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The document is the preface to the World Investment Report 2011 which discusses non-equity modes of international production and development. It notes that while global FDI has not yet returned to pre-crisis levels, some regions are recovering better than others. It forecasts that FDI flows will recover to pre-crisis levels over the next two years barring economic shocks. It also highlights that developing economies absorbed close to half of global FDI inflows in 2010 for the first time, and generated record FDI outflows, much directed to other developing countries. This demonstrates the growing importance of developing countries and of South-South cooperation and investment for sustainable development. It acknowledges the opportunities that new forms of international engagement like outsour

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U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 2011 NewYorkandGeneva,2011
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentii UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.11.II.D.2 ISBN 978-92-1-112828-4 Copyright © United Nations, 2011 All rights reserved Printed in Switzerland NOTE The Division on Investment and Enterprise of UNCTAD is a global centre of excellence, dealing with issues related to investment and enterprise development in the United Nations System. It builds on three and a half decades of experience and international expertise in research and policy analysis, intergovernmental consensus-building, and provides technical assistance to developing countries. The terms country/economy as used in this Report also refer, as appropriate, to territories or areas; the designations employed and the presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. In addition, the designations of country groups are intended solely for statistical or analytical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage of development reached by a particular country or area in the development process. The major country groupings used in this Report follow the classification of the United Nations Statistical Office. These are: Developed countries: the member countries of the OECD (other than Chile, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Turkey), plus the new European Union member countries which are not OECD members (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania), plus Andorra, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. Transition economies: South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Developing economies: in general all economies not specified above. For statistical purposes, the data for China do not include those for Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR), Macao Special Administrative Region (Macao SAR) and Taiwan Province of China. Reference to companies and their activities should not be construed as an endorsement by UNCTAD of those companies or their activities. The boundaries and names shown and designations used on the maps presented in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The following symbols have been used in the tables: • Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. Rows in tables have been omitted in those cases where no data are available for any of the elements in the row. • A dash (–) indicates that the item is equal to zero or its value is negligible. • A blank in a table indicates that the item is not applicable, unless otherwise indicated. • A slash (/) between dates representing years, e.g., 1994/95, indicates a financial year. • Use of a dash (–) between dates representing years, e.g. 1994–1995, signifies the full period involved, including the beginning and end years. • Reference to “dollars” ($) means United States dollars, unless otherwise indicated. • Annual rates of growth or change, unless otherwise stated, refer to annual compound rates. Details and percentages in tables do not necessarily add to totals because of rounding. The material contained in this study may be freely quoted with appropriate acknowledgement.
iii PREFACE Global foreign direct investment (FDI) has not yet bounced back to pre-crisis levels, though some regions show better recovery than others. The reason is not financing constraints, but perceived risks and regulatory uncertainty in a fragile world economy. The World Investment Report 2011 forecasts that, barring any economic shocks, FDI flows will recover to pre-crisis levels over the next two years. The challenge for the development community is to make this anticipated investment have greater impact on our efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In 2010 – for the first time – developing economies absorbed close to half of global FDI inflows. They also generated record levels of FDI outflows, much of it directed to other countries in the South. This further demonstrates the growing importance of developing economies to the world economy, and of South-South cooperation and investment for sustainable development. Increasingly, transnational corporations are engaging with developing and transition economies through a broadening array of production and investment models, such as contract manufacturing and farming, service outsourcing, franchising and licensing. These relatively new phenomena present opportunities for developing and transition economies to deepen their integration into the rapidly evolving global economy, to strengthen the potential of their home-grown productive capacity, and to improve their international competitiveness. Unlocking the full potential of these new developments will depend on wise policymaking and institution building by governments and international organizations. Entrepreneurs and businesses in developing and transition economies need frameworks in which they can benefit fully from integrated international production and trade. I commend this report, with its wealth of research and analysis, to policymakers and businesses pursuing development success in a fast-changing world. BAN Ki-moon Secretary-General of the United Nations
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The World Investment Report 2011(WIR11) was prepared by a team led by James Zhan. The team members include Richard Bolwijn, Quentin Dupriez, Masataka Fujita, Thomas van Giffen, Michael Hanni, Kalman Kalotay, Joachim Karl, Ralf Krüger, Guoyong Liang, Anthony Miller, Hafiz Mirza, Nicole Moussa, Shin Ohinata, Astrit Sulstarova, Elisabeth Tuerk, Jörg Weber and Kee Hwee Wee. Wolfgang Alschner, Amare Bekele, Federico Di Biasio, Hamed El Kady, Ariel Ivanier, Lizzie Medrano, Cai Mengqi, Abraham Negash, Sergey Ripinski, Claudia Salgado, Christoph Spennemann, Katharina Wortmann and Youngjun Yoo also contributed to the Report. Peter Buckley served as principal consultant. WIR11 also benefited from the advice of Ilan Alon, Mark Casson, Lorraine Eden, Pierre Guislain, Justin Lin, Sarianna Lundan, Ted Moran, Rajneesh Narula, Pierre Sauvé and Timothy Sturgeon. Research and statistical assistance was provided by Bradley Boicourt, Lizanne Martinez and Tadelle Taye as well as interns Hasso Anwer, Hector Dip, Riham Ahmed Marii, Eleni Piteli, John Sasuya and Ninel Seniuk. Production and dissemination of WIR11 was supported by Tserenpuntsag Batbold, Elisabeth Anodeau- Mareschal, Séverine Excoffier, Rosalina Goyena, Natalia Meramo-Bachayani, Chantal Rakotondrainibe and Katia Vieu. The manuscript was edited by Christopher Long and typeset by Laurence Duchemin and Teresita Ventura. Sophie Combette designed the cover. At various stages of preparation, in particular during the four seminars organized to discuss earlier drafts of the Report, the team benefited from comments and inputs received from Rolf Adlung, Marie-Claude Allard, Yukiko Arai, Rashmi Banga, Diana Barrowclough, Francis Bartels, Sven Behrendt, Jem Bendell, Nathalie Bernasconi, Nils Bhinda, Francesco Ciabuschi, Simon Collier, Denise Dunlap-Hinkler, Kevin Gallagher, Patrick Genin, Simona Gentile-Lüdecke, David Hallam, Geoffrey Hamilton, Fabrice Hatem, Xiaoming He, Toh Mun Heng, Paul Hohnen, Anna Joubin-Bret, Christopher Kip, Pascal Liu, Celso Manangan, Arvind Mayaram, Ronaldo Mota, Jean-François Outreville, Peter Muchlinski, Ram Mudambi, Sam Muradzikwa, Peter Nunnenkamp, Offah Obale, Joost Pauwelyn, Carlo Pietrobelli, Jaya Prakash Pradhan, Hassan Qaqaya, Githa Roelans, Ulla Schwager, Emily Sims, Brian Smart, Jagjit Singh Srai, Brad Stillwell, Roger Strange, Dennis Tachiki, Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann, Silke Trumm, Frederico Araujo Turolla, Peter Utting, Kernaghan Webb, Jacques de Werra, Lulu Zhang and Zbigniew Zimny. Numerous officials of central banks, government agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations also contributed to WIR11. The financial support of the Governments of Finland and Sweden is gratefully acknowledged.
vCONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE ..................................................................................................iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................iv ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ix KEY MESSAGES .........................................................................................x OVERVIEW ............................................................................................... xii CHAPTER I. GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS ............................................... 1 A. GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS: RECOVERY OVER THE HORIZON....................2 1. Overall trends ...............................................................................................................................2 a. Current trends ...........................................................................................................................................3 b. FDI by sector and industry .......................................................................................................................8 c. FDI by modes of entry ............................................................................................................................10 d. FDI by components ................................................................................................................................11 e. FDI by special funds: private equity and sovereign wealth funds ..........................................................13 2. Prospects ...................................................................................................................................16 B. FDI AS EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FINANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES..............21 C. FURTHER EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION ..................................24 1. Accelerating internationalization of firms .................................................................................24 2. State-owned TNCs .....................................................................................................................28 a. The universe of State-owned TNCs .......................................................................................................28 b. Trends in State-owned TNCs’ FDI ..........................................................................................................32 c. Issues related to corporate governance .................................................................................................34 CHAPTER II. REGIONAL INVESTMENT TRENDS ......................................... 39 A. REGIONAL TRENDS ........................................................................................40 1. Africa ...........................................................................................................................................40 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................40 b. Intraregional FDI for development ..........................................................................................................42 2. South, East and South-East Asia ..............................................................................................45 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................45 b. Rising FDI from developing Asia: emerging diversified industrial patterns ................................................47 3. West Asia ....................................................................................................................................52 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................52 b. Outward FDI strategies of West Asian TNCs ..........................................................................................53 4. Latin America and the Caribbean ..............................................................................................58 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................58 b. Developing country TNCs’ inroads into Latin America ...........................................................................60 5. South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States ......................................63 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................63 b East–South interregional FDI: trends and prospects ..............................................................................65 6. Developed countries ..................................................................................................................69 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................69 b. Bailing out of the banking industry and FDI ...........................................................................................71
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentvi B. TRENDS IN STRUCTURALLY WEAK, VULNERABLE AND SMALL ECONOMIES..................................................................... 74 1. Least developed countries ........................................................................................................74 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................74 b. Enhancing productive capacities through FDI .......................................................................................76 2. Landlocked developing countries .............................................................................................79 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................79 b. Leveraging TNC participation in infrastructure development..................................................................82 3. Small island developing States .................................................................................................85 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................85 b. Roles of TNCs in climate change adaptation .........................................................................................87 CHAPTER III. RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ........................................ 93 A. NATIONAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS.................................................................94 1. Investment liberalization and promotion ...................................................................................95 2. Investment regulations and restrictions ....................................................................................96 3. Economic stimulus packages and State aid .............................................................................98 B. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME...................................................100 1. Developments in 2010 .............................................................................................................100 2. IIA coverage of investment ......................................................................................................102 C. OTHER INVESTMENT-RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS .................................103 1. Investment in agriculture .........................................................................................................103 2. G-20 Development Agenda .....................................................................................................104 3. Political risk insurance .............................................................................................................104 D. INTERACTION BETWEEN FDI POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY .......................105 1. Interaction at the national level ...............................................................................................105 2. Interaction at the international level ........................................................................................107 3. Challenges for policymakers ...................................................................................................109 a. “Picking the winner” .............................................................................................................................109 b. Nurturing the selected industries .........................................................................................................109 c. Safeguarding policy space ...................................................................................................................110 d. Avoiding investment protectionism ......................................................................................................110 e. Improving international coordination ....................................................................................................110 E. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ............................................................111 1. Taking stock of existing CSR standards .................................................................................111 a. Intergovernmental organization standards ...........................................................................................111 b. Multi-stakeholder initiative standards ...................................................................................................112 c. Industry association codes and individual company codes .................................................................112 2. Challenges with existing standards: key issues .....................................................................113 a. Gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies .....................................................................................................113 b. Inclusiveness in standard-setting .........................................................................................................114 c. Relationship between voluntary CSR standards and national legislation ............................................114 d. Reporting and transparency .................................................................................................................114 e. Compliance and market impact ...........................................................................................................114 f. Concerns about possible trade and investment barriers .....................................................................115 3. Policy options ...........................................................................................................................117 a. Supporting CSR standards development..............................................................................................117 b. Applying CSR to public procurement policy ........................................................................................117 c. Building capacity ..................................................................................................................................117 d. Promoting CSR disclosure and responsible investment ......................................................................118 e. Moving from soft law to hard law .........................................................................................................118
viiCONTENTS f. Strengthening compliance promotion mechanisms among intergovernmental organization standards ...........................................................................................118 g. Applying CSR to investment and trade promotion and enterprise development .................................119 h. Introducing CSR into the international investment regime ...................................................................119 CHAPTER IV. NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................ 123 A. THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND TNC GOVERNANCE.................................................................... 124 1. TNC value chains and governance choices ............................................................................124 2. Defining features of NEMs .......................................................................................................127 B. THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF CROSS-BORDER NEMs..........................................130 1. The overall size and growth of cross-border NEMs................................................................132 2. Trends and indicators by type of NEM.....................................................................................133 a. Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing ................................................................................133 b. Franchising..............................................................................................................................................138 c. Licensing.................................................................................................................................................139 d. Other modalities......................................................................................................................................140 C. DRIVERS AND DETERMINANTS OF NEMs.......................................................142 1. Driving forces behind the growing importance of NEMs .......................................................142 2. Factors that make countries attractive NEM locations ..........................................................144 D. DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF NEMs........................................................147 1. Employment and working conditions ......................................................................................147 2. Local value added ....................................................................................................................153 3. Export generation .....................................................................................................................155 4. Technology and skills acquisition by NEMs ............................................................................157 5. Social and environmental impacts ..........................................................................................160 6. Long-term industrial capacity-building....................................................................................161 E. POLICIES RELATED TO NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION.............................................................................................................165 1. Embedding NEM policies in development strategies ............................................................165 2. Domestic productive capacity-building ..................................................................................166 a. Entrepreneurship policy ........................................................................................................................167 b. Education ..............................................................................................................................................167 c. Enhancing technological capacities .....................................................................................................167 d. Access to finance .................................................................................................................................168 3. Facilitation and promotion of NEMs ........................................................................................169 a. Setting up an enabling legal framework ...............................................................................................169 b. The role of investment promotion agencies .........................................................................................169 c. Home-country policies .........................................................................................................................170 d. International policies .............................................................................................................................170 4. Addressing potential negative effects of NEMs .....................................................................171 a. Strengthening the bargaining power of domestic firms .......................................................................171 b. Addressing competition concerns.........................................................................................................172 c. Labour issues and environmental protection .......................................................................................173 REFERENCES ........................................................................................ 177 ANNEX TABLES ..................................................................................... 185 SELECTED UNCTAD PUBLICATIONS ON TNCS AND FDI ............................ 226
