius
and the Netherlands (box table I.1.1).
Similar issues arise in relation to offshore financial centres such as the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands.
UNCTAD’s FDI data include those economies because no official statistics are available to use in disentangling
transit investment from other flows, as in the case of SPEs. However, for the most part UNCTAD excludes flows to
and from these economies in interpreting data on investment trends for their respective regions. Offshore financial
centres accounted for 8 per cent of global FDI inflows in 2013, with growth rates similar to global FDI; the impact on
the analysis of global trends is therefore likely to be limited.
Source: UNCTAD.
Box table I.1.1. FDI with and without SPEs reported by UNCTAD, 2013
Austria Hungary Luxembourg Mauritius Netherlands
FDI With SPE
Without SPE
(UNCTAD use)
With SPE
Without SPE
(UNCTAD use)
With SPE
Without SPE
(UNCTAD use)
With SPE
Without SPE
(UNCTAD use)
With SPE
Without SPE
(UNCTAD use)
FDI inflows 11.4 11.1 2.4 3.1 367.3 30.1 27.3 0.3 41.3 24.4
FDI ouflows 13.9 13.9 2.4 2.3 363.6 21.6 25.1 0.1 106.8 37.4
Inward FDI stock 286.3 183.6 255.0 111.0 3 204.8 141.4 312.6 3.5 3 861.8 670.1
Outward FDI stock 346.4 238.0 193.9 39.6 3 820.5 181.6 292.8 1.6 4 790.0 1 071.8
Source: UNCTAD, based on data from respective central banks.
Note: Stock data for Mauritius refer to 2012.

level (table I.1). APEC now accounts for more
than half of global FDI flows, similar to the
G-20, while the BRICS jumped to more than
one fifth. In ASEAN and the Common Market
of the South (MERCOSUR), the level of FDI
inflows doubled from the pre-crisis level. Many
regional and interregional groups in which
developed economies are members (e.g.
G-20, NAFTA) are all experiencing a slower
recovery.
Mixed trends for the megaregional
integration initiatives: TPP and RCEP
shares in global flows grew while TTIP
shares halved. The three megaregional
integration initiatives – the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) – show diverging FDI trends (see
chapter II for details). The United States
Figure I.2. FDI inflows, by region, 2008–2013
Developing Asia Europe Latin America and the Caribbean
North America Transition economies Africa
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Figure I.3. FDI inflows: top 20 host economies, 2012 and 2013
Note: British Virgin Islands is not included in the ranking because
of its nature as an offshore financial centre (most FDI is in
transit).
Italy
Colombia
Indonesia
Chile
Netherlands
Germany
India
Luxembourg
Ireland
United Kingdom
Mexico
Spain
Australia
Canada
Singapore
Brazil
Hong Kong, China
Russian Federation
China
United States
Developing and
Developed
economies
2013
2012
2013
2012
0
16
19
29
10
13
24
10
38
46
18
26
56
43
61
65
75
51
121
161
17
17
18
20
24
27
28
30
36
37
38
39
50
62
64
64
77
79
124
188
largest wireless network operator in the United
States, by Japanese telecommunications
group Softbank for $21.6 billion, the largest
deal ever by a Japanese company; and the
$4.8 billion acquisition of the pork producer
Smithfield by Shuanghui, the largest Chinese
takeover of a United States company to date.
FDI flows to the United States rose by 17 per
cent, reflecting signs of economic recovery in
the United States over the past year.
Transition economies experienced a 28 per
cent rise in FDI inflows, reaching $108 billion
– much of it driven by a single country. The
Russian Federation saw FDI inflows jump by
57 per cent to $79 billion, making it the world’s
third largest recipient of FDI for the first time
(figure I.3). The rise was predominantly ascribed
to the increase in intracompany loans and the
acquisition by BP (United Kingdom) of 18.5
per cent of Rosneft (Russia Federation) as part
of Rosneft’s $57 billion acquisition of TNK-BP
(see box II.4).
In 2013, APEC absorbed half of global
flows – on par with the G-20; the BRICS
received more than one fifth. Among major
regional and interregional groupings, two –
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
countries and the BRICS (Brazil, Russian
Federation, India, China and South Africa)
countries – saw a dramatic increase in their
share of global FDI inflows from the pre-crisis

and the EU, which are negotiating the formation
of TTIP, saw their combined share of global FDI
inflows cut nearly in half over the past seven years,
from 56 per cent during the pre-crisis period to 30
per cent in 2013. The share of the 12 countries
participating in the TPP negotiations was 32 per
cent in 2013, markedly smaller than their share in
world GDP of 40 per cent. RCEP, which is being
negotiated between the 10 ASEAN member
States and their 6 FTA partners, accounted for 24
per cent of global FDI flows in recent years, nearly
twice as much as before the crisis.
b. FDI outflows
Global FDI outflows rose by 5 per cent to $1.41
trillion, up from $1.35 trillion in 2012. Investors from
developing and transition economies continued
their expansion abroad, in response to faster
economic growth and investment liberalization
(chapter III) as well as rising income streams from
high commodity prices. In 2013 these economies
accounted for 39 per cent of world outflows; 15
years earlier their share was only 7 per cent (figure
I.4). In contrast, TNCs from developed economies
continued their “wait and see” approach, and their
investments remained at a low level, similar to that
of 2012.
FDI flows from developed countries continued
to stagnate. FDI outflows from developed
countries were unchanged from 2012 – at $857
billion – and still 55 per cent off their peak in 2007.
Developed-country TNCs continued to hold large
amounts of cash reserves in their foreign affiliates in
the form of retained earnings, which constitute part
of reinvested earnings, one of the components of
FDI flows. This component reached a record level
of 67 per cent (figure I.5).
Investments from the largest investor – the United
States – dropped by 8 per cent to $338 billion, led by
the decline in cross-border merger and acquisition
Table I.1. FDI inflows to selected regional and interregional groups,
average 2005–2007, 2008–2013
Regional/inter-regional
groups
2005–2007 pre-
crisis average
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
G-20 878 992 631 753 892 694 791
APEC 560 809 485 658 765 694 789
TPP 363 524 275 382 457 402 458
TTIP 838 858 507 582 714 377 434
RCEP 195 293 225 286 337 332 343
BRICS 157 285 201 237 286 266 304
NAFTA 279 396 184 250 287 221 288
ASEAN 65 50 47 99 100 118 125
MERCOSUR 31 59 30 65 85 85 85
G-20 59 55 52 53 52 52 54
APEC 37 44 40 46 45 52 54
TPP 24 29 23 27 27 30 32
TTIP 56 47 41 41 42 28 30
RCEP 13 16 18 20 20 25 24
BRICS 11 16 16 17 17 20 21
NAFTA 19 22 15 18 17 17 20
ASEAN 4 3 4 7 6 9 9
MERCOSUR 2 3 2 5 5 6 6
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Note: G-20 = 19 individual members economies of the G20, excluding the European Union, which is the 20th member, APEC
= Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, TTIP = Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TPP = Trans-Pacific
Partnership, RCEP = Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, BRICS = Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China
and South Africa, NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
MERCOSUR = Common Market of the South. Ranked in descending order of the 2013 FDI flows.

(MA) purchases and negative intracompany loans.
United States TNCs continued to accumulate
reinvested earnings abroad, attaining a record level
of $332 billion. FDI outflows from the EU rose by 5
per cent to $250 billion, while those from Europe as
a whole increased by 10 per cent to $329 billion.
With $60 billion, Switzerland became the largest
outward investor in Europe, propelled by a doubling
of reinvested earnings abroad and an increase in
intracompany loans. Countries that had recorded a
large decline in 2012, including Italy, the Netherlands
and Spain, saw their outflows rebound sharply.
In contrast, investments by TNCs from France,
Germany and the United Kingdom saw a
substantial decline. TNCs from France and the
United Kingdom undertook significant equity
divestment abroad. Despite the substantial
depreciation of the currency, investments from
Japanese TNCs continued to expand, rising
by over 10 per cent to a record $136 billion.
Flows from developing economies
remained resilient, rising by 3 per cent.
FDI from these economies reached a
record level of $454 billion in 2013. Among
developing regions, flows from developing
Asia and Africa increased while those from
Latin America and the Caribbean declined
(figure I.6). Developing Asia remained a large
source of FDI, accounting for more than one
fifth of the world’s total.
Flows from developing Asia rose by 8 per cent to
$326billionwithdivergingtrendsamongsubregions:
East and South-East Asia TNCs experienced growth
of 7 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively; FDI flows
from West Asia surged by almost two thirds; and
TNC activities from South Asia slid by nearly three
quarters. In East Asia, investment from Chinese
TNCs climbed by 15 per cent to $101 billion owing
to a surge of cross-border MAs (examples include
the $19 billion CNOOC-Nexen deal in Canada and
the $5 billion Shuanghui-Smithfield Foods deal in
the United States). In the meantime, investments
from Hong Kong (China) grew by 4 per cent
to $92 billion. The two East Asian economies
have consolidated their positions among the
leading sources of FDI in the world (figure I.7).
Investment flows from the two other important
sources in East Asia – the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan Province of China – showed
contrasting trends: investments by TNCs
from the former declined by 5 per cent to $29
billion, while those by TNCs from the latter
rose by 9 per cent to $14 billion.
FDI flows from Latin America and the
Caribbean decreased by 8 per cent to $115
billion in 2013. Excluding flows to offshore
financial centres (box I.1), they declined by 31
per cent to $33 billion. This drop was largely
attributable to two developments: a decline
in cross-border MAs and a strong increase
in loan repayments to parent companies by
Figure I.4. Share of FDI outflows by group of economies,
1999–2013
(Per cent)
0
25
50
75
100
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Developed economies Developing and transition economies
93
61
7
39
Figure I.5. Share of FDI outflow components for selected
developed countries,a
2007–2013
(Per cent)
a
Economies included are Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Equity outflows Reinvested earnings Other capital (intra-company loans)
62
-
57 53 50 45 41 39
24
30
20
42 50
44
67
14
27
8 5
15
1
10
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Brazilian and Chilean foreign affiliates abroad.
Colombian TNCs, by contrast, bucked the regional
trend and more than doubled their cross-border
MAs. Investments from TNCs registered in
Caribbean countries increased by 4 per cent
in 2013, constituting about three quarters of
the region’s total investments abroad.
FDI flows from transition economies
increased significantly, by 84 per cent,
reaching a new high of $99 billion. As in past
years, Russian TNCs were involved in the
most of the FDI projects, followed by TNCs
from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The value
of cross-border MA purchases by TNCs
from the region rose significantly in 2013 –
mainly as a result of the acquisition of TNK-
BP Ltd (British Virgin Islands) by Rosneft;
however, the number of such deals dropped.
2. FDI by mode of entry
The downward trend observed in 2012 both
in FDI greenfield projects1
and in cross-border
MAs reversed in 2013, confirming that the
general investment outlook improved (figure
I.8). The value of announced greenfield
projects increased by 9 per cent – remaining,
however, considerably below historical levels
– while the value of cross-border MAs
increased by 5 per cent.
In 2013, both FDI greenfield projects and
cross-border MAs displayed differentiated
patterns among groups of economies.
Developing and transition economies
largely outperformed developed countries,
with an increase of 17 per cent in the
values of announced greenfield projects
(from $389 billion to $457 billion), and a
sharp rise of 73 per cent for cross-border
MAs (from $63 billion to $109 billion). By
contrast, in developed economies both
greenfield investment projects and cross-
border MAs declined (by 4 per cent and
11 per cent, respectively). As a result,
developing and transition economies
accounted for historically high shares of
the total values of greenfield investment
and MA projects (68 per cent and 31 per
cent respectively).
The importance of developing and
transition economies stands out clearly in
Figure I.6. FDI outflows, by region, 2008–2013
Figure I.7. FDI outflows: top 20 home economies,
2012 and 2013
Developing and
Developed
economies
2013
2012
2013
2012
-4
0
Austria
Taiwan Province of China
Norway
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
Ireland
Spain
Singapore
Republic of Korea
Italy
Sweden
Netherlands
Canada
Germany
Switzerland
Hong Kong, China
Russian Federation
China
Japan
United States
17
13
20
35
3
19
13
31
8
29
55
80
45
88
49
88
123
14
14
18
19
22
23
26
27
29
32
33
37
43
58
60
92
95
101
136
367
338
Note: British Virgin Islands is not included in the ranking because of
its nature as an offshore financial centre (most FDI is in transit).
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Developing Asia Europe Latin America and the Caribbean
North America Transition economies Africa

their roles as acquirers. Their cross-border MAs
rose by 36 per cent to $186 billion, accounting for
53 per cent of global cross-border MAs. Chinese
firms invested a record $50 billion. A variety of
firms, including those in emerging industries such
as information technology (IT) and biotechnology,
started to engage in MAs. As to outward greenfield
investments, developing and transition economies
accounted for one third of the global total. Hong
Kong (China) stands out with an announced value
of projects of $49 billion, representing 7 per cent
of the global total. Greenfield projects from the
BRICS registered a 16 per cent increase, driven by
TNCs based in South Africa, Brazil and the Russian
Federation.
Southern TNCs acquired
significant assets of developed-
country foreign affiliates in
the developing world. In 2013,
the value of cross-border MA
purchases increased marginally
– by 5 per cent, to $349 billion –
largely on the back of increased
investment flows from developing
and transition economies, whose
TNCs captured a 53 per cent share
of global acquisitions. The global
rankings of the largest investor
countries in terms of cross-border
MAs reflect this pattern. For
example, among the top 20 cross-
border MA investors, 12 were
from developing and transition
economies – 7 more than in the case
of FDI outflows. More than two thirds of
gross cross-border MAs by Southern
TNCs were directed to developing and
transition economies. Half of these
investments involved foreign affiliates
of developed-country TNCs (figure I.9),
transferring their ownership into the
hands of developing-country TNCs.
This trend was particularly marked
in the extractive industry, where the
value of transactions involving sales by
developed-country TNCs to developing-
country-based counterparts represented
over 80 per cent of gross acquisitions
by South-based TNCs in the industry.
In Africa as a whole, these purchases accounted
for 74 per cent of all purchases on the continent.
In the extractive sector, in particular, Asian TNCs
have been making an effort to secure upstream
reserves in order to satisfy growing domestic
demand. At the same time, developed-country
TNCs have been divesting assets in some areas,
which eventually opens up opportunities for local or
other developing-country firms to invest.
The leading acquirer in South-South deals was
China, followed by Thailand, Hong Kong (China),
Mexico and India. Examples of this trend include
several megadeals such as the Italian oil and gas
group Eni’s sale of its subsidiary in Mozambique to
PetroChina for over $4 billion; the oil and gas group
Figure I.8. Historic trend of FDI projects, 2004–2013
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border MA
database for MAs and information from the Financial Times Ltd,
fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) for greenfield projects.
672
349
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
1 400
1 600
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Value of announced FDI greenfield projects
Value of cross-border MAs
Figure I.9. Distribution of gross cross-border MAs purchases by
TNCs based in developing and transition economies, 2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border MA database
Note: “Gross” refer to all cross-border MAs.
Developed
economy targets
28%
Targeting foreign affiliates
of other developing- and
transition-economy TNCs
8%
Targeting domestic
companies
42%
Developing and
transition economy
targets
72%
Targeting foreign
affiliates of developed-
country TNCs
50%

Apache’s (United States) sale of its subsidiary in
Egypt to Sinopec (China) for almost $3 billion; and
ConocoPhillips’s sale of its affiliates in Algeria to an
Indonesian State-owned company, Pertamina, for
$1.8 billion.
The banking industry followed the same pattern:
for example, in Colombia, Bancolombia acquired
the entire share capital of HSBC Bank (Panama)
from HSBC (United Kingdom) for $2.1 billion; and
in Egypt, Qatar National Bank, a majority-owned
unit of the State-owned Qatar Investment Authority,
acquired a 77 per cent stake of Cairo-based
National Société Générale Bank from Société
Générale (France) for $1.97 billion.
This trend – developing countries conducting
a high share of the acquisitions of developed-
country foreign affiliates – seems set to continue.
Whereas in 2007 only 23 per cent of acquisitions
from Southern TNCs from developing and transition
economies targeted foreign affiliates of developed-
country corporations, after the crisis this percentage
increased quickly, jumping to 30 per cent in 2010
and 41 per cent in 2011 to half of all acquisitions
in 2013.
3. FDI by sector and industry
At the sector level, the types of investment –
greenfield activity and cross-border MAs – varied
(figure I.10).
Primary sector. Globally, values of greenfield
and MA projects in the primary sector regained
momentum in 2013 (increasing by 14 per cent and
32 per cent, respectively), with marked differences
between groups of countries. Greenfield activity in
the extractive industry by developed and transition
economies plummeted to levels near zero, leaving
almost all the business to take place in developing
countries.
In developing countries the value of announced
greenfield projects doubled, from $14 billion in 2012
to $27 billion in 2013; the value of cross-border
MAs also increased, from a negative level of
-$2.5 billion in 2012 to $25 billion in 2013. Although
the value of greenfield projects in developing
economies still remains below historic levels, cross-
border MAs are back to recent historic highs
(2010–2011).
Manufacturing. Investment in manufacturing was
relatively stable in 2013, with a limited decrease in the
value of greenfield projects (-4 per cent) and a more
pronounced increase in the value of cross-border
MAs (+11 per cent). In terms of greenfield projects,
a sharp rise in investment activity was observed in
the textile and clothing industry, with the value of
announced investment projects totalling more than
$24 billion, a historical high and more than twice
the 2012 level. Conversely, the automotive industry
registered a significant decline for the third year in a
Figure I.10. FDI projects, by sector, 2012–2013
25 29
268 258
321 385
0
200
400
600
800
20%
-4%
14%
9%
52 68
113 126
167 155
0
200
400
600
800
2012 2013 2012 2013
Primary Manufacturing Services
-7%
11%
32%
5%
Value of announced FDI greenfield projects Value of cross-border MAs
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border MA database for MAs and information from the Financial
Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) for greenfield projects.

row. As for cross-border MAs, the regional trends
display a clear divergence between developed and
developing economies. While the value of cross-
border MAs in developed economies decreased
by more than 20 per cent, developing economies
enjoyed a fast pace of growth, seeing the value of
such deals double. The growth in momentum was
mainly driven by a boom in the value of cross-border
MAs in the food, beverages and tobacco industry,
which jumped from $12 billion in 2012 to almost
$40 billion in 2013.
Services. Services continued to account for the
largest shares of announced greenfield projects
and MA deals. In 2013, it was the fastest-
growing sector in terms of total value of announced
greenfield projects, with a significant increase of 20
per cent, while the value of MA deals decreased
moderately. As observed in the primary sector,
the increase in greenfield projects took place in
developing economies (+40 per cent compared
with -5 per cent in developed economies and -7 per
cent in transition economies). The growth engines
of the greenfield investment activity in developing
economies were business services (for which
the value of announced greenfield project tripled
compared with 2012) and electricity, gas and water
(for which the value of greenfield projects doubled).
The analysis of the past sectoral distribution
of new investment projects shows some
important emerging trends in regional
investment patterns. In particular, although
foreign investments in many poor developing
countries historically have concentrated heavily on
the extractive industry, analysis of FDI greenfield
data in the last 10 years depicts a more nuanced
picture: the share of FDI in the extractive industry
is still substantial but not overwhelming and, most
important, it is rapidly decreasing.
The analysis of the cumulative value of announced
greenfield projects in developing countries for the
last 10 years shows that investment in the primary
sector (almost all of it in extractive industries) is
more significant for Africa and least developed
countries (LDCs) than for the average developed
and developing economies (figure I.11). It also
shows that in both Africa and LDCs, investment
is relatively balanced among the three sectors.
However, looking at greenfield investment in terms
of the number of projects reveals a different picture,
in which the primary sector accounts for only a
marginal share in Africa and LDCs.
Over the past 10 years the share of the
primary sector in greenfield projects has been
gradually declining in both Africa and LDCs,
while that of the services sector has increased
significantly (figure I.12). The value share of
announced greenfield projects in the primary sector
has decreased from 53 per cent in 2004 to 11 per
Figure I.11. Sectoral distribution of announced greenfield FDI projects, by group of economies,
cumulative 2004–2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
0
20
40
60
80
100
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Africa LDCs
48 48 38 3442
46
31
28
1 3 8 9
51 49 54 57
6 11
26
36
52
43 43 36
0
20
40
60
80
100
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Africa LDCs
Primary Manufacturing Services Primary Manufacturing Services
Distribution of value Distribution of number of projects

cent in 2013 for Africa, and from 74 per cent to 9
per cent for LDCs. By comparison, the share for
the services sector has risen from 13 per cent to
63 per cent for Africa, and from 10 to 70 per cent
for LDCs.
At the global level some industries have experienced
dramatic changes in FDI patterns in the face of the
uneven global recovery.
• Oil and gas. The shale gas revolution in the
United States is a major game changer in the
energy sector. Although questions concerning
its environmental and economic sustainability
remain, it is expected to shape the global FDI
environment in the oil and gas industry and in
other industries, such as petrochemicals, that
rely heavily on gas supply.
• Pharmaceuticals. Although FDI in this industry
remains concentrated in the United States,
investments targeting developing economies
are edging up. In terms of value, cross-
border MAs have been the dominant mode,
enabling TNCs to improve their efficiency and
profitability and to strengthen their competitive
advantages in the shortest possible time.
• Retail industry. With the rise of middle classes
in developing countries, consumer markets are
flourishing. In particular, the retail industry is
attracting significant levels of FDI.
a. Oil and gas
The rapid development of shale gas is changing the
North American natural gas industry. Since 2007 the
production of natural gas in the region has doubled,
driven by the boom in shale gas production, which
is growing at an average annual rate of 50 per
cent.2
The shale gas revolution is also a key factor
in the resurgence of United States manufacturing.
The competitive gain produced by falling natural
gas prices3
represents a growth opportunity for
the manufacturing sector, especially for industries,
such as petrochemicals, that rely heavily on natural
gas as a fuel.
The shale gas revolution may change the game
in the global energy sector over the next decade
and also beyond the United States. However, the
realization of its potential depends crucially on a
number of factors. Above all, the environmental
impact of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing
is still a controversial issue, and opposition to the
technique is strengthening. An additional element
of uncertainty concerns the possibility of replicating
the United States success story in other shale-rich
countries, such as China or Argentina. Success will
require the ability to put in place in the near future the
necessary enablers, both “under the ground” (the
technical capability to extract shale gas effectively
and efficiently) and “above the ground” (a favourable
business and investment climate to attract foreign
Figure I.12. Historic evolution of the sectoral distribution of annouced greenfield FDI projects in Africa and LDCs,
2004–2013
(Per cent of total value)
Primary Manufacturing Services Primary Manufacturing Services
Africa Least developed countries
53
11
34
26
13
63
0
20
40
60
80
100
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
74
9
16
21
10
70
0
20
40
60
80
100
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

players to share technical and technological know-
how). In addition, new evidence suggests that
recoverable resources may be less than expected
(see chapter II.2.c).
From an FDI perspective, some interesting trends
are emerging:
• In the United States oil and gas industry, the
role of foreign capital supplied by major TNCs
is growing as the shale market consolidates
and smaller domestic players need to share
development and production costs.
• Cheap natural gas is attracting new capacity
investments, including foreign investments,
to United States manufacturing industries
that are characterized by heavy use of natural
gas, such as petrochemicals and plastics.
Reshoring of United States manufacturing
TNCs is also an expected effect of the lowering
of prices in the United States gas market.
• TNCs and State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
from countries rich in shale resources, such
as China, are strongly motivated to establish
partnerships (typically in the form of joint
ventures) with United States players to acquire
the technical expertise needed to lead the
shale gas revolution in their countries.
The FDI impact on the United States oil and
gas industry: a market consolidation story.
From an FDI perspective, the impact of the shale
revolution on the United States oil and gas industry
is an MA story. In the start-up (greenfield) stage,
the shale revolution was led by North American
independents rather than oil and gas majors.
Greenfield data confirm that, despite the shale gas
revolution, FDI greenfield activity in the United States
oil and gas industry has collapsed in the last five
years, from almost $3 billion in 2008 (corresponding
to some 5 per cent of all United States greenfield
activity) to $0.5 billion in 2013 (or 1 per cent of all
greenfield activity).4
Only in a second stage will the
oil and gas majors enter the game, either engaging
in MA operations or establishing partnerships,
typically joint ventures, with local players who are
increasingly eager to share the development costs
and ease the financial pressure.5
Analysis of cross-border MA deals in the recent
years (figure I.13) shows that deals related to shale
gas have been a major driver of cross-border MA
activity in the United States oil and gas industry,
accounting for more than 70 per cent of the total
value of such activity in the industry. The peak of
the consolidation wave occurred in 2011, when
the value of shale-related MAs exceeded $30
billion, corresponding to some 90 per cent of the
total value of cross-border MAs in the oil and gas
industry in the United States.
The FDI impact on the United States chemical
industries: a growth story. The collapse of North
American gas prices, down by one third to one
fourth since 2008, is boosting new investments in
United States chemical industries.
Unlike in the oil and gas industry, a significant
part of the foreign investment in the United States
chemical industry goes to greenfield investment
projects. A recent report by the American Chemical
Council6
confirms the trend toward new capacity
investments. On the basis of investment projects
that had been announced by March 2013, the
report estimates the cumulative capital expenditure
in the period 2010–2020 attributable to the shale
gas revolution at $71.7 billion. United States TNCs
such as ExxonMobil, Chevron and Dow Chemicals
will play a significant role in this expenditure, with
investments already planned for several billion
dollars.
These operations may also entail a reshoring of
current foreign business, with a potential negative
Figure I.13. Estimated value and share of shale gas
cross-border MA deals in all such dealsa
in the
United States oil and gas industry, 2008–2013
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-
border MA database for MAs; other various sources.
a
Includes changes of ownership.
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
%
$billion
Value (left scale)
Share (right scale)

impact (through divestments) on inward FDI to
traditionally cheap production locations such as
West Asia or China (see chapter II.2.c). TNCs from
other countries are also actively seeking investment
opportunities in the United States. According to
the Council’s report, nearly half of the cumulative
$71.7 billion in investments is coming from foreign
companies, often through the relocation of plants
to the United States. The investment wave involves
not only TNCs from the developed world; those
from developing and transition economies are also
increasingly active, aiming to capture the United
States shale opportunity.7
As a consequence, the most recent data show
a significant shift in global greenfield activity in
chemicals towards the United States: in 2013 the
country’s share in chemical greenfield projects
(excluding pharmaceutical products) reached a
record high of 25 per cent, from historical levels
between 5 and 10 per cent – well above the
average United States share for all other industries
(figure I.14).
The FDI impact on other shale-rich countries
(e.g. China): a knowledge-sharing story.
TNCs, including SOEs from countries rich in shale
resources, are strongly motivated to establish
partnerships with the United States and other
international players to acquire the technical know-
how to replicate the success of the United States
shale revolution in their home countries. In terms of
FDI, this is likely to have a twofold effect:
• Outward FDI flows to the United States
are expected to increase as these players
proactively look for opportunities to acquire
know-how in the field through co-management
(with domestic companies) of United States
shale projects. Chinese companies have been
among the most active players. In 2013, for
example, Sinochem entered into a $1.7 billion
joint venture with Pioneer Natural Resources to
acquire a stake in the Wolcamp Shale in Texas.
• Foreign capital in shale projects outside
the United States is expected to grow as
companies from shale-rich countries are
seeking partnerships with foreign companies to
develop their domestic shale projects. In China
the two giant State oil and gas companies,
PetroChina and CNOOC, have signed a
number of agreements with major western
TNCs, including Shell. In some cases these
agreements involve only technical assistance
and support; in others they also involve
actual foreign capital investment. This is the
case with the Shell-PetroChina partnership in
the Sichuan basin, which entails a $1 billion
investment from Shell. In other shale-rich
countries such as Argentina and Australia
the pattern is similar, with a number of joint
ventures between domestic companies and
international players.
b. Pharmaceuticals
A number of factors caused a wave of
restructuring and new market-seeking
investments in the pharmaceuticals industry.
They include the “patent cliff” faced by some large
TNCs,8
increasing demand for generic drugs,
and growth opportunities in emerging markets. A
number of developed-country TNCs are divesting
non-core business segments and outsourcing
research and development (RD) activities,9
while
acquiring or merging with firms in both developed
and developing economies to secure new streams
of revenues and to optimize costs. Global players
Figure I.14. United States share of global annouced
greenfield FDI projects, chemicalsa
vs all industries,
2009–2013
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, information
from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.
fDimarkets.com).
a
Excluding the pharmaceutical industry.
All industries Chemicals and chemical products
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

in this industry are keen to gain access to high-
quality, low-cost generic drug manufacturers.10
To
save time and resources, instead of developing
new products from scratch, TNCs are looking for
acquisition opportunities in successful research
start-ups and generics firms (UNCTAD 2011b).
Some focus on smaller biotechnology firms that
are open to in-licensing activities and collaboration.
Others look for deals to develop generic versions of
medicines.11
Two other factors – the need to deploy
vast reserves of retained earnings held overseas
and the desire for tax savings – are also driving
developed-country TNCs to acquire assets abroad.
A series of megadeals over the last two decades
has reshaped the industry.12
FDI in pharmaceuticals13
has been
concentrated in developed economies,
especially in the United States – the largest
pharmaceuticals market for FDI.14
Although the
number of greenfield FDI projects announced was
similar to the number of cross-border MAs,15
the
transaction values of the MAs (figure I.15) were
notably greater than the announced values of the
greenfield projects for the entire period (figure I.16).
The impact of MA deals in biological products on the
overall transaction volume became more prominent
since 2009. After a rise in 2011, these cross-border
MA activities – both in value and in the number
of deals – dropped in 2012–2013. The slowdown
also reflects a smaller number of
megadeals involving large TNCs in
developed economies.
Announced greenfield investments
in developing economies have been
relatively more important than devel-
oped-country projects since 2009,
when they hit a record $5.5 billion
(figure I.16). In 2013, while greenfield
FDI in developed economies stagnat-
ed ($3.8 billion), announced greenfield
investments in developing economies
($4.3 billion) represented 51 per cent
of global greenfield FDI in pharmaceu-
ticals (compared with an average of
40 per cent for the period 2003–2012).
Pharmaceutical TNCs are likely to
continue to seek growth opportuni-
ties through acquisitions, pursuing growth in emerg-
ing markets and opportunities for new product de-
velopment and marketing.16
Restructuring efforts by
developed-country TNCs are gaining momentum,
and further consolidation of the global generic mar-
ket is highly likely.17
During the first quarter of 2014,
the transaction value of cross-border MAs ($22.8
billion in 55 deals) already surpassed the value re-
corded for all of 2013.18
Announcements of poten-
tial deals strongly suggest a return of megadeals,19
led by cash-rich TNCs holding record amounts of
cash reserves in their foreign affiliates.20
The increasing interest of pharmaceuticals
TNCs in emerging markets can also be witnessed
in the trends in cross-border MAs. In developing
economies, the transaction value of cross-border
MA deals in pharmaceuticals, including biological
products, soared in 2008 (from $2.2 billion in 2007
to $7.9 billion),21
driven by the $5.0 billion acquisition
of Ranbaxy Laboratories (India) by Daiichi Sankyo
(Japan).22
It hit another peak ($7.5 billion) in 2010,
again led by a $3.7 billion deal that targeted India.23
As shown in figure I.15, transaction volumes in
developing and transition economies remain a
fraction of global cross-border MA activities in this
industry, but their shares are expanding. In 2013, at
$6.6 billion,24
their share in global pharmaceutical
deals reached the highest on record (figure I.17).25
Figure I.15. Cross-border MA deals in pharmaceuticals,a
2003–2013
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border MA database.
a
Includes biological products.
b
A substantial part of pharmaceuticals in developed countries is accounted for
by biological products.
Developing economies Transition economies Developed economiesb
0
20
40
60
80
100
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Pharmaceutical TNCs’ growing interest in emerging
markets as a new platform for growth will expand
opportunities for developing and transition
economies to attract investment. In Africa, for
example, where the growing middle class
is making the market more attractive to the
industry, the scale and scope of manufacturing
and RD investments are likely to expand to
meet increasing demands for drugs to treat
non-communicable diseases.26
At the same
time, TNCs may become more cautious about
their operations and prospects in emerging
markets as they face shrinking margins for
generics27
as well as bribery investigations,28
concerns about patent protection of branded
drugs,29
and failures of acquired developing-
country firms to meet quality and regulatory
compliance requirements.30
For some developing and transition
economies, the changing global environment
in this industry poses new challenges. For
example, as India and other generic-drug-
manufacturing countries start to export more
drugs to developed economies, one possible
scenario is a supply shortage in poor countries,
leading to upward pressures on price,
which will adversely affect access to
inexpensive, high-quality generic drugs
by people in need (UNCTAD 2013a).
In Bangladesh, where the domestic
manufacturing base for generics has
been developed by restricting FDI and
benefitting from TRIPS exemptions,
the Government will have to make
substantial changes in its policies and
in development strategies pertaining to
its pharmaceutical industry in order to
achieve sustainable growth.31
c. Retail
Changing industrial context. The
global retail industry is in the midst of an
industrial restructuring, driven by three
important changes. First, the rise of
e-commerce is changing consumers’
purchasing behaviour and exerts
strong pressures on the traditional
retail sector, particularly in developed
countries and high-income developing countries.
Second, strong economic growth and the rapid
expansion of the middle class have created
important retail markets in not only large emerging
Figure I.16. Value of greenfield FDI projects announced in
pharmaceuticals, by group of economies, 2003–2013
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi
Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Developing economies Transition economies Developed economies
Figure I.17. Cross-border MA deals in pharmaceuticalsa
targeted at developing and transition economies, 2004–2013
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border
MA database.
a
Includes biological products.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2004-2006
average
2007-2009
average
2010-2012
average
2013
%
$billion
Transaction value (left scale)
Share in global pharmaceutical deals (right scale)

markets but also other relatively small developing
countries. Third, competition has intensified, and
margins narrowed, as market growth has slowed.
In some large emerging markets, foreign retailers
now face difficulties because of the rising number
of domestic retailers and e-commerce companies
alike, as well as rising operational costs due to
higher real estate prices, for example.
These changes have significantly affected the
internationalization strategies and practices of
global retailers. Some large retail chains based
in developed countries have started to optimize
the scale of their businesses to fewer stores and
smaller formats. They do this first in their home
countries and other developed-country markets,
but now the reconfiguration has started to affect
their operations in emerging markets. In addition,
their internationalization strategies have become
more selective: a number of the world’s largest
retailers have slowed their expansion in some large
markets (e.g. Brazil, China) and are giving more
attention to other markets with greater growth
potential (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa).
Global retailers slow their expansion in large
emerging markets. Highly internationalized, the
top five retail TNCs (table I.2) account for nearly
20 per cent of the total sales of the world’s
250 largest retailers, and their share in total
foreign sales is more than 30 per cent.32
The latest
trends in their overseas investments showcase
the effects of an overall industry restructuring
on firms’ international operations. For instance,
the expansion of Wal-Mart (United States) in
Brazil and China has slowed. After years of rapid
expansion, Wal-Mart has nearly 400 stores in
China, accounting for about 11 per cent of Chinese
hypermarket sales. In October 2013, the company
announced that it would close 25 underperfor
ming stores, some of which were gained through
the acquisition of Trust-Mart (China) in 2007.33
A number of companies undertake divestments
abroad in order to raise cash and shore up balance
sheets,34
and it seems that regional and national
retailers have accordingly taken the opportunity
to expand their market shares, including
through the acquisition of assets sold by TNCs.
Carrefour (France) sold $3.6 billion in assets in
2012, withdrawing from Greece, Colombia and
Indonesia. In 2013, the French retailer continued to
downsize and divest internationally. In April, it sold
a 12 per cent stake in a joint venture in Turkey to
its local partner, Sabanci Holding, for $79 million.
In May, it sold a 25 per cent stake in another joint
venture in the Middle East to local partner MAF for
$680 million. Carrefour has also closed a number
of stores in China.
New growth markets stand out as a focus of
international investment. Some relatively low-
income countries in South America, sub-Saharan
Africa and South-East Asia have become increasingly
attractive to FDI by the world’s top retailers. After the
outbreak of the global financial crisis, the international
expansion of large United States and European
retailers slowed owing to economic recession and
its effects on consumer spending in many parts of
the world. Retailers’ expansion into large emerging
markets also slowed, as noted above. However,
Western retailers continued to establish and expand
their presence in the new growth markets, because
of their strong economic growth, burgeoning middle
Table I.2. Top 5 TNCs in the retail industry, ranked by foreign assets, 2012
(Billions of dollars and number ef employees)
Corporation Home economy
Sales Assets Employment Countries of
operation
Transnationality
Indexa
Foreign Total Foreign Total Foreign Total
Wal-Mart Stores Inc United States 127 447 84 193 800 000 2 200 000 28 0.76
Tesco PLC United Kingdom 35 103 39 76 219 298 519 671 33 0.84
Carrefour SA France 53 98 34 61 267 718 364 969 13 0.57
Metro AG Germany 53 86 27 46 159 344 248 637 33 0.62
Schwarz Groupb
Germany 49 88 .. .. .. .. 26 0.56
Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Thomson ONE.
a
The Transnationality Index is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: foreign to total assets, foreign to total
sales and foreign to total employment, except for Schwarz Group which is based on the foreign to total sales ratio.
b
Data of 2011.

class, increasing purchasing power and youthful
populations.
Africa has the fastest-growing middle class in
the world: according to the African Development
Bank, the continent’s middle class numbers about
120 million now and will grow to 1.1 billion by 2060.
Wal-Mart plans to open 90 new stores across
sub-Saharan Africa over the next three years, as it
targets growth markets such as Nigeria and Angola.
As Carrefour retreats from other foreign markets,
it aims to open its first store in Africa in 2015, in
Côte d’Ivoire, followed by seven other countries
(Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal).
In the luxury goods segment as well, some of the
world’s leading companies are investing in stores
and distribution networks in Africa (chapter II.1).
More and more cross-border MAs, including in
e-commerce. Global retailers invest internationally
through both greenfield investments and cross-
border MAs, and sometimes they operate in
foreign markets through non-equity modes, most
notably franchising. Available data show that, since
2009, international greenfield investment in retail
dropped for three years before a recent pickup;
by contrast, the value of cross-border MAs in the
sector has increased continuously. In 2012, driven
by the proactive international expansion of some
large TNCs, total global sales of cross-border MAs
surpassed the pre-crisis level, and that amount
continued to rise in 2013.
A number of megadeals have been undertaken in
industrialized economies over the past few years.35
At the same time, the world’s leading retailers
have expanded into emerging markets more and
more through cross-border MAs. For instance,
in 2009, Wal-Mart (United States) acquired a 58
per cent stake in DYS, Chile’s largest food retailer,
with an investment of $1.5 billion; and in 2012, it
acquired South Africa’s Massmart for $2.4 billion.
International MAs have also targeted e-commerce
companies in key markets, particularly China, where
online retail sales have reached almost the same
level as in the United States. Apart from foreign
e-commerce companies, international private
equity investors such as Bain Capital and IDG
Capital Partners (both from the United States) and
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) such as Temasek
(Singapore) have invested in leading Chinese
e-commerce companies, including in Alibaba and
JD.com before their planned initial public offering
(IPO) in the United States (table I.3).
4. FDI by selected types of investors
This subsection discusses recent trends in FDI by
private equity funds, SWFs and SOEs.
a. Private equity firms
In 2013, the unspent outstanding funds of
private equity firms (so-called dry powder)
grew further to a record level of $1.07 trillion,
an increase of 14 per cent over the previous
year. Firms thus did not use funds for investment
despite the fact that they could raise more money
for leverage owing to quantitative easing and low
interest rates. This is reflected also in lower levels of
FDI by such firms. In 2013, their new cross-border
investment (usually through MAs due to the nature
of the business) was only $171 billion ($83 billion
net of divestments), accounting for 21 per cent of
gross cross-border MAs. This was 10 percentage
points lower than in the peak year of 2007 (table I.4).
Private equity markets remain muted. In addition,
private equity firms are facing increasing scrutiny
from regulatory and tax authorities, as well as rising
pressure to find cost savings in their operations and
portfolio firms.
Private equity firms are becoming relatively more
active in emerging markets (figure I.18). In particular,
in Asia they acquired more companies, pushing up
the value of MAs. Examples include the acquisitions
Table I.3. Five largest cross-border
international private equity investments in
e-commerce in China, 2010–2012
Company Foreign investors
Investment
($ million)
Year
Alibaba
Sequoia Capital, Silver Lake,
Temasek
3 600 2011, 2012
JD.com
Tiger Fund, HilhouseCapitalMa-
nagement
1 500 2011
Yougou Belly International 443 2011
Gome Bain Capital 432 2010
VANCL Temasek, IDG Capital 230 2011
Source: UNCTAD, based on ChinaVenture (www.chinaventure.
com.cn).

of Ping An Insurance of China by a group of investors
from Thailand for $9.4 billion and Focus Media
Holding (China) by Giovanna Acquisition (Cayman
Islands) for $3.6 billion. Outside Asia, some emerging
economies, such as Brazil, offer opportunities for the
growth of private equity activity. For example, in Latin
America, where Latin America-based private equity
firms invested $8.9 billion in 2013, with $3.5 billion
going to infrastructure, oil and energy.36
In addition,
FDI by foreign private equity firms for the same year
was $6 billion. In contrast, slow MA growth in
regions such as Europe meant fewer opportunities
for private equity firms to pick up assets that might
ordinarily be sold off during or after an acquisition.
Furthermore, the abundance of cheap credit and
better asset performance in areas such as real estate
made private equity less attractive.
In 2013, private equity funds attracted attention
with their involvement in delisting major public
companies such as H. J. Heinz and Dell (both
United States), and with large cross-border MAs
such as the acquisition of Focus Media Holding,
as mentioned above. Furthermore, increases in
both club deals – deals involving several private
equity funds – and secondary buyouts, in which
investments change hands from one private equity
fund to another, may signal a diversification of
strategies in order to increase corporate value in the
context of the generally low investment activity by
private equity firms.
Secondary buyouts have been increasingly popular
also as an exit route in 2013, particularly in Western
Europe. Some of the largest private equity deals
of the year were sales to other buyout firms. For
example, Springer Science+Business Media
(Germany), owned by EQT Partners (United States)
and the Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation (GIC), was sold to BC Partners (United
Kingdom) for $4.4 billion. Nevertheless, there is still
an overhang of assets that were bought before the
financial crisis that have yet to realize their expected
value and have not been sold.
Although emerging market economies appear to
provide the greater potential for growth, developed
countries still offer investment targets, in particular
Table I.4. Cross-border MAs by private equity firms, 1996–2013
(Number of deals and value)
Number of deals Gross MAs Net MAs
Year Number Share in total (%) Value ($ billion) Share in total (%) Value ($ billion) Share in total (%)
1996 989 16 44 16 18 12
1997 1 074 15 58 15 18 10
1998 1 237 15 63 9 29 8
1999 1 466 15 81 9 27 5
2000 1 478 14 83 6 30 3
2001 1 467 17 85 11 36 8
2002 1 329 19 72 14 14 6
2003 1 589 23 91 23 31 19
2004 1 720 22 134 25 62 31
2005 1 892 20 209 23 110 20
2006 1 898 18 263 23 118 19
2007 2 108 17 541 31 292 28
2008 2 015 18 444 31 109 17
2009 2 186 24 115 18 70 25
2010 2 280 22 147 19 68 20
2011 2 026 19 161 15 69 12
2012 2 300 23 192 23 67 20
2013 2 043 24 171 21 83 24
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Note: Value on a net basis takes into account divestments by private equity funds. Thus it is calculated as follows: Purchases
of companies abroad by private equity funds (-) Sales of foreign affiliates owned by private equity funds. The table
includes MAs by hedge and other funds (but not sovereign wealth funds). Private equity firms and hedge funds refer to
acquirers as “investors not elsewhere classified”. This classification is based on the Thomson ONE database on MAs.

in small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs),
which are crucial to economic recovery and to the
absorption of unemployment. In the EU, where one
of the dominant concerns for SMEs is access to
finance – a concern that was further aggravated
during the crisis37
– private equity funds are an
important alternative source of finance.
b. SWFs
SWFs continue to grow, spread geographically,
but their FDI is still small. Assets under manage-
ment of more than 70 major SWFs approached
$6.4 trillion based in countries around the world,
including in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the
$150 billion Public Investment Corporation of South
Africa, SWFs were established recently in Angola,
Nigeria and Ghana, with oil proceeds of $5 billion,
$1 billion and $500 million, respectively. Since 2010,
SWF assets have grown faster than the assets of
any other institutional investor group, including pri-
vate equity and hedge funds. In the EU, for example,
between 15 and 25 per cent of listed companies
have SWF shareholders. In 2013, FDI flows of SWFs,
which had remained subdued after the crisis, reached
$6.7 billion, with cumulative flows of $130 billion
(figure I.19).
FDI by SWFs is still small, corresponding to less
than 2 per cent of total assets under management
and represented mostly by a few major SWFs.
Nevertheless, the geographical scope of their
investment has recently been expanding to markets
such as sub-Saharan Africa. In 2011, China
Investment Corporation (CIC) bought a 25 per cent
stake in Shanduka Groupe (South Africa) for $250
million, and in late 2013 Temasek (Singapore’s
SWF) paid $1.3 billion to buy a 20 per cent stake in
gas fields in the United Republic of Tanzania.
SWFs’ investment portfolios are expanding
across numerous sectors, including the retail and
consumer sectors, where Temasek’s acquisition
of a 25 per cent stake in AS Watson (Hong Kong,
China) for $5.7 billion in early 2014 is an example.
SWFs are also expanding their investment in
real estate markets in developed countries. For
example, in early 2014, the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority and Singapore’s GIC purchased an office
building in New York for $1.3 billion, and China’s
CIC spent £800 million for an office area in London.
In December 2013, GIC and Kuwait’s government
real estate company bought office buildings in
London for £1.7 billion. Norway’s Government
Pension Fund Global, the largest SWF, also started
Figure I.18. FDI by private equity funds, by major host region, 1995–2013
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
%
$billion
United States Europe
Latin America and the Caribbean Asia
Rest of the world Share of developing countries in total (right scale)
Note: Data refer to gross values of MAs by private equity firms; they are not adjusted to exclude FDI by SWFs.

to invest in real estate outside Europe in 2013,
with up to 5 per cent of its total funds. Global real
estate investment by SWFs is expected to run to
more than $1 trillion in 2014, a level similar to the
pre-crisis position seven years ago.38
SWF motives and types of investment targets differ.
The share of investment by SWFs in the Gulf region,
for example, has been increasing in part due to
external factors, such as the euro crisis, but also
in support of boosting public investment at home.
Gulf-based SWFs are increasingly investing in their
domestic public services (health, education and
infrastructure), which may lower their level of FDI
further. For countries with SWFs, public investment
is increasingly seen as having better returns
(financial and social) than portfolio investment
abroad. Chapter IV looks at ways that countries
without SWFs may be able to tap into this public-
services investment expertise.
By contrast, Malaysia’s SWF, Khazanah, like many
other SWFs,39
views itself more as a strategic
development fund. Although 35 per cent of its assets
areinvestedabroad,ittargetsthebulkofitsinvestment
at home to strategic development sectors, such
as utilities, telecommunications and other infra
structure, which are relevant for sustainable
development, as well as trying to crowd in private-
sector investment.40
In an effort to source funds widely and attract private
investment for public investment, some SWFs are
engaged in public offerings. For example, in 2013,
Doha Global Investment Company (backed by the
Qatari SWF) decided to launch an IPO. The IPO
will offer shares only to Qatari nationals and private
Qatari companies, thereby sharing some of the
benefits of Qatari sovereign investments directly with
the country’s citizens and companies.
SWFs are undertaking more joint activity with
private equity fund managers and management
companies, in part as a function of the decline of
private equity activity since the crisis. SWFs are
also taking larger stakes in private equity firms
as the funds look for greater returns following
declining yields on their traditional investments (e.g.
government bonds). SWFs may also be favouring
partnerships with private equity firms as a way of
securing managerial expertise in order to support
more direct involvement in their acquisitions; for
example, Norway’s Government Pension Fund
Global, which is a shareholder of Eurazeo (France),
Ratos (Sweden), Ackermans en Van Haaren
(Belgium) and other companies; and the United Arab
Emirates’ Mubadala, which is a shareholder in The
Carlyle Group (United States). These approaches
by SWFs to using and securing funds for further
investment provide useful lessons for other financial
firms in financing for development.
c. SOEs
State-owned TNCs (SO-TNCs) represent a
small part of the global TNC universe,41
but the
number of their foreign affiliates and the scale
of their foreign assets are significant. According
to UNCTAD’s estimates, there are at least 550 SO-
TNCs; their foreign assets are estimated at more
than $2 trillion.42
Both developed and developing
countries have SO-TNCs, some of them among the
largest TNCs in the world (table I.5). A number of
European countries, such as Denmark, France and
Germany, as well as the BRICS, are home to the
most important SO-TNCs.
Figure I.19. Annual and cumulative value of FDI
by SWFs, 2000–2013
border MA database for MAs and information from
the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.
com) for greenfield projects.
Note: Data include value of flows for both cross-border MAs
and greenfield FDI projects and only investments by
SWFs which are the sole and immediate investors. Data
do not include investments made by entities established
by SWFs or those made jointly with other investors. In
2003–2013, cross-border MAs accounted for about
80 per cent of total.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0
5
10
15
20
25
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Annual flows (left scale)
Cumulative flows
(right scale)

In line with the industrial characteristics of SOEs in
general, SO-TNCs tend to be active in industries that
are capital-intensive, require monopolistic positions
to gain the necessary economies of scale or are
deemed to be of strategic importance to the country.
Therefore, their global presence is considerable in
the extractive industries (oil and gas exploration and
metal mining), infrastructure industries and public
utilities (electricity, telecommunication, transport
and water), and financial services. The oil and gas
industry offers a typical example of the prominence
of SOEs, particularly in the developing world: SOEs
control more than three fourths of global crude oil
reserves. In addition, some of the world’s largest
TNCs in the oil and gas industry are owned and
controlled by developing-country governments,
including CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC in China,
Gazprom in the Russian Federation, Petronas in
Malaysia, Petrobras in Brazil and Saudi Aramco in
Saudi Arabia.
Owing to the general lack of data on FDI by
companies with different ownership features, it is
difficult to assess the global scale of FDI flows related
to SO-TNCs. However, the value of FDI projects,
including both cross-border MA purchases and
announced greenfield investments, can provide a
rough picture of such FDI flows and their fluctuation
over the years (figure I.20). Overall, FDI by SO-TNCs
had declined in every year after the global financial
Table I.5. The top 15 non-financial State-owned TNCs,a
ranked by foreign assets, 2012
(Billions of dollars and number of employees)
SO-TNCs Home country Industry
State
share
Assets Sales Employment Transnationality
Indexb
Foreign Total Foreign Total Foreign Total
GDF Suez France Utilities 36 175 272 79 125 110 308 219 330 0.59
Volkswagen Group Germany Motor vehicles 20 158 409 199 248 296 000 533 469 0.58
Eni SpA Italy Oil and gas 26 133 185 86 164 51 034 77 838 0.63
Enel SpA Italy Utilities 31 132 227 66 109 37 588 73 702 0.57
EDF SA France Utilities 84 103 331 39 93 30 412 154 730 0.31
Deutsche Telekom AG Germany Telecommunications 32 96 143 42 75 113 502 232 342 0.58
CITIC Group China Diversified 100 72 515 10 52 30 806 140 028 0.18
Statoil ASA Norway Oil and gas 67 71 141 28 121 2 842 23 028 0.29
General Motors Co United States Motor vehicles 16 70 149 65 152 108 000 213 000 0.47
Vattenfall AB Sweden Utilities 100 54 81 19 25 23 864 32 794 0.72
Orange S.A. France Telecommunications 27 54 119 24 56 65 492 170 531 0.42
Airbus Group France Aircraft 12 46 122 67 73 88 258 140 405 0.64
Vale SA Brazil Metal mining 3c
46 131 38 48 15 680 85 305 0.45
COSCO China Transport and storage 100 40 52 19 30 7 355 130 000 0.50
Petronas Malaysia Oil and gas 100 39 150 43 73 8 653 43 266 0.35
Source: UNCTAD.
a
These TNCs are at least 10 per cent owned by the State or public entities, or the State/public entity is the largest shareholder.
b
The Transnationality Index is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: foreign to total assets, foreign to total
sales and foreign to total employment.
c
State owns 12 golden shares that give it veto power over certain decisions.
Figure I.20. Value of estimated FDI by SO-TNCs,
2007–2013
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
%
$billion
Estimated FDI Share in global FDI outflows
the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.
Note: Estimated FDI is the sum of greenfield investments and
MAs. The combined value here is only an indication
of the size of total investment by SO-TNCs.

crisis, but in 2013 such investment started to pick
up, and the upward trend is likely to be sustained
in 2014, driven partly by rising investments in
extractive industries.
Rising FDI by SO-TNCs from emerging economies,
especially the BRICS, contributed to the growth in
FDI flows in 2013. The internationalization of Chinese
SOEs accelerated, driving up FDI outflows from
China. In extractive industries, Chinese SO-TNCs
have been very active in cross-border acquisitions:
for instance, CNOOC spent $15 billion to acquire
Nexen in Canada, the largest overseas deal ever
undertaken by a Chinese oil and gas company; and
Minmetal bought the Las Bambas copper mine
in Peru for $6 billion. Furthermore, Chinese SOEs
in manufacturing and services, especially finance
and real estate, have increasingly invested abroad.
Indian SO-TNCs in the extractive industries have
become more proactive in overseas investment
as well. For example, ONGC Videsh Limited, the
overseas arm of the State-owned Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation, is to invest heavily in Rovuma
Area I Block, a project in Mozambique.
In the Russian Federation, State ownership has
increased as Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil and
gas company, acquired BP’s 50 per cent interest
in TNK-BP for $28 billion (part in cash and part in
Rosneft shares) in March 2013. This deal made
Rosneft the world’s largest listed oil company by
output. In the meantime, Rosneft has expanded
its global presence by actively investing abroad: its
subsidiary Neftegaz America Shelf LP acquired a
30 per cent interest in 20 deep-water exploration
blocks in the Gulf of Mexico held by ExxonMobil
(United States). In December, Rosneft established
a joint venture in cooperation with ExxonMobil to
develop shale oil reserves in western Siberia.
Compared with their counterparts from the BRICS,
SO-TNCs from developed countries have been less
active in investing abroad and their international
investment remains sluggish. This is partly because
of the weak economic performance of their home
countries in the Eurozone. However, a number of
large MA projects undertaken by these firms, such
as those of EDF (France) and Vattenfall (Sweden),
were recorded in infrastructure industries. In
addition, emerging investment opportunities in
utilities and transport industries in Europe may
increase FDI by SO-TNCs in these industries.

The gradual improvement of macroeconomic
conditions, as well as recovering corporate profits
and the strong performance of stock markets, will
boost TNCs’ business confidence, which may lead
to a rise in FDI flows over the next three years. On the
basis of UNCTAD’s survey on investment prospects
of TNCs and investment promotion agencies (IPAs),
results of UNCTAD’s FDI forecasting model and
preliminary 2014 data for cross-border MAs and
greenfield activity, UNCTAD projects that FDI flows
could rise to $1.62 trillion in 2014, $1.75 trillion in
2015 and $1.85 trillion in 2016 (see figure I.1).
The world economy is expected to grow by
3.6 per cent in 2014 and 3.9 per cent in 2015
(table I.6). Gross fixed capital formation and trade
are projected to rise faster in 2014–2015 than in
2013. Those improvements could prompt TNCs
to gradually transform their record levels of cash
holdings into new investments. The slight rise in
TNC profits in 2013 (figure I.21) will also have a
positive impact on their capacity to invest.
b. prospects
FDI flows to developing countries will remain
high in the next three years. Concerns about
economic growth and the ending of quantitative
easing raise the risk of slow growth in FDI inflows in
emerging markets. Following the recent slowdown
in growth of FDI inflows in developing countries (a 6
per cent increase in 2013 compared with an aver-
age of 17 per cent in the last 10 years), FDI in these
countries is expected to remain flat in 2014 and
then increase slightly in 2015 and 2016 (table I.7).
In light of this projection, the pattern of FDI by
economic grouping may tilt in favour of developed
countries. The share of developing and transition
economies would decline over the next three years
(figure I.22).
However, the results of the model are based mainly
on economic fundamentals – projections which are
subject to fluctuation. Furthermore, the model does
not take into account risks such as policy uncertainty
and regional conflict, which are difficult to quantify.
It also does not take into account megadeals such
as the $130 billion buy-back of shares by Verizon
(United States) from Vodafone (United Kingdom
in 2014), which will reduce the equity component
of FDI inflows to the United States and affect the
global level of FDI inflows.
Although the introduction of quantitative
easing appears to have had little impact
on FDI flows in developing countries, this
might not be the case for the ending of those
measures. Although there seems to be a strong
relationship between the easing of monetary policy
Table I.6. Annual growth rates of global GDP,
trade, GFCF and employment, 2008–2015
(Per cent)
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013a
2014b
2015b
GDP 2.8 -0.4 5.2 3.9 3.2 3.0 3.6 3.9
Trade 3.1 -10.6 12.5 6.0 2.5 3.6 5.3 6.2
GFCF 2.0 -4.6 5.6 4.6 4.3 3.1 4.4 5.1
Employment 1.1 0.5 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Source: UNCTAD based on IMF for GDP, trade and GFCF, and
ILO for employment.
a
Estimation.
b
Projections.
Note: GFCF = gross fixed capital formation.
Figure I.21. Profitabilitya
and profit levels of TNCs,
2003–2013
a
Profitability is calculated as the ratio of net income to
total sales.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
%
$billion
Profits (left scale) Profitability (right scale)
UNCTAD’s econometric model (WIR11)
projects that FDI flows will pick up in 2014,
rising 12.5 per cent to reach $1.62 trillion
(table I.7), mainly owing to the strengthening of
global economic activity. Much of the impetus will
come from developed countries, where FDI flows
are expected to rise by 35 per cent.

Table I.7. Summary of econometric medium-term baseline scenarios of FDI flows, by groupings
Averages Projections
2005–2007 2009–2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Global FDI flows 1 493 1 448 1 330 1 452 1 618 1 748 1 851
Developing economies 455 635 729 778 764 776 799
Transition economies 60 79 84 108 92 85 82
Memorandum
Average growth rates Growth rates Growth rate projections
2005–2007 2009–2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Global FDI flows 39.6 1.0 - 21.8 9.1 11.5 8.0 5.9
Developed economies 46.5 - 0.4 - 41.3 9.5 34.8 16.3 9.5
Developing economies 27.8 4.4 0.6 6.7 - 1.8 1.6 2.9
Transition economies 47.8 - 1.9 - 11.3 28.3 - 15.0 - 7.6 - 3.9
Source: UNCTAD.
in developed countries and portfolio capital flows
to emerging economies, quantitative easing had no
visible impacts on FDI flows (figure I.23). FDI projects
have longer gestation periods and are thus less
susceptible to short-term fluctuations in exchange
rates and interest rates. FDI generally involves a
long-term commitment to a host economy. Portfolio
and other investors, by contrast, may liquidate their
investments when there is a drop in confidence in
the currency, economy or government.
Although quantitative easing had little impact on FDI
flows in the period 2009–2013, this might change
with the ending of unconventional measures,
judging by developments when the tapering was
announced and when it began to be implemented.
During the first half of 2013 and the beginning of
2014, there is evidence of a sharp decrease in
private external capital flows and a depreciation of
the currencies of emerging economies.
FDI inflows to the countries affected by the
tapering could see the effect of more company
assets offered for sale, given the heavy
indebtedness of domestic firms and their reduced
access to liquidity. Increases in cross-border
Figure I.22. FDI inflows: share by major economic groups,
2000–2013 and prospects, 2014–2016
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI database (www.unctad.org/
fdistatistics); and UNCTAD estimates.
0
25
50
75
100
2014
2015
2016
Developed economies Developing and transition economies
81
19
52
48
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

MAs in emerging markets in late 2013 and the
beginning of 2014 may reflect this phenomenon.
Foreign investors may also see the crisis as an
opportunity to pick up assets at relatively low
cost. Furthermore, some affected developing
countries (e.g. Indonesia) have intensified their
efforts to attract long-term capital flows or FDI to
compensate for the loss in short-term flows. Their
efforts essentially concentrate on further promoting
and facilitating inward FDI (chapter III). The impact
of tapering on FDI flows may evolve differently by
type of FDI.
• Export-oriented FDI: Currency depreciation,
if continued, can increase the attractiveness
of affected emerging economies to foreign
investors by lowering the costs of production
and increasing export competitiveness.
• Domestic market-oriented FDI: Reduced
demand and slower growth could lead to some
downscaling or delay of FDI in the countries
most affected. The impact on domestic-
market-oriented affiliates varies by sector and
industry. Foreign affiliates in the services sector
are particularly susceptible to local demand
conditions.
Reviving MA activity in the beginning of 2014.
An overall increase of FDI inflows and the rise of
developed countries as FDI hosts are apparent
in the value of cross-border MAs announced in
the beginning of 2014. For the first four months of
2014, the global market for cross-border MAs was
worth about $500 billion (including divestments), the
highest level since 2007 and more than twice the
value during the same period in 2013 (figure I.24).
The deals in this period were financed either by
stocks or by cash held in the form of retained
earnings abroad. The 10 largest deals announced
in the first quarter of 2014 all targeted companies in
developed countries (table I.8); in 2013 only 5 of the
top 10 deals were invested in developed countries.
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Foreign direct investment
QE2 QE3
Portfolio investment
QE1
Figure I.23. Portfolio investment and FDI inflows to emerging markets, quarterly Index, 2005 Q1–2013 Q4
(Base 100: quarterly average of 2005)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics); IMF for portfolio investment.
Note: 2013 Q4 is estimated.
Countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, the Russian Federation,
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Responses to this year’s World Investment
Prospects Survey (WIPS) support an opti-
mistic scenario. This year’s survey generated
responses from 164 TNCs, collected between
February and April 2014, and from 80 IPAs in 74
countries. Respondents revealed that they are still
uncertain about the investment outlook for 2014
but had a bright forecast for the following
two years (figure I.25). For 2016, half of the
respondents had positive expectations and
almost none felt pessimistic about the invest-
ment climate. When asked about their intend-
ed FDI expenditures, half of the respondents
forecasted an increase over the 2013 level
in each of the next three years (2014–2016).
Among the factors positively affecting FDI
over the next three years, respondents most
frequently cited the state of the economies
of the United States, the BRIC (Brazil, Rus-
sian Federation, India and China), and the
EU-28. Negative factors remain the pending
sovereign debt issues and fear of rising pro-
tectionism in trade and investment.
In the medium term, FDI expenditures are
set to increase in all sectors. However, low-
tech manufacturing industries are expected
to see FDI decreases in 2014. According to
the WIPS responses, TNCs across all sectors will
either maintain or increase FDI in 2015 and 2016.
In contrast, for 2014 investors expressed some
uncertainties about their plans, with respondents
from some low-tech industries in the manufacturing
sector forecasting decreases of expenditures.
Figure I.24. Global markets for cross-border MAs on
announcement basis January–April of each year
of 2007–2014, by group of economies
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border
MA database.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1 000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Developed-country targets Developing- and transition-
economy targets
Table I.8. Top 10 largest cross-border MA announcements by value of transaction,
January–April 2014
Date
announced
Target company Target industry Target nation Acquiror name
Value of
transaction
($ million)
Acquiror ultimate
parent firm
Acquiror ultimate
parent nation
04/28/2014 AstraZeneca PLC Pharmaceutical preparations United Kingdom Pfizer Inc 106 863 Pfizer Inc United States
04/04/2014 Lafarge SA Cement, hydraulic France Holcim Ltd 25 909 Holcim Ltd Switzerland
02/18/2014
Forest Laboratories
Inc
Pharmaceutical preparations United States Actavis PLC 25 110 Actavis PLC Ireland
04/30/2014
Alstom SA-Energy
Businesses
Turbines and turbine gene-
rator sets
France GE 17 124 GE United States
04/22/2014
GlaxoSmithKline
PLC-Oncology
Pharmaceutical preparations United Kingdom Novartis AG 16 000 Novartis AG Switzerland
01/13/2014 Beam Inc
Wines, brandy, and brandy
spirits
United States Suntory Holdings Ltd 13 933
Kotobuki Realty
Co Ltd
Japan
03/17/2014
Grupo Corporativo
ONO SA
Telephone communications,
except radiotelephone
Spain
Vodafone Holdings
Europe SLU
10 025 Vodafone Group PLC United Kingdom
02/21/2014 Scania AB
Motor vehicles and passenger
car bodies
Sweden Volkswagen AG 9 162
Porsche Automobil
Holding SE
Germany
04/22/2014
Novartis AG-Vac-
cines Business
Biological products, except
diagnostic substances
Switzerland GlaxoSmithKline PLC 7 102 GlaxoSmithKline PLC United Kingdom
03/16/2014 RWE Dea AG
Crude petroleum and natural
gas
Germany L1 Energy 7 099
LetterOne Holdings
SA
Luxembourg
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border MA database.

Figure I.26. IPAs’ selection of most promising industries
for attracting FDI in their own country
(Percentage of IPA respondents)
Source: UNCTAD survey.
Note: Based on responses from 80 IPAs. Aggregated by region or economic grouping to
which responding IPAs belong.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Miningpetroleum
Utilities
Hotelsrestaurants
Construction
Agriculture
Machineryandequipment
Machinery
Businessactivities
Transportcomm.
Finance
Hotelsrestaurants
Food
Construction
Utilities
Textiles
Africa Asia Developed
economies
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
Transition
economies
Respondents from manufacturing industries such
as textiles, wood and wood products, construction
products, metals and machinery indicated a fall in
investments in 2014. By 2016, almost half of TNCs
in all sectors expect to see an increase in their FDI
expenditures, in line with their rising optimism about
the global investment environment.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2014 2015 2016
Pessimistic Neutral Optimistic
Figure I.25. TNCs’ perception of the global
investment climate, 2014–2016
(Percentage of respondents)
Note: Based on responses from 164 companies.
Echoing the prospects perceived by TNCs, IPAs
also see more investment opportunities in services
than in manufacturing. Indeed, few IPAs selected
a manufacturing industry as one of the top three
promising industries. However, the view from
IPAs differs for inward FDI by region (figure I.26).
IPAs in developed economies anticipate good
prospects for FDI in machinery, business services,
such as computer programming and consultancy,
and transport and communication, especially
telecommunications. African IPAs expect further
investments in the extractive and utilities industries,
while Latin American IPAs emphasize finance
and tourism services. Asian IPAs refer to positive
prospects in construction, agriculture and machinery.
IPAs in transition economies have high expectations
in construction, utilities and textiles.
FDI expenditures are set to grow, especially
from developing countries, and to be directed
more to other developing countries. This
year’s survey results show diverging trends across
groups of economies with regard to investment
expenditures. More than half of the respondents
from the developing and transition economies

Figure I.27. IPAs’ selection of most promising investor
home economies for FDI in 2014–2016
(Percentage of IPA respondents selecting economy
as a top source of FDI)
Note: Based on responses from 80 IPAs.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
UnitedStates
China
Japan
UnitedKingdom
Germany
India
France
Canada
RepublicofKorea
Brazil
UnitedArabEmirates
Netherlands
RussianFederation
Turkey
Developed economies
Developing and transition economies
foresaw an increase in FDI expenditures
in 2014 (57 per cent) and in the medium
term (63 per cent). In contrast, TNCs from
developed countries expected to increase
their investment budgets in only 47 per cent
of cases, in both the short and medium
terms.
Developed economies remain important
sources of FDI but are now accompanied
by major developing countries such as
the BRIC, the United Arab Emirates, the
Republic of Korea and Turkey. Indeed, China
is consistently ranked the most promising
source of FDI, together with the United
States (figure I.27). Among the developed
economies, the United States, Japan, the
United Kingdom, Germany and France are
ranked as the most promising developed-
economy investors, underscoring their
continuing role in global FDI flows. As
to host economies, this year’s ranking is
largely consistent with past ones, with only
minor changes. South-East Asian countries
such as Viet Nam, Malaysia and Singapore,
and some developed economies, such as
the United Kingdom, Australia, France and
Poland, gained some positions, while Japan
and Mexico lost some (figure I.28).
Figure I.28. TNCs’ top prospective host economies
for 2014–2016
(Percentage of respondents selecting economy
as a top destination, (x)=2013 ranking)
Note: Based on responses from 164 companies.
0 10 20 30 40 50
10 Russian Federation (11)
17 Singapore (22)
15 Japan (10)
15 Malaysia (16)
13 Mexico (7)
13 Poland (14)
12 France (16)
10 Australia (13)
9 Viet Nam (11)
8 Thailand (8)
7 United Kingdom (9)
6 Germany (6)
5 Brazil (5)
4 India (3)
3 Indonesia (4)
2 United States (2)
1 China (1)
Developing and
Developed economies

International production continued to gain
strength in 2013, with all indicators of foreign
affiliate activity rising, albeit at different
growth rates (table I.9). Sales rose the most,
by 9.4 per cent, mainly driven by relatively high
economic growth and consumption in developing
and transition economies. The growth rate of
7.9 per cent in foreign assets reflects the strong
performance of stock markets and, indeed, is in
line with the growth rate of FDI outward stock.
Employment and value added of foreign affiliates
grew at about the same rate as FDI outflows – 5 per
cent – while exports of foreign affiliates registered
only a small increase of 2.5 per cent. For foreign
employment, the 5 per cent growth rate represents
a positive trend, consolidating the increase in 2012
following some years of stagnation in the growth
of the workforce, both foreign and national. By
contrast, a 5.8 per cent growth rate for value added
represents a slower trend since 2011, when value
added rebounded after the financial crisis. These
patterns suggest that international production is
growing more slowly than before the crisis.
Cash holdings for the top 5,000 TNCs remained
high in 2013, accounting for more than 11 per
cent of their total assets (figure I.29), a level
similar to 2010, in the immediate aftermath of
the crisis. At the end of 2013, the top TNCs from
developed economies had cash holdings, including
short-term investments, estimated at $3.5 trillion,
compared with roughly $1.0 trillion for firms from
developing and transition economies. However,
while developing-country TNCs have held their
cash-to-assets ratios relatively constant over time
at about 12 per cent, developed-country TNCs
have increased their ratios since the crisis, from
an average of 9 per cent in 2006–2008 to more
than 11 per cent in 2010, and they maintained that
ratio through 2013. This shift may reflect the greater
risk aversion of developed-economy corporations,
which are adopting cash holding ratios similar to
the ones prevalent in the developing world. Taking
the average cash-to-assets ratio in 2006–2008 as a
benchmark, developed-country TNCs in 2013 had
an estimated additional amount of cash holdings of
$670 billion.
Given the easy access to finance enjoyed by large
firms, partly thanks to the intervention of central
banks in the aftermath of the crisis, financial
constraints might not be the only reason for the
slow recovery of investments. However, easy
money measures did not lead to a full recovery
of debt financing to its pre-crisis level (figure I.30);
in 2013, net debt issuance amounted to just
under $500 billion, almost a third less than the
level in 2008. At the same time, corporations did
increase share buy-backs and dividend payments,
producing total cash outflows of about $1 trillion
in 2013. Two factors underlie this behaviour: on
the one hand, corporations are repaying debt and
rewarding their shareholders to achieve greater
stability in an economic environment still perceived
as uncertain, and on the other hand, depending in
which industry they operate, they are adopting a
very cautious attitude toward investment because
of weak demand.
Figure I.30 shows sources and uses of cash at
an aggregate level for the biggest public TNCs,
which hides important industry-specific dynamics.
In fact, overall capital expenditures (for both
domestic and foreign activities) have increased
in absolute terms over the last three years; at
the same time, expenditures for acquisition of
business have decreased. However, there are wide
differences across industries. TNCs in the oil and
gas, telecommunications and utilities industries all
significantly increased their expenditures (capital
expenditures plus acquisitions), especially in
2013. In contrast, investments in industries such
as consumer goods, and industrials (defined as
transport, aerospace and defence, and electronic
and electrical equipment) fell after the crisis and
have remained low. This is largely consistent with
the level of cash holdings observed by industry.
These industries accumulated cash holdings of
$440 billion and $511 billion between the pre-
crisis period and 2013 (figure I.31). This represents
a jump of more than three and two percentage
points, respectively, to 12.8 and 11.5 per cent. This
suggests that the companies operating in these
industries are the ones most affected by the slow
C. Trends in International Production

economic recovery and related persistent demand
slack in developed countries.
The other industries with bulging cash holdings are
computer services and software (here represented
by technology), which in 2013 saw an increase in
cash holdings of $319 billion over the pre-crisis level
(figure I.31). On the one hand, firms with more growth
opportunities and with high RD expenditures have
higher cash holdings than the average because
returns on research activities are highly risky
and unpredictable; hence firms prefer to rely on
cash generated in-house rather than on external
resources. On the other hand, these technology
industries – as well as health care industries – often
move intellectual property and drug patents to low-
tax jurisdictions, letting earnings from those assets
pile up offshore to avoid paying high home taxes.
This adds significantly to corporate cash stockpiles.
Table I.9. Selected indicators of FDI and international production,
2013 and selected years
Item
Value at current prices
1990
2005–2007
(pre-crisis average)
2011 2012 2013
FDI inflows 208 1 493 1 700 1 330 1 452
FDI outflows 241 1 532 1 712 1 347 1 411
FDI inward stock 2 078 14 790 21 117 23 304 25 464
FDI outward stock 2 088 15 884 21 913 23 916 26 313
Income on inward FDI a
79 1 072 1 603 1 581 1 748
Rate of return on inward FDI b
3.8 7.3 6.9 7.6 6.8
Income on outward FDI a
126 1 135 1 550 1 509 1 622
Rate of return on outward FDI b
6.0 7.2 6.5 7.1 6.3
Cross-border MAs 111 780 556 332 349
Sales of foreign affiliates 4 723 21 469 28 516 31 532c
34 508c
Value-added (product) of foreign affiliates 881 4 878 6 262 7 089c
7 492c
Total assets of foreign affiliates 3 893 42 179 83 754 89 568c
96 625c
Exports of foreign affiliates 1 498 5 012d
7 463d
7 532d
7 721d
Employment by foreign affiliates (thousands) 20 625 53 306 63 416 67 155c
70 726c
Memorandum:
GDP 22 327 51 288 71 314 72 807 74 284
Gross fixed capital formation 5 072 11 801 16 498 17 171 17 673
Royalties and licence fee receipts 29 161 250 253 259
Exports of goods and services 4 107 15 034 22 386 22 593e
23 160e
Source: UNCTAD.
a
Based on data from 179 countries for income on inward FDI and 145 countries for income on outward FDI in 2013, in both
cases representing more than 90 per cent of global inward and outward stocks.
b
Calculated only for countries with both FDI income and stock data.
c
Data for 2012 and 2013 are estimated using a fixed effects panel regression of each variable against outward stock and a
lagged dependent variable for the period 1980–2010.
d
Data for 1995–1997 are based on a linear regression of exports of foreign affiliates against inward FDI stock for the period
1982–1994. For 1998–2013, the share of exports of foreign affiliates in world exports in 1998 (33.3 per cent) was applied to
obtain values.
e
Data from IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2014.
Note: Not included in this table are the values of worldwide sales by foreign affiliates associated with their parent firms through
non-equity relationships and of the sales of the parent firms themselves. Worldwide sales, gross product, total assets,
exports and employment of foreign affiliates are estimated by extrapolating the worldwide data of foreign affiliates of
TNCs from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for sales; those from the
Czech Republic, France, Israel, Japan, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for value added (product);
those from Austria, Germany, Japan and the United States for assets; those from the Czech Republic, Japan, Portugal,
Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for exports; and those from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao (China), Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States for employment, on the basis of three-year average shares of those countries in
worldwide outward FDI stock.

For example, Apple (United States) has added
$103 billion to its cash holdings since 2009. Other
United States corporations in these industries such
as Microsoft, Google, Cisco Systems and Pfizer,
are all holding record-high cash reserves.
The cash-to-assets ratios in these
industries are thus normally much higher
and have also increased the most over
the years, from 22 to 26 per cent for
technology and from 15 to 16 per cent
for health care. By contrast, oil and gas
production, basic materials, utilities and
telecommunications are the industries
in which cash holdings have been low
during the period considered (with an
average cash-to-assets ratio of 6–8 per
cent). In the oil and gas industry, not
only have large investments been made
in past years, but United States oil and
gas production and capital spending on
that production have continued to rise,
boosted by the shale gas revolution.
Similarly, big investments have been
required in telecommunications (e.g. 4G
wireless networks, advanced television
and internet services).
The degree of internationalization
of the world’s largest TNCs
remained flat. Data for the top 100
TNCs, most of them from developed
economies, show that their
domestic production – as measured
by domestic assets, sales and
employment – grew faster than their
foreign production. In particular, their
ratio of foreign to total employment
fell for the second consecutive year
(table I.10). Lower internationalization
may be partly explained by onshoring
and relocation of production to home
countries by these TNCs (WIR13).
Similarly, the internationalization level
of the largest 100 TNCs domiciled in
remained stable. However, this was
not due to divestments or relocation
of international businesses, but to larger domestic
investment. Thus, while the foreign assets of TNCs
from these economies rose 14 per cent in 2012 –
faster than the rate of the world’s largest 100 TNCs
– the rise was similar to the increase in domestic
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
4 000
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
11.5
12.0
12.5
13.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
%
Cash holdings by developed economy firms
Cash holdings by developing and transition economy firms
Share of cash holdings in total assets of developed economy firms
Share of cash holdings in total assets of developing and transition economy firms
$billion
Figure I.29. Cash holdings of top 5,000 TNCs and their share
in total assets, 2006–2013
Note: Data based on records of 5,309 companies of which 3,472 were in
developed countries. These do not include non-listed companies such
as many developing country SO-TNCs.
Figure I.30. Top 5,000 TNCs: major cash sources and uses,
2006–2013
Note: Based on records of 5,108 companies, of which 3,365 were in
developed countries. Both domestic and foreign activities are
covered. These companies do not include non-listed companies
such as SOEs.
- 500
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
4 000
sources
uses
sources
uses
sources
uses
sources
uses
sources
uses
sources
uses
sources
uses
sources
uses
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Net issuance of debt Cash from operating activities
Capital expenditures Acquisition of business
Net issuance of stock Total cash dividends paid

Figure I.31. Cash holdings and their ratio to total assets, top 5,000 TNCs,
by industry, 2006–2008 and 2013
Note: Data based on records of 5,309 companies, of which 3,472 were in developed
countries.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
BasicMaterials
ConsumerGoods
ConsumerServices
HealthCare
Industrials
OilGas
Technology
Telecommunications
Utilities
%
$billion
Yearly average, 2006–2008 2013
Share of cash holdings in total assets on average, 2006–2008 and 2013
Table I.10. Internationalization statistics of the 100 largest non-financial TNCs worldwide and from
(Billions of dollars, thousands of employees and per cent)
Variable
100 largest TNCs worldwide
100 largest TNCs from developing
and transition economies
2011 2012 a 2011–2012
% Change
2013 b 2012–2013
% Change
2011 2012 % Change
Assets
Foreign 7 634 7 888 3 8 035 2 1 321 1 506 14
Domestic 4 897 5 435 11 5 620 3 3 561 4 025 13
Total 12 531 13 323 6 13 656 2 4 882 5 531 13
Foreign as % of total 61 59 -2c
59 0c
27 27 0c
Sales
Foreign 5 783 5 900 2 6 057 3 1 650 1 690 2
Domestic 3 045 3 055 0 3 264 7 1 831 2 172 19
Total 8 827 8 955 1 9 321 4 3 481 3 863 11
Foreign as % of total 66 66 0c
65 -1c
47 44 -4c
Employment
Foreign 9 911 9 821 -1 9 810 0 3 979 4 103 3
Domestic 6 585 7 125 8 7 482 5 6 218 6 493 4
Total 16 496 16 946 3 17 292 2 10 197 10 596 4
Foreign as % of total 60 58 -2c
57 -1c
39 39 0c
Source: UNCTAD.
a
Revised results.
b
Preliminary results.
c
In percentage points.
Note: From 2009 onwards, data refer to fiscal year results reported between 1 April of the base year to 31 March of the
following year. Complete 2013 data for the 100 largest TNCs from developing and transition economies are not yet
available.

assets (13 per cent) (table I.10). The growth of
sales and foreign employment at home outpaced
foreign sales. In particular, the 19 per cent growth
in domestic sales demonstrates the strength of
developing and transition economies.
Notes
1
Greenfield investment projects data refer to announced ones.
The value of a greenfield investment project indicates the
capital expenditure planned by the investor at the time of the
announcement. Data can be substantially different from the
official FDI data as companies can raise capital locally and
phase their investments over time, and the project may be
cancelled or may not start in the year when it is announced.
2
United States Energy Information Administration.
3
United States natural gas prices dropped from nearly $13 per
MMBtu (million British thermal units) in 2008 to $4 per MMBtu
in 2013 (two to three times lower than European gas prices
and four times lower than Japanese prices for liquefied natural
gas).
4
According to UNCTAD database, based on information from
the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
5
Both United States and foreign companies benefit from these
deals. United States operators get financial support, while
foreign companies gain experience in horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing that may be transferable to other regions.
Most of the foreign investment in these joint ventures involves
buying a percentage of the host company’s shale acreages
through an upfront cash payment with a commitment to cover
a portion of the drilling cost. Foreign investors in joint ventures
pay upfront cash and commit to cover the cost of drilling extra
wells within an agreed-upon time frame, usually between 2 and
10 years.
6
American Chemical Council, “Shale Gas Competitiveness, and
new US chemical industry investment: an analysis based on
announced projects”, May 2013.
7
As examples, South African Sasol is investing some $20 billion
in Louisiana plants that turn gas into plastic, in the largest-
ever manufacturing project by a foreign direct investor in the
United States; Formosa Plastics from Taiwan Province of
China plans two new factories in Texas to make ethylene and
propylene, key components in the manufacture of plastics and
carpets; EuroChem, a Russian company that makes fertilizers,
is building an ammonia plant in Louisiana, where proximity to
the Mississippi River provides easy access to Midwest farms.
Recently the CEO of Saudi Basic Industries Corporation
(SABIC), the world’s biggest petrochemicals maker by market
value, disclosed company plans to enter the United States
shale market.
8
The potential sharp decline in revenues as a firm’s patents
on one or more leading products expire from the consequent
opening up of the market to generic alternatives.
9
Innovation used to drive this industry, but outsourcing of RD
activities has become one of the key industry trends in the past
decade as a result of big TNCs shifting their RD efforts in the
face of patent cliffs and cost pressures (IMAP, Global Pharma
Biotech MA Report 2014, www.imap.com, accessed on 2
April 2014).
10
“India approves $1.6bn acquisition of Agila Specialties by
Mylan”, 4 September 2014, www.ft.com.
11
“Pharma biotech stock outlook – Dec 2013 – industry
outlook”, 3 December 2013, www.nasdaq.com.
12
“Big pharma deals are back on the agenda”, Financial Times,
22 April 2014.
13
In the absence of global FDI data specific to the
pharmaceutical industry, trends in cross-border MA deals
and greenfield FDI projects are used to represent the global
FDI trends in this industry. Subindustries included in MA deals
are the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical
products, botanical products and biological products. In
greenfield FDI projects, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.
14
In the United States, FDI inflows to this industry represented
about one quarter of manufacturing FDI in 2010–2012
(“Foreign direct investment in the United States”, 23 October
2013, www.whitehouse.gov).
15
For the period 2003–2013, the number of greenfield FDI
projects was between 200 and 290, with an annual average
of 244, while that of cross-border MAs was between 170 and
280, with an annual average of 234.
16
PwC (2014), Pharmaceutical and Life Science Deals Insights
Quarterly, quoted in “Strong Q4 pharmaceutical life sciences
MA momentum expected to continue into 2014, according to
PwC” (PwCUS, press release, 10 February 2014).
17
“Why did one of the world’s largest generic drug makers exit
China?”, Forbes, 3 February 2014, www.forbes.com.
18
The largest deals reported in the first quarter of 2014 were a
$4.3 billion acquisition of Bristol-Myers Squibb (United States)
by AstraZeneca (United Kingdom) through its Swedish affiliate,
followed by a $4.2 billion merger between Shire (Ireland) and
ViroPharma (United States).
19
Among them, the largest so far was a bid made by Pfizer
(United States) for AstraZeneca (United Kingdom) (table I.8).
Even though Pfizer walked away, AstraZeneca may look for
another merger option with a smaller United States company
(“Big pharma deals are back on the agenda”, Financial Times,
22 April 2014).
20
“Corporate takeovers: Return of the big deal”, The Economist,
3 May 2014.
21
In 2008, no information on transaction value was available for
transition economies.
22
Daiichi Sankyo plans to divest in 2014.
23
Abbott Laboratories (United States) acquired the Healthcare
Solutions business of Piramal Healthcare (India). In transition
economies, only $7 million was recorded in 2010.
24
The largest deal was a $1.9 billion acquisition of
Agila Specialties, a Bangalore-based manufacturer of
pharmaceuticals, from Strides Arcolab (United States) by Mylan
(United States).
25
When deals in biological products are excluded, the share of
developing and transition economies in 2013 exceeded 30 per
cent.
26
GlaxoSmithKline (United Kingdom) has announced plans to
invest over $200 million in sub-Saharan Africa in the next five
years to expand its existing manufacturing capacities in Kenya,
Nigeria and South Africa and to build new factories in Ethiopia,
Ghana and/or Rwanda, as well as the world’s first open-
access RD laboratory for non-communicable diseases in
Africa, creating 500 new jobs (“Drugmaker GSK to invest $200
mln in African factories, RD”, 31 March 2014, www.reuters.
com).
27
“The world of pharma in 2014 – serialization, regulations, and
rising API costs”, 23 January 2014, www.thesmartcube.com.
28
IMAP, Global Pharma Biotech MA Report 2014, www.imap.
com, accessed on 2 April 2014.
29
For example, “Low-Cost Drugs in Poor Nations Get a Lift in
Indian Court”, The New York Times, 1 April 2013.

30
See, for example, “What does Mylan get for $1.6 billion? A
vaccine maker with a troubled factory”, 24 September 2013,
www.forbes.com; “US drug regulator slams poor maintenance
of Ranbaxy plant”, 27 January 2014, http://indiatoday.intoday.
in.
31
See UNCTAD (2013a) for details.
32
Data on the world’s top 250 retailers show that these
companies receive about one quarter of their revenues from
abroad (Deloitte, 2013).
33
Laurie Burkitt and Shelly Banjo, “Wal-Mart Takes a Pause in
China “, Wall Street Journal, 16 October 2013.
34
Reuters, “Carrefour sells stake in Middle East venture for
$683m”, Al Arabiya News, 22 May 2013.
35
In 2011, for example, Aldi (Germany) took over Walgreen’s and
Home Depot in the United States.
36
Latin American Private Equity Venture Capital Association,
as quoted in “LatAm investment hit six-year high”, Private
Equity International, 20 February 2014, and “PE drives LatAM
infrastructure”, 16 December 2013, Financial Times.
37
European Central Bank, 2013 SMEs’ Access to Finance
Survey, http://ec.europa.eu.
38
Forecast by Cushman Wakefield.
39
As reported in an interview with the managing director of
Kazanah: “We have a mandate to ‘crowd-in’ and catalyze
some parts of the economy, hence we tend to find our natural
home in those areas where there is a strategic benefit, perhaps
in providing an essential service or key infrastructure, and
where there are high barriers to entry for the private sector,
inter alia very long investment horizons or large balance sheet
requirements.”
40
Available at http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2013/07/30/
malaysias-khazanah-not-just-a-swf-but-a-nation-building-
institution/.
41
In UNCTAD’s definition, SO-TNCs are TNCs that are at least
10 per cent owned by the State or public entities, or in which
the State or public entity is the largest shareholder or has a
“golden share”.
42
UNCTAD has revamped the SO-TNC database by strictly
applying its definition, thereby shortening the list of SO-TNCs.
In addition, some majority privately owned TNCs, in which
the State has acquired a considerable share through financial
investment, are no longer considered State-owned. See,
e.g., Karl P. Sauvant and Jonathan Strauss, “State-controlled
entities control nearly US$ 2 trillion in foreign assets”, Columbia
FDI Perspectives, No. 64 April 2, 2012.
Nihic tem, Ti. Effre, voltis, nostra traci iaelut fat orum ine

CHAPTER II
REGIONAL
INVESTMENT
TRENDS

Introduction
In 2013, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows
increased in all three major economic groups –
developed, developing and transition economies
(table II.1) – although at different growth rates.
FDI flows to developing economies reached a new
high of $778 billion, accounting for 54 per cent of
global inflows in 2013. Flows to most developing
subregions were up. Developing Asia remained
the largest host region in the world. FDI flows to
transition economies recorded a 28 per cent
increase, to $108 billion. FDI flows to developed
countries increased by 9 per cent to $566 billion
– still only 60 per cent of their pre-crisis average
during 2005–2007. FDI flows to the structurally
weak, vulnerable and small economies fell by 3 per
cent in 2013, from $58 billion in 2012 to $57 billion,
as the growth of FDI to least developed countries
(LDCs) was not enough to offset the decrease
of FDI to small island developing States (SIDS)
and landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)
(table II.1). Their share in the world total also fell,
from 4.4 per cent in 2012 to 3.9 per cent.
Outward FDI from developed economies stagnated
at $857 billion in 2013, accounting for a record low
share of 61 per cent in global outflows. In contrast,
flows from developing economies remained resilient,
rising by 3 per cent to reach a new high of $454
billion. Flows from developing Asia and Africa rose
while those from Latin America and the Caribbean
declined. Developing Asia remained a large source
of FDI, accounting for more than one fifth of the
global total. And flows from transition economies
rose significantly – by 84 per cent – reaching a new
high of $99 billion.
Table II.1. FDI flows, by region, 2011–2013
Region FDI inflows FDI outflows
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
World 1 700 1 330 1 452 1 712 1 347 1 411
European Union 490 216 246 585 238 250
North America 263 204 250 439 422 381
Africa 48 55 57 7 12 12
Asia 431 415 426 304 302 326
South Asia 44 32 36 13 9 2
West Asia 53 48 44 22 19 31
Oceania 2 3 3 1 2 1
58 58 57 12 10 9
LDCs 22 24 28 4 4 5
LLDCs 36 34 30 6 3 4
SIDS 6 7 6 2 2 1
Developed economies 51.8 38.8 39.0 71.0 63.3 60.8
European Union 28.8 16.2 17.0 34.2 17.7 17.8
North America 15.5 15.3 17.2 25.6 31.4 27.0
Developing economies 42.6 54.8 53.6 24.7 32.7 32.2
Africa 2.8 4.1 3.9 0.4 0.9 0.9
Asia 25.3 31.2 29.4 17.8 22.4 23.1
East and South-East Asia 19.6 25.1 23.9 15.8 20.3 20.7
South Asia 2.6 2.4 2.4 0.8 0.7 0.2
West Asia 3.1 3.6 3.0 1.3 1.4 2.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 14.3 19.2 20.1 6.5 9.2 8.1
Oceania 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Transition economies 5.6 6.3 7.4 4.3 4.0 7.0
3.4 4.4 3.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
LDCs 1.3 1.8 1.9 0.3 0.3 0.3
LLDCs 2.1 2.5 2.0 0.4 0.2 0.3
SIDS 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1
Source: UNCTAD, FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a
Without double counting.

CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 37
1. Africa
A. REGIONAL TRENDS
Figure C. FDI outflows, 2007–2013
Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
Fig. B - Africa
FDI inflows
Share in
world total
Central Africa Southern Africa West Africa
East Africa North Africa
Fig. C - Africa
FDI outflows
2.6 3.3 4.6 3.3 2.8 4.1 3.9 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.9
0
15
30
45
60
75
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
- 4
0
4
8
12
16
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Africa Southern Africa West Africa
East Africa North Africa
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013
Fig. FID flows - Africa
(Host) (Home)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Morocco
Egypt
Nigeria
Mozambique
South
Africa
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2013 2012 2013 2012
Liberia
Sudan
Nigeria
Angola
South
Africa
Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies,
by range,a
2013
Range Inflows Outflows
Above
$3.0 billion
South Africa, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Ghana
and Sudan
South Africa
$2.0 to
$2.9 billion
Democratic Republic of the Congo
and the Congo
Angola
$1.0 to
$1.9 billion
Equatorial Guinea, United
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia,
Algeria, Mauritania, Uganda,
Tunisia and Liberia
Nigeria
$0.5 to
$0.9 billion
Ethiopia, Gabon, Madagascar,
Libya, Namibia, Niger, Sierra
Leone, Cameroon, Chad and Kenya
Sudan and Liberia
$0.1 to
$0.4 billion
Mali, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso,
Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Senegal,
Djibouti, Mauritius, Botswana,
Seychelles, Malawi, Rwanda and
Somalia
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Morocco,
Egypt, Zambia, Libya, Cameroon and
Mauritius
Below
$0.1 billion
Togo, Swaziland, Lesotho, Eritrea,
São Tomé and Principe, Gambia,
Guinea, Cabo Verde, Guinea-
Bissau, Comoros, Burundi, Central
African Republic and Angola
Gabon, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Benin, Togo,
Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Tunisia,
Lesotho, Rwanda, Mali, Ghana, Seychelles,
Kenya, Mauritania, Cabo Verde, Guinea,
Swaziland, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and
Principe, Botswana, Mozambique, Uganda,
Niger, Namibia and Algeria
a
Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
Table C. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World -1 254 3 848 629 3 019
Developed economies -3 500 -8 953 635 2 288
European Union 841 -4 831 1 261 1 641
North America -1 622 -5 196 19 -17
Australia -1 753 141 -645 664
Developing economies 2 172 12 788 -7 731
Africa 126 130 126 130
Asia 2 050 13 341 145 596
China 1 580 7 271 - 78
India 22 419 410 233
Indonesia - 1 753 212 -
Singapore 271 543 -615 167
Transition economies - - - -
Table B. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2012–2013
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total -1 254 3 848 629 3 019
Primary -1 125 135 308 289
Mining, quarrying and petroleum -1 148 135 286 289
Manufacturing 231 3 326 1 518 1 632
Food, beverages and tobacco 634 1 023 185 244
Chemicals and chemical products 17 16 -162 -
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical botanical prod. 42 567 502 1 310
Non-metallic mineral products -25 1 706 81 -
Services -360 387 -1 197 1 098
Transportation and storage 2 27 2 27
Information and communication -750 -207 -11 105
Financial and insurance activities 335 240 -1 688 653
Business services 24 104 374 135
Table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
Sector/industry
Africa as destination Africa as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 47 455 53 596 7 764 15 807
Primary 7 479 5 735 455 7
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 7 479 3 795 455 7
Manufacturing 21 129 13 851 4 013 7 624
Food, beverages and tobacco 2 227 1 234 438 373
Textiles, clothing and leather 206 1 750 34 128
Non-metallic mineral products 1 067 3 616 674 2 896
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 2 316 1 593 - 108
Services 18 847 34 010 3 296 8 177
Electricity, gas and water 6 401 11 788 60 -
Construction 3 421 3 514 - 1 005
Transport, storage and communications 3 147 7 652 1 221 2 558
Business services 1 892 7 096 889 2 662
Table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
Partner region/economy
Africa as destination Africa as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 47 455 53 596 7 764 15 807
Developed economies 17 541 27 254 1 802 2 080
European Union 8 114 16 308 370 960
United States 4 844 2 590 1 362 1 076
Japan 708 1 753 39 -
Developing economies 29 847 26 234 5 962 13 652
Africa 4 019 12 231 4 019 12 231
Nigeria 711 2 261 161 2 729
South Africa 1 397 4 905 396 344
Asia 25 586 13 807 1 474 1 337
China 1 771 303 102 140
India 7 747 5 628 149 68
Transition economies 67 108 - 76

FDI inflows to Africa rose by 4 per cent to $57 billion,
driven by international and regional market-seeking
flows, and infrastructure investments. Expectations
for sustained economic and population growth
continue to attract market-seeking FDI into
consumer-oriented industries. Intraregional
investments are increasing, led by South African,
Kenyan and Nigerian corporations. Most of the
outflows were directed to other countries in the
continent, paving the way for investment-driven
regional integration.
Consumer-oriented sectors are beginning
to drive FDI growth. Expectations for further
sustained economic and population growth
underlie investors’ continued interest not only in
extractive industries but also in consumer-market-
oriented sectors that target the rising middle-class
population (WIR13).1
This group is estimated to
have expanded 30 per cent over the past decade,
reaching 120 million people. Reflecting this change,
FDI is starting to diversify into consumer-market-
oriented industries, including consumer products
such as foods, information technology (IT), tourism,
finance and retail. Similarly, driven by the growing
trade and consumer markets, infrastructure FDI
showed strong increases in transport and in
information and communication technology (ICT).
Data on announced greenfield investment
projects (table D) show that the services sector
is driving inflows (see also chapter I). In particular,
investments are targeting construction, utilities,
business services and telecommunications. The
fall in the value of greenfield investment projects
targeting the manufacturing sector was caused
by sharply decreasing flows in resource-based
industries such as coke and petroleum products,
and metal and metal products, both of which fell
by about 70 per cent. By contrast, announced
greenfield projects show rising inflows in the textile
industry and high interest by international investors
in motor vehicle industries. Data on cross-border
merger and acquisition (MA) sales show a sharp
increase in the manufacturing sector, targeting the
food processing industry, construction materials
(non-metallic mineral products) and pharmaceutical
industries (table B).
Some foreign TNCs are starting to invest in
research and development (RD) in agriculture
in the continent, motivated by declining yields,
global warming, concerns about supply shortages
and the sectoral need for a higher level of
technological development. For example, in 2013,
Dupont (United States) gained a majority stake in the
seed company Pannar by promising to invest $6.2
million by 2017 to establish an RD hub in South
Africa to develop new seed technology for the region.
Similarly, Barry Callebaut (Switzerland) inaugurated
its Cocoa Centre of Excellence to promote advanced
agricultural techniques in Côte d’Ivoire, the world’s
largest cocoa-producing country. That investment is
estimated at $1.1 million.
Technology firms have also started to invest
in innovation in Africa. In November 2013, IBM
opened its first African research laboratory, on the
outskirts of Nairobi, with an investment of more than
$10 million for the first two years. The facility reflects
IBM’s interest in a continent where smartphones
are becoming commonplace. Kenya has become
a world leader in payment by mobile phone, stirring
hope that Africa can use technology to leapfrog
more established economies. In October, Microsoft
announced a partnership with three African
technology incubation hubs to develop businesses
based on cloud-computing systems. In the last few
years, Google has funded start-up hubs in Nigeria,
Kenya and South Africa, as part of a push to invest
in innovation in Africa.
Trends in FDI flows vary by subregion. Flows
to North Africa decreased by 7 per cent to $15.5
billion (figure B). However, with this relatively high
level of FDI, investors appear to be ready to return
to the region. FDI to Egypt fell by 19 per cent but
remained the highest in the subregion at $5.6
billion. In fact, many foreign investors, especially
producers of consumer products, remain attracted
by Egypt’s large population (the largest in the
subregion) and cheap labour costs. Most of the
neighbouring countries saw increasing flows.
Morocco attracted increased investment of $3.4
billion – especially in the manufacturing sector, with
Nissan alone planning to invest about $0.5 billion in
a new production site – as well as in the real estate,
food processing and utility sectors. In Algeria, the
Government is intensifying efforts to reform the
market and attract more foreign investors. As an
example, State-owned Société de Gestion des
Participations Industries Manufacturières concluded

an agreement with Taypa Tekstil Giyim (Turkey),
to construct a multimillion-dollar centre in the
textile-clothing industry. Among other objectives,
the partnership aims to promote public-private
joint ventures in Algeria and to create employment
opportunities for more than 10,000 people,
according to the Algerian Ministry of Industry.
FDI flows to West Africa declined by 14 per cent, to
$14.2 billion, much of that due to decreasing flows
to Nigeria. Uncertainties over the long-awaited
petroleum industry bill and security issues triggered
a series of asset disposals from foreign TNCs.
National champions and other developing-country
TNCs are taking over the assets of the retreating
TNCs. Examples are two pending megadeals
that will see Total (France) and ConocoPhillips
(United States) sell their Nigerian assets to
Sinopec Group (China) and local Oando PLC for
$2.5 billion and $1.8 billion, respectively. By
contrast, in 2013 Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire
started to produce oil, attracting considerable
investment from companies such as Royal Dutch
Shell (United Kingdom), ExxonMobil (United
States), China National Offshore Oil Company
(CNOOC) and China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), as well as from State-owned
petroleum companies in Thailand and India.
Central Africa attracted $8.2 billion of FDI in 2013, a
fall of 18 per cent from the previous year. Increasing
political turmoil in the Central African Republic and
the persisting armed conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo could have negatively
influenced foreign investors. In East Africa, flows
surged by 15 per cent to $6.2 billion, driven
by rising flows to Kenya and Ethiopia. Kenya is
developing as the favoured business hub, not only
for oil and gas exploration in the subregion but also
for industrial production and transport. The country
is set to develop further as a regional hub for
energy, services and manufacturing over the next
decade. Ethiopia’s industrial strategy is attracting
Asian capital to develop its manufacturing base. In
2013, Huanjin Group (China) opened its first factory
for shoe production, with a view to establishing a
$2 billion hub for light manufacturing. Early in the
year, Julphar (United Arab Emirates), in conjunction
with its local partner, Medtech, officially inaugurated
its first pharmaceutical manufacturing facility in
Africa in Addis Ababa. Julphar’s investment in the
construction of the plant is estimated at around
$8.5 million. Uganda, the United Republic of
Tanzania and Madagascar maintained relatively
high inward flows, thanks to the development of
their gas and mineral sectors.
FDI flows to Southern Africa almost doubled in 2013,
jumping to $13.2 billion from $6.7 billion in 2012,
mainly owing to record-high flows to South Africa
and Mozambique. In both countries, infrastructure
was the main attraction. In Mozambique,
investments in the gas sector also played a role.
Angola continued to register net divestments, albeit
at a lower rate than in past years. Because foreign
investors in that country are asked to team with
local partners, projects are failing to materialize for
lack of those partners, despite strong demand.2
Outward FDI flows from Africa rose marginally
to $12 billion. The main investors were South Africa,
Angola and Nigeria, with flows mostly directed to
neighbouring countries. South African outward
FDI almost doubled, to $5.6 billion, powered
by investments in telecommunications, mining
and retail. Nigeria outflows were concentrated
in building materials and financial services. A few
emerging TNCs expanded their reach over the
continent. In addition to well-known South African
investors (such as Bidvest, Anglo Gold Ashanti,
MTN, Shoprite, Pick’n’Pay, Aspen Pharmacare and
Naspers), some other countries’ conglomerates
are upgrading their cross-border operations first
in neighbouring countries and then across the
whole continent. For example, Sonatrach (Algeria)
is present in many African countries in the oil and
gas sector. Other examples include the Dangote
and Simba Groups (Nigeria), which are active in
the cement, agriculture and oil-refining industries.
Orascom (Egypt), active in the building materials
and chemicals industries, is investing in North
African countries. Sameer Group (Kenya) is involved
in industries that include agriculture, manufacturing,
distribution, high-tech, construction, transport and
finance. The Comcraft Group (Kenya), active in the
services sector, is extending its presence beyond
the continent into Asian markets.
Regional integration efforts intensified.
African leaders are seeking to accelerate regional
integration, which was first agreed to in the 1991
Abuja Treaty. The treaty provided for the African

Economic Community to be set up through a
gradual process, which would be achieved by
coordinating, harmonizing and progressively
integrating the activities of regional economic
communities (RECs).3
Recent efforts in this direction
include a summit of African Union leaders in January
2012 that endorsed a new action plan to establish
a Continental Free Trade Area. In addition, several
RECs plan to establish monetary unions as part of a
broader effort to promote regional integration.
Another example of these integration efforts was the
launch of negotiations on the COMESA-EAC-SADC
Free Trade Area in 2011, between the Common
Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the
East African Community (EAC) and the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). The
Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (FTA) involves
26 African countries in the strategic objective of
consolidating RECs to achieve a common market
as well as a single investment area. In the Tripartite
Roadmap, Phase I covers the implementation
of the FTA for trade in goods.4
Phase II will
discuss infrastructure and industrial development,
addressing investment issues as well as services,
intellectual property rights, competition policy, and
trade development and competitiveness.
Although Phase II plans to address investment
issues, the primary impact on FDI will most likely
occur through tariff and non-tariff measures,
especially non-tariff barriers, the main remaining
impediment to the free and competitive flow of
goods and services on the continent.
Raising intraregional FDI supports African
leaders’ efforts to achieve deeper regional
integration. The rapid economic growth of the
last decade underlies the rising dynamism of
African firms on the continent, in terms of both
trade and foreign investment.5
Led by the cross-
border operations of TNCs based in the major
economies of the continent, this trend is sustaining
African leaders’ efforts. Intra-African investments
are trending up, driven by a continuous rise in
South African FDI into the continent, as well as by
increases of flows since 2008 from Kenya, Nigeria,
and Northern African countries.6
Between 2009 and 2013, the share of cross-border
greenfield projects – the major investment type in
Africa – originating from other African countries
has increased to 18 per cent, from about 10 per
cent in the period 2003–2008 (figure II.1). All major
investors – South Africa (7 per cent), Kenya (3 per
cent) and Nigeria (2 per cent) – more than doubled
their shares. Over the same five years, the gross
value of cross-border intra-African acquisitions
grew from less than 3 per cent of total investments
in 2003–2008 to more than 9 per cent in the next
five years. Growing consumer markets are a key
force enabling these trends, given that an increasing
amount of FDI into Africa – from abroad and by
region – goes to consumer-facing industries, led by
banking and telecommunications.
Compared with other foreign investment,
intra-African projects are concentrated in
manufacturing and services; the extractive
industries play a very marginal role (figure
II.2). Comparing the sectoral distribution across
sources shows that 97 per cent of intra-African
investments target non-primary sectors compared
with 76 per cent of investments from the rest of
the world, with a particularly high difference in the
share that targets the manufacturing sector. Intra-
African investments in the manufacturing sector
concentrate in agri-processing, building materials,
electric and electronic equipment, and textiles,
while in the services sector African TNCs have
been attracted to telecommunications and retail
industries, especially in rapidly growing economies
like those in Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia.
Other very active industries for intraregional
investments are finance, especially banking, and
business services, where investors from South
Africa, Kenya, Togo and Nigeria are expanding
in the neighbouring countries. In finance, low-
technology consumer products and wood furniture,
intra-African investments accounted for roughly 40
per cent of all greenfield investments by number of
projects. In residential construction and in hotels
and restaurants services, TNCs from South Africa,
Kenya and Egypt were the leading investors in Africa
by number of cross-border acquisitions deals. The
high shares of intra-African investment targeting
the manufacturing sector accord with evidence
from trade statistics showing that the industry
products that are most traded intraregionally are
manufactured goods – especially those entailing low
and medium levels of processing (UNCTAD, 2013b).
These industries could thus benefit the most from

regional integration measures; an enlarged market
could provide companies enough scope to grow
and create incentives for new investments.
The share of intra-African FDI in the manufacturing
and services sectors varies widely across RECs.
In some RECs, such as ECOWAS and EAC,
intraregional FDI in these sectors represents about
36 per cent of all investments; in others, such
as UMA, it is marginal (figure II.3). Furthermore,
excluding SADC, investments from all of Africa
usually represents a much higher share of FDI than
intra-REC investments do.
The gap between intra-African and intra-REC
FDI indicates that cross-REC investment
flows are relatively common and suggests
the importance of viewing RECs as building
blocks of a continental FTA. Because RECs’
market size is limited and not all RECs have
advanced TNC members that can drive FDI, the
integration of RECs into a single Africa-wide market
will benefit most the economies of the smallest
and less industrially diversified groups such as the
Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS).
Intraregional FDI is a means to integrate
smaller African countries into global
production processes. Smaller African economies
rely more heavily on regional FDI (figure II.4). For
many smaller countries, often landlocked or non-oil-
exporting ones, intraregional FDI is a critical source
of foreign capital.
For smaller countries such as Benin, Burkina
Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Rwanda and
Togo, investments from other African countries
represented at least 30 per cent of their FDI stocks.
Similarly, Southern African countries such as
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Uganda and the
United Republic of Tanzania received a sizeable
Figure II.1. Geographical distribution of sources of greenfield investment in Africa
by number of projects, 2003–2008 and 2009–2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
Europe
41
Europe
44
North America
18
China
3
India
4 Rest of world
21
Rest of world
19
Africa
10
2003–2008
North America
13
China
3
India
6
Africa
18
2009–2013
Nigeria 1
Kenya 1
South
Africa 3
Rest of
Africa 5
Nigeria 2
Kenya 3
South
Africa 7
Rest of
Africa 6
Figure II.2. Sectoral distribution of announced value
of FDI greenfield projects by source,
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial
Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
Primary Manufacturing Services
3
48
49
Africa
24
32
44
Rest of world

Figure II.3. Announced value of FDI greenfield projects in manufacturing and services,
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
(Per cent)
Intra-REC
ECOWAS 58
Africa 281
Host
region
Total value
($ billlion)
Share of investment from Africa
17
1
15
17
18
36
37
EAC 31
ECCAS 23
SADC 83
COMESA 106
UMA 43
Figure II.4. Intraregional FDI stock in Africa (various years)
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx).
a
Mauritius was excluded from the calculation of the African share as it acts as an investment platform for many extraregional
investors.
Host countries
(ranked by inward FDI stock)
South Africa (2012) 163.5
Nigeria (2012) 111.4
Morocco (2011) 44.5
Mozambique (2012) 13.3
Zambia (2012) 12.4
United Rep. of Tanzania (2011) 9.2
Uganda (2012) 7.7
Ghana (2011) 7.1
Namibia (2012) 5.8
Madagascar (2011) 4.9
Botswana (2012) 2.8
Kenya (2008) 2.8
Mali (2012) 2.3
Lesotho (2010) 1.6
Burkina Faso (2012) 1.2
Senegal (2012) 1.2
Malawi (2010) 1.2
Benin (2012) 1.0
Togo (2011) 0.9
Rwanda (2011) 0.8
Guinea-Bissau (2011) 0.1
Share of FDI stock from Africaa
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1…
1…
1…
1…
1…
1…
1…
1…
1…
1…
2…
2…
Total inward FDI stock
($ billlion)

amount of their FDI stock from the region (excluding
stock from Mauritius), most of that from South
Africa. By contrast, African investments in North
African countries such as Morocco are minimal; the
bulk of investments there come from neighbouring
countries in Europe and the Middle East.
Intraregional FDI is one of the most important
mechanisms through which Africa’s increasing
demand can be met by a better utilization of its own
resources. Furthermore, intra-African investment
helps African firms enhance their competitiveness
by increasing their scale, developing their
production know-how and providing access to
better and cheaper inputs. Several of the most
prominent African TNCs that have gone global, such
as Anglo American and South African Breweries
(now SABMiller), were assisted in developing
their international competitiveness through first
expanding regionally.
The rising intra-African investments have not
yet triggered the consolidation of regional
value chains. In terms of participation in global
value chains (GVCs), Africa ranks quite high in
international comparisons: its GVC participation
rate in 2011 was 56 per cent compared with the
developing-country average of 52 per cent and the
global average of 59 per cent (figure II.5). However,
the analysis of the components of the GVC
participation rate shows that the African down
stream component (exports that are incorporated in
other products and re-exported) represents a much
higher share than the upstream component (foreign
value added in exports). This high share reflects the
important contribution of African natural resources to
other countries’ exports.
Natural resources are mainly traded with
extraregional countries, do not require much
transformation (nor foreign inputs), and thus
contribute little to African industrial development
and its capacity to supply the growing internal
demand. The high share of commodities in the
region’sexportstogetherwithinadequatetransport,
energy and telecommunications infrastructure is
also a key factor hampering the development of
regional value chains. Among the world’s regions,
Africa relies the least on regional interactions in
the development of GVCs. On both the upstream
side (the foreign value added) and the downstream
side (the domestic value added included in other
countries’ exports), the share of intra-African
value chain links is very limited compared with
all other regions (figure II.6). In terms of sectors,
manufacturing and services appear to be more
regionally integrated than the primary sector. One
of the industries most integrated regionally is agri-
processing, where Africa benefits from economies
of scale – deriving from regional integration
measures – in processing raw materials. However,
further development and upscaling of the regional
value chains in this industry remains difficult as
long as intra-African investments are local market-
oriented FDI.
Across RECs, regional value chains seem to
be most developed in the three RECs that are
Figure II.5. GVC participation rate for Africa and other selected regions, 2011
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD-EORA GVC Database.
Note: GVC participation rate indicates the share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the
foreign value added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other
countries’ exports (the downstream component, or DVX), divided by total exports.
GVC participation rate
Global
Developing economies
Africa
East and South-East Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
54
45
56
52
59
Upstream component
Downstream component

planning to create the Tripartite FTA (COMESA,
EAC and SADC). This suggests that the economies
in this subregion are a step ahead in the regional
integration process. Northern African countries
that belong to UMA are the least involved in
regional value chains, while the participation of
ECCAS and ECOWAS in regional value chains is
relatively in the average of the continent.
Future prospects for regional integration
and industrial development. The Tripartite FTA
that COMESA, EAC and SADC members aim to
establish could be a useful model for other regional
communities to use in boosting their efforts to bring
Africa’s small and fragmented economies together
into a single market. By deepening regional
integration, resources will be pooled and local
markets enlarged, thus stimulating production
and investment and improving prospects for
growth and development in the continent. One
of the main obstacles to integration as well as
to the development of regional value chains is
inadequate and poor infrastructure. Insufficient
and nonexistent transport and energy services are
common problems that affect all firms operating
in Africa.7
To tackle some infrastructure gaps and
make further economic development possible,
international support is needed. In particular, the
sustainable development goals (SDGs) (chapter IV)
offer an opportunity to increase FDI that targets
the continent’s major needs.
The sharp increase in the number of Asian
businesses engaging in Africa (through both trade
and FDI), as well as the new investments from
North America and Europe in RD and consumer
industries, could provide an extraregional impetus
to the development of regional value chains and
GVCs. With declining wage competitiveness, China,
for example, may relocate its labour-intensive
industries to low-income countries while upgrading
its industry towards more sophisticated products
with higher value added (Lin 2011, Brautigam
2010).8
The relocation of even a small part of China’s
labour-intensive industries could support industrial
development in Africa, providing a much-needed
source of employment for the burgeoning working-
age population.9
Figure II.6. Regional value chain participation, 2011
Note: The upstream component is defined as the foreign value added used in a country’s exports; the downstream component
is defined as the domestic value added supplied to other countries’ exports.
European Union
East and South-East Asia
North and Central America
Transition economies
Latina America and Caribbean
Africa
of which Primary
Manufacturing
Services 13
11
8
10
14
24
54
57
67
4
7
4
5
15
9
31
50
84
Share of upstream component
from same region
(Per cent)
Share of downstream component
to same region
(Per cent)

Asia continues to be the world’s top FDI spot,
accounting for nearly 30 per cent of global FDI
inflows. Thanks to a significant increase in cross-
border MAs, total inflows to the region as a whole
amounted to $426 billion in 2013, 3 per cent higher
than in 2012. The growth rates of FDI inflows to
the East, South-East and South Asia subregions
ranged between 2 and 10 per cent, while inflows
to West Asia declined by 9 per cent (figure II.7).
FDI outflows from subregions showed more
diverging trends: outflows from East and South-
East Asia experienced growth of 7 and 5 per cent,
respectively; outflows from West Asia increased
by about two thirds; and those from South Asia
plummeted to a negligible level (figure II.7).
For some low-income countries in the region, weak
infrastructure has long been a major challenge in
attractingFDIandpromotingindustrialdevelopment.
Today, rising intraregional FDI in infrastructure
industries, driven by regional integration efforts
(section a) and enhanced connectivity through the
establishment of corridors between subregions
(section b), is likely to accelerate infrastructure
build-up, improve the investment climate and
promote economic development.
Figure II.7. FDI in and out of developing Asia, by subregion, 2012–2013
0
50
100
150
200
250
East Asia South-East Asia South Asia West Asia
FDI inflows
0
50
100
150
200
250
East Asia South-East Asia South Asia West Asia
2012 2013
2012 2013
FDI outflows
2. Asia

a. East and South-East Asia
Fig. B - East South-East Asia
FDI inflows
Fig. C - East South-East Asia
FDI outflows
South-East Asia
Share in
world total
12.6 13.5 17.1 22.0 19.6 25.1 23.9 8.3 8.8 15.4 18.0 15.8 20.3 20.7
0
60
120
180
240
300
360
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
East Asia
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
South-East Asia
East Asia
Fig. FID ﬂows - East and South-East Asia
(Host) (Home)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Thailand
Indonesia
Singapore
Hong Kong,
China
China
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Taiwan
Province
of China
Singapore
Republic
of Korea
Hong Kong,
China
China
2013 20122013 2012
by range,a
2013
Above
$50 billion
China, Hong Kong (China) and
Singapore
China and Hong Kong (China)
$10 to
$49 billion
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and
Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan
Province of China and Malaysia
$1.0 to
$9.9 billion
Viet Nam, Philippines, Taiwan
Province of China, Myanmar, Macao
(China), Mongolia and Cambodia
Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and
Viet Nam
$0.1 to
$0.9 billion
Brunei Darussalam, Lao People's
Democratic Republic and Democratic
People's Republic of Korea
..
Below
$0.1 billion
Timor-Leste
Mongolia, Macao (China), Cambodia,
Timor-Leste, Lao People's
Democratic Republic and Brunei
Darussalam
a
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 22 377 40 655 78 736 98 217
Primary 831 -3 489 10 578 10 902
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 421 -3 492 11 982 10 845
Manufacturing 12 702 19 017 12 956 6 376
Food, beverages and tobacco 7 197 13 411 4 820 5 701
Basic metal and metal products 281 919 2 822 -2 339
Computer, electronic optical prod. elect. equipment 712 1 239 2 878 1 635
Machinery and equipment 1 830 196 1 525 1 897
Services 8 844 25 128 55 203 80 939
Electricity, gas, water and waste management 858 1 216 2 761 4 873
Information and communications 4 379 104 4 827 2 827
Financial and insurance activities 709 14 977 46 321 66 826
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 22 377 40 655 78 736 98 217
European Union 2 686 -5 814 24 286 8 927
United Kingdom -2 958 721 15 364 3 033
Canada -290 -32 7 778 20 805
United States - 1 149 5 038 7 608 11 289
Australia 580 -270 11 050 6 861
Japan 3 821 9 005 2 969 1 676
Africa -386 334 1 861 9 728
Asia and Oceania 16 339 30 619 16 614 32 610
Latin America and the Caribbean 87 1 194 5 491 2 875
Transition economies - 597 256 2 160
Sector/industry
East and South-East
Asia as destination
East and South-East
Asia as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 147 303 146 465 110 393 106 067
Primary 363 593 3 022 2 195
Manufacturing 70 298 76 193 43 738 22 285
Chemicals and chemical products 9 946 13 209 10 770 3 301
Electrical and electronic equipment 9 361 7 571 11 562 5 492
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 17 212 16 855 4 844 3 293
Services 76 641 69 679 63 632 81 588
Electricity, gas and water 4 507 17 925 14 392 7 979
Construction 19 652 11 179 29 147 13 388
Finance 13 658 9 080 6 109 4 951
Business services 9 611 9 553 2 184 42 666
East and South-East
Asia as destination
East and South-East
Asia as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 147 303 146 465 110 393 106 067
European Union 38 453 41 127 19 012 8 230
Germany 12 036 13 189 468 401
United Kingdom 8 443 7 632 15 003 4 079
United States 27 637 23 173 13 417 3 943
Japan 24 252 27 191 677 1 728
Asia 47 327 44 652 59 632 36 904
East Asia 23 966 17 753 25 144 21 185
South-East Asia 19 728 14 094 18 549 10 662
South Asia 2 386 2 627 8 211 3 016
Transition economies 1 247 10 178 7 728 2 041

Against the backdrop of a sluggish world economy
and a regional slowdown in growth, total FDI
inflows to East and South-East Asia reached
$347 billion in 2013, 4 per cent higher than in
2012. Inflows to East Asia rose by 2 per cent to
$221 billion, while those to South-East Asia
increased by 7 per cent to $125 billion. FDI outflows
from the overall region rose by 7 per cent to
$293 billion. In late 2012, the 10 member States of
the Association for Southeast Asian Development
(ASEAN) and their 6 FTA partners (Australia, China,
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New
Zealand) launched negotiations for the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In
2013, combined FDI inflows to the 16 negotiating
members amounted to $343 billion, accounting for
24 per cent of global FDI flows. The expansion of
free trade areas in and beyond the region is likely to
further increase the dynamism of FDI growth and
deliver associated development benefits.
China’s outflows grew faster than inflows. FDI
inflows to China have resumed their growth since
late 2012. With inflows at $124 billion in 2013, the
country again ranked second in the world (figure I.3)
and narrowed the gap with the largest host country,
the United States. China’s 2 per cent growth in
2013 was driven by rising inflows in services,
particularly trade and real estate. As TNCs invest in
the country increasingly through MAs, the value of
cross-border MA sales surged, from $10 billion in
2012 to $27 billion in 2013.
In the meantime, China has strengthened its position
as one of the leading sources of FDI, and its outflows
are expected to surpass its inflows within two years.
During 2013, FDI outflows swelled by 15 per cent,
to an estimated $101 billion, the third highest in
the world. Chinese companies made a number of
megadeals in developed countries, such as the $15
billion CNOOC-Nexen deal in Canada and the $5
billion Shuanghui-Smithfield deal in the United States
– the largest overseas deals undertaken by Chinese
firms in the oil and gas and the food industries,
respectively. As China continues to deregulate
outward FDI,10
outflows to both developed and
developing countries are expected to grow further.
For instance, Sinopec, the second largest Chinese
oil company, plans to invest $20 billion in Africa in the
next five years,11
while Lenovo’s recent acquisitions
of IBM’s X86 server business ($2.3 billion) and
Motorola Mobile ($2.9 billion) will boost Chinese FDI
in the United States.
High-income economies in the region
performed well in attracting FDI. Inflows to
the Republic of Korea reached $12 billion, the
highest level since the mid-2000s, thanks to rising
foreign investments in shipbuilding and electronics
– industries in which the country enjoys strong
international competitiveness – as well as in the
utility industries. In 2013, FDI inflows to Taiwan
Province of China grew by 15 per cent, to $4 billion,
as economic cooperation with Mainland China
helped improve business opportunities in the island
economy.12
In 2013, FDI outflows from the Republic
of Korea declined by 5 per cent to $29 billion, while
those from Taiwan Province of China rose by 9 per
cent to $14 billion.
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore – the other two
high-income economies in the region – experienced
relatively slow growth in FDI inflows. Inflows to
Hong Kong (China) increased by 2 per cent to
$77 billion. Although this amount is still below the
record level of $96 billion in 2011, it is higher than
the three-year averages before the crisis ($49 billion)
and after the crisis ($68 billion). In 2012, annual FDI
inflows to Singapore rose above $60 billion for the
first time. A number of megadeals in 2013, such as
the acquisition of Fraser Neave by TCC Assets
for about $7 billion, drove FDI inflows to a record
$64 billion. As the recipients of the second and third
largest FDI in developing Asia, Hong Kong (China)
and Singapore have competed for the regional
headquarters of TNCs with each other, as well as
with some large Chinese cities, in recent years
(box II.1).
FDI growth in ASEAN slowed, particularly
in some lower-income countries. FDI inflows
to ASEAN rose by 7 per cent in 2013, to $125
billion. It seems that the rapid growth of FDI inflows
to ASEAN during the past three years – from
$47 billion in 2009 to $118 billion in 2012 – has
slowed, but the balance between East Asia and
South-East Asia continued to shift in favour of the
latter (figure B).
Among the ASEAN member States, Indonesia
was most affected by the financial turmoil in
emerging economies in mid-2013. However,
FDI inflows remained stable, at about $18 billion.

Box II.1. Attracting regional headquarters of TNCs:
competition among Asian economies
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore are very attractive locations for the regional headquarters of TNCs. The two
economies are similar in terms of specific criteria that are key for attracting regional headquarters (European Chamber,
2011). As highly open economies, strong financial centres and regional hubs of commerce, both are very successful
in attracting such headquarters. The number of TNC headquarters based in Hong Kong (China), for example, had
reached about 1,380 by the end of 2013. Its proximity to Mainland China may partly explain its competitive edge.
The significant presence of such headquarters has helped make the two economies the major recipients of FDI in
their subregions: Hong Kong (China) is second only to Mainland China in East Asia, while Singapore is the largest
host in South-East Asia.
The two economies now face increasing competition from large cities in Mainland China, such as Beijing and
Shanghai. By the end of October 2013, for example, more than 430 TNCs had established regional headquarters in
Shanghai, as well as 360 RD centres.13
However, the TNCs establishing these headquarters have targeted mainly
the Chinese market, while Hong Kong (China) and Singapore remain major destinations for the headquarters of
TNCs targeting the markets of Asia and the Pacific at large.
In March 2014, the Chinese Government decided to move the headquarters of CIFIT Group, China’s largest TNC in
terms of foreign assets, from Beijing to Hong Kong (China). This decision shows the Government’s support for the
economy of Hong Kong (China) and is likely to enhance the city’s competitive advantages for attracting investment
from leading TNCs, including those from Mainland China.
Source: UNCTAD.
In Malaysia, another large FDI recipient in ASEAN,
inflows increased by 22 per cent to $12 billion
as a result of rising FDI in services. In Thailand,
inflows grew to $13 billion; however, about 400 FDI
projects were shelved in reaction to the continued
political instability, and the prospects for inflows
to the country remain uncertain.14
Nevertheless,
Japanese investment in manufacturing in Thailand
has risen significantly during the past few years and
is likely to continue to drive up FDI to the country.
FDI inflows to the Philippines were not affected
by 2013’s typhoon Haiyan; on the contrary, total
inflows rose by one fifth, to $4 billion – the highest
level in its history. The performance of ASEAN’s
low-income economies varied: while inflows to
Myanmar increased by 17 per cent to $2.6 billion,
those to Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic and Viet Nam remained at almost the
same levels.
FDI outflows from ASEAN increased by 5 per cent.
Singapore, the regional group’s leading investor,
saw its outward FDI double, rising from $13 billion in
2012 to $27 billion in 2013. This significant increase
was powered by large overseas acquisitions by
Singaporean firms and the resultant surge in the
amount of transactions. Outflows from Malaysia
and Thailand, the other two important investing
countries in South-East Asia, dropped by 21 per
cent and 49 per cent, to $14 billion and $7 billion,
respectively.
Prospects remain positive. Economic growth has
remained robust and new liberalization measures
have been introduced, such as the launch of the
China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone. Thus, East
Asia is likely to enjoy an increase of FDI inflows in the
near future. The performance of South-East Asia is
expected to improve as well, partly as a result of
the accelerated regional integration process (see
below). However, rising geopolitical tensions have
become an important concern in the region and
may add uncertainties to the investment outlook.
As part of a renewed effort to bring about economic
reform and openness, new policy measures are
being introduced in trade, investment and finance
in the newly established China (Shanghai) Pilot Free
Trade Zone. In terms of inward FDI administration,
a new approach based on pre-establishment
national treatment has been adopted in the zone,
and a negative list announced. Specific segments
in six service industries – finance, transport,
commerce and trade, professional services,
cultural services and public services – have been
opened to foreign investors (chapter III). FDI

inflows to the zone and to Shanghai in general are
expected to grow as a result.15
Accelerated regional integration
contributes to rising FDI flows
Regional economic integration in East and South-
East Asia has accelerated in recent years. This
has contributed to enhanced competitiveness in
attracting FDI and TNC activities across different
industries. In particular, investment cooperation
among major economies has facilitated inter
national investment and operation by regional
TNCs in their neighbouring countries, contributing
to greater intraregional FDI flows and stronger
regional production networks. Low-income
countries in the region have benefited significantly
from such flows in building up their infrastructure
and productive capacities. The geographical
expansion of free trade areas in and beyond the
region is likely to further extend the dynamism of
FDI growth and deliver associated development
benefits.
A comprehensive regional partnership in the
making. ASEAN was the starting point of regional
economic integration in East and South-East Asia,
and has always been at the centre of the integration
process. Established in 1967, ASEAN initially
involved Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand. Subsequently, Brunei
Darussalam, Viet Nam, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Myanmar and Cambodia joined. Since its
establishment, ASEAN has made efforts to widen
as well as deepen the regional integration process,
contributing to improved regional connectivity
and interaction. Its economic links with the rest
of the world have increasingly intensified and its
intraregional links have strengthened.
Over time, ASEAN has broadened the scope of
regional economic integration alongside its major
partners – China, the Republic of Korea and Japan
– through the ASEAN+3 Cooperation.16
The East
Asia Summit involves these three countries as well,
in addition to Australia, India and New Zealand.17
ASEAN has signed FTAs with all six countries.
In November 2012, the 10 ASEAN member
States and the six ASEAN FTA partners launched
negotiations for RCEP, which aims to establish the
largest free trade area in the world by population. In
2013, combined FDI inflows to the 16 negotiating
members amounted to $343 billion, or 24 per cent
of global FDI inflows.
Proactive investment cooperation. Investment
cooperation is an important facet of these regional
economic integration efforts. In 1998, ASEAN
members signed the Framework Agreement on
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). In 2009, the
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement
(ACIA) consolidated the 1998 AIA Agreement
and the 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments (also known as the
ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement). At the
ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in August
2011, member States agreed to accelerate the
implementation of programmes towards the
ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, focusing on
initiatives that would enhance investment promotion
and facilitation.
In addition, various investment agreements have
been signed under general FTA frameworks in East
and South-East Asia. In recent years significant
progress has been made, involving leading
economies in Asia, including China, India, Japan
and the Republic of Korea. For instance, ASEAN
and China signed their investment agreement in
August 2009. In May 2012, China, Japan and the
Republic of Korea signed a tripartite investment
agreement, which represented a crucial step in
establishing a free trade bloc among the three East
Asian countries.
Within the overall framework of regional integration,
these investment agreements aim to facilitate
international investment in general but may also
promote cross-border investment by regional TNCs
in particular. In addition, ASEAN has established
effective institutional mechanisms of investment
facilitation and promotion, aiming to coordinate
national efforts within the bloc and compete
effectively with other countries in attracting FDI.
Rising intraregional FDI flows. Proactive regional
investment cooperation efforts in East and South-
East Asia have contributed to a rise in FDI inflows to
the region in general and intraregional FDI flows in
particular. ASEAN has seen intraregional flows rise
over the past decade, and for some of its member
States, inflows from neighbouring countries
have increased significantly. During 2010–2012,

the RCEP-negotiating countries (or ASEAN+6
countries) provided on average 43 per cent of FDI
flows to ASEAN, compared with an average of 17
per cent during 1998–2000 (figure II.8).
Emerging industrial patterns and development
implications. Rising intraregional FDI flows
have focused increasingly on infrastructure and
manufacturing. Low-income countries in the region
have gained in particular.
• Manufacturing. Rising intraregional FDI in
manufacturing has helped South-East Asian
countries build their productive capacities in both
capital- and labour-intensive industries. TNCs
from Japan have invested in capital-intensive
manufacturing industries such as automotive and
electronics. For instance, Toyota has invested
heavily in Thailand in recent years, making the
country its third largest production base. Attracted
by low labour costs and good growth prospects,
Japanese companies invested about $1.8 billion
in Viet Nam in 2011, and $4.4 billion of Japanese
investment was approved in 2012. FDI from
Japan is expected to increase in other ASEAN
member States as well, particularly Myanmar.
China’s investment in manufacturing in ASEAN
covers a broad range of industries but is especially
significant in labour-intensive manufacturing.
• Infrastructure. TNCs from Singapore have been
important investors in infrastructure industries in
the region, accounting for about 20 per cent of
greenfield investments. In recent years, Chinese
companies have invested in Indonesia and
Viet Nam.19
In transport, Chinese investment is
expected to increase in railways, including in the
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar.
In November 2013, China and Thailand signed a
memorandum of understanding on a large project
that is part of a planned regional network of high-
speed railways linking China and Singapore. In
the meantime, other ASEAN member States
have begun to open some transport industries
to foreign participation, which may lead to
more intraregional FDI (including from Chinese
companies). For example, Indonesia has recently
allowed foreign investment in service industries
such as port management.20
As more countries
in South-East Asia announce ambitious long-term
plans, total investment in infrastructure in this
subregion between 2011 and 2020 is expected to
exceed $1.5 trillion.21
Fulfilling this huge amount
of investment will require mobilizing various
sources of funding, in which TNCs and financial
institutions within East and South-East Asia can
Figure II.8. Major sources of FDI inflows to ASEAN,
1998–2000 and 2010–2012
Source: UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/
en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-
Bilateral.aspx).
Average, 2010–2012Average, 1998 – 2000
24% 8%
42%
19%
17%
30%
17%
43%
0
20
40
60
80
100
+ 26
percentage
points
United StatesEUOther sourcesASEAN +6
China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea,
as well as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have
made considerable advances as sources of FDI to
ASEAN. It seems that this has taken place mainly
at the cost of the United States and the European
Union (EU). Singapore is an important source of
FDI for other countries in ASEAN, as well as for
other major Asian economies, such as China and
India.18
Japan has been one of the leading investors
in South-East Asia, and ASEAN as a whole
accounted for more than one tenth of all Japanese
outward FDI stock in 2012. In 2013, Japanese
investors spent nearly $8 billion in ASEAN, which
is replacing China as the most important target
of Japanese FDI. In recent years, FDI flows from
China to ASEAN countries have rapidly increased,
and the country’s outward FDI stock in ASEAN as a
whole had exceeded $25 billion by the end of 2012
(figure II.9). The establishment of the China-ASEAN
Free Trade Area in early 2010 has strengthened
regional economic cooperation and contributed to
the promotion of two-way FDI flows, particularly
from China to ASEAN. Accordingly, the share of
ASEAN in China’s total outward FDI stock rose to
5.3 per cent in 2012.

Source: UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx).
Figure II.9. China: outward FDI stock in ASEAN member States and share of ASEAN in total, 2005–2012
Others
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Viet Nam
Thailand
Indonesia
Cambodia
Myanmar
Singapore
Share of ASEAN in total
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
%
$billion
play an important role, through both equity- and
non-equity modes.
For most of the low-income countries in the
region, intraregional flows account for a major
share of FDI inflows, contributing to a rapid build-
up of infrastructure and productive capacities. For
instance, Indonesia and the Philippines have seen
higher capital inflows to infrastructure industries,
such as electricity generation and transmission,
through various contractual arrangements.
Cambodia and Myanmar, the two LDCs in South-
East Asia, have recently emerged as attractive
locations for investment in labour-intensive
industries, including textiles, garments and footwear.
Low-income South-East Asian countries have
benefited from rising production costs in China and
the subsequent relocation of production facilities.
Outlook. The negotiation of RCEP started in May
2013 and is expected to be completed in 2015.
It is likely to promote FDI inflows and associated
development benefits for economies at different
levels of development in East and South-East Asia,
through improved investment climates, enlarged
markets, and the build-up of infrastructure and
productive capacities. RCEP is not the only
integration mechanism that covers a large range
of economies across Asia and the Pacific. As the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (chapter I) extend beyond the
geographical scope of the region, so may the
development benefits related to increased flows of
both trade and investment.

b. South Asia
Fig. FID ﬂows - South Asia
(Host) (Home)
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Islamic
Rep. of Iran
India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Islamic
Rep. of Iran
India
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 2 4 6 8 10
2013 20122013 2012
Fig. B - South Asia
FDI inflows
Fig. C - South Asia
FDI inflows
Share in
world total
1.7 3.1 3.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
5
10
15
20
25
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
by range,a
2013
Above
$10 billion
India ..
$1.0 to
$9.9 billion
Islamic Republic of Iran,
Bangladesh and Pakistan
India
$0.1 to
$0.9 billion
Sri Lanka and Maldives Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan
Below
$0.1 billion
Nepal, Afghanistan and Bhutan Sri Lanka and Bangladesh
a
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 2 821 4 784 3 104 1 621
Primary 130 28 -70 1 482
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 130 2 -70 1 482
Manufacturing 1 232 4 608 718 920
Food, beverages and tobacco 355 1 173 -2 -34
Chemicals and chemical products -207 3 620 12 246
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical botanical prod. 138 3 148 502 551
Basic metal and metal products 124 -4 068 116 65
Services 1 459 148 2 456 -781
Electricity, gas, water and waste management 40 -677 - -
Information and communications -430 -209 414 85
Financial and insurance activities 1 597 -298 675 -691
Business services -59 621 56 350
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 2 821 4 784 3 104 1 621
European Union 467 1 518 669 1 734
France 1 051 144 - 108
United Kingdom -791 1 110 62 510
United States 627 1 368 1 759 387
Japan 1 077 382 7 -
Switzerland -1 011 -62 357 -
Developing economies 1 456 1 212 683 -262
Africa 431 233 22 419
Asia and Oceania 1 026 979 542 -1 240
Latin America and the Caribbean - - 119 559
South Asia
as destination
South Asia
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 39 525 24 499 27 714 15 789
European Union 12 962 6 543 2 895 2 593
Germany 4 291 1 137 847 500
United Kingdom 2 748 2 386 1 765 1 733
United States 5 559 4 718 829 1 308
Japan 3 147 2 801 84 45
Africa 149 871 9 315 5 799
Asia and Oceania 15 511 6 031 8 815 4 717
East and South-East Asia 8 211 3 016 2 386 2 627
West Asia 4 972 2 293 4 100 1 367
Transition economies 252 76 380 872
Sector/industry
South Asia
as destination
South Asia
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 39 525 24 499 27 714 15 789
Primary 165 23 4 602 47
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 165 23 4 602 47
Manufacturing 16 333 11 220 11 365 6 842
Chemicals and chemical products 1 786 1 161 1 668 900
Metals and metal products 3 317 896 2 178 886
Other manufacturing 1 089 1 008 103 509
Services 23 027 13 256 11 747 8 900
Transport, storage and communications 7 210 3 265 1 442 2 121
Finance 3 264 1 906 726 722

FDI inflows to South Asia rose by 10 per cent
to $36 billion in 2013. Outflows from the region
slid by nearly three fourths, to $2 billion. Facing
old challenges and new opportunities, South
Asian countries registered varied performance in
attracting FDI. At the regional level, renewed efforts
to enhance connectivity with other parts of Asia are
likely to help build up infrastructure and improve the
investment climate. India has taken various steps
to open its services sector to foreign investors,
most notably in the retail industry. It seems that the
opening up of single-brand retail in 2006 has led to
increased FDI inflows; that of multi-brand retail in
2012 has so far not generated the expected results.
Trends in MAs and announced greenfield
projects diverged. In 2013, the total amount of
announced greenfield investments in South Asia
dropped by 38 per cent, to $24 billion (table D).
In manufacturing, greenfield projects in metals
and metal products and in the automotive industry
experienced considerable drops; in services, a
large decline took place in infrastructure industries
and financial services. Most major recipients of
FDI in the region experienced a significant decline
in greenfield projects, except for Sri Lanka, where
they remained at a high level of about $1.3 billion.
In contrast, the total amount of cross-border MA
sales rose by 70 per cent, to $5 billion. The value
of MAs boomed in manufacturing, particularly
in food and beverage, chemical products and
pharmaceuticals (table B). A number of large deals
took place in these industries. For instance, in food
and beverage, Relay (Netherlands) acquired a 27 per
cent stake in United Sprits (India) for $1 billion, and,
in pharmaceuticals, Mylan (United States) took over
Agila (India) for $1.9 billion. Some smaller deals also
took place in other South Asian countries, including
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
FDI inflows rose in India, but macroeconomic
uncertainties remain a major concern. The
dominant recipient of FDI in South Asia, India, expe-
rienced a 17 per cent increase in inflows in 2013, to
$28 billion (table A). The value of greenfield projects
by TNCs declined sharply in both manufacturing
and services. Flows in the form of MAs from the
United Kingdom and the United States increased,
while those from Japan declined considerably. In
the meantime, the value of greenfield projects from
these countries all dropped, but only slightly. The
main manufacturing industries targeted by foreign
investors were food and beverage, chemical prod-
ucts, and pharmaceuticals.
Macroeconomic uncertainties in India continue to
be a concern for foreign investors. The annual rate
of GDP growth in that country has slowed to about
4 per cent, and the current account deficit has
reached an unprecedented level – nearly 5 per
cent of GDP. The Indian rupee depreciated
significantly in mid-2013. High inflation and the
other macroeconomic problems have cast doubts
on prospects for FDI, despite the Government’s
ambitious goal to boost foreign investment. Policy
responses to macroeconomic problems will play an
important role in determining FDI prospects in the
short to medium run.22
ForIndiancompanies,domesticeconomicproblems
seemed to have deterred international expansion,
and India saw its outward FDI drop to merely $1.7
billion in 2013. The slide occurred mainly as a result
of reversed equity investment – from $2.2 billion to
-2.6 billion – and large divestments by Indian TNCs
accounted for much of the reverse. Facing a weak
economy and high interest rates at home, some
Indian companies with high financial leverage sold
equity or assets in order to improve cash flows.23
Facing old challenges as well as new oppor
tunities, other countries reported varied
performance. Bangladesh experienced significant
growth in FDI inflows: from $1.3 billion in 2012
to about $1.6 billion in 2013. Manufacturing
accounted for a major part of inflows and
contributed significantly to employment creation
(UNCTAD, 2013a). The country has emerged as an
important player in the manufacturing and export
of ready-made garments (RMG) and has become
a sourcing hotspot with its advantages of low cost
and capacity (WIR13). However, the industry in
Bangladesh has faced serious challenges, including
in labour standards and skill development (box II.2).
FDI inflows to Pakistan increased to $1.3 billion,
thanks to rising inflows to services in 2013. The
country recently held its first auction for 3G and
4G networks of mobile telecommunications. China
Mobile was the winning bidder and now plans to
invest $1.5 billion in Pakistan in the next four years.

Box II.2. Challenges facing the garment industry of Bangladesh:
roles of domestic and foreign companies
Bangladesh has been recognized as one of the “Next 11” emerging countries to watch, following the BRICS countries
(Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa) and listed among the “Frontier Five” emerging economies,
along with Kazakhstan, Kenya, Nigeria and Viet Nam. The RMG industry has been the major driver of the country’s
economic development in recent decades and is still fundamental to the prospects of the Bangladesh economy. This
industry is considered the “next stop” for developed-country TNCs that are moving sourcing away from China. Such
opportunity is essential for development, as Bangladesh needs to create jobs for its growing labour force (ILO, 2010).
With the prediction of further growth in the industry and the willingness of developed-country firms to source from
Bangladesh, the picture on the demand side seems promising. However, realizing that promise requires the country
to address constraints on the supply side. At the national level, poor infrastructure continues to deter investment in
general and FDI in particular (UNCTAD, 2013a). At the firm level, one issue concerns the need for better compliance
with labour legislation, as illustrated by several tragedies in the country’s garment industry. Besides strengthening
such compliance, the industry needs to develop its capabilities, not only by consolidating strengths in basic garment
production but also by diversifying into higher-value activities along the RMG value chain.
Currently, Bangladesh’s garment firms compete predominantly on price and capacity. The lack of sufficient skills
remains a major constraint, and both domestic and foreign-invested firms need to boost their efforts in this regard. A
recent UNCTAD study shows the dominance of basic and on-the-job training, which links directly to established career
trajectories within firms. However, high labour turnover hampers skill development at the firm level. On-the-job training
is complemented by various initiatives supported by employer organizations, which have training centres but often
cooperate with governmental and non-governmental organizations.
FDI has accounted for a relatively small share of projects in the Bangladesh RMG industry in recent years. During
2003–2011, only 11 per cent of investment projects registered in the industry were foreign-originated. Nevertheless,
owing to the larger scale of such projects, they account for a significantly high share of employment and capital
formation, and they can be an important catalyst for skills development in the labour force.
Source: UNCTAD (2014a).
FDI to the Islamic Republic of Iran focuses heavily
on oil exploration and production, and economic
sanctions have had negative effects on those
inflows, which declined by about one third in 2013,
to $3 billion.
Services have attracted increasing attention from
TNCs, as countries open new sectors to foreign
investment. However, as demonstrated in India’s
retail industry (see next subsection), some of the
new liberalization efforts have not yet been able to
boost FDI inflows as governments expected. One
reason is the uncertain policy environment. For
instance, responses from foreign investors to the
Indian Government’s liberalization efforts have been
mixed.
Enhanced regional connectivity improves FDI
prospects in South Asia. Poor infrastructure has
long been a major challenge in attracting FDI and
promoting industrial development in the region.
Policy developments associated with enhanced
connectivity with East Asia, especially the potential
establishment of the Bangladesh-China-India-
Myanmar Economic Corridor and the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (box II.3), are likely to
accelerate infrastructure investment in South Asia,
and to improve the overall investment climate. As a
result of interregional initiatives, China has shown
its potential to become an important source of
FDI in South Asia, particularly in infrastructure and
manufacturing industries. The Chinese Government
has started negotiating with the Indian Government
on setting up an industrial zone in India to host
investments from Chinese companies. China is
the third country to consider such country-specific
industrial zones in India, following Japan and the
Republic of Korea (WIR13).
New round of retail liberalization
has not yet brought expected FDI
inflows to India
Organized retailing, such as supermarkets and
retail chains, has expanded rapidly in emerging
markets.25
In India, organized retail has become
a $28 billion sector and is expected to grow to

Box II.3. International economic corridors and FDI prospects in South Asia
Two international economic corridors linking South Asia and East and South-East Asia are to be established: the
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Countries
involved in the two initiatives have drawn up specific timetables for implementation. For the BCIM Economic Corridor,
for example, the four countries have agreed to build transport, energy and telecommunication networks connecting
each other.24
The two initiatives will help enhance connectivity between Asian subregions and foster regional economic cooperation.
In particular, these initiatives will facilitate international investment, enhancing FDI flows between participating
countries and benefiting low-income countries in South Asia. Significant investment in infrastructure, particularly
for land transportation, is expected to take place along these corridors, strengthening the connectedness of the
three subregions. In addition, industrial zones will be built along these corridors, leading to rising investment in
manufacturing in the countries involved. This is likely to help South Asian countries benefit from the production
relocation that is under way in China.
Source: UNCTAD.
Source: UNCTAD.
Box figure II.3.1. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor
and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: the geographical scope
a market worth $260 billion by 2020, according
to forecasts of the Boston Consulting Group. As
part of an overall reform programme and in order
to boost investment and improve efficiency in
the industry, the Indian Government opened up
single-brand and multi-brand retail in 2006 and
2012, respectively. However, the two rounds of
liberalization have had different effects on TNCs’
investment decisions, and the recent round has not
yet generated the expected results.
Two rounds of retail liberalization. The
liberalization of the Indian retail sector has
encountered significant political resistance from
domestic interest groups, such as local retailers and
small suppliers (Bhattacharyya, 2012). In response,
the Government adopted a gradual approach
to opening up the sector – first the single-brand
segment and then the multi-brand one. When the
Government opened single-brand retail to foreign
investment in 2006, it allowed 51 per cent foreign
ownership; five years later, it allowed 100 per cent.
In September 2012, the Government started to
allow 51 per cent foreign ownership in multi-brand
retail.
However, to protect relevant domestic stakeholders
and to enhance the potential development benefits
of FDI, the Government has simultaneously
introduced specific regulations. These regulations

cover important issues, such as the minimum
amount of investment, the location of operation,
the mode of entry and the share of local sourcing.
For instance, single-brand retailers must source
30 per cent of their goods from local small and
medium-size enterprises. Multi-brand retailers may
open stores only in cities with populations greater
than 1 million and must invest at least $100 million.
In addition, the Government recently clarified
that foreign multi-brand retailers may not acquire
existing Indian retailers.
The opening up of single-brand retail in 2006
led to increased FDI inflows. Since the initial
opening up of the retail sector, a number of the
world’s leading retailers, such as Wal-Mart (United
States) and Tesco (United Kingdom), have taken
serious steps to enter the Indian market. These
TNCs have started doing businesses of wholesale
and single-brand retailing, sometimes through joint
ventures with local conglomerates. For instance,
jointly with Bharti Group, Wal-Mart opened about
20 stores in more than a dozen major cities. Tesco’s
operations include sourcing and service centres, as
well as a franchise arrangement with Tata Group. It
has also signed an agreement to supply Star Bazaar
with exclusive access to Tesco’s retail expertise and
80 per cent of the stock of the local chain.
Thanks to policy changes in 2006, annual FDI
inflows to the trade sector in general jumped from
an average of $60 million during 2003–2005 to
about $600 million during 2007–2009. Inflows have
fluctuated between $390 million and $570 million in
recent years (figure II.10). The share of the sector
in total FDI inflows rose from less than 1 per cent
in 2005 to about 3 per cent during 2008–2009.
However, that share has declined as investment
encouraged by the first round of investment
liberalization lost momentum.
The opening up of multi-brand retail in 2012
has not generated the expected results.
Policy-related uncertainties continue to hamper the
expansion plans of foreign chains. Although foreign
investment continues to flow into single-brand retail,
no new investment projects have been recorded
in multi-brand retail and in fact divestments have
taken place. Major TNCs that entered the Indian
market after the first round of liberalization have
taken steps to get out of the market. For instance,
Wal-Mart (United States) recently abandoned its
plan to open full-scale retail outlets in India and
dissolved its partnership with Bharti.
TNCs’ passive and even negative reactions to the
second round of retail liberalization in India were
due partly to the strict operational requirements
and continued policy uncertainties. As the two
rounds of policy changes encountered significant
political resistance, compromises have been made
at both national and local levels to safeguard local
interests by regulating issues related to the location
of operations, the mode of entry and the share of
local sourcing required.
The way forward. A different policy approach
could be considered for better leveraging foreign
investment for the development of Indian retail
industry. For example, in terms of mode of entry,
franchising and other non-equity forms of TNC
participation can be options. Through such
arrangements, the host country can benefit from
foreign capital and know-how while minimizing
potential tensions between foreign and local
stakeholders.
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC
database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Figure II.10. India: wholesale and retail trade inflows,
2005–2012
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FDI inflows to trade in India Share of trade in total inflows
%
$million

c. West Asia
Fig. B - West Asia
FDI inflows
Fig. C - West Asia
FDI outflows
Other West Asia Turkey Other West Asia Turkey
Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC)
Share in
world total
4.0 5.1 5.9 4.3 3.1 3.6 3.0 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.4 2.2
0
20
40
60
80
100
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
10
20
30
40
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC)
Fig. FID ﬂows - West Asia
(Host) (Home)
Lebanon
Iraq
Saudi
Arabia
United Arab
Emirates
Turkey
United Arab
Emirates
Turkey
Saudi
Arabia
Qatar
Kuwait
2013 20122013 2012
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 0 2 4 6 8 10
by range,a
2013
Above
$10 billion
Turkey and United Arab Emirates ..
$5.0 to
$9.9 billion
Saudi Arabia Kuwait and Qatar
$1.0 to
$4.9 billion
Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait,
Jordan and Oman
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, Oman and Bahrain
Below
$1.0 billion
Bahrain, State of Palestine,
Yemen and Qatar
Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen,
Jordan and State of Palestine
a
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 8 219 2 065 11 390 8 077
Primary 233 357 21 476
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 233 344 21 466
Manufacturing 2 568 451 1 668 61
Food, beverages and tobacco 1 019 186 1 605 -
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chem. botanical prod. 700 40 27 -
Services 5 419 1 257 9 700 7 540
Electricity, gas and water 284 140 - 1 908
Construction 125 14 1 126 -47
Transportation and storage 874 55 -132 483
Information and communications 3 357 21 2 803 1 137
Financial and insurance activities - 298 465 6 543 3 972
Business services 1 039 371 73 184
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 8 219 2 065 11 390 8 077
Developed economies -1 083 406 5 223 2 739
European Union -3 007 714 5 319 1 312
Germany 72 3 456 -584 -654
United Kingdom -214 390 1 318 1 527
United States 1 700 -573 -244 67
Egypt - - 9 3 150
West Asia 3 855 1 039 3 855 1 039
Iraq -14 - 1 503 630
Qatar 3 357 449 - -
Russian Federation 3 873 3 1 582 425
Sector/industry
West Asia as destination West Asia as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 44 668 56 527 35 069 39 240
Primary 2 5 990 37 1 701
Manufacturing 20 249 18 692 12 401 17 880
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 5 002 3 769 5 768 9 666
Chemicals and chemical products 6 181 4 178 103 202
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 1 019 5 750 130 111
Services 24 417 31 845 22 630 19 659
Electricity, gas and water 2 608 13 761 601 1 777
Construction 6 693 3 253 5 105 4 313
Hotels and restaurants 3 809 3 555 3 302 3 142
Finance 2 226 1 641 3 993 2 305
West Asia as destination West Asia as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 44 668 56 527 35 069 39 240
Europe 9 883 15 801 1 640 2 509
North America 5 102 10 009 342 1 976
North Africa 1 047 109 10 511 3 906
Egypt 1 047 86 7 403 1 552
East Asia 4 901 1 058 820 500
South-East Asia 2 827 984 427 9 678
South Asia 4 100 1 367 4 972 2 293
West Asia 12 746 12 729 12 746 12 729
Russian Federation 122 12 710 313 1 345

FDI flows to West Asia decreased in 2013 by 9 per
cent, to $44 billion, the fifth consecutive decline
since 2009 and a return to the level they had in
2005. Persistent tensions in the region continued
to hold off foreign direct investors in 2013. Since
2009, FDI flows to Saudi Arabia and Qatar have
maintained a downward trend. During this period,
flows to a number of other countries have started
to recover, although that recovery has been bumpy
in some cases. Flows have remained well below the
levels reached some years ago, except in Kuwait
and Iraq, where they reached record levels in 2012
and 2013, respectively.
Turkey remained West Asia’s main FDI
recipient in 2013, although flows decreased
slightly, remaining at almost the same level as in
the previous year – close to $13 billion (figure A).
This occurred against a background of low cross-
border MA sales, which dropped by 68 per cent to
$867 million, their lowest level since 2004. While
inflows to the manufacturing sector more than
halved, dropping to $2 billion and accounting for
only 16 per cent of the total, they increased in
electricity, gas and water supply (176 per cent to
$2.6 billion), finance (79 per cent to $3.7 billion),
and real estate (16 per cent to $3 billion). Together
these three industries represented almost three
quarters of total FDI to the country.
FDI flows to the United Arab Emirates
continued their recovery after the sharp decline
registered in 2009, increasing in 2013 for the fourth
consecutive year and positioning this country as the
second largest recipient of FDI after Turkey. Flows
increased by 9 per cent to $10.5 billion, remaining
however well below their level in 2007 ($14.2 billion).
This FDI recovery coincided with the economy
rebounding from the 2009 debt crisis, driven by
both oil and non-oil activities. Among the latter,
the manufacturing sector expanded, led by heavy
industries such as aluminium and petrochemicals;
tourism and transport benefited from the addition
of more routes and capacity by two local airlines;
and the property market recovered, thanks to the
willingness of banks to resume loans to real estate
projects, which brought new life to the construction
business, the industry that suffered most from the
financial crisis and has taken the longest to recover.
That industry got further impetus in November
2013, when Dubai gained the right to host the
World Expo 2020.
Flows to Saudi Arabia registered their fifth
consecutive year of decline, decreasing by
24 per cent to $9.3 billion, and moving the country
from the second to the third largest host economy
in the region. This decline has taken place despite
the large capital projects under way in infrastructure
and in downstream oil and gas, mainly refineries and
petrochemicals. However, the Government remains
the largest investor in strategically important
sectors, and the activities of many private firms
(including foreign ones) depend on government
contracts (non-equity mode) or on joint ventures
with State-owned companies. The departure in
2013 of over 1 million expatriate workers has
exacerbated the mismatch of demand and supply
in the private job market that has challenged private
businesses since the 2011 launch of the policy of
“Saudization” (WIR13).
Flows to Iraq reached new highs. Despite high
levels of instability in Iraq, affecting mainly the central
area around Baghdad, FDI flows are estimated to
have increased by about 20 per cent in 2013, to
$2.9 billion. The country’s economic resurgence has
been underpinned by its vast hydrocarbon wealth.
Economic growth has been aided by substantial
increases in government spending to compensate
for decades of war, sanctions and underinvestment
in infrastructure and basic services. In addition,
work on several large oilfields has gathered speed
since the award of the largest fields to foreign oil
TNCs. A significant development for the industry in
2013 was the start of operations of the first stage
of a long-delayed gas-capture project run by Basra
Gas Company (State-owned South Gas Company
(51 per cent), Shell (44 per cent) and Mitsubishi
(5 per cent)). The project captures associated gas
that was being flared from three oil fields in southern
Iraq and processes it for liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG), natural gas liquids and condensate for
domestic markets.
FDI flows to Kuwait are estimated to have decreased
by 41 per cent in 2013, after having reached record
highs in 2012 owing to a one-off acquisition deal
worth $1.8 billion (see WIR13). FDI to Jordan
increased by 20 per cent to $1.8 billion, despite
regional unrest and sluggish economic growth.

Because of the country’s geostrategic position,
countries and foreign entities have been extending
considerable new funding in the form of aid, grants,
guarantees, easy credit and investment.26
FDI
to Lebanon is estimated to have fallen by 23 per
cent, with most of the flows still focused on the
real estate market, which registered a significant
decrease in investments from the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries.
Prospects for the region’s inward FDI remain
bleak, as rising political uncertainties are a strong
deterrent to FDI, even in countries not directly
affected by unrest and in those registering robust
economic growth. The modest recovery in FDI
flows recorded recently in some countries would
have been much more substantial in the absence of
political turmoil, given the region’s vast hydrocarbon
wealth.
FDI outflows from West Asia soared by 64 per
cent to $31 billion in 2013, boosted by rising flows
from the GCC countries, which enjoy a high level
of foreign exchange reserves derived from their
accumulation of surpluses from export earnings.
Although each of these countries augmented its
investment abroad, the quadrupling of outflows
from Qatar and the 159 per cent growth in flows
from Kuwait explain most of the increase. Given the
high levels of their foreign exchange reserves and
the relatively small sizes of their economies, GCC
countries are likely to continue to increase their
direct investment abroad.
New challenges faced by the GCC petro
chemicals industry. With the goal of diversifying
their economies by leveraging their abundant oil and
gas and their capital to develop industrial capabilities
and create jobs where they enjoy competitive
advantages, GCC Governments have embarked
since the mid-2000s on the development of large-
scale petrochemicals projects in joint ventures with
international oil companies (see WIR12). These
efforts have significantly expanded the region’s
petrochemicals capacities.27
And they continue to
do so, with a long list of plants under development,
including seven megaprojects distributed between
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and
Oman (table II.2). The industry has been facing new
challenges, deriving among others from the shale
gas production under way in North America (see
chapter I), which has affected the global strategy of
petrochemicals TNCs.
TNC focus on the United States. The shale
gas revolution in North America, combined with
gas shortages in the GCC region,28
has reduced
the cost advantage of the GCC petrochemicals
players and introduced new competition. By driving
down gas prices in the United States,29
the shale
revolution is reviving that country’s petrochemicals
sector.30
Some companies have been looking
again to the United States, which offers a huge
consumer base and the opportunity to spread
companies’ business risks. Global petrochemicals
players that have engaged in several multibillion-
Table II.2. Selected mega-petrochemicals projects under development in the GCC countries
Project/Company name Partners Location Start Up
Capital
expenditure
($ million)
Sadara Aramco (65%) and Dow Chemical (35%) Jubail, Saudi Arabia 2016 20 000
Chemaweyaat Abu Dhabi Investment Council (40%); International
Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) (40%) and Abu
Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) (20%)
Al-Gharbia UAE 2018 11 000–20 000
Petro Rabigh 2 Aramco (37.5%) and Sumitomo (37.5%) Rabigh, Saudi Arabia 2016 7 000
Al Karaana Qatar Petroleum (80%) and Shell (20%) Ras, Laffan, Qatar 2017 6 400
Al-Sejeel Qatar Petroleum (80%) and Qatar Petrochemical (Qapco)
(20%)
Ras Laffan, Qatar 2018 5 500
Liwa Plastics Oman Oil Refineries and Petroleum Industries (Orpic) Sohar, Oman 2018 3 600
Kemya SABIC (50%) and Exxon Mobil (50%) Jubail, Saudi Arabia 2015 3 400
Source: UNCTAD, based on various newspaper accounts.

dollar megaprojects in GCC countries in the last
10 years – including Chevron Phillips Chemical,
Dow Chemical and ExxonMobil Chemical – have
been considering major projects in the United
States. For example, Chevron Phillips is planning
to build a large-scale ethane cracker and two
polyethylene units in Texas.31
Dow Chemical has
restarted its idled Saint Charles plant in Louisiana
and is undertaking a major polyethylene and
ethylene expansion in its plant in Texas.32
As of
March 2014, the United States chemical industry
had announced investment projects valued at about
$70 billion and linked to the plentiful and affordable
natural gas from domestic shale formations. About
half of the announced investment is by firms based
outside the United States (see chapter III).
Shale technology is being transferred through
cross-border MAs to Asian TNCs. United
States technology has been transferred to Asian
countries rich in shale gas through MA deals,
which should eventually help make these regions
more competitive producers and exporters for
chemicals. Government-backed Chinese and
Indian companies have been aggressively luring or
acquiring partners in the United States and Canada
to gather the required production techniques, with a
view to developing their own domestic resources.33
GCC petrochemicals and energy enterprises
have also invested in North America. The
North American shale gas boom has also attracted
investment from West Asian petrochemicals
companies: NOVA Chemicals (fully owned by
Abu Dhabi’s State-owned International Petroleum
Investment Company) is among the first to build a
plant to exploit low-cost North American ethylene.34
SABIC (Saudi Arabia) is also moving to harness the
shale boom in the United States. The company –
which already has a presence in the United States
through SABIC Americas, a chemicals and fertilizer
producer and a petrochemicals research centre – is
looking to seal a deal to invest in a petrochemicals
project as well.35
The boom has also pushed State-
owned Qatar Petroleum (QP) to establish small
footholds in North America’s upstream sector.
Because QP is heavily dependent on Qatar’s North
Field, it has invested to diversify risk geographi
cally. In April 2013, its affiliate, Qatar Petroleum
International (QPI), signed a memorandum of
understanding with ExxonMobil for future joint
investment in unconventional gas and natural gas
liquids in the United States, which suggests a
strategy of strengthening ties with TNCs that invest
in projects in Qatar36
and reflects joint interest in
expanding the partnership both domestically and
internationally. QPI also announced a $1 billion
deal with Centrica (United Kingdom) to purchase oil
and gas assets and exploration acreage in Alberta
from oil sands producer Suncor Energy (Canada).
However, new evidence suggests that the outlook
for the shale gas industry may be less bright than
was thought.37
Petrochemicals producers in the Middle East
should nonetheless build on this experience
to develop a strategy of gaining access to key
growth markets beyond their diminishing feedstock
advantage. Rather than focusing on expanding
capacity, they need to leverage their partnership with
petrochemicals TNCs to strengthen their knowledge
and skills base in terms of technology, research and
efficient operations, and to establish linkages with the
global manufacturing TNCs that use their products.
Efforts towards that end have been undertaken, for
example, by SABIC, which has opened RD centres
in Saudi Arabia, China and India, and is developing
a strategy to market its chemicals to international
manufacturing giants.

3. Latin America and the Caribbean
Fig. FID flows - LAC
(Host) (Home)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Peru
Colombia
Chile
Mexico
Brazil
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Argentina
Bolivarian
Rep. of
Venezuela
Colombia
Chile
Mexico
2013 2012 2013 2012
Fig. B - LAC
FDI inflows
Fig. C - LAC
FDI outflows
Share in
world total
8.6 11.6 12.4 13.3 14.3 19.2 20.1 3.4 4.8 4.7 8.0 6.5 9.2 8.1
Financial centres
Central America and the Caribbean excl. financial centres
South America
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
35
70
105
140
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Financial centres
Central America and the Caribbean excl. Financial Centres
South America
by range,a
2013
Above
$10 billion
British Virgin Islands, Brazil, Mexico,
Chile, Colombia, Cayman Islands
and Peru
British Virgin Islands, Mexico,
Cayman Islands and Chile
$5.0 to
$9.9 billion
Argentina and Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of)
Colombia
$1.0 to
$4.9 billion
Panama, Uruguay, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Bolivia
(Plurinational State of), Trinidad and
Tobago, Guatemala, Bahamas and
Honduras
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
and Argentina
$0.1 to
$0.9 billion
Nicaragua, Ecuador, Jamaica,
Paraguay, Barbados, Guyana, Haiti,
Aruba, El Salvador, Antigua and
Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname and Saint Kitts
and Nevis
Trinidad and Tobago, Panama,
Bahamas, Costa Rica and Peru
Less than
$0.1 billion
Belize, Saint Lucia, Grenada, Sint
Maarten, Anguilla, Curaçao, Dominica
and Montserrat
Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Saint Lucia, Aruba, Antigua
and Barbuda, Barbados, El Salvador,
Grenada, Sint Maarten, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Belize, Montserrat, Dominica,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, Jamaica, Uruguay, Curaçao,
Dominican Republic and Brazil
a
Note: Not including offshore financial centres.
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 24 050 61 613 33 673 18 479
Primary -2 550 28 245 823 309
Mining, quarrying and petroleum -2 844 28 238 868 309
Manufacturing 9 573 25 138 4 849 7 153
Food, beverages and tobacco 3 029 23 848 235 4 644
Basic metal and metal products 4 367 -34 1 326 39
Non-metallic mineral products - - 66 1 936
Services 17 027 8 230 28 001 11 017
Electricity, gas, water and waste management -73 3 720 398 85
Transportation and storage 4 550 1 520 3 443 628
Information and communications 1 146 252 -10 345
Financial and insurance activities 5 121 2 189 19 586 9 931
Business services 3 043 -488 960 -23
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 24 050 61 613 33 673 18 479
Developed economies 1 699 -7 188 17 146 7 274
Belgium 1 237 15 096 - -60
Spain -1 996 -7 083 1 109 422
United Kingdom -4 592 -30 530 932 -213
United States 8 717 6 299 4 642 2 250
Brazil 1 138 21 8 555 2 909
Chile 9 445 2 769 608 617
Colombia 2 277 4 815 4 260 1 500
Mexico -134 2 700 448 214
Transition economies - 53 916 -178 387
Russian Federation - 53 916 -178 370
Sector/industry
LAC as destination LAC as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 69 731 145 066 9 508 18 257
Primary 5 557 12 485 159 4 000
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 5 557 12 485 159 4 000
Manufacturing 32 236 34 630 3 745 4 292
Food, beverages and tobacco 3 605 3 844 692 1 493
Chemicals and chemical products 1 790 3 038 157 362
Metals and metal products 5 226 3 913 823 89
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 12 409 11 794 523 114
Services 31 939 97 952 5 605 9 966
Transport, storage and communications 4 150 14 205 560 4 703
Finance 2 138 5 770 413 923
LAC as destination LAC as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 69 731 145 066 9 508 18 257
Europe 27 786 37 739 385 653
Italy 8 106 6 013 - -
Spain 6 799 11 875 62 121
North America 22 852 30 687 1 780 585
Japan 3 250 6 420 - -
East Asia 4 582 45 538 99 693
Latin America and the Caribbean 6 576 15 730 6 576 15 730
Brazil 2 706 5 926 1 895 3 022
Mexico 1 260 4 144 790 1 113
Transition economies 337 855 - 96

FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean
reached $292 billion in 2013 (figure B). Excluding
the offshore financial centres, they increased by
6 per cent to $182 billion. Flows to Central America
and the Caribbean increased by 64 per cent to
$49 billion, boosted by a mega-acquisition in
Mexico. Whereas in previous years FDI growth
was driven largely by South America, in 2013
flows to this subregion declined by 6 per cent to
$133 billion, as the decline in metal prices
dampened FDI growth in the metal mining
industry of some countries. FDI outflows reached
$115 billion in 2013. Excluding financial centres,
they declined by 31 per cent to $33 billion.
Central America and the Caribbean drove
FDI growth to the region. The purchase by
the Belgian brewer AB InBev of the remaining
shares in Grupo Modelo for $18 billion more than
doubled inflows to Mexico to $38 billion (figure
A), and is largely behind the strong increase
of FDI to Central America and the Caribbean.
Flows also increased in Panama (61 per cent to
$4.7 billion) − Central America’s second largest
recipient after Mexico − on the back of large
infrastructure investment projects, including the
expansion of the Panama Canal and of the capital
city’s metro rail system, both part of ambitions to
develop the country into a regional logistical hub
and expand its capacity for assembly operations.
Flows to Costa Rica rose by 14 per cent to
$2.7 billion, boosted by a near tripling of real estate
acquisitions by non-residents, accounting for
43 per cent of total FDI to the country. The growth
of FDI to Guatemala and to Nicaragua slowed
in 2013, with flows growing by only 5 per cent
after registering substantial increases in the last
few years. The growth was powered primarily by
surges in FDI in the mining and banking industries
in Guatemala, and in free trade zones and offshore
assembly manufacturing in Nicaragua.
In the Caribbean, flows to the Dominican Republic
fell by 37 per cent to $2 billion, after two years of
strong recovery which had driven them to $3.1
billion in 2012. This fall is due to both the predictable
decline of cross-border MAs in 2013 − after the
one-off acquisition of the country’s largest brewer
for $1.2 billion in 2012 − and the completion of
the Barrick Gold mining investment project, which
started production in 2012. FDI in Trinidad and
Tobago − highly concentrated in the oil and gas ex
tractive industry, which attracted more than 70 per
cent of total inflows to the country in 2001–2011
(see section B.3) − decreased by 30 per cent to
$1.7 billion, owing to the halving of reinvested
earnings as natural gas prices remained weak.
After three consecutive years of strong
growth, FDI to South America declined (figure
B). Among the main recipient countries, Brazil saw
only a slight decline from 2012 − 2 per cent to
$64 billion (figure A) − but with highly uneven growth
by sector. Flows to the primary sector soared by
86 per cent to $17 billion, powered primarily by the
oil and gas extractive industry (up 144 per cent to
$11 billion), while flows to the manufacturing and
services sectors decreased by 17 and 14 per cent,
respectively. FDI to the automobile and electronics
industries bucked the trend of the manufacturing
sector, rising by 85 and 120 per cent, respectively.
FDI to Chile declined by 29 per cent to $20 billion,
driven mainly by decreasing flows to the mining
industry, which accounted for more than half of
total FDI flows to this country in 2006–2012. The
decrease in this sector is due to the completion
of a number of investment projects that started
production in 2013 and to the indefinite suspension
of Barrick Gold’s (Canada) $8.5 billion Pascua-Lama
gold-mining mega-project, located on the Chilean-
Argentinian border.38
The suspension, prompted
mainly by lower gold prices and Barrick’s financial
strains, has also affected FDI to Argentina, which
declined by 25 per cent. Flows to Peru decreased
by 17 per cent to $10 billion, following a strong
decline of reinvested earnings (by 41 per cent to
$4.9 billion) and of equity capital (by 48 per cent
to $2.4 billion), partly compensated by the increase
in intracompany loans. The Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela saw its FDI inflows more than double, to
$7 billion. Inflows to Colombia increased by 8 per
cent to $17 billion (figure A), largely on the back
of cross-border MA sales in the electricity and
banking industries.
Decreasing cross-border purchases and
increasing loan repayments caused a slide
of outward FDI from the region. FDI outflows
reached $115 billion in 2013 (figure C). Excluding
offshore financial centres, they declined by 31 per
cent to $33 billion. The decline is the result of both
a 47 per cent decrease in cross-border acquisitions

from the high value reached during 2012 ($31 billion)
and a strong increase in loan repayments to parent
companies by foreign affiliates of Brazilian and
Chilean TNCs.39
Colombian TNCs clearly bucked
the region’s declining trend in cross-border MAs,
more than doubling the value of their net purchases
abroad to over $6 billion, mainly in the banking, oil
and gas, and food industries.
FDI prospects in the region are likely to be led
by developments in the primary sector. New
opportunities are opening for foreign TNCs in the
region’s oil and gas industry, namely in Argentina
and in Mexico.
Argentina’s vast shale oil and gas resources40
and
the technical and financial needs of Yacimientos
Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), the majority State-owned
energy company, to exploit them open new horizons
for FDI in this industry. The agreement reached in
2014 with Repsol (Spain) regarding compensation
for the nationalization of its majority stake in YPF41
removed a major hurdle to the establishment of joint
ventures between YPF and other foreign companies
for the exploitation of shale resources. YPF has
already secured some investment, including a
$1.2 billion joint venture with Chevron (United States)
for the exploitation of the Vaca Muerta shale oil
and gas field. Total (France) will also participate in a
$1.2 billion upstream joint venture.
In Mexico, FDI in the oil and gas industry is likely
to receive a powerful boost after the approval of
the long-disputed energy reform bill that ended
a 75-year State oil monopoly and opened the
Mexican energy industry to greater participation
by international energy players in the upstream,
midstream and downstream oil and gas sectors
(see chapter III).
The sectoral composition of FDI stock in Latin
America and the Caribbean shows similarities
and differences by countries and subregions.
The services sector is the main target of FDI both
in South America and in Central America and
the Caribbean (figure II.11), albeit relatively more
important in the latter. The prominence of this sector
is the result of the privatizations and the removal of
restrictions on FDI that took place in both subregions
in the last two decades. The manufacturing sector
is the second most important target in both
subregions, but more important in Central America
and the Caribbean. The primary sector is relatively
more important in South America but marginal in
the other subregion. In Brazil and Mexico – the two
biggest economies, where the region’s FDI to the
manufacturing sector is concentrated − FDI is driven
by two different strategies; export-oriented in Mexico
(efficiency-seeking) and domestic-market-oriented in
Brazil (market-seeking).
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database.
Figure II.11. Latin America and the Caribbean: share of FDI stock by main sectors, subregions and countries, 2012
(Per cent)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
South America Central
America and
Caribbean
South America,
except Brazil
Central
America and
Caribbean,
except Mexico
Brazil Mexico
Services Manufacturing Primary

These different patterns of FDI flows and the
different strategies of TNCs have shaped the
different export structures of the two subregions,
with primary products and commodity-based
manufactures predominating in South America’s
exports and manufactured products predominating
in Central America and the Caribbean’s exports,
resulting in two distinct GVC participation patterns.
A closer look at the industry level also shows
significant differences in GVC patterns within
the same manufacturing activities, resulting from
different industrialization strategies.
Different patterns of GVC integration. In 2011,
the share of Latin American exports dependent
on GVCs was 45 per cent, but the subregional
figures differ strongly. In Central America and the
Caribbean, GVC participation derives primarily
from the relatively high imported foreign value
added in exports (upstream component), while
the downstream component is low. This occurs
because most exports are made up of medium-
and high-skill technology-intensive products (e.g.
automobiles, electronics) as well as low-technology
products (e.g. textiles) near the end of the value
chain. In South America, by contrast, there is low
upstream but high downstream participation in
GVCs (figure II.12). This is due to the predominance
of primary products and commodity-based
manufactures in exports, which use few foreign
inputs and, because they are at the beginning of the
value chain, are themselves used as intermediate
goods in third countries’ exports.
The same phenomenon can be observed in the
value added exports of the manufacturing sector.
While GVC participation in this sector in South
America was 34 per cent in 2010 – shared equally
between imported value added and downstream
use of exports (at 17 per cent each) – participation
was much higher in Central America and the
Caribbean (50 per cent) and highly imbalanced
in favour of imported value added in exports
(44 per cent), while downstream use represented
only 6 per cent (figure II.13). Differences between the
two subregions are more accentuated in industries
such as electronics, motor vehicles, machinery and
equipment, and textiles and clothing (table II.3).
This different degree and pattern of participation in
GVCs between the two subregions − in the same
38
14
23
12
27
21
0 10 20 30 40
Central America and
the Caribbean
South America
Latin America and the
Caribbean
Downstream component Upstream component
GVC
participation rate
45
41
50
Source: UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
The share of foreign value added in Central America and the Caribbean’s exports is under-estimated because the
UNCTAD-EORA data do not take into account the high import content of production in the maquiladora industry.
Figure II.12. GVC participation rate in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2011
(Per cent)

manufacturing activities − derives from their position
in the value chain, the nature of end markets, the
linkages between export activities and the local
economy, the nature of industrial policy, and the
degree of intraregional integration. Central American
and Caribbean countries rely heavily on the United
States as both an export market for manufacturing
products (76 per cent of all such exports) (figure II.14)
and a GVC partner, especially in the upstream part of
the chain, contributing 55 per cent of the imported
value added in those exports (table II.4). However,
their intraregional trade links and GVC interaction
are weak: the subregion absorbs only 5 per cent of
its own manufacturing exports (see figure II.4) and
accounts for a small part of its upstream and down
stream GVC links in the manufacturing sector (2 per
cent and 6 per cent respectively) (see table II.4).
By contrast, intraregional trade links in South
America are much stronger, accounting for 49 per
cent of the subregion’s manufacturing exports,
24 per cent of its upstream GVC manufacturing
links, and 13 per cent of its downstream links
(table II.4). Finally, South America’s manufacturing
exports integrate a much lower share of imported
value added (17 per cent) than do those of Central
America (44 per cent) (table II.4).
In the manufacturing sector in particular, the
differences between South America and Central
America in patterns of GVC participation derive
mostly from two sources: different industrialization
strategies and different modes of integration in
international trade of Latin America’s biggest
economies, Brazil and Mexico.42
This is illustrated
by the example of the automobile industry, which,
in both countries, is dominated by almost the same
foreign vehicle-assembly TNCs but shows very
different patterns of GVC participation.
Two ways to participate in GVCs: the
automobile industry in Brazil and Mexico.
Brazil and Mexico are respectively the seventh and
eighth largest automobile producers and the fourth
and sixteenth largest car markets, globally.43
Almost
all of their motor vehicle production is undertaken
Total exports as calculated in GVCs (sum of the three components) are not necessarily the same as reported in the
national account of exports of goods and services.
Figure II.13. Latin America and the Caribbean: value added exports by main components,
sectors and subregions, 2010
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
South America
Central America and the
Caribbean
South America
Caribbean
South America
Caribbean
South America
Caribbean
TotalPrimaryManufacturingServices
Domestic value added incorporated in other countries' exports (downstream component)
Foreign value added in exports (upstream component)
40%
49%
40%
35%
34%
50%
51%
55%
13%
37%
7%
12%
17%
44%
10%
21%
27%
12%
32%
22%
17%
6%
41%
34%
GVC
participation
Value added exports
Downstream
component,
share
Upstream
component,
share rate

Source: UNCTAD GlobStat.
Figure II.14. Latin America and the Caribbean: geographical distribution of export of manufactured
goods by destination, 2010
(Per cent)
Other developed
countries
2
Europe
16
United States
12
South America
49
Central America
and the
Caribbean
9
Developing Asia
9
Other
developing and
transition
economies
3
United States
76
Europe
4
Other developed
countries
4
South America
7
Central America
and the
Caribbean
5
Developing Asia
3 Other
developing and
transition
economies
1
Central America and the CaribbeanSouth America
Table II.3. Latin America and the Caribbean manufacturing sector: GVC participation, components
and share in total value added manufacturing exports by main industry, 2010
(Per cent)
Industry
South America Central America and the Caribbean
GVC
participation
rate
FVA
share
DVX
share
Share in
total manu-
facturing
exports
GVC
participation
rate
FVA
share
DVX
share
Share in
total manu-
facturing
exports
Manufacturing sector 34 17 17 100 50 44 6 100
Textiles, clothing and leather 27 16 11 8 41 38 2 10
Metal and metal products 43 16 27 12 55 29 26 4
Machinery and equipment 27 16 12 7 41 38 4 5
Wood and wood products 35 13 22 8 45 31 14 2
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 40 9 31 5 42 31 11 3
Rubber and plastic products 42 21 21 3 56 42 14 1
Non-metallic mineral products 29 11 18 3 27 12 15 2
by global vehicle assemblers, most of which −
including Ford, General Motors, Honda, Nissan,
Renault, Toyota and Volkswagen − have assembly
plants in both countries. This shared characteristic
notwithstanding, clear differences exist between the
industries in the two countries. The most significant
one is that the Brazilian automobile value chain
has the domestic market as its main end market,
whereas the Mexican one is largely export-oriented
and directed mainly to the United States as its end

market. In 2012, the Mexican automobile industry
exported, for example, 82 per cent of its vehicle
production44
– 64 per cent of it to the United States.
By contrast, only 13 per cent of vehicle production
in Brazil was exported, with MERCOSUR absorbing
67 per cent of exports by value.45
The inward/outward orientation of the motor vehicle
industries in the two countries is also reflected by
the much lower GVC participation of Brazil’s motor
vehicle exports − 26 per cent, compared with 58
per cent for Mexico’s exports. This difference is
explained mainly by the much lower imported
content in Brazil’s exports (21 per cent versus 47
per cent in Mexico) and also − but to a lesser extent
− by the lower participation of Brazil’s motor vehicle
exports in other countries’ exports (5 per cent,
compared with 11 per cent) (table II.5).
Another difference is the major interaction of Brazil’s
automotive industry with other Latin American
countries – mainly Argentina, with which Brazil has
an agreement on common automotive policy.46
Mexico’s industry relies strongly on developed
countries, mainly the United States; its few linkages
with other Latin American countries are with
neighbours that do not have significant activity in
the automotive industry. Indeed, whereas Latin
America and the Caribbean accounts for only
4 per cent of GVC participation in Mexico’s motor
vehicle exports, in Brazil its share is 12 per cent.
More tellingly, Brazil represents an important step in
Argentina’s motor vehicle value chain: it accounts
for 34 per cent of GVC participation in Argentina’s
motor vehicle exports (table II.5) and absorbs
77 per cent of the value of those exports.47
Different TNC strategies and different
government industrial policies have resulted
in distinct GVC integration patterns with
different implications in each country for
business linkages, innovation and technology.
Mexico opted for an export-oriented strategy that
allows companies operating under the IMMEX
programme48
to temporarily import goods and
services that will be manufactured, transformed or
repaired, and then re-exported, with no payment
of taxes, no compensatory quotas and other
specific benefits.49
This strategy relies mainly on
Table II.4. Latin America and the Caribbean: GVC upstream and downstream links in the manufacturing
sector by subregion and by geographical origin and destination, 2010
(Per cent)
Partner region
FVA share
(by origin)
DVX share
(by destination)
GVC participation
rate (by origin
and destination)
South
America
Central
America and
the Caribbean
South
America
Central
America and
the Caribbean
South
America
Central
America and
the Caribbean
Developed countries 55 76 64 76 59 76
North America 23 54 14 35 19 52
Europe 27 16 46 38 36 19
Other developed 5 6 4 3 5 6
Developing and transition economies 45 24 36 24 41 24
South America 24 5 13 4 19 5
Central America and the Caribbean 2 2 5 6 3 2
Asia and Oceania 15 15 15 11 15 15
Other developing and transition economies 4 2 3 3 4 2
World 100 100 100 100 100 100
Amount ($ billion) 50 130 48 19 98 149
Share in total value added manufacturing exports 17 44 17 6 34 50

the low cost of labour as a fundamental factor of
competitiveness and GVC integration. It has resulted
in the development of an extensive network of
maquiladora-type producers, including carmakers
and automobile suppliers, mostly foreign owned,
that has transformed Mexico into a significant
export hub. However, it has not necessarily forged
strong linkages with local suppliers (Sturgeon et al.,
2010).50
The weak linkages with local suppliers in
the automobile value chain may also be attested
to by the high level of foreign value added in the
industry’s exports (table II.5).
In contrast, the automotive value chain in Brazil
has benefited from the advantages offered by a
large internal and regional market, and thus has
expanded into more complex and diverse activities,
generating local innovation. Brazilian affiliates of
TNC carmakers have increased their technological
capabilities through the search for solutions to meet
local demand, related to technical differences in
materials, fuels and road conditions or to distinct
consumer preferences. Thus, the capabilities of
Brazilian automotive engineering have been formed
through a learning process of adapting and, more
Table II.5. Latin America: GVC upstream and downstream links in the motor vehicle industry,
selected countries,by geographical origin and destination, 2010
(Per cent)
FVA share
(by origin)
DVX share
(by destination)
GVC participation
rate (by origin
and destination)
Partner region/country Brazil Mexico Argentina Brazil Mexico Argentina Brazil Mexico Argentina
Developed countries 79 89 43 70 81 50 72 83 48
United States 36 72 18 24 56 17 27 59 17
Europe 33 10 20 37 16 27 36 15 26
Other developed 9 7 5 9 9 6 9 8 6
Developing and transition economies 21 11 57 30 19 50 28 17 52
Latin America and the Caribbean 12 4 49 12 4 37 12 4 40
South America 11 4 49 11 4 36 11 4 39
Argentina 9 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0
Brazil 0 3 42 0 2 31 0 2 34
Central America and the Caribbean 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
Mexico 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
Asia and Oceania 9 7 7 14 13 12 13 12 11
China 4 3 4 6 5 6 6 5 5
Other developing and transitional economies 1 0 0 3 2 2 3 1 1
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Amount ($ billion) 5.7 33.2 2.2 1.4 8.1 0.7 7.0 41.2 2.9
Share in total value added motor vehicle
exports (%)
21 47 50 5 11 15 26 58 65
UNCTAD-Eora’s estimates of foreign and domestic value added in Mexico’s gross exports do not take into account
the high import content of production in the Maquiladora and PITEX programmes, likely leading to a significant under-
estimation of the share of foreign value added in its exports. UNCTAD-Eora’s data, based on a country’s input-output
table, relies on the assumption that the intensity in the use of imported inputs is the same between production for
exports and production for domestic sales. This assumption does not hold for countries, like Mexico, hosting significant
processing exports characterized by favourable tax treatment for temporary imports to produce export goods. This
implies a significant difference in the intensity of imported intermediate inputs between the production of processing
exports on the one hand and the production for normal exports and domestic sales on the other hand. Estimates using
an input-output table for the maquiladora industry for 2003, found a foreign value added share of about 74 per cent
for the transportation equipment industry (NICS 336) in 2003 (De la Cruz et al. (2011), while UNCTAD-Eora’s estimates
for the same year are 41 per cent for the manufacture of motor vehicles trailers and semi-trailers and other transport
equipment (ISIC D34 and D35).

recently, designing and developing vehicles suitable
for local conditions. This process has generated
opportunities to involve locally owned component
producers, local research and engineering services
institutions, and other smaller suppliers of parts
and components, which may have specific local
knowledge not available in multinational engineering
firms (Quadros, 2009; Quadros et al., 2009).51
Although the size of the Brazilian car market was one
of the main factors behind the wave of investment
in the 1990s and the progressive delegation of
innovation activities to Brazilian affiliates and their
local suppliers, Government policies have been a
strong determinant in the attraction of new vehicle
assemblers and in the expansion of innovation and
RD activities. In contrast to Mexico, where since
the 1990s, Government policy has moved towards
free trade and investment rules, automotive policy
in Brazil maintains high tariffs on automotive
products imported from outside MERCOSUR.
Brazil also introduced a series of incentives for
exports and for investment in new plants. In 2011,
faced with an increase in imported models favoured
by the expanding internal market, an overvalued
local currency and depressed export markets in
developed countries, the Government introduced
an internal tax on car purchases. However, it
exempted carmakers that sourced at least 65 per
cent of their parts from MERCOSUR partners or
from Mexico (with which Brazil has an automotive
deal). This reduced vehicle imports from a peak of
27 per cent in December 2011 to 19 per cent
in October 2013. In 2012, the Government
renegotiated the bilateral deal with Mexico,
imposing import quotas. A new automotive
regime for 2013–2017 (Inovar Autos), introduced
in 2012, set new rules that are intended to boost
local content, energy efficiency, innovation and
RD. Companies that achieve specific targets in
production steps located in Brazil and in investment
in product development and RD will benefit from
additional tax incentives.52
Both Brazil and Mexico continue to attract signifi
cant foreign investment in their automobile sector.
In Brazil, the new automobile regime, combined
with the continued expansion of the car market
in Brazil and Argentina, has encouraged foreign
investors to step up investment plans and increase
local content.53
In Mexico, low labour costs, an
increasingly dense and capable foreign-owned
supply chain, and a global web of FTAs are driving a
production surge in the automotive industry, much
of it from Japanese and German manufacturers.54
The growth potential of the automotive industry
appears promising in both countries, despite clear
differences between the two in government policies
and TNC strategies. Mexico has successfully
leveraged its strategic proximity to the United
States market and its trade agreements with more
than 40 countries to attract important amounts
of FDI to its automobile industry, which has
transformed the country into a major export base,
creating significant job opportunities. However, the
country’s competitiveness is still based primarily
on low wages, and the industry – strongly export-
oriented – has developed only weak linkages with
local suppliers. In Brazil, the exports are lower
but the advantages represented by the large
internal and regional markets have attracted FDI
to the automobile industry. The need to adapt
to the specificities of this market, coupled with a
government policy introduced in the 2000s to
provide greater incentives for innovation, RD and
development of domestic productive capacity, have
led to more integration of local suppliers into the
automobile value chain, and the development of
local innovation and RD capabilities.

4. Transition economies
Fig. B - Transition
FDI inflows
Fig. B - Transition
FDI outflows
Georgia
Commonwealth of Independent States
South-East Europe
Georgia
Commonwealth of Independent States
South-East Europe
Share in
world total
4.4 6.5 5.8 5.0 5.6 6.3 7.4 2.2 3.1 4.1 3.9 4.3 4.0 7.0
0
25
50
75
100
125
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
20
40
60
80
100
Fig. FID flows - Transition
(Host) (Home)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Kazakhstan
Russian
Federation
0 20 40 60 80 100
Belarus
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Russian
Federation
2013 2012 2013 2012
by range,a
2013
Above
$5.0 billion
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan Russian Federation
$1.0 to
$4.9 billion
Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Albania, Uzbekistan, Serbia
and Georgia
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
$0.5 to
$0.9 billion
Kyrgyzstan ..
Below
$0.5 billion
Montenegro, Armenia, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of
Moldova and Tajikistan
Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Albania,
Republic of Moldova, Montenegro,
Armenia, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan,
the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina
a
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 6 852 -3 820 9 296 56 970
Developed economies 4 746 -7 591 4 848 1 682
European Union 3 709 -3 987 5 164 243
Cyprus 7 988 -234 - -
Sweden -1 747 - 3 384 - 15
United States -212 -3 580 -283 30
Africa - - - -
Latin America and the Caribbean -178 387 - 53 916
West Asia 1 582 425 4 023 3
South, East and South-East Asia 256 2 160 - 597
China 200 2 000 - -
Transition economies 424 771 424 771
Sector/industry
as destination
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 39 389 27 868 9 950 18 611
Primary 2 604 560 145 3 146
Manufacturing 18 134 10 041 6 496 2 462
Food, beverages and tobacco 2 348 725 201 248
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 424 501 3 747 714
Chemicals and chemical products 5 316 995 186 396
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 4 229 2 027 1 682 673
Services 18 651 17 267 3 310 13 003
Construction 2 908 3 069 31 -
Transport, storage and communications 4 051 2 698 893 676
Finance 2 056 2 359 1 134 1 330
as destination
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 39 389 27 868 9 950 18 611
European Union 20 338 14 719 2 337 2 186
Germany 4 329 2 767 29 157
United Kingdom 2 538 563 540 80
United States 4 610 2 570 279 41
Africa - 76 67 108
South Asia 380 872 252 76
West Asia 2 140 3 653 3 156 12 779
Latin America and the Caribbean - 96 337 855
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 6 852 -3 820 9 296 56 970
Primary -1 193 -3 726 2 173 55 687
Mining, quarrying and petroleum -1 212 -3 726 2 173 55 687
Manufacturing 340 2 813 -547 -24
Food, beverages and tobacco 6 189 -40 4
Chemicals and chemical products 281 2 000 - 30
Basic metal and metal products 5 425 -182 -59
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment -390 60 - -
Services 7 705 -2 907 7 669 1 307
Electricity, gas, water and waste management -451 857 - 597
Transport and storage 2 148 348 1 291 652
Information and communications 6 714 -4 106 23 -
Financial and insurance activities -168 -164 6 314 -17

FDI flows to and from transition economies reached
record levels in 2013. The Russian Federation was
the world’s third largest recipient of FDI and the
world’s fourth largest investor, mostly due to a
single large deal. In South-East Europe, most of the
increase in inflows was driven by the privatization of
remaining State-owned enterprises in the services
sector. FDI in the transition economies is likely to be
affected by uncertainties related to regional conflict;
FDI linkages between the transition economies and
the EU may be particularly impacted.
FDI inflows to the transition economies
increased by 28 per cent in 2013, to $108
billion (figure B). The FDI performance of both
transition subgroups was significant: in South-East
Europe, flows increased by 43 per cent, from $2.6
billion in 2012 to $3.7 billion in 2013, reflecting a
rise of investments in the services sector; in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
28 per cent rise in flows was due to the significant
growth of FDI to the Russian Federation, which
made it the world’s third largest recipient of
inflows for the first time. Large countries in the
region continued to account for the lion’s share of
inward FDI, with the top two destinations (Russian
Federation and Kazakhstan) accounting for 82 per
cent of the flows (figure A).
The Russian Federation saw FDI flows grow by
57 per cent, reaching $79 billion. Foreign investors
were motivated by continued strong growth in the
domestic market coupled with productivity gains.
They primarily used intracompany loans from parent
companies to finance these investments. Investors
also continued to be attracted by high returns in
energy and other natural-resource-related projects,
as illustrated by partnership deals in “hard to
access” oil projects, for which tax relief is offered.
The FDI surge was also due to the acquisition by
BP (United Kingdom) of an 18.5 per cent equity
stake in Rosneft (Russia Federation) as part of a
bigger deal between those two companies (box
II.4). As a result, in 2013 the United Kingdom was
the largest investor in the Russian Federation for
the first time, accounting for an estimated 23 per
cent of FDI to the country.
FDI inflows to Kazakhstan declined by 29 per
cent, to $10 billion, as investments in financial
services slowed, with some foreign banks divesting
their assets. For example, Unicredit (Italy) sold its
affiliate ATF bank to a domestic investor. Political
uncertainties since 2013 have halved FDI flows to
Ukraine to $3.8 billion, partly due to a number of
divestments – in particular, in the banking sector.
In South-East Europe, most of the FDI
inflows were driven by privatizations in the
services sector. In Albania, FDI inflows reached
$1.2 billion, owing mainly to the privatization of
four hydropower plants and to the acquisition of a
70 per cent share of the main oil-refining company
ARMO by Heaney Assets Corporation (Azerbaijan).
In Serbia, the jump in FDI can be ascribed to
some major acquisitions. The private equity
group KKR (United States) acquired pay-TV and
broadband group SBB/Telemach, for $1 billion.
Abu Dhabi’s Etihad Airways acquired a 49 per
cent stake in Jat Airways, the Serbian national flag
Box II.4. The Rosneft-BP transactions
In March 2013, Rosneft, the Russian Federation’s State-owned and largest oil company, completed the acquisition
of TNK-BP. Rosneft paid $55 billion to the two owners: BP (United Kingdom) and A.A.R. Consortium, an investment
vehicle based in the British Virgin Islands that represented the Russian co-owners of TNK-BP. A.A.R. was paid
all in cash, while BP received $12.5 billion in cash and an 18.5 per cent stake in Rosneft, valued at $15 billion.
The payment by Rosneft was reflected as direct equity investment abroad in the balance-of-payment statistics of
the Russian Federation, while the acquisition by BP of the stake in Rosneft was reflected as direct equity inflow.
The remainder of the acquisition was funded by borrowing from foreign banks (reported at $29.5 billion) and from
domestic banks. The Rosneft-BP transactions raised FDI inflows in the first quarter of 2013 by $15 billion in the
Russian Federation. It raised foreign borrowing by about $29.5 billion, while boosting FDI outflows by $55 billion in
the British Virgin Islands.
Source: UNCTAD, based on conversation with the Central Bank of Russia; Institute of International Finance, “Private capital
flows to emerging market economies”, June 2013.

carrier, as part of the offloading of loss-making
State-owned enterprises.
Although developed countries were the main
investors in the region, developing-economy
FDI has been on the rise. Chinese investors,
for example, have expanded their presence in the
CIS by acquiring either domestic or foreign assets.
Chengdong Investment Corporation acquired a
12 per cent share of Uralkali (Russian Federation),
the world’s largest potash producer. CNPC acquired
ConocoPhillips’ shares in the Kashagan oil-field
development project in Kazakhstan for $5 billion.
In 2013, outward FDI from the region jumped
by 84 per cent, reaching $99 billion. As in
past years, Russian TNCs accounted for most
FDI projects, followed by TNCs from Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan. The value of cross-border MA
purchases by TNCs from the region rose more than
six-fold, mainly owing to the acquisition of TNK-
BP Ltd (British Virgin Islands) by Rosneft (box II.4).
Greenfield investments also rose by 87 per cent to
$19 billion.
Prospects. FDI in the transition economies is
expected to decline in 2014 as uncertainties
related to regional conflict deter investors – mainly
those from developed countries. However, regional
instability has not yet affected investors from
developing countries. For example, in the Russian
Federation, the government’s Direct Investment
Fund – a $10 billion fund to promote FDI in the
country – has been actively deployed in collaboration
with foreign partners, for example, to fund a deal
with Abu Dhabi’s Finance Department to invest
up to $5 billion in Russian infrastructure. In South-
East Europe, FDI is expected to rise – especially in
pipeline projects in the energy sector. In Serbia, the
South Stream project, valued at about €2 billion, is
designed to transport natural gas from the Russian
Federation to Europe. In Albania, the Trans-Adriatic
pipeline will generate one of that country’s largest
FDI projects, with important benefits for a number
of industries, including manufacturing, utilities
and transport. The pipeline will enhance Europe’s
energy security and diversity by providing a new
source of gas.55
(i) Interregional FDI with the EU
FDI linkages between the East (transition
economies) and the West (EU) were strong until
2013, but the deepening stand-off between the
EU and the Russian Federation over Ukraine might
affect their FDI relationship.
Over the past 10 years, transition economies have
been the fastest-growing hosts for FDI worldwide,
overtaking both developed and all developing
groups (figure II.15). During 2000–2013, total FDI
in these economies – in terms of stocks as well
as flows – rose at roughly 10 times the rate of
growth of total global FDI. Similarly, outflows from
transition economies rose by more than 17 times
between 2000 and 2013, an increase unrivalled
by any other regional grouping. EU countries have
been important partners, both as investors and
recipients, in this evolution.
Figure II.15. FDI inflow index of selected regions,
2000–2013
(Base 2000 = 100)
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Transition economies Developed economies Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean Developing Asia
In transition economies, the EU has the
largest share of inward FDI stock, accounting
for more than two thirds of the total. North
America has consistently accounted for a lower
share of inward FDI to transition economies (3 per
cent), while the share of developing economies
has been on the rise to 17 per cent. In the CIS, EU
investors are motivated by a desire to gain access
to natural resources and growing local consumer

markets, and to benefit from business opportunities
arising from the liberalization of selected industries.
In South-East Europe, most of the EU investments
are driven by the privatization of State-owned
enterprises and by large projects benefiting from a
combination of low production costs in the region
and the prospect of association with or membership
in the EU. Among the EU countries, Germany has
the largest stock of FDI, followed by France, Austria,
Italy and the United Kingdom (figure II.16).
Data on individual FDI projects show a similar
pattern: In terms of cross-border MAs, TNCs from
the Netherlands are the largest acquirers (31 per
cent), followed by those from Germany and Italy.
In greenfield projects, German investors have the
largest share (19 per cent), followed by those from
the United Kingdom and Italy. With regard to target
countries, about 60 per cent of the region’s MAs
and announced greenfield projects took place in
the Russian Federation, followed by Ukraine.
Data on cross-border MAs indicate that EU
investments in transition economies are more
concentrated in finance; electricity, gas and water,
information and communication; and mining and
quarrying (figure II.17). Construction; transport,
storage and communication; motor vehicles and
other transport equipment; coke and petroleum
products; and electricity, gas and water are the
main recipient industries of announced greenfield
Source: Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border MA database for MAs (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics)
and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) for greenfield projects.
Note: MA data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10 per cent. Greenfield
data refer to estimated amounts of capital investment.
Figure II.17. Distribution of cross-border MAs and greenfield investment in transition economies concluded
by EU TNCs, by industry, cumulative 2003–2013
Greenﬁeld investmentCross-border MAs
Finance
(22)
Electricity, gas
and water
(20)Information and
communication
(17)
Mining,
quarrying and
petroleum
(15)
Transportation
and storage
(7)
Metals and
metal products
(6)
Chemicals and
chemical
products
(3)
Trade
(3)
Motor vehicles
and other
transport
equipment
(2)
Others
(5)
Construction
(11)
Transport,
storage and
communications
(9)
Motor vehicles
and other
transport
equipment
(8)
Coke,
petroleum
products and
nuclear fuel
(8)
Electricity, gas
and water
(8)
Mining,
quarrying and
petroleum
(8)
Trade
(8)
Non-metallic
mineral
products
(5)
Finance
(5)
Others
(29)
Note: Data as reported by the investor countries.
Figure II.16. Major EU investors in transition
economies, 2012 outward stock
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Greece
Slovenia
Finland
Sweden
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Italy
Austria
France
Germany

projects by EU investors. Salient FDI trends in some
of these industries are as follows:
• The relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions
in the financial services industry and accession
to the WTO of some transition economies
facilitated the entry of EU investors. It also
reflected European banks’ increasing interest
in growth opportunities outside their traditional
markets. For example, UniCredit (Italy) acquired
Ukrsotsbank (Ukraine) for $2.1 billion and
Société Générale Group (France) bought a
20 per cent equity stake in Rosbank, one of the
largest Russian banks, for $1.7 billion. In South-
East Europe, the share of banking assets owned
by foreign entities, mainly from the EU, has risen
to more than 90 per cent. Foreign banks (mainly
Austrian, Italian and Greek banking groups) have
either acquired local banks or established local
affiliates or regional branches.
• The need for structural reform to enable the
electricity industry to meet the growing demand
for electric power in the Russian Federation
prompted the unbundling and reorganization
of State-owned Unified Energy Systems. This
restructuring and sales of assets have provided
opportunities for foreign investors to enter the
industry. A number of the stakes have been
acquired by European TNCs, such as Fortum
(Finland), Enel (Italy), E.ON (Germany), CEZ Group
(Czech Republic), RWE Group (Germany) and
EDF (France).
• Driven by high expected returns, EU TNCs
increased their investments in energy and natural-
resource-related projects, mainly through two
channels. First, the European companies entered
transition economies’ oil and gas markets through
asset-swap deals by which those companies
obtained minority participation in exploration and
extraction projects in exchange for allowing firms
from transition economies to enter downstream
markets in the EU. For example, Wintershall
(Germany) acquired a stake in the Yuzhno-
Russkoye gas field in Siberia; in return, Gazprom
(Russian Federation) could acquire parts of
Wintershall’s European assets in hydrocarbons
transportation, storage and distribution. Second,
in some “hard to access” oil and gas projects
requiring cutting-edge technology, such as the
development of the Yamal and Shtokman fields,
EU TNCs were invited to invest.
• Among announced greenfield projects, the
increased activity in the automotive industry
in transition economies was fuelled by EU
manufacturers’ search for low-cost, highly
skilled labour and access to a growing market.
Many EU car manufacturers – among them,
Fiat, Volkswagen, Opel, Peugeot and Renault –
have opened production facilities in transition
economies, mainly in the Russian Federation. Car
assembly plants have already created a sufficient
critical mass to encourage the entry of many
types of component suppliers.
The bulk of outward FDI stock from transition
economies is in EU countries. Virtually all (95 per
cent) of the outward stock from South-East Europe
and CIS countries is due to the expansion abroad
of Russian TNCs. These investors increasingly
look for strategic assets in EU markets, including
downstream activities in the energy industry and
value added production activities in metallurgy,
to build global and regional value chains through
vertical integration. Much of the outward FDI has
been undertaken by relatively few major TNCs with
significant exports, aiming to reinforce their overseas
business activities through investment. Russian
oil and gas TNCs made some market-seeking
acquisitions of processing activities, distribution
networks, and storage and transportation facilities
across Europe. For example, Gazprom concluded
an agreement with OMV (Austria) for the purchase
of 50 per cent of its largest Central European
gas distribution terminal and storage facility, and
Lukoil acquired a 49 per cent stake in the Priolo
oil refinery of ISAB (Italy) for $2.1 billion (table II.6).
Russian TNCs in iron and steel also continued to
increase their investments in developed countries.
For MAs, the United Kingdom was the main target
with almost one third of all investment; for greenfield
projects, Germany accounted for 36 per cent of
investments from transition economies (figure II.18).
Prospects for the FDI relationship between the
EU and transition economies. Since the global
economic crisis, several Russian TNCs have had to
sell foreign companies they acquired through MAs
as the values of their assets declined (an example is
Basic Element, which lost some of its foreign assets
in machinery and construction in Europe).

The regional conflict might affect FDI flows to
and from transition economies. The outlook for
developed-country TNCs investing in the region
appears gloomier. For Russian TNCs investing
abroad, an important concern is the risk of losing
access to foreign loans. Banks in developed
countries may be reluctant to provide fresh finance.
Although some Russian State banks might fill the
gap left by foreign lenders, some Russian TNCs
depend on loans from developed countries.
Table II.6. The 20 largest cross-border MA deals in EU countries by transition economy TNCs,
2005–2013
Year
Value
($ million)
Acquired company Host economy
Industry of the
acquired company
Ultimate acquiring
company
Ultimate home
economy
Industry of the
ultimate acquiring
company
2008 2 098 ISAB Srl Italy
Crude petroleum
and natural gas
NK LUKOIL Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2005 2 000 Nelson Resources Ltd United Kingdom Gold ores NK LUKOIL Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2009 1 852
MOL Magyar Olaj es
Gazipari Nyrt
Hungary
Crude petroleum
and natural gas
Surgutneftegaz Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2007 1 637 Strabag SE Austria
Industrial buildings
and warehouses
KBE Russian Federation Investors, nec
2011 1 600 Ruhr Oel GmbH Germany Petroleum refining Rosneftegaz Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2009 1 599 Lukarco BV Netherlands Pipelines, nec NK LUKOIL Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2008 1 524 Oriel Resources PLC United Kingdom
Ferroalloy ores,
except vanadium
Mechel Russian Federation Iron and steel forgings
2007 1 427 Strabag SE Austria
Industrial buildings
and warehouses
KBE Russian Federation Investors, nec
2006 1 400 PetroKazakhstan Inc United Kingdom
Crude petroleum
and natural gas
NK KazMunaiGaz Kazakhstan
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2010 1 343 Kazakhmys PLC United Kingdom Copper ores Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National government
2009 1 200 Rompetrol Group NV Netherlands
Crude petroleum
and natural gas
NK KazMunaiGaz Kazakhstan
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2012 1 128
BASF Antwerpen NV-
Fertilizer Production
Plant
Belgium
Nitrogenous
fertilizers
MKHK YevroKhim Russian Federation
Chemical and fertilizer
mineral mining, nec
2012 1 024 Gefco SA France
Trucking, except
local
RZhD Russian Federation
Railroads, line-haul
operating
2009 1 001 Sibir Energy PLC United Kingdom
Crude petroleum
and natural gas
Gazprom Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2008 940 Formata Holding BV Netherlands Grocery stores
Pyaterochka
Holding NV
Russian Federation Grocery stores
2012 926
Bulgarian
Telecommunications
Co AD
Bulgaria
Telephone
communications,
except
radiotelephone
Investor Group Russian Federation Investors, nec
2011 744 Sibir Energy PLC United Kingdom
Crude petroleum
and natural gas
Gazprom Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2012 738
Volksbank
International AG {VBI}
Austria Banks Sberbank Rossii Russian Federation Banks
2009 725
Total Raffinaderij
Nederland NV
Netherlands
Crude petroleum
and natural gas
NK LUKOIL Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and
natural gas
2006 700 Lucchini SpA Italy
Steel works, blast
furnaces, and rolling
mills
Kapital Russian Federation Steel foundries, nec
Note: The data cover only deals that involved acquisition of an equity stake greater than 10 per cent.

Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) for MAs and
information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) for greenfield projects.
Note: The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10 per cent.
Figure II.18. Distribution of cross-border MAs and greenfield investment in EU countries concluded
by transition-economy TNCs, by host country, cumulative 1990–2013 (MAs) and 2003–2013
(greenfield investments)
Cross-border MAs Greenﬁeld investment
United Kingdom
(29)
Austria
(15)
Netherlands
(11)
Italy
(8)
Germany
(8)
Hungary
0
Belgium
(4)
Finland
(4)
Bulgaria
(3)
Others
(12)
Germany
(36)
Bulgaria
(10)Poland
(9)
United Kingdom
(6)
Romania
(6)
Lithuania
(5)
Hungary
(4)
Latvia
(3)
Finland
(3)
Others
(18)
Furthermore, additional scrutiny of Russian
investments in Europe, including an asset swap
between Gazprom and BASF (Germany), may slow
down the vertical integration process that Russian
TNCs have been trying to establish.56

5. Developed countries
Fig. FID flows - Developed
(Host) (Home)
0 50 100 150 200
United
Kingdom
Spain
Australia
Canada
United
States
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Canada
Germany
Switzerland
Japan
United
States
2013 2012 2013 2012
Fig. B - Developed
FDI inflows
Fig. C - Developed
FDI outflows
Share in
world total
66.1 56.8 50.6 49.5 51.8 38.8 39.0 83.3 80.0 72.3 67.4 71.0 63.3 60.8
0
300
600
900
1 200
1 500
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
400
800
1 200
1 600
2 000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
North America
Other developed Europe
Other developed countries
European Union
North America
Other developed Europe
Other developed countries
European Union
by range,a
2013
Above
$100 billion
United States United States and Japan
$50 to
$99 billion
Canada Switzerland and Germany
$10 to
$49 billion
Australia, Spain, United Kingdom,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany,
Netherlands, Italy, Israel and Austria
Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, Italy,
Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, United
Kingdom, Norway and Austria
$1 to
$9 billion
Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic,
France, Romania, Portugal, Hungary,
Greece, Japan, Denmark and
Bulgaria
Denmark, Australia, Israel, Finland,
Czech Republic, Hungary and
Portugal
Below
$1 billion
New Zealand, Estonia, Latvia,
Slovakia, Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania,
Iceland, Gibraltar, Bermuda, Slovenia,
Finland, Malta, Belgium, Switzerland
and Poland
New Zealand, Iceland, Estonia,
Latvia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Bermuda, Malta,
Croatia, Slovakia, Greece, France,
Poland and Belgium
a
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 268 652 239 606 183 914 151 752
Primary 50 161 39 346 -10 406 -41 903
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 43 032 37 906 -10 411 -42 154
Manufacturing 109 481 86 617 117 068 79 993
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chem. botanical prod. 11 638 742 17 951 20 443
Computer, electronic optical prod. electrical equipt. 22 061 10 776 23 909 11 808
Services 109 010 113 643 77 252 113 662
Trade 12 581 7 406 19 537 -2 067
Information and communications 22 395 29 374 9 372 22 476
Financial and insurance activities 9 905 9 081 27 461 64 741
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 268 652 239 606 183 914 151 752
Europe 45 246 34 225 93 865 112 545
North America 103 729 85 138 67 732 40 618
Other developed countries 26 432 45 287 13 811 12 487
Japan 32 276 44 872 -1 548 2 576
Developing economies 79 982 65 035 3 760 -6 307
Africa 635 2 288 -3 500 -8 953
Latin America and the Caribbean 17 146 7 274 1 699 -7 188
Asia and Oceania 62 201 55 473 5 561 9 833
China 27 009 37 405 3 251 6 201
Singapore -1 039 2 745 6 004 4 386
Transition economies 4 848 1 682 4 746 -7 591
Sector/industry
Developed countries
as destination
Developed countries
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 224 604 215 018 413 541 458 336
Primary 9 222 1 687 16 979 17 878
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 9 220 1 683 16 977 15 712
Manufacturing 88 712 92 748 186 278 197 086
Textiles, clothing and leather 6 579 13 711 10 080 18 269
Services 126 670 120 584 210 285 243 372
Transport, storage communications 17 070 19 436 40 067 41 630
Finance 11 120 10 260 23 106 21 309
Developed countries
as destination
Developed countries
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 224 604 215 018 413 541 458 336
Europe 107 093 112 784 109 572 107 921
North America 47 082 54 615 45 010 57 582
Other developed countries 16 744 17 488 16 337 19 383
Japan 9 818 11 212 4 317 7 920
Africa 1 802 2 080 17 541 27 254
Asia and Oceania 46 650 24 475 139 280 146 140
China 6 232 9 171 50 451 48 894
India 8 553 3 530 21 249 13 571
Latin America and the Caribbean 2 172 1 249 56 709 80 421

After the sharp fall in 2012, overall FDI of the
39 developed economies57
resumed its recovery
in 2013, albeit marginally in the case of outflows.
Inflows were $566 billion, rising 9 per cent over
2012 (figure B). Outflows were $857 billion in
2013, virtually unchanged from $852 billion a year
earlier (figure C). Both inflows and outflows were
still barely half of the peak level in 2007. In terms
of global share, developed countries accounted for
39 per cent of total inflows and 61 per cent of total
outflows – both historically low levels.
Despite the overall increase in inflows, recovery was
concentrated in a smaller set of economies; only 15
of 39 economies registered a rise. Inflows to Europe
were $251 billion (up 3 per cent over 2012), with EU
countries accounting for the bulk, at $246 billion.
Inflows to Italy and Spain made a robust recovery,
with the latter receiving the largest flows in Europe in
2013 (figure A). Inflows to North America rebounded
to $250 billion with a 23 per cent increase, making
the United States and Canada the recipients of the
largest flows to developed countries in 2013 (figure
A). The increase was primarily due to large inflows
from Japan in the United States and a doubling of
United States FDI in Canada. Inflows to Australia
and New Zealand together declined by 12 per cent,
to $51 billion.
The recovery of outflows from developed countries
was more widely shared, with an increase in
22 economies. Outflows from Europe rose by
10 per cent to $328 billion, of which $250 billion
was from the EU countries. Switzerland became
Europe’s largest direct investor (figure A). In
contrast, outflows from North America shed another
10 per cent, slipping to $381 billion. The effect of
greater cash hoarding abroad by United States
TNCs (i.e. an increase in reinvested earnings) was
countered by the increasing transfer of funds raised
in Europe back to the home country (i.e. a decline in
intracompany loans). Outflows from Japan grew for
the third successive year, rising to $136 billion. In
addition to investment in the United States, market-
seeking FDI in South-East Asia helped Japan
consolidate its position as the second largest direct
investor (figure A).
Diverging trends among major European
countries. European FDI flows have fluctuated
considerably from year to year. Among the major
economies, Germany saw inflows more than
double from $13 billion in 2012 to $27 billion in
2013. In contrast, inflows to France declined by
80 per cent to $5 billion and those to the United
Kingdom declined by 19 per cent to $37 billion. In
all cases, large swings in intracompany loans were
a significant contributing factor. Intracompany loans
to Germany, which had fallen by $39 billion in 2012,
bounced back by $20 billion in 2013. Intracompany
loans to France fell from $5 billion in 2012 to -$14
billion in 2013, implying that foreign TNCs pulled
funds out of their affiliates in France. Similarly,
intracompany loans to the United Kingdom fell from
-$2 billion to -$10 billion. Other European countries
that saw a large change in inflows of intracompany
loans in 2012 were Luxembourg (up $22 billion) and
the Netherlands (up $16 billion).
Negative intracompany loans weigh down
outflows from the United States. In 2013, two
types of transactions had opposite effects on FDI
outflows from the Unites States. On the one hand,
the largest United States TNCs are estimated to
have added more than $200 billion to their overseas
cash holdings in 2013, raising the accumulated total
to just under $2 trillion, up 12 per cent from 2012. On
the other hand, non-European issuers (mostly United
States but also Asian TNCs) reportedly sold euro-
denominated corporate bonds worth $132 billion (a
three-fold increase from 2011) and transferred some
of the proceeds to the United States to meet funding
needs there.58
Rather than repatriating retained
earnings, United States TNCs often prefer to meet
funding needs through additional borrowing so as
to defer corporate income tax liabilities.59
Favourable
interest rates led them to raise those funds in Europe.
As a consequence, the United States registered
negative outflows of intracompany loans (-$6.1
billion) in 2013, compared with $21 billion in 2012.
TTIP under negotiation. The Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a proposed
FTA between the EU and the United States. Talks
started in July 2013 and are expected to finish in
2015 or early 2016. If successfully concluded, TTIP
would create the world’s largest free trade area. Its
key objective is to harmonize regulatory regimes
and reduce non-tariff “behind the border” barriers to
trade and investment.60
Aspects of TTIP could have
implications for FDI.

The EU and the United States together constitute
more than 45 per cent of global GDP. FDI flows
within the TTIP bloc accounted for, on average,
half of global FDI flows over the period 2004–2012
(figure II.19). Intra-EU FDI has tended to be volatile,
but FDI flows between the EU and the United States
have remained relatively stable in recent years.
Viewed from the United States, the EU economies
make up about 30 per cent of the outside world
in terms of GDP. The EU’s importance as a
destination for United States FDI has been much
more significant, with its share in flows ranging from
41 per cent to 59 per cent over 2004–2012, and
its share in outward stocks at over 50 per cent by
the end of that period.61
In contrast, the EU’s share
in United States exports averaged only 25 per
cent over the same period. Major host countries of
United States FDI are listed in table II.7.
The industry breakdown shows that about four fifths
of United States FDI stock in the EU is in services,
in which “Holding Companies (nonbank)” account
for 60 per cent and “Finance (except depository
institutions) and insurance” for another 20 per cent.
Manufacturing takes up 12 per cent.
From the EU’s perspective, much of the inflows to
EU countries arrive from other EU countries. Over
the period 2004–2012, on average, 63 per cent
of FDI flows to the region came from other EU
Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Eurostat.
Figure II.19. FDI inflows between the EU and
the United States and intra-EU against global flows,
2004–2012
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Rest
Intra-EU
From the United States to the EU
From the EU to the United States
Table II.7. United States FDI stock abroad,
by major recipient economies, 2012
Destination
FDI stock
($ million)
Share
(%)
Netherlands 645 098 14.5
United Kingdom 597 813 13.4
Luxembourg 383 603 8.6
Canada 351 460 7.9
Ireland 203 779 4.6
Singapore 138 603 3.1
Japan 133 967 3.0
Australia 132 825 3.0
Switzerland 130 315 2.9
Germany 121 184 2.7
European Union 2 239 580 50.3
All countries total 4 453 307 100.0
Source: UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/en/
Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.
aspx).
Note: Excludes Bermuda and United Kingdom Caribbean
islands (British Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Montserrat).
countries and 15 per cent from the United States.
The combined share of the EU and the United
States in FDI stock in the EU at the end of 2012
was 76 per cent. Considering the EU as a single
block, the United States was the largest investment
partner, accounting for one third of all investment
flows from outside the EU.
For the United States, the share of the EU in its
inflows ranged from 45 per cent to 75 per cent
over the period 2004–2012. In terms of FDI stock,
the EU’s share was 62 per cent at the end of 2012
(table II.8). The top investors include the larger
economies in the EU, such as France and Germany,
along with the United Kingdom. Luxembourg and
the Netherlands rank high as source countries of
FDI in the United States, too. One explanation for
the high share of these economies is that they
have become preferred locations for incorporating
global companies. The merger between two of
the largest suppliers of chip-making equipment,
Applied Materials (United States) and Tokyo
Electron (Japan), in 2013 illustrates the case. To
implement the merger, the two companies set up
a holding company in the Netherlands. The existing
companies became United States and Japanese
affiliates of the Dutch holding company through
share swaps.

Booming inflows to Israel. One beneficiary of
the growing cash holdings among TNCs seems
to be Israel, which hosts a vibrant pool of venture-
capital-backed start-up companies, especially in
knowledge-intensive industries. These companies
have become acquisition targets of global TNCs.
In 2013, foreign TNCs are estimated to have spent
$6.5 billion on Israeli companies,62
raising inflows
to Israel to the record high of $12 billion. High-
profile examples include the acquisitions of Waze
by Google for $966 million, Retalix by NCR for
$735 million and Intucell by Cisco for $475 million.
Berkshire Hathaway paid $2.05 billion to take full
control of its Israeli affiliate IMC. A Moody’s report
noted that, at 39 per cent at the end of 2013,
the technology industry had the largest hoard
(domestic and offshore) of total corporate cash of
non-financial United States companies; the health-
care and pharmaceuticals industries followed.63
This concentration of cash in knowledge-intensive
industries may signal further deals in the making
for Israel.
A shift towards consumer-oriented industries.
As the weight of developing countries in the global
economy increases, their effects on both the inward
and outward FDI patterns of developed countries
are becoming more apparent. The growth of more
affluent, urbanized populations in developing
economies presents significant market potential
that TNCs around the world are keen to capture.
For example, the shift in emphasis in the Chinese
economy from investment-led to consumption-led
growth is beginning to shape investment flows in
consumer-oriented industries such as food (tables
B and D).
On the one hand, TNCs from developed countries
are entering the growing food market in China.
The Japanese trading house Marubeni, the largest
exporter of soya beans to China, finalized a $2.7
billion deal to acquire the grain merchant Gavilon
(United States) after the deal was approved by
China’s competition authority. On the other hand,
the trend is also shaping investment flows in
the other direction: in the largest takeover of a
United States company by a Chinese company,
Shuanghui acquired pork producer Smithfield for
$4.7 billion. Shuanghui’s strategy is to export meat
products from the United States to China and other
markets. Another example of Chinese investment
in agri-processing occurred in New Zealand, where
Shanghai Pengxin proposed to acquire Synlait
Farms, which owns 4,000 hectares of farmland, for
$73 million.64
The company had already acquired
the 8,000-hectare Crafar farms for $163 million in
2012.
A slowdown in investment in extractive
industries. Earlier optimism in the mining industry,
fuelled by surging demand from China, has been
replaced by a more cautious approach. Rio Tinto
(United Kingdom/Australia) announced that its
capital expenditure would fall gradually from over
$17 billion in 2012 to $8 billion in 2015. BHP Billiton
(Australia) also announced its intent to reduce its
capital and exploration budget. Glencore Xstrata
(Switzerland) announced it would reduce its total
capital expenditures over 2013–2015 by $3.5
billion. The investment slowdown in mining has
affected developed countries that are rich in natural
resources, an effect that was particularly apparent
in cross-border MAs (table B). Net MA sales
(analogous to inward FDI) of developed countries
in mining and quarrying were worth $110 billion
at the peak of the commodity boom in 2011 but
declined to $38 billion in 2013. For example, in the
United States they fell from $46 billion in 2011 to
$2 billion in 2013 and in Australia from $24 billion
Table II.8. FDI stock in the United States, by
major source economy, 2012
Source
FDI stock
($ million)
Share
(%)
United Kingdom 486 833 18.4
Japan 308 253 11.6
Netherlands 274 904 10.4
Canada 225 331 8.5
France 209 121 7.9
Switzerland 203 954 7.7
Luxembourg 202 338 7.6
Germany 199 006 7.5
Belgium 88 697 3.3
Spain 47 352 1.8
Australia 42 685 1.6
European Union 1 647 567 62.2
All countries total 2 650 832 100.0
Source: UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/en/
Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilaleral.
aspx).
Note: Excludes Bermuda and United Kingdom Caribbean
islands (British Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Montserrat).

in 2011 to $5 billion in 2013. Similarly, net cross-
border purchases (analogous to outward FDI) by
developed-country TNCs in this industry declined
from $58 billion in 2011 to a net divestment of
-$42 billion in 2013.
TNCseyeinggrowthmarkets.Growingconsumer
markets in emerging economies remain a prime
target for developed-country TNCs. The Japanese
beverages group Kirin Holdings, which bought
control of Brazil’s Schincariol in 2011, announced
its plan to invest $1.5 billion during 2014 to expand
its beer-brewing capacity in the country. Japanese
food and beverage group Suntory acquired the
United States spirits company Beam Inc. for
$13.6 billion and the drinks brands Lucozade and
Ribena of GlaxoSmithKline for $2.1 billion. These
deals give the Japanese group not only a significant
presence in the United States and the United
Kingdom, but also access to distribution networks
in India, the Russian Federation and Brazil in the
case of Beam, and Nigeria and Malaysia in the case
of Lucozade and Ribena.
Growing urban populations are driving a rapid
expansion of power generation capacity in
emerging economies, which is drawing investment
from developed-country TNCs. In October 2013,
an international consortium comprising Turkish
Electricity Generation Corporation, Itochu (Japan),
GDF Suez (France) and the Government of Turkey
signed a framework agreement to study the
feasibility of constructing a nuclear power plant in
Sinop, Turkey.65
GDF Suez (France) also teamed up
with Japanese trading house Mitsui and Moroccan
energy company Nareva Holdings to form the joint
venture Safi Energy Company, which was awarded
a contract to operate a coal-fired power plant in
Morocco in September 2013.66
Another European
power company, Eon (Germany), acquired a 50 per
cent stake in the Turkish power company Enerjisa
and increased its stake in the Brazilian power
generation company MPX in 2013, in an effort to
build a presence in emerging markets.
The pursuit of “next emerging markets” has led
TNCs to target lower-income countries, too. For
instance, the Japanese manufacturer Nissin Food
invested in a joint venture with the Jomo Kenyatta
University of Agriculture and Technology in Kenya,
initially to market imported packaged noodles, but
also to start local production in 2014. The joint
venture aims to source agricultural input from local
producers and to export packaged noodles to
neighbouring countries, taking advantage of free
trade within EAC.
Facilitating investment in Africa. In June 2013,
the Government of the United States announced
Power Africa – an initiative to double the number of
people in sub-Saharan Africa with access to power.
For the first phase over 2013–2018, the Government
has committed more than $7 billion in financial
support and loan guarantees, which has resulted
in the leveraging of commitments by private sector
partners, many of them TNCs, to invest over $14.7
billion in the power sectors of the target countries.
In a different sector, the Government of Japan
announced a $2 billion support mechanism for its
TNCs to invest in natural resource development
projects in Africa.67
One of the projects earmarked
for support is Mitsui’s investment – expected to be
worth $3 billion – in natural gas in Mozambique.
General optimism might not be reflected in
FDI statistics in 2014. UNCTAD’s forecast based
on economic fundamentals suggests that FDI flows
to developed economies could rise by 35 per cent
in 2014 (chapter I). As an early indication, MA
activities picked up significantly in the first quarter
of 2014. Furthermore, shareholder activism is likely
to intensify in North America, adding extra impetus
to spend the accumulated earnings. However,
reasons to expect declines in FDI flows are also
present. The divestment by Vodafone (United
Kingdom) of its 45 per cent stake in Verizon
Wireless (United States) was worth $130 billion,
appearing in statistics as negative FDI inflows to
the United States.

1. Least developed countries
Fig. B - LDCs
FDI inflows
Fig. C - LDCs
FDI outflows
Share in
world total
0.8 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.9 - 0.0 - 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
OceaniaAsia
Latin America and the CaribbeanAfrica
OceaniaAsia
Latin America and the CaribbeanAfrica
Fig. FID flows - LDCs
(Host) (Home)
0 2 4 6 8 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Zambia
Dem. Rep.
of the
Congo
Liberia
Sudan
Angola
2013 2012
Equatorial
Guinea
Dem.
Rep. of the
Congo
Myanmar
Sudan
Mozambique
2013 2012
by range,a
2013
Above
$2.0 billion
Mozambique, Sudan Myanmar and
Angola
$1.0 to
$1.9 billion
Equatorial Guinea, United Republic
of Tanzania, Zambia, Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Mauritania, Uganda
and Liberia
..
$0.5 to
$0.9 billion
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Niger, Sierra
Leone and Chad
Sudan and Liberia
$0.1 to
$0.4 billion
Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Senegal,
Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Djibouti, Haiti, Malawi, Rwanda,
Somalia and Solomon Islands
and Zambia
Below
$0.1 billion
Togo, Nepal, Afghanistan, Lesotho,
Eritrea, Vanuatu, São Tomé and
Principe, Samoa, Gambia, Guinea,
Bhutan, Timor-Leste, Guinea-Bissau,
Comoros, Kiribati, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Yemen and Angola
Burkina Faso, Yemen, Malawi, Benin,
Cambodia, Togo, Bangladesh, Senegal,
Lesotho, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Mali,
Mauritania, Solomon Islands, Guinea,
Vanuatu, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and
Principe, Samoa, Kiribati, Mozambique,
Uganda, Niger and Lao People's
Democratic Republic
a
B. TRENDS IN STRUCTURALLY WEAK, VULNERABLE
AND SMALL ECONOMIES
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 374 26 -102 -12
Primary 11 16 - -12
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 11 16 - -12
Manufacturing 342 37 -185 -
Food, beverages and tobacco 351 20 - -
Textiles, clothing and leather - 2 - -
Chemicals and chemical products - - -185 -
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chem. botanical prod. - 15 - -
Non-metallic mineral products 90 - - -
Services 22 -27 83 -
Information and communications 18 3 - -
Financial and insurance activities 1 -42 83 -
Business services - 12 - -
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 374 26 -102 -12
Developed economies -1 217 -4 020 88 2
Cyprus - -155 - -
Italy - -4 210 - -
Switzerland - 761 - -
Canada -1 258 -353 - -
Australia -115 -36 - -
Developing economies 1 591 4 046 -190 -14
Nigeria - - -185 -
Panama - -430 - -
China 1 580 4 222 - -14
Malaysia - 176 - -
Sector/industry
LDCs as destination LDCs as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 21 923 39 943 1 005 1 528
Primary 4 390 3 461 - 7
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries - 1 940 - -
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 4 390 1 520 - 7
Manufacturing 6 727 8 100 91 395
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 1 970 1 764 - -
Non-metallic mineral products 1 265 3 379 - 262
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 397 812 - -
Services 10 806 27 482 914 1 126
Electricity, gas and water 3 905 17 902 - -
Finance 1 920 1 523 327 593
LDCs as destination LDCs as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 21 923 39 043 1 005 1 528
Developed economies 8 822 24 806 32 122
Finland 18 1 942 - -
United Kingdom 1 289 2 152 - -
Iceland - 4 000 - -
United States 3 251 1 194 - -
Japan 1 371 11 322 - -
Nigeria 691 1 833 - 17
South Africa 786 2 360 8 -
Malaysia 342 1 059 1 2
India 4 383 3 479 - 41
Transition economies 30 - - 39

FDI flows to LDCs rose to $28 billion in 2013.
Greenfield investments in LDCs rebounded to a
three-year high, driven by announced projects in
the services sector. External finance constitutes an
importantpartofthefinancingofinfrastructureprojects
in LDCs, but a substantial portion of announced
investments has not generated FDI inflows. Growing
official development finance to support infrastructure
projects in LDCs is encouraging, but LDCs’ estimated
investment needs are much greater. Mobilization of
resources for infrastructure development in LDCs
remains a challenge.
FDI inflows to LDCs increased by 14 per cent to
$28 billion. While inflows to some larger LDCs fell
or stagnated (figure A), rising inflows were recorded
elsewhere. A $2.6 billion reduction in divestment
(negative inflows) in Angola contributed most to this
trend, followed by gains in Ethiopia ($0.7 billion or
242 per cent), Myanmar ($0.4 billion or 17 per cent),
the Sudan ($0.6 billion or 24 per cent) and Yemen
(a $0.4 billion or 75 per cent fall in divestment). The
share of inflows to LDCs in global inflows continued
to be small (figure B). Among the developing
economies, the share of inflows to LDCs increased
to 3.6 per cent of FDI inflows to all developing
economies compared with 3.4 per cent in 2012.
As in 2012, developed-economy TNCs contin-
ued selling their assets in LDCs to other foreign
investors. The net sales value of cross-border MAs
in LDCs (table B) masks the fact that more than 60
such deals took place in 2013. While the value of net
sales to developed-economy investors continued
to decline in 2013 (table C) – indicating the highest-
ever divestments in LDCs by those economies – net
sales to developing-economy investors rose to a re-
cord level, mainly through the acquisition of assets
divested by developed economies. Examples include
the $4.2 billion divestment of a partial stake in the
Italian company Eni’s oil and gas exploration and
production affiliate in Mozambique, which was ac-
quired by the China National Petroleum Corporation.
Other such deals include a series of acquisitions by
Glencore (Switzerland) in Chad and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which were recorded as a
$0.4 billion divestment by Canada and a $0.4 billion
divestment by Panama (table C).68
Announced greenfield FDI rebounded, driven
by large-scale energy projects. The number of
announced new projects reached a record high,69
and the value of announced investments reached
their highest level in three years. The driving force
was robust gains in the services sector (table D),
contributing 70 per cent of total greenfield invest
ments. Greenfield investments in energy (in 11
projects) and in transport, storage and communi
cations (in 59 projects) both hit their highest levels
in 2013 (table D). Announced greenfield FDI from
developed economies was at a 10-year high, led by
record-high investments from Iceland and Japan to
LDCs (table E). A single large electricity project from
each of these home countries boosted greenfield
investments in LDCs.
The largest fossil fuel electric power project from
Japan (table II.9) was linked with the development
of a newly established special economic zone (SEZ)
in Myanmar (box II.2). Iceland’s $4 billion geothermal
power project in Ethiopia (see also table II.9) received
support from the Government of the United States
as part of its six-nation Power Africa initiative, a $7
billion commitment to double the number of people
with access to electricity in Africa.70
In this, the largest
alternative energy project ever recorded in LDCs,
Rejkavik Geothermal (Iceland) will build and operate
up to 1,000 megawatts of geothermal power in the
next 8–10 years.
India continued to lead greenfield FDI from
developing economies to LDCs, with South
Africa and Nigeria running second and third.
Among investors from developing economies, India
remained the largest, despite a 21 per cent fall in the
value of announced investments in LDCs (table E).
Announced greenfield investments from India were
mostly in energy – led by Jindal Steel Power –
and telecommunications projects – led by the Bharti
Group – in African LDCs. In Asia, Bangladesh was the
only LDC in which Indian greenfield FDI projects were
reported in 2013.71
Announced greenfield investments
from South Africa and Nigeria to LDCs showed a
strong increase (table E). The fourth largest project in
Mozambique (table II.9) accounted for two thirds of
announced greenfield FDI from South Africa to LDCs.
Announced greenfield FDI projects from Nigeria to
LDCs hit a record high, led by the Dangote Group’s
cement and concrete projects in five African LDCs
and Nepal ($1.8 billion in total). Greenfield projects
from Nigeria also boosted greenfield investments in
non-metallic mineral products in LDCs (table D).

External finance constitutes an important
part of the financing of a growing number of
infrastructure projects announced in LDCs.
The surge in announced greenfield investments in
energy, transport, storage and communications
(table D) indicates increasing foreign engagement
in infrastructure projects in LDCs. From 2003
to 2013, nearly 290 infrastructure projects72
– including domestic and non-equity modes
of investment – were announced in LDCs.73
The cumulative costs amounted to $332 billion
(about $30 billion a year),74
of which 43 per cent
($144 billion) was attributed to 142 projects that
were announced to be financed partly or fully by
foreign sponsors (including public entities, such as
bilateral and multilateral development agencies)
and almost half ($164 billion) was attributed to
110 projects whose sponsors were unspecified.75
Energy projects have been the driver, accounting
for 61 per cent of the estimated cost of all foreign
participating projects (and 71 per cent of the total
project costs with unspecified sponsors).
Over the past decade, the number of announced
infrastructure projects in LDCs rose from an annual
average of 15 in 2003–2005 to 34 in 2011–2013.
Growth in total announced project costs nearly
quadrupled (from an annual average of $11 billion
in 2003–2005 to $43 billion in 2011–2013). The
total value of announced infrastructure projects hit
an exceptionally high level twice: first in 2008 and
then in 2012 (figure II.20). In both cases, the driver
was the announcement of a single megaproject – in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo ($80 billion
in energy)76
in 2008 and in Myanmar ($50 billion in
transportation) in 2012. Not only did the number of
projects increase to their highest level in 2013, but
the total value of announced projects also made
significant gains, in 2012–2013 (figure II.20). This
was due to a sharp increase in transport projects in
Africa, led by a $10 billion project for an oil and gas
free port zone in the United Republic of Tanzania,
as well as a $4 billion rail line project and a $3 billion
rail and port project in Mozambique.77
A substantial portion of announced
infrastructure investments has not generated
FDI inflows. Judging from the level of current FDI
stock in LDCs (annex table II.2) and the average
annual FDI inflows to all LDCs ($16.7 billion in
2003–2013), a substantial portion of foreign
and unspecified contributions to announced
infrastructure projects (about $29 billion annually,
of which $15 billion was attributed to unspecified
sponsors) did not generate FDI inflows. Project
costs could be shared among different types
of sponsors, so that not all were funded by
foreign investors alone. Also, the FDI statistics
do not capture a large part of foreign sponsors’
investment commitments, which were financed
with non-equity modes of investments by TNCs
(WIR08 and WIR11), debts, structured finance, or
bilateral or multilateral donor funding.78
It is also
possible that some announced projects may have
been cancelled or never realized. Another possible
explanation is that the year when a project is
announced does not correspond to the year
when the host LDC receives FDI.79
The status of
two megaprojects announced in 2008 and 2012
(boxes II.5 and II.6) reflects these gaps between
announced project costs and their impacts
on FDI flows. Neither project has yet triggered
the announced levels of foreign or domestic
investment.
Table II.9. The five largest greenfield projects announced in LDCs, 2013
Host economy
(destination)
Industry segment Investing company Home economy
Estimated investment
($ million)
Myanmar
Fossil fuel
electric power
Mitsubishi Japan 9 850
Ethiopia Geothermal electric power Reykjavik Geothermal Iceland 4 000
Mozambique Forestry and logging Forestal Oriental Finland 1 940
Mozambique Petroleum and coal products Beacon Hill Resources South Africa 1 641
Cambodia Biomass power Wah Seong Malaysia 1 000

Figure II.20. Estimated value and number of announced infrastructure projects in LDCs,
by type of sponsor, 2003–2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number
$billion
Domestic sponsors only Involving foreign sponsors
Number
Box II.5. The Grand Inga Hydroelectric Power Station Project: no foreign investment
secured to start first phase
When the $80 billion Grand Inga hydroelectric project was recorded in 2008, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
was one of five African countries (with Angola, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) that agreed to develop this
project under the management of the Western Power Corridor, a consortium of five national utility companies repre-
senting each of the five States sharing 20 per cent of the equity. The host country had already secured an agreement
with BHP Billiton (Australia) to jointly develop a $3 billion aluminium smelter to use 2,000 megawatts of electricity to
be generated by the first phase of the project, “Inga III”.80
In 2009, however, seeking a greater controlling share in
the project, the Democratic Republic of the Congo withdrew from the agreement and went alone to develop Inga
III.81
BHP Billiton was then selected to build a $5 billion smelter, along with a 2,500-megawatt plant for $3.5 billion.
In early 2012, citing economic difficulties, the company abandoned both plans and withdrew from Inga III.
In May 2013, the stalled project was revived as a 4,800-megawatt project at an estimated cost of $12 billion, to
be managed by Eskom (South Africa) and Société Nationale d’Electricité (Democratic Republic of the Congo).
By the end of 2013, a cooperation treaty had been sealed between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
South Africa, in which South Africa committed to buy more than half of the electricity generated. With financial and
technical assistance from the African Development Bank ($33 million) and the World Bank ($73 million),82
feasibility
studies were conducted for the base chute development. Other bilateral development agencies and regional banks
expressed interest in funding the project, but no firm commitments have been made.
Three consortiums, including TNCs from Canada, China, the Republic of Korea and Spain, have been prequalified
to bid for this $12 billion project, and a winning bidder will be selected in the summer of 2014.83
This will result in an
expansion in both FDI and non-equity modes of activity by TNCs, though the exact amounts will depend on which
consortium wins and the configuration of the project. Construction is scheduled to start in early 2016, to make the
facility operational by 2020.
Source: UNCTAD based on “Grand Inga Hydroelectric Project: An Overview”, www.internationalrivers.org, and “The Inga
3 Hydropower Project”, 27 January 2014, www.icafrica.org.

The growth in development finance to support
infrastructure projects in LDCs is encouraging,
but the estimated investment needs in these
countries are much greater. Along with FDI and
non-equity modes, official development assistance
(ODA) from the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) has been the important external
source of finance for infrastructure projects in
LDCs. Because ODA can act as a catalyst for
boosting FDI in infrastructure development in LDCs
(WIR10), synergies between ODA disbursements
and FDI inflows to LDCs should be encouraged to
strengthen productive capacities in LDCs.88
Led by transport and storage, gross disbursements
of official development finance (ODF) to selected
infrastructure sectors89
in LDCs are growing
steadily (figure II.21). ODF includes both ODA
and non-concessional financing90
from multilateral
development banks. In cumulative terms, however,
gross ODF disbursements to infrastructure projects
in LDCs amounted to $41 billion,91
or an annual
average of $4 billion, representing 0.9 per cent of
average GDP in 2003–2012.
Relatively small infrastructure financing by DAC
donors is not unique to LDCs.92
Yet, considering
that low-income countries had to spend 12.5 per
cent of GDP (or about $60 billion for LDCs) annually
to develop infrastructure to meet the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs),93
ODF of $4 billion
a year (7 per cent of the estimated $60 billion) for
all LDCs appears to fall short of their investment
requirements. Given the structural challenges such
countries face, where the domestic private sector
is underdeveloped, it is a daunting task to bridge
the gap between ODF and investment needs for
achieving the SDGs (see chapter IV).
For instance, in water supply and sanitation, where
hardly any foreign investments in announced
projects have been recorded in the last decade, the
highest level of gross ODF disbursements to LDCs
($1.8 billion in 2012) would cover no more than 10
per cent of the estimated annual capital that LDCs
need ($20 billion a year for 2011–2015) to meet the
MDG water supply and sanitation target ($8 billion)
and universal coverage target (an additional $12
billion).94
With the current level of external finance,
therefore, the remaining $18 billion must be secured
in limited domestic sources in LDCs.
Prospects. Announced projects suggest that
FDI inflows to infrastructure projects in LDCs
Box II.6. Dawei Special Economic Zone: $10 billion secured, search continues for
new investors to finance remaining $40 billion
Although the announced $50 billion build-operate-own project in Dawei, Myanmar – the Dawei SEZ – was registered
as a transportation project, it is a multisectoral infrastructure project: a two-way road between Myanmar and Thailand,
a seaport, steel mills, oil refineries, petrochemical factories, power plants, telecommunication lines, water supply, a
wastewater treatment system, and housing and commercial facilities.
When this project was announced in late 2012, Thailand’s largest construction group, Italian-Thailand Development
(ITD), was in charge under a 75-year concession. ITD was responsible for implementing the first phase, estimated at
$8 billion, and construction was scheduled to start in April 2014.84
However, due to ITD’s failure to secure sufficient
investments and reach an agreement on the development of energy infrastructure, the Governments of Myanmar and
of Thailand took over the project in 2013, establishing a joint special purpose vehicle (SPV).85
Stressing the potential for Dawei to grow into a new production hub in the ASEAN region, the Thai-Myanmar SPV
approached the Government of Japan, which had been engaged in the development of another SEZ in Thilawa.86
In
November 2013, the Thai-Myanmar SPV involved a leading Japanese TNC in a 7-megawatt power station project
in Dawei at an estimated cost of $9.9 billion (table II.9). To manage this project, a Thai-Japan joint venture has been
established by Mitsubishi Corporation (Japan) (30 per cent) and two Thai firms – Electricity Generating Authority of
Thailand (50 per cent) and ITD (20 per cent).87
To implement the remaining six segments of infrastructure development in the SEZ, the Thai-Myanmar SPV continues
to look for new investors. The viability of the SEZ depends on successful implementation of the planned infrastructure
developments. Until the remaining $40 billion is secured, therefore, its fate is on hold.
Source: UNCTAD.

are growing, which is imperative for sustainable
economic growth. FDI inflows to LDCs in the ASEAN
region are likely to grow further by attracting not only
large-scale infrastructure investments but also FDI
in a range of industries in the manufacturing and
services sectors (section A.2.a). As infrastructure
investments tend to flow more into larger resource-
rich LDCs than into smaller resource-scarce ones,
there is a risk that uneven distributions of FDI
among LDCs may intensify.
Mobilization of available resources for improving
infrastructure in LDCs remains a great challenge.
Along with the international aid target for LDCs,
donor-led initiatives for leveraging private finance
in infrastructure development in developing
economies – such as some DAC donors’ explicit
support for public-private partnerships (PPPs),95
EU
blending facilities,96
and the G-20’s intent to identify
appropriate actions to increase infrastructure
investment in low-income countries (OECD, 2014,
p. 27) – can generate more development finance for
LDCs. The promotion of impact investments and
private-sector investments in economic and social
infrastructure for achieving the SDGs (chapter IV) will
lead to opportunities for some LDCs. The increasing
importance of FDI and development finance from
the South to LDCs97
is also encouraging.
The extent of FDI growth and sustainable economic
development in LDCs largely depends on the
successful execution and operation of infrastructure
projects in the pipeline. In this respect, domestic
and foreign resources should be mobilized more
efficiently and effectively. Although international
development partners are stepping up their
efforts to deliver on their commitments for better
development outcomes, LDCs are also expected to
increase domestic investments in infrastructure.98
Source: UNCTAD, based on selected sectoral data available from the OECD Creditor Reporting System.
Note: Excludes disbursements to finance–related training, policy, administration and management projects in these four sectors.
Figure II.21. Gross ODF disbursements to LDCs, selected sectors, 2003–2012
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Energy Transport and storage Telecommunications Water supply and sanitation

2. Landlocked developing countries
Fig. FID flows - LLCs
(Host) (Home)
0 5 10 15 - 1 - 0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Zambia
Mongolia
Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
2013 2012
Mongolia
Burkina Faso
Zambia
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
2013 2012
by range,a
2013
Above
$1 billion
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Zambia, Bolivia
(Plurinational State of), Uganda and
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
$500 to
$999 million
Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Niger and Chad ..
$100 to
$499 million
Mali, Zimbabwe, Paraguay, Burkina
Faso, Armenia, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Republic of
Moldova, Botswana, Malawi, Rwanda
and Tajikistan
Zambia
$10 to
$99 million
Nepal, Afghanistan, Swaziland,
Lesotho and Bhutan
Burkina Faso, Mongolia, Malawi,
Republic of Moldova, Zimbabwe,
Lesotho, Armenia and Rwanda
Below
$10 million
Burundi and Central African Republic
Mali, Swaziland, Kyrgyzstan,
Botswana, Uganda, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Niger and Lao People's Democratic
Republic
a
Fig. B - LLCs
FDI inflows
Fig. C - LLCs
FDI outflows
Share in
world total
0.8 1.5 2.3 1.6 2.1 2.5 2.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
2
4
6
8
10
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Transition economies Asia and Oceania
Africa
Transition economies Asia and Oceania
Africa
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total -574 258 544 6
Primary -2 612 -22 160 2
Mining, quarrying and petroleum -2 614 -22 160 2
Manufacturing 468 257 -183 -
Food, beverages and tobacco 377 177 - -
Chemicals and chemical products - 5 -185 -
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment - 60 - -
Non-metallic mineral products 90 - - -
Services 1 570 23 566 3
Trade - - 20 -
Information and communications 1 542 20 - -
Financial and insurance activities 17 3 598 3
Public administration and defence, compulsory social sec. - - -52 -
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World -574 258 544 6
Developed economies -804 99 445 2
European Union -823 72 435 2
Other developed Europe -5 331 - -
Canada 2 -298 10 -
United States -22 - - -
Other developed countries 44 -6 - -
Developing economies 191 160 -35 3
Africa 106 - -185 3
Latin America and the Caribbean -150 - - -
West Asia - 6 150 -
South, East and South-East Asia 235 154 - -
Transition economies 23 - 133 -
Sector/industry
LLDCs as destination LLDCs as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 17 931 17 211 4 005 1 033
Primary 1 443 1 207 - -
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 1 443 1 207 - -
Manufacturing 8 931 5 273 3 276 407
Chemicals and chemical products 4 781 128 - 92
Non-metallic mineral products 66 1 624 18 75
Metals and metal products 1 784 279 - 70
Electrical and electronic equipment 246 587 - -
Services 7 558 10 730 729 626
Electricity, gas and water 2 300 5 213 - -
Trade 400 467 197 133
Finance 1 306 1 301 240 332
LLDCs as destination LLDCs as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 17 931 17 211 4 005 1 033
European Union 3 109 3 618 128 150
Other developed Europe 12 4 346 - -
United States 1 131 502 50 3
Other developed countries 431 1 060 - 35
Africa 679 2 872 308 174
South Asia 3 643 776 - 116
West Asia 1 962 582 3 034 114
Latin America and the Caribbean 10 684 - 66
Transition economies 799 1 168 240 338

FDI flows to the landlocked developing countries
(LLDCs) fell by 11 per cent to $29.7 billion in 2013
after the 2012 figure was revised slightly downward
to $33.5 billion. Investment to the group was still
concentrated in the transition-economy LLDCs,
which accounted for 62 per cent of FDI inflows. In
African LLDCs, FDI flows increased by 10 per cent
but the picture was mixed: 7 of the 15 countries
experienced falls and 8 countries, predominantly
mineral-exporting economies, saw increases.
In contrast to 2012, when the Republic of Korea
and the West Asian economies led investments, in
2013 developed-economy investors took the lead
(in particular Europe), which increased their share
in the group from 29 per cent in 2012 to 57 per
cent. Services continued to attract strong investor
interest, especially in the electricity, water and gas
sectors and the transport sector.
FDI inflows to LLDCs as a group registered a
decline of 11 per cent in 2013, to $29.7 billion.
This follows revised figures for 2012 that show
a slight fall, making 2013 the first year in which
FDI has fallen two years in a row for this group of
economies. The Asian group of LLDCs experienced
the largest fall, nearly 50 per cent, mainly due to a
precipitous decline in investment in Mongolia. As
reported in UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Review of
Mongolia (UNCTAD, 2014), this fall was linked to
an investment law introduced in early 2012 which
was thought to have concerned many investors,
especially those who were already cautious.99
The
law was amended in November 2013. The more
than 12 per cent drop in FDI to the transition LLDCs
is accounted for mainly by a tailing off of investment
to Kazakhstan in 2013, despite strong performance
in Azerbaijan, where inflows rose by 31 per cent.
In other subregions, FDI performance was positive
in 2013. Inflows to the Latin American LLDCs
increased by 38 per cent, as a result of the steadily
increasing attractiveness of the Plurinational State
of Bolivia to foreign investors. African LLDCs saw
their share of total LLDC inflows increase from 18
to 23 per cent, with strong performance in Zambia,
where flows topped $1.8 billion. Nevertheless,
inflows to LLDCs in 2013 remained comparatively
small, representing just 2 per cent of global flows –
a figure which has shrunk since 2012 and illustrates
the continuing economic marginalization of many of
these countries.
LLDC outflows, which had surged to $6.1 billion in
2011, declined in 2012 but recovered to $3.9 billion
last year, up 44 per cent. Historically, Kazakhstan
has accounted for the bulk of LLDC outflows and,
together with Azerbaijan, it accounted for almost all
outward investment last year.
Greenfield and MA figures reveal a changed
pattern of investment in 2013 in terms of sectors
and source countries. In 2012, the major investors
in LLDCs were developing economies, primarily
the Republic of Korea and India. However, in
2013, developing-economy flows to LLDCs fell by
almost 50 per cent from $11.9 billion in 2012 to
$6.2 billion – albeit with some notable exceptions
such as Nigeria, which was the second largest
investor in LLDCs in 2013. Europe was the major
investor, accounting for 46 per cent of FDI in
terms of source; as investors in LLDCs, developed
economies as a whole increased their share from
29 per cent in 2012 to 57 per cent in 2013.
In terms of investors’ sectoral interests, services
remain strong: in 2013, announced greenfield
investments in this sector increased 42 per cent
from the previous year. Investment in infrastructure
doubled, in particular to the electricity, water and
gas sectors, primarily on the back of an announced
greenfield project in the geothermal sector in
Ethiopia by Reykjavik Geothermal, valued at
$4 billion (see previous section on LDCs); FDI to
the transport sector rose 29 per cent. With regard
to MAs, the pattern of divestment in the primary
sector – especially by European firms – that was
seen in 2012 continued, albeit more slowly, and
European firms registered a positive number for
total MAs in 2013.
a. FDI in the LLDCs – a stock-
taking since Almaty I (2003)
The Almaty Programme of Action for the LLDCs,
adopted in 2003, addressed transport and transit
cooperation to facilitate the integration of LLDCs into
the global economy. The follow-up Second United
Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing
Countries, to be held in November 2014, will
examine LLDC performance in this respect and
assess their infrastructure needs, in particular those
that can improve trade links, reduce transport costs
and generate economic development. Recognizing

the critical role that the private sector can play, it will
be essential for LLDCs to adopt measures to boost
investment, in particular investment in infrastructure
for transport, telecommunications and utilities.
An analysis of FDI indicators (table II.10) over the past
10 years reveals a mixed performance in LLDCs.
In terms of FDI growth, they fared better than the
global average but worse than other developing
countries as a group. Among LLDCs, FDI growth
in the Latin American and African subregions was
stronger than in the transition economies and
Asian subregion. Looking at the importance of FDI
for LLDC economies, in terms of the share of FDI
stock in GDP, it has averaged 5 percentage points
higher than in developing countries, revealing the
importance of foreign investment for growth in
the LLDCs. In terms of the ratio of FDI to gross
fixed capital formation (GFCF) – one of the building
blocks of development – FDI’s role was again more
important for LLDCs than for developing economies
over the previous 10 years. And LLDCs registered a
much stronger growth rate in GVC participation than
either the developing-country or the global average.
b. FDI inflows over the past decade
Since 2004, FDI inflows to LLDCs have generally
followed a rising trajectory, with the exception of
declines in 2005 and following the global economic
crisis in 2009 and 2010. Figures for 2012 and 2013
also show a decline in inward investment to the
group, but FDI has nevertheless stabilized around
the previous three-year average (figure II.22).
At 10 per cent, the compound annual growth
rate (CAGR) for FDI inflows to LLDCs was higher
than the world rate of 8 per cent but lower than
for developing countries as a whole, at 12 per
cent (table II.10). Although the transition LLDCs
accounted for the bulk of the increase in FDI in value
terms, the subregion’s CAGR was in fact the lowest
of all LLDC regions over the period (table II.11). The
Asian and Latin American economies experienced
the strongest FDI growth in terms of their CAGR,
which dampens the effects of volatility in flows.
However, the picture in Latin America is distorted
by the presence of only two landlocked economies,
and in Asia by the impact of Mongolia’s natural
resources boom, which attracted significantly
increased FDI over the past decade.
Another distortion therefore concerns the weight of
the mineral-exporting economies that mainly form
part of the transition-economy subregion, and in
particular, Kazakhstan. As a group, the transition-
economy LLDCs accounted for the bulk of FDI
inflows over the period 2004–2013, with an average
share of almost 70 per cent. Indeed, just six mineral-
exporting countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
Table II.10. Selected FDI and GVC indicators, 2004–2013
(Per cent)
Indicator LLDCs
Developing
countries
World
FDI inflows, annual growth 10 12 8
Inward FDI stock as % of GDP, 10-year average 34 29 30
FDI inflows as % of GFCF, 10-year average 21 11 11
GVC participation, annual growtha
18 12 10
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC/database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) and UNCTAD-Eora GVC
Database.
Note: Annual growth computed as compound annual growth rate over the period considered.
GVC participation indicates the part of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the foreign value
added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other countries’
exports (the downstream component, or DVX).
a
2004–2011.
Table II.11. FDI inflows to LLDCs, 2004–2013
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
Subregion 2004 2013 Growth
LLDCs Subregion 12 290 29 748 10
LLDCs-Africa 2 464 6 800 12
LLDCs-Latin America and the Caribbean 113 2 132 39
LLDCs-Asia and Oceania 305 2 507 26
LLDCs-Transition economies 9 408 18 309 8
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI-
TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database
Note: Growth computed as compound annual growth rate
over the period.

and Azerbaijan, plus the non-transition - economies
of Mongolia, Uganda and Zambia – accounted for
almost three quarters of all LLDC inflows. Although
trends have remained broadly similar over the past
decade, several countries have attracted increasing
flows, largely as a result of the development of their
natural resource sectors, among them Mongolia,
Turkmenistan and Uganda. All three countries
started to attract large increases in FDI in the past
five years. Kazakhstan, which accounted for over
60 per cent of LLDC FDI during the boom years
of 2006–2008, has since seen its share of inflows
decline to about 41 per cent and to just under a
third in 2013.
However, as a share of global flows, FDI inflows to
LLDCs remain small, having grown from 1.7 per
cent of global flows in 2004 to a high of 2.5 per cent
in 2012, and retreated to just 2 per cent this year.
c. FDI’s contribution to economic
growth and capital formation
With the caveat that FDI trends in LLDCs remain
skewed by the dominance of the mineral-exporting
economies of Central Asia, it is clear that FDI
has made a significant contribution to economic
development in LLDCs. As a percentage of GDP,
inflows have been relatively more important for this
group of countries than for the global average or for
developing countries as a group. FDI flows peaked
at over 6 per cent of GDP in 2004 and remained
an important source of investment at 5 per cent
of GDP in 2012. Even ignoring Kazakhstan, and
latterly Mongolia, FDI as a percentage of GDP
has remained above the world and developing-
country averages (1.04 percentage points higher
than developing countries without Kazakhstan, and
0.53 percentage point higher without Kazakhstan
and Mongolia, averaged over the past decade.)
The story repeats itself when FDI stocks are used
instead of flows (figure II.23). Despite having fallen
Figure II.22. FDI inflows to LLDCs, average, various years and 2013
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2004−2006 2007−2009 2010−2012 2013
Africa Latin America Asia Transition economies World (right scale)
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
1 400
1 600
1 800
Figure II.23. FDI stock as a percentage of GDP,
2004–2013
(Per cent)
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
World Developing economies LLDCs

Figure II.24 FDI inflows as a share of gross fixed
capital formation, 2004–2013
(Per cent)
database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) and IMF for
gross fixed capital formation data.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
World Developing economies LLDCs
below the world and developing-country averages
in 2007, FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP have
since risen steeply and now represent a value
equivalent to 38 per cent of GDP, compared with
31 per cent for developing countries as a whole.
This picture is reinforced by the role of FDI in
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) – one of the
essential building blocks of long-term investment
and development. In LLDCs, FDI can potentially
contribute to GFCF: it plays a far more important
role in GFCF than in the global average or in
developing countries generally (figure II.24). The
average ratio of FDI to GFCF peaked at over
27 per cent in 2004; after a dramatic fall in 2005,
it climbed steadily to more than 20 per cent in
2012. What is significant, however, is the difference
between the relative importance of FDI for GFCF for
LLDCs: the average ratio of FDI to GFCF is almost
twice that for other developing countries and for
all economies, both of which have hovered around
10 per cent in the past five years.
process – not far below the developing-country
average of 52 per cent (figure II.25).
LLDCs have a much smaller share in the upstream
component of GVC participation, reflecting the role
that natural resources play in several countries’
exports. Consequently, the average LLDC upstream
component – 18 per cent in 2011 – is lower than
the average developing-country share – 25 per
cent. However, the growth of LLDC participation in
GVCs in all subregions in the past decade looks
very different: the compound annual growth rate
has averaged more than 18 per cent from 2004 to
2011. This compares with a global growth rate in
GVC participation of 10 per cent and a developing-
country growth rate of 12 per cent. In view of the
rising rates of foreign investment in this group of
countries over the past decade, a relationship can
be inferred between increasing FDI flows, principally
from TNCs, and rapid growth in GVC participation.
e. MAs and greenfield
investments in the LLDCs
– a more nuanced picture
Like FDI as a whole, MAs in the LLDC group
are dominated by Kazakhstan. Of the 73 MA
deals worth over $100 million completed in the
LLDCs over the last 10 years, almost half were in
Kazakhstan, including 8 of the top $10 billion-plus
deals. Of these, all but two were in the mineral and
gas sectors. However, the telecommunications
sector also produced a number of large deals, not
only in Kazakhstan but also in Zambia, Uganda and
Uzbekistan.
From 2004 through 2013, the average value of
announced greenfield investments has been greater
than that of MAs and more diversified across the
group. Of the 115 largest greenfield investments
worth more than $500 million, just over a quarter were
in Kazakhstan, a significantly smaller proportion than
the country’s share of MAs. Kazakhstan also took a
similar proportion of the $42 billion-plus investments.
However, in terms of sectoral distribution, greenfield
projects were even more concentrated in the mineral
and gas sectors than were MAs.
Focusing specifically on investment in infra
structure (in this case in electricity generation,
telecommunications and transportation), where
LLDCs have particular needs, shows that greenfield
d. The role of investment in LLDC
GVC patterns
WIR13 drew attention to the links between
investment and trade, particularly through the
GVCs of TNCs. It is striking that, despite their
structural constraints, LLDCs do not differ markedly
from other developing countries in terms of their
participation in GVCs: as a group, almost 50 per
cent of their exports form part of a multistage trade

investment has been relatively more distributed
geographically over the past decade. Although
Kazakhstan still accounts for 9 per cent of greenfield
projects in infrastructure worth over $100 million, this
share is lower than its shares in MAs in infrastructure
and in large greenfield FDI projects (figure II.26). Of
the 133 greenfield projects in infrastructure worth
over $100 million in the past decade, 99 were in the
Asian and transition economy LLDCs, 29 were in
Africa and 5 were in South America.
MA and greenfield data portray a more nuanced
picture of the geographical spread of foreign
investment deals and projects in LLDCs. For
example, they do not all take place in Kazakhstan
and a small number of Central Asian economies. The
data also reveal the concentration of investment in
two sectors: minerals and gas, where investment is
primarily resource seeking, and telecommunications,
where it is primarily market seeking.
The indicators of FDI performance in LLDCs since
2004 (table II.10) show that LLDCs performed
relatively well compared with developing countries
and with the global economy on all indicators, even
when Kazakhstan and Mongolia are excluded from
the analysis. However, it is clear that to speak of
LLDCs as a homogenous group is misleading and
disguises regional and country differences. As
LLDCs prepare for the follow-up Global Review
Conference in 2014, policymakers and the
international community must reflect on how to
spread the benefits of FDI to other members of
the grouping and beyond a relatively narrow set of
sectors, as well as how to promote FDI attraction
in those LLDCs, while minimizing any negative
impacts.100
Note: GVC participation rate indicates the share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the foreign
value added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other countries’
exports (the downstream component, or DVX), divided by total exports.
Figure II.25. GVC participation rate, 2011, and GVC participation growth, 2004–2011
(Per cent)
51
41
48
49
49
0 20 40
LLDCs-Transition
economies
LLDCs-Latin America
and the Caribbean
LLDCs-Asia
LLDCs-Africa
All LLDCs
GVC participation rate
Upstream component Downstream component
Annual growth
of GVC
participation
20
21
19
12
18
the Financial Times Ltd., fDiMarkets (www.fDimarkets.
Figure II.26. Kazakhstan: share of LLDC MAs,
greenfield investment projects and greenfield
infrastructure projects, 2004–2013
(Per cent)
9
72
61
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Greenfield large deals
$500M
Greenfield infrastructure
$100M
MA large deals
$100M
MA infrastructure
$100M
26

3. Small island developing States
Fig. B - SIDs
FDI inflows
Fig. C - SIDs
FDI outflows
Share in
world total
0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Oceania Asia
Africa
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Oceania Asia
Africa
Fig. FID flows - SIDs
(Host) (Home)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Timor-Leste
Marshall
Islands
Mauritius
Bahamas
Trinidad
and Tobago
2013 2012
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Maldives
Barbados
Jamaica
Bahamas
Trinidad
and Tobago
2013 2012
by range,a
2013
Above
$1 billion
Trinidad and Tobago and Bahamas ..
$500 to
$999 million
Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
$100 to
$499 million
Barbados, Maldives, Fiji, Mauritius,
Seychelles, Antigua and Barbuda,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Saint Kitts and Nevis and Solomon
Islands
Bahamas and Mauritius
$50 to
$99 million
Saint Lucia and Grenada ..
$1 to
$49 million
Vanuatu, São Tomé and Principe,
Samoa, Marshall Islands, Timor-
Leste, Cabo Verde, Papua New
Guinea, Dominica, Comoros, Tonga,
Kiribati and Palau
Marshall Islands, Timor-Leste,
Seychelles, Fiji, Saint Lucia, Antigua
and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada,
Cabo Verde, Solomon Islands, Saint
Kitts and Nevis and Tonga
Below
$1 million
Federated States of Micronesia
Vanuatu, São Tomé and Principe,
Samoa, Dominica, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, Kiribati and Jamaica
a
Sector/industry
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 97 -596 -2 -266
Primary 110 -600 25 -14
Agriculture, forestry and fishing - - 20 -
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 110 -600 5 -14
Manufacturing -47 -5 - 10
Food, beverages and tobacco -47 - - -
Basic metal and metal products - - - 10
Services 33 9 -27 -262
Electricity, gas, water and waste management - - 228 -
Transportation and storage 20 - - -
Information and communications - 4 - 108
Financial and insurance activities 13 - -254 -369
Business services - 5 - -
Region/country
Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 97 -596 -2 -266
Developed economies -42 -604 5 -219
Germany - 285 - -
Switzerland - -285 - -
United States -37 -600 - 103
Developing economies 119 3 -7 -47
Latin America and the Caribbean - -272 330 -86
Guatemala - - 228 -
Cayman Islands - -272 - -86
India 115 - 66 38
Indonesia - - 189 -
Singapore 7 331 -655 9
Sector/industry
SIDS as destination SIDS as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 2 298 6 506 205 3 809
Primary 8 2 532 - -
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 8 2 532 - -
Manufacturing 1 169 1 986 130 -
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 929 1 048 - -
Chemical and chemical products - 850 - -
Services 1 121 1 988 75 3 809
Electricity, gas and water 156 - - -
Construction - 1 350 - -
Hotels and restaurants 505 65 30 -
Transport, storage and communications 116 477 - 1 871
Finance 201 22 12 190
SIDS as destination SIDS as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 2 298 6 506 205 3 809
Europe 307 255 26 3
United States 181 1 379 - -
Australia 1 005 316 - -
Japan - 863 - -
Kenya - - - 450
Nigeria - - - 2 296
China - 3 250 - 164
Latin America and the Caribbean 30 13 30 457
Small island developing states (SIDS) 30 - 30 -

a. FDI in small island developing
States – a decade in review
FDI inflows to the SIDS declined by 16 per cent
to $5.7 billion in 2013, putting an end to a two-
year recovery. Flows decreased in all subregions,
but unevenly. African SIDS registered the highest
decline (41 per cent to $499 million), followed by
Latin American SIDS (14 per cent to $4.3 billion).
SIDS in Asia and Oceania registered a slight 3 per
cent decline to $853 million. This trend is examined
in a long-term context.
SIDS face unique development challenges that are
formally recognized by the international community.
For this reason, their financing needs to achieve
economic, social and environmentally sustainable
development are disproportionally large, both
as a share of their GDP and as compared with
other developing countries’ needs. Mobilization
of financing through various channels – private or
public, and domestic or international – is no doubt
required for sustainable development in SIDS.
External finance includes ODA and private capital
flows (both FDI and portfolio and other investment,
such as bank loan flows) as well as remittances and
other flows.
A third United Nations Conference on SIDS is to
be held in September 2014 in Samoa. It seeks a
renewedpoliticalcommitmenttoSIDS’development
through identifying new and emerging challenges
and opportunities for their sustainable development
and establishing priorities to be considered in the
elaboration of the post-2015 UN development
agenda. This section reviews a decade of FDI to the
29 SIDS countries – as listed by UNCTAD (box II.7)
– in terms of their trends, patterns, determinants
and impacts.
The global economic crisis halted strong FDI
growth. FDI inflows into SIDS increased significant
ly over 2005–2008, reaching an annual average of
$6.3 billion, more than twice the level over 2001–
2004. However, the global financial crisis led to a
severe reversal of this trend, with FDI plummeting
by 47 per cent, from $8.7 billion in 2008 to
$4.6 billion in 2009. Flows recovered in 2011 and
2012, before declining again in 2013, remaining
below the annual average they had reached in
2005–2008 (figure II.27).
Although FDI flows to the SIDS are very small in
relative terms, accounting for only 0.4 per cent of
global FDI flows over 2001–2013, they are very high
compared with the size of the SIDS’ economies.
The ratio of inflows to current GDP during 2001–
2013 was almost three times the world average
and more than twice the average of developing and
transition economies. These relatively high inflows
to the group are the result of fiscal advantages
offered to foreign investors in a number of SIDS,
and of a limited number of very large investments in
extractive industries.
Caribbean SIDS have traditionally attracted
the bulk of FDI into SIDS, accounting for 78 per
cent of flows over the period 2001–2013. Their
proximity to and economic dependence on the
large North American market are the main factors
Box II.7. UNCTAD’s list of SIDS
The United Nations has recognized the particular problems of SIDS without, however, establishing criteria for
determining an official list of them. Fifty-two countries and territories are presently classified as SIDS by the United
Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and
Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS); 29 have been defined by UNCTAD and used for analytical purposes.
This review regroups the 29 countries in three geographical regions:
• Africa SIDS: Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Comoros, Mauritius and Seychelles.
• Asia and Oceania SIDS: Maldives, Timor-Leste, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
• Caribbean SIDS: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Source: UNCTAD; UN OHRLLS, “Small Islands Developing States - Small Islands Big(ger) Stakes”, United Nations, New
York, 2011.

explaining their higher attractiveness compared
with other SIDS regions.
However, SIDS located in Africa and in Asia and
Oceania experienced relatively stronger FDI growth
during the 2000 (figure II.28). Their share in total
FDI flows increased from 11 per cent in 2001–2004
to 20 per cent in 2005–2008, to 29 per cent in
2009–2013. The actual importance of Asia and
Oceania as a SIDS recipient subregion is probably
underestimated, because of the undervaluation of
FDI flows to Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste,
two countries rich in natural resources that host
significant FDI projects in the extractive industry
(box II.8) but do not include those projects in official
FDI statistics (Timor-Leste) or do not reflect them
fully (Papua New Guinea).
Mineral extraction and downstream-related
activities, tourism, business and finance are
the main target industries for FDI. Sectoral
FDI data are available for very few SIDS countries.
Only Jamaica, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Papua New Guinea make available official sectoral
data on FDI. These data show a high concentration
of FDI in the extractive industries in Papua New
Guinea and in Trinidad and Tobago.101
FDI flows to
Mauritius are directed almost totally to the services
sector, with soaring investments in activities such
as finance, hotels and restaurants, construction
and business in the period 2007–2012. FDI to
Jamaica, which used to be more diversified among
the primary, manufacturing and services sectors,
has increasingly targeted service industries during
the period 2007–2012 (table II.12).
In the absence of FDI sectoral data for most SIDS
countries, information on greenfield FDI projects
announced by foreign investors in the SIDS
Figure II.27. FDI flows into SIDS by main subregion, 2001–2013
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
10 000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
SIDs-Caribbean SIDs-Africa SIDS-Asia and Oceania
Figure II.28. FDI flows to the SIDS by region,
2001–2013
0 5 10 15 20 25
SIDs-Africa
SIDs-Asia and
Oceania
SIDs-Caribbean
Cumulative 2001–2004 Cumulative 2005–2008
Cumulative 2009–2013

between 2003 and 2013 is used as an alternative
way to assess which countries and industries
have attracted foreign investors’ interest, if not
actual investments. (MAs – another mode of
FDI – are almost nonexistent in SIDS.) Upstream
and downstream activities in the oil, gas and
metal minerals industries103
have been the focus
of most capital expenditures in greenfield projects
announced by foreign investors (57 per cent
of the total), with Papua New Guinea, Trinidad
and Tobago, Timor-Leste and Fiji hosting these
projects. Hotels and restaurants are the next
largest focus of foreign investors’ pledges to invest
(12 per cent of total announced investments), with
Maldives being their favourite destination. Other
services industries, such as construction, transport
Box II.8. TNCs in the extractive industry in Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste
Papua New Guinea has high prospects for oil and gas, with deposits of both found across its territory. The most
developed of its projects is the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project led by ExxonMobil,102
which is expected to begin
production in 2014. It will produce 6.6 million tonnes of LNG per year for end users in Taiwan Province of China,
Japan and China. The project cost is now estimated at $19 billion, significantly more than the initial cost ceiling of $15
billion. A potential second project is the Gulf LNG project initially driven by InterOil (United States) and now operated
by Total (France), which took a majority share in 2013. Oil and gas drilling by foreign companies is continuing apace,
with plenty of untapped potential and more gas and oil being discovered each year.
Papua New Guinea is also rich in metal mining, with copper and gold being the major mineral commodities produced.
The country is estimated to be the 11th largest producer of gold, accounting for about 2.6 per cent of global
production. It also has deposits of chromite, cobalt, nickel and molybdenum. Several international mining companies
are majority owners or shareholders in metal-producing operations, including Newcrest Mining (Australia), Harmony
Gold Mining (South Africa), Barrick Gold (Canada), New Guinea Gold (Canada) and MCC (China).
Timor-Leste has many oil and gas deposits both onshore and offshore, although most petroleum development
has been far offshore. It also has significant untapped mineral potential in copper, gold, silver and chromite, but
the mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure have impeded widespread exploration and development. Major
oil and gas discoveries in the Timor Sea in 1994 have led to the development of a large-scale offshore oil industry.
ConocoPhillips, Eni, Santos, INPEX Woodside, Shell and Osaka Gas are among the international oil companies
operating there.
Source: United States Department of the Interior, 2011 Minerals Yearbook Papua New Guinea, December 2012; Revenue
Watch Institute, “Timor-Leste; Extractive Industries”, www.revenuewatch.org.
Table II.12. SIDS: FDI flows and stock by sector, selected countries, various years
FDI flows (average per year) FDI stock
Sector/industry
Jamaica Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago Papua New Guinea
2001–2006 2007–2012 2001–2006 2007–2012 2001–2006 2007–2011 2006 2012
Primary 141 71 3 4 768 796 1 115 4 189
Mining, quarrying
and petroleum
141 71 - - 768 796 991 4 000
Manufacturing 68 36 6 8 10 26 126 184
Services 169 238 78 363 43 487 61 149
Business activities 67 133 18 146 .. .. .. ..
Finance .. .. 37 114 .. .. 43 64
Hotels and
restaurants
99 106 10 46 .. .. 3 5
Construction .. .. 2 31 .. .. .. ..
Other services 3 - 11 26 .. .. 14 80
Total 663 587 87 375 876 1 344 1 350 4 576
Unspecified 285 242 - - 54 35 48 54

and communications, finance, public utilities and
business activities, are among the other typical
activities for which greenfield FDI projects have
been announced in SIDS countries (table II.13).
Developed-country TNCs have announced the
most capital spending in greenfield projects
in SIDS countries (almost two thirds of total
capital expenditures). Resource-rich countries
such as Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Timor-Leste represented 63 per cent of
such TNCs’ announced capital spending. TNCs
from developing and transition economies have
focused their interest mainly in four SIDS countries,
namely Papua New Guinea, Maldives, Mauritius
and Jamaica, which together represented the
destinations of 89 per cent of those TNCs’ total
announced capital spending (table II.14).
Main location advantages of SIDS, and the
opportunities and risks they represent for
sustainable development. The endowments of
SIDS, principally in natural resources and human
capital, confer a number of location advantages. In
addition, all of these countries qualify for at least
one trade preference regime104
that gives them, in
principle, preferential access to developed-country
markets. A number of industries have flourished
based on these advantages:
• Tourism and fishing industries have been favoured
because of the valuable natural resources,
including oceans, sizeable exclusive economic
zones, coastal environments and biodiversity.
Tourism is often identified as a promising growth
sectorinSIDS,offeringoneofthefewopportunities
for economic diversification through the many
linkages it can build with other economic sectors.
If adequately integrated into national development
plans, it can contribute to the growth of sectors
such as agriculture, fishing and services. But if
not properly planned and managed, tourism can
have negative social and environmental impacts,
Table II.13. SIDS: announced value of greenfield FDI projects by sector, total and top 10 destination
countries, 2003–2013
Sector/industry
Papua
New
Guinea
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Maldives
Timor-
Leste
Mauritius Jamaica Fiji Bahamas Seychelles
São Tomé
and
Principe
Others Total
Primary 8 070 3 091 - 1 000 - - 792 - - - 228 13 181
Mining, quarrying
and petroleum
8 070 3 091 - 1 000 - - 792 - - - 228 13 181
Manufacturing 7 155 3 865 78 4 010 203 687 59 142 102 351 248 16 900
Coke, petroleum pro-
ducts and nuclear fuel
6 650 791 - 4 000 1 - - - - - - 11 442
Metal and metal
products
228 404 - - 2 384 - - - - - 1 019
Chemicals and
chemical products
- 2 435 - - 3 10 - - - - 80 2 527
Food, beverages
and tobacco
214 92 - 10 - 258 46 - 59 - 129 808
Other manufacturing 63 143 78 - 197 35 13 142 43 351 39 1 104
Services 1 113 301 5 683 116 4 344 3 147 551 1 079 695 161 2 337 19 527
Hotels and restaurants - - 3 153 - 362 504 206 128 476 - 1 171 5 999
Construction - - 1 997 - 2 445 1 350 - - - - - 5 792
Transport, storage
and communications
70 23 326 116 362 1 027 70 837 186 150 446 3 613
Finance 162 111 208 - 164 96 248 34 19 11 241 1 295
Electric, gas and
water distribution
775 - - - - - - - - - 340 1 115
Business activities 48 55 - - 774 43 27 55 14 - 77 1 094
Other services 59 111 - - 237 126 - 24 - - 63 619
Total 16 338 7 256 5 762 5 126 4 547 3 834 1 403 1 220 797 512 2 813 49 608
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fdimarkets.com).

Table II.14. SIDS: announced value of greenfield FDI projects by top 10 home countries to top 10
destination countries, 2003–2013
Home country
Papua
New
Guinea
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Maldives
Timor-
Leste
Mauritius Jamaica Fiji Bahamas Seychelles
São Tomé
and
Principe
Other
SIDS
Total
SIDS
United States 3 005 3 094 206 - 569 1 207 554 252 - - 1 161 10 046
Australia 3 535 316 - 4 000 5 - 456 - - - 290 8 601
China 3 528 - - - - 1 350 8 - - - 98 4 983
South Africa 3 000 - - - 1 320 - - - - - - 4 320
India 923 171 1 565 - 419 3 3 - 224 - - 3 307
Canada 970 1 205 617 - 121 38 - - 241 - 63 3 254
United Kingdom 139 1 412 42 - 119 367 13 328 7 351 367 3 145
France - - 13 - 1 732 103 41 550 - - - 2 439
Thailand - - 1 620 10 3 - - - - - 65 1 698
United Arab Emirates - 23 715 - 72 - 42 - 265 - 64 1 180
Italy 8 - - 1 000 - - - - - - - 1 008
Korea, Republic of 959 4 - - 11 - - - - - - 975
Others 272 1 032 985 116 178 766 288 90 60 161 707 4 653
World 16 338 7 256 5 762 5 126 4 547 3 834 1 403 1 220 797 512 2 813 49 608
Developed economies 7 705 6 967 1 302 5 108 2 686 2 441 1 115 1 131 298 501 2 072 31 325
Developing and
8 634 289 4 460 19 1 861 1 393 288 89 498 11 741 18 283
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fdimarkets.com).
significantly degrade the environment on which it
is so dependent and lead to irreversible damage
to ecosystems and to traditional activities such as
agriculture and fishing (UN OHRLLS, 2011).
• Mining and related activities have been developed
in some SIDS that have sizeable nonrenewable
natural resources. If properly managed, mineral
endowments can provide opportunities for
economic development and poverty alleviation.
However, exploitation of non-renewable
resources poses serious challenges – economic,
social and environmental – to prospects for long-
term sustainable development. The economic
challenges consist in defining how to create value
from mineral resources, how to capture that
value locally and how to make the best use of the
revenues created. The social and environmental
challenges derive from the strong environmental
footprint and the profound social impacts that the
extractive industry tends to have (see WIR07).
• Business and offshore financial services have
prospered in a number of SIDS countries against
the backdrop of strong incentives for non-
resident companies and individuals to establish
headquarters and financial and trading operations
in their jurisdictions. These include favourable
tax regimes, efficient business registrations,
secrecy rules and lax regulatory frameworks.
Host countries see these services as a source
of growth and economic diversification, with
positive spillover effects on other activities,
including tourism, hotels and restaurants,
telecommunications and transport. However, they
could bring some disadvantages, such as making
small, open economies vulnerable to sharp
changes in global financial flows and putting them
under the scrutiny of the very countries affected
by the activities facilitated by favourable tax
regimes.105
• Exports such as textiles, apparel, garment
assembly and processed fish have been
developed in some SIDS – for example, Cabo
Verde, Fiji, Jamaica and Mauritius – under the
cover of preference trade regimes. However, trade
liberalization on a most-favoured-nation basis
and the dismantling of textile and clothing quotas
under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
of the World Trade Organization have resulted
in preference erosion that has been particularly
acute among garment-exporting SIDS.

These sectors have been the primary target of FDI
and will continue to offer the greatest development
opportunities. These activities also constitute the
main sources of the foreign exchange earnings
that are necessary to finance the energy and
food imports on which these island countries are
often highly dependent. Although FDI represents
an important additional source of investment
capital in industries that are critical to growth and
development, very little is known about FDI impacts
on SIDS – in particular, how these impacts interact
with their structural vulnerabilities.
The small size of SIDS countries means that
development and the environment are closely
interrelated and interdependent. There is usually
great competition for land and water resources
among tourism, agriculture and other land uses
(such as mining, in resource-rich countries), and
the overdevelopment of any of these sectors could
be detrimental to the others. The environmental
consequences of ill-conceived development can
threaten not only the livelihood of people but
also the islands themselves and the cultures they
nurture. The challenge for SIDS is to ensure that
FDI and its use for economic development do not
cause any permanent harm to sustainable use of
land, water and marine resources.

Notes
1
Estimates for Africa’s middle class vary considerably among
sources. The figure quoted is consistent with those of the African
Development Bank (AfDB) and the Standard Chartered Bank
regional head of research for Africa. It is based on a definition
of middle class that includes people spending between $4 and
$20 per day. This class of consumers represented in 2010
more than 13 per cent of the continent’s population.
2
“The MPLA sticks to its course”, Africa Confidential, Vol. 55,
No. 1, 10 January 2014.
3
The African Union recognizes eight RECs as the building
blocks of an eventual African Economic Community: the Arab
Maghreb Union (UMA), the Common Market for East and
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan
States (CENSAD), the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC),
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Other
regional groups exist, but are not among these building blocks.
Moreover, some of the RECs recognized by the African Union
are not active. Thus, in this section, the analysis is limited to
the major RECs: COMESA, SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, UMA
and EAC.
4
This involves the negotiation of seven main technical issues:
(1) rules of origin; (2) non-tariff barriers; (3) standardization,
metrology, conformity, assessment and accreditation (i.e.
technical barriers to trade), and sanitary and phytosanitary
measures; (4) customs cooperation, documentation,
procedures and transit instruments; (5) trade remedies; (6)
dispute settlement; and (7) tariff liberalization.
5
Intra-African trade has increased fourfold since 2000, though
its share in global trade has remained constant over the last
decade at 11–14 per cent.
6
Conclusive analysis of the impact of regional integration on FDI
would require data on bilateral FDI flows and detailed sectoral
data, which are not available for most African countries. There
is also some degree of imprecision in FDI data for Africa
related to the large scale of the informal economy. The analysis
presented here relies on announced greenfield data.
7
For example, 60 per cent of Japanese companies in Africa cite
transport and energy service gaps as their biggest problems,
according to a survey by the Japan External Trade Organization.
8
Investment patterns as well as the establishment of special
Chinese trade and investment zones in Africa lend some
support to this hypothesis (Brautigam and Tang, 2011).
9
By the middle of the century, Africa’s working-age population will
number 1.2 billion, from about 500 million today, meaning it will
provide one in four of the world’s workers, compared with one
in eight from China.
10
For instance, according to a policy document released in
December 2013, overseas investment projects below $1
billion are not subject to government approval.
11
“Sinopec will invest $20 billion in Africa in five years”, China
News Service, 17 December 2013.
12
However, controversy and political turmoil related to the
Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement have cast doubt on the
prospects for FDI in services. The agreement, signed in June
2013, aimed to substantially liberalize trade in services between
mainland China and Taiwan Province of China. Under the
terms of the treaty, service industries such as banking, health
care, tourism, film, telecommunications and publishing will be
opened to bilateral investment.
13
Data released by the Shanghai Municipality.
14
Board of Investment, Thailand (see: Michael Peel, “Thailand
political turmoil imperils foreign and domestic investment”,
Financial Times, 9 March 2014).
15
In the first three quarters of 2013, for example, 33 TNCs
established headquarters in Shanghai, including 10 for the
Asia Pacific region. In addition, some large storage and logistic
projects are under construction in the zone. About 600 foreign
affiliates have been established there.
16
Each of the three East Asian economies has its own economic
arrangement and relationship with ASEAN, and all three are
currently negotiating their agreement on a free trade area.
17
The East Asia Summit is an annual forum, initially held by
leaders of the ASEAN+6 countries (ASEAN+3 and Australia,
India and New Zealand). Membership has expanded to
include the United States and the Russian Federation. The
Summit has gradually moved towards a focus on economic
cooperation and integration.
18
Asia as a whole accounted for 58 per cent of Singapore’s total
outward FDI stock of $350 billion by the end of 2011, including
ASEAN (which accounted for 22 percent of the total FDI stock
of Singapore), China (18 per cent), Hong Kong (China) (9 per
cent), Japan (4 per cent) and India (3 per cent). The largest
recipients of Singaporean FDI within ASEAN are Malaysia (8 per
cent), Indonesia (7 per cent) and Thailand (4 per cent). For many
of these economies, Singapore ranks among the top investing
countries. Detailed data on the breakdown of FDI stock of
South-East Asian countries show that Singapore is among the
leading investors for countries such as Malaysia and Thailand.
19
In Viet Nam, for instance, a joint venture between China
Southern Power Grid and a local firm is investing $2 billion in
a power plant.
20
According to the latest policy change approved in April 2014,
harbour management may be 49 per cent foreign owned.
21
China International Capital Corporation estimates.
22
See, for instance, Saurabh Mukherjea, “Removing inflation
distortions will bring back FDI”, The Economic Times, 26 May
2014.
23
See, for example, “Standard and Poor: Indian corporates
divesting stake to improve cash flows”, Singapore: Commodity
Online, 19 March 2014.
24
Saibal Dasgupta, “Plan for economic corridor linking India to
China approved”, The Times of India, 20 December 2013.
25
InIndia,organizedretailingreferstotradingactivitiesundertaken
by licensed retailers, such as supermarkets and retail chains,
while unorganized retailing refers to the traditional formats of
low-cost retailing, such as local corner shops, convenience
stores and pavement vendors. Currently supermarkets and
similar organized retailing account for about 2–4 per cent of
the whole retail market.
26
In 2013, GCC countries began disbursing a $5 billion grant
agreed in 2011, and the United States provided a 100 per
cent guarantee for a seven-year, $1.25 billion Eurobond
with interest set at 2.503 per cent. The International Finance
Corporation (IFC) announced that it was heading a consortium
of lenders that would provide $221 million for construction
of a 117-megawatt wind farm in Jordan’s southwest. The
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
opened a permanent office in Amman and officially conferred
“Recipient Nation” status on Jordan, which henceforth can
benefit from more of EBRD’s regular products and services,
including financing tools, soft loans and technical assistance
(EBRD has already provided a $100 million soft loan to finance
a power plant near the capital). The United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) launched two initiatives: the
Jordan Competitiveness Program, a $45 million scheme aimed
at attracting $700 million in FDI and creating 40,000 jobs over
the next five years, and an agreement to provide $235 million for

education development over five years. And the EU announced
about $54 million in new assistance to help Jordan cope with
the costs of hosting Syrian refugees (Oxford Business Group,
“Jordan attracts flurry of foreign funds”, Economic Update, 19
December 2013).
27
In 2012, GCC countries hosted 13 per cent of the world’s
primary petrochemicals production. Their production capacity
grew by 5.6 per cent to 127.8 million tonnes in 2012, in
contrast to that of the global industry, which grew by a mere
2.6 per cent. Among GCC countries, Saudi Arabia leads the
industry with a production capacity of 86.4 million tonnes
in 2012, or 68 per cent of total capacity in GCC countries.
Forecasts are that the region’s petrochemicals capacity will
reach 191.2 million tonnes by 2020, with Saudi Arabia leading
the expansion and adding 40.6 million tonnes, and Qatar and
the United Arab Emirates adding 10 million tonnes and 8.3
million tonnes, respectively.
28
Cheap natural gas has fed the industry’s growth, but that
advantage is slowly eroding as the opportunity cost of
natural gas goes up. Despite huge reserves, natural gas is
fast becoming a scarce commodity in the region owing to
rising power consumption. The unrelenting drive towards
industrialization and diversification in energy-intensive industries
since the 2000s has placed significant demand pressure on gas
production. Low regulated gas prices have resulted in physical
shortages of gas in every GCC country except Qatar, as
demand has outstripped local supply capacity. Consequently,
the supply of ethane – a key by-product of natural gas used
as a petrochemicals feedstock – is not expected to grow
significantly, and most of the anticipated supply is already
committed (Booz Co., 2012).
29
The price of natural gas in the United States was about $3.75
per million British thermal units at the end of 2012, down from
more than $13 per million in 2008. United States ethane has
fallen from about $0.90 a gallon in 2011 to about $0.30 a gallon
at the end of 2012. (“Sabic looks to tap into US shale gas”,
Financial Times, 28 November 2012.)
30
The United States produced nearly a third of the world’s
petrochemicals products in the 1980s, but that market share
had shrunk to 10 per cent by 2010. (“GCC Petrochemicals
Sector Under Threat From US”, Gulf Business, 14 October
2013.)
31
“Global shale revolution threatens Gulf petrochemicals
expansion”, Financial Times, 13 May 2013, www.ft.com.
32
“Dow Chemical moving ahead with polyethylene investments”,
Plastic News, 19 March 2014; “Global Economic Weakness
Pares Saudi Petchem Profits”, MEES, 15 February 2013.
33
To acquire upstream assets in North America, China’s national
oil companies have spent more than $34 billion since 2010,
most of that on unconventional projects. The latest deal was
the $15.1 billion acquisition by CNOOC of Nexen (Canada)
in 2013, which gives CNOOC control over significant oil and
shale gas operations in Canada. In the same vein, in 2010
Reliance Industries Limited (India) acquired shale gas assets
in the United States for $3.45 billion, while State-owned GAIL
India Limited acquired a 20 per cent stake in the Eagle Ford
shale acreage from Carrizo Oil Gas Inc. (United States) for
$64 million.
34
It is building a 454,000 tonne/year linear low-density
polyethylene plant at its site in Alberta (Canada). (“NOVA
weighs US Gulf, Canada ethylene to supply possible PE
plant”, Icis.com, 7 May 2013, www.icis.com.)
35
The United States Energy Information authority is expected to
publishnewestimatesthatconsiderablydownplaythecountry’s
recoverable shale reserves. (“U.S. officials cut estimate of
recoverable Monterey Shale oil by 96%”, Los Angeles Times,
20 May 2014; “Write-down of two-thirds of US shale oil
explodes fracking myth”, The Guardian, 22 May 2014.)
36
“Sabic eyes investing in US petrochemicals”, Financial Times,
8 October 2013.
37
QP (70 per cent) and ExxonMobil (30 per cent) are partners
in RasGas, an LNG-producing company in Qatar. In addition,
ExxonMobil has a 7 per cent stake in QP’s Barzan gas project,
which is set to come online in 2014.
38
Sectoral data for Brazil and Chile are from the Central Bank of
Brazil and the Central Bank of Chile, respectively.
39
Intracompany loans in both Brazil and Chile registered
negative values in 2013, indicating that loan repayments to
parent companies by foreign affiliates were higher than loans
from the former to the latter. Net intracompany loans reached
-$18 billion in Brazil (compared with -$10 billion in 2012), and
-$2 billion in Chile (compared with $8 billion in 2012).
40
The United States Energy Information Administration
estimated Argentina’s shale gas resources as the second
largest in the world and its shale oil resources as the fourth
largest (The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Industry Report,
Energy, Argentina”, April 2014).
41
Under the agreement, Repsol will receive $5 billion in bonds. The
dollar bond payment − which will mature between 2017 and
2033 − guarantees a minimum market value of $4.67 billion. If
the market value of the bonds does not amount to the minimum,
the Argentine government must pay Repsol an additional
$1 billion in bonds. The agreement also stipulates the termination
of all judicial and arbitration proceedings and the reciprocal
waiver of future claims. (Repsol, “Argentina and Repsol reach a
compensation agreement over the expropriation of YPF”, press
release, 25 February 2014, www.repsol.com).
42
Brazil accounts for 57 per cent of South America’s total
manufactured exports, and Mexico accounts for 88 per cent of
manufactured exports of Central America and the Caribbean
(UNCTAD GlobalStat).
43
The difference in market size between Brazil and Mexico
has increased considerably in recent years. Vehicle sales
amounted to 1.7 million and 1.2 million units, respectively,
in Brazil and Mexico in 2005, and 3.8 million and 1.1 million
units in 2013. This translated to a more than doubling of
vehicle sales per capita in Brazil from 9.2 to 18.8 units per
1,000 inhabitants, and a decrease in Mexico from 10.6 to
9 per 1,000 inhabitants (Organisation Internationale des
Constructeurs d’Automobiles, www.oica.net for vehicle sales
data, and UNCTAD Globstat for population data).
44
Including cars, light commercial vehicles, buses, trucks and
agricultural machinery.
45
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), 2013,
“La industria automotriz en México”, Serie Estadísticas
Sectoriales; Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos
Automotores (ANFAVEA), www.anfavea.com.br; UNCTAD
GlobalStat.
46
Brazil and Argentina have been developing a common
automotive policy since the creation of MERCOSUR. In 2002
they subscribed to the “Agreement on Common Automotive
Policy between the Argentine Republic and the Federative
Republic of Brazil”, which establishes a bilateral regime of
administered trade and was in force until 30 June 2014,
before being extended in May 2014 for one year (“Brasil y
Argentina prorrogarán su acuerdo automotriz por un año”,
América Economía, 5 mayo 2014).
47
UNCTAD GlobalStat.
48
On 1 November 2006, the Mexican government published
the Decree for the Promotion of the Manufacturing, Maquila
and Export Service Industry (the IMMEX Decree). This
instrument integrates the programs for the Development and

Operation of the Maquila Export Industry and the Temporary
Import Programs to Produce Export Goods. The companies
supported by those programmes jointly represent 85 per cent
of Mexico’s manufactured exports.
49
Mexico passed a tax reform law, which took effect on 1 January
2014, that includes certain provisions that reduce benefits for
IMMEX companies. However, in order to reduce the impact
of these reforms on IMMEX companies, a presidential decree
and resolutions issued in late 2013 enabled IMMEX companies
to retain some benefits taken away in the general provisions.
50
In general, despite the higher technology content of its
manufactured exports than the Latin American average
(19 per cent versus 12 per cent), Mexico lags behind countries
like Brazil and Argentina in terms of research intensity (RD as a
share of GDP). This share was 0.5 per cent in 2013 compared
with 1.3 per cent for Brazil and 0.6 per cent for Argentina. The
country’s prospects for long-term growth based on innovation
are perceived as limited, given its current resources, priorities
and national aspirations. See “2014 global RD funding
forecast”, RD Magazine, December 2013; and Economist
Intelligent Unit, “Intellectual-Property Environment in Mexico”,
2010.
51
For instance, anti-corrosion technologies related to the use of
ethanol fuel have seen considerable development in research
institutions in Brazil. In addition, national suppliers such as
Arteb, Lupatech and Sabó have not only become more directly
involved in co-design with assemblers’ affiliates in Brazil, but
have even become involved in innovation projects led by
assemblers’ headquarters or their European affiliates. Arteb
and Lupatech provide innovation inputs directly from Brazil
to General Motors. Sabó has worked with Volkswagen in
Wolfsburg and through Sabó’s European subsidiary (Quadros,
2009; Quadros et al., 2009).
52
Economist Intelligence Unit, Industry Report, Automotive,
Brazil, January 2014.
53
See Economist Intelligence Unit, Industry Report, Automotive,
Brazil, January 2014; “Brazil’s growing taste for luxury”,
Economist Intelligence Unit, 14 January 2014.
54
See Economist Intelligence Unit, Industry Report, Automotive,
Mexico, April 2014.
55
The pipeline will transport natural gas from the giant Shah
Deniz II development in Azerbaijan through Greece and
Albania to Italy, from which it can be transported farther into
Western and Central Europe.
56
The deal by Gazprom (Russian Federation) to take over one
of Europe’s largest gas storage facilities is attracting fresh
scrutiny in Germany. The State-owned enterprise is finalizing
an asset swap with BASF, its long-term German partner,
under which it will increase its stake in Wingas, a German gas
storage and distribution business, from less than 50 per cent
to 100 per cent. In return, BASF will obtain stakes in western
Siberian gas fields. When the deal was announced in 2012,
it raised little concern in Germany, where Gazprom has been
the biggest foreign supplier of energy for decades and an
increasingly important investor in domestic energy. But the
recent crisis has prompted some to question the transaction.
57
Croatia is now counted as a developed country, as are all
other EU member countries.
58
“Companies flock to Europe to raise cash”, Financial Times,
20 January 2014. The article reports data from Dealogic.
59
See, for example, “Microsoft favors Europe for record bond
sale: corporate finance”, Bloomberg, 4 December 2013.
60
Widely cited but also disputed research by the Centre for
Economic Policy Research estimates that if the most ambitious
comprehensive agreement is reached, the deal would add
€120 billion and €95 billion, respectively, to the GDP of the
EU and the United States by 2027. The gains therefore would
amount to about 0.5 per cent of projected GDP for 2027.
61
The exception is 2005, when there was a net divestment of
United States FDI in Europe caused by the repatriation tax
holiday introduced by the United States Government.
62
“Cross-border mergers and acquisitions deals soared in
2013”, Haaretz, 9 January 2014.
63
Moody’s Investors Service, “US non-financial corporates’ cash
pile grows, led by technology”, announcement, 31 March
2014.
64
The takeover was approved by the New Zealand Overseas
Investment Office in February 2014.
65
If the plan is approved, ATMEA, the Paris-based joint venture
between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan) and Areva
(France), is to build reactors for the project worth $22 billion.
66
The power plant will be built by Daewoo Engineering and
Construction (Republic of Korea).
67
The support is provided through the State-owned Japan Oil,
Gas and Metals National Corporation.
68
InChad,Glencoreacquiredpartialstakesinexclusiveexploration
authorizations owned by Griffiths Energy International (Canada).
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Glencore raised its
stake in a copper mining company to 69 per cent by acquiring
a 14.5 per cent stake from High Grade Minerals (Panama).
69
The number of projects in 2013 was 408, as compared with
357 in 2012.
70
“Reykjavik plans to start $2 billion Ethiopian power project”,
Bloomberg, 12 March 2014, www.bloomberg.com.
71
The largest was a $227 million project by the Mahindra
Group in the automotive industry, followed by a $107 million
telecommunication project by the Bharti Group and a $60
million project in the transport industry by Hero Cycles.
72
Here, “infrastructure” refers to four sectors: energy and power,
telecommunications, transportation, and water and sewerage.
73
Based on the project data registered in the Thomson ONE
database.
74
The relevant project information for LDCs in the Thomson ONE
database, however, is far from complete. For example, about
40 per cent of registered projects do not report announced or
estimated project costs.
75
The contributions by foreign sponsors could be greater
because more than a quarter of foreign participating projects
were registered without values.
76
This project was reported with unspecified sponsors in the
Thomson ONE database.
77
All three were registered as build-own-operate projects with
no information on sponsors.
78
FDI inflows comprise capital provided by a foreign direct
investor to an FDI enterprise (positive inflows) and capital
received from an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor
(negative inflows). Thus, external funding flows into LDCs
under non-equity modes – without the involvement of direct
investments – are beyond the scope of the FDI statistics.
79
For example, in large-scale projects, investors’ commitments
are often divided in multiple phases, stretching into years or
even decades. Delays in the execution of announced projects
are also common, owing to changing political situations and
to social or environmental concerns. These tendencies also
apply to the value of announced greenfield FDI investments
(table D), which are usually (but not always) much greater than
annual FDI inflows in the corresponding years (figure B).
80
“Agreement to investigate development of DRC aluminium
smelter using power from Inga 3 hydropower scheme”,
23 October 2007, www.bhpbilliton.com.

81
“Africa’s biggest electricity project, Inga 3 powers regional
cooperation”, 11 October 2013, www.theafricareport.com.
82
“World Bank Group Supports DRC with Technical Assistance
for Preparation of Inga 3 BC Hydropower Development”,
20 March 2014, www.worldbank.org.
83
“US and Chinese work together on Inga 3?”, 22 January 2014,
www.esi-africa.com.
84
“Myanmar-Thai Dawei project likely to begin construction in
April”, 7 November 2012, www.4-traders.com.
85
“Italian-Thai ditched as Thailand, Myanmar seize Dawei
development zone”, 21 November 2013, www.reuters.com;
“Burma, Thailand push ahead with Dawei SEZ”, Bangkok
Post, 31 December 2013.
86
To manage the Thilawa SEZ project, a Myanmar-Japan joint
venture was established in October 2013. It comprises private
and public entities from Myanmar (51 per cent), Japanese
TNCs (about 40 per cent) and the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (about 10 per cent).
87
“Mitsubishi to build massive power plant in Myanmar”,
22 November 2013, http://asia.nikkei.com.
88
In this respect, UNCTAD’s plan of action for investment in
LDCs recommends strengthening public-private infrastructure
development efforts (UNCTAD 2011c).
89
In the OECD Creditor Reporting System, the corresponding
sectors included here are “Energy” (excluding energy policy
and administration management, and related education
and training), “Transport Storage” (excluding transport
policy and administration management, and related
education and training), “Telecommunications” and “Water
Supply Sanitation” (excluding water resources policy and
administration management).
90
Non-concessional financing, provided mainly by multilateral
development banks to developing economies, is not ODA
and is reported as “other official flows” (OOF) in the OECD
Creditor Reporting System. Because of the significance of
such financing for supporting infrastructure development,
OECD (2014) argues that ODF, which includes both ODA
and OOF, better represents the reality of infrastructure finance
from DAC members to developing economies. In the case of
LDCs, however, the scale of OOF (cumulative total of $1.1
billion in the selected four sectors) was insignificant, compared
with that of ODA (cumulative total of $39.7 billion in the four
sectors) for the period 2003–2012.
91
This represents 10 per cent of cumulative gross ODF
disbursements to all sectors in LDCs for the period 2003–
2012.
92
The OECD (2014) estimates that gross ODF disbursements
account for only 5–8 per cent of all infrastructure finance
in developing economies and that the rest comes from the
domestic public sector and citizens (55–75 per cent) and the
private sector (20–30 per cent). The majority of ODF has gone to
upper-middle-income countries rather than low-income ones.
The low level of support for low-income countries reflects the
difficulty of maximizing returns on investment, reflecting their
weak enabling environment (OECD 2014, p. 6).
93
Estache (2010) estimated that the annual infrastructure
investment needs (including both operating and capital
expenditures for 2008–2015) in low-income countries were
12.5 per cent of their GDP. Because no estimates were available
for LDCs as a group, the suggested ratio of 12.5 per cent was
applied to LDCs’ annual average GDP in 2003–2012 ($477
billion) to derive the estimate of $59.6 billion.
94
Calculations were based on annex tables C–D in WHO (2012)
by extracting total financial capital costs estimated for LDCs.
95
For example, the Government of Japan not only supports
PPPs in infrastructure “at the heart of its development co-
operation” but also encourages domestic companies to take
part in infrastructure projects in its aid recipient countries
through the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s Private
Sector Investment Finance (PSIF) component (OECD, 2014,
p. 14).
96
Blending grants with loans, equity or guarantees from public or
private financiers reduces the financial risk of projects. Through
regional EU blending facilities (e.g. the EU-Africa Infrastructure
Trust Fund), grants from the European Commission and EU
member States are combined with long-term loans or equity
provided by development financial institutions or private
financiers (OECD, 2014).
97
See, for example, United Nations, “Review of progress made
in implementing the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, the new
directions strategy for South-South cooperation and the
Nairobi outcome document of the High-level United Nations
Conference on South-South Cooperation, taking into account
the complementary role of South-South cooperation in the
implementation of relevant major United Nations conferences
in the social, economic and related fields”, SSC/18/1, 31
March 2014.
98
At the national level, this entails changes in fiscal policy and
tax administration brought about by strengthening government
capacity to manage revenues (UNCTAD 2013c).
99
The Law on Foreign Investment in Strategic Sectors (SEFIL)
established comprehensive permitting requirements on FDI
entry and operation by private and State-owned enterprises in
a number of sectors, including mining, in May 2012.
100
Towards this end, UNCTAD will produce a comprehensive
paper on investment in the LLDCs later in 2014.
101
In Trinidad and Tobago, FDI to the services sector increased
strongly in 2007–2011 as a consequence of one large
acquisition undertaken in 2008 in the financial sector, namely
the $2.2 billion purchase of RBTT Financial Group by the
Royal Bank of Canada.
102
Other partners in the project are Australian Oil Search Limited,
Santos, Merlin Petroleum, local landowners and the State-
owned Petromin.
103
Petroleum, chemical and metal products are among the
most relevant downstream activities of the oil, gas and metal
minerals industries.
104
SIDS status confers no special trade preference. However,
all SIDS qualify for at least one preference scheme. Although
SIDS that fall within the LDC category benefit from LDC-
specific preferences, all other SIDS – a majority – are
beneficiaries of preferences through special programmes
such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative of the United States,
Caribcan of Canada and SPARTECA of Australia and New
Zealand. The EU grants special trade preferences to a
large majority of SIDS by virtue of the Cotonou Partnership
Agreement between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
on the one hand, and members of the EU on the other
(UNCTAD, 2004).
105
See “Bankers on the Beach”, Finance and Development,
vol. 48, no. 2, June 2011.

CHAPTER III
recent policy
developments
and key issues

106 World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
A. NATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES
1. Overall trends
Most investment policy measures remain geared
towards promotion and liberalization, but the share
of regulatory or restrictive measures increased.
In 2013, according to UNCTAD’s count, 59
countries and economies adopted 87 policy
measures affecting foreign investment. Of these
measures, 61 related to liberalization, promotion
and facilitation of investment, while 23 introduced
new restrictions or regulations on investment (table
III.1). The share of new regulations and restrictions
increased slightly, from 25 per cent in 2012 to 27
per cent in 2013 (figure III.1). Almost half of the
policy measures applied across the board. Most
of the industry-specific measures addressed the
services sector (table III.2).
a. FDI liberalization and promotion
New FDI liberalization measures were mainly
reported for countries in Asia. Several of them
pertained to the telecommunications industry. For
instance, India removed the cap on foreign direct
investment in telecommunications.1
The Republic
of Korea passed the amended Telecommunications
BusinessAct,whichallowsforeigninvestorscovered
by a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Republic
of Korea to acquire up to 100 per cent of Korea’s
facility-based telecommunications businesses with
the exception of SK and KT Telecom.2
Mexico
increased the threshold for foreign investment in
telecommunications to 100 per cent in all areas
except radio and television broadcasting, where the
limit is 49 per cent under certain conditions.3
In addition to liberalizing telecommunications
investment, India raised the FDI cap in the defence
sector beyond 26 per cent upon approval by
the Cabinet Committee on Security and under
specific conditions. In other sectors, including
petroleum and natural gas, courier services,
single-brand retail, commodity exchanges, credit
information companies, infrastructure companies
in the securities market and power exchanges,
government approval requirements have been
relaxed.4
Indonesia amended the list of business
fields open to foreign investors and increased the
foreign investment ceiling in several industries,
including pharmaceuticals, venture capital
operations in financial services and power plant
projects in energy generation.5
The Philippines
Table III.1. Changes in national investment policies, 2000−2013
(Number of measures)
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of countries that
introduced changes
46 52 44 60 80 78 71 50 41 47 55 49 54 59
Number of regulatory changes 81 97 94 125 164 144 126 79 68 88 121 80 86 87
Liberalization/promotion 75 85 79 113 142 118 104 58 51 61 80 59 61 61
Restriction/regulation 5 2 12 12 20 25 22 19 15 23 37 20 20 23
Neutral/indeterminatea
1 10 3 - 2 1 - 2 2 4 4 1 5 3
Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database.
a
In some cases, the expected impact of the policy measure on the investment is undetermined.
Figure III.1. Changes in national investment policies,
2000−2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor.
0
25
50
75
100
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
94
6
73
27

CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments and Key Issues 107
amended its Rural Bank Act to allow foreign
individuals or entities to hold equity of up to 60 per
cent in rural banks.6
Among the FDI promotion measures, the National
Assembly of Cuba approved a new law on foreign
investment which offers guarantees to investors
and fiscal incentives.7
The country also set up a new
special economic zone (SEZ) for foreign investors
in Mariel.8
The Republic of Korea has introduced
a new system lowering the minimum required area
to designate an investment zone.9
In Pakistan, the
Commerce Ministry finalized an agreement with the
National Insurance Company for comprehensive
insurance coverage of foreign investors.10
b. Investment liberalization and
promotion for domestic and
foreign investors
General investment liberalization policies in 2013
were characterized mainly by new privatizations.
Full or partial privatizations benefiting both domestic
and foreign investors took place in at least 10
countries. For instance, in Peru, the Congress
approved the privatization of up to 49 per cent
of the State energy firm Petroperú – the first time
that investment of private capital in Petroperú has
been authorized.11
In Serbia, Etihad Airways (United
Arab Emirates) acquired a 49 per cent stake in
JAT Airways, the Serbian national flag carrier (see
also chapter II.A.4).12
In Slovenia, the Parliament
gave its support to the Government’s plan to
sell 15 State-owned firms, including the largest
telecommunications operator, Telekom Slovenia.13
Another important liberalization relates to recent
energy reforms in Mexico. In December 2013, the
Mexican Congress approved modifications to the
Constitution, including the lifting of a restriction on
private capital in the oil industry (see also chapter
II.A.3). The reforms allow the Government to issue
licenses and enter into contracts for production
sharing, profit sharing and services.14
Investment incentives and facilitation measures
applying to investors irrespective of their nationality
were enacted most commonly in Africa and in
Asia. Promotion measures, which mainly focused
on fiscal incentive schemes, included a number
of sector-specific programs. Some policies were
adopted in early 2014. For instance, the Dominican
Republic extended tax benefits for investors in its
tourism development law.15
Malaysia announced its
National Automotive Policy 2014, which grants
fiscal incentives with the objective to promote a
competitive and sustainable domestic automotive
industry.16
Facilitation measures concentrated on simplifying
business registration. For instance, Mongolia
passed a new Investment Law that reduces
approval requirements, streamlines the registration
process and provides certain legal guarantees and
incentives.17
Mozambique passed a decree that
will facilitate the establishment of new companies
through a single business registration form.18
Dubai,
in the United Arab Emirates, introduced a series of
reforms making it easier to set up hotels.19
A number of countries introduced SEZs or revised
policies related to existing SEZs. For instance,
China launched the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free
Trade Zone, introducing various new policy
measures on trade, investment and finance (see
also chapter II.A.2.a). With regard to inward FDI,
Table III.2. Changes in national investment policies, by industry, 2013
(Per cent and number of measures)
Sector/industry
(%)
(%)
Neutral/indeterminate
(%)
Total number of
measures
Total 72 25 3 93
Cross-industry 80 17 2 41
Agribusiness 80 20 - 5
Extractive industries 60 30 10 10
Manufacturing 75 25 - 4
Services 64 33 3 33
Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database.
Note: Overall totals differ from table III.1 because some of the measures can be classified under more than one type.

this free trade zone adopts a new approach,
providing for establishment rights, subject to
exceptions. Specific segments in six service
sectors – finance, transport, commerce and trade,
professional services, cultural services and public
services – were opened to foreign investors.20
The
Government of South Sudan officially launched
the Juba SEZ, an industrial area for business and
investment activities.21
c. New FDI restrictions and
regulations
Newly introduced FDI restrictions and related
policies included revision of entry regulations,
rejection of investment projects after review and
a nationalization. At least 13 countries introduced
new restrictions specifically for foreign investors in
2013.
Among the revisions of entry regulations, Indonesia
lowered the foreign ownership ceiling in several
industries, including onshore oil production and
data communications system services.22
Sri Lanka
restricted foreigners from owning land but still
allows long-term leases of land.23
Canada changed
the Investment Canada Act to make it possible for
the Minister of Industry to decide – in the context
of “net benefit” reviews under the act – that an
entity is controlled by one or more foreign State-
owned enterprises even though it would qualify as
Canadian-controlled under the criteria established
by the act.24
The Government of France issued
a decree reinforcing its control mechanisms for
foreign investments in the interests of public order,
public security or national defence. The measure
covers the following strategic sectors: energy, water,
transportation, telecommunications, defence and
health care.25
The Government of India amended
the definition of the term “control” for the purpose
of calculating the total foreign investment in Indian
companies.26
Recently, the Russian Federation
added three types of transport-related activities
to its law on procedures for foreign investment in
business entities of strategic importance for national
defence and state security.27
Some governments blocked a number of foreign
takeovers. For instance, under the national
security provisions of the Investment Canada
Act, Canada rejected the proposed acquisition
of the Allstream division of Manitoba Telecom
Services by Accelero Capital Holdings (Egypt).28
The Commission on Foreign Investment of the
Russian Federation turned down the request by
Abbott Laboratories (United States) to buy Russian
vaccine maker Petrovax Pharm, citing protection
of the country’s national security interests, among
other considerations.29
In addition, the European
Commission prohibited the proposed acquisition
of TNT Express (the Netherlands) by UPS (United
States). The Commission found that the takeover
would have restricted competition in member
States in the express delivery of small packages.30
The Plurinational State of Bolivia nationalized the
Bolivian Airport Services (SABSA), a subsidiary
of Abertis y Aena (Spain) for reasons of public
interest.31
d. New regulations or restrictions
for domestic and foreign
investors
Some countries introduced restrictive or regulatory
policies affecting both domestic and foreign
investors. For instance, the Plurinational State
of Bolivia introduced a new bank law that allows
control by the State over the setting of interest
rates by commercial banks. It also authorizes the
Government to set quotas for lending to specific
sectors or activities.32
Ecuador issued rules for
the return of radio and television frequencies in
accordance with its media law, requiring that 66
per cent of radio frequencies be in the hands of
private and public media (33 per cent each), with
the remaining 34 per cent going to “community”
media.33
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
adopted a decree regulating the automotive sector
regarding the production and sale of automobiles.34
e. Divestment prevention and
reshoring promotion35
An interesting recent phenomenon entails
government efforts to prevent divestments by foreign
investors. In light of economic crises and persistently
high domestic unemployment, some countries
have introduced new approval requirements for
dislocations and layoffs. In addition, some home
countries have started to promote reshoring of
overseas investment by their TNCs.

• In France the Parliament passed a bill imposing
penalties on companies that shut down opera-
tions that are deemed economically viable. The
law requires firms with more than 1,000 em-
ployees to prove that they have exhausted op-
tions for selling a plant before closing it.36
• Greece passed a law that makes it more dif-
ficult for companies listed on the Greek stock
exchange to relocate their head offices abroad.
The Greek capital markets law now requires
approval of relocation by 90 per cent of share-
holders, rather than the prior threshold of 67
per cent.37
• The Republic of Korea passed the Act on Sup-
porting the Return of Overseas Korean Enter-
prises. Accordingly, the Government founded
the Reshoring Support Centre and is planning
to provide reshoring businesses with incentives
that are similar to those provided to foreign-in-
vested companies.38
• Since 2011, the Government of the United States
has been operating the “Select USA” program,
which, inter alia, has the objective of attracting
and retaining investment in the United States
economy.39
2. Recent trends in investment incentives
Incentives are widely used for attracting investment.
Linking them to sustainable development goals
and monitoring their impact could improve their
effectiveness.
Policymakers use incentives to stimulate investments
in specific industries, activities or disadvantaged
regions. However, such schemes have been
criticized for being economically inefficient and
leading to misallocations of public funds.
a. Investment incentives: types
and objectives
Although there is no uniform definition of what
constitutes an investment incentive, such incentives
can be described as non-market benefits that
are used to influence the behaviour of investors.
Incentives can be offered by national, regional
and local governments, and they come in many
forms. These forms can be classified in three main
categories on the basis of the types of benefits that
are offered: financial benefits, fiscal benefits and
regulatory benefits (see table III.3).
From January 2014 to April 2014, UNCTAD
conducted a global survey of investment promotion
agencies (IPAs) on their prospects for FDI and for
the promotion of sustainable development through
investment incentives for foreign investors.40
According to the survey results, fiscal incentives
are the most important type for attracting and
benefiting from foreign investment (figure III.2).41
This is particularly true in developing and transition
economies. Financial and regulatory incentives are
considered less important policy tools for attracting
and benefiting from FDI. In addition to investment
incentives, IPAs consider investment facilitation
measures as particularly important for attracting
investment.
Investment incentives can be used to attract or
retain FDI in a particular host country (locational
incentives). In such cases, they can be perceived
as compensation for information asymmetries
between the investor and the host government, as
well as for deficiencies in the investment climate,
such as weak infrastructure, underdeveloped
human resources and administrative constraints. In
this context, investment incentives can become a
key policy instrument in the competition between
countries and within countries to attract foreign
investment.
Investment incentives can also be used as a tool to
advance public policy objectives such as economic
Figure III.2. Importance of investment incentives
in the country’s overall strategy to attract
and benefit from FDI
(Per cent)
0 25 50 75 100
Regulatory incentives
Financial incentives
Fiscal incentives
Absolutely critical Very important Important
Somewhat important Not at all important
Source: UNCTAD survey of IPAs (2014).
Note: Regulatory incentives only refer to the lowering of
standards.

Table III.3. Investment incentives by type and mechanism
Financial incentives
Investment grants
“Direct subsidies” to cover (part of) capital, production or marketing costs in relation to an
investment project
Subsidized credits and credit
guarantees
Subsidized loans
Loan guarantees
Guaranteed export credits
Government insurance at preferential
rates, publicly funded venture capital
participating in investments involving
high commercial risks
Government insurance at preferential rates, usually available to cover certain types of risks
(such as exchange rate volatility, currency devaluation and non-commercial risks such as
expropriation and political turmoil), often provided through an international agency
Fiscal incentives
Profit-based Reduction of the standard corporate income tax rate or profit tax rate, tax holiday
Capital-investment-based Accelerated depreciation, investment and reinvestment allowances
Labour-based
Reduction in social security contribution
Deductions from taxable earnings based on the number of employees or other labour-
related expenditures
Sales-based Corporate income tax reductions based on total sales
Import-based
Duty exemptions on capital goods, equipment or raw materials, parts and inputs related to
the production process
Tax credits for duties paid on imported materials or supplies
Export-based
Export tax exemptions, duty drawbacks and preferential tax treatment of income from
exports
Income tax reduction for special foreign-exchange-earning activities or for manufactured
exports
Tax credits on domestic sales in return for export performance, income tax credits on net
local content of exports
Deduction of overseas expenditures and capital allowance for export industries
Based on other particular expenses
Corporate income tax deduction based on, for example, expenditures relating to marketing
and promotional activities
Value added based
Corporate income tax reductions or credits based on the net local content of outputs
Income tax credits based on net value earned
Reduction of taxes for expatriates
Tax relief to help reduce personal tax liability and reduce income tax and social security
contribution
Other incentives (including regulatory incentives)
Regulatory incentives
Lowering of environmental, health, safety or labour standards
Temporary or permanent exemption from compliance with applicable standards
Stabilization clauses guaranteeing that existing regulations will not be amended to the
detriment of investors
Subsidized services (in kind)
Subsidized dedicated infrastructure: electricity, water, telecommunication, transportation or
designated infrastructure at less than commercial price
Subsidized services, including assistance in identifying sources of finance, implementing
and managing projects and carrying out pre-investment studies; information on markets,
availability of raw materials and supply of infrastructure; advice on production processes
and marketing techniques; assistance with training and retraining; and technical facilities for
developing know-how or improving quality control
Market privileges
Preferential government contracts
Closing the market to further entry or the granting of monopoly rights
Protection from import competition
Foreign exchange privileges
Special exchange rates
Special foreign debt-to-equity conversion rates
Elimination of exchange risks on foreign loans
Concessions of foreign exchange credits for export earnings
Special concessions on repatriation of earnings and capital
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2004).

growth through foreign investment or to make
foreign affiliates in a country undertake activities
regarded as desirable (behavioural incentives). For
this purpose, incentives may focus on support for
economic growth indicators, such as job creation,
skill transfer, research and development (RD),
export generation and establishment of linkages
with local firms.
For most countries, job creation is the most
important objective of investment incentives. About
85 per cent of IPAs indicated that job creation
ranks among their top five objectives (figure III.3),
with almost 75 per cent ranking it their primary or
secondary objective. In importance, job creation is
followed by technology transfer, export promotion,
local linkages and domestic value added, and skills
development. Just over 40 per cent of respondents
indicated that locational decisions and international
competition rank among the top five objectives of
their incentive policies. Interestingly, this is the case
for more than half of IPAs from developed countries
but less than one third of those from developing
or transition economies. An explanation might
be that other objectives, such as technological
development, exports and skill development, are
already relatively advanced in most developed
countries. Finally, two potential objectives –
environmental protection and promotion, and local
development – do not rank as highly, confirming
that there is considerable room for improvement
when it comes to connecting incentive strategies
with sustainable development goals such as those
being discussed for the United Nations post-2015
development agenda (see chapter IV for further
details).
Investment incentives are usually conditioned on
the fulfilment by the investor of certain performance
requirements. The IPA survey shows that such
requirements primarily relate to job creation and to
technology and skill transfer, followed by minimum
investment and locational and export requirements
(figure III.4). Environmental protection, along with
some other policy objectives, does not rank among
the key concerns.
Investment incentives may target specific industries.
According to IPAs, the most important target
industry for investment incentives is the IT and
business services industry. Over 40 per cent of the
respondents indicate that this industry is among
their top five target industries (figure III.5). Other
key target industries include agriculture and hotels
and restaurants. Even though renewable energy is
among the top target industries, still less than one
third of promotion agencies rank it among the top
five industries.
The use of FDI-specific investment incentives
differs from country to country. About 40 per cent
Figure III.3. Most important objectives of investment incentives for foreign investors
(Per cent)
0 25 50 75 100
Other
Compensate for perceived market failures
Environmental protection/promotion
Compensate for perceived cost of doing business
Industrial policy
Local development
Locational decisions (international competition for FDI)
Skills development
Linkages with local industry and domestic added value
Export promotion
Transfer of technology
Job creation
50%
Note: Based on number of times mentioned as one of the top five objectives.

of IPAs indicated that incentives frequently target
foreign investors specifically, while a quarter of the
agencies say this is never the case. More than two
thirds of IPAs indicated that incentive programmes
frequently fulfil their purpose, while 11 per cent
indicated that they always do so.
b. Developments related to
investment incentives
For the most part, investment incentives have
escaped systematic monitoring. Therefore, data
on trends in the use of investment incentives
and changes in policy objectives – including the
promotion of sustainable development – are scarce.
Figure III.4. Most important performance requirements linked to investment incentives for foreign investors
(Per cent)
0 25 50 75 100
Other
Production quotas
Local procurement
RD expenditure
Use of environmentally friendly technologies
Export requirements
Investment location
Minimum investment
Training/skill transfer
Minimum number of jobs created
50%
Note: Based on number of times mentioned as one of the top five performance requirements.
Figure III.5. Top 10 target industries of investment incentive policies
(Per cent)
Note: Based on number of times mentioned as one of the top five target industries.
0 25 50 75 100
Mining, quarrying and petroleum
Machinery and equipment
Electrical and electronic equipment
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment
Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology
Food, beverages and tobacco
Renewable energy
Hotels and restaurants
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
IT and business services
33%

the Russian Federation exempted education and
health-care services from the corporate profit tax
under certain conditions.45
A number of countries introduced measures
to promote local development. For instance in
2012, Algeria implemented an incentives regime
that is applicable to the wilayas (provinces) of the
South and the Highlands.46
China has provided
preferential taxation rates on imports of equipment,
technologies and materials by foreigners investing
in the central and western areas of the country.47
Japan recently designated six SEZs in an attempt
to boost local economies. These zones are located
around the country and focus on different industries,
including agriculture, tourism and RD.48
Among regions, over the last decade Asia has
introduced the most policy changes related to
investment incentives, followed by Africa (figure
III.7). China and the Republic of Korea took the lead
in Asia, while Angola, Egypt, Libya and South Africa
were the front-runners in Africa. Most of these
incentives (75 per cent) do not target any industry
in particular; of the industry-specific incentives,
most target the services industries, followed by
manufacturing.
c. Policy recommendations
Despite the fact that investment incentives have
not been a major determinant of FDI and that
their cost-effectiveness can be questioned, recent
UNCTAD data show that policymakers continue to
use incentives as an important policy instrument
for attracting FDI. Linking investment incentives
schemes to sustainable development goals could
make them a more effective policy tool to remedy
market failures and could offer a response to
the criticism raised against the way investment
incentives have traditionally been used (see also
chapter IV).
Governments should also follow a number of
good practices: (i) The rationale for investment
incentives should derive explicitly from the country’s
developmentstrategy,andtheireffectivenessshould
be fully assessed before adoption. (ii) Incentives
for specific industries should aim to ensure self-
sustained viability so as to avoid subsidizing non-
viable industries at the expense of the economy
Data from UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Monitor
suggest that investment incentives constitute a
significant share of newly adopted investment policy
measures that seek to create a more attractive
investment climate for investors. Between 2004 and
2013, this share fluctuated between 26 per cent and
55 per cent, with their overall importance increasing
during the period (figure III.6). In 2013, over half of
new liberalization and promotion measures related
to the provision of incentives to investors. More
than half of these incentive measures are fiscal
incentives.
Although sustainable development is not among
the most prominent objectives of incentive policies,
some recent measures cover areas such as health
care, education, RD and local development.
For instance, in Angola, the Patrons Law of 2012
defines the tax and other incentives available to
corporations that provide funding and support to
projects related to social initiatives, education,
culture, sports, science, health and information
technology.42
In 2010, Bulgaria adopted legislation
that grants reimbursement of up to 50 per cent
for spending on educational and RD activities,
and provides a subsidy of up to 10 per cent for
investments in processing industries.43
In 2011,
Poland adopted the “Programme to support
investments of high importance to the Polish
economy for 2011–2020”, with the aim of increasing
innovation and the competitiveness of the economy
by promoting FDI in high-tech sectors.44
In 2011,
Figure III.6. Investment incentives as a share of total
number of liberalization, promotion and facilitation
measures, 2004–2013
(Number of measures and per cent)
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Numberofmeasures
%
Liberalization, promotion and facilitation measures
Share of incentive measures

as a whole. (iii) All incentives should be granted on
the basis of pre-determined, objective, clear and
transparent criteria, offered on a non-discriminatory
basis and carefully assessed in terms of long-
term costs and benefits prior to implementation.
(iv) The costs and benefits of incentives should
be periodically reviewed and their effectiveness
in achieving the desired objectives thoroughly
evaluated and monitored.49
1. Trends in the conclusion of international
investment agreements
a. The IIA universe continues to grow
The past years brought an increasing dichotomy
in investment treaty making: disengaging and “up-
scaling.”
The year 2013 saw the conclusion of 44 inter
national investment agreements (IIAs) (30 bilateral
investment treaties, or BITs, and 14 “other IIAs”50
),
bringing the total number of agreements to 3,236
(2,902 BITs and 334 “other IIAs”) by year-end51
(figure III.8). Countries that were particularly active
in concluding BITs in 2013 include Kuwait (7);
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (4 each);
and Japan, Mauritius and the United Republic of
Tanzania (3 each). (See annex table III.7 for a list
of each country’s total number of BITs and “other
IIAs”.)
In 2013, several BITs were terminated.52
South
Africa, for example, gave notice of the termination of
its BITs with Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and
Switzerland in 2013;53
and Indonesia gave notice
of the termination of its BIT with the Netherlands
in 2014. Once taking effect, the terminated BITs
that were not replaced by new ones will reduce
the total number of BITs, albeit only marginally
(by 43, or less than 2 per cent). By virtue of
“survival clauses”, however, investments made
before the termination of these BITs will remain
protected for periods ranging from 10 to 20
years, depending on the relevant provisions of the
terminated BITs.54
“Other IIAs” concluded in 2013 can be grouped into
three broad categories, as identified in WIR12:
B. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES
Figure III.7. Share of policy changes relating to investment incentives,
by region and industry, 2004–2013
(Per cent)
Asia
30
Africa
23
Developed
countries
21
CIS and
South-East
Europe
13
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
13
Cross-industry
74
Services
12
Manufacturing
7
Extractive
industries
4 Agribusiness
3

Figure III.8. Trends in IIAs signed, 1983–2013
Source: UNCTAD, IIA database.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
0
50
100
150
200
250
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
CumulativenumberofIIAs
AnnualnumberofIIAs
Annual BITs Annual other IIAs All IIAs cumulative
• Seven agreements with BIT-equivalent provisions.
The Canada–Honduras Free Trade Agreement
(FTA); the China–Iceland FTA; Colombia’s FTAs
with Costa Rica, Israel, the Republic of Korea,
and Panama; and New Zealand’s FTA with Taiwan
Province of China all fall in the category of IIAs
that contain obligations commonly found in BITs,
including substantive standards of investment
protection and investor–State dispute settlement
(ISDS).
• Two agreements with limited investment
provisions. The China–Switzerland FTA and the
EFTA–Costa Rica–Panama FTA fall in the category
of agreements that provide limited investment-
related provisions (e.g. national treatment with
respect to commercial presence or free movement
of capital relating to direct investments).
• Five agreements with investment cooperation
provisions and/or a future negotiating mandate.
The Chile–Thailand FTA and the EFTA–Bosnia
and Herzegovina FTA, as well as the trade and
investment framework agreements signed by the
United States with the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), Myanmar and Libya, contain general
provisions on cooperation in investment matters
and/or a mandate for future negotiations on
investment.
An important development occurred in early 2014,
when Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, the four
countries that formed the Pacific Alliance in 2011,
signed a comprehensive protocol that includes
a chapter on investment protection with BITs-like
substantive and procedural investment protection
standards.
In addition, at least 40 countries and 4 regional
integration organizations are currently or have
been recently revising their model IIAs. In terms of
ongoing negotiations of “other IIAs”, the European
Union (EU) is engaged in negotiating more than 20
agreementsthatareexpectedtoincludeinvestment-
related provisions (which may vary in their scope
and depth).55
Canada is engaged in negotiating 12
FTAs; the Republic of Korea is negotiating 10; Japan
and Singapore are negotiating 9 agreements each;
and Australia and the United States are negotiating
8 each (figure III.9). Some of these agreements are
megaregional ones (see below).

The agreements concluded in past years and
those currently under negotiation are contributing
to an “up-scaling” of the global investment
policy landscape. This effect can be seen in the
participation rate (i.e. the large number of countries
that have concluded or are negotiating treaties), the
process (which exhibits an increasing dynamism)
and the substance of agreements (the expansion
of existing elements and inclusion of new ones). All
of this contributes to a growing dichotomy in the
directions of investment policies over the last few
years, which has manifested itself in simultaneous
moves by countries to expand the global IIA regime
and to disengage from it.
In a general sense, the more countries engage in
IIA negotiations, including megaregional ones, the
more they create a spirit of action and engagement
also for those countries that are not taking part.
However, the successful creation of the numerous
“other IIAs”, BITs and megaregional agreements
under negotiation is far from certain. A stagnation or
breakdown of one or several of these negotiations
could cause the climate for international investment
policymaking to deteriorate and effectively hinder
the momentum and spirit of action at the bilateral,
regional and multilateral levels.
b. Sustainable development
elements increasingly feature
in new IIAs
New IIAs illustrate the growing tendency to
craft treaties that are in line with sustainable
development objectives.
A review of the 18 IIAs concluded in 2013 for
which texts are available (11 BITs and 7 FTAs
with substantive investment provisions), shows
that most of the treaties include sustainable-
development-oriented features, such as those
identified in UNCTAD’s Investment Policy
Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD)
and in WIR12 and WIR13.56
Of these agreements,
15 have general exceptions – for example, for
the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, or the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources57
– and 13 refer in their preambles to the
protection of health and safety, labour rights, the
environment or sustainable development. Twelve
treaties under review contain a clause that explicitly
Figure III.9. Most active negotiators of “other IIAs”: treaties under negotiation and partners involved
(Number)
Note: The selection of countries represented in this chart is based on those that are the “most active” negotiators of “other
IIAs”. It has to be noted that the scope and depth of investment provisions under discussion varies considerably across
negotiations.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
United States
Singapore
Republic of Korea
Japan
EU (28)
Canada
Australia
Number of treaties under negotiation Number of partner countries involved

Table III.4. Selected aspects of IIAs signed in 2013
Policy Objectives
Select aspects of IIAs
commonly found in IIAs, in
order of appearance
Sustainable-development-
enhancingfeatures
Focusoninvestments
conducivetodevelopment
Preservetherighttoregulate
inthepublicinterest
Avoidoverexposureto
litigation
Stimulateresponsible
businesspractices
Serbia-UnitedArabEmirates
BIT
RussianFederation-
UzbekistanBIT
NewZealand-TaiwanProvince
ofChinaFTA
Morocco-SerbiaBIT
Japan-SaudiArabiaBIT
Japan-MyanmarBIT
Japan-MozambiqueBIT
EFTA-CostaRica-PanamaFTA
Colombia-SingaporeBIT
Colombia-RepublicofKorea
FTA
Colombia-PanamaFTA
Colombia-IsraelFTA
Colombia-CostaRicaFTA
Canada-UnitedRepublicof
TanzaniaBIT
Canada-HondurasFTA
Benin-CanadaBIT
Belarus-LaoPeople’s
DemocraticRepublicBIT
Austria-NigeriaBIT
References to the protection
of health and safety, labour
rights, environment or
sustainable development in
the treaty preamble
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Refined definition of
investment (exclusion
of portfolio investment,
sovereign debt obligations
or claims of money arising
solely from commercial
contracts)
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
A carve-out for prudential
measures in the financial
services sector
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Fair and equitable standard
equated to the minimum
standard of treatment of
aliens under customary
international law
X X X X X X X X X X
Clarification of what does
and does not constitute an
indirect expropriation
X X X X X X X X X X X X
Detailed exceptions from
the free-transfer-of-funds
obligation, including
balance-of-payments
difficulties and/or
enforcement of national
laws
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Omission of the so-called
“umbrella” clause
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
General exceptions, e.g. for
the protection of human,
animal or plant life or
health; or the conservation
of exhaustible natural
resources
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Explicit recognition
that parties should not
relax health, safety or
environmental standards to
attract investment
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Promotion of corporate
and social responsibility
standards by incorporating
a separate provision into the
IIA or as a general reference
in the treaty preamble
X X X X X X
Limiting access to ISDS
(e.g., limiting treaty
provisions subject to ISDS,
excluding policy areas from
ISDS, limiting time period
to submit claims, no ISDS
mechanism)
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Source: UNCTAD.
Note: This table is based on IIAs concluded in 2013 for which the text was available. It does not include “framework agreements”,
which do not include substantive investment provisions.

recognizes that parties should not relax health,
safety or environmental standards in order to attract
investment.
These sustainable development features are sup
plemented by treaty elements that aim more broadly
at preserving regulatory space for public policies
of host countries and/or at minimizing exposure
to investment arbitration. Provisions found with
differing frequency in the 18 IIAs include clauses
that (i) limit treaty scope (for example, by excluding
certain types of assets from the definition of
investment); (ii) clarify obligations (by crafting detailed
clauses on fair and equitable treatment (FET) and/
or indirect expropriation); (iii) set forth exceptions
to the transfer-of-funds obligation or carve-outs
for prudential measures; (iv) carefully regulate ISDS
(for example, by limiting treaty provisions that are
subject to ISDS, excluding certain policy areas
from ISDS, setting out a special mechanism for
taxation and prudential measures, and restricting
the allotted time period within which claims can be
submitted); or (v) omit the so-called umbrella clause
(table III.4).
In addition to these two types of clauses
(i.e. those strengthening the agreement’s
sustainable development dimension and those
preserving policy space), a large number of the
treaties concluded in 2013 also add elements that
expand treaty standards. Such expansion can
take the form of adding a liberalization dimension
to the treaty and/or strengthening investment
protections (e.g. by enlarging the scope of the
treaty or prohibiting certain types of government
conduct previously unregulated in investment
treaties). Provisions on pre-establishment and rules
that prohibit additional performance requirements
or that require the publication of draft laws and
regulations are examples (included in, e.g., the
Benin–Canada BIT, the Canada–Tanzania FTA, the
Japan–Mozambique BIT and the New Zealand–
Taiwan Province of China FTA).
The ultimate protective and liberalizing strength of
an agreement, as well as its impact on policy space
and sustainable development, depends on the
overall combination (i.e. the blend) of its provisions
(IPFSD). Reconciling the two broad objectives – the
pursuit of high standard investment protection and
liberalization on the one hand and the preservation
of the right to regulate in the public interest on the
other – is the most important challenge facing IIA
negotiators and investment policymakers today.
Different combinations of treaty clauses represent
each country’s attempt to identify the “best fit”
combination of treaty elements.
2. Megaregional agreements: emerging
issues and systemic implications
Megaregional agreements are broad economic
agreements among a group of countries that
together have significant economic weight and in
which investment is only one of several subjects
addressed.58
The last two years have seen an
expansion of negotiations for such agreements.
Work on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
the EU–United States Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Canada–EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) are cases in point. Once concluded,
these are likely to have a major impact on global
investment rule making and global investment
patterns.
During the past months, negotiations for
megaregional agreements have become
increasingly prominent in the public debate,
attracting considerable attention – support and
criticism alike – from different stakeholders. Prime
issues relate to the potential economic benefits of
the agreements on the one hand, and their likely
impact on Contracting Parties’ regulatory space
and sustainable development on the other. In this
section, the focus is on the systemic implications of
these agreements for the IIA regime.
a. The magnitude of megaregional
agreements
Megaregional agreements merit attention because
of their sheer size and potentially huge implications.
Megaregional agreements merit attention
because of their sheer size, among other
reasons (table III.5; see also table I.1 in chapter I).
Together, the seven negotiations listed in table III.5
involve 88 countries.59
In terms of population, the
biggest is the Regional Comprehensive Economic

Table III.5. Overview of selected megaregional agreements under negotiation
Selected indicators 2012
Megaregional
agreement
Negotiating parties
Number
of
countries
Items
Value
($ billion)
Share in
global
total
(%)
IIA impact No.
CETA
EU (28),
Canada
29
GDP: 18 565 26.1 Overlap with current BITs: 7
Exports: 2 588 17.5 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 0
Intraregional exports: 81 New bilateral relationships created:a
21
FDI inward stock: 2 691 17.6
Intraregional FDI inflows: 28
Tripartite
Agreement
COMESA,
EAC and SADC
26b
Exports: 355 2.4 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 8
67
FDI inward stock: 372 2.4
Intraregional FDI inflows: 1.3
EU-Japan
FTA
EU (28), Japan 29
28
PACER Plus
Australia, New Zealand,
Pacific Islands Forum
developing countries
15
Exports: 299 2.0 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 2
103
FDI inward stock: 744 4.9
RCEP
ASEAN countries and
Australia, China, Japan,
India, Republic of Korea
and New Zealand
16
Intraregional exports: 2 195 New bilateral relationships created:a
5
TPP
Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, United States
and Viet Nam
12
Intraregional exports: 2 012 New bilateral relationships created:a
22
TTIP
EU (28),
United States
29
19
Source: UNCTAD.
a
“New bilateral relationships” refers to the number of new bilateral IIA relationships created between countries upon signature of the megaregional
agreement in question.
b
Overlapping membership in COMESA, EAC and SADC have been taken into account.
Note: This table does not take into account the negotiations for the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) which have sectoral focus.
ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
and Viet Nam.
COMESA: Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
EAC: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania.
EU (28): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Pacific Island Forum countries: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
SADC: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, FET,
expropriation, transfer of funds, performance
requirements), its liberalization dimension and its
procedural protections, notably ISDS.
Similar to what occurs in negotiations for “other
IIAs”, megaregional negotiators are also tasked
with addressing treaty elements beyond the
investment chapter that have important investment
implications. The protection of intellectual property
rights (IPRs), the liberalization of trade in services
and the facilitation of employee work visas are
examples in this regard.
In addition to issues that have been considered in
numerous past agreements, some megaregional
negotiators also face the challenge of dealing
with new issues that have emerged only recently.
How to address issues related to State-owned
enterprises or sovereign wealth funds and how to
pursue regulatory cooperation are cases in point.
Table III.6. Selected investment and investment-related issues under consideration in
negotiations of megaregional agreements
Selected investment provisions Selected investment-related provisions
Scope and coverage: the definition of public debt
(i.e. whether or not debt instruments of a Party or of
a State enterprise are considered covered investments),
the type of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) investments that
would be protected (e.g. only direct investments or also
portfolio investments)
Regulatory cooperation: the requirement to provide information and
to exchange data on regulatory initiatives (i.e. draft laws/regulations),
the requirement to examine – where appropriate – regulations’
impact on international trade and investment prior to their adoption,
the use of mutual recognition arrangements in specific sectors, the
establishment of a regulatory cooperation council
Performance requirements: the prohibition of performance
requirements beyond those listed in TRIMs (e.g. prohibiting
the use or purchase of a specific (domestic) technology)
Intellectual property rights (IPRs): the property protected (e.g.
undisclosed test data), the type of protection offered (e.g. exclusive
rights) and the level of protection offered (e.g. extending the term of
patent protection beyond what is required by TRIPS)
Standards of treatment: different techniques for clarifying
the meaning of indirect expropriation and fair and equitable
treatment (FET)
Trade in services: the nature of services investment covered (“trade
in services” by means of commercial presence) and the relationship
with the investment chapter
Investment liberalization: the depth of commitments,
the possibility of applying ISDS to pre-establishment
commitments
Financial services: the coverage of “commercial presence”-type
investments in the sector and the promotion of more harmonized
regulatory practices
Denial of benefit: a requirement for investors to conduct
“substantial business operations” in the home country
in order to benefit from treaty protection
Government procurement: the obligation to not discriminate against
foreign companies bidding for State contracts and the opening of
certain aspects of governments’ procurement markets to foreign
companies
Transfer of funds exceptions: the scope and depth of
exceptions to free transfer obligations
Competition: provisions on competitive neutrality (e.g. to ensure that
competition laws of Parties apply to SOEs)
ISDS: the inclusion of ISDS and its scope (e.g. only for
post-establishment or also for pre-establishment
commitments), potential carve-outs or special mechanisms
applying to sensitive issues (e.g. public debt or financial
issues), methods for effective dispute prevention and the
inclusion of an appeals mechanism
Corporate social responsibility (CSR): the inclusion of non-binding
provisions on CSR
Key personnel: the inclusion of provisions facilitating the
presence of (foreign) natural persons for business purposes
General exceptions: the inclusion of GATT- or GATS-type general
exceptions for measures aimed at legitimate public policy objectives
Source: UNCTAD.
Partnership (RCEP), accounting for close to half of
the global population. In terms of GDP, the biggest
is TTIP, representing 45 per cent of global GDP. In
terms of global FDI inward stock, TPP tops the list.
Megaregional agreements are also significant in
terms of the new bilateral IIA relationships they
can create. For example, when it is concluded,
the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic
Relations (PACER) Plus may create 103 such new
relationships.
b. Substantive issues at hand
Megaregional negotiations cover several of the
issues typically addressed in negotiations for BITs
or “other IIAs”. For the investment chapter, nego
tiators need to devise key IIA provisions, including
the clause setting out the treaty’s coverage of
investments and investors, the treaty’s substantive
standards of protection (e.g. national treatment,

In all of this, negotiators have to carefully consider
the possible interactions between megaregional
agreements and other investment treaties; between
the different chapters of the agreement; and
between the clauses in the investment chapter of
the agreement in question.
Table III.6 offers selected examples of key issues
under discussion in various current megaregional
negotiations. The table is not exhaustive, and
the inclusion of an issue does not mean that it is
being discussed in all megaregional agreements.
Moreover, it should be noted that discussions
on investment issues are at different stages (e.g.
negotiations for the Tripartite agreement plan to
address investment issues only in the second
phase, which is yet to start). In sum, the table offers
a snapshot of selected issues.
Negotiations of megaregional agreements may
present opportunities for the formulation of a new
generation of investment treaties that respond to the
sustainable development imperative. Negotiators
have to determine where on a spectrum between
utmost investor protection and maximum policy
flexibility a particular agreement should be located.
This also offers space to apply lessons learned
about how IIAs have been implemented and how
they have been interpreted by arbitral tribunals.
c. Consolidation or further
complexities
Depending on how they are implemented,
megaregionals can either help consolidate the
IIA regime or create further complexities and
inconsistencies.
Once concluded, megaregional agreements may
have important systemic implications for the IIA
regime. They offer opportunities for consolidating
today’s multifaceted and multilayered treaty
network. This is not automatic however. They could
also create new inconsistencies resulting from
overlaps with existing agreements.
Megaregional agreements present an opportunity
to consolidate today’s network of close to 3,240
IIAs. Overlapping with 140 agreements (45 bilateral
and regional “other IIAs” and 95 BITs), the six
megaregional agreements in which BITs-type
provisions are on the agenda have the potential
of transforming the fragmented IIA network into a
more consolidated and manageable one of fewer,
but more inclusive and more significant, IIAs. At the
same time, the six agreements would create close
to 200 new bilateral IIA relationships (figure III.10).
The extent of consolidation of the IIA regime
that megaregional agreements may bring about
Figure III.10. Existing IIAs and new bilateral relationships created, for six megaregional agreements
(Number)
Note: “New bilateral relationships” refers to the number of new IIA relationships created between countries upon signature of
a megaregional agreement.
EU-Japan
CETA (EU-Canada)
TTIP (EU-United States)
TPP
RCEP
PACER Plus
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Existing BITs Existing “other IIAs” New bilateral relationships

depends crucially on whether the negotiating
parties opt to replace existing bilateral IIAs with the
pertinent megaregional agreement. The currently
prevailing approach to regionalism has resulted
in a degree of parallelism that adds complexities
and inconsistencies to the system (WIR13). The
coexistence of megaregional agreements and other
investment treaties concluded between members
of these agreements raises questions about which
treaty should prevail.60
This may change, however,
with the increasing number of agreements involving
the EU, where prior BITs between individual EU
member States and megaregional partners will be
replaced by the new EU-wide treaties.
In addition, megaregional agreements may create
new investment standards on top of those that
exist in the IIAs of the members of the megaregional
agreement with third countries – be they bilateral
or plurilateral. Insofar as these standards will differ,
they increase the chance for “treaty shopping” by
investors for the best clauses from different treaties
by using the MFN clause. This can work both
ways, in terms of importing higher standards into
megaregional agreements from other agreements
(“cherry-picking”) or benefiting from megaregionals’
higher standards in other investment relationships
(“free-riding”).
Several arbitral decisions have interpreted the
MFN clause as allowing investors to invoke more
investor-friendly language from treaties between
the respondent State and a third country, thereby
effectively sidelining the “base” treaty (i.e. the treaty
between the investor’s home and host countries)
on the basis of which the case was brought.
Therefore, the issue of “cherry-picking” requires
careful attention in the drafting of the MFN clause
(UNCTAD, 2010; see also IPFSD).
Insofar as “free-riding” and excluding others from the
megaregional agreement’s benefits are concerned,
treaty provisions that except investor treatment
granted within a regional economic integration or-
Figure III.11. Participation in key megaregionals and OECD membership
RCEP
Bulgaria,
Croatia,
Cyprus,
Latvia,
Lithuania,
Malta,
Romania
and the EU
Austria,
Belgium,
Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France,
Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy,
Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom
Israel,
Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland,
Turkey
Australia,
Japan,
New Zealand
Canada,
Mexico,
Chile
United
States
Peru
Cambodia,
China, India,
Indonesia,
Lao People’s
Democratic Republic,
Myanmar,
Philippines,
Thailand
Brunei,
Malaysia,
Singapore,
Viet Nam
TTIP
OECD
TPP
Republic of Korea
Source: UNCTAD.

ganization from the application of the MFN clause
(the so-called regional economic integration organi-
zation, or REIO clause) can apply (UNCTAD, 2004).
d. Implications for existing
plurilateral cooperation
Megaregional agreements can have implications for
existing plurilateral cooperation.
At the plurilateral level, they raise questions about
their future relationship with existing investment
codes,suchastheOECDinstruments(i.e.theOECD
Codes on Liberalization of Capital Movements and
on Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations)
and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).
Of the 34 OECD members, 22 would be bound by
the TTIP’s investment provisions, 7 participate in
TPP and 4 in RCEP, resulting in a situation where
all but 5 (Iceland, Israel, Norway, Switzerland and
Turkey) would be party to one or more megaregional
agreement (figure III.11). Similarly, 28 ECT members
would be subject to the TTIP’s provisions, and 2
ECT members are engaged in the TPP and 2 in
RCEP negotiations.61
Once concluded, some megaregional agreements
will therefore result in considerable overlap with
existing plurilateral instruments and in possible
inconsistencies that could give rise to “free-riding”
problems.
Related to this are questions concerning the
rationale for including an investment protection
chapter (including ISDS) in megaregional agree
ments between developed countries that have
advanced regulatory and legal systems and
generally open investment environments. To date,
developed countries have been less active in
concluding IIAs among themselves. The share of
“North-North” BITs is only 9 per cent (259 of today’s
total of 2,902 BITs). Moreover, 200 of these BITs are
intra-EU treaties – many of which were concluded
by transition economies before they joined the
EU (figure III.12).
e. Implications for non-
participating third parties
In terms of systemic implications for the IIA
regime, megaregional agreements may also affect
countries that are not involved in the negotiations.
These agreements can create risks but also offer
opportunities for non-parties.
There is the risk of potential marginalization of
third parties, which could further turn them from
“rule makers” into “rule takers” (i.e. megaregional
agreements make it even more difficult for non-
parties to effectively contribute to the shaping of the
global IIA regime). To the extent that megaregional
agreements create new IIA rules, non-parties may
be left behind in terms of the latest treaty practices.
At the same time, megaregional agreements may
present opportunities. Apart from “free-riding” (see
above), megaregional agreements can also have
a demonstrating effect on other negotiations. This
Figure III.12. Share of North-North BITs in global BITs, by end 2013
(Per cent)
North-South
41
Intra-EU
77
Others
33
North-North
9
South-South
27
Transition-World
23

applies to both the inclusion of new rules and the
reformulation or revision or omission of existing
standards.
Third parties may also have the option of acceding
to megaregional agreements. This could, however,
reinforce their role as “rule-takers” and expose them
to the conditionalities that sometimes emanate
from in accession procedures. This is particularly
problematic, given that many non-participating
third countries are poor developing countries.
* * *
Megaregional agreements are likely to have a
major impact on global investment rule making in
the coming years. This also includes the overall
pursuit of sustainable development objectives.
Transparency in rule making, with broader
stakeholder engagement, can help in finding
optimal solutions and ensuring buy-in from those
affected by a treaty. It is similarly important that the
interests of non-parties are adequately considered.
The challenge of marginalization that potentially
arises from megaregional agreements can be
overcome by “open regionalism”. A multilateral
platform for dialogue among regional groupings on
key emerging issues would be helpful in this regard.
3. Trends in investor–State dispute
settlement
With 56 new cases, the year saw the second
largest number of known investment arbitrations
filed in a single year, bringing the total number of
known cases to 568.
In 2013, investors initiated at least 56 known ISDS
cases pursuant to IIAs (UNCTAD 2014) (figure III.13).
This comes close to the previous year’s record-high
number of new claims. In 2013 investors brought an
unusually high number of cases against developed
States (26); in the remaining cases, developing
(19) and transition (11) economies are the
respondents.
Figure III.13. Known ISDS cases, 1987–2013
Source: UNCTAD, ISDS database.
Note: Due to new information becoming available for 2012 and earlier years the number of known ISDS cases has been
revised.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Annualnumberofcases
ICSID Non-ICSID All cases cumulative
Cumulativenumberofcases

Forty-two per cent of cases initiated in 2013 were
brought against member States of the EU. In all of
these EU-related arbitrations, except for one, the
claimants are EU nationals bringing the proceedings
under either intra-EU BITs or the ECT (sometimes
relying on both at the same time). In more than
half of the cases against EU member States, the
respondents are the Czech Republic or Spain.
In fact, nearly a quarter of all arbitrations initiated
in 2013 involve challenges to regulatory actions by
those two countries that affected the renewable
energy sector. With respect to the Czech Republic,
investors are challenging the 2011 amendments
that placed a levy on electricity generated from solar
power plants. They argue that these amendments
undercuttheviabilityoftheinvestmentsandmodified
the incentive regime that had been originally put in
place to stimulate the use of renewable energy in
the country. The claims against Spain arise out of a
7 per cent tax on the revenues of power generators
and a reduction of subsidies for renewable energy
producers.
Investors also challenged the cancellation or
alleged breaches of contracts by States, alleged
direct or de facto expropriation, revocation of
licenses or permits, regulation of energy tariffs,
allegedly wrongful criminal prosecution and land
zoning decisions. Investors also complained about
the creation of a State monopoly in a previously
competitive sector, allegedly unfair tax assessments
or penalties, invalidation of patents and legislation
relating to sovereign bonds.
By the end of 2013, the number of known ISDS
cases reached 568, and the number of countries
that have been respondents in at least one dispute
increased to 98. (For comparison, the World Trade
Organization had registered 474 disputes by that
time, involving 53 members as respondents.) About
three quarters of these ISDS cases were brought
against developing and transition economies, of
which countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
account for the largest share. EU countries ranked
third as respondents, with 21 per cent of all cases
(figure III.14). The majority of known disputes
continued to accrue under the ICSID Convention
and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (62 per
cent), and the UNCITRAL Rules (28 per cent). Other
arbitral venues have been used only rarely.
The overwhelming majority (85 per cent) of all ISDS
claims by end 2013 were brought by investors
from developed countries, including the EU (53 per
cent) and the United States (22 per cent).62
Among
the EU member States, claimants come most
frequently from the Netherlands (61 cases), the
United Kingdom (43) and Germany (39).
Figure III.14. Respondent States by geographical region and EU in focus, total by end 2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, ISDS database.
Respondent States, EU countriesRespondent States, by region
Africa
10
Asia and Oceania
23
Europe
(Non-EU)
7
Latin America
and the Caribbean
29
North America
10
Czech
Republic
23
Poland
14
Hungary
10
Slovakia
9
Spain
8
Romania
8
Others
28
Europe
(EU)
21
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Estonia
France
Germany
Greece
Latvia
Lithuania
Slovenia
United Kingdom

The three investment instruments most frequently
used as a basis for all ISDS claims have been
NAFTA (51 cases), the ECT (42) and the Argentina–
United States BIT (17). At least 72 arbitrations have
been brought pursuant to intra-EU BITs.
At least 37 arbitral decisions were issued in 2013,
including decisions on objections to a tribunal’s
jurisdiction, on the substantive merits of the claims,
on compensation and on applications for annulment
of an arbitral award. For only 23 of these decisions
are the texts in the public domain.
Known decisions on jurisdictional objections
issued in 2013 show a 50/50 split – half of them
rejecting the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute
and half affirming it and thereby letting the claims
proceed to their assessment on the merits. Of eight
decisions on the merits that were rendered in 2013,
seven accepted – at least in part – the claims of
the investors, and one dismissed all of the claims;
this represents a higher share of rulings in favour
of investors than in previous years. At least five
decisions rendered in 2013 awarded compensation
to the investors, including an award of $935 million
plus interest, the second highest known award in
the history of ISDS.63
Arbitral developments in 2013 brought the overall
number of concluded cases to 274.64
Of these,
approximately 43 per cent were decided in favour
of the State and 31 per cent in favour of the investor.
Approximately 26 per cent of cases were settled.
In these cases, the specific terms of settlement
typically remain confidential.
The growing number of cases and the broad
range of policy issues raised in this context have
turned ISDS into arguably the most controversial
issue in international investment policymaking.
Over the past year, the public discourse about
the pros and cons of ISDS has continued to
gain momentum. This has already spurred some
action. For example, UNCITRAL adopted new
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor–
State Arbitration on 11 July 2013. Similarly, the
Energy Charter Secretariat invited Contracting
Parties to discuss measures to reform investment
dispute settlement under the ECT. In all of this
effort, UNCTAD’s IPFSD table on policy options
for IIAs (notably section 6) and the roadmap for
five ways to reform the ISDS system identified in
WIR13 can help and guide policymakers and other
stakeholders (figure III.15).
4. Reform of the IIA regime: four paths of
action and a way forward
Four different paths of IIA regime reform emerge:
status quo, disengagement, selective adjustments
and systematic reform.
The IIA regime is undergoing a period of reflection,
review and reform. While almost all countries are
parties to one or several IIAs, few are satisfied with
the current regime for several reasons: growing
uneasiness about the actual effects of IIAs in terms
of promoting FDI or reducing policy and regulatory
space, increasing exposure to ISDS and the lack
of specific pursuit of sustainable development
objectives. Furthermore, views on IIAs are strongly
diverse, even within countries. To this adds the
complexity and multifaceted nature of the IIA regime
and the absence of a multilateral institution (like the
WTO for trade). All of this makes it difficult to take
a systematic approach towards comprehensively
reforming the IIA (and the ISDS) regime. Hence, IIA
reform efforts have so far been relatively modest.
Many countries follow a “wait and see” approach.
Hesitation in respect to more holistic and far-
reaching reform reflects a government’s dilemma:
more substantive changes might undermine a
country’s attractiveness for foreign investment, and
first movers could particularly suffer in this regard.
In addition, there are questions about the concrete
content of a “new” IIA model and fears that some
approaches could aggravate the current complexity
and uncertainty.
IIA reform has been occurring at different levels
of policymaking. At the national level, countries
have revised their model treaties, sometimes
on the basis of inclusive and transparent multi-
stakeholder processes. In fact, at least 40 countries
(and 5 regional organizations) are currently in the
process of reviewing and revising their approaches
to international-investment-related rule making.
Countries have also continued negotiating IIAs at
the bilateral and regional levels, with novel provisions
and reformulations (table III.4). Megaregional
agreements are a case in point. A few countries
have walked away from IIAs, terminating some of
their BITs or denouncing international arbitration

conventions. At the multilateral level, countries
have come together to discuss specific aspects of
IIA reform.
Bringing together these recent experiences allows
the mapping of four broad paths that are emerging
regarding actions for reforming the international
investment regime (table III.7):
• Maintaining the status quo
• Disengaging from the regime
• Introducing selective adjustments
• Engaging in systematic reform
Each of the four paths of action comes with its own
advantages and disadvantages, and responds to
specific concerns in a distinctive way (table III.7).
Depending on the overall objective that is being
pursued, what is considered an advantage by some
stakeholders may be perceived as a challenge
by others. In addition, the four paths of action,
as pursued today, are not mutually exclusive; a
country may adopt elements from one or several
of them, and the content of a particular IIA may be
influenced by one or several paths of action.
This section discusses each path from the
perspective of strategic regime reform. The
discussion begins with the two most opposed
approaches to investment-related international
commitments: at one end is the path that maintains
the status quo; at the other is the path that
disengages from the IIA regime. In between are
Table III.7. Four paths of action: an overview
Path Content of policy action Level of policy action
Systematic
reform
Designing investment-related international commitments
that:
• create proactive sustainable-development-oriented IIAs (e.g.
add SDG investment promotion)
• effectively rebalance rights and obligations in IIAs (e.g. add
investor responsibilities, preserve policy space)
• comprehensively reform ISDS (i.e. follow five ways identified in
WIR 13)
• properly manage interactions and foster coherence between
different levels of investment policies and investment and other
public policies (e.g. multi-stakeholder review)
Taking policy action at three levels of
policymaking (simultaneously and/or
sequentially):
• national (e.g. creating a new model IIA)
• bilateral/regional (e.g. (re-)negotiating IIAs
based on new model)
• multilateral (e.g. multi-stakeholder
consensus-building, including collective
learning)
Selective
adjustments
Pursuing selective changes to:
• add a sustainable development dimension to IIAs (e.g.
sustainable development in preamble)
• move towards rebalancing rights and obligations (e.g. non-
binding CSR provisions)
• change specific aspects of ISDS (e.g. early discharge of
frivolous claims)
• selectively address policy interaction (e.g. not lowering
standards clauses)
Taking policy action at three levels of
policymaking (selectively):
• national (e.g. modifying a new model IIA)
• bilateral/regional (e.g. negotiating IIAs
based on revised models or issuing joint
interpretations)
• multilateral (e.g. sharing of experiences)
Status quo Not pursuing any substantive change to IIA clauses or
investment-related international commitments
Taking policy action at bilateral and
regional levels:
• continue negotiating IIAs based on existing
models
• leave existing treaties untouched
Disengagement Eliminating investment-related commitments Taking policy action regarding different
aspects:
• national (e.g. eliminating consent to
ISDS in domestic law and terminating
investment contracts)
• bilateral/regional (e.g. terminating existing
IIAs)
Source: UNCTAD.

the two paths of action that opt for reform of the
regime, albeit to different degrees.
The underlying premise of the analysis here is that
the case for reform has already been made (see
above). UNCTAD’s IPFSD, with its principle of
“dynamic policymaking” – which calls for a con-
tinuing assessment of the effectiveness of policy
instruments – is but one example. The questions
are not about whether to reform the international
investment regime but how to do so. Furthermore,
today’s questions are not only about the change
to one aspect in a particular agreement but about
the comprehensive reorientation of the global IIA
regime to balance investor protection with sustain-
able development considerations.
a. Maintaining the status quo
At one end of the spectrum is a country’s choice
to maintain the status quo. Refraining from
substantive changes to the way that investment-
related international commitments are made sends
an image of continuity and investor friendliness.
This is particularly the case when maintaining the
status quo involves the negotiation of new IIAs
that are based on existing models. Above all, this
path might be attractive for countries with a strong
outward investment perspective and for countries
that have not yet responded to numerous – and
highly politicized – ISDS cases.
Intuitively, this path of action appears to be the
easiest and most straightforward to implement. It
requires limited resources (e.g. there is no need
for assessments, domestic reviews and multi-
stakeholder consultations) and avoids unintended,
potentially far-reaching consequences arising from
innovative approaches to IIA clauses.
At the same time, however, maintaining the status
quo does not address any of the challenges arising
from today’s global IIA regime and might contribute
to a further stakeholder backlash against IIAs.
Moreover, as an increasing number of countries
are beginning to reform IIAs, maintaining the status
quo (i.e. maintaining BITs and negotiating new
ones based on existing templates) may become
increasingly difficult.
b. Disengaging from the IIA regime
At the other end of the spectrum is a country’s choice
to disengage from the international investment
regime, be it from individual agreements, multilateral
arbitration conventions or the regime as a whole.
Unilaterally quitting IIAs sends a strong signal of
dissatisfaction with the current regime. This path of
action might be particularly attractive for countries
in which IIA-related concerns feature prominently in
the domestic policy debate.
Intuitively, disengaging from the IIA regime might
be perceived as the strongest, or most far-
reaching path of action. Ultimately, for inward and
outward investors, it would result in the removal
of international commitments on investment
protection that are enshrined in international
treaties. Moreover, this would result in the effective
shielding from ISDS-related risks.
However, most of the desired implications will
materialize only over time, and only for one treaty
at a time. Quitting the system does not immediately
protect the State against future ISDS cases, as IIA
commitments usually endure for a period through
survival clauses. In addition, there may be a need
to review national laws and State contracts, as
they may also provide for ISDS (including ICSID
arbitration), even in the absence of an IIA. Moreover,
unless termination is undertaken on a consensual
basis, a government’s ability to terminate an
IIA is limited. Its ability to do so depends on the
formulation of the treaty at issue (i.e. the “survival”
clause) and may be available only at a particular,
limited point in time (WIR13).
Moreover, eliminating single international commit
ments at a time (treaty by treaty) does not contribute
to the reform of the IIA regime as a whole, but
only takes care of individual relationships. Only if
such treaty termination is pursued with a view to
renegotiation can it also constitute a move towards
reforming the entire IIA regime.

c. Introducing selective
adjustments
Limited, i.e. selective, adjustments that address
specific concerns is the path of action that is gaining
ground rapidly. It may be particularly attractive
for those countries that wish to respond to the
challenges posed by IIAs but wish to demonstrate
their continued, constructive engagement with
the investment regime. It can be directed towards
sustainable development and other policy
objectives.
This path of action has numerous advantages. The
selective choice of modifications can permit the
prioritization of “low-hanging fruit” or concerns that
appear most relevant and pressing, while leaving
the treaty core untouched (see for example, the
option of “tailored modifications” in UNCTAD’s
five paths of reform for ISDS, figure III.15). It
also allows the tailoring of the modification to a
particular negotiating counterpart so as to suit
a particular economic relationship. Moreover,
selective adjustment also allows the testing and
piloting of different solutions; the focus on future
treaties facilitates straightforward implementation
(i.e. changes can be put in practice directly by the
parties to individual negotiations); the use of “soft”
(i.e. non-binding) modifications minimizes risk; and
the incremental step-by-step approach avoids a
“big bang” effect (and makes the change less prone
to being perceived as reducing the agreement’s
protective value). Indeed, introducing selective
adjustments in new agreements may appear as
an appealing – if not the most realistic – option for
reducing the mounting pressure on IIAs.
At the same time, however, selective adjustments
in future IIAs cannot comprehensively address
the challenges posed by the existing stock of
treaties.65
It cannot fully deal with the interaction of
Figure III.15. Five ways of reform for ISDS, as identified in WIR13, illustrative actions
ISDS reform
Promoting alternative dispute resolution
(ADR)
Tailoring the existing system through individual IIAs
Limiting investor access to ISDS
Creating a standing international investment court
Introducing an appeals facility
• Fostering ADR methods
(e.g. conciliation or mediation)
• Fostering dispute prevention
policies (DPPs) (e.g. ombudsman)
• Emphasizing mutually acceptable
solutions and preventing
escalation of disputes
• Implementing at the domestic
level, with (or without) reference in
IIAs
• Setting time limits for bringing
claims
• Expanding the contracting
parties' role in interpreting the
treaty
• Providing for more transparency
in ISDS
• Including a mechanism for early
discharge of frivolous claims
• Reducing the subject-matter
scope for ISDS claims
• Denying potection to investors
that engage in “nationality
planning”
• Introducing the requirement to
exhaust local remedies before
resorting to ISDS
• Allowing for the substantive review of awards
rendered by tribunals (e.g. reviewing issues of law)
• Creating a standing body (e.g. constituted of
members appointed by States)
• Requiring subsequent tribunals to follow the
authoritative pronouncements of the appeals facility
• Replacing the current system (of ad hoc
tribunals) with a new institutional structure
• Creating a standing international court of
judges (appointed by States )
• Ensuring security of tenure (for a fixed term)
to insulate judges from outside interests
(e.g. interest in repeat appointments)
• Considering the possibility of an appeals
chamber
Source: UNCTAD.

treaties with each other and, unless the selective
adjustments address the MFN clause, it can allow
for “treaty shopping” and “cherry-picking”.66
It may
not satisfy all stakeholders. And, throughout all of
this, it may lay the groundwork for further change,
thus creating uncertainty instead of stability.
d. Pursuing systematic reform
Pursuing systematic reform means designing
international commitments that promote sustainable
development and that are in line with the investment
and development paradigm shift (WIR12). With
policy actions at all levels of governance, this is the
most comprehensive approach to reforming the
current IIA regime.
This path of action would entail the design of a
new IIA treaty model that effectively addresses
the three challenges mentioned above (increasing
the development dimension, rebalancing rights
and obligations, and managing the systemic
complexity of the IIA regime), and that focuses on
proactively promoting investment for sustainable
development. Systematic reform would also entail
comprehensively dealing with the reform of the ISDS
system, as outlined in last year’s World Investment
Report (figure III.15).
At first glance, this path of action appears daunting
and challenging on numerous fronts. It may be time-
and resource-intensive. Its result – more “balanced”
IIAs – may be perceived as reducing the protective
value of the agreements at issue and offering a
less attractive investment climate. Comprehensive
implementation of this path requires dealing with
existing IIAs, which may be seen as affecting
investors’ “acquired rights.” And amendments
or renegotiation may require the cooperation of a
potentially large number of treaty counterparts.
Yet this path of action is the only one that can bring
about comprehensive and coherent reform. It is
also the one best suited for fostering a common
response from the international community to
today’s shared challenge of promoting investment
for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
* * *
A way forward: UNCTAD’s perspective
Multilateral facilitation and a comprehensive gradual
approach to reform could effectively address the
systemic challenges of the IIA regime.
Whichever paths countries take, a multilateral
process is helpful to bring all parties together. It
also brings a number of other benefits to the reform
process:
• facilitating a more holistic and more coordi-
nated approach, in the interest of sustainable
development (see chapter IV) and the interests
of developing countries, particularly the LDCs;
• factoring in universally agreed principles related
to business and development, including those
adopted in the UN context and international
standards;
• building on the 11 principles of investment poli-
cymaking set out in UNCTAD’s IPFSD (table
III.8);
• ensuring inclusiveness by involving all stake-
holders;
• backstopping bilateral and regional actions;
and
• helping to address first mover challenges.
Such multilateral engagement could facilitate a
gradual approach with carefully sequenced actions.
This could first define the areas for reform (e.g. by
identifying key and emerging issues and lessons
learned, and agreeing on what to change and what
not to change), then design a roadmap for reform
(e.g. by identifying different options for reform,
assessing them and agreeing on a roadmap), and
finally implement reform. Naturally, such multilateral
engagement in consensus building is not the same
as negotiating legally binding rules on investment.
The actual implementation of reform-oriented policy
choices will be determined by and happening
at the national, bilateral, and regional levels. For
example, national input is essential for identifying
key and emerging issues and lessons learned;
consultations between countries (at the bilateral and
regional levels) are required for agreeing on areas
for change and areas for disagreement; national

Table III.8. Core Principles for investment policymaking for sustainable development
Area Core Principles
1
Investment for
• The overarching objective of investment policymaking is to promote investment for inclusive
growth and sustainable development.
2 Policy coherence
• Investment policies should be grounded in a country’s overall development strategy. All
policies that impact on investment should be coherent and synergetic at both the national and
international levels.
3
Public governance and
institutions
• Investment policies should be developed involving all stakeholders, and embedded in an
institutional framework based on the rule of law that adheres to high standards of public
governance and ensures predictable, efficient and transparent procedures for investors.
4 Dynamic policymaking
• Investment policies should be regularly reviewed for effectiveness and relevance and adapted
to changing development dynamics.
5
Balanced rights and
obligations
• Investment policies should be balanced in setting out rights and obligations of States and
investors in the interest of development for all.
6 Right to regulate
• Each country has the sovereign right to establish entry and operational conditions for foreign
investment, subject to international commitments, in the interest of the public good and to
minimize potential negative effects.
7 Openness to investment
• In line with each country’s development strategy, investment policy should establish open,
stable and predictable entry conditions for investment.
8
Investment protection
and treatment
• Investment policies should provide adequate protection to established investors. The
treatment of established investors should be non-discriminatory.
9
Investment promotion
and facilitation
• Policies for investment promotion and facilitation should be aligned with sustainable
development goals and designed to minimize the risk of harmful competition for investment.
10
Corporate governance
and responsibility
• Investment policies should promote and facilitate the adoption of and compliance with best
international practices of corporate social responsibility and good corporate governance.
11 International cooperation
• The international community should cooperate to address shared investment-for-development
policy challenges, particularly in least developed countries. Collective efforts should also be
made to avoid investment protectionism.
Source: IPFSD.
experiences are necessary for identifying different
options for reform; and sharing such experiences at
the multilateral level can help in assessing different
options.
The successful pursuit of these steps requires
effective support in four dimensions: consensus
building, analytical support, technical assistance,
and multi-stakeholder engagement.
• A multilateral focal point and platform could
provide the infrastructure and institutional
backstopping for consensus building activities
that create a comfort zone for engagement,
collective learning, sharing of experiences and
identifyication of best practices and the way
forward.
• A multilateral focal point could provide general
backstopping and analytical support, with evi-
dence-based policy analysis and system-wide
information to provide a global picture and
bridge the information gap.
• A multilateral focal point and platform could
also offer effective technical assistance, par-
ticularly for low-income and vulnerable devel-
oping countries (including LDCs, LLDCs and
SIDS) that face challenges when striving to en-
gage effectively in IIA reform, be it at the bilat-
eral or the regional level. Technical assistance
is equally important when it comes to the im-
plementation of policy choices at the national
level.
• A multilateral platform can also help ensure the
inclusiveness and universality of the process.
International investment policymakers (e.g. IIA
negotiators) would form the core of such an ef-
fort but be joined by a broad set of other in-
vestment-development stakeholders.

Through all of these means, a multilateral focal
point and platform can effectively support national,
bilateral and regional investment policymaking,
facilitating efforts towards redesigning international
commitments in line with today’s sustainable
development priorities. UNCTAD already offers
some of these support functions. UNCTAD’s
2014 World Investment Forum will offer a further
opportunity in this regard.
Notes
1
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Press Note No. 6, 22
August 2013.
2
Ministry of Science, ITC and Future Planning, Telecommuni-
cations Business Act Amendments, 14 August 2013.
3
Telecommunications Reform Decree, Official Gazette, 11
June 2013.
4
August 2013.
5
Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, Presidential
Decree No. 39/2014, 23 April 2014.
6
Official Gazette, 24 May 2013.
7
Official Gazette, No. 20 Extraordinary, Law 118, 16 April
2014.
8
Decree 313/2013, Official Gazette No. 026, 23 September
2013.
9
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, “Korea Introduces
Mini Foreign Investment Zones”, 26 April 2013.
10
Ministry of Commerce, “Insurance Coverage to Foreign Buy-
ers”, 2 January 2013.
11
Official Gazette, 18 December 2013.
12
Etihad Airways, “Etihad Airways, Jat Airways and Govern-
ment of Serbia unveil strategic partnership to secure future
of Serbian National Airline”, 1 August 2013.
13
Ministry of Finance, “The Parliament Gave a Green Light to
the Privatization of 15 Companies”, 30 June 2013.
14
Official Gazette, 20 December 2013.
15
Law No. 195-13, Official Gazette, 8 January 2014.
16
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, “National Auto-
motive Policy (NAP) 2014”, 20 January 2014.
17
Investment Mongolia Agency, “Mongolian Law on Invest-
ment”, 3 October 2013.
18
Economist Intelligence Unit, “Government streamlines busi-
ness registration procedures”, 9 October 2013.
19
Government of Dubai Media Office, “Mohammed bin Rashid
streamlines hotel investment and development in Dubai”, 20
January 2014.
20
State Council, “Circular of the State Council on the Frame-
work Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone”,
Guo Fa [2013] No. 38, 18 September 2013.
21
Embassy of South Sudan, “South Sudan launches modern
business and investment city”, 22 June 2013.
22
Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, Presidential De-
cree No.39/2014, 23 April 2014.
23
Cabinet Decision, 21 February 2013.
24
Parliament of Canada, Bill C-60, Royal Assent (41-1), 26
June 2013.
25
Official Gazette No.112, Decree 2014-479, 15 May 2014;
Ministry of the Economy, Industrial Renewal and the Digital
Economy, Press Release No. 68, 15 May 2014.
26
August 2013.
27
Federal Law 15-FZ, “On introducing changes to some legis-
lative acts of the Russian Federation on providing transport
security”, 3 February 2014.
28
Government of Canada, “Statement by the Honourable
James Moore on the Proposed Acquisition of the Allstream
Division of Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. by Accelero Cap-
ital Holdings”, 7 October 2013.
29
“Abbott is denied permission to buy Petrovax”, Kommer-
sant, 22 April 2013.
30
European Commission, “Mergers: Commission blocks
proposed acquisition of TNT Express by UPS”, 30 January
2013.
31
Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, “Morales
dispone nacionalización del paquete accionario de SABSA”,
press release, 18 February 2013.
32
National Assembly, Law 393 on Financial Services, 21 Au-
gust 2013.
33
Ley Orgánica de Comunicación, Official Gazette No. 22, 25
June 2013.
34
Decree 625, Official Gazette No. 6.117 Extraordiary, 4
December 2013.
35
First published in UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor
No.11.
36
National Assembly, Text 1037, 1270, 1283 and adopted
text 214, 1 October 2013.
37
Official Gazette No. 216, 11 October 2013.
38
National Assembly, Act on Supporting the Return of Over-
seas Korean Enterprises, 27 June 2013.
39
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Executive
Order: Establishment of the SelectUSA Initiative”, 15 June
2011.
40
Of 257 IPAs contacted, 75 completed the questionnaire,
representing an overall response rate of 29 per cent. Re-
spondents included 62 national and 13 subnational agen-
cies. Regarding the geographical breakdown, 24 per cent
of respondents were from developed countries, 24 per cent
from countries in Africa, 21 per cent from countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean, 19 per cent from countries in
Asia and 8 per cent from transition economies.
41
The survey also included investment facilitation as a policy in-
strument for attracting and benefiting from FDI. However, as
that instrument falls outside the scope of this section, related
results have been not been included here.
42
Deloitte, Tax News Flash No. 1/2012, 8 February 2012.
43
“Regulations for application of the Investment Promotion
Act”, Official Gazette No. 62, 10 August 2010.
44
“PLN727 million form the budget for the support of hi-tech
investment projects”, Invest in Poland, 5 July 2011.
45
Government Resolution No. 917 of 10 November 2011, The
Russian Gazette, 18 November 2011.
46
National Agency for Investment Development, “The incen-
tives regime applicable to the Wilayas of the South and the
Highlands”, 4 January 2012.
47
Ministry of Commerce, “Public Notice No. 4 [2009] of the
General Administration of Customs”, 9 January 2009.
48
“Okinawa, Tokyo designated as ‘strategic special zone”, Nik-
kei Asian Review, 28 March 2014.
49
For more details on policy recommendations, see the
National Investment Policy Guidelines of UNCTAD’s IPFSD.

50
“Other IIAs” refers to economic agreements other than BITs
that include investment-related provisions (e.g., investment
chapters in economic partnership agreements and FTAs,
regional economic integration agreements and framework
agreements on economic cooperation).
51
The total number of IIAs given in WIR13 has been revised
downward as a result of retroactive adjustments to UNC-
TAD’s database on BITs and other IIAs. Readers are invited
to visit UNCTAD’s expanded and upgraded database on
IIAs, which allows a number of new and more user-friendly
search options (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org).
52
Of 148 terminated BITs, 105 were replaced by a new treaty,
27 were unilaterally denounced, and 16 were terminated by
consent.
53
South Africa gave notice of the termination of its BIT with
Belgium and Luxembourg in 2012.
54
Investments made by investors in South Africa before the
BITs’ termination will remain protected for another 10 years
in the case of Spanish investments (and vice versa), 15 years
in the case of Dutch investments and 20 years in the cases
of German and Swiss investments. Investments made by
Dutch investors in Indonesia will remain protected for an ad-
ditional 15 years after the end of the BIT.
55
This figure includes agreements for which negotiations have
been finalized but which have not yet been signed.
56
See annex table III.3 of WIR12 and annex table III.1 of WIR13.
Note that in the case of “other IIAs”, these exceptions are
counted if they are included in the agreement’s investment
chapter or if they relate to the agreement as a whole.
58
This definition of “megaregional agreement” does not hinge
on the requirement that the negotiating parties jointly meet a
specific threshold in terms of share of global trade or global
FDI.
59
The number avoids double counting by taking into account
the overlap of negotiating countries, e.g. between TPP and
RCEP or between TTIP and TPP, as well as between coun-
tries negotiating one agreement (Tripartite).
60
This is an issue governed by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.
61
“Membership in the Energy Charter Treaty”, as counted here,
includes States in which ratification of the treaty is still pend-
ing.
62
A State is counted if the claimant, or one of the co-claimants,
is a national (physical person or company) of the respective
State. This means that when a case is brought by claimants
of different nationalities, it is counted for each nationality.
63
Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi Sons Co. v. Libya and
others, Final Arbitral Award, 22 March 2013.
64
A number of arbitral proceedings have been discontinued
for reasons other than settlement (e.g., due to the failure to
pay the required cost advances to the relevant arbitral insti-
tution). The status of some other proceedings is unknown.
Such cases have not been counted as “concluded”.
65
Unless the new treaty is a renegotiation of an old one (or
otherwise supersedes the earlier treaty), modifications are
applied only to newly concluded IIAs (leaving existing ones
untouched).
66
Commitments made to some treaty partners in old IIAs may
filter through to newer IIAs through an MFN clause (depend-
ing on its formulation), with possibly unintended conse-
quences.

CHAPTER Iv
INVESTING IN THE
sdgs: An Action Plan
for promoting private
sector contributions

A. INTRODUCTION
Table IV.1. Overview of prospective SDG focus areas
• Poverty eradication, building shared
prosperity and promoting equality
• Sustainable agriculture, food security
and nutrition
• Health and population dynamics
• Education and lifelong learning
• Gender equality and women’s
empowerment
• Water and sanitation
• Energy
• Economic growth, employment
infrastructure
• Industrialization and promotion of
equality among nations
• Sustainable cities and human
settlements
• Sustainable consumption and
production
• Climate change
• Conservation and sustainable use of
marine resources, oceans and seas
• Ecosystems and biodiversity
• Means of implementation; global
partnership for sustainable development
• Peaceful and inclusive societies, rule of law
and capable institutions
Source: UN Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, working document, 5-9 May 2014 session.
1. The United Nations’ Sustainable
Development Goals and implied
investment needs
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that
are being formulated by the international community
will have very significant implications for investment
needs.
Faced with common global economic, social
and environmental challenges, the international
community is in the process of defining a set of
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs,
to be adopted in 2015, are meant to galvanize action
by governments, the private sector, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and other stakeholders worldwide by
providing direction and setting concrete targets
in areas ranging from poverty reduction to food
security, health, education, employment, equality,
climate change, ecosystems and biodiversity,
among others (table IV.1).
The experience with the Millenium Development
Goals (MDGs), which were agreed in 2000 at the
UN Millennium Summit and will expire in 2015,
has shown how achievable measurable targets
can help provide direction in a world with many
different priorities. They have brought focus to
the work of the development community and
helped mobilize investment to reduce poverty and
achieve notable advances in human well-being in
the world’s poorest countries. However, the MDGs
were not designed to create a dynamic process
of investment in sustainable development and
resilience to economic, social or environmental
shocks. They were focused on a relatively
narrow set of fundamental goals – for example,
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, reducing
child mortality, improving maternal health – in
order to trigger action and spending on targeted
development programmes.
The SDGs are both a logical next step (from
fundamental goals to broad-based sustainable
development) and a more ambitious undertaking.
They represent a concerted effort to shift the global
economy – developed as well as developing – onto
a more sustainable trajectory of long-term growth
and development. The agenda is transformative,
as for instance witnessed by the number of
prospective SDGs that are not primarily oriented to
specific economic, social or environmental issues
but instead aim to put in place policies, institutions
and systems necessary to generate sustained
investment and growth.
Where the MDGs required significant financial
resources for spending on focused development
programmes, the SDGs will necessitate a major
escalation in the financing effort for investment in
broad-based economic transformation, in areas
such as basic infrastructure, clean water and
sanitation, renewable energy and agricultural
production.
The formulation of the SDGs – and their associated
investment needs – takes place against a
seemingly unfavourable macroeconomic backdrop.
Developed countries are only barely recovering from
the financial crisis, and in many countries public
sector finances are precarious. Emerging markets,
where investment needs in economic infrastructure
are greatest, but which also represent new potential

CHAPTER IV Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan for promoting private sector contributions 137
sources of finance and investment, are showing
signs of a slowdown in growth. And vulnerable
economies, such as the least developed countries
(LDCs), still rely to a significant extent on external
sources of finance, including official development
assistance (ODA) from donor countries with
pressured budgets.
2. Private sector contributions to the
SDGs
The role of the public sector is fundamental and
pivotal. At the same time the contribution of the
private sector is indispensable.
Given the broad scope of the prospective SDGs,
private sector contributions can take many forms.
Some will primarily place behavioural demands on
firms and investors. Private sector good governance
in relation to SDGs is key, this includes, e.g.:
• commitment of the business sector to
sustainable development;
• commitment specifically to the SDGs;
• transparency and accountability in honoring
sustainable development in economic, social
and environmental practices;
• responsibility to avoid harm, e.g. environmental
externalities, even if such harms are not strictly
speaking prohibited;
• partnership with government on maximizing
co-benefits of investment.
Beyond good governance aspects, a great deal of
financial resources will be necessary.
The investment needs associated with the SDGs
will require a step-change in the levels of both
public and private investment in all countries,
and especially in LDCs and other vulnerable
economies. Public finances, though central and
fundamental to investment in SDGs, cannot alone
meet SDG-implied demands for financing. The
combination of huge investment requirements and
pressured public budgets – added to the economic
transformation objective of the SDGs – means that
the role of the private sector is even more important
than before. The private sector cannot supplant the
big public sector push needed to move investment
in the SDGs in the right direction. But an associated
big push in private investment can build on the
complementarity and potential synergies in the two
sectors to accelerate the pace in realizing the SDGs
and meeting crucial targets. In addition to domestic
private investment, private investment flows from
overseas will be needed in many developing
countries, including foreign direct investment (FDI)
and other external sources of finance.
At first glance, private investors (and other
corporates, such as State-owned firms and
sovereign wealth funds; see box IV.1), domestic
and foreign, appear to have sufficient funds to
potentially cover some of those investment needs.
For instance, in terms of foreign sources, the cash
holdings of transnational corporations (TNCs) are in
the order of $5 trillion; sovereign wealth fund (SWF)
assets today exceed $6 trillion; and the holdings
of pension funds domiciled in developed countries
alone have reached $20 trillion.
At the same time, there are instances of goodwill
on the part of the private sector to invest in
sustainable development; in consequence, the
value of investments explicitly linked to sustainability
objectives is growing. Many “innovative financing”
initiatives have sprung up, many of which are
collaborative efforts between the public and private
sectors, as well as international organizations,
foundations and NGOs. Signatories of the Principles
for Responsible Investment (PRI) have assets under
management of almost $35 trillion, an indication
that sustainability principles do not necessarily
impede the raising of private finance.
Thus there appears to be a paradox that has to
be addressed. Enormous investment needs and
opportunities are associated with sustainable
development. Private investors worldwide appear to
have sufficient funds available. Yet these funds are
not finding their way to sustainable-development-
oriented projects, especially in developing countries:
e.g. only about 2 per cent of the assets of pension
funds and insurers are invested in infrastructure,
and FDI to LDCs stands at a meagre 2 per cent of
global flows.
The macroeconomic backdrop of this situation is
related to the processes which have led to large
sums of financial capital being underutilized while
parts of the real sector are starved of funds (TDR

Figure IV.1. Strategic framework for private investment in the SDGs
MOBILIZATION
Raising finance and
reorienting financial markets
towards investment in SDGs
IMPACT
minimizing risks
LEADERSHIP
policy coherence
CHANNELLING
Source: UNCTAD.
2009; TDR 2011; UNCTAD 2011d; Wolf, M. 2010);
this chapter deals with some of the microeconomic
aspects of shifting such capital to productive
investment in the SDGs.1
3. The need for a strategic framework
for private investment in the SDGs
A strategic framework for private sector investment
in SDGs can help structure efforts to mobilize funds,
to channel them to SDG sectors, and to maximize
impacts and mitigate drawbacks.
Since the formulation of the MDGs, many initiatives
aimed at increasing private financial flows to
sustainable development projects in developing
countries have sprung up. They range from impact
investing (investments with explicit social and
environmental objectives) to numerous “innovative
financing mechanisms” (which may entail
partnerships between public and private actors).
These private financing initiatives distinguish
themselves either by the source of finance (e.g.
institutional investors, private funds, corporations),
their issue area (general funds, environmental
investors, health-focused investors), the degree
of recognition and public support, or many other
criteria, ranging from geographic focus to size to
investment horizon. All face specific challenges, but
broadly there are three common challenges:
• Mobilizing funds for sustainable development
– raising resources in financial markets or
through financial intermediaries that can be
invested in sustainable development.
• Channelling funds to sustainable development
projects – ensuring that available funds
make their way to concrete sustainable-
development-oriented investment projects
on the ground in developing countries, and
especially LDCs.
• Maximizing impact and mitigating drawbacks
– creating an enabling environment and
putting in place appropriate safeguards that
need to accompany increased private sector
engagement in what are often sensitive
sectors.
The urgency of solving the problem, i.e. “resolving
the paradox”, to increase the private sector’s
contribution to SDG investment is the driving force
behind this chapter. UNCTAD’s objective is to
show how the contribution of the private sector to
investment in the SDGs can be increased through

Box IV.1. Investing in Sustainable Development: Scope and Definitions
The research for this chapter has benefited from a significant amount of existing work on financing for development,
by many international and other stakeholder organizations. The scope of these efforts varies significantly along the
dimensions of public and private sources of finance; domestic and international sources; global and developing-
country financing needs; overall financing needs and capital investment; direct and portfolio investment; and overall
development financing and specific SDG objectives. Within this context, the chapter focuses on five dimensions:
• Private investment by firms, including corporate investment. The term “corporate” is meant to include (semi-)
public entities such as State-owned enterprises and SWFs. Private individuals, who mostly invest in sustainable
development through funds or dedicated corporate-like vehicles are as such included. Other private sources of
finance by individuals, such as remittances, are not addressed here. As much of the data on investment distin-
guishes between public and private (rather than corporate) origin, and for ease of exposition, the term “private
sector investment” will be used throughout the chapter.
• Domestic and foreign investors. Unless specified differently, domestic firms are included in the scope of the
analysis and recommendations. The respective roles of domestic and foreign investors in SDG projects will vary
by country, sector and industry. A crucial aspect of sustainable development financing and investment will be
linkages that foreign investors establish with the local economy.
• Developing countries. The focus of the chapter is on developing countries, with specific attention to weak and
vulnerable economies (LDCs, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States). However,
some of the data used are solely available as global estimates (indicated, where pertinent).
• Capital investment. “Investment” normally refers to “capital expenditures” (or “capex”) in a project or facility.
Financing needs also include operating expenditures (or “opex”) – for example, on health care, education and
social services – in addition to capital expenditures (or “capex”). While not regarded as investment, these ex-
penditures are referred to where they are important from an SDG perspective. In keeping with this definition, the
chapter does not examine corporate philanthropic initiatives, e.g. funds for emergency relief.
• Broad-based sustainable development financing needs. The chapter examines investment in all three broadly
defined pillars of the SDGs: economic growth, social inclusion and environmental stewardship. In most cases,
these are hard to separate in any given SDG investment. Infrastructure investments will have elements of all
three objectives. The use of the terms “SDG sectors” or “SDG investments” in this chapter generally refers to
social pillar investments (e.g. schools, hospitals, social housing); environmental pillar investments (e.g. climate
change mitigation, conservation); and economic pillar investments (e.g. infrastructure, energy, industrial zones,
agriculture).
Source: UNCTAD.
a concerted push by the international community,
within a holistic strategic framework that addresses
all key challenges in mobilizing funds, channelling
them to sustainable development and maximizing
beneficial impact (figure IV.1).
The chapter poses the following questions:
1. How large is the disparity between available
financing and the investment required to
achieve the SDGs? What is the potential for
the private sector to fill this gap? What could
be realistic targets for private investment in
SDGs? (Section B.)
2. How can the basic policy dilemmas associated
with increased private sector investment in
SDG sectors be resolved through governments
providing leadership in this respect? (Section
C.)
3. What are the main constraints to mobilizing
private sector financial resources for
investment in sustainable development, and
how can they be surmounted? (Section D.)
4. What are the main constraints for channelling
investment into SDG sectors, and how can
they be overcome? (Section E.)
5. What are the main challenges for investment
in SDG sectors to have maximum impact, and
what are the key risks involved with private
investment in SDG sectors? How can these
challenges be resolved and risks mitigated?
(Section F.)
The concluding section (section G) of the chapter
brings key findings together into an Action Plan for
Private Investment in the SDGs that reflects the
structure of the strategic framework.

B. The investment gap and private sector potential
This section explores the magnitude of total
investment required to meet the SDGs in developing
countries; examines how these investment needs
compare to current investment in pertinent sectors
(the investment gap); and establishes the degree to
which the private sector can make a contribution,
with specific attention to potential contributions in
vulnerable economies.
Private sector contributions often depend on
facilitating investments by the public sector. For
instance, in some sectors – such as food security,
health or energy sustainability – publicly supported
RD investments are needed as a prelude to large-
scale SDG-related investments.
1. SDG investment gaps and the role of
the private sector
The SDGs will have very significant resource
implications worldwide. Total investment needs in
developing countries alone could be about $3.9
trillion per year. Current investment levels leave a
gap of some $2.5 trillion.
This section examines projected investment
needs in key SDG sectors over the period 2015-
2030, as well as the current levels of private
sector participation in these sectors. It draws on
a wide range of sources and studies conducted
by specialized agencies, institutions and research
entities (box IV.2).
At the global level, total investment needs are in the
order of $5 to $7 trillion per year. Total investment
needs in developing countries in key SDG sectors
are estimated at $3.3 to $4.5 trillion per year over
the proposed SDG delivery period, with a midpoint
at $3.9 trillion (table IV.2).2
Current investment in
these sectors is around $1.4 trillion, implying an
annual investment gap of between $1.9 and $3.1
trillion.
Economic infrastructure
Total investment in economic infrastructure in
developing countries – power, transport (roads,
rails and ports), telecommunications and water and
sanitation – is currently under $1 trillion per year for
all sectors, but will need to rise to between $1.6 and
$2.5 trillion annually over the period 2015-2030.
Increases in investment of this scale are formidable,
and much of the additional amount needs to come
from the private sector. One basis for gauging the
potential private sector contribution in meeting
the investment gap in economic infrastructure is
to compare the current level of this contribution in
developing countries, with what could potentially
be the case. For instance, the private sector share
in infrastructure industries in developed countries
(or more advanced developing countries) gives an
indication of what is possible as countries climb the
development ladder.
Apart from water and sanitation, the private share of
investment in infrastructure in developing countries
is already quite high (30-80 per cent depending on
the industry); and if developed country participation
levels are used as a benchmark, the private
sector contribution could be much higher. Among
developing countries, private sector participation
ranges widely, implying that there is considerable
leeway for governments to encourage more private
sector involvement, depending on conditions and
development strategies.
Recent trends in developing countries have, in fact,
been towards greater private sector participation
in power, telecommunications and transport
(Indonesia, Ministry of National Development
Planning 2011; Calderon and Serven 2010; OECD
2012; India, Planning Commission 2011). Even in
water and sanitation, private sector participation
can be as high as 20 per cent in some countries.
At the same time, although the rate reaches 80
per cent in a number of developed countries, it
can be as low as 20 per cent in others, indicating
varying public policy preferences due to the social
importance of water and sanitation in all countries.
Given the sensitivity of water provision to the poor
in developing countries, it is likely that the public
sector there will retain its primacy in this industry,
although a greater role for private sector in urban
areas is likely.

Box IV.2. Data, methods and sources used in this section
As the contours of the future SDGs are becoming clearer, many organizations and stakeholders in the process have
drawn up estimates of the additional financing requirements associated with the economic, social and environmental
pillars of sustainable development. Such estimates take different forms. They may be lump-sum financing needs
until 2030 or annual requirements. They may aggregate operational costs and capital expenditures. And they are
often global estimates, as some of the SDGs are aimed at global commons (e.g. climate change mitigation).
This section uses data on SDG investment requirements as estimated and published by specialized agencies,
institutions and research entities in their respective areas of competence, using a meta-analytic approach. As
much as possible, the section aims to express all data in common terms: (i) as annual or annualized investment
requirements and gaps; (ii) focusing on investment (capital expenditures only); and (iii) primarily narrowing the scope
to investment in developing countries only. Any estimates by UNCTAD are as much as possible consistent with the
work of other agencies and institutions. Figures are quoted on a constant price basis to allow comparisons between
current investment, future investment needs and gaps. However agencies’ estimates use different base years for the
GDP deflator, and the GDP rate assumed also varies (usually between 4–5 per cent constant GDP growth).
This section has extensively reviewed many studies and analyses to establish consensus estimates on future
investment requirements.1
The principal sources drawn upon are:
• Infrastructure: McKinsey provided valuable support, including access to the MGI ISS database. McKinsey
(2013), Bhattacharya et al. in collaboration with G-24 (2012), MDB Committee on Development Effectiveness
(2011), Fay et al (2011), Airoldi et al. (2013), OECD (2006, 2007, 2012), WEF/PwC (2012).
• Climate Change: CPI and UNCTAD jointly determined the investment needs ranges provided in table IV.2, in-
cluding unpublished CPI analysis. Buchner et al. (2013), World Bank (2010), McKinsey (2009), IEA (2009, 2012),
UNFCCC (2007), WEF (2013).
• Food security and agriculture: FAO analysis, updated jointly by FAO-UNCTAD; context and methodology in
Schmidhuber and Bruinsma (2011).
• Ecosystems/Biodiversity: HLP (2012) and Kettunen et al. (2013).
Further information and subsidiary sources used are provided in table IV.2. These sources were used to “sense
check” the numbers in table IV.2 and estimate the private share of investment in each sector.
There are no available studies on social sectors (health and education) conducted on a basis comparable to the above
sectors. UNCTAD estimated investment needs over 2015-2030 for social sectors using a methodology common to
studies in other sectors, i.e. the sum of: the annualized investment required to shift low-income developing countries
to the next level of middle income developing countries, the investment required to shift this latter group to the
next level, and so on. The raw data required for the estimations were primarily derived from the World Bank, World
Development Indicators Database.
The data presented in this chapter, while drawing on and consistent with other organizations, and based on
recognized methodological principles, should nonetheless be treated only as a guide to likely investment. In addition
to the many data and methodological difficulties that confront all agencies, projections many years into the future
can never fully anticipate the dynamic nature of climate change, population growth and interest rates – all of which
will have unknown impacts on investment and development needs.2
Bearing in mind the above limitations, the
estimates reported in this section provide orders of magnitude of investment requirements, gaps and private sector
participation.
Source: UNCTAD.
1
In a number of cases, this section draws on estimates for future investment requirements and gaps not made
specifically with SDGs in mind. Nevertheless, the aims underlying these estimates are normally for sustainable
development purposes consistent with the SDGs (e.g. estimates pertaining to climate change mitigation or
infrastructure). This approach has also been taken by the UN System Task Team (UNTT 2013) and other United
Nations bodies aiming to estimate the financing and investment implications of the SDGs.
2
For instance, a spate of megaprojects in power and road transport in developing countries during the last few
years has caused the proportion of infrastructure to GDP to rise for developing countries as a whole. A number of
studies on projected investment requirements in infrastructure – which assume a baseline ratio of infrastructure,
normally 3-4 per cent – do not fully factor this development in.

Table IV.2. Current investment, investment needs and gaps and private sector participation in key SDG
sectors in developing countriesa
2015-2030
Sector Description
Estimated
current
investment
Total
investment
required
Investment
Gap
Average private sector
participation in current
investmentb
(latest
available year)
$ billion
Annualized $ billion
(constant price)
Developing
countries
Developed
countries
A B C = B - A Per cent
Powerc
Investment in generation,
transmission and distribution of
electricity
~260 630–950 370–690 40–50 80–100
Transportc Investment in roads, airports, ports
and rail
~300 350–770 50–470 30–40 60–80
Telecommunicationsc Investment in infrastructure (fixed
lines, mobile and internet)
~160 230–400 70–240 40–80 60–100
Water and sanitationc Provision of water and sanitation to
industry and households
~150 ~410 ~260 0–20 20–80
Food security and
agriculture
Investment in agriculture, research,
rural development, safety nets, etc.
~220 ~480 ~260 ~75 ~90
Climate change
mitigation
Investment in relevant infrastructure,
renewable energy generation,
research and deployment of climate-
friendly technologies, etc.
170 550–850 380–680 ~40 ~90
Climate change
adaptation
Investment to cope with impact
of climate change in agriculture,
infrastructure, water management,
coastal zones, etc.
~20 80–120 60–100 0–20 0–20
Eco-systems/
biodiversity
Investment in conservation and
safeguarding ecosystems, marine
resource management, sustainable
forestry, etc.
70–210d
Health
Infrastructural investment, e.g. new
hospitals
~70 ~210 ~140 ~20 ~40
Education
Infrastructural investment, e.g. new
schools
~80 ~330 ~250 ~15 0–20
Source: UNCTAD.
a
Investment refers to capital expenditure. Operating expenditure, though sometimes referred to as ‘investment’ is not included.
The main sources used, in addition to those in box IV.2, include, by sector:
Infrastructure: ABDI (2009); Australia, Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (2012); Banerjee (2006);
Bhattacharyay (2012); Australia, Reserve Bank (2013); Doshi et al. (2007); Calderon and Serven (2010); Cato Institute (2013);
US Congress (2008); Copeland and Tiemann (2010); Edwards (2013); EPSU (2012); Estache (2010); ETNO (2013); Foster and
Briceno-Garmendia (2010); Goldman Sachs (2013); G-30 (2013); Gunatilake and Carangal-San Jose (2008); Hall and Lobina
(2010); UK H.M. Treasury (2011, 2013); Inderst (2013); Indonesia, Ministry of National Development Planning (2011); Izaguirre
and Kulkarni (2011); Lloyd-Owen (2009); McKinsey (2011b); Perrotti and Sánchez (2011); Pezon (2009); Pisu (2010); India,
Planning Commission (2011, 2012); Rhodes (2013); Rodriguez et al. (2012); Wagenvoort et al. (2010); World Bank (2013a)
and Yepes (2008);
Climate Change: AfDB et al. (2012); Buchner et al. (2011, 2012) and Helm et al.(2010).
Social sectors: Baker (2010); High Level Task Force on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems (2009); Institute
for Health Metrics and Evaluation (2010, 2012); Leading Group on Innovative Financing to Fund Development (2010); McCoy
et al. (2009); The Lancet (2011, 2013); WHO (2012) and UNESCO (2012, 2013).
b
The private sector share for each sector shows large variability between countries.
c
Excluding investment required for climate change, which is included in the totals for climate change mitigation and adaptation.
d
Investment requirements in ecosystems/biodiversity are not included in the totals used in the analysis in this section, as they
overlap with other sectors.

Food security
Turning to investment in food security and
agriculture, current relevant investment is around
$220 billion per year. Investment needs in this area
refer to the FAO’s “zero hunger target” and primarily
covers investment in relevant agriculture areas
such as: agriculture-specific infrastructure, natural
resource development, research, and food safety
nets, which are all a part of the relevant SDG goals.
On this basis, total investment needs are around
$480 billion per year, implying an annual gap of
some $260 billion over and above the current level.
The corporate sector contribution in the agricultural
sector as a whole is already high at 75 per cent in
developing countries, and is likely to be higher in
the future (as in developed countries).
Social infrastructure
Investment in social infrastructure, such as
education and health, is a prerequisite for
effective sustainable development, and therefore
an important component of the SDGs. Currently
investment in education is about $80 billion per
year in developing countries. In order to move
towards sustainable development in this sector
would require $330 billion to be invested per year,
implying an annual gap of about $250 billion over
and above the current level.
Investment in health is currently about $70 billion
in developing countries. The SDGs would require
investment of $210 billion per year, implying an
investment gap of some $140 billion per year over
and above the current level. The private sector
investment contribution in healthcare in developing
countries as a whole is already very high, and this
is likely to continue, though perhaps less so in
vulnerable economies. In contrast, the corporate
contribution in both developed and developing
countries in education is small to negligible and likely
to remain that way. Generally, unlike in economic
infrastructure, private sector contributions to
investment in social infrastructure are not likely to
see a marked increase.
For investment in social infrastructure it is also
especially important to take into account additional
operational expenditures as well as capital
expenditures (i.e. investment per se). The relative
weight of capital expenditures and operating
expenditures varies considerably between sectors,
depending on technology, capital intensity, the
importance of the service component and many
other factors. In meeting SDG objectives, operating
expenditures cannot be ignored, especially in
new facilities. In the case of health, for example,
operating expenditures are high as a share of
annual spending in the sector. After all, investing
in new hospitals in a developing country is
insufficient to deliver health services – that is to say
doctors, nurses, administrators, etc. are essential.
Consideration of operating cost is important in all
sectors; not allowing for this aspect could see the
gains of investment in the SDGs reversed.
Environmental sustainability
Investment requirements for environmental
sustainability objectives are by nature hard to
separate from investments in economic and social
objectives. To avoid double counting, the figures for
the investment gap for economic infrastructure in
table IV.2 exclude estimates of additional investment
required for climate change adaptation and
mitigation. The figures for social infrastructure and
agriculture are similarly adjusted (although some
overlap remains). From a purely environmental point
of view, including stewardship of global commons,
the investment gap is largely captured through
estimates for climate change, especially mitigation,
and under ecosystems/biodiversity (including
forests, oceans, etc.).
Current investments for climate change mitigation,
i.e. to limit the rise in average global warming to
2o
Celsius, are $170 billion in developing countries,
but require a large increase over 2015-2030 (table
IV.2). Only a minority share is presently contributed
by the private sector – estimates range up to 40 per
cent in developing countries. A bigger contribution
is possible, inasmuch as the equivalent contribution
in developed countries is roughly 90 per cent,
though much of this is the result of legislation as
well as incentives and specific initiatives.
The estimated additional investment required
for climate change mitigation are not just for
infrastructure, but for all sectors – although the
specific areas for action depend very much on the

Figure IV.2. Example investment needs in vulnerable and excluded groups
(Billions of dollars per year)
Source: : UNCTAD, WHO (2012), IEA (2009, 2011), World Bank and IEA (2013), Bazilian et al. (2010) and UNESCO (2013).
Note: These needs are calculated on a different basis from table IV.2 and the numbers are not directly comparable.
types of policies and legislation that are enacted by
governments (WIR10). In future these policies will
be informed by the SDGs, including those related
to areas such as growth, industrialization and
sustainable cities/settlements. The size and pattern
of future investment in climate change in developing
countries (and developed ones) depends very much
on which policies are adopted (e.g. feed-in tariffs
for renewable energy, emissions from cars, the
design of buildings, etc.), which is why the range of
estimates is wide.
Investment in climate change adaptation in
developing countries is currently very small, in
the order of $20 billion per year, but also need
to increase substantially, even if mitigation is
successful (table IV.2). If it is not, with average
temperatures rising further than anticipated, then
adaptation needs will accelerate exponentially,
especially with respect to infrastructure in coastal
regions, water resource management and the
viability of ecosystems.
The current private sector share of investment in
climate change adaptation in developing countries
appears to be no different, at up to 20 per cent,
than in developed ones. In both cases considerable
inventiveness is required to boost corporate
contribution into territory which has traditionally
been seen as the purview of the State, and in
which – from a private sector perspective – the risks
outweigh the returns.
Other investment needs: towards
inclusiveness and universality
There are vulnerable communities in all economies.
This is perhaps more so in structurally weak
economies such as LDCs, but numerically greater
pockets of poverty exist in better off developing
countries (in terms of average incomes) such as in
South Asia.
Thus, while the estimated investment needs
discussed in this section are intended to meet the
overall requirements for sustainable investment in
all developing countries, they may not fully address
the specific circumstance of many of the poorest
communities or groups, especially those who are
isolated (e.g. in rural areas or in forests) or excluded
(e.g. people living in slums).
For this reason, a number of prospective SDGs
(or specific elements of all SDGs) – such as those
focusing on energy, water and sanitation, gender
and equality – include elements addressing the
prerequisites of the otherwise marginalized.
Selected examples of potential types of targets
Universal access to clean drinking
water and sanitation
Universal access to energy
Universal access to schooling
Estimated current investment and private sector
participation ($ Billion/year)
10-15
~ 10
Estimated annual
investment needs
~ 80
~ 50
~ 30
Private sector
participation
100

Potential private sector contribution to bridging the gap
At current level of participation
At a higher rate of participation
3.9
1.4
2.5
Total annual
investment needs
Current annual
investment
Annual
investment
gap
1.8
0.9
Figure IV.3. Estimated annual investment needs and potential private sector contribution,
2015–2030
(Trillions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD based on table IV.2.
Note: Totals are the mid-points of range estimates.
are presented in figure IV.2, with estimates of the
associated financing requirements.
In most such cases the private sector contribution
in developing countries is low, although it should
be possible to increase it (for instance, in electricity
access). However, boosting this share will be easier
in some places (e.g. in urban areas), but difficult
in others (e.g. remote locations, among very low-
income groups, and where the number of individuals
or communities are relatively small or highly
dispersed). The private sector contribution to goals
aimed at vulnerable individuals and communities
therefore needs to be considered carefully.
2. Exploring private sector potential
At today’s level of private sector participation in
SDG investments in developing countries, a funding
shortfall of some $1.6 trillion would be left for the
public sector (and ODA) to cover.
The previous section has established the order of
magnitude of the investment gap that has to be
bridged in order to meet the SDGs. Total annual
SDG-related investment needs in developing
countries until 2030 are in the range of $3.3 to $4.5
trillion, based on estimates for the most important
SDG sectors from an investment point of view
(figure IV.3). This entails a mid-point estimate of
$3.9 trillion per year. Subtracting current annual
investment of $1.4 trillion leaves a mid-point
estimated investment gap of $2.5 trillion, over and
above current levels. At the current private sector
share of investment in SDG areas, the private
sector would cover only $900 billion of this gap,
leaving $1.6 trillion to be covered by the public
sector (including ODA). For developing countries
as a group, including fast-growing emerging
markets, this scenario corresponds approximately
to a “business as usual” scenario; i.e. at current
average growth rates of private investment, the
current private sector share of total investment
needs could be covered. However, increasing the
participation of the private sector in SDG financing
in developing countries could potentially cover a
larger part of the gap, if the relative share of private
sector investment increased to levels observed in
developed countries. It is clear that in order to avoid
what could be unrealistic demands on the public
sector in many developing countries, the SDGs
must be accompanied by strategic initiatives to
increase private sector participation.
The potential for increasing private sector
participation is greater in some sectors than in
others (figure IV.4). Infrastructure sectors, such as
power and renewable energy (under climate change
mitigation), transport and water and sanitation,
are natural candidates for greater private sector
participation, under the right conditions and with
appropriate safeguards. Other SDG sectors are
less likely to generate significantly higher amounts
of private sector interest, either because it is difficult
to design risk-return models attractive to private
investors (e.g. climate change adaptation), or

Figure IV.4. Potential private-sector contribution to investment gaps at current and high participation levels
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Power
Climate change mitigation
Food Security
Telecommunications
Transport
Ecosystems/biodiversity
Health
Water and sanitation
Climate change
adaptation
Education
Current participation, mid-point
High participation, mid-point
Current participation, range
High participation, range
Source: UNCTAD.
Note: Private-sector contribution to investment gaps calculated using mid-points of range estimates in table IV.2. The higher
participation level is the average private-sector investment shares observed in developed countries. Some sectors do
not have a range of estimates, hence the mid-point is the single estimated gap.
because they are more in the realm of public sector
responsibilities and consequently highly sensitive
to private sector involvement (e.g. education and
healthcare).
3. Realistic targets for private sector
SDG investment in LDCs
The SDGs will necessitate a significant increase in
public sector investment and ODA in LDCs. In order
to reduce pressure on public funding requirements,
a doubling of the growth rate of private investment
is desirable.
Investment and private sector engagement across
SDG sectors are highly variable across developing
countries. The extent to which policy action to
increase private sector investment is required
therefore differs by country and country grouping.
Emerging markets face entirely different conditions
to vulnerable economies such as LDCs, LLDCs and
small island developing States (SIDS), which are
necessarily a focus of the post-2015 SDG agenda.
In LDCs, for instance, ODA remains the largest
external capital flow, at $43 billion in 2012 (OECD
2013a), compared to FDI inflows of $28 billion
and remittances of $31 billion in 2013. Moreover,
a significant proportion of ODA is spent on
government budget support and goes directly to
SDG sectors like education and health. Given its
importance to welfare systems and public services,
ODA will continue to have an important role to play
in the future ecology of development finance in
LDCs and other vulnerable economies; and often it
will be indispensable.
Nevertheless, precisely because the SDGs entail
a large-scale increase in financing requirements in
LDCs and other vulnerable economies (relative to
their economic size and financing capacity), policy
intervention to boost private investment will also
be a priority. It is therefore useful to examine the
degree to which private sector investment should
be targeted by such policy actions.
Extrapolating from the earlier analysis of the total
SDG investment need for developing countries as
a whole (at about $3.9 trillion per year), the LDC
share of investment in SDG sectors, based on the
current size of their economies and on the specific
needs related to vulnerable communities, amounts

Figure IV.5. Private sector SDG investment scenarios in LDCs
Source: UNCTAD estimates, based on table IV.2 and figure IV.3.
8%
Implied growth rate Implied increase in
of private sector
investment
public investment
(including ODA)
11%
15% x3
x6
x8
16
60
90
180
240
24
180
150
70
Total annual SDG investment
needs in LDCs in 2030
Current investment in
SDGs in LDCs
Scenario 3: Private-sector share
of investment in SDG sectors rises
to that observed in developed
countries
$ billions
Scenarios for private-sector investment in SDG sectors in LDCs
Scenario 2: Current private-sector
share of investment in SDG sectors
in LDCs maintained
Scenario 1: “Do nothing” current
growth rate of private-sector
investment maintained
Required public investment and ODA under each scenario
60
to nearly $120 billion a year and a total for the 2015-
2030 period of $1.8 trillion. Current investments
in LDCs in SDG sectors are around $40 billion.3
Figure IV.5 provides an example of a target-setting
scenario for private investment in LDCs.
Total investment needs of $1.8 trillion would imply a
target in 2030, the final year of the period, of $240
billion.4
The current growth rate of private sector
investment in LDCs, at around 8 per cent, would
quadruple investment by 2030, but still fall short of
the investment required (Scenario 1). This “doing
nothing” scenario thus leaves a shortfall that would
have to be filled by public sector funds, including
ODA, requiring an eight-fold increase to 2030.
This scenario, with the limited funding capabilities
of LDC governments and the fact that much of
ODA in LDCs is already used to support current
(not investment) spending by LDC governments,
is therefore not a viable option. Without higher
levels of private sector investment, the financing
requirements associated with the prospective
SDGs in LDCs will be unrealistic for the public
sector to bear.
One target for the promotion of private sector
investment in SDGs could be to cover that part of
the total investment needs that corresponds to its
current share of investment in LDCs’ SDG sectors
(40 per cent), requiring a private sector investment
growth rate of 11 per cent per year but still implying
a six-fold increase in public sector investment and
ODA by 2030 (Scenario 2). A “stretch” target for
private investment (but one that would reduce
public funding requirements to more realistic levels)
could be to raise the share of the private sector
in SDG investments to the 75 per cent observed
in developed countries. This would obviously
require the right policy setting both to attract such
investment and to put in place appropriate public
policy safeguards, and would imply the provision of
relevant technical assistance. Such a stretch target
would ease the pressure on public sector funds and
ODA, but still imply almost trebling the current level.
Public sector funds, and especially ODA, will
therefore remain important for SDG investments in
LDCs, including for leveraging further private sector
participation. At the same time, the private sector
contribution must also rise in order to achieve the
SDGs.

Box IV.3. External sources of finance and the role of FDI
External sources of finance to developing and transition economies include FDI, portfolio investment, other investment
flows (mostly bank loans), ODA and remittances. Together these flows amount to around $2 trillion annually (box
figure IV.3.1). After a sharp drop during the global financial crisis they returned to high levels in 2010, although they
have seen a slight decline since then, driven primarily by fluctuating flows in bank loans and portfolio investment.
The composition of external sources of finance differs by countries’ level of development (box figure IV.3.2). FDI is an
important source for all groups of developing countries, including LDCs. ODA accounts for a relatively large share of
external finance in LDCs, whereas these countries receive a low amount of portfolio investment, reflecting the lack
of developed financial markets.
The components of external finance show
different degrees of volatility. FDI has been the
largest and most stable component over the
past decade, and the most resilient to financial
and economic crises. It now accounts for just
under half of all net capital flows to developing
and transition economies. The relative stability
and steady growth of FDI arises primarily because
it is associated with the build-up of productive
capacity in host countries. Direct investors tend
to take a long-term interest in assets located
in host countries, leading to longer gestation
periods for investment decisions, and making
existing investments more difficult to unwind.
FDI thus tends to be less sensitive to short-term
macroeconomic, exchange rate or interest rate
fluctuations.
/...
Box figure IV.3.1. External development finance to developing
and transition economies, 2007–2013
- 500
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
FDI Portfolio investment Other investment
ODA Remittances
Source: UNCTAD, based on data from IMF (for portfolio and other investment), from
the UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System (for FDI inflows), from OECD
(for ODA) and the World Bank (for remittances).
Note: Data are shown in the standard balance-of-payments presentation, thus
on a net basis.
Box figure IV.3.2. Composition of external sources
of development finance, 2012
Source: UNCTAD, based on data from IMF (for portfolio and other
investment), from the UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information
System (for FDI inflows), from OECD (for ODA) and the World
Bank (for remittances).
Remittances
Other investment
Portfolio investment
ODA
FDI
40%
21%
6% 38%
23% 1%
11%
13%
20%
26%
Developing and
transition
economies
Least
developed
countries

Reaching the “stretch” target over a period of 15
years requires a doubling in the current growth
rate of private investment. Such an increase
has implications for the components of private
investment. For instance, foreign investment,
especially FDI, is relatively important in private
sector capital formation in LDCs (box IV.3). While
FDI amounts to less than 10 per cent of the value
of gross fixed capital formation in developing
countries, in LDCs it reaches around 15 per cent,
with higher peaks in particular groups of structurally
weak economies (for example, more than 23 per
cent in landlocked developing countries). As private
capital formation is around half of the total in LDCs
on average, foreign investment could therefore
constitute close to 30 per cent of private investment,
potentially with higher growth potential. Pursuing a
“stretch” target for private investment in LDCs may
thus require a particular focus on the attraction of
external sources of private finance.
Box IV.3. External sources of finance and the role of FDI (concluded)
The nature of FDI as a relatively stable and long-term investment in productive assets thus brings it close to the type
of investment required in SDG sectors. A number of caveats are warranted, including:
• The relative importance of FDI is lower in the poorest countries; on its own, FDI (like all types of private sector
investment) will first flow to lower risk/higher return opportunities, both in terms of location and in terms of sec-
tor. This is an important consideration in balancing public and private investment policy priorities.
• FDI flows do not always translate into equivalent capital expenditures, especially where they are driven by
retained earnings or by transactions (such as mergers and acquisitions (MAs), although some MA transac-
tions, such as brownfield investment in agriculture do results in significant capital expenditure).
• FDI can contain short-term, relatively volatile components, such as “hot money” or investments in real estate.
Nevertheless, a comparison with other external sources of finance shows that FDI will have a key role to play in
investing in the SDGs. For example, ODA is partly used for direct budgetary support in the poorest countries and
on current spending in SDG sectors, rather than for capital expenditures. Remittances are predominantly spent
on household consumption (although a small but growing share is used for investment entrepreneurial ventures).
Portfolio investment is typically in more liquid financial assets rather than in fixed capital and tends to be more volatile.
And with portfolio investment, bank loans have been the most volatile external source of finance for developing
economies over the last decade.
Source: UNCTAD.

1. Leadership challenges in raising
private sector investment in the SDGs
Increasing the involvement of private investors
in SDG sectors, many of which are sensitive or
involve public services, leads to a number of policy
dilemmas. Public and private sector investment are
no substitutes, but they can be complementary.
Measures to increase private sector involvement
in investment in sustainable development lead to
a number of policy dilemmas which require careful
consideration.
• Increasing private investment is necessary.
But the role of public investment remains
fundamental. Increases in private sector
investment to help achieve the prospective
SDGs are necessary, but public sector
investment remains vital and central. The
two sectors are not substitutes, they are
complementary. Moreover, the role of the
public sector goes beyond investment per se,
and includes all the conditions necessary to
meet the SDG challenge.
• Attracting private investment into SDG sectors
entails a conducive investment climate.
At the same time, there are risks involved.
Private sector engagement in a number of
SDG sectors where a strong public sector
responsibility exists has traditionally been a
sensitive issue. Private sector service provision
in healthcare and education, for instance,
can have negative effects on standards
unless strong governance and oversight
is in place, which in turn requires capable
institutions and technical competencies.
Private sector involvement in essential
infrastructure industries, such as power
or telecommunications can be sensitive in
countries where this implies the transfer of
public sector assets to the private sector,
requiring appropriate safeguards against
anti-competitive behaviour and for consumer
protection. Private sector operations in
infrastructure such as water and sanitation
are particularly sensitive because of the basic-
needs nature of these sectors.
C. Investing in THE SDGs: a call for leadership
• Private sector investors require attractive risk-
return rates. At the same time, basic-needs
services must be accessible and affordable
to all. The fundamental hurdle for increased
private sector contributions to investment in
SDG sectors is the inadequate risk-return
profile of many such investments. Perceived
risks can be high at all levels, including country
and political risks, risks related to the market
and operating environment, down to project
and financial risks. Projects in the poorest
countries, in particular, can be easily dismissed
by the private sector as “poor investments”.
Many mechanisms exist to share risks or
otherwise improve the risk-return profile for
private sector investors. Increasing investment
returns, however, cannot lead to the services
provided by private investors ultimately
becoming inaccessible or unaffordable for the
poorest in society. Allowing energy or water
suppliers to cover only economically attractive
urban areas while ignoring rural needs, or to
raise prices of essential services, are not a
sustainable outcome.
• The scope of the SDGs is global. But
LDCs need a special effort to attract more
private investment. From the perspective
of policymakers at the international level,
the problems that the SDGs aim to address
are global issues, although specific targets
may focus on particularly acute problems
in poor countries. While overall financing for
development needs may be defined globally,
with respect to private sector financing
contribution, special efforts are required for
LDCs and other vulnerable economies. Without
targeted policy intervention these countries will
not be able to attract resources from investors
which often regard operating conditions and
risks in those economies as prohibitive.
2. Meeting the leadership challenge: key
elements
The process of increasing private investment in
SDGs requires leadership at the global level, as well
as from national policymakers, to provide guiding

principles, set targets, galvanize action, foster
dialogue, and guarantee inclusiveness.
Given the massive financing needs concomitant
to the achievement of the SDGs, what is needed
is a concerted push, which in turn requires strong
global leadership, (i) providing clear direction and
basic principles of action, (ii) setting objectives and
targets, (iii) building strong and lasting consensus
among many stakeholders worldwide and (iv)
ensuring that the process is inclusive, keeping on
board countries that require support along the way
(figure IV.6).
Guiding principles for private sector
investment in the SDGs
Themanystakeholdersinvolvedinstimulatingprivate
investment in SDGs will have varying perspectives
on how to resolve the policy dilemmas inherent in
seeking greater private sector participation in SDG
sectors. A common set of principles for investment
in SDGs can help establish a collective sense of
direction and purpose.
The following broad principles could provide a
framework.
• Balancing liberalization and regulation. Greater
private sector involvement in SDG sectors
is a must where public sector resources are
insufficient (although selective, gradual or
sequenced approaches are possible); at the
same time, such increased involvement must
be accompanied by appropriate regulations
and government oversight.
• Balancing the need for attractive risk-
return rates with the need for accessible
and affordable services for all. This requires
governments to proactively address market
failures in both respects. It means placing clear
obligations on investors and extracting firm
commitments, while providing incentives to
improve the risk-return profile of investment.
And it implies making incentives or subsidies
conditional on social inclusiveness.
• Balancing a push for private investment funds
with the push for public investment. Synergies
between public and private funds should be
found both at the level of financial resources
– e.g. raising private sector funds with public
sector funds as base capital – and at the policy
level, where governments can seek to engage
Figure IV.6. Providing leadership to the process of raising private-sector investment in the SDGs:
key challenges and policy options
Agree a set of guiding principles for SDG investment policymaking
Increasing private-sector involvement in SDG sectors can lead to policy dilemmas (e.g. public vs
private responsibilities, liberalization vs regulation, investment returns vs accessibility and
affordability of services); an agreed set of broad policy principles can help provide direction
 Need for a clear sense of
direction and common
 Need for global consensus
and an inclusive process,
keeping on board countries
that need support
 Need for clear objectives to
galvanize global action
 Need to manage investment
policy interactions
Key challenges Policy options
Set SDG investment targets
Focus targets on areas where private investment is most needed and where increasing such
investment is most dependent on action by policymakers and other stakeholders: LDCs
Multi-stakeholder platform and multi-agency technical assistance facility
International discussion on private-sector investment in sustainable development is dispersed
among many organizations, institutions and forums, each addressing specific areas of interest.
There is a need for a common platform to discuss goals, approaches and mechanisms for
mobilizing of finance and channelling investment into sustainable development
Financing solutions and private-sector partnership arrangements are complex, requiring
significant technical capabilities and strong institutions. Technical assistance will be needed to
avoid leaving behind the most vulnerable countries, where investment in SDGs is most important.
•
•
•
•
Ensure policy coherence and synergies
Manage national and international, investment and related policies, micro- and macro-
economic policies
•
Source: UNCTAD.

private investors to support programmes of
economic or public service reform. Private
and public sector investment should thus be
complementary and mutually supporting.
• Balancing the global scope of the SDGs with
the need to make a special effort in LDCs.
Special targets and special measures should
be adopted for private investment in LDCs.
ODA and public funds should be used where
possible to leverage further private sector
financing. And targeted technical assistance
and capacity-building should be aimed at
LDCs to help attract and manage investment.
Beyond such broad principles, in its Investment
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development
(IPFSD), an open-source tool for investment
policymakers, UNCTAD has included a set of
principles specifically focused on investment
policies that could inform wider debate on
guiding principles for investment in the SDGs. The
IPFSD Principles are the design criteria for sound
investment policies, at the national and international
levels, that can support SDG investment promotion
and facilitation objectives while safeguarding
public interests. UNCTAD has already provided the
infrastructure for further discussion of the Principles
through its Investment Policy Hub, which allows
stakeholders to discuss and provide feedback on
an ongoing basis.
SDG investment targets
The rationale behind the SDGs, and the experience
with the MDGs, is that targets help provide
direction and purpose. Ambitious investment
targets are implied by the prospective SDGs. The
international community would do well to make
targets explicit and spell out the consequences
for investment policies and investment promotion
at national and international levels. Achievable
but ambitious targets, including for increasing
public and private sector investment in LDCs, are
thus a must. Meeting targets to increase private
sector investment in the SDGs will require action
at many levels by policymakers in developed and
developing countries; internationally in international
policymaking bodies and by the development
community; and by the private sector itself. Such
broad engagement needs coordination and strong
consensus on a common direction.
Policy coherence and synergies
Policymaking for investment in SDG sectors,
and setting investment targets, needs to take
into account the broader context that affects
the sustainable development outcome of such
investment. Ensuring coherence and creating
synergies with a range of other policy areas is a
key element of the leadership challenge, at both
national and global levels. Policy interaction and
coherence are important principally at three levels:
• National and international investment policies.
Success in attracting and benefiting from
foreign investment for SDG purposes depends
on the interaction between national investment
policies and international investment
rulemaking. National rules on investor rights
and obligations need to be consistent with
countries’ commitments in international
investment agreements, and these treaties
must not unduly undermine regulatory space
required for sustainable development policies.
In addition, it is important to ensure coherence
between different IIAs to which a country is a
party.
• Investment and other sustainable-
development-related policies. Accomplishing
SDGs through private investment depends
not only on investment policy per se (i.e.,
entry and establishment rules, treatment and
protection, promotion and facilitation) but
on a host of investment-related policy areas
including tax, trade, competition, technology,
and environmental, social and labour market
policies. These policy areas interact, and an
overall coherent approach is needed to make
them conducive to investment in the SDGs and
to achieve synergies (WIR12, p. 108; IPFSD).
• Micro- and macroeconomic policies.
Sound macro-economic policies are a key
determinant for investment, and financial
systems conducive to converting financial
capital into productive capital are important
facilitators, if not prerequisites, for promoting
investment in the SDGs. A key part of the
leadership challenge is to push for and support
coordinated efforts towards creating an overall
macro-economic climate that provides a
stable environment for investors, and towards

D. Mobilizing funds for investment in tHE SDGs
re-orienting the global financial architecture
to focus on mobilizing and channelling funds
into real, productive assets, especially in SDG
sectors (TDR 2009; TDR 2011; UNCTAD
2011b, Wolf, M. 2010).5
Global multi-stakeholder platform
on investing in the SDGs
At present international discussions on private
sector investment in sustainable development are
dispersed among many organizations, institutions
and forums, each addressing specific areas of
interest. There is a need for a regular body that
provides a platform for discussion on overall
investment goals and targets, shared mechanisms
for mobilization of finance and channelling of
investment into sustainable development projects,
and ways and means of measuring and maximizing
positive impact while minimizing negative effects.
A global multi-stakeholder platform on investing in
the SDGs could fill that gap, galvanizing promising
initiatives to mobilize finance and spreading
good practices, supporting actions on the
ground channelling investment to priority areas,
and ensuring a common approach to impact
measurement. Such a multi-stakeholder platform
could have subgroups by sector, e.g. on energy,
agriculture, urban infrastructure, because the
cross-sector span of investments is so great.
Multi-agency technical assistance
facility
Finally, many of the solutions discussed in this
chapter are complex, requiring significant technical
capabilities and strong institutions. Since this is
seldom the case in some of the poorest countries,
which often have relatively weak governance
systems, technical assistance will be required in
order to avoid leaving behind vulnerable countries
where progress on the SDGs is most essential. A
multi-agency consortia (a “one-stop shop” for SDG
investment solutions) could help to support LDCs,
advising on, for example, investment guarantee
and insurance schemes, the set-up of SDG project
development agencies that can plan, package and
promote pipelines of bankable projects, design
of SDG-oriented incentive schemes, regulatory
frameworks, etc. Coordinated efforts to enhance
synergies are imperative.
The mobilization of funds for SDG investment occurs
within a global financial system with numerous and
diverse participants. Efforts to direct more financial
flows to SDG sectors need to take into account the
different challenges and constraints faced by all
actors.
1. Prospective sources of finance
The global financial system, its institutions and
actors, can mobilize capital for investment in the
SDGs. The flow of funds from sources to users of
capital is mediated along an investment chain with
many actors (figure IV.7), including owners of capital,
financial intermediaries, markets, and advisors.
Constraints to mobilizing funds for SDG financing
can be found both at the systemic level and at the
level of individual actors in the system and their
interactions. Policy responses will therefore need to
address each of these levels.
Policy measures are also needed more widely
to stimulate economic growth in order to create
supportive conditions for investment and capital
mobilization. This requires a coherent economic and
development strategy, addressing macroeconomic
and systemic issues at the global and national
levels, feeding into a conducive investment climate.
In return, if global and national leaders get their
policies right, the resulting investment will boost
growth and macroeconomic conditions, creating a
virtuous cycle.
Prospective sources of investment finance range
widely from large institutional investors, such as
pension funds, to the private wealth industry. They
include private sector sources as well as publicly
owned and backed funds and companies; domestic
and international sources; and direct and indirect
investors (figure IV.8 illustrates some potential

Figure IV.7. SDG investment chain and key actors involved
Users of capital for
SDG investment
•
Principal
institutions
Intermediaries
Advisors
Sources of capital Markets
• Governments
• International
organizations and
development banks
• Public and semi-
public institutions
• Multinational and
local firms
entrepreneurs
• NGOs
• Impact investors
• ...
• Financial advisors
• Wealth managers
• Investment consultants
• Rating agencies
Institutional asset
managers
• Investment banks and
brokerage firms
• Equity
• Corporate debt
• Sovereign debt
• Other markets and
financial instruments
• Governments (e.g. ODA)
• Households/individuals, e.g.:
– Retail investors
– High-net-worth individuals
– Pensions
– Insurance premia
• Firms (e.g. reserves/retained
earnings
• Philanthropic institutions
or foundations
• Other institutions with capital
reserves (e.g. universities)
Asset pools
(or primary intermediaries)
Banks
Pension funds
Insurance companies
Mutual funds
Sovereign wealth funds
Endowment funds
Private Equity
Venture capital
Impact investors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• ...
Source: UNCTAD.
corporate sources of finance; others, including
some non-traditional sources, are discussed in box
IV.4).
The overall gap of about $2.5 trillion is daunting, but
not impossible to bridge; domestic and international
sources of capital are notionally far in excess of
SDG requirements. However, existing savings and
assets of private sector actors are not sitting idle;
they are already deployed to generate financial
returns. Nevertheless, the relative sizes of private
sector sources of finance can help set priorities for
action.
All the sources indicated in figure IV.8 are invested
globally, of which a proportion is in developing
countries (including by domestic companies). In the
case of TNCs, for example, a third of global inward
FDI stock in 2013 was invested in developing
countries (and a bigger share of FDI flows).
Pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds
and sovereign wealth funds, on the other hand,
currently have much less involvement in developing
markets. The majority of bank lending also goes to
developed markets.
Each group of investor has a different propensity for
investment in the SDGs.
• Banks. Flows of cross-border bank lending to
developing countries were roughly $325 billion
in 2013, making international bank lending
the third most important source of foreign
capital after FDI and remittances. The stock of
international cross-border bank claims on all
countries stood at $31.1 trillion at the end of
Figure IV.8. Relative sizes of selected potential sources
of investment, 2012
(Value of assets, stocks and loans in trillions of dollars)
6.3a
25a
26
34
121
SWFs
TNCs
Insurance companies
Pension funds
Bank assets
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, IMF (2014);
SWF Institute, fund rankings; TheCityUK (2013).
Note: This figure is not exhaustive but seeks to list some key
players and sources of finance. The amounts for assets,
stocks and loans indicated are not equivalent, in some
cases, overlap, and cannot be added.
a
2014 figure.

2014, of which $8.8 trillion, or 28 per cent of
the total, was in developing countries.6
As well as an important source of project debt
finance, banks are in a powerful position to
contribute to the SDGs through, for instance,
the implementation of the Equator Principles
(EPs), a risk management framework that helps
determine, assess and manage environmental
and social risk specifically in infrastructure and
other industrial projects. Currently 78 financial
institutions in 34 countries have officially
adopted the EPs, a third of which are in
developing countries. These institutions cover
over 70 per cent of international project finance
debt in emerging markets.7
State-owned banks (including development
banks), regional development banks and
local banking institutions (Marois, 2013) all
have particular and significant relevance for
investment in SDGs. State-owned banks and
other financial institutions have always played
an important role in development, targeting
specific sectors, for example, infrastructure
and public services, often at preferential
rates. Today State-owned financial institutions
(SOFI) account for 25 per cent of total assets
in banking systems around the world; and
the capital available in SOFIs in developing
countries can be used both for investment
in SDGs directly and to leverage funds and
investment from the private sector (sections
D.3 and E).
• Pension funds. UNCTAD estimates that
pension funds have at least $1.4 trillion of
assets invested in developing markets; and the
value of developed-country assets invested in
the South is growing in addition to the value of
pension funds based in developing countries
(and which are predominantly invested in
their own domestic markets). By 2020, it is
estimated that global pension fund assets will
have grown to more than $56 trillion (PwC
2014a). Pension funds are investors with
long-term liabilities able to take on less liquid
investment products. In the past two decades,
they have begun to recognize infrastructure
investment as a distinct asset class and
there is the potential for future investment by
them in more illiquid forms of infrastructure
investment. Current engagement of pension
funds in infrastructure investment is still small,
at an estimated average of 2 per cent of assets
(OECD 2013b). However, lessons can be
drawn from some countries, including Australia
and Canada, which have been successful in
packaging infrastructure projects specifically
to increase investment by pension funds (in
both cases infrastructure investment makes up
some 5 per cent of pension fund portfolios).
• Insurance companies. Insurance companies
are comparable in size to pension and mutual
funds. With similar long-term liabilities as
pension funds (in the life insurance industry),
insurance companies are also less concerned
about liquidity and have been increasingly
prepared to invest in infrastructure, albeit
predominantly in developed markets. One
study suggests that insurance companies
currently allocate an average of 2 per cent of
their portfolio to infrastructure, although this
increases to more than 5 per cent in some
countries (Preqin 2013). While insurance
companies could provide a source of
finance for investment in SDG sectors, their
greater contribution may come from off-
setting investments in areas such as climate
change adaptation against savings from
fewer insurance claims and lower insurance
premiums.8

The growth of parts of the insurance industry
is therefore intimately tied to investment
in sustainable development sectors, e.g.
investment in agricultural technologies to resist
climate change, or flood defences to protect
homes and businesses, can have a positive
impact on the sustainability of the insurance
fund industry. There is a virtuous cycle to be
explored whereby insurance funds can finance
the type of investment that will reduce future
liabilities to events such as natural disasters.
Already, the insurance industry is committed to
mainstreaming ESG goals into its activities and
raising awareness of the impact of new risks
on the industry, for example through the UN-
backed Principles for Sustainable Insurance.

• Transnational corporations (TNCs). With $7.7
trillion currently invested by TNCs in developing
economies, and with some $5 trillion in cash
holdings, TNCs offer a significant potential
source of finance for investment in SDG
sectors in developing countries. FDI already
represents the largest source of external
finance for developing countries as a whole,
and an important source (with ODA and
remittances) even in the poorest countries.
It is an important source of relatively stable
development capital, partly because investors
typically seek a long-term controlling interest
in a project making their participation less
volatile than other sources. In addition, FDI has
the advantage of bringing with it a package of
technology, managerial and technical know-
how that may be required for the successful
set-up and running of SDG investment
projects.
• Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). With 80 per
cent of SWF assets owned by developing
countries, there is significant potential for
SWFs to make a contribution to investment
in SDG sectors in the global South. However,
more than 70 per cent of direct investments
by SWFs are currently made in developed
markets (chapter I), and a high proportion of
their total assets under management may also
be invested in developed markets. SWFs share
many similarities with institutional investors
such as pension funds – several SWFs are
constituted for this purpose, or also have
that function, such as CalPERS and SPU
(Truman 2008; Monk 2008). Other SWFs are
established as strategic investment vehicles
(Qatar holdings of the Qatar Investment
Authority); as stabilization funds displaying the
characteristics of a central bank (SAMA); or as
development funds (Temasek).
Box IV.4. Selected examples of other sources of capital for investment in the SDGs
Foundations, endowments and family offices. Some estimates put total private wealth at $46 trillion (TheCityUK 2013),
albeit a third of this figure is estimated to be incorporated in other investment vehicles, such as mutual funds. The
private wealth management of family offices stands at $1.2 trillion and foundations/endowment funds at $1.3 trillion
in 2011 (WEF 2011). From this source of wealth it may be possible to mobilize greater philanthropic contributions to
long-term investment, as well as investments for sustainable development through the fund management industry. In
2011 the United States alone were home to more than 80,000 foundations with $662 billion in assets, representing
over 20 per cent of estimated global foundations and endowments by assets, although much of this was allocated
domestically.
Venture capital. The venture capital industry is estimated at $42 billion (EY 2013) which is relatively small compared
to some of the sums invested by institutional investors but which differs in several important respects. Investors
seeking to allocate finance through venture capital often take an active and direct interest in their investment. In
addition, they might provide finance from the start or early stages of a commercial venture and have a long-term
investment horizon for the realization of a return on their initial capital. This makes venture capital more characteristic
of a direct investor than a short-term portfolio investor.
Impact investment. Sources for impact investment include individuals, foundations, NGOs and capital markets.
Impact investments funded through capital markets are valued at more than $36 billion (Martin 2013). The impact
investment industry has grown in size and scope over the past decade (from the Acumen fund in 2001 to an
estimated 125 funds supporting impact investment in 2010 (Simon and Barmeier 2010)). Again, while relatively
small in comparison to the potential of large institutional investors, impact investments are directly targeted at
SDG sectors, such as farming and education. Moreover, their promotion of social and economic development
outcomes in exchange for lower risk-adjusted returns makes impact investment funds a potentially useful source of
development finance.
Microfinance. Some studies show that microfinance has had some impact on consumption smoothing during
periods of economic stress and on consumption patterns. However, other studies also indicate that there has been
limited impact on health care, education and female empowerment (Bauchet et al 2011; Bateman and Chang 2012).
Nevertheless, as the microfinance industry has matured, initiatives such as credit unions have had more success;
the encouragement of responsible financial behaviour through prior saving and affordable loans has made valuable
contributions to consumption, health and education.
Source: UNCTAD, based on sources in text.

Despite several reported concerns about
SWF governance (Bagnall and Truman 2013),
SWFs can offer a number of advantages for
investment in SDG sectors in poor countries,
not least because their finance is unleveraged,
and their investment outlook is often long
term. For example, 60 per cent of SWFs
already actively invest in infrastructure (Preqin
2013); moreover in sectors such as water and
energy, SWFs may honour the inherent public
nature of these services in a way that private
investors may not. This is because some SWFs
(and public pension funds) have non-profit
driven obligations, such as social protection
or intergenerational equity; they also represent
a form of “public capital” that could be used
for the provision of essential services in low-
income communities (Lipschutz and Romano
2012).
All the institutions and markets described above
face obstacles and incentives, internal and external,
that shape investment decisions and determine
whether their choices contribute to or hinder
attainment of the SDGs. Policy interventions can
thus target specific links in the investment chain
and/or specific types of institutions to ensure that
financial markets and end users are better geared
towards sustainable outcomes than is presently the
case.
2. Challenges to mobilizing funds for SDG
investments
Constraints in financial markets hindering the flow
of funds to SDG investments include start-up and
scaling problems for innovative solutions market
failures, lack of transparency on ESG performance
and misaligned rewards for market participants.
There are a number of impediments or constraints
to mobilizing funds for investment in SDG-related
projects (figure IV.9).
An important constraint lies in start-up and scaling
issues for innovative financing solutions. Tapping
the pool of available global financial resources
for SDG investments requires greater provision
Source: UNCTAD.
Figure IV.9. Mobilizing funds for SDG investment: key challenges and policy options
Failures in global capital
markets
Build or improve pricing mechanisms for externalities
Internalization in investment decisions of externalities e.g. carbon emissions, water use,
social impacts
Start-up and scaling issues
for new financing solutions
Create fertile soil for innovative SDG-financing approaches and corporate initiatives
Facilitation and support for SDG dedicated financial instruments and impact investing
initiatives through incentives and other mechanisms
Expansion or creation of funding mechanisms that use public-sector resources to
catalyze mobilization of private-sector resources
“Go-to-market” channels for SDG investment projects in financial markets: channels for
SDG investment projects to reach fund managers, savers and investors in mature
financial markets, ranging from securitization to crowd funding
•
•
Promote Sustainable Stock Exchanges
SDG listing requirements, indices for performance measurement and reporting for investors
Lack of transparency on
sustainable corporate
performance
•
Misaligned investor
incentive/pay structures
Introduce financial market reforms
Reform of pay, performance and reporting structures to favor long-term investment
conducive to SDG realization
Rating methodologies that reward long-term real investment in SDG sectors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

of financial instruments and mechanisms that are
attractive for institutions to own or manage. A
range of innovative solutions has begun to emerge,
including new financial instruments (e.g. green
bonds) and financing approaches (e.g. future
income securitization for development finance);
new investor classes are also becoming important
(e.g. funds pursuing impact investing). To date,
however, these solutions remain relatively small
in scale and limited in scope, or operate on the
margins of capital markets (figure IV.9, section D.3).
Over time, changing the mindset of investors
towards SDG investment is of fundamental
importance, and a number of further constraints
hinder this. First, market failures in global capital
markets contribute to a misallocation of capital
in favour of non-sustainable projects/firms and
against those that could contribute positively to the
SDGs. Failure by markets and holders of capital
to price negative externalities into their capital
allocation decisions means that the cost of capital
for investors reflects solely the private cost. Thus,
profit-maximizing investors do not take sufficient
account of environmental and other social costs
when evaluating potential investments because
these costs do not materially affect their cost of
capital, earnings or profitability. For instance, the
absence of a material price for carbon implies
social costs associated with emissions are virtually
irrelevant for capital allocation decisions.
Second, a lack of transparency on ESG performance
further precludes consideration of such factors
in the investment decisions of investors, financial
intermediaries and their advisors (and the ultimate
sources of capital, such as households). The
fragmentation of capital markets, while facilitating
the allocation of capital, has disconnected the
sources of capital from end users. For example,
households do not have sufficient information about
where and how their pensions are invested in order
to evaluate whether it is being invested responsibly
and, for example, whether it is in line with the SDGs.
Similarly, asset managers and institutional investors
do not have sufficient information to make better
informed investment decisions that might align
firms with the SDGs.
Third, the rewards that individuals and firms receive
in terms of pay, performance and reporting also
influence investment allocations decisions. This
includes not only incentive structures at TNCs and
other direct investors in SDG-relevant sectors, but
also incentive structures at financial intermediaries
(and their advisors) who fund these investors. The
broad effects of these incentive structures are
three-fold: (i) an excessive short-term focus within
investment and portfolio allocation decisions; (ii) a
tendency towards passive investment strategies
and herding behaviour in financial markets; and
(iii) an emphasis on financial returns rather than a
consideration of broader social or environment
risk-return trade-offs. These market incentives and
their effects have knock-on consequences for real
economic activity.
3. Creating fertile soil for innovative
financing approaches
Innovative financial instruments and funding
mechanisms to raise resources for investment in
SDGs deserve support to achieve scale and scope.
A range of innovative financing solutions to
support sustainable development have emerged in
recent years, including new financial instruments,
investment funds and financing approaches. These
have the potential to contribute significantly to the
realization of the SDGs, but need to be supported,
adapted to purpose and scaled up as appropriate.
It is important to note that many of these solutions
are led by the private sector, reflecting an increasing
alignment between UN and international community
priorities and those of the business community (box
IV.5).
Facilitate and support SDG-
dedicated financial instruments
and impact investment
Financial instruments which raise funds for
investment in social or environmental programs
are proliferating, and include green bonds9
and
the proposed development impact bonds. They
target investors that are keen to integrate social
and environmental concerns into their investment
decisions. They are appealing because they ensure
a safer return to investors (many are backed by

donors or multilateral banks), but also because
they are clearly defined sustainable projects or
products.10
The proceeds are often credited to
special accounts that support loan disbursements
for SDG projects (e.g. development or climate
change adaptation and mitigation projects).
These instruments were often initially the domain
of multilateral development banks (MDBs) because
this lent credibility with investors in terms of
classifying which investments were socially and
environmentally friendly. More recently, however,
a number of TNCs have issued green bonds. For
instance, EDF Energy undertook a €1.4 billion issue
to finance investment in solar and wind energy;11
Toyota raised $1.75 billion for the development of
hybrid vehicles;12
and Unilever raised £250 million
for projects that would reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, water usage or waste within its supply
Box IV.5. Convergence between UN priorities and those of the
international business community
In a globe-spanning series of consultations, UN Global Compact participants offered their views on global
development priorities they consider central to any future development agenda. The results of these consultations
reflect a growing understanding of the convergence between the priorities of the United Nations and those of the
international business community on a wide range of global issues and challenges.
Box Figure IV.5.1. Global Development Priorities Identified by Businesses
Private Sustainability Finance: from managing risks to embracing new opportunities that create value for business
and society. Over the past decade, a number of principles-based initiatives have been adopted throughout the
finance-production value chain, from portfolio investors, banks and insurance companies, to foundations and TNCs
in the real economy. For instance, led by private actors Responsible Private Finance has already reached a significant
critical mass across the private sector. There is now a broad consensus that incorporating social, environmental
and governance concerns in decision-making improves risk management, avoids harmful investments and makes
business sense. Examples of this trend include initiatives such as the Principles for Responsible Investment,
the Equator Principles, the Principles for Sustainable Insurance, the Sustainable Stock Exchanges initiative and
innovative approaches to sustainable foreign direct investment by multinationals.
Private sustainability finance holds enormous potential to contribute to the broad implementation efforts in the post-
2015 future. However, public action through good governance, conducive policies, regulations and incentives is
required to drive the inclusion of sustainability considerations in private investment decisions. And it requires private
action to significantly enhance the scale and intensity of private sustainability finance.
Source: UN Global Compact.
Prosperity
Equity
Education
Food
Agriculture
Peace
Stability
Infrastructure
Technology
Good Governance
Human Rights
Water
Sanitation
Energy
Climate
Health
Women’s
Empower-
ment
Gender
Equality
The Poverty
Apex
Human Needs
Capacities
The Resource
Triad
Enabling
Environment

chain.13
While the development of this market by
corporate issuers is positive, its continued advance
may give rise to the need for labelling or certification
of investments, so investors have assurance about
which are genuinely “green” or have “social impact”.
Impact investing is a phenomenon that reflects
investors’ desire to generate societal value (social,
environmental, cultural) as well as achieve financial
return. Impact investment can be a valuable source
of capital, especially to finance the needs of low-
income developing countries or for products and
servicesaimedatvulnerablecommunities.Thetypes
of projects targeted can include basic infrastructure
development, social and health services provision
and education – all of which are being considered
as SDGs. Impact investors include aid agencies,
NGOs, philanthropic foundations and wealthy
individuals, as well as banks, institutional investors
and other types of firms and funds. Impact investing
is defined not by the type of investor, but by their
motives and objectives.14
A number of financial vehicles have emerged
to facilitate impact investing by some such
groups (others invest directly). Estimated impact
investments through these funds presently range
from $30 to $100 billion, depending on which
sectors and types of activity are defined as
constituting “impact investing”; and similarly the
estimated future global potential of impact investing
varies from the relatively modest to up to $1 trillion
in total (J.P. Morgan 2010). A joint study of impact
investment by UNCTAD and the United States
Department of State observed in 2012 that over 90
per cent of impact investment funds are still invested
in the developed world, mostly in social impact and
renewable energy projects. Among developing
countries, the largest recipient of impact investing is
Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by Africa
and South Asia (Addis et al. 2013). A key objective
should be to direct more impact investment to
developing countries, and especially LDCs.
A number of constraints hold back the expansion
of impact investing in developing countries. Key
constraints related to the mobilization of impact
investment funds include lack of capital across
the risk-return spectrum; lack of a common
understanding of what impact investment entails;
inadequate ways to measure “impact”; lack of
research and data on products and performance;
and a lack of investment professionals with the
relevant skills. Key demand-related constraints in
developing countries are: shortage of high-quality
investment opportunities with a track record; and a
lack of innovative deal structures to accommodate
portfolio investors’ needs. A number of initiatives
are underway to address these constraints and
expand impact investment, including the Global
Impact Investing Network (GIIN), the United States
State Department Global Impact Economy Forum,
Impact Reporting and Investment Standards,
Global Impact Investment Ratings System, the
United Kingdom Impact Program for sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia and the G8 Social Impact
Investing Taskforce.
Expand and create funding
mechanisms that use public sector
resources to catalyze mobilization
of private sector resources
A range of initiatives exist to use the capacity of
the public sector to mobilize private finance. Often
these operate at the project level (Section E), but
initiatives also exist at a macro level to raise funds
from the private sector, including through financial
markets.
Vertical funds (or financial intermediary funds)
are dedicated mechanisms which allow multiple
stakeholders (government, civil society, individuals
and the private sector) to provide funding for
pre-specified purposes, often to underfunded
sectors such as disease eradication or climate
change. Funds such as the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria15
or the Global
Environment Fund16
have now reached a significant
size. Similar funds could be created in alignment
with other specific SDG focus areas of the SDGs in
general. The Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund17
is
another prominent example of a fund that has been
used as a vehicle to provide preferential loans for
the purpose of developing inclusive business.
Matchingfundshavebeenusedtoincentivizeprivate
sector contributions to development initiatives by
making a commitment that the public sector will
contribute an equal or proportionate amount. For
example, under the GAVI Matching Fund, the United
Kingdom Department for International Development

and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have
pledged about $130 million combined to match
contributions from corporations, foundations, their
customers, members, employees and business
partners.18
Front-loading of aid. In addition to catalyzing
additional contributions, the public sector can
induce private sector actors to use financing
mechanisms that change the time profile of
development financing, through front-loading of aid
disbursements. The International Finance Facility
for Immunization (IFFIm) issues AAA-rated bonds
in capital markets which are backed by long-term
donor government pledges. As such, aid flows to
developing countries which would normally occur
over a period of 20 years are converted to cash
immediately upon issuance. For investors, the
bonds are attractive due to the credit rating, a
market-comparable interest rate and the perceived
“socially responsible return” on investment. IFFIm
has raised more than $4.5 billion to date through
bond issuances purchased by institutional and retail
investors in a range of different mature financial
markets.19
Future-flow securitization. Front-loading of aid is
a subset of a broader range of initiatives under
the umbrella of future-flow securitization which
allows developing countries to issue marketable
financial instruments whose repayments are
secured against a relatively stable revenue stream.
These can be used to attract a broader class of
investors than would otherwise be the case. Other
prominent examples are diaspora bonds whose
issuance is secured against migrant remittance
flows, and bonds backed by the revenue stream
from, e.g. natural resources. These instruments
allow developing countries to access funding
immediately that would normally be received over
a protracted period.
Build and support “go-to-market”
channels for SDG investment
projects in financial markets
A range of options is available, and can be
expanded, to help bring concrete SDG investment
projects of sufficient scale directly to financial
markets and investors in mature economies,
reducing dependence on donors and increasing
the engagement of the private sector.
Project aggregation and securitization. SDG
investment projects and SDG sectors are often not
well aligned with the needs of institutional investors
in mature financial markets because projects are
too small and sectors fragmented. For example,
renewable energy markets are more disaggregated
than traditional energy markets. Institutional
investors prefer to invest in assets which have
more scale and marketability than investment in
individual projects provide. As such, aggregating
individual projects in a pooled portfolio can create
investment products more in line with the appetite
of large investors. This can be achieved through
securitization of loans to many individual projects
to create tradable, rated asset backed securities.
For instance, a group of insurers and reinsurers
with $3 trillion of assets under management have
recently called for more scale and standardization
of products in low-carbon investments.20
Crowd funding. Crowd funding is an internet-
based method for raising money, either through
donations or investments, from a large number of
individuals or organizations. Globally it is estimated
that crowd funding platforms raised $2.7 billion in
2012 and were forecast to increase 81 per cent
in 2013, to $5.1 billion (Massolution 2013). While
currently more prevalent in developed countries, it
has the potential to fund SDG-related projects in
developing countries. Crowd funding has been an
effective means for entrepreneurs or businesses
in developed countries that do not have access
to more formal financial markets. In a similar way,
crowd funding could help dormant entrepreneurial
talent and activity to circumvent traditional capital
markets and obtain finance. For example, since
2005 the crowd funding platform Kiva Microfunds
has facilitated over $560 million in internet-
based loans to entrepreneurs and students in 70
countries.21
4. Building an SDG-supportive financial
system
A financial system supportive of SDG investment
ensures that actors in the SDG investment chain
(i) receive the right stimuli through prices for

investment instruments that internalize social costs
and benefits; (ii) have access to information on
the sustainability performance of investments so
that they can make informed decisions; and (iii)
are rewarded through mechanisms that take into
account responsible investment behavior. These
elements are part of a wider context of systemic
issues in the global financial architecture,22
which
is not functioning optimally for the purposes of
channeling funds to productive, real assets (rather
than financial assets).23
a. Build or improve pricing
mechanisms to curb
externalities
Effective pricing mechanisms to internalize social
and environmental costs are necessary to align
market signals with sustainable development goals.
The most effective and yet most challenging way to
ensure that global capital allocation decisions are
aligned with the needs of sustainable development
would be to “get the prices right”. That is, to ensure
that negative (and positive) social and environmental
externalities are factored into the price signals that
financial market participants and direct investors
receive.
A long-term influence is adherence to responsible
investment principles which helps firms to recognize
and price-in both the financial costs associated
with compliance, but also the rewards: i.e. less
risk, potential efficiency gains, and the positive
externalities arising from a good reputation.
A number of environmental externalities have been
traditionally addressed using tools such as fines
or technical standards, but more recently pricing
and tax methods have become more common. In
the area of climate change, for carbon emissions,
a number of countries have experimented with
innovative approaches over the past two decades.
Two principle methods have been explored for
establishing a price for carbon emissions: a cap
and trade “carbon market” characterized by the
trading of emissions permits; and “carbon taxes”
characterized by a special tax on fossil fuels and
other carbon-intensive activities. The EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS) was the first major carbon
market and remains the largest. Carbon markets
exist in a handful of other developed countries,
and regional markets exist in a few US states and
Canadian provinces. Carbon trading schemes are
rarer in developing countries, although there are
pilot schemes, such as one covering six Chinese
cities and provinces.
Complexities associated with carbon markets,
and the failure so far of such markets to establish
prices in line with the social costs of emissions,
have increased experimentation with taxation. For
instance, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom
are examples of countries that have implemented
some form of carbon tax or “climate levy”. Carbon
taxes have also been implemented in the Canadian
provinces of British Columbia and Quebec, and
in 2013 a Climate Protection Act was introduced
in the United States Senate proposing a federal
carbon tax. The experience with carbon pricing is
applicable to other sectors, appropriately adapted
to context.
b. Promote Sustainable Stock
Exchanges
Sustainable stock exchanges provide listed entities
withtheincentivesandtoolstoimprovetransparency
on ESG performance, and allow investors to make
informed decisions on responsible allocation of
capital.
Sustainability reporting initiatives are important
because they help to align capital market signals
with sustainable development and thereby to
mobilize responsible investment in the SDGs.
Sustainability reporting should be a requirement
not only for TNCs on their global activities, but also
for asset owners and asset managers and other
financial intermediaries outlined in figure IV.8 on
their investment practices.
Many pension funds around the world do not
report on if and how they incorporate sustainability
issues into their investment decisions (UNCTAD
2011c). Given their direct and indirect influence
over a large share of the global pool of available
financial resources, all institutional investors should
be required to formally articulate their stance on
sustainable development issues to all stakeholders.
Such disclosure would be in line with best practices
and the current disclosure practices of funds in
other areas.

Greater accountability and transparency of the entire
investment chain is essential, including investment
allocation decisions, proxy voting practices
and advice of asset owners, asset managers,
pension funds, insurance companies, investment
consultants and investment banks. Without proper
measurement, verification and reporting of financial,
social and environmental sustainability information,
ultimate sources of capital (especially households
and governments) cannot determine how the funds
that have been entrusted to these institutions have
been deployed.
Stock exchanges and capital market regulators play
an important role in this respect, because of their
position at the intersection of investors, companies
and government policy. The United Nations
Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE) initiative is a
peer-to-peer learning platform for exploring how
exchanges can work together with investors,
regulators, and companies to enhance corporate
transparency, and ultimately performance, on ESG
(environmental, social and corporate governance)
issues and encourage responsible long-term
approaches to investment. Launched by the UN
Secretary-General in 2009, the SSE is co-organized
by UNCTAD, the UN Global Compact, the UN-
supported Principles for Responsible Investment,
and the UNEP Finance Initiative.24
An increasing number of stock exchanges and
regulators have introduced, or are in the process of
developing, initiatives to help companies meet the
evolving information needs of investors; navigate
increasingly complex disclosure requirements and
expectations; manage sustainability performance;
and understand and address social and
environmental risks and opportunities. UNCTAD
has provided guidance to help policymakers and
stock exchanges in this effort.
c. Introduce financial market
reforms
Realigning rewards in financial markets to favour
investment in SDGs will require action, including
reform of pay and performance structures, and
innovative rating methodologies.
Reforms at both the regulatory and institutional
levels may lead to more effective alignment of
the system of rewards to help ensure that global
capital markets serve the needs of sustainable
development. This would require policy action and
corporate-led initiatives affecting a wide range of
different institutions, markets as well as financial
behaviour.
Reform pay, performance and
reporting structures to favour
long-term investment conducive to
SDG realization
The performance evaluation and reward structures
of both institutions and individuals operating in
financial markets are not conducive to investment
in SDGs. Areas of action may include:
• Pay and performance structures. Pay and
performance structures should be aligned with
long-term sustainable performance objectives
rather than short-term relative performance.
For instance, compensation schemes for
asset managers, corporate executives and a
range of financial market participants could
be paid out over the period during which
results are realized, and compensation linked
to sustainable, fundamental drivers of long-
term value. Companies need to take action
to minimize the impact of short-termism on
the part of financial intermediaries on their
businesses and, more positively, create the
conditions that enable these capital sources
to support and reward action and behaviour
by direct investors that contribute to the
realization of the SDGs.
• Reporting requirements. Reporting
requirements could be revised to reduce
pressure to make decisions based on short-
term financial or investment performance.
Reporting structures such as quarterly
earnings guidance can over emphasise the
significance of short-term measures at the
expense of the longer-term sustainable value
creation.
Promote rating methodologies that
reward long-term investment in
SDG sectors
Ratings that incorporate ESG performance help
investors make informed decisions for capital

allocation towards SDGs. Existing initiatives and
potential areas for development include:
• Non-financial ratings. Rating agencies have a
critical influence on asset allocation decisions
by providing an independent assessment of
the credit risk associated with marketable
debt instruments. Rating agencies’ traditional
models are based on an estimation of the
relative probability of default only, and hence
do not incorporate social or environmental
risks and benefits associated with particular
investments. In order to invest in SDG-
beneficial firms and projects, investors need
access to ratings which assess the relative
ESG performance of firms. Dow Jones, MSCI
and Standard and Poor’s have for several years
been incorporating ESG criteria into specialized
sustainability indices and ratings for securities.
Standard and Poor’s also announced in 2013
that risks from climate change will be an
increasingly important factor in its ratings of
sovereign debt. Greater effort could be taken
to further integrate sustainability issues
into both debt and equity ratings. An
important dimension of sustainability
ratings for equity is that ratings are
typically paid for by investors, the users
of the rating. This helps address the
conflict of interest inherent within the
“issuer pays” model that has plagued
financial ratings agencies in the wake
of the global financial crisis and remains
common for debt ratings.
• Connecting reporting, ratings,
integration and capacity-building.
Maximizing the contribution of corporate
sustainability reporting to sustainable
development is a multi-stage process
(figure IV.10). Corporate sustainability
information should feed into systems
of analysis that can produce actionable
information in the form of corporate
sustainability ratings. Such ratings
on corporate debt and equities should be
integrated into the decision-making processes
of key investment stakeholders including
policymakers and regulators, portfolio
investors, TNCs, media and civil society.
These investment stakeholders can seek to
implement a range of incentives and sanctions
to provide market signals that help to better
align the outcomes of market mechanisms
with the sustainable development policies
of countries. To be truly transformative, this
integration process needs to align itself with
the policy objectives of the SDGs and to create
material implications for poor sustainability
performance. Finally, sustainability ratings
and standards can also be used as a basis
for capacity-building programmes to assist
developing-country TNCs and small and
medium-sized enterprises to adopt best
practices in the area of sustainability reporting
and management systems. This will provide
new information to guide investors and
promote investment.
Figure IV.10. The reporting and ratings chain of action
Reporting
• Standards development and harmonization (regulators)
• Requirements and incentives (policy makers)
Ratings
• Methodology development
• Compilation and dissemination
• Trends analysis
Integration
• Portfolio investors: asset allocation and proxy voting
• Governments: incentives and sanctions
• Companies: pay incentives and management systems
• Media: name and shame
• Civil society: engagement and dialogue
Capacity
Building
• Implement best practices in sustainability reporting
• Adopt sustainable development management systems
Source: UNCTAD.

E. Channelling investment into the SDGs
1. Challenges to channelling funds into
the SDGs
Key constraints to channelling funds into SDGs
include entry barriers, inadequate risk-return ratios
for SDG investments, a lack of information, effective
packaging and promotion of projects, and a lack of
investor expertise.
Investment in SDG sectors is not solely a question
of availability and mobilization of capital, but also of
the allocation of capital to sustainable development
projects. Macroeconomic policies improving overall
conditions for investment and growth, industrial
policies establishing or refining a development
strategy, and similar policies, can encourage
investment, public or private, domestic or foreign,
into SDG sectors or others. However, while they are
necessary conditions for investment, they are not
necessarily enough.
Investors face a number of constraints and
challenges in channelling funds to SDG projects:
Entry barriers to SDG investments. Investment
for sustainable development can be discouraged
by an unwelcoming investment climate. Investors
may face administrative or policy-related hurdles
in some sectors related to SDGs which are often
sensitive as many constitute a public service
responsibility. These sectors may even be closed
either to private investors in general, or to foreign
investors in particular.
Inadequate risk-return ratios for SDG investment.
Risks related to SDG investment projects can occur
at the country and policy level (e.g. legal protection
for investment); at the market or sector level (e.g.
uncertain demand); and at the project (financial)
level. For example, investments in agriculture
or infrastructure are subject to uncertainty and
concerns about local demand and spending power
of the local population; ownership or access to
sensitive resources (e.g. land); and the very long
payback periods involved. As a result, investors,
especially those not accustomed to investing in
SDG sectors in developing countries, demand
higher rates of return for investment in countries
with greater (perceived or real) risks.
Lack of information, effective packaging and
promotion of bankable investment projects in SDG
sectors. Investment opportunities in commercial
activities are usually clearly delineated; location
options may be pre-defined in industrial zones; the
investment process and associated rules are clearly
framed; and investors are familiar with the process
of appraising risks and assessing potential financial
returns on investment in their own business. SDG
sectors are usually more complex. Investment
projects such as in infrastructure, energy or health,
may require a process where political priorities
need to be defined, regulatory preparation is
needed (e.g. planning permissions and licenses,
market rules) and feasibility studies carried out. In
addition, smaller projects may not easily provide the
scale that large investors, such as pension funds,
require. Therefore, aggregation and packaging
can be necessary. While commercial investments
are often more of a “push” nature, where investors
are looking for opportunities, SDG projects may
be more of a “pull” nature, where local needs drive
the shaping of investment opportunities. Effective
promotion and information provision is therefore
even more important because investors face
greater difficulty in appraising potential investment
risks and returns, due to a lack of historical data
and investment benchmarks to make meaningful
comparisons of performance.
Lack of investor expertise in SDG sectors. Some
of the private sector investors that developing
countries are aiming to attract to large-scale
projects, such as infrastructure or agriculture,
are relatively inexperienced, including private
equity funds and SWFs. These investors have not
traditionally been engaged in direct investment
in these countries (particularly low-income
economies) nor in SDG sectors, and they may not
have the necessary expertise in-house to evaluate
investments, to manage the investment process
(and, where applicable, to manage operations).
These constraints can be addressed through
public policy responses, as well as by actions and
behavioural change by corporations themselves
(see figure IV.11).

Figure IV.11. Channelling investment into SDG sectors: key challenges and policy options
•
•
Establish new incentives schemes and a new generation of investment promotion institutions
•
•
•
Lack of information and
effective packaging and
promotion of SDG
investment projects
Lack of investor expertise
in SDG sectors
• Entry barriers to
SDG investments
Inadequate risk-return ratios
for SDG investments
Alleviate entry barriers, while safeguarding legitimate public interests
•
Expand use of risk--sharing and mitigation mechanisms for SDG investments
•
•
•
•
Build SDG investment partnerships
• - and host-country investment promotion agencies: home- country
•
Transforming IPAs into SDG investment development agencies, focusing on the preparation and
marketing of pipelines of bankable projects in the SDGs.
Redesign of investment incentives, facilitating SDG investment projects, and supporting impact
objectives of all investments.
Regional SDG investment compacts: regional cooperation mechanisms to promote investment in
SDGs, e.g. regional cross-border infrastructure, regional SDG clusters
Creation of an enabling policy environment for investment in sustainable development (e.g.
UNCTAD’s IPFSD), and formulation of national strategies for attracting investment in SDG sectors.
Wider use of PPPs for SDG projects to improve risk-return profiles and address market failures.
Wider availability of investment guarantee and risk insurance facilities to specifically support and
protect SDG investments.
Public sector and ODA leveraging and blended financing: public and donor funds as base capital
or junior debt, to share risks or improve risk-return profile for private-sector funders.
Advance market commitments and other mechanisms to provide more stable and/or reliable
markets for investors.
Partnerships between home
partner to act as business development agency for investment in the SDGs in developing countries.
SVE-TNC-MDB triangular partnerships: global companies and MDBs partner with LDCs and small
vulnerable economies, focusing on a key SDG sector or a product key for economic development.
•
Source: UNCTAD.
2. Alleviating entry barriers, while
safeguarding public interests
A basic prerequisite for successful promotion
of SDG investment is a sound overall policy
climate, conducive to attracting investment while
safeguarding public interests, especially in sensitive
sectors.
A development strategy for attracting and guiding
private investment into priority areas for sustainable
development requires the creation of an enabling
policy environment. Key determinants for a host
country’s attractiveness, such as political, economic
and social stability; clear, coherent and transparent
rules on the entry and operational conditions for
investment; and effective business facilitation are all
relevant for encouraging investment in SDG sectors.
The rule of law needs to be respected, together
with a credible commitment to transparency,
participation and sound institutions that are capable,
efficient and immune to corruption (Sachs 2012).
At the same time, alleviating policy constraints for
private investment in SDG sectors must not come
at the price of compromising legitimate public
interests concerning the ownership structure and
the regulatory framework for activities related to
sustainable development. This calls for a gradual
approach towards liberalization of SDG sectors and
proper sequencing.
The enabling policy framework should clearly
stipulate in what SDG areas private investment is
permitted and under what conditions. While many
SDG sectors are open to private investment in
numerous countries, important country-specific
limitations persist. One case in point is infrastructure,
where public monopolies are common.25
Reducing
investment barriers can open up new investment
opportunities, but may require a gradual approach,
starting with those SDG sectors where private
involvement faces fewer political concerns. Host

countries may first allow service and management
contracts and move to PPPs once contractual
partners have gained more experience.
Private investment may also be hindered by
exclusive rights that governments grant to single
service providers (e.g. in water or energy supply)
to ensure sufficient revenue for the operator
through economies of scale. Such policies should
not entirely impede market access for small-scale
providers, since the latter can be essential to fill the
gap of service provision where the main operator
fails to reach the poorest or isolated segments of
the population (OECD 2009).
If concerns exist particularly in respect of foreign
participation in SDG sectors, host countries can
opt for foreign ownership limitations instead of
complete prohibitions. They can also subject foreign
investment to a national benefit test on a case-by-
case basis, for instance as regards investment in
critical infrastructure. Investment contracts (such
as PPPs) between the host country and foreign
investors, as well as business concessions offer the
possibility to admit foreign investment under the
condition that the investor actively contributes to
SDGs. For instance, foreign investors have received
the right to exploit natural resources in exchange
for a commitment to build certain infrastructure or
social institutions, such as hospitals or schools.
With respect to foreign participation in agriculture,
unambiguous land tenure rights, including a land
registry system, are critical not only for attracting
investors, but also for protecting smallholders from
dispossession and for increasing their bargaining
power vis-à-vis foreign investors. Political
opposition against foreign investment in agriculture
can be alleviated by promoting outgrower schemes
(WIR09, UNCTAD and World Bank 2014).
Ininfrastructuresectors,whichareoften monopolies,
a crucial prerequisite for liberalization or opening up
to private or foreign investors is the establishment
of effective competition policies and authorities. In
such cases, the establishment of an independent
regulator can help ensure a level playing field. A
similar case can be made in other sectors, where
policy action can help avoid a crowding out of local
micro- and small and medium-sized firms (such as
agricultural smallholders) who form the backbone
of the economy in most developing countries.
Other regulatory and policy areas are relevant for
the creation of a conducive investment climate and
for safeguarding public policy interest. UNCTAD’s
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable
Development (IPFSD) has been successful in
moving discussion and policy in this direction since
its publication in 2012.
3. Expanding the use of risk-sharing tools
for SDG investments
A number of tools, including PPPs, investment
insurance, blended financing and advance market
commitments, can help improve the risk-return
profile of SDG investment projects.
A key means to improve the risk-return profile
for private sector actors is the ability of relevant
stakeholders (the public sector, typically home-
country governments, development banks or
international organizations) to share, minimize
or offer alternatives to the risks associated with
investment in sustainable development.
Innovative risk management tools can help channel
finance and private investment in SDGs depending
on the specific requirements of sustainable
development projects.
Widen the use of public-private
partnerships
The use of PPPs can be critical in channelling
investment to SDG sectors because they involve
the public and private sectors working together,
combining skills and resources (financial, managerial
andtechnical),andsharingrisks.Manygovernments
turn to PPPs when the scale and the level of
resources required for projects mean they cannot
be undertaken solely through conventional public
expenditures or procurement. PPPs are typically
used for infrastructure projects, especially for water
and transportation projects (such as roads, rail and
subway networks), but also in social infrastructure,
health care and education.26
PPPs may also involve
international sustainable development programmes
and donor funds; for instance, the International
Finance Facility for Immunization is a PPP, which

uses the long-term borrowing capacity of donor
governments, with support of the international
capital markets to collect funds and finance the
GAVI immunization programmes.
PPPs can offer various means for improving the risk-
return profile of sustainable development projects.
They offer the possibility for tailor-made risk sharing
in respect of individual sustainable development
investments. PPPs also allow for cost sharing
concerning the preparation of feasibility studies;
risk sharing of the investment operations through
co-investment, guarantees and insurances; and an
increase of investor returns through, for example, tax
credits and industry support by providing capacity
for research and innovation. Direct financial support
agreed upon in PPPs can help to overcome start-
up barriers for sustainable-development-related
investments.
Caution is needed when developing PPPs as they
can prove relatively expensive methods of financing
and may increase the cost to the public sector if
up-front investment costs and subsequent revenue
streams (investment returns) are not adequately
assessed. This is especially relevant for LDCs and
small vulnerable economies (SVEs) with weaker
technical, institutional and negotiation capacities
(Griffiths et al. 2014). Examples of risks associated
with PPPs for governments include high fiscal
commitments and difficulty in the estimation of
the cost of guarantees (e.g. when governments
provide guarantees on demand, exchange rates or
other costs). Governments should carefully design
contractual arrangements, ensure fair risk sharing
between the public and the private sector, develop
the capacities to monitor and evaluate partnerships,
and promote good governance in PPP projects.27

Given the technical complexity of PPP projects
and the institutional and governance capabilities
required on the part of developing countries,
widening the use of PPPs will require:
• the creation of dedicated units and expertise
in public institutions, e.g. in SDG investment
development agencies or relevant investment
authorities, or in the context of regional SDG
investment development compacts where
costs and know-how can be shared.
• technical assistance from the international
development community, e.g. through
dedicated units in international organizations
(or in a multi-agency context) advising on PPP
project set-up and management.
An option that can alleviate risks associated with
PPPs, further leverage of public funds to increase
private sector contributions, and bring in technical
expertise, are three- or four-way PPP schemes
with the involvement not only of local governments
and private sector investors, but also with donor
countries and MDBs as partners.
Link the availability of guarantee
and risk insurance facilities to
SDGs
Numerous countries promote outward investment
by providing investment guarantees that protect
investors against certain political risks in host
countries (such as the risk of discrimination,
expropriation, transfer restrictions or breach
of contract). Granting such guarantees can be
conditional on the investment complying with
sustainability criteria. A number of countries, such as
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Japan, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom and the United States require
environmental and social impact assessments be
done for projects with potentially significant adverse
impacts.28
In addition to mechanisms providing insurance
against political risks at the country level,
mechanisms providing guarantees and risk
insurance offered by multilateral development
institutions also take into account sustainable
developmentobjectives.Forinstance,indetermining
whether to issue a guarantee, the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency evaluates all projects
in accordance with its Policy on Environmental and
Social Sustainability, adopted in October 2013. 29
Public sector and ODA-leveraging
and blended financing
National, regional and multilateral development
banks, as well as ODA, can represent critical
sources of finance that can be used as leveraging
mechanisms. In a similar vein, development banks
can play a crowding-in role, enabling private

investment, or providing support for the private
sector in periods of crisis when firms cannot
receive financing from private banks. In addition
development banks have played, and continue
to play, a role in socially oriented projects where
private investment is lacking.
ODA can play similar roles, especially in vulnerable
economies. For instance, the 2002 Monterrey
Consensus already pointed out the need to
intensify efforts to promote the use of ODA to
leverage additional financing for development. ODA
continues to be of critical importance, particularly for
LDCs, because financial flows to these countries are
small and the capacity to raise sufficient resources
domestically is lacking. Aid can act as a catalyst for
private investment, and there is growing consensus
on the potential complementarity of public aid
and private investment to foster development
(UNECOSOC 2013). To date, the share of ODA
supporting private investment is small, but interest
in this mechanism is rising among donor countries
and development finance institutions; for example,
blended ODA from EU institutions rose from 0.2
per cent in 2007 to almost 4 per cent in 2012
(EURODAD 2014). The amount of ODA directed to
private sector blending mechanisms is expected to
increase.
Public sector and ODA-leveraged and blended
financing involves using public and donor funds as
base capital, to share risks or improve risk-return
profiles for private sector funders. Blending can
reduce costs as it involves the complementary use
of grants and non-grant sources such as loans
or risk capital to finance investment projects in
developing countries. It can be an effective tool for
investment with long gestation periods and with
economic and social rates of return exceeding the
pure financial rate of return (e.g. in the renewable
energy sector).
Caution must be exercised in the use of blending,
as it involves risks. Where the private funding
component exclusively pursues financial returns,
development impact objectives may be blurred.
ODA can also crowd out non-grant finance (Griffiths
et al. 2014). Evaluating blended projects is not
easy and it can be difficult to demonstrate key
success factors, such as additionality, transparency
and accountability and to provide evidence of
development impact.
Advance market commitments and
other market creation mechanisms
In several SDG sectors, private investment is
severely constrained by the absence of a sufficient
market. For instance, private basic health and
education services, but also infrastructure services,
such as private water and electricity supply, may
not be affordable to large parts of the population.
Examples of policy options to help create markets
in SDG sectors that can attract private sector
investment include:
• Policies aimed at enhancing social
inclusiveness and accessibility of basic
services – such as subsidy schemes for the
poor in the form of education vouchers or cash
grants for energy and water distribution.
• Public procurement policies, through which
governments at the central and local level can
give preference to the purchase of goods that
have been produced in an environmentally and
socially-friendly manner. Cities, for example,
increasingly have programs relating to the
purchase of hybrid fleets or renewable power,
the upgrading of mass transportation systems,
green city buildings or recycling systems
(WIR10).
• Feed-in tariffs for green electricity produced
by households or other private sector entities
that are not utilities but that can supply excess
energy to the grid (WIR10).
• Regional cooperation can help create markets,
especially for cross-border infrastructure
projects, such as roads, electricity or water
supply, by overcoming market fragmentation.
Other concrete mechanisms may include so-called
advance market commitments. These are binding
contracts typically offered by governments or
financing entities which can be used (i) to guarantee
a viable market, e.g. for goods that embody socially
beneficial technologies for which private demand
is inadequate, such as in pharmaceuticals and
renewable energy technologies (UNDESA 2012);
(ii) to provide assured funding for the innovation

of socially beneficial technologies, e.g. through
rewards, payments, patent buyouts, even if
the private demand for the resulting goods is
insufficient; and/or (iii) to act as a consumption
subsidy when the RD costs are high and the
returns uncertain, with a result of lowering the price
for consumers, often allowing the private sector to
remain in charge of the production, marketing and
distribution strategies. Donors guarantee a viable
market for a known period, which reduces the
risks for producers associated with RD spending
(i.e. commitments act as incentives for producers
to invest in research, staff training and production
facilities). Advance market commitments (United
Nations I-8 Group 2009) have been used to raise
finance for development of vaccine production for
developing countries, for instance by successfully
accelerating the availability of the pneumococcal
vaccine in low-income countries.
4. Establishing new incentives schemes
and a new generation of investment
promotion institutions
Alleviating constraints in the policy framework
of host countries may not be sufficient to trigger
private investment in SDGs. Potential investors may
still hesitate to invest because they consider the
overall risk-return ratio as unfavourable. Investment
promotion and facilitation efforts can help overcome
investor reluctance.
a. Transform IPAs into SDG
investment development
agencies
A new generation of investment promotion requires
agencies to target SDG investors and to develop
and market pipelines of bankable projects.
Through their investment promotion and facilitation
policies, and especially in the priorities given
to investment promotion agencies (IPAs), host
countries pursue a variety of mostly economic
objectives, above all job creation, export promotion,
technology dissemination and diffusion, linkages
with local industry and domestic value added
as well as skills development (see figure III.4 in
chapter III). Most IPAs, therefore, do not focus
specifically on SDG investment objectives or SDG
sectors, although the existing strategic priorities do
contribute to sustainable development through the
generation of income and poverty alleviation.
Pursuing investments in SDGs implies, (i) targeting
investors in sectors or activities that are particularly
conducive to SDGs and (ii) creating and bringing
to market a pipeline of pre-packaged bankable
projects.
In pursuing SDG-related investment projects,
IPAs face a number of challenges beyond those
experienced in the promotion of conventional FDI.
In particular:
• A broadening of the IPA network of in-country
partnerships. Currently, typical partners of
IPAs include trade promotion organizations,
economic development agencies, export
processing zones and industrial estates,
business development organizations, research
institutions and universities. While these
relationships can help promote investment in
SDG projects, the network needs to expand to
include public sector institutions dealing with
policies and services related to infrastructure,
health, education, energy and rural
development, as well as local governments,
rural extension services, non-profit
organizations, donors and other development
stakeholders.
• Broadening of contacts with wider groups of
targets and potential investors, including not
only TNCs but also new potential sources
of finance, such as sovereign wealth funds,
pension funds, asset managers, non-profit
organizations, and others.
• Development of in-house expertise on
sustainable development-related investment
projects, new sectors and possible support
measures. IPAs, which traditionally focus
on attracting investments in manufacturing
and commercial services, need to become
familiar with the concept of SDG-related
investment projects, including PPPs. Training
in international best practice and investment
promotion techniques could be acquired from
international organizations and private sector
groups. For example, in 2013, UNCTAD
started a program that assists IPAs from
developing countries in the promotion of green
FDI.

To channel investment into SDG sectors that may be
less visible or attractive to investors, governments
– alone or in the context of regional cooperation
– should develop a pipeline of bankable SDG
investment projects.
Key characteristics of bankable projects are
prioritization, preparation and packaging:
• Political prioritization involves the identification
of priority projects and the determination
of priority sectors, based on national
development objectives and strategies. The
projects should be politically feasible within the
economic development strategy of the country,
with a clear political consensus at all levels
(national, state and provincial as applicable)
and public support. Thus projects should be
selected on the basis of a consensus among
government entities on their priorities. At
this inception stage, policymakers should
identify scalable business models and develop
strategies for large-scale roll-out over the long
term.
• Regulatory preparation involves the pre-
clearing of regulatory aspects and facilitation of
administrative procedures that might otherwise
deter investors. Examples include pre-approval
of market-support mechanisms or targeted
financial incentives (such fiscal incentives
aiming to reduce the cost of capital); advance
processing of required licenses and permits
(e.g. planning permissions); or carrying out
environmental impact studies prior to inviting
bids from investors.
• Packaging relates to the preparation of
concrete project proposals that show viability
from the standpoint of all relevant stakeholders,
e.g. technical feasibility studies for investors,
financial feasibility assessments for banks
or environmental impact studies for wider
stakeholders. Governments can call upon
service providers (e.g. technical auditors,
test and certification organizations) to assist
in packaging projects. Packaging may also
include break up or aggregation/bundling
of projects into suitable investment sizes for
relevant target groups. And it will include the
production of the “prospectus” that can be
marketed to investors.
Public funding needs for feasibility studies and
other project preparation costs can be significant.
They typically average 5–10 per cent of total project
costs, which can add up to hundreds of millions of
dollars for large infrastructure projects (World Bank
2013b). To accelerate and increase the supply
of bankable projects at the national and regional
levels, particularly in LDCs, international support
programmes could be established with the financial
support of ODA and technical assistance of MDBs.
b. Redesign of investment
incentives for SDGs
Reorienting investment incentives towards SDGs
implies targeting investments in SDG sectors
and making incentives conditional on social and
environmental performance.
Designing investment incentives schemes for
SDGs implies putting emphasis on the quality
of investments in terms of their mid- and long-
term social and environmental effects (table
IV.3). Essentially, incentives would move from
purely “location-focused” (a tool to increase the
competitiveness of a location) to more “SDG-
focused” (a tool to promote investment in
sustainable development).
SDG-oriented investment incentives can be of two
types:
• Incentives targeted specifically at SDG
sectors (e.g. those provided for investment in
renewable energy, infrastructure or health).
• Incentives conditional upon social and
environmental performance of investors
(including, for instance, related to policies
on social inclusion). Examples include
performance requirements relating to
employment, training, local sourcing of inputs,
RD, energy efficiency or location of facilities in
disadvantaged regions.
Table IV.4 contains some examples of investment
incentives related to environmental sustainability.
In UNCTAD’s most recent survey of IPAs, these
agencies noted that among SDG sectors investment
incentive schemes are mostly provided for energy,
RD and infrastructure development projects. In
addition to these sectors, incentives are sometimes

Table IV.3. Traditional and sustainable development oriented investment incentives
Traditional economic growth oriented investment
incentives
Investment incentives that take into account sustainable
development considerations
Focus on sectors important for economic growth, job
creation and export generation
Additional focus on SDG sectors
Focus on short- and medium-term economic gains Long-term implications of investment for sustainable development
considered
Cost-benefit analysis in favour of economic gains Cost-benefit analysis with adequate weight to long-term social and
environmental costs of investment
Lowering of regulatory standards considered as a policy
option
Lowering of regulatory standards as part of the incentives package
excluded
Monitoring primarily of economic impacts of the investment Monitoring of the overall impact of the investment on sustainable
development
Source: UNCTAD.
provided for projects across numerous SDG areas,
or linked to SDG objectives through performance
criteria.
In addition to financial, fiscal or regulatory incentives,
governments can facilitate investors by building
surrounding enabling infrastructure or by letting
them use such infrastructure at low or zero cost.
For instance, investments in agricultural production
require good storage and transportation facilities.
Investments in renewable energy (e.g. wind or solar
parks) necessitate the building of a grid to transport
the energy to consumers. The construction of
schools and hospitals in rural areas calls for
adequate roads, and public transportation to make
education and health services easily reachable.
There is an important role for domestic, regional
and multilateral development banks in realizing
such enabling projects.
A reorientation of investment incentives policies
(especially regulatory incentives) towards
sustainable development could also necessitate a
phasing out of incentives that may have negative
social or ecological side effects, in particular where
such incentives result in a “race-to-the-bottom”
with regard to social or environmental standards or
in a financially unsustainable “race to the top”.
A stronger focus on sustainable development may
call for a review of existing subsidy programs for
entire industries. For example, the World Bank
estimates that $1 trillion to $1.2 trillion per year
are currently being spent on environmentally
harmful subsidies for fossil fuels, agriculture, water
and fisheries (World Bank 2012). More generally,
investment incentives are costly. Opportunity costs
must be carefully considered. Public financial
outlays in case of financial incentives, or missed
revenues in case of fiscal incentives, could be used
directly for SDG investment projects.
Investment incentives should also not become
permanent; the supported project must have the
potential to become self-sustainable over time –
something that may be difficult to achieve in some
SDG sectors. This underlines the importance
of monitoring the actual effects of investment
incentives on sustainable development, including
the possibility of their withdrawal if the impact
proves unsatisfactory.
c. Establish regional SDG
investment compacts
Regional SDG investment compacts can help spur
private investment in cross-border infrastructure
projects and build regional clusters of firms in SDG
sectors.
Regional cooperation can foster SDG investment.
A key area for such SDG-related cross-border
cooperation is infrastructure development.
Existing regional economic cooperation initiatives
could evolve towards regional SDG investment
compacts. Such compacts could focus on
liberalization and facilitation of investment and
establish joint investment promotion mechanisms
and institutions. Regional industrial development
compacts could include in their scope all policy
areas important for enabling regional development,
such as the harmonization, mutual recognition or

Table IV.4. Examples of investment incentives linked to environmental sustainability
Country Environmental incentives
Brazil • Initiative and incentive programs for wind, power, biomass and small hydro-subsectors
Canada
• Special tax credits for development of new technologies that address issues of climate change, clean air,
and water and soil quality
• Nova Scotia provides up to 20 per cent of the development cost of ocean tech and non-traditional energy
sources
Germany • Grant programs for projects related to energy efficiency, CO2
reduction and renewable energy
Indonesia • 5- to 10-year tax break in renewable energy
Japan
• Investments in smart communities that unite information networks, energy systems and traffic systems as
well as improve comfort and reduce CO2
emissions
South Africa • Accelerated depreciation for investments in renewable energy and biofuel production
• Tax break for entities that become more energy-efficient
• Allowance for expenditure on green technology and improved resource efficiency
Turkey • Interest-free loans for renewable energy production and for projects to improve energy efficiency and reduce
environmental impact
United Kingdom • Funding schemes for off-shore wind farms
United States
• Guaranteed loans to eligible clean energy projects and direct loans to manufacturers of advanced
technology vehicles and components
• Tax incentives to improve energy efficiency in the industrial sector
• Incentives at the state level
Source: UNCTAD based on desk research.30
approximation of regulatory standards and the
consolidation of private standards on environmental,
social and governance issues.
Regional SDG investment compacts could aim to
create cross-border clusters through the build-up
of relevant infrastructure and absorptive capacity.
Establishing such compacts implies working in
partnership, between governments of the region
to identify joint investment projects, between
investment promotion agencies for joint promotion
efforts, between governments and international
organizations for technical assistance and capacity-
building, and between the public and private sector
for investment in infrastructure and absorptive
capacity (figure IV.12) (see also WIR13).
5. Building SDG investment partnerships
Partnerships between home countries of investors,
host countries, TNCs and MDBs can help
overcome knowledge gaps as well as generate joint
investments in SDG sectors.
Private investors’ lack of awareness of suitable
sustainable development projects, and a shortfall
in expertise, can be overcome through knowledge-
sharing mechanisms, networks and multi-
stakeholder partnerships.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships can support
investment in SDG sectors because they enhance
cooperation, understanding and trust between
key partners. Partnerships can facilitate and
strengthen expertise, for instance by supporting
the development of innovative and synergistic ways
to pool resources and talents, and by involving
relevant stakeholders that can make a contribution
to sustainable development. Partnerships can
have a number of goals, such as joint analysis and
research, information sharing to identify problems
and solutions, development of guidelines for best
practices, capacity-building, progress monitoring
and implementation, or promotion of understanding
and trust between stakeholders. The following are
two examples of potential partnerships that can
raise investor expertise in SDGs.
Partnerships between home- and
host-country investment promotion
agencies.
Cooperation between outward investment
agencies in home countries and IPAs in host

Figure IV.12. Regional SDG Investment Compacts
Source: UNCTAD.
Partnerships between governments
in regions
Partnerships
between the
public and
private sectors
Partnerships
between
governments and
international
organizations
Partnerships between trade and
investment promotion agencies
Integrated investment agreements
(liberalization and facilitation)
Joint investment promotion
mechanisms and institutions
Joint
infrastructure
development
projects
Joint
programmes
to build
absorptive
capacity
Regional SDG
Investment
Compact
countries could be ad hoc or systematic, and
potentially institutionalized. IPAs that target projects
related to sustainable development could partner
with outward investment agencies for three broad
purposes:
• Information dissemination and marketing
of SDG investment opportunities in home
countries. Outward investment agencies could
provide matching services, helping IPAs identify
potential investors to approach.
• Where outward investment agencies provide
investment incentives and facilitation services
to their investors for SDG projects, the
partnership could increase chances of realizing
the investment.
• Outward investment agencies incentives for
SDG investments could be conditional on
the ESG performance of investors, ensuring
continued involvement of both parties in
the partnership for monitoring and impact
assessment.
Through such partnerships outward investment
agencies could evolve into genuine business
development agencies for investments in SDGs
in developing countries, raising awareness of
investment opportunities, helping investors bridge
knowledge gaps and gain expertise, and practically
facilitating the investment process.
SVE-TNC-MDB triangular
partnerships
Partnerships between governments of SVEs,
private investors (TNCs), and MDBs could be
fostered with the aim of promoting investments
in SDG sectors which are of strategic interest to
SVEs. Depending on the economy, the strategic
sector may be infrastructure, a manufacturing
industry or even a value chain segment. Crucially,
in such “triangular” partnerships, stakeholders

would work together to identify the bottlenecks
for private investment, and jointly develop public-
private solutions to develop the strategic sector,
bearing in mind wider socioeconomic and long-
term ramifications. In particular, the partnership
would work towards raising long-term, sound and
sustainable investment in SDGs, but also promote
investment in surrounding economic and social
infrastructure, giving support to governments
towards a sound management of resources through
collaborative stakeholder engagement. In all cases,
the SVE government has to be in the “driver’s seat”.
Participating TNCs will typically be players in the
sector, with consequent reputational risks if the
partnership fails. In some case the SVE may make
up (or become) an important part of the TNCs’
operations in a sector – e.g. as a supply base for a
commodity – leading to the firm having a stake in
a well-run economy and local development. TNCs
may also enter the partnership to demonstrate
good corporate citizenship. The participation
of MDBs – or equivalent entities – is required to
monitor progress and impact, safeguard against
unwarranted economic dominance, provide policy
advice, and run contiguous development projects
(e.g. linkages created with local firms).
Beyond formal partnerships, broad knowledge-
sharing platforms can also help. Governments,
private and public research institutions, market
intermediaries and development agencies all play
a role in producing and disseminating information
on investment experience and future project
opportunities. This can be done through platforms
for knowledge sharing and dissemination.
Examples include the Green Growth Knowledge
Platform (GGKP), launched by the Global Green
Growth Institute, the OECD, UNEP and the World
Bank. Investors themselves also establish networks
that foster relationships, propose tools, support
advocacy, allow sharing of experiences, and can
lead to new investment opportunities.
F. Ensuring sustainable development impact of
investment in the SDGs
1. Challenges in managing the impact of
private investment in SDG sectors
Key challenges in managing the impact of private
investment in SDG sectors include weak absorptive
capacity in some developing countries, social and
environmental impact risks, the need for stakeholder
engagement and effective impact monitoring.
Once investment has been mobilized and
channelled towards SDG sectors, there remain
challenges to overcome in order to ensure that the
resultant benefits for sustainable development are
maximized, and the potential associated drawbacks
mitigated (figure IV.13). Key challenges include the
following.
Weak absorptive capacity in developing economies.
Developing countries, LDCs in particular, often
suffer from a lack of capacity to absorb the benefits
of investment. There is a risk that the gains from
investment accrue primarily to the investor and are
not shared through spillovers and improvement
in local productive capacity. A lack of managerial
or technical capabilities among local firms and
workers hinders the extent to which they can form
business linkages with foreign investors, integrate
new technologies, and develop local skills and
capacity.
Risks associated with private investment in SDG
sectors. There are challenges associated with
greater private sector engagement in often sensitive
SDG sectors in developing countries. At a general
level, the social and environmental impacts of private
sector operations need to be addressed across
the board. But opening basic-needs sectors such
as water and sanitation, health care or education
to private investors requires careful preparation
and the establishment of appropriate regulatory
frameworks within which firms will operate.
In addition, where efforts are made specifically
to attract private investment from international
investors, there are risks that part of the positive
impact of such investment for local economies does

Figure IV.13. Maximizing the sustainable development impact of investment and minimizing risks
•
Establish effective regulatory frameworks and standards
• Environmental, labour, social regulations; effective taxation; mainstreaming of SDGs
into IIAs; coordination of SDG investment policies at national and international levels.
Need to minimize risks
associated with private
Inadequate investment
impact measurement and
reporting tools
• Weak absorptive capacity in
developing countries
Need to engage
stakeholders and manage
impact trade-offs
Build productive capacity, entrepreneurship, technology, skills, linkages
• Entrepreneurship development, inclusive finance initiatives, technology dissemination,
business linkages.
• New economic zones for SDG investment, or conversion of existing SEZs and
technology zones.
Good governance, capable institutions, stakeholders engagement
• Stakeholder engagement for private investment in sensitive SDG sectors;
institutions with the power to act in the interest of stakeholders.
Implement SDG impact assessment systems
• Indicators for measuring (and reporting to stakeholders) the economic, social and
environmental performance of SDG investments.
• Corporates to add ESG and SDG dimensions to financial reporting to influence their
behaviour on the ground.
•
•
Source: UNCTAD.
not materialize or leaks away as a result of relatively
low taxes paid by investors (in cases where they
are attracted with the help of fiscal incentives) or
profits being shifted out of the country within the
international networks of TNCs. The tax collection
capabilities of developing countries, and especially
LDCs, may not be sufficient to safeguard against
such practices.
Finally, regulatory options for governments to
mitigate risks and safeguard against negative
effects when attracting private investment into
SDG sectors can be affected by international
commitments that reduce policy space.
Need to engage stakeholders and manage trade-
offs effectively. Attracting needed investment
in agriculture to increase food production may
have consequences for smallholders or displace
local populations. Investments in infrastructure
can affect local communities in a variety of ways.
Investments in water supply can involve making
trade-offs between availability and affordability in
urban areas versus wider accessibility. Health and
education investments, especially by private sector
operators, are generally sensitive areas that require
engagement with stakeholders and buy-in from
local communities. Managing such engagement
in the investment process, and managing
the consequences or negative side effects of
investments requires adequate consultation
processes and strong institutions.
Inadequate investment impact measurement and
reporting tools. Ensuring the on-the-ground impact
of investment in SDG sectors is fundamental
to justifying continued efforts to attract private
investment in them and to enhance governance
of such investment. Many initiatives to mobilize
and channel funds to SDGs are hampered by a
lack of accurate impact indicators. Even where
measurement tools exist at the project level (e.g.
for direct impacts of individual investments on their
immediate environment), they may be available
at the macro level (e.g. long-term aggregate
impacts of investments across a sector). Adequate
measurement of impact is a prerequisite for many
upstream initiatives.

2. Increasing absorptive capacity
The development of local enterprise and local
technological capabilities that will enhance the
ability of domestic firms to engage in and benefit
from technology and skills dissemination is referred
to in this chapter as domestic absorptive capacity.
Domestic absorptive capacity is crucial not only to
increase chances of attracting private investment,
but also in order to maximize the benefits of private
investment in SDG sectors. Policy can help create
an operating environment that allows local firms,
entrepreneurs and workers to realize the benefits of
investment in SDG sectors. The key elements that
enhance absorptive capacity differ by SDG sector
(table IV.5). The development of these absorptive
capacity elements also builds productive capacity
in host countries which in turn encourages further
investment, creating a virtuous circle.
a. Key policy areas:
entrepreneurship, technology,
skills, linkages
A range of policy tools is available to increase
absorptive capacity, including the promotion
and facilitation of entrepreneurship, support to
technology development, human resource and
skills development, business development services
and promotion of business linkages.
A wide range of policy options exist for
governments to improve the absorptive capacity of
local economies, in order to maximize the benefits
of private investment entering SDG sectors. Firstly,
this revolves around increasing involvement of local
entrepreneurs; micro, small and medium-sized
firms; and smallholders, in the case of agricultural
investment. Secondly, governments can increase
the domestic skills base not only as an enabler
for private investment, but also to increase the
transfer of benefits to local economies. Thirdly,
local enterprise development and upgrading can
be further encouraged through the widening and
deepening of SDG-oriented linkages programmes.
Technology dissemination and knowledge sharing
between firms is key to technological development,
for instance of new technologies that would result
in green growth. Fostering linkages between firms,
within and across borders, can facilitate the process
of technology dissemination and diffusion, which
in turn can be instrumental in helping developing
countries catch up with developed countries and
shift towards more sustainable growth paths.
Promote entrepreneurship
• Stimulating entrepreneurship, including social
entrepreneurship, for sustainable development.
Domestic entrepreneurial development can
strengthen participation of local entrepreneurs
within or related to SDG sectors, and foster
inclusiveness (see UNCTAD’s Entrepreneurship
Policy Framework31
). In particular, through
social entrepreneurship, governments can
create special business incubators for social
enterprises. The criteria for ventures to be
hosted in such “social business incubators”
are that they should have a social impact, be
sustainable and show potential for growth.
These kinds of initiatives are proliferating
worldwide, as social entrepreneurs are
identified as critical change agents who will
use economic and technological innovation to
achieve social development goals.32
Table IV.5. Selected ways to raise absorptive
capacity in SDG sectors
SDG sector Examples
Infrastructure
(50%)
Construction and engineering capabilities of
local firms and workforce
Project management expertise of local
workforce
Presence of local suppliers and contractors
Climate
change
and
environment
(27%)
Entrepreneurship skills, clusters of renewable
energy firms
RD, science and technology parks for low
carbon technology
Presence of laboratories, research institutes,
universities
Food security
(12%)
Clusters of agribusiness processing firms
Local suppliers of inputs, crops, fertilizers,
replacement machinery
Local workforce skilled in crop production and
processing
Social sectors
(11%)
Local skills in provision of services e.g. teaching,
nursing
Managerial capabilities to run schools, hospitals
Local (social) entrepreneurship skills
Source: UNCTAD.
Note: Percentages represent the average share of investment
needs identified for each sector in section B.

• Encourage financial inclusiveness. Initiatives
and programmes can be encouraged to
facilitate access to finance for entrepreneurs
in micro, small and medium-sized firms or
women-owned firms (or firms owned by under-
represented groups). In order to improve
access to credit by local small and medium-
sized enterprises and smallholders, loans
can be provided by public bodies when no
other reasonable option exists. They enable
local actors to make investments of a size
and kind that the domestic private banking
sector may not support. Financial guarantees
by governments put commercial banks in a
position to grant credits to small customers
without a financial history or collateral. Policies
can also relax some regulatory requirements
for providing credits, for instance the “know
your customer” requirement in financial
services (Tewes-Gradl et al. 2013).
Boost technology and skills
development
• Support science and technology development.
Technical support organizations in standards,
metrology, quality, testing, RD, productivity
and extension for small and medium-sized
enterprises are necessary to complete and
improve the technology systems with which
firms operate and grow. Appropriate levels
of intellectual property (IP) protection and an
effective IP rights framework can help give
firms confidence in employing advanced
technologies and provide incentives for
local firms to develop or adapt their own
technologies.
• Develop human resources and skills. Focus on
training and education to raise availability of
relevant local skills in SDG sectors is a crucial
determinant to maximize long-term benefits
from investment in SDG sectors. Countries can
also adopt a degree of openness in granting
work permits to skilled foreign workers,
to allow for a lack of domestic skills and/
or to avail themselves of foreign skills which
complement and fertilize local knowledge and
expertise.
• Provide business development services.
A range of services can facilitate business
activity and investment, and generate
spillover effects. Such services might include
business development services centres and
capacity-building facilities to help local firms
meet technical standards and improve their
understanding of international trade rules and
practices. Increased access could be granted
for social enterprises, including through social
business incubators, clusters and green
technology parks.
• Establish enterprise clustering and networking.
Enterprise agglomeration may determine
“collective efficiency” that in turn enhances
the productivity and overall performance
of clustered firms. Both offer opportunities
to foster competitiveness via learning and
upgrading. Other initiatives include the
creation of social entrepreneurship networks
and networks of innovative institutions and
enterprises to support inclusive innovation
initiatives.
Widen and deepen SDG-oriented
linkages programmes
• Stimulate business linkages. Domestic and
international inter-firm and inter-institution
linkages can provide local firms with the
necessary externalities to cope with the
dual challenge of knowledge creation and
upgrading. Policies should be focused on
promoting more inclusive business linkages
models, including support for the development
of local processing units; fostering inclusive
rural markets including through pro-poor
public-private sector partnerships; integrating
inclusive business linkages promotion
into national development strategies; and
encouraging domestic and foreign investors to
develop inclusive business linkages.
• Create pro-poor business linkages
opportunities. Private investment in SDGs
can create new pro-poor opportunities for
local suppliers – small farmers, small service
providers and local vendors. Potential policy
actions to foster pro-poor linkages include
disseminating information about bottom of the

pyramid consumers’ needs; creating shared
supplier databases; leveraging local logistics
networks; introduce market diversification
services for local suppliers; addressing
constraints related to inadequate physical
infrastructure through supply collection
centres, shared premises and internet-based
solutions; and promoting micro-franchising
schemes, for instance in the health-care sector,
in order to promote access (to health services),
awareness, availability and affordability.
b. SDG incubators and special
economic zones
Development of linkages and clusters in incubators
or economic zones specifically aimed at stimulating
businesses in SDG sectors may be particularly
effective.
The aforementioned range of initiatives to maximize
absorptive capacity of SDG investment could be
made more (cost-) effective if they are conducted
in one place through the creation of special
economic zones (SEZs) or technology zones, or
the conversion of existing ones into SDG-focused
clusters. These can be used to promote, attract,
and retain investment in specific and interrelated
SDG sectors with a positive impact arising from:
• Clusters and networks of closely associated
firms and activities supporting the development
of inclusive spillovers and linkages within
zones, and beyond. As local firms’ capabilities
rise, demonstration effects become
increasingly important.
• Incubator facilities and processes designed
into zones’ sustainable development support
services and infrastructure to nurture local
business and social firms/entrepreneurs
(and assist them in benefitting from the local
cluster).
• Zones acting as mechanisms to diffuse
responsible practices, including in terms of
labour practices, environmental sustainability,33
health and safety, and good governance.
An SDG-focused zone could be rural-based, linked
to specific agricultural products, and designed to
support and nurture smallholder farmers, social
entrepreneurs from the informal sector and ensure
social inclusion of disadvantaged groups.
In the context of SDG-focused SEZs, policymakers
should consider broadening the availability of
sustainable-development-related policies, services
and infrastructure to assist companies in meeting
stakeholder demands – for instance, improved
corporate social responsibility policies and
practices. This would strengthen the State’s ability
to promote environmental best practices and meet
its obligation to protect the human rights of workers.
Finally, SEZs should improve their reporting to
better communicate the sustainable development
services.
3. Establishing effective regulatory
frameworks and standards
Increased private sector engagement in often
sensitive SDG sectors needs to be accompanied
by effective regulation. Particular areas of attention
include human health and safety, environmental and
social protection, quality and inclusiveness of public
services, taxation, and national and international
policy coherence.
Reaping the development benefits from investment
in SDG sectors requires not only an enabling
policy framework, but also adequate regulation
to minimize any risks associated with investment
(see table IV.6 for examples of regulatory tools).
Moreover, investment policy and regulations must
be adequately enforced by impartial, capable and
efficient public institutions, which is as important for
policy effectiveness as policy design itself.
In regulating investment in SDG sectors, and in
investment regulations geared towards sustainable
development in general, protection of human
rights, health and safety standards, social and
environmental protection and respect of core
labour rights are essential. A number of further
considerations are especially important:
• Safeguarding quality and inclusiveness of
public services. Easing constraints for private
investors in SDGs must not come at the price
of poor quality of services (e.g. in electricity or
water supply, education and health services).
This calls for appropriate standard setting by

host countries concerning the content, quality,
inclusiveness and reliability of the services
(e.g. programs for school education, hygienic
standards in hospitals, provision of clean water,
uninterrupted electricity supply, compulsory
contracting for essential infrastructure
services), and for monitoring compliance. Laws
on consumer protection further reinforce the
position of service recipients.
• Contractual arrangements between host
countries and private investors can play
a significant role. Through the terms of
concession agreements, joint ventures or
PPPs, host countries can ensure that private
service providers respect certain quality
standards in respect of human health,
environmental protection, inclusiveness and
reliability of supply. This includes a sanction
mechanism if the contractual partners fail to
live up to their commitments.
• Balancing the need for fair tax revenues
with investment attractiveness. Effective tax
policies are crucial to ensure that tax revenues
are sufficient and that they can be used
for SDGs, such as the financing of public
services, infrastructure development or health
and education services. Taxation is also an
important policy tool to correct market failures
in respect of the SDG impact of investment,
e.g. through imposing carbon taxes or
providing tax relief for renewable energies.
Introducing an efficient and fair tax system is,
however, far from straightforward, especially in
developing countries. A recent report on tax
compliance puts many developing countries
at the bottom in the ranking on tax efficiency
(PwC 2014b). Countries should consider
how to broaden the tax base, (i) by reviewing
incentive schemes for effectiveness, and (ii)
by improving tax collection capabilities and
combating tax avoidance. An example of
a successful recent tax reform is Ecuador,
which significantly increased its tax collection
rate. These additional revenues were spent
for infrastructure development and other
social purposes. The country now has the
highest proportion of public investment as a
share of GDP in the region.34
To combat tax
avoidance and tax evasion, it is necessary to
close existing loopholes in taxation laws. In
addition to efforts at the domestic level, this
requires more international cooperation, as
demonstrated by recent undertakings in the
G-20, the OECD and the EU, among others.
Developing countries, especially LDCs, will
require technical assistance to improve tax
collection capabilities and to deal with new and
complex rules that will emerge from ongoing
international initiatives.
• Ensuring coherence in national and
international policymaking. Regulations
need to cover a broad range of policy areas
beyond investment policies per se, such as
taxation, competition, labour market regulation,
environmental policies and access to land. The
coverage of such a multitude of different policy
areas confirms the need for consistency and
coherence in policymaking across government
institutions. At the domestic level, this means,
e.g. coordination at the interministerial level
and between central, regional and local
governments.
Table IV.6. Examples of policy tools to ensure the
sustainability of investment
SDG Regulations
Environmental
sustainability
Pollution emission rules (e.g. carbon taxes)
Environmental protection zones
Risk-sensitive land zoning
Environmental impact assessments of investments
Reporting requirements on environmental
performance of investment
Good corporate citizenship
Social
sustainability
Labour policies and contract law
Human rights
Land tenure rights
Migration policies
Safety regulations
Provisions on safe land and housing for low-
income communities
Prohibition of discrimination
Reporting requirements on social performance of
investment
Social impact assessments of investments
Source: UNCTAD.

Coherence is also an issue for the relationship
between domestic legislation and international
agreements in the areas of investment,
environmental protection and social rights,
among others. Numerous international
conventions and non-binding principles provide
important policy guidance on how to design
and improve domestic regulatory frameworks,
including UNCTAD’s IPFSD.
• Making international investment agreements
(IIAs) proactive in mobilizing and channelling
investment into SDGs. Most IIAs still remain
silent on environmental and social issues.
Only recent agreements start dealing with
sustainability issues, but primarily from the
perspective of maintaining regulatory space
for environmental and social purposes. IIAs
could do more and also promote investment in
SDGs in a proactive manner. This includes, for
example, emphasising the importance of SDGs
as an overarching objective of the agreement
or a commitment of contracting parties to
particularly encourage and facilitate investment
in SDGs. These are issues both for the
negotiation of new IIAs and the renegotiation
of existing agreements. Systematic reform, as
outlined in chapter III of this report, can help.
Finally, while laws and regulations are the basis of
investor responsibility, voluntary CSR initiatives and
standards have proliferated in recent years, and they
are increasingly influencing corporate practices,
behaviour and investment decisions. Governments
can build on them to complement the regulatory
framework and maximize the development
benefits of investment. A number of areas can
benefit from the encouragement of CSR initiatives
and the voluntary dissemination of standards; for
example, they can be used to promote responsible
investment and business behaviour (including the
avoidance of corrupt business practices), and they
can play an important role in promoting low-carbon
and environmentally sound investment.
4. Good governance, capable institutions,
stakeholder engagement
Good governance and capable institutions are key
enablers for the attraction of private investment in
general, and in SDG sectors in particular. They are
also needed for effective stakeholder engagement
and management of impact trade-offs.
Good governance and capable institutions are
essential to promoting investment in SDGs and
maximizing positive impact in a number of ways:
(i) to attract investment, (ii) to guarantee inclusive
policymaking and impacts, (iii) to manage synergies
and trade-offs.
Attracting investment. Good governance is a
prerequisite for attracting investment in general,
and in SDG sectors in particular. Investments in
infrastructure, with their long gestation period,
are particularly contingent on a stable policy
environment and capable local institutions.
Institutional capabilities are also important in dealing
or negotiating with investors, and for the effective
implementation of investment regulation.
Stakeholder engagement. Additionally, investment
in SDG areas affects many stakeholders in
different ways. Managing differential impacts and
“side effects” of SDG investments requires giving
a say to affected populations through effective
consultative processes. It also requires strong
capabilities on the part of governments to deal with
consequences, for example to mitigate negative
impacts on local communities where necessary,
while still progressing on investment in targeted
SDG objectives.
Adequate participation of multiple stakeholders
at various levels is needed, as governance of
investment in SDGs is important not just at the
national level but also at the regional and local levels.
In fact, SDG investments are subject to governance
at different levels, e.g. from local metropolitan areas
to national investments to regional infrastructure
(such as highways, intercity rail, port-related
services for many countries, transnational power
systems).
Synergies and trade-offs. A holistic, cross-sectoral
approach that creates synergies between the
different SDG pillars and deals with trade-offs is
important to promote sustainable development.
Objectives such as economic growth, poverty
reduction, social development, equity, and
sustainability should be considered together with
a long-term outlook to ensure coherence. To do

this, governments can make strategic choices
about which sectors to build on, and all relevant
ministries can be involved in developing a focused
development agenda grounded on assessments
of emerging challenges. Integration of budgets
and allocating resources to strategic goals rather
than individual ministries can encourage coherence
across governments. Integrated decision-making
for SDGs is also important at sub-national levels
(Clark 2012).
Promoting SDGs through investment-related
policies may also result in trade-offs between
potentially conflicting policy objectives. For
example, excessive regulation of investor activity
can deter investment; fiscal or financial investment
incentives for the development of one SDG pillar
can reduce the budget available for the promotion
of other pillars. Also, within regions or among social
groups, choices may have to be made when it
comes to prioritizing individual investment projects.
At the international policymaking level, synergies
are equally important. International macroeconomic
policy setting, and reforms of the international
financial architecture, have a direct bearing on
national and international investment policies, and
on the chances of success in attracting investment
in SDGs.
5. Implementing SDG impact assessment
systems
a. Develop a common set of SDG
impact indicators
Monitoring of the impact of investment, especially
along social and environmental dimensions, is key
to effective policy implementation. A set of core
quantifiable impact indicators can help.
Monitoring. SDG-related governance requires
monitoring the impact of investments, including
measuring progress against goals. UNCTAD has
suggested a number of guiding principles that are
relevant in this context (IPFSD, WIR12). Investment
policies should be based on a set of explicitly
formulated objectives related to SDGs and ideally
include a number of quantifiable goals for both
the attraction of investment and the impact of
investment on SDGs. The objectives should set
clear priorities, a time frame for achieving them,
and the principal measures intended to support the
objectives.
To measure policy effectiveness for the attraction
of investment, policymakers should use a focused
set of key indicators that are the most direct
expression of the core sustainable development
contributions of private investments, including
direct contributions to GDP growth through
additional value added, capital formation and
export generation; entrepreneurial development
and development of the formal sector and tax
base; and job creation. Central to this should be
indicators addressing labour, social, environmental
and sustainability development aspects.
The impact indicator methodology developed
for the G-20 Development Working Group by
UNCTAD, in collaboration with other agencies, may
provide guidance to policymakers on the choice of
indicators of investment impact and, by extension,
of investment policy effectiveness (see table IV.7).
The indicator framework, which has been tested
in a number of developing countries, is meant
to serve as a tool that countries can adapt and
adopt in accordance with their national sustainable
development priorities and strategies (see also
IPFSD, WIR12).
Sustainable development impacts of investment in
SDGs can be cross-cutting. For instance, clusters
promoting green technology entrepreneurship can
serve as economic growth poles, with employment
generation and creation of value added as
positive side effects. Investments in environmental
protection schemes can have positive effects on
human health and indirectly on economic growth.
Such cross-cutting effects should be reflected in
impact measurement methodologies.
At the micro level (i.e. the sustainable development
impact of individual investments), the choice of
indicators can be further detailed and sophisticated,
as data availability is greater. Additional indicators
might include qualitative measures such as new
management practices or techniques transferred,
social benefits generated for workers (health care,
pensions, insurance), or ancillary benefits not
directly related to the investment project objectives

(recreational facilities, schools and clinics for
workers, families or local communities).
b. Require integrated corporate
reporting for SDGs
Impact measurement and reporting by private
investors on their social and environmental
performance promotes corporate responsibility
on the ground and supports mobilization and
channelling of investment.
Corporate sustainability reporting is an important
enablerofpoliciestopromotetheSDGs.High-quality
sustainability reporting involves the generation of
internal company data on sustainability related
activities and control systems, facilitating proactive
management, target setting and benchmarking.
Publicly reported data can play an important role in
enabling governments to monitor the effectiveness
of policies and incentive structures, and often serve
as a prerequisite for resource mobilization for SDG
investment.
The importance of sustainability reporting has been
recognized throughout the process leading up
to the formation of the SDGs. In 2013, the High-
Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015
Development Agenda proposed that “in future – at
latest by 2030 – all large businesses should be
reporting on their environmental and social impact
– or explain why if they are not doing so”. (United
Nations 2013). In 2014, the European Parliament
adopted a directive which will require the disclosure
of environmental and social information by large
public-interest companies (500+ employees).
Individual UN Member States around the world
have also taken steps to promote sustainability
reporting.35
Apart from regulatory initiatives, some
Table IV.7. Possible indicators for the definition of investment impact objectives and
the measurement of policy effectiveness
Area Indicators Details and examples
Economic
value added
1. Total value added
• Gross output (GDP contribution) of the new/additional economic activity
resulting from the investment (direct and induced)
2. Value of capital formation • Contribution to gross fixed capital formation
3. Total and net export generation
• Total export generation; net export generation (net of imports) is also
captured by the value added indicator
4. Number of formal business entities
• Number of businesses in the value chain supported by the investment;
this is a proxy for entrepreneurial development and expansion of the
formal (tax-paying) economy
5. Total fiscal revenues
• Total fiscal take from the economic activity resulting from the investment,
through all forms of taxation
Job creation 6. Employment (number)
• Total number of jobs generated by the investment, both direct and induced
(value chain view), dependent and self-employed
7. Wages • Total household income generated, direct and induced
8. Typologies of employee skill levels
• Number of jobs generated, by ILO job type, as a proxy for job quality and
technology levels (including technology dissemination)
Sustainable
development
9. Labour impact indicators
• Employment of women (and comparable pay) and of disadvantaged
groups
• Skills upgrading, training provided
• Health and safety effects, occupational injuries
10. Social impact indicators • Number of families lifted out of poverty, wages above subsistence level
• Expansion of goods and services offered, access to and affordability of
basic goods and services
11. Environmental impact indicators • GHG emissions, carbon offset/credits, carbon credit revenues
• Energy and water consumption/efficiency hazardous materials
• Enterprise development in eco-sectors
12. Development impact indicators • Development of local resources
• Technology dissemination
Source: IAWG (2011).
Note: The report was produced by an inter-agency working group coordinated by UNCTAD.

stock exchanges have implemented mandatory
listing requirements in the area of sustainability
reporting.36
The content and approach to the preparation of
sustainability reports is influenced by a number
of international initiatives actively promoting
reporting practices, standards and frameworks.
Recent examples of such initiatives and entities
include the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),37
the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP),38
the
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC),39
the Accounting for Sustainability (A4S)40
and
the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
(SASB).41
UNCTAD has also been active in this area
(box IV.6)
Box IV.6. UNCTAD’s initiative on sustainability reporting
UNCTAD has provided guidance on sustainability rule making via its Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts
on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) (UNCTAD 2014). Member States at ISAR endorsed
the following recommendations:
• Introducing voluntary sustainability reporting initiatives can be a practical option to allow companies time to
develop the capacity to prepare high-quality sustainability reports.
• Sustainability reporting initiatives can also be introduced on a comply or explain basis, to establish a clear set of
disclosure expectations while allowing for flexibility and avoiding an undue burden on enterprises.
• Stock exchanges and/or regulators may consider advising the market on the future direction of sustainability
reporting rules. Companies should be allotted sufficient time to adapt, especially if stock exchanges or regulators
are considering moving from a voluntary approach to a mandatory approach.
• Sustainability reporting initiatives should avoid creating reporting obligations for companies that may not have
the capacity to meet them. Particularly in the case of mandatory disclosure initiatives, one option is to require
only a subset of companies (e.g. large companies or State-owned companies) to disclose on sustainability
issues.
• Stock exchanges and regulators may wish to consider highlighting sustainability issues in their existing definitions
of what constitutes material information for the purposes of corporate reporting.
• With a view to promoting an internationally harmonized approach, stock exchanges and regulators may wish to
consider basing sustainability reporting initiatives on an international reporting framework.
Considerations for the design and implementation of sustainability reporting initiatives include using a multi-
stakeholder consultation approach in the development process for creating widespread adoption and buy-in and
creating incentives for compliance, including public recognition and investor engagement.
Source: UNCTAD.

The range of challenges discussed in previous
sections, as well as the wide array of existing and
potential policy solutions available to overcome
those challenges, demonstrate above all that
there is no single all-encompassing solution or
“magic bullet” for increasing the engagement of the
private sector in raising finance for, and investing
in, sustainable development. The potential sources
and destinations of financial resources are varied,
and so are the constraints they face. This chapter
has attempted to highlight some of the paths that
financial flows can follow towards useful investment
in sustainable development projects, indicating
a number of policy solutions to encourage such
flows, to remove hurdles, to maximize the positive
impacts and to minimize the potential risks involved.
Many of the more concrete solutions have been tried
and tested over a significant period of time already
G. An Action Plan for Private Sector
Investment in the SDGs
– such as risk-sharing mechanisms including PPPs
and investment guarantees. Others have emerged
more recently, such as various ways to raise finance
for and stimulate impact investment. And yet others
require broader change in markets themselves, in
the mindset of participants in the market, in the way
sustainable development projects are packaged
and marketed, or in the broader policy setting for
investment.
Given the massive financing needs that will be
associated with the achievement of the SDGs,
all of these solutions are worth exploring. What
they need is a concerted push to address the
main challenges they face in raising finance and
in channelling it to sustainable development
objectives. Figure IV.14 summarizes the key
challenges and solutions discussed in this chapter
in the context of the proposed Strategic Framework
for Private Investment in the SDGs.
Figure IV.14. Key challenges and possible policy responses
IMPACT
minimizing risks
CHANNELLING
LEADERSHIP
policy coherence
MOBILIZATION
Raising finance and re-orienting
financial markets towards
investment in SDGs
Key challenges Policy responses
• Need for a clear sense of direction and common
• Need for clear objectives to galvanize global action
• Need to manage investment policy interactions
• Need for global consensus and an inclusive
process
• Agree a set of guiding principles for SDG investment
policymaking
• Set SDG investment targets
• Ensure policy coherence and synergies
• Multi-stakeholder platform and multi-agency technical
assistance facility
• Build an investment policy climate conducive to investing in
SDGs, while safeguarding public interests
• Expand use of risk sharing mechanisms for SDG
investments
• Establish new incentives schemes and a new generation of
investment promotion institutions
• Build SDG investment partnerships
• Build productive capacity, entrepreneurship, technology,
skills, linkages
• Establish effective regulatory frameworks and standards
• Good governance, capable institutions, stakeholder
engagements
• Implement a common set of SDG investment impact
indicators and push Integrated Corporate Reporting
• Create fertile soil for innovative SDG-financing approaches
and corporate initiatives
• Build or improve pricing mechanisms for externalities
• Promote Sustainable Stock Exchanges
• Introduce financial market reforms
• Start-up and scaling issues for new financing
solutions
• Failures in global capital markets
• Lack of transparency on sustainable corporate
performance
• Misaligned investor rewards/pay structures
• Entry barriers
• Lack of information and effective packaging and
promotion of SDG investment projects
• Inadequate risk-return ratios for SDG investments
• Lack of investor expertise in SDG sectors
• Weak absorptive capacity in developing countries
• Need to minimize risks associated with private
• Need to engage stakeholders and manage impact
trade-offs
• Inadequate investment impact measurement and
reporting tools
Source: UNCTAD.

1. A Big Push for private investment in
the SDGs
While there is a range of policy ideas and options
available to policymakers, a focused set of priority
packages can help shape a big push for SDG
investment.
There are many solutions, mechanisms and policy
initiatives that can work in raising private sector
investment in sustainable development. However, a
concerted push by the international community, and
by policymakers at national levels, needs to focus
on few priority actions – or packages. Six priority
packages that address specific segments of the
“SDG investment chain” and relatively homogenous
groups of stakeholders, could constitute a
significant “Big Push” for investment in the SDGs
(figure IV.15). Such actions must be in line with the
guiding principles for private sector investment in
SDGs (section C.2), namely balancing liberalization
and regulation, attractive risk return with accessible
and affordable services, the push for private funds
with the fundamental role of the State, and the
global scope of the SDGs with special efforts for
LDCs and other vulnerable economies.
1. A new generation of investment promotion
strategies and institutions. Sustainable
development projects, whether in infrastructure,
social housing or renewable energy, require
intensified efforts for investment promotion
and facilitation. Such projects should become
a priority of the work of investment promotion
agencies and business development
organizations, taking into account their
peculiarities compared to other sectors. For
example, some categories of investors in such
projects may be less experienced in business
operations in challenging host economies and
require more intensive business development
support.
The most frequent constraint faced by potential
investors in sustainable development projects
is the lack of concrete proposals of sizeable,
impactful, and bankable projects. Promotion
and facilitation of investment in sustainable
development should include the marketing
of pre-packaged and structured projects
with priority consideration and sponsorship
at the highest political level. This requires
specialist expertise and dedicated units,
e.g. government-sponsored “brokers” of
sustainable development investment projects.
Putting in place such specialist expertise
(ranging from project and structured finance
expertise to engineering and project design
skills) can be supported by technical
assistance from international organizations
and MDBs. Units could also be set up at the
regional level (see also the regional compacts)
to share costs and achieve economies of
scale.
At the international investment policy level,
promotion and facilitation objectives should
be supported by ensuring that IIAs pursue
the same objectives. Current agreements
focus on the protection of investment.
Mainstreaming sustainable development in IIAs
requires, among others, proactive promotion
of SDG investment, with commitments in
areas such as technical assistance. Other
measures include linking investment promotion
institutions, facilitating SDG investments
through investment insurance and guarantees,
and regular impact monitoring.
2. SDG-oriented investment incentives.
Investment incentive schemes can be
restructured specifically to facilitate sustainable
development projects, e.g. as part of risk-
sharing solutions. In addition, investment
incentives in general – independent of the
economic sector for which they are granted
– can incorporate sustainable development
considerations by encouraging corporate
behaviour in line with SDGs. A transformation
is needed to move incentives from purely
“location-focused” (aiming to increase
the attractiveness of a location) towards
increasingly “SDG-focused”, aiming to promote
investment for sustainable development.
Regional economic cooperation organizations,
with national investment authorities in their
region could adopt common incentive design
criteria with the objective of reorienting
investment incentive schemes towards
sustainable development.

Source: UNCTAD.
Figure IV.15. A Big Push for private investment in the SDGs: action packages
Balancing
liberalization and
regulation
Balancing the need
for attractive risk-
return rates with the
need for accessible
and affordable
services for all
Balancing a push
for private funds
with the push
for public
investment
Balancing the global
scope of the SDGs with
the need to make a
special effort in LDCs
Action Packages
2
Reorientation of investment
incentives
5
1
New generation of investment
promotion strategies and
institutions
Pro-active SDG investment
promotion and facilitation
 At national level:
strategies focusing on SDG
sectors
institutions: SDG investment
developing and marketing
pipelines of bankable projects
 New generation of IIAs:
–
– Safeguarding policy space for
6
Guiding Principles
 SDG-oriented investment
incentives
– Targeting SDG sectors
– Conditional on sustainability
contributions
 SDG investment guarantees
and insurance schemes
3
 Regional/South-South economic
cooperation focusing on:
– Regional cross-border SDG
infrastructure development
– Regional SDG industrial
clusters, including development
of regional value chains
– Regional industrial collaboration
agreements
Regional SDG Investment
Compacts
Enabling innovative financing
and a reorientation of
financial markets
 New SDG financing vehicles
 SDG investment impact
indicators
 Investors’ SDG contribution
rating
 Integrated reporting and multi-
stakeholder monitoring
 Sustainable Stock
Exchanges (SSEs)
Changing the global
business mindset
 Global Impact MBAs
 Training programmes for SDG
investment (e.g. fund
management/financial market
certifications)
 Enrepreneurship programmes
in schools
4
 Partnerships between outward
investment agencies in home
countries and IPAs in host
countries
 Online pools of bankable SDG
projects
 SDG-oriented linkages
programmes
 Multi-agency technical
assistance consortia
 SVE-TNC-MDG partnerships
New forms of partnerships
for SDG investment

3. Regional SDG Investment Compacts. Regional
South-South cooperation can foster SDG
investment. A key area for such SDG-related
cross-border cooperation is infrastructure
development. Existing regional economic
cooperation initiatives could evolve towards
regional SDG investment compacts. Such
compacts could focus on reducing barriers
and facilitating investment and establish
joint investment promotion mechanisms and
institutions. Regional industrial development
compacts could include all policy areas
important for enabling regional development,
such as the harmonization, mutual recognition
or approximation of regulatory standards
and the consolidation of private standards on
environmental, social and governance issues.
4. New forms of partnership for SDG investments.
Partnerships in many forms, and at different
levels, including South-South, are crucial to the
performance and success of SDG investments.
First, cooperation between outward investment
agencies in home countries and IPAs in
host countries could be institutionalized for
the purpose of marketing SDG investment
opportunities in home countries, provision of
investment incentives and facilitation services
for SDG projects; and joint monitoring and
impact assessment. Outward investment
agencies could evolve into genuine business
development agencies for investments in
SDG sectors in developing countries, raising
awareness of investment opportunities,
helping investors bridge knowledge gaps
and gain expertise, and practically facilitating
the investment process. Concrete tools that
might support SDG investment business
development services might include on-line
tools with pipelines of bankable projects,
and opportunities for linkages programmes
in developing countries. Multi-agency
consortia (a “one-stop shop” for SDG
investment solutions) could help to support
LDCs in establishing appropriate institutions
and schemes to encourage, channel and
maximize the impact from private sector
investment.
Other forms of partnership might lead to SDG
incubators and special economic zones based
on close collaboration between the public
and private sectors (domestic and foreign),
such as SDG-focused rural-based agriculture
zones or SDG industrial model towns, which
could support more effective generation,
dissemination and absorption of technologies
and skills. They would represent hubs from
which activity, knowledge and expertise could
spill into and diffuse across the wider economy.
In a similar vein, triangular partnerships, such
as between SVEs, TNCs and MDBs could be
fostered to engage the private sector in the
nurturing and expansion of sectors, industries
or value chain segments.
5. Enabling innovative financing mechanisms
and reorienting financial markets. New and
existing innovative financing mechanisms,
such as green bonds and impact investing,
would benefit from a more effective enabling
environment, allowing them to be scaled up
and targeted at relevant sources of capital and
ultimate beneficiaries. Systematic support and
effective inclusion would especially encourage
the emergence, take-up and/or expansion
of under-utilized catalytic instruments (e.g.
vertical funds) or go-to-market channels such
as crowd funding. Beyond this, integrated
reporting on the economic, social and
environmental impact of private investors is
a first step towards encouraging responsible
behaviour by investors on the ground. It
is a condition for other initiatives aimed at
channelling investment into SDG projects
and maximizing impact; for example, where
investment incentives are conditional upon
criteria of social inclusiveness or environmental
performance, such criteria need clear and
objective measurement. In addition, it is an
enabler for responsible investment behaviour
in financial markets and a prerequisite for
initiatives aimed at mobilizing funds for
investment in SDGs.
6. Changing the business mindset and
developing SDG investment expertise. The
majority of managers in the world’s financial
institutions and large multinational enterprises
– the main sources of global investment –
as well as most successful entrepreneurs

tend to be strongly influenced by models of
business, management and investment that
are commonly taught in business schools.
Such models tend to focus on business and
investment opportunities in mature or emerging
markets, with the risk-return profiles associated
with those markets, while they tend to ignore
opportunities outside the parameters of these
models. Conventional models also tend to be
driven exclusively by calculations of economic
risks and returns, often ignoring broader social
and environmental impacts, both positive and
negative. Moreover, a lack of consideration in
standard business school teachings of the
challenges associated with operating in poor
countries, and the resulting need for innovative
problem solving, tend to leave managers ill-
prepared for pro-poor investments.
The majority of students interested in social
entrepreneurship end up starting projects
in middle- to high-income countries, and
most impact investments – investments with
objectives that explicitly include social or
environmental returns – are located in mature
markets. A curriculum for business schools
that generates awareness of investment
opportunities in poor countries and that instils
in students the problem solving skills needed in
developing-country operating environments will
have an important long-term impact.
UNCTAD, in partnership with business school
networks, teachers, students as well as
corporates, is currently running an initiative
to develop an “impact curriculum” for MBA
programmes and management schools, and
a platform for knowledge sharing, exchange of
teaching materials and pooling of “pro-poor”
internship opportunities in LDCs. UNCTAD
invites all stakeholders who can contribute to
join the partnership.
2. Stakeholder engagement and a
platform for new ideas
The Strategic Framework for Private Investment
in the SDGs provides a basis for stakeholder
engagement and development of further ideas.
UNCTAD’s World Investment Forum and its
Investment Policy Hub provide the infrastructure.
The Plan of Action for Private Investment in the
SDGs (figure IV.16) proposed in this chapter is not
an all-encompassing or exhaustive list of solutions
and initiatives. Primarily it provides a structured
framework for thinking about future ideas. Within
each broad solution area, a range of further
options may be available or may be developed,
by stakeholders in governments, international
organizations, NGOs, or corporate networks.
UNCTAD is keen to learn about such ideas and
to engage in discussion on how to operationalize
them, principally through two channels: first,
through UNCTAD’s intergovernmental and expert
group meetings on investment, and in particular
the biennial World Investment Forum (WIF); and,
second, through an open process for collecting
inputs and feedback on the Plan of Action, and
through an on-line discussion forum on UNCTAD’s
Investment Policy Hub.
(i) The World Investment Forum:
Investing in Sustainable
Development
The World Investment Forum 2014 will be held
in October 2014 in Geneva, and will have as its
theme “Investing in Sustainable Development”.
High-level participants including Heads of State,
parliamentarians, ministers, heads of international
organizations, CEOs, stock exchange executives,
SWF managers, impact investors, business
leaders, academics, and many other stakeholders
will consider how to raise financing by the private
sector, how to channel investment to sustainable
development projects, and how to maximize
the impact of such investment while minimizing
potential risks involved. They will explore existing
and new solutions and discuss questions such as:
• which financing mechanisms provide the best
return, i.e. which mechanisms can mobilize
more resources, more rapidly and at the lowest
opportunity cost for sustainable development;
• which types of investments will yield the
most progress on the SDGs and are natural
candidates for involvement of the private
sector;

• which types of investment in which a significant
role is envisaged for the private sector require
the most policy attention.
As suggested in the Plan of Action, the biennial WIF
could become a permanent “Global Stakeholder
Review Mechanism” for investment in the SDGs,
reporting to ECOSOC and the UN General
Assembly.
(ii) UNCTAD’s Investment Policy
Hub
In its current form, the Plan of Action for Investment
in the SDGs has gone through numerous
consultations with experts and practitioners. It is
UNCTAD’s intention to provide a platform for further
consultation and discussion with all investment and
sustainable development stakeholders, including
policymakers, the international development
community, investors, business associations,
and relevant NGOs and interest groups. To allow
for further improvements resulting from such
consultations, the Plan of Action has been designed
as a “living document”. The fact that the SDGs
are still under discussion, as wells as the dynamic
nature of the investment policy environment add to
the rationale for such an approach.
The Plan of Action provides a point of reference and
a common structure for debate and cooperation on
national and international policies to mobilize private
sector funds, channel them to SDGs, and maximize
impact. UNCTAD will add the infrastructure for such
cooperation, not only through its policy forums
on investment, but also by providing a platform
for “open sourcing” of best practice investment
policies through its website, as a basis for the
inclusive development of further options with the
participation of all.

Figure IV.16. Detailed plan of action for private investment in the SDGs
Detailed plan of action for private investment in the SDGs
Leadership
Setting
guiding
principles,
galvanizing
action,
ensuring
policy
coherence
Recommended Actions

Description

Mobilization
Further
policy
options
 chanisms for externalities 

Further
policy
options
 


 


 






 
Debt swaps and write-offs
Voluntary contributions/product labelling/certification
Set SDG investment targets
Change business/investor mindsets
Build or improve pricing me
Create fertile soil for innovative SDG-financing
approaches and corporate initiatives
Establish a global multi-stakeholder platform on
investing in the SDGs
Agree a set of guiding principles for SDG investment
policymaking
Create a multi-agency technical assistance facility
Promote Sustainable Stock Exchanges
– Realign incentives in capital markets
– Develop new rating methodologies for SDG
investments
Introduce financial market reforms
– Facilitate and support SDG-dedicated financial
instruments and impact Investing initiatives
– Expand initiatives that use the capacity of a
public sector to mobilize private finance
– Build and support go-to-market channels for
SDG investment projects in financial markets
– “Global Impact MBA”
– Other educational initiatives


Quantitative and time-bound targets for investment in SDG
sectors and LDCs, committed to by the international community.
Modalities to internalize in investment decisions the cots of
externalities, e.g. carbon emissions, water use.
Mechanisms to redirect debt repayment to SDG sectors.
A multi-agency institutional arrangement to support LDCs,
advising on e.g. guarantees, bankable project set-up, incentive
scheme design and regulatory frameworks.
Internationally agreed principles, including definition of SDGs,
policy-setting parameters, and operating, monitoring and impact
assessment mechanisms.
A regular forum bringing together all stakeholders, such as a
regular segment in UNCTAD’s World Investment Forum or an
expert committee on SDG investment reporting to ECOSOC and
the General Assembly.
SDG listing requirements, indices for performance measurement
and reporting for investors and broader stakeholders.
Reform of pay, performance and reporting structures to favor
long-term investment conducive to SDG achievement
Rating methodologies that reward long-term real investment in
SDG sectors.
Incentives for and facilitation of financial instruments that link
investor returns to impact, e.g. green bonds.
Use of government-development funds as seed capital or
guarantee to raise further private sector resources in financial
markets
Channels for SDG investment projects to reach fund managers,
savers and investors in mature financial markets, ranging from
securitization to crowd funding.
Contributions collected by firms (e.g. through product sales) and
passed on to development funds.
Dedicated MBA programme or modules to teach mindset and
skills required for investing and operating in SDG sectors in low-
income countries (e.g. pro-poor business models).
Changes in other educational programmes, e.g. specialized
financial markets/advisors training, accounting training, SDG
entrepreneurship training.
Raising
finance and
reorienting
financial
markets
towards
investment
in SDGs
/...

Figure IV.16. Detailed plan of action for private investment in the SDGs (concluded)
– Create SDG incubators and clusters
Build an investment policy climate conducive to
investing in SDGs, while safeguarding public interests
Increase absorptive capacity
Establish effective regulatory frameworks and
Good governance, capable institutions, stake-
holder engagement
– Build productive capacities, linkages and
spillovers
Detailed plan of action for private investment in the SDGs (concluded)
Recommended Actions Description
National and international investment policy elements geared
towards promoting sustainable development (e.g. UNCTAD's
IPFSD); formulating national strategies for attracting investment
in SDG sectors.
New economic zones for SDG investment, or conversion of
existing SEZs and technology zones.
Further
policy
options
Entrepreneurship development, technology dissemination,
business linkages, inclusive finance initiatives, etc.

Establish new incentives schemes and a new
generation of investment promotion institution
– Make investment incentives fit-for-purpose for the
promotion of SDG investment
– Transform IPAs into SDG investment
– Establish regional SDG investment compacts

Expand use of risk-sharing tools for SDG investments
– Improve and expand use of PPPs
– Provide SDG investment guarantees and risk
insurance facilities
– Expand use of ODA-leveraged and blended
financing
– Create markets for SDG investment outputs

Transformation of IPAs towards a new generation of investment
promotion, focusing on the preparation and marketing of
pipelines of bankable projects and impact assessment
Regional cooperation mechanisms to promote investment in
SDGs, e.g. regional cross-border infrastructure, regional SDG
clusters.
Re-design of investment incentives, facilitating SDG investment
projects, and supporting impact objectives of all investment.


standards

Environmental, labour and social regulations; effective taxation;
mainstreaming of SDGs into IIAs; coordination of SDG
investment policies at national and international levels, etc.






Advance market commitments and other mechanisms to provide
more stable and more reliable markets for SDG investors.
Wider use of PPPs for SDG projects to improve risk-return
profiles and address market failures.
Wider availability of investment guarantee and risk insurance
facilities to specifically support and protect SDG investments.
Use of ODA funds as base capital or junior debt, to share risks
or improve risk-return profile for private sector funders.





– Require integrated corporate reporting for SDGs
Implement SDG impact assessment systems
– Develop a common set of SDG investment impact
indicators
Addition of ESG and SDG dimensions to financial reporting to
influence corporate behavior on the ground.

Indicators for measuring (and reporting to stakeholders) the
economic, social and environmental performance of SDG
investments.


 Stakeholder engagement for private investment in sensitive
SDG sectors; institutions with the power to act in the
interest of stakeholders, etc.
Build SDG investment partnerships
– Partner home- and host-country investment
promotion agencies for investment in the SDGs
– Develop SVE-TNC-MDB triangular partnerships
Create a global SDG Wiki platform and investor

Home-country partner to act as business development agency
to facilitate investment in SDG sectors in developing countries.
Global companies and MDBs to partner with LDCs and small
vulnerable economies, focusing on a key SDG sector or a
product key to economic development.
Knowledge-sharing platforms and networks to share expertise
on SDG investments and signal opportunities



networks
Further
policy
options
Impact
Maximizing
sustainable
development
benefits,
minimizing
risks
Chanelling
Promoting
and
facilitating
investment in
SDG sectors
Source: UNCTAD.

Notes
1
For the macroeconomic aspects of investment, see TDR
2008, TDR 2013, UNDESA 2009.
2
Estimates for ecosystems/biodiversity are excluded from
totals because these overlap with estimates for other
sectors, such as climate change and agriculture.
3
Both figures are annualized averages over the period
2015-2030.
4
The final year target results from a standard exponential
growth projection, to avoid an unrealistic increase in
investment in the first year.
5
See also Summers, L. (2010). “The over-financialization of
the US economy”, www.cambridgeforecast.wordpress.
com.
6
BIS International Banking Statistics (2014), www.bis.org.
7
Equator Principles, www.equator-principles.com.
8
Joint statement by Climatewise, MunichRe Climate
Insurance Initiative and the UNPRI, November 2013 www.
climatewise.org.uk.
9
Green bonds were designed in partnership with the
financial group Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken so that
they could ensure a triple A rated fixed-income product
to support projects related to climate change. They
can be linked to carbon credits, so that investors can
simultaneously fight global warming, support SDG projects
and hedge their exposure to carbon credits. According
to the WEF (2013 - Box 2.2) “The size of the green bond
market has been estimated at $174 billion by HSBC and
the Climate Bonds Initiative, under a definition that looks
beyond explicitly labeled ‘green/climate bonds’. Other
estimates, including those from the OECD, place the
market nearer to $86 billion.”
10
In the case of green bonds, these were mainly the preserve
of international financial institutions until recently. In 2013
and 2014, EDF and Toyota became issuers of green
bonds and in 2014 Unilever went beyond projects such as
renewable energy and electric vehicles, aiming to reduce
the environmental footprint of its ordinary activities (“Green
Bonds: Spring in the air”, The Economist, 22 March 2014).
11
“EDF: Successful launch of EDF’s first Green Bond”,
Reuters, 20 November 2013.
12
“Toyota Said to Issue $1.75 Billion of Green Asset-Backed
Bonds”, Bloomberg News, 11 March 2014.
13
“Unilever issues first ever green sustainability bond”, www.
unilever.com.
14
Some typologies differentiate between social and impact
investment, with the former stressing the generation of
societal value and the latter profit, but the distinction
is not clear (a mix of impact and profit prevails in both
types); many organisations and institutions use the terms
interchangeably.
15
The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
has secured pledges of about $30 billion since its creation
in 2002, and over 60 per cent of pledges have been paid
to date (World Bank 2013b).
16
The Global Environment Fund GEF – a partnership
between 182 countries, international agencies, civil society
and private sector – has provided $11.5 billion in grants
since its creation in 1991 and leveraged $57 billion in co-
financing for over 3,215 projects in over 165 countries
(World Bank 2013b).
17
Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund, www.aecfafrica.org.
18
GAVI Matching Fund, www.gavialliance.org.
19
The International Finance Facility for Immunisation Bonds,
www.iffim.org.
20
“Call to increase opportunities to make low carbon fixed
income investments”, www.climatewise.org.uk.
21
Kiva, www.kiva.org.
22
A wide range of institutions has made proposals in this
area, for example, UNCTAD (2009a), Council of the EU
(2009), FSB (2008), G-20 (2009), IMF (2009), UK Financial
Services Authority (2009), UK H.M. Treasury (2009), US
Treasury (2009), among others.
23
For an update on global financial architecture see FSB
(2014).
24
The SSE has a number of Partner Exchanges from around
the world, including the Bombay Stock Exchange, Borsa
Istanbul, BMFBOVESPA (Brazil), the Egyptian Exchange,
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the London Stock
Exchange, the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the New York
Stock Exchange, NASDAX OMX, and the Warsaw Stock
Exchange. Collectively these exchanges list over 10,000
companies with a market capitalization of over $32 trillion.
25
However, certain SDG sectors, such as water supply or
energy distribution, may form a natural monopoly, thereby
de-facto impeding the entry of new market participants
even in the absence of formal entry barriers.
26
Examples and case studies can be found in UNDP (2008),
World Bank (2009a), IFC (2011), UNECE (2012).
27
There exist a number of useful guides, for instance, World
Bank (2009b) and UNECE (2008).
28
Australia, Export Finance and Insurance Commission,
http://stpf.efic.gov.au; Austrian Environmental and Social
Assessment Procedure, www.oekb.at; Delcredere |
Ducroire (2014); Nippon Export and Investment Insurance
“Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations
in Trade Insurance”, http://nexi.go.jp; Atradius Dutch
State Business, “Environmental and Social Aspects”,
www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl; UK Export Finance,
“Guidance to Applicants: Processes and Factors in UK
Export Finance Consideration of Applications”, www.gov.
uk; Overseas Private Investment Corporation (2010).
29
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, “Policy on Envi-
ronmental and Social Sustainability”, www.miga.org.
30
ApexBrasil - Renewable Energy, www2.apexbrasil.com.
br; Deloitte (2013b); “Environmental financial incentives in
South Africa”, Green Business Guide, 14 January 2013,
www.greenbusinessguide.co.za; Japan External Trade
Organization - Attractive Sectors: Future Energy Systems,
http://jetro.org; Nova Scotia – Capital Investment Incentive,
www.novascotia.ca; Regulation of the Minister of Finance
of Indonesia Number 130/PMK.011/2011, “Provision of
Corporate Income Tax Relief or Reduction Facility”; South
Africa Department of Trade and Industry, “A Guide to
Incentive Schemes 2012/13”, www.thedti.gov.za; Turkey
Investment Support and Promotion Agency – Turkey’s
Investment Incentives System, www.invest.gov.tr; United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Department
for Business, Innovation Skills – Grant for Business
Investment: Guidelines, www.gov.uk; U.S. Department
of Energy – About the Loan Programs Office (LPO): Our
Mission, www.energy.gov/lpo/mission; U.S. Department
of Energy – State Energy Efficiency Tax Incentives for
Industry, www.energy.gov.
31
UNCTAD Entrepreneurship Policy Framework, www.
unctad-org/diae/epf.
32
For example, RLabs Innovation Incubator in South Africa
provides entrepreneurs with a space to develop social
businesses ideas aimed at impacting, reconstructing and
empowering local communities through innovation. The

Asian Social Enterprise Incubator (ASEI) in the Philippines
provides comprehensive services and state of the art
technology for social enterprises engaged at the base
of the pyramid. The GSBI Accelerator program, from
Santa Clara University, California, pairs selected social
entrepreneurs with two Silicon Valley executive mentors,
to enable them to achieve scale, sustainability and impact.
At the global level, the Yunus Social Business Incubator
Fund operates in several developing countries to create
and empower local social businesses and entrepreneurs
to help their own communities by providing pro-poor
healthcare, housing, financial services, nutrition, safe
drinking water and renewable energy.
33
For instance, the zones may have well developed
environmental reporting requirements under which
companies are required to report their anticipated amounts
of wastes, pollutants, and even the decibel level of noise
that is expected to be produced (see also WIR 2013).
Several zones around the world have been certified to the
ISO 14001 environmental management system standard.
34
World Bank – Ecuador Overview, www.worldbank.org.
35
India, for example, requires the largest 100 listed
companies on its major stock exchanges to report on
environmental and social impacts.
36
For example, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South
Africa. Many other exchanges, such as BMFBovespa in
Brazil, have actively promoted voluntary mechanisms such
as reporting standards and indices to incentivize corporate
sustainability reporting.
37
Producer of the most widely used sustainability reporting
guidelines. According to a 2013 KPMG study, 93 per cent
of the world’s largest 250 companies issue a CR report,
of which 82 per cent refer to the GRI Guidelines. Three-
quarters of the largest 100 companies in 41 countries
produce CR reports, with 78 per cent of these referring to
the GRI Guidelines (KPMG 2013).
38
A global system for companies and cities to measure,
disclose, manage and share environmental information
and host to the Climate Disclosure Standards Board.
Over 4,000 companies worldwide use the CDP reporting
system.
39
Producer of the International Integrated Reporting
Framework, recognizes sustainability as a contributor to
value creation.
40
Works to catalyze action by the finance, accounting and
investor community to support a fundamental shift towards
resilient business models and a sustainable economy.
41
Provides standards for use by publicly listed corporations
in the United States in disclosing material sustainability
issues for the benefit of investors and the public.

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ANNEX TABLES 203
Annex Tables
Table 1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008−2013 ............................................................... 205
Table 2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2013 ..................................................... 209
Table 3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2007−2013 ........... 213
Table 4. Value of cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2007−2013 .......................................... 216
Table 5. Cross-border MA deals worth over $3 billion completed in 2013 .................................. 217
Table 6. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2007−2013 ............................... 218
Table 7. List of IIAs as of end 2013................................................................................................. 222

List of annex tables available on the UNCTAD site,
www.unctad.org/wir, and on the CD-ROM
1. FDI inflows, by region and economy, 1990−2013
2. FDI outflows, by region and economy, 1990−2013
3. FDI inward stock, by region and economy, 1990−2013
4. FDI outward stock, by region and economy, 1990−2013
5. FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 1990−2013
6. FDI outflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 1990−2013
7. FDI inward stock as percentage of gross domestic products, by region and economy, 1990−2013
8. FDI outward stock as percentage of gross domestic products, by region and economy, 1990−2013
9. Value of cross-border MA sales, by region/economy of seller, 1990−2013
10. Value of cross-border MA purchases, by region/economy of purchaser, 1990−2013
11. Number of cross-border MA sales, by region/economy of seller, 1990−2013
12. Number of cross-border MA purchases, by region/economy of purchaser, 1990−2013
13. Value of cross-border MA sales, by sector/industry, 1990−2013
14. Value of cross-border MA purchases, by sector/industry, 1990−2013
15. Number of cross-border MA sales, by sector/industry, 1990−2013
16. Number of cross-border MA purchases, by sector/industry, 1990−2013
17. Cross-border MA deals worth over $1 billion completed in 2013
18. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source, 2003−2013
19. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by destination, 2003−2013
20. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by sector/industry, 2003−2013
21. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source, 2003−2013
22. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by destination, 2003−2013
23. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by sector/industry, 2003−2013
24. Estimated world inward FDI stock, by sector and industry, 1990 and 2012
25. Estimated world outward FDI stock, by sector and industry, 1990 and 2012
26. Estimated world inward FDI flows, by sector and industry, 1990−1992 and 2010−2012
27. Estimated world outward FDI flows, by sector and industry, 1990−1992 and 2010−2012
28. The world's top 100 non-financial TNCs, ranked by foreign assets, 2013
29. The top 100 non-financial TNCs from developing and transition economies, ranked by foreign assets, 2012

ANNEX TABLES 205
Annex table 1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008–2013
Region/economy
FDI inflows FDI outflows
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
World 1 818 834 1 221 840 1 422 255 1 700 082 1 330 273 1 451 965 1 999 326 1 171 240 1 467 580 1 711 652 1 346 671 1 410 696
Developed economies 1 032 385 618 596 703 474 880 406 516 664 565 626 1 599 317 846 305 988 769 1 215 690 852 708 857 454
Europe 577 952 408 924 436 303 538 877 244 090 250 799 1 045 129 431 433 591 326 653 000 299 478 328 729
European Union 551 413 363 133 383 703 490 427 216 012 246 207 983 601 383 598 483 002 585 275 237 865 250 460
Austria 6 858 9 303 840 10 618 3 939 11 083 29 452 10 006 9 994 21 878 17 059 13 940
Belgium 193 950 60 963 77 014 119 022 - 30 261 - 2 406 221 023 7 525 24 535 96 785 - 17 443 - 26 372
Bulgaria 9 855 3 385 1 525 1 849 1 375 1 450 765 - 95 230 163 345 179
Croatia 5 938 3 346 490 1 517 1 356 580 1 405 1 273 - 152 53 - 36 - 187
Cyprus 1 414 3 472 766 2 384 1 257 533 2 717 383 679 2 201 - 281 308
Czech Republic 6 451 2 927 6 141 2 318 7 984 4 990 4 323 949 1 167 - 327 1 790 3 294
Denmark 1 824 3 917 - 11 522 13 094 2 831 2 083 13 240 6 305 - 124 12 610 7 976 9 170
Estonia 1 731 1 840 1 598 340 1 517 950 1 114 1 547 142 - 1 452 952 357
Finland - 1 144 718 7 359 2 550 4 153 - 1 065 9 297 5 681 10 167 5 011 7 543 4 035
France 64 184 24 215 33 628 38 547 25 086 4 875 155 047 107 136 64 575 59 552 37 195 - 2 555
Germany 8 109 23 789 65 620 59 317 13 203 26 721 72 758 69 639 126 310 80 971 79 607 57 550
Greece 4 499 2 436 330 1 143 1 740 2 567 2 418 2 055 1 558 1 772 677 - 627
Hungary 6 325 1 995 2 202 6 290 13 983 3 091 2 234 1 883 1 148 4 663 11 337 2 269
Ireland - 16 453 25 715 42 804 23 545 38 315 35 520 18 949 26 616 22 348 - 1 165 18 519 22 852
Italy - 10 835 20 077 9 178 34 324 93 16 508 67 000 21 275 32 655 53 629 7 980 31 663
Latvia 1 261 94 380 1 466 1 109 808 243 - 62 19 62 192 345
Lithuania 1 965 - 14 800 1 448 700 531 336 198 - 6 55 392 101
Luxembourg 16 853 19 314 39 731 18 116 9 527 30 075 14 809 1 522 21 226 7 750 3 063 21 626
Malta 943 412 924 276 4 - 2 100 457 136 130 4 - 42 - 7
Netherlands 4 549 38 610 - 7 324 21 047 9 706 24 389 68 334 34 471 68 341 39 502 267 37 432
Poland 14 839 12 932 13 876 20 616 6 059 - 6 038 4 414 4 699 7 226 8 155 727 - 4 852
Portugal 4 665 2 706 2 646 11 150 8 995 3 114 2 741 816 - 7 493 14 905 579 1 427
Romania 13 909 4 844 2 940 2 522 2 748 3 617 274 - 88 - 21 - 33 - 112 119
Slovakia 4 868 - 6 1 770 3 491 2 826 591 550 904 946 713 - 73 - 422
Slovenia 1 947 - 659 360 998 - 59 - 679 1 468 262 - 207 118 - 272 58
Spain 76 993 10 407 39 873 28 379 25 696 39 167 74 717 13 070 37 844 41 164 - 3 982 26 035
Sweden 36 888 10 093 140 12 924 16 334 8 150 30 363 26 202 20 349 29 861 28 951 33 281
United Kingdom 89 026 76 301 49 617 51 137 45 796 37 101 183 153 39 287 39 416 106 673 34 955 19 440
Other developed Europe 26 539 45 791 52 600 48 450 28 079 4 592 61 528 47 835 108 323 67 725 61 613 78 269
Gibraltar 159a
172a
165a
166a
168a
166a
- - - - - -
Iceland 917 86 246 1 108 1 025 348 - 4 209 2 292 - 2 357 23 - 3 206 395
Norway 10 251 16 641 17 044 20 586 16 648 9 330 20 404 19 165 23 239 19 880 19 782 17 913
Switzerland 15 212 28 891 35 145 26 590 10 238 - 5 252 45 333 26 378 87 442 47 822 45 037 59 961
North America 367 919 166 304 226 449 263 428 203 594 249 853 387 573 327 502 312 502 438 872 422 386 380 938
Canada 61 553 22 700 28 400 39 669 43 025 62 325 79 277 39 601 34 723 52 148 55 446 42 636
United States 306 366 143 604 198 049 223 759 160 569 187 528 308 296 287 901 277 779 386 724 366 940 338 302
Other developed countries 86 514 43 368 40 722 78 101 68 980 64 975 166 615 87 371 84 942 123 818 130 844 147 786
Australia 47 162 27 192 35 799 65 209 55 518 49 826 30 661 11 933 19 607 8 702 6 212 6 364
Bermuda 78 - 70 231 - 258 48 55 323 21 - 33 - 337 241 50
Israel 10 875 4 607 5 510 10 766 9 481 11 804 7 210 1 751 8 656 5 329 2 352 4 932
Japan 24 425 11 938 - 1 252 - 1 758 1 732 2 304 128 020 74 699 56 263 107 599 122 549 135 749
New Zealand 3 974 - 299 434 4 142 2 202 987 401 - 1 034 448 2 525 - 510 691
Developing economies 668 758 532 580 648 208 724 840 729 449 778 372 338 354 276 664 420 919 422 582 440 164 454 067
Africa 59 276 56 043 47 034 48 021 55 180 57 239 4 947 6 278 6 659 6 773 12 000 12 418
North Africa 23 153 18 980 16 576 8 506 16 624 15 494 8 752 2 588 4 847 1 575 3 273 1 481
Algeria 2 632 2 746 2 301 2 581 1 499 1 691 318 215 220 534 - 41 - 268
Egypt 9 495 6 712 6 386 - 483 6 881 5 553 1 920 571 1 176 626 211 301
Libya 3 180 3 310 1 909 - 1 425 702 5 888 1 165 2 722 131 2 509 180
Morocco 2 487 1 952 1 574 2 568 2 728 3 358 485 470 589 179 406 331
Sudan 2 600 2 572 2 894 2 692 2 488 3 094 98 89 66 84 175 915
Tunisia 2 759 1 688 1 513 1 148 1 603 1 096 42 77 74 21 13 22
Other Africa 36 124 37 063 30 458 39 515 38 556 41 744 - 3 805 3 690 1 813 5 198 8 726 10 937
West Africa 12 538 14 764 12 024 18 649 16 575 14 203 1 709 2 120 1 292 2 731 3 155 2 185
Benin 170 134 177 161 282 320 - 4 31 - 18 60 40 46
Burkina Faso 106 101 35 144 329 374 - 0 8 - 4 102 73 83
Cabo Verde 264 174 158 153 57 19 0 - 0 0 1 - 1 2a
Côte d’Ivoire 446 377 339 302 322 371 - - 9 25 15 29 33
Gambia 70 40 37 36 25 25a
- - - - - -
Ghana 1 220 2 897 2 527 3 222 3 293 3 226a
8 7 - 25 1 9a
Guinea 382 141 101 956 606 25 126 - - 1 3 1
Guinea-Bissau 5 17 33 25 7 15 - 1 - 0 6 1 - 0 0
Liberia 284 218 450 508 985 1 061 382 364 369 372 1 354 698a
Mali 180 748 406 556 398 410 1 - 1 7 4 16 9
Mauritania 343a
- 3a
131a
589a
1 383a
1 154a
4a
4a
4a
4a
4a
4a
Niger 340 791 940 1 066 841 631 24 59 - 60 9 2 - 7
/…

Annex table 1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008-2013 (continued)
Region/economy
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Nigeria 8 249 8 650 6 099 8 915 7 127 5 609 1 058 1 542 923 824 1 543 1 237
Senegal 398 320 266 338 276 298 126 77 2 47 56 32
Sierra Leone 58 111 238 950 548 579a
- - - - - -
Togo 24 49 86 728 94 84 - 16 37 37 1 264 35 37
Central Africa 5 021 6 027 9 389 8 527 9 904 8 165 149 53 590 366 222 634
Burundi 4 0 1 3 1 7 1 - - - - -
Cameroon 21 740 538 652 526 572a
- 2 - 69 503 187 - 284 135a
Central African Republic 117 42 62 37 71 1 - - - - - -
Chad 466a
376a
313a
282a
343a
538a
- - - - - -
Congo 2 526a
1 862a
2 211a
3 056a
2 758a
2 038a
- - - - - -
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 1 727 664 2 939 1 687 3 312 2 098 54 35 7 91 421 401
Equatorial Guinea - 794 1 636 2 734a
1 975a
2 015a
1 914a
- - - - - -
Gabon 773a
573a
499a
696a
696a
856a
96a
87a
81a
88a
85a
85a
Rwanda 102 119 42 106 160 111 - - - - - 14
São Tomé and Príncipe 79 16 51 32 23 30 0 0 0 0 0 0
East Africa 4 358 3 928 4 511 4 778 5 378 6 210 109 89 141 174 205 148
Comoros 5 14 8 23 10 14a
- - - - - -
Djibouti 229 100 27 78 110 286 - - - - - -
Eritrea 39a
91a
91a
39a
41a
44a
- - - - - -
Ethiopia 109 221 288 627 279 953a
- - - - - -
Kenya 96 115 178 335 259 514 44 46 2 9 16 6
Madagascar 1 169 1 066 808 810 812 838a
- - - - - -
Mauritius 383 248 430 433 589 259 52 37 129 158 180 135
Seychelles 130 171 211 207 166 178 13 5 6 8 9 8
Somalia 87a
108a
112a
102a
107a
107a
- - - - - -
Uganda 729 842 544 894 1 205 1 146 - - 4 - 1 - 0 - 1
United Republic of Tanzania 1 383 953 1 813 1 229 1 800 1 872 - - - - - -
Southern Africa 14 206 12 343 4 534 7 561 6 699 13 166 - 5 771 1 429 - 210 1 927 5 144 7 970
Angola 1 679 2 205 - 3 227 - 3 024 - 6 898 - 4 285 - 2 570 - 7 - 1 340 2 093 2 741 2 087
Botswana 521 129 136 1 093 147 188 - 91 6 1 - 10 9 - 0
Lesotho 194 178 51 53 50 44 - 0 3 21 22 20 17
Malawi 195 49 97 129 129 118a
19 - 1 42 50 50 47a
Mozambique 592 893 1 018 2 663 5 629 5 935 0 3 - 1 3 3 - 0
Namibia 720 522 793 816 861 699 5 - 3 5 5 - 6 - 8
South Africa 9 209 7 502 3 636 4 243 4 559 8 188 - 3 134 1 151 - 76 - 257 2 988 5 620
Swaziland 106 66 136 93 90 67a
- 8 7 - 1 9 - 6 1a
Zambia 939 695 1 729 1 108 1 732 1 811 - 270 1 095 - 2 - 702 181
Zimbabwe 52 105 166 387 400 400 8 - 43 14 49 27
Asia 396 025 323 683 409 021 430 622 415 106 426 355 236 380 215 294 296 186 304 293 302 130 326 013
East and South-East Asia 245 786 209 371 313 115 333 036 334 206 346 513 176 810 180 897 264 271 269 605 274 039 292 516
East Asia 195 446 162 578 213 991 233 423 216 679 221 058 142 852 137 826 206 699 213 225 220 192 236 141
China 108 312 95 000 114 734 123 985 121 080 123 911 55 910 56 530 68 811 74 654 87 804 101 000
Hong Kong, China 67 035 54 274 82 708 96 125 74 888 76 633 57 099 57 940 98 414 95 885 88 118 91 530
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 44a
2a
38a
56a
120a
227a
- - - - - -
Korea, Republic of 11 188 9 022 9 497 9 773 9 496 12 221 19 633 17 436 28 280 29 705 30 632 29 172
Macao, China 2 591 852 2 831 726 3 437 2 331a
- 83 - 11 - 441 120 456 45a
Mongolia 845 624 1 691 4 715 4 452 2 047 6 54 62 94 44 50
Taiwan Province of China 5 432 2 805 2 492 - 1 957 3 207 3 688 10 287 5 877 11 574 12 766 13 137 14 344
South-East Asia 50 340 46 793 99 124 99 613 117 527 125 455 33 958 43 071 57 572 56 380 53 847 56 374
Brunei Darussalam 330 371 626 1 208 865 895a
16 9 6 10 - 422a
- 135a
Cambodia 815 539 783 815 1 447 1 396a
20 19 21 29 36 42a
Indonesia 9 318 4 877 13 771 19 241 19 138 18 444a
5 900 2 249 2 664 7 713 5 422 3 676a
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 228 190 279 301 294 296a
- 75a
1a
- 1a
0a
- 21a
- 7a
Malaysia 7 172 1 453 9 060 12 198 10 074 12 306a
14 965a
7 784a
13 399a
15 249a
17 115a
13 600a
Myanmar 863 973 1 285 2 200 2 243 2 621 - - - - - -
Philippines 1 340 2 065 1 070 2 007 3 215 3 860 1 970 1 897 2 712 2 350 4 173 3 642
Singapore 12 201 23 821 55 076 50 368 61 159 63 772 6 806 26 239 33 377 23 492 13 462 26 967
Thailand 8 455 4 854 9 147 3 710 10 705 12 946 4 057 4 172 4 467 6 620 12 869 6 620
Timor-Leste 40 50 29 47 18 20a
- - 26 - 33 13 13a
Viet Nam 9 579 7 600 8 000 7 519 8 368 8 900 300 700 900 950 1 200 1 956
South Asia 56 692 42 427 35 038 44 372 32 442 35 561 21 647 16 507 16 383 12 952 9 114 2 393
Afghanistan 94 76 211 83 94 69 - - - - - -
Bangladesh 1 086 700 913 1 136 1 293 1 599 9 29 15 13 53 32
Bhutan 20 72 31 26 22 21 - - - - - -
India 47 139 35 657 27 431 36 190 24 196 28 199 21 147 16 031 15 933 12 456 8 486 1 679
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1 980 2 983 3 649 4 277 4 662 3 050 380a
356a
346a
360a
430a
380a
Maldives 181 158 216 256 284 325a
- - - - - -
Nepal 1 39 87 95 92 74 - - - - - -
Pakistan 5 438 2 338 2 022 1 326 859 1 307 49 71 47 62 82 237
/…

ANNEX TABLES 207
Annex table 1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008-2013 (continued)
Region/economy
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sri Lanka 752 404 478 981 941 916 62 20 43 60 64 65
West Asia 93 547 71 885 60 868 53 215 48 458 44 282 37 922 17 890 15 532 21 736 18 977 31 104
Bahrain 1 794 257 156 781 891 989 1 620 - 1 791 334 894 922 1 052
Iraq 1 856 1 598 1 396 2 082 2 376 2 852a
34 72 125 366 448 538a
Jordan 2 826 2 413 1 651 1 474 1 497 1 798 13 72 28 31 5 16
Kuwait - 6 1 114 1 304 3 260 3 931 2 329a
9 100 8 584 3 663 4 434 3 231 8 377a
Lebanon 4 333 4 804 4 280 3 485 3 674 2 833a
987 1 126 487 755 572 690a
Oman 2 952 1 485 1 782 1 563 1 040 1 626 585 109 1 498 1 233 877 1 384
Qatar 3 779 8 125 4 670 - 87 327 - 840 3 658 3 215 1 863 6 027 1 840 8 021
Saudi Arabia 39 456 36 458 29 233 16 308 12 182 9 298 3 498 2 177 3 907 3 430 4 402 4 943
State of Palestine 52 301 180 214 244 177 - 8 - 15 77 - 37 - 2 - 9
Syrian Arab Republic 1 466 2 570 1 469 804 - - 2a
- - - - -
Turkey 19 762 8 629 9 058 16 171 13 224 12 866 2 549 1 553 1 464 2 349 4 074 3 114
United Arab Emirates 13 724 4 003 5 500 7 679 9 602 10 488 15 820 2 723 2 015 2 178 2 536 2 905
Yemen 1 555 129 189 - 518 - 531 - 134 66a
66a
70a
77a
71a
73a
Latin America and the Caribbean 211 138 150 913 189 513 243 914 255 864 292 081 95 931 55 026 117 420 110 598 124 382 114 590
South and Central America 129 440 78 631 125 567 163 106 168 695 182 389 37 237 13 358 46 423 40 939 45 100 32 258
South America 93 394 56 677 95 875 131 120 142 063 133 354 35 869 3 920 30 996 28 042 22 339 18 638
Argentina 9 726 4 017 11 333 10 720 12 116 9 082 1 391 712 965 1 488 1 052 1 225
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 513 423 643 859 1 060 1 750 5 - 3 - 29 - - -
Brazil 45 058 25 949 48 506 66 660 65 272 64 045 20 457 - 10 084 11 588 - 1 029 - 2 821 - 3 496
Chile 15 518 12 887 15 725 23 444 28 542 20 258 9 151 7 233 9 461 20 252 22 330 10 923
Colombia 10 596 7 137 6 746 13 405 15 529 16 772 2 486 3 348 6 893 8 304 - 606 7 652
Ecuador 1 058 308 163 644 585 703 48a
51a
136a
65a
- 14a
62a
Guyana 178 164 198 247 276 240a
- - - - - -
Paraguay 209 95 216 557 480 382 8 - - - - -
Peru 6 924 6 431 8 455 8 233 12 240 10 172 736 411 266 113 - 57 136
Suriname - 231 - 93 - 248 70 62 113 - - - - 3 1 - 0
Uruguay 2 106 1 529 2 289 2 504 2 687 2 796 - 11 16 - 60 - 7 - 5 - 16
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 1 741 - 2 169 1 849 3 778 3 216 7 040 1 598 2 236 1 776 - 1 141 2 460 2 152
Central America 36 046 21 954 29 692 31 985 26 632 49 036 1 368 9 439 15 427 12 897 22 761 13 620
Belize 170 109 97 95 194 89 3 0 1 1 1 1
Costa Rica 2 078 1 347 1 466 2 176 2 332 2 652 6 7 25 58 428 273
El Salvador 903 366 - 230 219 482 140 - 80 - - 5 0 - 2 3
Guatemala 754 600 806 1 026 1 245 1 309 16 26 24 17 39 34
Honduras 1 006 509 969 1 014 1 059 1 060 - 1 4 - 1 2 55 26
Mexico 28 313 17 331 23 353 23 354 17 628 38 286 1 157 9 604 15 050 12 636 22 470 12 938
Nicaragua 626 434 508 968 805 849 19 - 29 18 7 44 64
Panama 2 196 1 259 2 723 3 132 2 887 4 651 248 - 174 317 176 - 274 281
Caribbean 81 698 72 282 63 946 80 808 87 169 109 692 58 693 41 668 70 998 69 658 79 282 82 332
Anguilla 101 44 11 39 44 56 2 0 0 0 0 -
Antigua and Barbuda 161 85 101 68 134 138 2 4 5 3 4 4
Aruba 15 - 11 187 488 - 326 163 3 1 3 3 3 4
Bahamas 1 512 873 1 148 1 533 1 073 1 111 410 216 150 524 132 277
Barbados 464 247 290 725 516 376a
- 6 - 56 - 54 - 25 89 3a
British Virgin Islands 51 722a
46 503a
50 142a
58 429a
72 259a
92 300a
44 118a
35 143a
53 883a
56 414a
64 118a
68 628a
Cayman Islands 19 634a
20 426a
8 659a
14 702a
6 808a
10 577a
13 377a
6 311a
16 946a
11 649a
13 262a
12 704a
Curaçao 147 55 89 69 57 27 - 1 5 15 - 30 12 - 20
Dominica 57 43 25 14 23 18 0 1 1 0 0 0
Dominican Republic 2 870 2 165 1 896 2 275 3 142 1 991 - 19 - 32 - 23 - 25 - 27a
- 21a
Grenada 141 104 64 45 34 78 6 1 3 3 3 3
Haiti 29 56 178 119 156 190 - - - - - -
Jamaica 1 437 541 228 218 490 567 76 61 58 75 3 - 2
Montserrat 13 3 4 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saint Kitts and Nevis 184 136 119 112 94 112 6 5 3 2 2 2
Saint Lucia 166 152 127 100 80 88 5 6 5 4 4 4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 159 111 97 86 115 127 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sint Maarten 86 40 33 - 48 14 58 16 1 3 1 - 4 2
Trinidad and Tobago 2 801 709 549 1 831 2 453 1 713 700 - - 1 060 1 681 742
Oceania 2 318 1 942 2 640 2 283 3 299 2 698 1 097 66 654 918 1 652 1 047
Cook Islands - - 6a
- - - - 963a
13a
540a
814a
1 307a
887a
Fiji 341 164 350 403 376 272 - 8 3 6 1 2 4
French Polynesia 14 22 64 136 156 119a
30 8 38 27 43 36a
Kiribati 3 3 - 0a
0a
1a
9a
1 - 1 - 0 - - 0a
- 0a
Marshall Islands 40a
- 11a
27a
34a
27a
23a
35a
- 25a
- 11a
29a
24a
19a
Micronesia, Federated States of - 5a
1a
1a
1a
1a
1a
- - - - - -
Nauru 1a
1a
- - - - - - - - - -
New Caledonia 1 746 1 182 1 863 1 768 2 564 2 065a
64 58 76 41 175 97a
Niue - - - - - - 4a
- 0a
- - 1a
- -
/…

Annex table 1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008-2013 (concluded)
Region/economy
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Palau 6a
1a
5a
5a
5a
6a
0a
- - - - -
Papua New Guinea - 30 423 29 - 310 25 18 0 4 0 1 89 -
Samoa 49 10 1 15 24 28 - 1 - 1 9 0
Solomon Islands 95 120 238 146 68 105 4 3 2 4 3 2
Tonga 4 - 0 7 28 8 12a
2 0 2 1 1a
1a
Vanuatu 44 32 41 58 38 35 1 1 1 1 1 0
Transition economies 117 692 70 664 70 573 94 836 84 159 107 967 61 655 48 270 57 891 73 380 53 799 99 175
South-East Europe 7 014 5 333 4 242 5 653 2 593 3 716 511 168 318 256 132 80
Albania 974 996 1 051 876 855 1 225 81 39 6 30 23 40
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 002 250 406 493 366 332 17 6 46 18 15 - 13
Serbia 2 955 1 959 1 329 2 709 365 1 034 283 52 189 170 54 13
Montenegro 960 1 527 760 558 620 447 108 46 29 17 27 17
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 586 201 212 468 93 334 - 14 11 2 - 0 - 8 - 2
CIS 109 113 64 673 65 517 88 135 80 655 103 241 60 998 48 120 57 437 72 977 53 371 98 982
Armenia 944 760 529 515 489 370 19 50 8 78 16 16
Azerbaijan 14 473 563 1 465 2 005 2 632 556 326 232 533 1 192 1 490
Belarus 2 188 1 877 1 393 4 002 1 464 2 233 31 102 51 126 156 173
Kazakhstan 16 819 14 276 7 456 13 760 13 785 9 739 3 704 4 193 3 791 5 178 1 959 1 948
Kyrgyzstan 377 189 438 694 293 758 - 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 - 0
Moldova, Republic of 711 208 208 288 175 231 16 7 4 21 20 28
Russian Federation 74 783 36 583 43 168 55 084 50 588 79 262 55 663 43 281 52 616 66 851 48 822 94 907
Tajikistan 376 95 8 70 233 108 - - - - - -
Turkmenistan 1 277a
4 553a
3 631a
3 399a
3 117a
3 061a
- - - - - -
Ukraine 10 913 4 816 6 495 7 207 7 833 3 771 1 010 162 736 192 1 206 420
Uzbekistan 711a
842a
1 628a
1 651a
674a
1 077a
- - - - - -
Georgia 1 564 659 814 1 048 911 1 010 147 - 19 135 147 297 113
Memorandum
Least developed countries (LDCs)b
18 931 18 491 19 559 22 126 24 452 27 984 - 1 728 1 092 375 4 297 4 454 4 719
Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)c
27 884 27 576 22 776 35 524 33 530 29 748 4 178 4 990 5 219 6 101 2 712 3 895
Small island developing States (SIDS)d
8 711 4 575 4 548 6 266 6 733 5 680 1 299 269 331 1 818 2 246 1 217
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a
Estimates.
b
Least developed countries include Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (which, however, graduated from LDC status effective 1 January 2014), São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia.
c
Landlocked developing countries include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad,
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal,
Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
d
Small island developing States include Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, the Marshall Islands,
Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe,
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

ANNEX TABLES 209
Annex table 2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2013
Region/economy
FDI inward stock FDI outward stock
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013
World 2 078 267 7 511 300 25 464 173 2 087 908 8 008 434 26 312 635
Developed economies 1 563 939 5 681 797 16 053 149 1 946 832 7 100 064 20 764 527
Europe 808 866 2 471 019 9 535 639 885 707 3 776 300 12 119 889
European Union 761 821 2 352 810 8 582 673 808 660 3 509 450 10 616 765
Austria 10 972 31 165 183 558 4 747 24 821 238 033
Belgium - - 924 020 - - 1 009 000
Belgium and Luxembourg 58 388 195 219 - 40 636 179 773 -
Bulgaria 112 2 704 52 623 124 67 2 280
Croatia .. 2 796 32 484 .. 824 4 361
Cyprus ..a,b
2 846a
21 182 8 557a
8 300
Czech Republic 1 363 21 644 135 976 .. 738 21 384
Denmark 9 192 73 574 158 996a
7 342 73 100 256 120a
Estonia - 2 645 21 451 - 259 6 650
Finland 5 132 24 273 101 307 11 227 52 109 162 360
France 97 814 390 953 1 081 497a
112 441 925 925 1 637 143a
Germany 111 231 271 613 851 512a
151 581 541 866 1 710 298a
Greece 5 681 14 113 27 741 2 882 6 094 46 352
Hungary 570 22 870 111 015 159 1 280 39 613
Ireland 37 989 127 089 377 696 14 942 27 925 502 880
Italy 59 998 122 533 403 747 60 184 169 957 598 357
Latvia - 2 084 15 654 - 23 1 466
Lithuania - 2 334 17 049 - 29 2 852
Luxembourg - - 141 381 - - 181 607
Malta 465 2 263 14 859a
.. 193 1 521a
Netherlands 68 701 243 733 670 115 105 088 305 461 1 071 819
Poland 109 34 227 252 037 95 1 018 54 974
Portugal 10 571 32 043 128 488 900 19 794 81 889
Romania 0 6 953 84 596 66 136 1 465
Slovakia 282 6 970 58 832 .. 555 4 292
Slovenia 1 643 2 893 15 235 560 768 7 739
Spain 65 916 156 348 715 994 15 652 129 194 643 226
Sweden 12 636 93 791 378 107 50 720 123 618 435 964
United Kingdom 203 905 463 134 1 605 522 229 307 923 367 1 884 819
Other developed Europe 47 045 118 209 952 966 77 047 266 850 1 503 124
Gibraltar 263a
642a
2 403a
- - -
Iceland 147 497 10 719 75 663 12 646
Norway 12 391 30 265 192 409a
10 884 34 026 231 109a
Switzerland 34 245 86 804 747 436 66 087 232 161 1 259 369
North America 652 444 2 995 951 5 580 144 816 569 2 931 653 7 081 929
Canada 112 843 212 716 644 977 84 807 237 639 732 417
United States 539 601 2 783 235 4 935 167 731 762 2 694 014 6 349 512
Other developed countries 102 629 214 827 937 365 244 556 392 111 1 562 710
Australia 80 364 118 858 591 568 37 505 95 979 471 804
Bermuda - 265a
2 664 - 108a
835
Israel 4 476 20 426 88 179 1 188 9 091 78 704
Japan 9 850 50 322 170 929a
201 441 278 442 992 901a
New Zealand 7 938 24 957 84 026 4 422 8 491 18 465
Developing economies 514 319 1 771 479 8 483 009 141 076 887 829 4 993 339
Africa 60 675 153 742 686 962 20 229 38 858 162 396
North Africa 23 962 45 590 241 789 1 836 3 199 30 635
Algeria 1 561a
3 379a
25 298a
183a
205a
1 737a
Egypt 11 043a
19 955 85 046 163a
655 6 586
Libya 678a
471 18 461 1 321a
1 903 19 435
Morocco 3 011a
8 842a
50 280a
155a
402a
2 573a
Sudan 55a
1 398a
29 148 - - -
Tunisia 7 615 11 545 33 557 15 33 304
Other Africa 36 712 108 153 445 173 18 393 35 660 131 761
West Africa 14 013 33 010 145 233 2 202 6 381 15 840
Benin - 173a
213 1 354 2a
11 149
Burkina Faso 39a
28 1 432 4a
0 277
Cabo Verde 4a
192a
1 576 - - - 0a
Côte d’Ivoire 975a
2 483 8 233 6a
9 177
Gambia 157 216 754a
- - -
Ghana 319a
1 554a
19 848a
- - 118a
Guinea 69a
263a
3 303a
.. 12a
144a
Guinea-Bissau 8a
38 112 - - 6
Liberia 2 732a
3 247 6 267 846a
2 188 4 345
Mali 229a
132 3 432 22a
1 49
Mauritania 59a
146a
5 499a
3a
4a
43a
/…

Annex table 2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2013 (continued)
Region/economy
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013
Niger 286a
45 4 940 54a
1 14
Nigeria 8 539a
23 786 81 977 1 219a
4 144 8 645
Senegal 258a
295 2 696 47a
22 412
Sierra Leone 243a
284a
2 319a
- - -
Togo 268a
87 1 494 - - 10 1 460
Central Africa 3 808 5 732 61 946 372 681 2 903
Burundi 30a
47a
16a
0a
2a
1a
Cameroon 1 044a
1 600a
6 239a
150a
254a
717a
Central African Republic 95a
104a
620a
18a
43a
43a
Chad 250a
576a
4 758a
37a
70a
70a
Congo 575a
1 889a
23 050a
- - -
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 546 617 5 631a
- 34a
1 136a
Equatorial Guinea 25a
1 060a
15 317a
0a
- 2a
3a
Gabon 1 208a
- 227a
5 119a
167a
280a
920a
Rwanda 33a
55 854 - - 13
São Tomé and Principe 0a
11a
345a
- - -
East Africa 1 701 7 202 46 397 165 387 2 160
Comoros 17a
21a
107a
- - -
Djibouti 13a
40 1 352 - - -
Eritrea .. 337a
791a
- - -
Ethiopia 124a
941a
6 064a
- - -
Kenya 668a
932a
3 390a
99a
115a
321a
Madagascar 107a
141 6 488a
1a
10a
6a
Mauritius 168a
683a
3 530a
1a
132a
1 559a
Seychelles 213 515 2 256 64 130 271
Somalia ..a,b
4a
883a
- - -
Uganda 6a
807 8 821 - - 2
United Republic of Tanzania 388a
2 781 12 715 - - -
Southern Africa 17 191 62 209 191 597 15 653 28 210 110 858
Angola 1 024a
7 978a
2 348 1a
2a
11 964
Botswana 1 309 1 827 3 337 447 517 750
Lesotho 83a
330 1 237 0a
2 205
Malawi 228a
358 1 285a
- ..a,b
119a
Mozambique 25 1 249 20 967 2a
1 24
Namibia 2 047 1 276 4 277 80 45 32
South Africa 9 207 43 451 140 047a
15 004 27 328 95 760a
Swaziland 336 536 838a
38 87 76a
Zambia 2 655a
3 966a
14 260 - - 1 590
Zimbabwe 277a
1 238a
3 001 80a
234a
337
Asia 340 270 1 108 173 5 202 188 67 010 653 364 3 512 719
East and South-East Asia 302 281 1 009 804 4 223 370 58 504 636 451 3 153 048
East Asia 240 645 752 559 2 670 165 49 032 551 714 2 432 635
China 20 691a
193 348 956 793a
4 455a
27 768a
613 585a
Hong Kong, China 201 653 491 923 1 443 947 11 920 435 791 1 352 353
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 572a
1 044a
1 878a
- - -
Korea, Republic of 5 186 43 740 167 350 2 301 21 500 219 050
Macao, China 2 809a
2 801a
21 279a
- - 1 213a
Mongolia 0a
182a
15 471 - - 552
Taiwan Province of China 9 735a
19 521 63 448a
30 356a
66 655 245 882a
South-East Asia 61 636 257 244 1 553 205 9 471 84 736 720 413
Brunei Darussalam 33a
3 868 14 212a
0a
512 134a
Cambodia 38a
1 580 9 399a
.. 193 465a
Indonesia 8 732a
25 060a
230 344a
86a
6 940a
16 070a
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 13a
588a
2 779a
1a
20a
- 16a
Malaysia 10 318 52 747a
144 705a
753 15 878a
133 996a
Myanmar 281 3 211 14 171 - - -
Philippines 3 268a
13 762a
32 547a
405a
1 032a
13 191a
Singapore 30 468 110 570 837 652 7 808 56 755 497 880
Thailand 8 242 31 118 185 463a
418 3 406 58 610a
Timor-Leste - - 230 - - 83
Viet Nam 243a
14 739a
81 702 - - -
South Asia 6 795 29 834 316 015 422 2 949 125 993
Afghanistan 12a
17a
1 638a
- - -
Bangladesh 477a
2 162 8 596a
45a
69 130a
Bhutan 2a
4a
163a
- - -
India 1 657a
16 339 226 748 124a
1 733 119 838
Iran, Islamic Republic of 2 039a
2 597a
40 941 .. 572a
3 725a
Maldives 25a
128a
1 980a
- - -
Nepal 12a
72a
514a
- - -
/…

ANNEX TABLES 211
Annex table 2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2013 (continued)
Region/economy
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013
Pakistan 1 892 6 919 27 589 245 489 1 731
Sri Lanka 679a
1 596 7 846a
8a
86 569a
West Asia 31 194 68 535 662 803 8 084 13 964 233 678
Bahrain 552 5 906 17 815 719 1 752 10 751
Iraq ..a,b
..a,b
15 295a
- - 1 984a
Jordan 1 368a
3 135 26 668 158a
44 525
Kuwait 37a
608a
21 242a
3 662a
1 428a
40 247a
Lebanon 53a
14 233 55 604a
43a
352 8 849a
Oman 1 723a
2 577a
19 756 - - 6 289
Qatar 63a
1 912 29 964a
- 74 28 434a
Saudi Arabia 15 193a
17 577 208 330a
2 328a
5 285a
39 303a
State of Palestine - 647a
2 750a
- ..a,b
181a
Syrian Arab Republic 154a
1 244 10 743a
4a
107a
421a
Turkey 11 150a
18 812 145 467 1 150a
3 668 32 782
United Arab Emirates 751a
1 069a
105 496 14a
1 938a
63 179a
Yemen 180a
843 3 675a
5a
12a
733a
Latin America and the Caribbean 111 373 507 344 2 568 596 53 768 195 339 1 312 258
South and Central America 103 311 428 929 1 842 626 52 138 104 646 647 088
South America 74 815 308 949 1 362 832 49 346 96 046 496 692
Argentina 9 085a
67 601 112 349 6 057a
21 141 34 080
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 1 026 5 188 10 558 7a
29 8
Brazil 37 143 122 250 724 644 41 044a
51 946 293 277
Chile 16 107a
45 753 215 452 154a
11 154 101 933
Colombia 3 500 11 157 127 895 402 2 989 39 003
Ecuador 1 626 6 337 13 785 18a
252a
687a
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 0a
58a
75a
- - -
Guyana 45a
756a
2 547a
- 1a
2a
Paraguay 418a
1 219 4 886 134a
214 238a
Peru 1 330 11 062 73 620a
122 505 4 122a
Suriname - - 910 - - -
Uruguay 671a
2 088 20 344a
186a
138 428a
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 3 865 35 480 55 766 1 221 7 676 22 915
Central America 28 496 119 980 479 793 2 793 8 600 150 396
Belize 89a
301 1 621 20a
43 53
Costa Rica 1 324a
2 709 21 792 44a
86 1 822
El Salvador 212 1 973 8 225 56a
104 2
Guatemala 1 734 3 420 10 256 .. 93 472
Honduras 293 1 392 10 084 - - 353
Mexico 22 424 101 996 389 083 2 672a
8 273 143 907
Nicaragua 145a
1 414 7 319 - - 230
Panama 2 275 6 775 31 413 - - 3 556
Caribbean 8 062 78 415 725 971 1 630 90 693 665 170
Anguilla 11a
231a
1 107a
- 5a
31a
Antigua and Barbuda 290a
619a
2 712a
- 5a
104a
Aruba 145a
1 161 3 634 - 675 689
Bahamas 586a
3 278a
17 155a
- 452a
3 471a
Barbados 171 308 4 635a
23 41 1 025a
British Virgin Islands 126a
32 093a
459 342a
875a
67 132a
523 287a
Cayman Islands 1 749a
25 585a
165 500a
648a
20 788a
129 360a
Curaçao - - 717a
- - 56a
Dominica 66a
275a
665a
- 3a
33a
Dominican Republic 572 1 673 25 411 - 572a
921a
Grenada 70a
348a
1 430a
- 2a
53a
Haiti 149a
95 1 114 .. 2a
2a
Jamaica 790a
3 317 12 730a
42a
709a
401
Montserrat 40a
83a
132a
- 0a
1a
Netherlands Antillesc
408a
277 - 21a
6a
-
Saint Kitts and Nevis 160a
487a
1 916a
- 3a
56a
Saint Lucia 316a
807a
2 430a
- 4a
65a
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 48a
499a
1 643a
- 0a
5a
Sint Maarten - - 278a
- - 8a
Trinidad and Tobago 2 365a
7 280a
23 421a
21a
293a
5 602a
Oceania 2 001 2 220 25 262 68 267 5 965
Cook Islands 1a
218a
836a
- - 1a
5 037a
Fiji 284 356 3 612 25a
39 52
French Polynesia 69a
139a
803a
- - 251a
Kiribati - - 14a
- - 1a
Marshall Islands 1a
218a
1 029a
- ..a,b
181a
/…

Annex table 2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2013 (concluded)
Region/economy
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013
Nauru ..a,b
..a,b
..a,b
18a
22a
22a
New Caledonia 70a
67a
12 720a
- - -
Niue - 6a
..a,b
- 10a
22a
Palau 2a
4a
37a
- - -
Papua New Guinea 1 582a
935 4 082a
26a
210a
315a
Samoa 9a
77 282 - - 21
Solomon Islands - 106a
1 040 - - 38
Tonga 1a
15a
132a
- - -
Vanuatu - 61a
578 - - 23
Transition economies 9 58 023 928 015 .. 20 541 554 769
South-East Europe .. 2 886 58 186 .. 16 3 336
Albania - 247 6 104a
.. - 244a
Bosnia and Herzegovina - 1 083a
8 070a
- - 199a
Montenegro - - 5 384a
- - 47a
Serbia - 1 017a
29 269 - - 2 557
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia .. 540 5 534 - 16 102
CIS 9 54 375 858 153 .. 20 408 550 068
Armenia 9a
513 5 448 - 0 186
Azerbaijan - 3 735 13 750 - 1 9 005
Belarus .. 1 306 16 729 .. 24 677
Kazakhstan - 10 078 129 554 - 16 29 122
Kyrgyzstan - 432 3 473 - 33 1
Moldova, Republic of - 449 3 668 - 23 136
Russian Federation - 32 204 575 658a
- 20 141 501 202a
Tajikistan .. 136 1 625 - - -
Turkmenistan .. 949a
23 018a
- - -
Ukraine .. 3 875 76 719 .. 170 9 739
Uzbekistan - 698a
8 512a
- - -
Georgia .. 762 11 676 - 118 1 365
Memorandum
Least developed countries (LDCs)d
11 051 36 631 211 797 1 089 2 683 23 557
Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)e
7 471 35 790 285 482 844 1 305 42 883
Small island developing States (SIDS)f
7 136 20 511 89 548 220 2 033 13 383
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a
Estimates.
b
Negative stock value. However, this value is included in the regional and global total.
c
This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010.
d
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (which, however, graduated from LDC status effective 1 January 2014), São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal,
d
f
Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe,

ANNEX TABLES 213
Annex table 3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2007–2013
Region / economy
Net salesa
Net purchasesb
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
World 1 045 085 626 235 285 396 349 399 556 051 331 651 348 755 1 045 085 626 235 285 396 349 399 556 051 331 651 348 755
Developed economies 915 675 479 687 236 505 260 391 438 645 268 652 239 606 870 435 486 166 191 637 225 830 430 134 183 914 151 752
Europe 565 152 175 645 139 356 127 606 214 420 144 651 132 963 593 585 382 058 133 024 44 682 171 902 38 504 6 798
European Union 533 185 260 664 119 344 118 328 185 332 128 630 120 813 538 138 322 169 120 722 23 489 140 634 15 660 - 786
Austria 9 661 1 327 2 067 354 7 002 1 687 148 5 923 3 243 3 309 1 525 3 733 1 835 8 813
Belgium 733 3 995 12 375 9 449 3 946 1 786 6 429 9 269 30 775 - 9 804 477 7 841 - 1 354 13 251
Bulgaria 959 227 191 24 - 96 31 - 52 20 39 2 17 - - - 0
Croatia 674 274 - 201 92 81 100 - 12 8 325 - - 5
Cyprus 1 301 853 47 693 782 51 1 417 5 879 8 875 647 - 562 3 738 8 060 652
Czech Republic 246 276 2 473 - 530 725 37 1 617 572 72 1 573 14 26 474 4 012
Denmark 7 158 5 962 1 270 1 319 7 958 4 759 1 341 3 339 2 841 3 337 - 3 601 - 133 553 214
Estonia - 59 110 28 3 239 58 - 39 - 7 - 0 4 - 1 1 - 36
Finland 8 571 1 163 382 336 1 028 1 929 - 35 - 1 054 12 951 641 1 015 2 353 4 116 1 754
France 30 145 6 609 609 3 573 23 161 12 013 8 953 73 312 66 893 42 175 6 180 37 090 - 3 051 2 177
Germany 37 551 34 081 12 753 10 577 13 440 7 793 16 739 59 904 63 785 26 985 7 025 5 656 15 674 6 829
Greece 1 379 7 387 2 074 283 1 204 35 2 488 1 502 3 484 387 553 - 148 - 1 561 - 1 015
Hungary 2 068 1 728 1 853 223 1 714 96 - 1 108 1 41 0 799 17 - 7 -
Ireland 811 3 025 1 712 2 127 1 934 12 096 11 147 7 340 3 505 - 664 5 143 - 5 648 2 629 - 4 091
Italy 27 211 - 5 116 2 341 6 329 15 095 5 286 5 910 62 173 20 976 17 165 - 5 190 3 902 - 1 633 2 440
Latvia 47 195 109 72 1 1 4 4 - - 30 40 - 3 - -
Lithuania 35 172 23 470 386 39 30 - 31 - - 0 4 - 3 10
Luxembourg 7 379 - 3 510 444 2 138 9 495 6 461 177 16 5 906 54 1 558 1 110 - 4 247 3 794
Malta - 86 - 13 315 - 96 7 - - 25 - 235 - 16 25 22
Netherlands 162 533 - 9 443 18 114 4 162 14 076 17 637 22 896 4 291 48 521 - 3 222 16 418 - 3 841 - 1 092 - 3 243
Poland 680 1 507 666 1 195 9 963 824 434 189 1 090 229 201 511 3 399 243
Portugal 1 574 - 1 312 504 2 772 911 8 225 7 465 4 071 1 330 723 - 8 965 1 642 - 4 735 - 603
Romania 1 926 1 010 331 148 88 151 - 45 - 4 7 24 - - -
Slovakia 66 136 21 - 0 126 541 - - - 10 - 18 - 30 -
Slovenia 57 418 - 332 51 330 30 74 320 251 - 50 - 10 - -
Spain 57 440 37 041 31 849 10 348 17 716 4 978 5 185 40 015 - 12 160 - 507 2 898 15 505 - 1 621 - 7 348
Sweden 3 151 17 930 2 175 527 7 647 5 086 - 76 30 983 6 883 9 819 918 - 2 381 151 - 4 994
United Kingdom 169 974 154 619 24 920 60 886 46 774 36 936 29 110 230 314 52 768 27 639 - 3 521 69 704 - 1 926 - 23 671
Other developed Europe 31 967 - 85 019 20 011 9 278 29 088 16 021 12 150 55 448 59 889 12 302 21 193 31 268 22 845 7 584
Andorra - - - - - 12 - - - - - 166 - -
Faeroe Islands - 0 - 85 - - - - - - - - 13 35
Gibraltar - 212 - - - 19 50 116 - 13 253 8 1 757 - 527 - 48
Guernsey 31 36 2 011 175 25 1 294 17 7 383 890 4 171 10 338 - 1 183 1 968 - 768
Iceland - 227 - - 14 - 11 - 4 770 744 - 806 - 221 - 437 - 2 559 126
Isle of Man 221 35 114 157 - 217 55 1 535 324 137 852 - 736 - 162 - 850
Jersey 816 251 414 81 88 133 - 537 - 686 401 1 054 5 192 3 564 2 015
Liechtenstein - - - - - - - 270 - 12 - - - -
Monaco 437 - - - 30 - - - - 1 100 16 - 2
Norway 7 659 15 025 1 867 7 445 9 517 5 862 7 874 9 162 7 556 391 - 3 905 5 661 4 191 87
Switzerland 23 032 - 100 578 15 606 1 321 19 647 8 635 4 208 32 675 51 074 7 742 12 967 20 832 16 357 6 984
North America 281 057 257 478 78 270 97 766 180 302 95 656 82 910 230 393 18 280 41 856 121 461 173 157 113 486 89 106
Canada 99 682 35 147 12 431 13 307 33 344 29 484 23 342 46 864 44 247 17 538 35 744 36 049 37 580 30 180
United States 181 375 222 331 65 838 84 459 146 958 66 172 59 567 183 529 - 25 967 24 317 85 717 137 107 75 907 58 926
Other developed countries 69 466 46 564 18 879 35 019 43 923 28 345 23 733 46 457 85 828 16 757 59 687 85 076 31 924 55 848
Australia 44 751 33 730 22 534 27 192 34 671 23 959 11 923 43 309 18 823 - 3 471 15 623 6 453 - 7 023 - 5 260
Bermuda 480 1 006 883 - 405 121 905 3 273 - 38 408 2 064 2 981 1 935 2 468 3 249 4 412
Israel 1 064 1 443 1 351 1 207 3 663 1 026 3 339 8 166 11 054 183 5 929 8 720 - 2 210 676
Japan 19 132 9 909 - 5 833 7 261 4 671 1 791 4 271 29 607 49 826 17 307 31 268 62 372 37 795 55 122
New Zealand 4 039 476 - 55 - 235 797 664 928 3 782 4 061 - 243 4 933 5 063 113 899
Developing economies 97 023 120 669 41 999 84 913 84 645 56 147 112 969 146 269 116 419 77 800 101 605 105 381 127 547 129 491
Africa 5 325 24 540 5 903 7 410 8 634 - 1 254 3 848 10 356 8 266 2 577 3 792 4 393 629 3 019
North Africa 2 267 19 495 2 520 1 066 1 353 - 388 2 969 1 401 4 729 1 004 1 471 17 85 459
Algeria - 82 - - - - 10 - 47 - - - - - 312
Egypt 1 798 18 903 1 680 120 609 - 705 1 836 1 448 4 678 76 1 092 - - 16 -
Libya 200 307 145 91 20 - - - 51 601 377 - - -
Morocco 269 80 691 846 274 296 1 092 - - 324 - 17 101 147
Sudan - - - - 450 - - - - - - - - -
Tunisia - 122 4 9 - 21 31 - - 3 2 - - -
Other Africa 3 058 5 045 3 383 6 343 7 281 - 865 879 8 955 3 537 1 573 2 322 4 376 543 2 560
Angola - - 475 - 471 1 300 - - - - 60 - - - - 69 -
Botswana 1 - 50 - 6 7 - - 3 - - - 14 10 3
Burkina Faso - 20 - - - 1 0 - - - - - - -
Cameroon - 1 1 - 0 - - - - - - - - -
Congo - 435 - - - 7 - - - - - - - -
Congo, Democratic Republic of the - - 5 175 - - - 51 - 45 - - - - 19 -
Côte d’Ivoire - - 10 - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Equatorial Guinea - - 2 200 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Eritrea - - - 12 - 254 - 54 - - - - - - - -
Ethiopia - - - - 146 366 - - - - - - - -
Gabon 82 - - - - - - - 16 - - - - - -
Ghana 122 900 0 - - 3 - 15 - - - 1 - - -
Guinea - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kenya 396 - - - 19 86 103 - 18 - - - 3 - -
Liberia - - - 587 - - - - - - - - - -
Madagascar - - - - - - 12 - - - - - - -
/…

Annex table 3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2007–2013 (continued)
Region / economy
Net salesa
Net purchasesb
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Malawi 5 - 0 0 - - 20 - - - - - - -
Mali - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2
Mauritania 375 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mauritius 8 26 37 176 6 13 - 253 136 16 433 - 173 - 418 65
Mozambique 2 - - 35 27 3 2 - - - - - - -
Namibia 2 15 59 104 40 15 6 - - - - - - -
Niger - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 185 -
Nigeria 485 - 597 - 197 476 539 - 159 537 196 418 25 - 1 40 241
Rwanda - 6 9 - - 69 2 - - - - - - -
Senegal 80 - - - 457 - - - - - - - - - -
Seychelles 89 49 - 19 - - - 0 66 13 5 - 78 189 1
Sierra Leone 31 40 - 13 52 - - - - - - - - -
South Africa 1 374 6 815 3 860 3 570 6 673 - 968 214 8 646 2 873 1 504 1 619 4 291 825 2 246
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - 6 - - -
Togo - - - - - - - - 20 - - 353 - 5 -
Uganda - 1 - - - - 15 - - - 257 - - -
United Republic of Tanzania - - 2 60 0 36 - - - - - - - -
Zambia 8 1 11 272 - 8 - 25 - 16 2 - - -
Zimbabwe 0 7 6 - 27 - 296 5 - 44 1 - 1 - - - -
Asia 68 930 85 903 38 993 38 667 56 732 33 418 47 504 98 606 103 539 70 088 80 332 83 013 93 230 107 915
East and South-East Asia 41 374 55 421 29 287 27 972 32 476 22 377 40 655 25 795 60 664 41 456 67 896 70 122 78 736 98 217
East Asia 24 049 30 358 16 437 18 641 14 699 11 987 27 423 1 774 41 318 36 836 53 444 52 057 62 005 70 587
China 8 272 17 768 11 362 7 092 12 083 9 531 26 866 1 559 35 834 23 444 30 524 37 111 37 930 50 195
Hong Kong, China 7 778 8 661 3 185 13 113 2 157 2 948 459 - 9 077 1 074 6 462 13 255 10 125 16 076 16 784
Korea, Republic of 101 1 219 1 962 - 2 063 2 550 - 1 528 - 615 8 377 5 247 6 601 9 952 4 574 5 754 3 765
Macao, China 157 593 - 57 33 34 30 213 - 0 - 580 52 - 10 -
Mongolia 7 - 344 57 88 82 - 77 - 106 - 24 - - - -
Taiwan Province of China 7 735 2 117 - 360 409 - 2 212 925 578 915 - 943 932 - 339 247 2 235 - 157
South-East Asia 17 325 25 063 12 850 9 331 17 776 10 390 13 232 24 021 19 346 4 620 14 452 18 065 16 731 27 630
Brunei Darussalam 0 - 3 - - - 0 - - 10 - - - -
Cambodia 3 30 - 336 5 50 - 100 12 - - - - 0 - -
Indonesia 753 2 879 817 1 416 6 826 477 844 474 757 - 2 381 197 409 315 2 923
Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - - 110 6 - - - - - - - - -
Malaysia 5 260 2 990 354 2 837 4 450 721 - 749 4 010 9 457 3 293 2 416 4 137 9 251 1 862
Myanmar - 1 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - -
Philippines 1 175 3 988 1 476 329 2 586 411 890 - 2 514 - 150 57 19 479 682 71
Singapore 7 700 14 106 9 893 3 884 1 730 8 037 10 950 21 762 7 919 2 775 8 953 8 044 802 6 269
Thailand 1 991 150 351 461 954 - 65 40 42 1 339 865 2 810 4 996 5 659 16 498
Viet Nam 445 921 293 289 1 175 908 1 245 247 25 - 57 - 21 7
South Asia 6 027 12 884 5 931 5 634 13 093 2 821 4 784 28 786 13 376 347 26 870 6 288 3 104 1 621
Bangladesh 4 - 10 13 - - 13 - - - 1 - - -
Iran, Islamic Republic of - 765 - - - 16 - - - - - - - -
India 4 805 10 317 5 877 5 613 12 798 2 805 4 763 28 774 13 370 347 26 886 6 282 3 103 1 619
Maldives - 3 - - - - - - - - - 3 - - -
Nepal - 13 - - 4 - - - - - - - - -
Pakistan 1 213 1 377 - - 0 247 - 153 8 - - - - 13 - - 2
Sri Lanka 6 409 44 9 44 153 - 0 12 6 - - 6 1 -
West Asia 21 529 17 598 3 775 5 061 11 163 8 219 2 065 44 025 29 499 28 285 - 14 434 6 604 11 390 8 077
Bahrain 63 335 - 452 30 - - 111 1 545 3 451 155 - 3 662 - 2 691 527 317
Iraq - 34 - 11 717 1 727 324 33 - - - - - 14 8
Jordan 760 877 30 - 99 183 22 - 5 45 322 - - 29 37 - 2 -
Kuwait 3 963 506 - 55 460 16 2 230 414 2 003 3 688 441 - 10 793 2 078 376 258
Lebanon - 153 108 - 642 46 317 - 210 - 233 253 26 836 80 -
Oman 621 10 - 388 - - 774 - 79 601 893 - 530 222 354 - 20
Qatar - 124 298 12 28 169 - 6 797 6 028 10 276 626 - 790 7 971 3 078
Saudi Arabia 125 330 42 297 657 1 429 291 16 010 1 518 121 1 698 107 294 520
Syrian Arab Republic - - 2 66 - - - - - - - - - -
Turkey 15 150 13 982 3 159 2 058 8 930 2 690 867 767 1 495 - - 38 908 2 012 590
United Arab Emirates 856 1 292 299 755 556 366 286 16 536 12 629 16 145 - 1 732 5 896 - 207 3 326
Yemen 144 - - 20 - 44 - - - - - - - -
Latin America and the Caribbean 22 534 10 969 - 2 901 29 992 19 256 24 050 61 613 37 032 3 708 4 961 17 485 18 010 33 673 18 479
South America 15 940 4 205 - 3 879 18 659 14 833 20 259 17 063 12 020 5 068 4 771 13 719 10 312 23 719 12 516
Argentina 989 - 1 757 97 3 457 - 295 360 - 76 587 259 - 80 514 102 2 754 99
Bolivia, Plurinational State of - 77 24 - 4 - 16 - 1 74 - - - - - 2 -
Brazil 7 642 1 900 84 10 115 15 112 18 087 9 996 10 794 5 480 2 518 9 030 5 541 7 401 2 971
Chile 1 998 3 252 1 301 826 - 197 - 78 2 299 466 47 1 707 882 628 10 248 2 771
Colombia 4 813 - 46 - 1 633 - 1 296 - 1 216 1 974 3 881 1 177 16 211 3 210 5 085 3 007 6 406
Ecuador 29 0 6 357 167 140 108 - 0 - - 40 - -
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) - 48 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Guyana 3 1 1 - 3 - - - - - - 0 3 -
Paraguay 10 4 - 60 - 1 0 - - - - - - - - -
Peru 1 135 430 38 612 512 - 67 618 - 623 417 77 171 319 225
Suriname - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - -
Uruguay 158 20 2 448 747 89 162 - - - 7 13 0 8
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of - 760 329 - 3 710 4 158 - - 249 - - 1 003 - 1 358 - 2 - - 1 268 - 16 35
Central America 4 317 2 900 182 8 853 1 222 1 841 16 845 16 863 - 780 3 354 2 949 4 736 6 887 3 585
Belize - 0 - 1 - 60 - - 43 - 2 - - - -
Costa Rica - 34 405 - 5 17 120 191 - 16 - - - - 354 50
El Salvador 835 - 30 43 103 - 1 - 550 - - - - 12 -
Guatemala 5 145 - 650 100 - 213 411 140 - - - - - -
/…

ANNEX TABLES 215
Annex table 3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2007–2013 (concluded)
Region / economy
Net salesa
Net purchasesb
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Honduras 140 - - 1 23 - - - - - - - - 104
Mexico 3 144 2 306 129 7 989 1 143 1 116 15 896 17 629 - 190 3 187 2 896 4 274 6 504 3 845
Nicaragua - - - 1 - 71 0 130 - - - - - - -
Panama 226 44 23 164 - 235 758 216 - 1 397 - 590 165 53 462 18 - 414
Caribbean 2 277 3 864 796 2 480 3 201 1 950 27 706 8 149 - 579 - 3 164 817 2 962 3 067 2 378
Anguilla - - - - - - - - 30 - - 10 3 - -
Antigua and Barbuda 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bahamas - 41 - 82 212 145 - 2 370 1 438 - 243 112 - 350 228 - 10
Barbados 217 207 - 328 - - - 3 3 8 - - - - 86
British Virgin Islands 559 1 001 204 391 631 32 26 958 5 085 - 2 375 - 1 579 21 733 1 968 1 869
Cayman Islands - 487 3 84 - 112 130 40 757 2 544 - 1 363 743 1 188 909 444
Dominican Republic 42 - 108 0 7 39 1 264 213 93 - - 31 - - -
Haiti - - 1 59 - - - - - - - - - -
Jamaica 595 - - - 9 - - 105 14 28 1 - - 15
Netherlands Antillesc
- - 2 19 235 276 16 - 14 - 30 - 156 52 - 158 -
Puerto Rico 862 - 587 1 037 1 214 88 1 079 - 261 - 2 454 22 77 202 120 - 9
Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - - 0 - 0 - - -
Trinidad and Tobago - 2 236 - - 973 16 - 600 - 2 207 - 10 - - 15 - - 244
Turks and Caicos Islands - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
US Virgin Islands - - - 473 - - - - - 4 - 1 150 - 400
Oceania 234 - 742 4 8 844 23 - 67 4 275 906 174 - 4 - 35 15 78
American Samoa - - - - - 11 - - - - - - - 29 86
Fiji 12 2 - 1 - - 0 - - - - - - -
French Polynesia - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 44 -
Marshall Islands 45 - - - - - - - 136 0 - - 35 - 3
Micronesia, Federated States of - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
Nauru - - - - - - - - - 172 - - - -
Norfolk Island - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 -
Papua New Guinea 160 - 758 0 8 843 5 - 78 - 275 1 051 - - 4 - - -
Samoa 3 13 - - - - - - - 324 - - - - - 14
Solomon Islands 14 - - - 19 - - - - - - - - -
Tokelau - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - -
Tuvalu - - - - - - - - 43 - - - - -
Vanuatu - - 4 - - - 3 - - - - - - -
Transition economies 32 388 25 879 6 893 4 095 32 762 6 852 - 3 820 18 620 11 005 7 789 5 378 13 378 9 296 56 970
South-East Europe 1 511 587 529 65 1 367 3 16 1 031 - 9 - 174 - 51 2 -
Albania 164 3 146 - - - - - - - - - - -
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 014 9 8 - - 1 6 - - - - - 1 -
Montenegro 0 - 362 - - - - 4 - - - - - -
Serbia 280 501 10 19 1 340 2 9 1 038 - 7 - 174 - 51 1 -
Serbia and Montenegro - 7 3 - - - - - - 3 - - - - -
The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
53 67 - 46 27 - - - - - - - - -
Yugoslavia (former) - - - - - - - - 11 - - - - - -
CIS 30 824 25 188 6 349 4 001 31 395 6 849 - 3 838 17 590 11 014 7 963 5 378 13 139 9 294 56 970
Armenia 423 204 - - 26 23 - - - - - - 0 -
Azerbaijan - 2 - 0 - - - - 519 - - 2 748 -
Belarus 2 500 16 - 649 10 - 13 - - - - - - 215
Kazakhstan 727 398 1 621 101 293 - 831 217 1 833 1 634 - 1 462 8 088 - 32 -
Kyrgyzstan 209 - - 44 72 - 5 - - - - - - - -
Moldova, Republic of 24 4 - - - 9 - - - - - - - - -
Russian Federation 25 120 18 606 4 579 2 882 29 589 7 228 - 3 901 15 497 7 869 7 957 3 875 4 943 8 302 56 158
Tajikistan 5 - - - 14 - - - - - - - - -
Ukraine 1 816 5 931 145 322 1 400 434 - 169 260 993 6 40 106 276 597
Uzbekistan - 25 4 1 - - 3 - - - - - - -
Georgia 53 104 14 30 - 1 2 - - - - 0 188 - -
Unspecified - - - - - - - 9 761 12 645 8 170 16 586 7 158 10 894 10 541
Memorandum
Least developed countries (LDCs)d
668 - 2 552 - 765 2 204 501 374 26 - 80 - 261 16 259 353 - 102 - 12
Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)e
1 395 778 1 983 615 700 - 574 258 1 814 2 262 - 9 1 727 8 076 544 6
Small island developing States (SIDS)f
1 144 1 819 41 9 448 1 223 97 - 596 3 004 2 772 - 16 542 - 651 - 2 - 266
a
Net sales by the region/economy of the immediate acquired company.
b
Net purchases by region/economy of the ultimate acquiring company.
c
This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010.
d
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (which, however, graduated from LDC status effective 1 January 2014), São Tomé and Principe, Senegal,
e
f
Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe,
Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net cross-border MA sales in a host economy = Sales of companies in the host economy to
foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the host economy; Net cross-border MA purchases by a home economy = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs
(-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10 per cent.

Annex table 4. Value of cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2007–2013
Sector/industry
Net salesa
Net purchasesb
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 1045 085 626 235 285 396 349 399 556 051 331 651 348 755 1045 085 626 235 285 396 349 399 556 051 331 651 348 755
Primary 93 918 89 682 52 891 67 605 149 065 51 521 67 760 120 229 47 203 28 446 46 861 93 236 3 427 27 229
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries 9 006 2 920 730 2 524 1 426 7 585 7 422 1 078 2 313 1 783 408 381 -1 423 318
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 84 913 86 761 52 161 65 081 147 639 43 936 60 338 119 152 44 890 26 663 46 453 92 855 4 850 26 911
Manufacturing 329 135 195 847 74 871 133 936 203 319 113 110 125 684 217 712 137 715 37 889 128 194 224 316 138 230 96 165
Food, beverages and tobacco 49 040 10 618 5 117 35 044 48 394 18 526 53 355 35 233 -42 860 - 467 33 629 31 541 31 748 35 790
Textiles, clothing and leather 14 977 3 840 426 668 4 199 2 191 4 545 -1 946 - 51 555 2 971 2 236 2 466 1 757
Wood and wood products 1 202 1 022 645 804 5 060 4 542 2 828 2 780 434 1 450 8 471 3 748 3 589 3 044
Publishing and printing 601 - 347 - 5 - 190 31 20 78 - 284 30 906 - 112 65 16
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 5 768 90 1 506 1 964 -1 430 -1 307 - 663 7 202 -3 356 - 844 -6 767 -2 625 -3 748 -2 003
Chemicals and chemical products 103 990 76 637 28 077 33 708 77 201 38 524 33 949 89 327 60 802 26 539 46 889 91 138 41 485 28 339
Rubber and plastic products 2 527 1 032 1 5 475 2 223 1 718 760 1 691 461 - 285 127 1 367 581 368
Non-metallic mineral products 36 913 27 103 2 247 6 549 927 1 619 5 733 17 502 23 013 - 567 5 198 1 663 755 3 609
Metals and metal products 84 012 19 915 - 966 6 710 5 687 9 662 9 490 46 492 23 018 2 746 5 171 19 449 9 820 647
Machinery and equipment -25 337 8 505 2 180 6 412 14 251 1 291 5 296 -34 240 8 975 1 815 5 989 14 564 12 836 6 804
Electrical and electronic equipment 46 852 22 834 19 789 21 375 28 279 22 219 7 538 40 665 48 462 4 335 11 816 38 561 26 823 13 506
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment -2 364 13 583 12 539 8 644 4 299 6 913 1 234 1 065 9 109 73 6 737 10 899 5 039 1 058
Other manufacturing 10 955 11 015 3 309 6 578 14 420 7 181 1 598 11 862 9 992 2 509 7 059 11 888 6 773 3 229
Services 622 032 340 706 157 635 147 857 203 667 167 020 155 311 707 144 441 317 219 062 174 344 238 499 189 993 225 361
Electricity, gas and water 108 003 48 128 59 062 -6 602 21 100 11 984 9 988 45 036 26 551 44 514 -14 759 6 758 3 116 7 739
Construction 16 117 4 582 11 646 10 763 3 074 2 253 3 174 7 047 -2 890 -2 561 -1 995 -1 466 2 772 4 868
Trade 33 875 29 258 3 631 7 278 15 645 12 730 -4 165 -4 590 18 851 3 203 6 029 6 415 23 228 -1 591
Accommodation and food service activities 872 6 418 995 1 937 1 494 - 411 4 537 -6 903 3 511 354 854 684 -1 847 925
Transportation and storage 32 242 14 800 5 468 10 795 16 028 10 439 5 732 18 927 7 236 3 651 7 652 8 576 9 336 3 146
Information and communication 47 371 29 122 45 076 19 278 25 174 35 172 31 317 32 645 49 854 38 843 19 313 23 228 17 417 26 975
Finance 306 249 108 472 13 862 59 270 64 279 39 512 49 292 562 415 316 903 123 704 139 648 166 436 116 121 155 996
Business services 60 455 88 745 14 675 30 661 48 321 43 723 43 819 48 944 32 923 7 760 16 878 26 353 18 854 26 642
Public administration and defense 793 4 209 1 271 1 380 2 910 3 602 4 078 -2 484 -11 118 - 594 -4 147 - 288 -1 165 -1 049
Education 807 1 225 509 881 953 213 76 42 155 51 266 347 317 -1 040
Health and social services 4 194 3 001 653 9 936 2 947 6 636 4 091 7 778 - 620 187 3 815 729 954 2 315
Arts, entertainment and recreation 4 114 1 956 525 1 565 1 404 971 1 591 262 1 116 - 47 635 526 275 406
Other service activities 6 940 793 263 715 339 196 1 780 -1 973 -1 154 - 3 155 199 615 29
a
Net sales in the industry of the acquired company.
b
Net purchases by the industry of the acquiring company.
Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net Cross-border MAs sales by sector/industry = Sales of companies in the industry of the
acquired company to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the industry of the acquired company; net cross-border MA purchases by sector/industry = Purchases of
companies abroad by home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company.
The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.

ANNEX TABLES 217
Annextable5.Cross-borderMAdealsworthover$3billioncompletedin2013
Rank
Value
($billion)
AcquiredcompanyHosteconomya
IndustryoftheacquiredcompanyAcquiringcompanyHomeeconomya
Industryoftheacquiringcompany
Shares
acquired
127.0TNK-BPLtdBritishVirginIslandsCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasOAONeftyanayaKompaniyaRosneftRussianFederationCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas50
227.0TNK-BPLtdBritishVirginIslandsCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasOAONeftyanayaKompaniyaRosneftRussianFederationCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas50
321.6SprintNextelCorpUnitedStatesTelephonecommunications,exceptradiotelephoneSoftBankCorpJapanRadiotelephonecommunications78
419.1NexenIncCanadaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasCNOOCCanadaHoldingLtdCanadaInvestors,nec100
518.0GrupoModeloSABdeCVMexicoMaltbeveragesAnheuser-BuschMexicoHoldingSdeRLdeCVMexicoMaltbeverages44
69.4PingAnInsurance(Group)CoofChinaLtdChinaLifeinsuranceInvestorGroupThailandInvestors,nec16
78.5ElanCorpPLCIrelandBiologicalproducts,exceptdiagnosticsubstancesPerrigoCoUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparations100
88.3DEMasterBlenders1753BVNetherlandsRoastedcoffeeOakLeafBVNetherlandsInvestmentoffices,nec85
97.7KabelDeutschlandHoldingAGGermanyCableandotherpaytelevisionservicesVodafoneVierteVerwaltungsgesellschaftmbHGermanyRadiotelephonecommunications77
106.9FraserNeaveLtdSingaporeBottledcannedsoftdrinkscarbonatedwatersTCCAssetsLtdBritishVirginIslandsInvestmentoffices,nec62
116.0NeimanMarcusGroupIncUnitedStatesDepartmentstoresInvestorGroupCanadaInvestors,nec100
125.8ActivisionBlizzardIncUnitedStatesPrepackagedSoftwareActivisionBlizzardIncUnitedStatesPrepackagedSoftware38
135.7CanadaSafewayLtdCanadaGrocerystoresSobeysIncCanadaGrocerystores100
145.3BankofAyudhyaPCLThailandBanksBankofTokyo-MitsubishiUFJLtdJapanBanks72
154.8MIPTowerHoldingsLLCUnitedStatesRealestateinvestmenttrustsAmericanTowerCorpUnitedStatesRealestateinvestmenttrusts100
164.8SmithfieldFoodsIncUnitedStatesMeatpackingplantsShuanghuiInternationalHoldingsLtdChinaMeatpackingplants100
174.4SpringerScience+BusinessMediaSAGermanyBooks:publishing,orpublishingprintingInvestorGroupUnitedKingdomInvestors,nec100
184.4BNPParibasFortisSA/NVBelgiumBanksBNPParibasSAFranceSecuritybrokers,dealers,andflotationcompanies25
194.3AvioSpA-AviationBusinessItalyAircraftenginesandenginepartsGeneralElectricCo{GE}UnitedStatesPower,distribution,andspecialtytransformers100
204.2SiamMakroPCLThailandGrocerystoresCPALLPCLThailandGrocerystores64
214.2ENIEastAfricaSpAMozambiqueCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasPetroChinaCoLtdChinaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas29
224.2AllyFinancialInc-EuropeanOperationsUnitedKingdomPersonalcreditinstitutionsGeneralMotorsFinancialCoIncUnitedStatesPersonalcreditinstitutions100
234.1AegisGroupPLCUnitedKingdomAdvertising,necDentsuIncJapanAdvertisingagencies86
244.1AllyCreditCanadaLtdCanadaPersonalcreditinstitutionsRoyalBankofCanadaCanadaBanks100
254.1ANAAeroportosdePortugalSAPortugalAirportsandairportterminalservicesVINCIConcessionsSASFranceHighwayandstreetconstruction95
264.0GambroABSwedenSurgicalandmedicalinstrumentsandapparatusBaxterInternationalIncUnitedStatesSurgicalandmedicalinstrumentsandapparatus100
273.9SterliteIndustries(India)LtdIndiaPrimarysmeltingandrefiningofcopperSesaGoaLtdIndiaIronores100
283.7T-MobileUSAIncUnitedStatesRadiotelephonecommunicationsMetroPCSCommunicationsIncUnitedStatesRadiotelephonecommunications100
293.6HindustanUnileverLtdIndiaSoapotherdetergents,exceptspecialtycleanersUnileverPLCUnitedKingdomFoodpreparations,nec15
303.6FocusMediaHoldingLtdChinaOutdooradvertisingservicesGiovannaAcquisitionLtdChinaInvestors,nec100
313.6Tele2RussiaHoldingABRussianFederationTelephonecommunications,exceptradiotelephoneVTBGroupRussianFederationNationalcommercialbanks100
323.5SlovakGasHoldingBVSlovakiaNaturalgastransmissionEnergetickyaPrumyslovyHoldingasCzechRepublicElectricservices100
333.3TYSABRIUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparationsBiogenIdecIncUnitedStatesBiologicalproducts,exceptdiagnosticsubstances50
343.2StatoilASA-GullfaksFieldNorwayCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasOMVAGAustriaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas19
353.1TheShawGroupIncUnitedStatesFabricatedpipeandpipefittingsChicagoBridgeIronCoNVNetherlandsSpecialtradecontractors,nec100
363.1ICAABSwedenGrocerystoresHakonInvestABSwedenInvestors,nec60
373.1TransportetInfrastructuresGazFranceSA{TIGF}FranceNaturalgastransmissionInvestorGroupItalyInvestors,nec100
Source: UNCTADFDI-TNC-GVCInformationSystem,cross-borderMAdatabase(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a
Immediatecountry.
Note: Aslongastheultimatehosteconomyisdifferentfromtheultimatehomeeconomy,MAdealsthatwereundertakenwithinthesameeconomyarestillconsideredcross-borderMAs.

Annex table 6. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2007–2013
World as destination World as source
Partner region/economy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
By source By destination
World 880 832 1 413 540 1 008 273 860 905 902 365 613 939 672 108 880 832 1 413 540 1 008 273 860 905 902 365 613 939 672 108
Developed countries 632 655 1 027 852 734 272 625 190 636 843 413 541 458 336 310 109 425 276 318 385 298 739 297 581 224 604 215 018
Europe 414 450 599 130 445 470 384 529 355 244 231 327 256 094 222 398 317 370 200 298 168 435 176 488 136 320 125 087
European Union 374 544 548 639 412 323 352 752 327 446 214 416 229 275 216 647 307 460 194 248 161 758 172 635 133 181 121 601
Austria 14 783 22 426 10 057 9 309 8 309 4 641 5 395 3 144 3 028 1 717 2 289 4 134 1 579 1 095
Belgium 6 569 12 860 8 872 5 817 6 030 3 703 4 241 8 149 10 797 3 796 6 067 3 351 2 575 2 980
Bulgaria 81 286 30 147 121 81 217 7 695 11 231 4 780 3 680 5 300 2 756 1 906
Croatia 2 909 3 261 146 1 071 105 175 240 1 795 3 194 1 707 2 397 1 798 1 141 1 039
Cyprus 428 323 856 543 4 379 1 561 974 465 629 249 720 385 204 152
Czech Republic 5 158 4 615 1 729 2 298 2 109 2 184 1 960 7 491 5 684 4 575 7 733 4 874 2 690 3 805
Denmark 7 375 13 944 9 951 4 534 8 151 7 597 7 050 2 001 1 968 2 195 457 794 850 743
Estonia 2 654 559 188 1 088 358 259 861 840 1 481 1 260 947 883 997 788
Finland 13 189 11 071 3 628 4 351 5 891 4 795 6 751 1 269 2 415 1 208 1 692 2 153 1 691 2 461
France 55 234 89 486 66 071 52 054 49 030 27 881 30 710 19 367 24 114 11 371 9 109 10 519 7 072 9 354
Germany 73 929 98 526 73 239 72 025 69 841 50 718 48 478 16 417 30 620 19 585 17 081 18 504 12 210 10 722
Greece 1 700 4 416 1 802 1 300 1 450 1 574 763 5 096 5 278 2 090 1 123 2 377 1 553 3 092
Hungary 1 913 4 956 1 159 431 1 245 1 055 599 9 550 9 031 3 739 7 557 3 213 2 502 2 118
Ireland 7 629 9 510 14 322 5 743 4 704 5 630 4 346 4 679 8 215 4 932 4 453 6 982 5 045 4 577
Italy 22 961 41 297 29 744 23 431 23 196 21 334 21 124 11 760 12 618 10 471 11 365 5 692 4 037 3 919
Latvia 284 660 761 821 279 75 149 717 2 545 828 965 717 1 042 656
Lithuania 303 723 305 252 158 640 273 1 485 1 542 1 238 1 558 7 304 1 271 971
Luxembourg 9 097 14 103 10 879 7 085 9 418 5 802 4 315 695 431 759 731 290 270 336
Malta 68 212 773 12 566 68 46 299 395 467 300 174 308 199
Netherlands 24 566 39 940 32 555 19 651 17 697 9 441 13 731 5 840 9 438 9 459 8 469 5 650 4 075 7 119
Poland 2 252 1 790 1 241 2 238 850 1 409 855 18 776 31 977 14 693 11 566 13 024 11 891 7 960
Portugal 4 522 11 162 7 180 5 088 2 153 2 058 2 087 6 476 6 785 5 443 2 665 1 732 1 231 1 474
Romania 108 430 131 708 129 127 293 21 006 30 474 15 019 7 764 16 156 9 852 9 210
Slovakia 474 135 393 1 314 277 356 246 5 485 3 350 3 152 4 149 5 664 1 420 1 758
Slovenia 683 1 658 586 536 346 335 165 1 037 612 282 748 692 469 175
Spain 31 236 45 465 42 209 37 687 29 365 18 000 24 617 23 529 27 530 15 984 16 444 11 501 11 918 13 271
Sweden 11 875 21 448 15 508 14 895 13 906 7 152 10 385 4 372 2 930 2 827 2 364 3 160 1 354 1 027
United Kingdom 72 562 93 379 78 009 78 322 67 382 35 765 38 406 27 209 59 149 50 423 27 367 35 611 41 177 28 696
Other developed Europe 39 906 50 491 33 147 31 777 27 798 16 911 26 819 5 751 9 911 6 050 6 676 3 853 3 139 3 486
Andorra - 14 30 145 18 114 - - - 20 5 - - 1
Iceland 1 545 568 123 633 433 39 4 215 53 1 077 - 705 203 136 248
Liechtenstein 74 105 136 111 133 92 39 131 8 - 9 - - 115
Monaco 6 15 34 48 258 - 32 71 234 43 33 123 38 17
Norway 10 792 12 058 10 588 5 433 6 634 3 325 2 999 794 3 200 2 334 2 243 830 583 1 279
San Marino - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - -
Switzerland 27 489 37 732 22 236 25 408 20 323 13 339 19 535 4 703 5 391 3 654 3 682 2 698 2 382 1 826
North America 145 789 299 570 196 675 164 915 185 207 123 651 134 222 54 485 71 110 85 957 80 779 100 002 63 504 67 277
Canada 14 748 43 513 30 928 20 023 28 507 19 146 14 187 8 630 15 763 14 084 17 789 27 256 8 447 15 098
United States 131 040 256 058 165 747 144 892 156 700 104 504 120 035 45 855 55 347 71 873 62 990 72 746 55 058 52 179
Other developed countries 72 416 129 152 92 126 75 746 96 392 58 563 68 020 33 226 36 795 32 131 49 525 21 091 24 779 22 653
Australia 14 191 31 052 18 421 12 441 14 486 10 456 8 939 22 816 22 624 19 990 41 253 12 245 16 488 10 552
Bermuda 3 937 3 440 8 108 1 573 1 198 844 1 943 15 - 1 165 6 14 4
Greenland 214 35 - - - - - - - - 457 - - -
Israel 4 347 12 725 2 726 6 655 3 447 2 816 3 134 457 853 3 333 856 696 1 692 1 148
Japan 49 189 81 290 61 868 54 210 76 176 42 891 51 701 7 768 11 287 8 240 6 407 6 177 5 273 9 700
New Zealand 537 611 1 004 867 1 085 1 555 2 303 2 171 2 030 568 388 1 967 1 312 1 249
Developing economies 228 856 361 610 254 896 215 212 247 631 190 448 195 161 499 559 880 220 634 961 510 098 547 047 349 946 429 221
Africa 5 564 12 765 13 386 14 517 35 428 7 764 15 807 82 133 160 790 91 629 81 233 81 130 47 455 53 596
North Africa 2 639 5 207 2 396 1 095 746 2 735 1 496 49 382 63 135 41 499 24 542 11 931 15 946 10 569
Algeria 60 620 16 - 130 200 15 8 952 19 107 2 380 1 716 1 204 2 370 4 286
Egypt 1 880 3 498 1 828 990 76 2 523 1 132 12 780 13 376 20 678 12 161 6 247 10 205 3 035
Libya - - 19 - - - - 4 061 3 004 1 689 1 858 49 98 121
Morocco 50 619 393 58 87 12 115 5 113 16 925 6 189 4 217 2 535 1 398 2 461
South Sudan - - - - - - - 19 1 181 54 139 235 382 180
Sudan 42 - - - 432 - - - 1 612 2 025 2 440 58 66 55
Tunisia 609 471 140 47 21 - 235 18 458 7 931 8 484 2 010 1 602 1 426 432
Other Africa 2 925 7 558 10 990 13 422 34 682 5 029 14 311 32 751 97 655 50 130 56 692 69 199 31 509 43 028
Angola 39 78 15 494 - 362 112 8 138 11 204 5 536 1 147 305 3 022 552
Benin - - - - - - - - 9 - 14 46 17 160
Botswana - - 11 9 138 70 36 344 2 220 349 660 492 148 103
Burkina Faso - - - - - - - 9 281 272 479 165 1 217
Burundi - - - - - 12 11 - 19 47 25 41 19 66
/…

ANNEX TABLES 219
Annex table 6. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2007–2013 (continued)
Cabo Verde - - - - - - - 9 128 - 38 62 - 8
Cameroon - - 19 - - - - 2 460 351 1 155 5 289 4 272 566 502
Central African Republic - - - - - - - 361 - - - - 59 -
Chad - - - - - - - - 758 402 - 135 101 150
Comoros - - - - - - - 9 9 - - 7 138 11
Congo - - - - - - - 198 9 1 281 - 37 119 434
Congo, Democratic Republic of - 161 - 7 - - - 1 238 3 294 43 1 238 2 242 517 556
Côte d’ Ivoire - 13 10 19 - 48 326 71 372 131 261 937 1 038 1 873
Djibouti - - - - - - - 5 1 555 1 245 1 255 - 25 180
Equatorial Guinea - - - - - - 12 - 6 1 300 9 1 881 2 13
Eritrea - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ethiopia - 18 12 - - 54 70 919 762 321 290 630 441 4 510
Gabon - - - - 9 - - 328 3 298 927 1 231 219 267 46
Gambia - - - - - - - 9 31 31 405 26 200 9
Ghana - - 7 15 51 51 28 129 4 918 7 059 2 689 6 431 1 319 2 780
Guinea - - - - - - - - - 61 1 411 548 33 35
Guinea-Bissau - - - - - - - 361 - 19 - - - -
Kenya 198 616 314 3 920 421 835 441 332 549 1 896 1 382 2 855 988 3 644
Lesotho - - - - - - - 51 16 28 51 710 10 -
Liberia - - - - - - - - 2 600 821 4 591 287 53 558
Madagascar - - - - - - - 3 335 1 325 365 - 140 363 182
Malawi - 9 9 - - 2 - - 19 713 314 454 24 559
Mali - 19 10 19 9 - 11 - 172 59 13 0 794 13
Mauritania - - - - - - - 37 272 - 59 279 361 23
Mauritius 38 307 1 809 2 642 3 287 149 3 252 481 317 147 71 1 749 142 49
Mozambique - - - - - 59 - 2 100 6 600 1 539 3 278 9 971 3 456 6 108
Namibia - 23 - - - 344 420 473 1 907 1 519 390 832 777 1 057
Niger - - - - - - - - 3 319 - 100 277 - 350
Nigeria 190 698 659 1 048 1 046 723 3 061 3 213 27 381 7 978 8 340 4 543 4 142 5 983
Reunion - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rwanda - - 26 - - 19 - 283 252 312 1 839 779 110 424
São Tomé and Principe - - - - - - - 2 351 - - - - 150
Senegal - - - - 10 8 389 536 1 281 548 883 69 1 238 1 260
Seychelles - - - - - - - 125 130 1 121 9 43 156
Sierra Leone - - - - - - - - 73 260 230 212 119 611
Somalia - - - - - - - - 361 - 59 - 44 381
South Africa 2 393 4 841 7 820 5 146 29 469 2 082 5 833 5 247 13 533 7 695 6 819 12 430 4 777 5 643
Swaziland - - - - - - - - 23 12 - 646 7 150
Togo 49 94 142 34 214 19 122 351 146 26 - - 411 363
Uganda 9 40 28 9 - - 7 291 3 057 2 147 8 505 2 476 569 752
United Republic of Tanzania 9 9 57 49 27 24 138 327 2 492 623 1 077 3 806 1 137 852
Zambia - - 9 - - 168 33 422 1 276 2 375 1 376 2 366 840 1 074
Zimbabwe - 629 34 10 - - 8 557 979 889 754 5 834 3 074 480
Asia 211 077 329 843 226 047 178 906 191 076 173 175 161 096 349 751 583 342 424 092 313 488 331 839 231 496 227 492
East and South-East Asia 130 227 154 975 122 130 123 597 115 164 110 393 106 067 243 703 321 831 251 936 202 925 205 922 147 303 146 465
East Asia 83 797 107 698 83 957 87 393 86 185 71 304 83 494 127 920 151 963 135 605 117 637 119 919 93 099 82 464
China 32 765 47 016 25 496 20 684 40 140 19 227 19 295 104 359 126 831 116 828 96 749 100 630 73 747 69 473
Hong Kong, China 17 313 15 528 17 468 8 147 13 023 11 953 49 225 4 742 7 164 9 073 8 217 7 127 7 960 5 137
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of - - - - - - - 560 533 228 - 59 - 227
Korea, Republic of 21 928 33 775 29 119 30 285 20 896 30 031 9 726 9 108 11 828 4 583 3 601 7 087 6 279 4 731
Macao, China - 2 - - - - - 4 224 909 310 282 430 2 382 257
Mongolia - - - 150 - - - 448 330 302 1 608 183 122 595
Taiwan Province of China 11 792 11 377 11 875 28 127 12 126 10 094 5 248 4 477 4 367 4 280 7 179 4 403 2 608 2 045
South-East Asia 46 430 47 277 38 173 36 203 28 979 39 089 22 573 115 783 169 868 116 331 85 288 86 003 54 204 64 001
Brunei Darussalam - 77 - - 2 - - 722 435 470 156 5 969 77 45
Cambodia - 51 149 - - - 184 261 3 581 3 895 1 759 2 365 1 625 1 956
Indonesia 1 824 393 1 043 415 5 037 843 395 18 512 36 019 29 271 13 740 24 152 16 881 9 983
Lao People’s Democratic Republic - 192 - - - - - 1 371 1 151 2 118 335 980 589 458
Malaysia 26 806 13 818 14 904 21 319 4 140 18 458 2 557 8 318 23 110 13 580 15 541 13 694 6 827 5 536
Myanmar 20 - - - 84 - 160 378 1 434 1 889 449 712 2 029 13 444
Philippines 1 541 563 1 410 1 790 324 629 504 15 509 14 800 9 719 4 645 2 813 4 263 2 988
Singapore 13 432 21 444 12 985 8 631 13 308 16 537 12 633 24 979 13 983 12 940 16 992 20 562 9 838 8 378
Thailand 2 159 7 936 6 032 3 128 4 443 2 432 5 072 6 601 15 122 7 678 8 641 4 121 5 699 5 645
Timor-Leste - - - - - - - - - - 1 000 - 116 -
Viet Nam 647 2 804 1 651 920 1 643 190 1 070 39 133 60 234 34 772 22 030 10 634 6 259 15 570
South Asia 24 343 39 788 23 226 21 115 32 560 27 714 15 789 55 632 87 161 68 983 55 433 58 669 39 525 24 499
Afghanistan - - - - 8 - 15 6 269 2 978 634 305 245 320
Bangladesh - 72 37 103 109 144 1 53 860 645 2 720 490 2 361 872
/…

Annex table 6. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2007–2013 (continued)
Bhutan - - - - - - - - - 135 83 86 39 183
India 18 136 38 039 17 338 20 250 31 589 24 891 14 740 43 445 70 207 55 156 44 491 48 921 30 947 17 741
Iran, Islamic Republic of 6 137 429 5 743 535 515 1 578 - 6 217 6 911 2 982 3 034 1 812 - 79
Maldives - - - - - - - 206 462 453 2 162 1 012 329 107
Nepal - 2 - 6 31 125 232 3 740 295 340 128 - 853
Pakistan 40 1 220 42 153 227 106 686 5 049 6 390 3 955 1 255 2 399 4 315 3 033
Sri Lanka 29 27 66 68 82 871 115 652 1 323 2 383 714 3 517 1 290 1 312
West Asia 56 507 135 081 80 691 34 195 43 352 35 069 39 240 50 417 174 350 103 173 55 130 67 248 44 668 56 527
Bahrain 8 995 15 987 14 740 1 070 912 1 145 598 820 8 050 2 036 1 997 3 931 3 535 1 154
Iraq 42 - 20 - 48 - 52 474 23 982 12 849 5 486 10 597 976 14 998
Jordan 244 627 1 650 591 52 1 037 105 1 250 11 903 2 506 2 824 3 250 1 401 10 946
Kuwait 2 936 16 108 4 585 2 850 4 502 1 331 10 833 373 2 256 987 673 494 1 051 2 183
Lebanon 596 626 639 246 301 393 153 428 1 292 1 772 1 336 531 201 104
Oman 87 84 3 110 39 165 101 479 1 794 8 954 5 608 4 255 5 043 4 970 2 641
Qatar 972 8 839 13 663 2 891 13 044 8 749 1 546 1 368 19 021 21 519 5 434 4 362 2 172 1 573
Saudi Arabia 2 089 5 795 6 105 1 441 5 027 2 389 2 746 14 630 36 718 14 860 8 139 15 766 8 393 6 430
State of Palestine - - - - - 15 - 52 1 050 16 15 - - 8
Syrian Arab Republic - 326 59 - 193 0 0 1 854 4 949 3 134 2 165 1 315 10 -
Turkey 2 399 4 464 4 068 4 031 3 155 3 216 6 864 14 655 17 127 23 859 8 917 10 323 9 540 9 491
United Arab Emirates 38 147 82 175 32 053 21 034 15 954 16 684 15 844 12 372 36 218 13 067 12 870 11 623 12 053 6 821
Yemen - 49 - 2 - 9 20 347 2 830 961 1 019 11 366 178
Latin America and the Caribbean 12 215 18 926 15 442 21 773 20 776 9 508 18 257 63 442 131 592 117 061 113 098 130 791 69 731 145 066
South America 8 539 16 196 12 040 18 602 10 520 6 715 11 864 39 422 83 232 81 409 89 861 96 732 50 071 67 334
Argentina 625 470 1 118 1 284 871 1 422 1 381 5 466 7 193 9 217 7 112 12 000 6 004 4 342
Bolivia, Plurinational State of - - - - - - 66 49 789 1 947 797 305 10 1 028
Brazil 4 372 11 073 7 736 10 323 4 649 3 200 6 865 17 516 40 201 40 304 43 860 56 888 26 373 29 055
Chile 2 239 855 1 758 2 564 1 578 1 106 1 566 3 093 6 360 12 888 5 874 13 814 10 233 10 212
Colombia 139 500 102 3 390 1 020 884 1 111 3 986 8 281 2 945 10 616 6 892 2 909 11 479
Ecuador 89 67 330 166 60 38 - 518 511 348 132 648 603 784
Guyana - - - - - - - 10 1 000 12 160 15 302 38
Paraguay - - - - - - - 607 378 83 3 873 108 287 395
Peru 315 17 108 25 380 12 391 2 974 9 859 11 831 11 956 4 074 2 184 6 340
Suriname - - - - - - - - 101 - - 384 34 13
Uruguay 25 3 49 3 5 - 4 2 910 4 381 504 749 1 030 720 1 620
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 735 3 211 840 847 1 956 53 480 2 293 4 179 1 331 4 732 574 413 2 029
Central America 2 880 1 186 2 459 2 869 9 820 2 441 5 785 21 438 41 320 31 929 20 025 25 614 17 217 68 714
Belize - - - - 5 - - - - 3 5 - 241 100
Costa Rica 95 6 45 63 11 1 110 2 157 570 1 427 1 981 3 364 476 825
El Salvador 102 - 281 147 20 - 55 356 562 716 276 462 171 863
Guatemala 79 58 131 86 125 211 222 979 905 1 330 963 209 53 1 059
Honduras 61 - - - - 40 378 951 1 089 126 226 551 43 549
Mexico 2 444 990 1 923 2 101 9 498 2 184 4 954 13 652 34 896 25 059 14 809 18 741 15 401 23 101
Nicaragua 54 67 - 251 - - 31 62 185 877 280 274 135 40 602
Panama 47 65 80 220 161 5 35 3 282 3 114 2 391 1 485 2 013 697 1 616
Caribbean 795 1 544 944 302 437 353 609 2 581 7 039 3 723 3 212 8 445 2 444 9 018
Antigua and Barbuda - - - - - - - - 82 - - - - -
Aruba - - - - - - - - 64 - 6 25 70 -
Bahamas 19 18 42 - 2 7 97 18 61 5 64 333 24 15
Barbados 2 - - 5 26 19 - - - 29 137 303 16 -
Cayman Islands 166 554 853 52 243 297 41 36 326 104 253 349 351 6
Cuba - 77 - - 21 - 0 127 2 703 1 015 1 567 465 223 195
Dominica - - - - - - - 63 - - - - - -
Dominican Republic 498 - 30 25 - - - 749 2 044 1 399 330 5 143 584 2 684
Grenada - - - - - - - 3 - - 5 5 30 0
Guadeloupe - - - - - - - - 267 - - 25 - -
Haiti - - - 9 - - 10 - 2 110 59 376 2 426
Jamaica 2 889 17 160 128 30 460 29 317 41 23 491 13 1 363
Martinique 63 - - 13 - - - 35 - 6 - - 23 -
Puerto Rico 20 6 4 36 18 - 1 713 739 716 570 752 926 2 530
Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - - - - - 64 -
Saint Lucia - - - - - - - 12 - 3 144 64 - 65
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Trinidad and Tobago 26 - - 3 - - - 797 372 296 22 114 119 1 514
Turks and Caicos Islands - - - - - - - - 64 - 34 - - 221
Oceania - 76 20 16 351 - - 4 234 4 496 2 179 2 279 3 287 1 265 3 067
Fiji - - 2 8 - - - 206 117 339 - 179 41 13
French Polynesia - - 10 - - - - - - - 108 - - -
/…

ANNEX TABLES 221
Annex table 6. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2007–2013 (concluded)
Micronesia, Federated States of - - - - - - - - - - - - 156 -
New Caledonia - - - - 202 - - 3 800 1 400 22 - 8 - -
Papua New Guinea - 73 - 8 149 - - 228 2 438 1 786 1 944 3 050 1 068 3 054
Samoa - 2 - - - - - - 500 - - - - -
Solomon Islands - - 8 - - - - - 42 32 228 51 - -
Transition economies 19 321 24 077 19 105 20 503 17 891 9 950 18 611 71 164 108 044 54 926 52 067 57 736 39 389 27 868
South-East Europe 31 658 326 485 202 82 220 11 399 18 167 6 192 5 241 7 464 7 568 5 851
Albania - - - 105 - - 3 4 454 3 505 124 68 525 288 57
Bosnia and Herzegovina - 7 - 16 2 9 26 2 623 1 993 1 368 283 1 253 1 287 880
Montenegro - - - 7 - - 9 694 851 120 380 436 355 613
Serbia 31 651 314 356 150 74 84 3 131 9 196 3 816 4 040 4 295 4 459 3 721
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - - 12 1 49 - 99 497 2 622 763 470 956 1 179 579
CIS 19 290 23 337 18 746 20 009 17 514 9 620 18 360 58 431 87 069 44 336 45 809 48 292 31 397 20 757
Armenia - 51 - 9 83 171 - 434 690 1 003 265 805 434 773
Azerbaijan 4 307 1 223 3 779 580 435 3 246 221 1 999 1 921 1 939 711 1 289 1 573 964
Belarus 76 1 323 391 2 091 133 91 540 487 977 1 134 1 888 1 268 787 581
Kazakhstan 109 411 706 636 383 138 221 4 251 17 844 1 949 2 536 7 816 1 191 1 370
Kyrgyzstan - 60 30 - - - - 3 362 539 50 - 358 83 49
Moldova, Republic of - 557 - - 0 - 3 162 163 488 301 320 118 285
Russian Federation 13 657 16 976 13 055 15 476 15 527 5 019 16 185 38 157 51 949 29 792 34 519 22 781 18 537 12 213
Tajikistan - 82 10 - - - - 327 226 570 3 1 076 669 44
Turkmenistan - - - - - - - 1 051 3 974 1 433 458 1 926 8 -
Ukraine 1 142 2 656 776 1 218 954 954 1 191 7 185 7 686 4 561 4 061 3 094 3 192 4 191
Uzbekistan - - - - - 0 - 1 016 1 101 1 418 1 068 7 560 4 806 289
Georgia - 82 33 8 174 248 31 1 334 2 808 4 398 1 017 1 980 424 1 261
Memorandum
Least developed countries (LDCs)a
168 798 502 732 923 1 005 1 528 21 220 55 740 34 229 39 853 33 647 21 923 39 043
Landlocked developing countries(LLDCs)b
4 425 3 290 4 675 1 429 1 137 4 005 1 033 18 840 47 069 25 449 28 026 39 438 17 931 17 211
Small island developing States (SIDS)c
87 1 290 1 877 2 825 3 592 205 3 809 2 187 5 325 3 132 5 957 7 429 2 298 6 506
a
Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (which, however, graduated from LDC status effective 1 January 2014), São Tomé and Principe, Senegal,
b
Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay,
Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
c
Small island developing States include: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands,
Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe,
Note: Data refer to estimated amounts of capital investment.

Annex table 7. List of IIAs at end 2013a
BITs Other IIAsb
Total
Afghanistan 3 4 7
Albania 43 7 50
Algeria 47 8 55
Angola 8 7 15
Anguilla - 1 1
Antigua and Barbuda 2 9 11
Argentina 58 15 73
Armenia 40 3 43
Aruba - 1 1
Australia 22 14 36
Austria 66 61 127
Azerbaijan 46 4 50
Bahamas 1 9 10
Bahrain 29 15 44
Bangladesh 28 4 32
Barbados 10 9 19
Belarus 60 4 64
Belgiumc
93 61 154
Belize 7 9 16
Benin 16 9 25
Bermuda - 1 1
Bhutan - 2 2
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 17 12 29
Bosnia and Herzegovina 38 5 43
Botswana 8 7 15
Brazil 14 16 30
British Virgin Islands - 1 1
Brunei Darussalam 8 16 24
Bulgaria 68 62 130
Burkina Faso 14 9 23
Burundi 7 9 16
Cambodia 21 14 35
Cameroon 16 6 22
Canada 30 17 47
Cape Verde 9 6 15
Cayman Islands - 1 1
Central African Republic 4 5 9
Chad 14 6 20
Chile 50 28 78
China 130 17 147
Colombia 8 20 28
Comoros 6 10 16
Congo 14 5 19
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 16 10 26
Cook Islands - 2 2
Costa Rica 21 17 38
Côte d’Ivoire 10 10 20
Croatia 58 62 120
Cuba 58 3 61
Cyprus 27 62 89
Czech Republic 79 62 141
Denmark 55 62 117
Djibouti 9 10 19
/…

ANNEX TABLES 223
Annex table 7. List of IIAs at end 2013(continued)
BITs Other IIAsb
Total
Dominica 2 9 11
Dominican Republic 15 4 19
Ecuador 18 8 26
Egypt 100 13 113
El Salvador 22 9 31
Equatorial Guinea 9 5 14
Eritrea 4 6 10
Estonia 27 63 90
Ethiopia 29 6 35
Fiji - 3 3
Finland 71 62 133
France 102 62 164
Gabon 14 6 20
Gambia 16 7 23
Georgia 31 4 35
Germany 134 62 196
Ghana 26 7 33
Greece 43 62 105
Grenada 2 9 11
Guatemala 19 11 30
Guinea 20 7 27
Guinea-Bissau 2 8 10
Guyana 8 10 18
Haiti 7 9 16
Honduras 11 10 21
Hong Kong, China 16 4 20
Hungary 58 62 120
Iceland 9 30 39
India 84 12 96
Indonesia 64 14 78
Iran, Islamic Republic of 61 2 63
Iraq 7 6 13
Ireland - 62 62
Israel 37 5 42
Italy 93 62 155
Jamaica 17 9 26
Japan 22 17 39
Jordan 53 9 62
Kazakhstan 45 7 52
Kenya 14 7 21
Kiribati - 2 2
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 24 - 24
Korea, Republic of 91 13 104
Kuwait 74 14 88
Kyrgyzstan 29 7 36
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 24 15 39
Latvia 44 62 106
Lebanon 50 8 58
Lesotho 3 7 10
Liberia 4 7 11
Libya 35 11 46
Liechtenstein - 1 1
/…

Annex table 7. List of IIAs at end 2013(continued)
BITs Other IIAsb
Total
Lithuania 54 62 116
LuxembourgC
93 62 155
Macao, China 2 2 4
Madagascar 9 5 14
Malawi 6 9 15
Malaysia 68 21 89
Maldives - 3 3
Mali 17 8 25
Malta 22 62 84
Mauritania 20 7 27
Mauritius 40 10 50
Mexico 29 15 44
Moldova, Republic of 39 4 43
Monaco 1 - 1
Mongolia 43 3 46
Montenegro 18 4 22
Montserrat - 9 9
Morocco 63 9 72
Mozambique 25 7 32
Myanmar 7 14 21
Namibia 14 7 21
Nauru - 2 2
Nepal 6 3 9
Netherlands 97 62 159
New Caledonia - 1 1
New Zealand 5 12 17
Nicaragua 18 11 29
Niger 5 9 14
Nigeria 24 8 32
Norway 15 28 43
Oman 34 14 48
Pakistan 46 7 53
Palestinian Territory 3 7 10
Panama 24 10 34
Papua New Guinea 6 3 9
Paraguay 24 15 39
Peru 31 27 58
Philippines 37 13 50
Poland 62 62 124
Portugal 55 62 117
Qatar 49 14 63
Romania 82 62 144
Russian Federation 72 3 75
Rwanda 7 10 17
Saint Kitts and Nevis - 9 9
Saint Lucia 2 9 11
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2 9 11
Samoa - 2 2
San Marino 8 - 8
São Tomé and Principe 1 3 4
Saudi Arabia 24 14 38
Senegal 25 9 34
/…

ANNEX TABLES 225
Annex table 7. List of IIAs at end 2013(concluded)
BITs Other IIAsb
Total
Serbia 51 4 55
Seychelles 4 9 13
Sierra Leone 3 7 10
Singapore 41 26 67
Slovakia 55 62 117
Slovenia 38 62 100
Solomon Islands - 2 2
Somalia 2 5 7
South Africa 43 10 53
South Sudan - 1 1
Spain 82 62 144
Sri Lanka 28 5 33
Sudan 27 10 37
Suriname 3 10 13
Swaziland 6 10 16
Sweden 69 62 131
Switzerland 119 31 150
Syrian Arab Republic 42 5 47
Taiwan Province of China 23 5 28
Tajikistan 34 7 41
Thailand 39 21 60
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 39 5 44
Timor-Leste 3 1 4
Togo 4 9 13
Tonga 1 2 3
Trinidad and Tobago 13 9 22
Tunisia 55 9 64
Turkey 89 19 108
Turkmenistan 25 6 31
Tuvalu - 2 2
Uganda 15 8 23
Ukraine 73 5 78
United Arab Emirates 45 14 59
United Kingdom 105 62 167
United Republic of Tanzania 19 7 26
United States 46 64 110
Uruguay 30 17 47
Uzbekistan 50 5 55
Vanuatu 2 2 4
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 28 4 32
Viet Nam 60 17 77
Yemen 37 6 43
Zambia 11 8 19
Zimbabwe 30 8 38
a
The number of BITs and “other IIAs” in this table do not add up to the total number of BITs and “other IIAs” as stated in the text, because some economies/territories have concluded
agreements with entities that are not listed in this table. Because of ongoing reporting by member States and the resulting retroactive adjustments to the UNCTAD database, the data
differ from those reported in WIR13.
b
These numbers include agreements concluded by economies as members of a regional integration organization.
c
BITs concluded the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.

ANNEX TABLES 227
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT PAST ISSUES
WIR 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development
WIR 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies
WIR 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development
WIR 2010: Investing in a Low-carbon Economy
WIR 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development
WIR 2008: Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge
WIR 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development
WIR 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development
WIR 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of RD
WIR 2004: The Shift Towards Services
WIR 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives
WIR 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness
WIR 2001: Promoting Linkages
WIR 2000: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development
WIR 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development
WIR 1998: Trends and Determinants
WIR 1997: Transnational Corporations, Market Structure and Competition Policy
WIR 1996: Investment, Trade and International Policy Arrangements
WIR 1995: Transnational Corporations and Competitiveness
WIR 1994: Transnational Corporations, Employment and the Workplace
WIR 1993: Transnational Corporations and Integrated International Production
WIR 1992: Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth
WIR 1991: The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment
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also be obtained by contacting:
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c/o National Book Network
15200 NBN Way
PO Box 190
Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214
email: unpublications@nbnbooks.com
https://unp.un.org/
For further information on the work on foreign direct investment
and transnational corporations, please address inquiries to:
Division on Investment and Enterprise
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Palais des Nations, Room E-10052
CH-1211 Geneva 10 Switzerland
Telephone: +41 22 917 4533
Fax: +41 22 917 0498
web: www.unctad.org/diae
HOW TO OBTAIN THE PUBLICATIONS

World Investment Report 2014

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World Investment Report 2014