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentviii Boxes I.1. Why are data on global FDI inflows and outflows different?.....................................................6 I.2. FDI flows and the use of funds for investment.........................................................................12 I.3. Forecasting global and regional flows of FDI ..........................................................................17 I.4 Effects of the natural disaster on Japanese TNCs and outward FDI.......................................19 I.5. FDI and capital controls ............................................................................................................23 I.6. Recent trends in internationalization of the largest financial TNCs in the world ...................26 I.7. What is a State-owned enterprise: the case of France ...........................................................29 II.1. The Arab Spring and prospects for FDI in North Africa ..........................................................43 II.2. China’s rising investment in Central Asia .................................................................................66 II.3. Russian TNCs expand into Africa .............................................................................................67 II.4. Overcoming the disadvantages of being landlocked: experience of Uzbekistan in attracting FDI in manufacturing .................................................................................................................81 II.5. Natural resource-seeking FDI in Papua New Guinea: old and new investors.........................88 II.6. TNCs and climate change adaptation in the tourism industry in SIDS ..................................89 III.1. Examples of investment liberalization measures in 2010–2011 ..............................................96 III.2. Examples of investment promotion measures in 2010–2011 ..................................................97 III.3. Examples of new regulatory measures affecting established foreign investors in 2010–2011 ..............................................................................................................................98 III.4. Examples of entry restrictions for foreign investors in 2010–2011 .........................................99 III.5. EU FDI Policymaking ..............................................................................................................101 III.6. WTO TRIMS Agreement ..........................................................................................................108 III.7. The 10 principles of the UN Global Compact ........................................................................112 III.8. Impact investing: achieving competitive financial returns while maximizing social and environmental impact ............................................................................................119 IV.1. The evolution of retail franchising in transition economies ...................................................127 IV.2. Methodological note ...............................................................................................................131 IV.3. The use of management contracts in the hotel industry .......................................................141 IV.4 Employment impact in developing countries of NEMs in garment and footwear production ................................................................................................................149 IV.5. Labour conditions in Foxconn’s Chinese operations – concerns and corporate responses ................................................................................................................................151 IV.6. Cyclical employment in contract manufacturing in Guadalajara ..........................................152 IV.7. Value capture can be limited: iPhone production in China....................................................156 IV.8. Managing the environmental impact of contract farming......................................................162 IV.9. From contract manufacturing to building brands – the Chinese white goods sector..........163 IV.10. NEMs as catalysts for capacity-building and development..................................................164 IV.11. Educational reforms in Viet Nam promote entrepreneurship.................................................167 IV.12. Providing access to finance for SMEs engaging in franchising activities.............................169 IV.13. Pre-contractual requirements in franchising...........................................................................172
ixABBREVIATIONS ABBREVIATIONS ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations BIT bilateral investment treaty BOO build-own-operate BOT build-operate-transfer CIS Commonwealth of Independent States COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CSR corporate social responsibility EAC East African Community EMS electronics manufacturing services FDI foreign direct investment GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GFCF gross fixed capital formation GHG green house gas IIA international investment agreement IP intellectual property IPA investment promotion agency IPO initial public offering ISDS investor–state dispute settlement IT-BPO information technology and business process outsourcing LDC least developed country LLDC landlocked developing country LNG liquefied natural gas M&As mergers and acquisitions MFN most favoured nation MSI multi-stakeholder initiative NEM non-equity mode NIE newly industrializing economies ODA official development assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PPM process and production method PPP public-private partnership QIA Qatar Investment Authority R&D research and development ROCE return on capital employed RTAs regional trade agreements SADC Southern African Development Community SEZ special economic zone SIDS small island developing States SME small and medium-sized enterprise SOE State-owned enterprise SWF sovereign wealth fund TBT technical barriers to trade TNC transnational corporation TRIMs trade-related investment measures TRIPs trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights WIPS World Investment Prospects Survey
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentx KEY MESSAGES FDI TRENDS AND PROSPECTS Global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows rose moderately to $1.24 trillion in 2010, but were still 15 per cent below their pre-crisis average. This is in contrast to global industrial output and trade, which were back to pre-crisis levels. UNCTAD estimates that global FDI will recover to its pre-crisis level in 2011, increasing to $1.4–1.6 trillion, and approach its 2007 peak in 2013. This positive scenario holds, barring any unexpected global economic shocks that may arise from a number of risk factors still in play. For the first time, developing and transition economies together attracted more than half of global FDI flows. Outward FDI from those economies also reached record highs, with most of their investment directed towards other countries in the South. In contrast, FDI inflows to developed countries continued to decline. Some of the poorest regions continued to see declines in FDI flows. Flows to Africa, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States all fell, as did flows to South Asia. At the same time, major emerging regions, such as East and South-East Asia and Latin America experienced strong growth in FDI inflows. International production is expanding, with foreign sales, employment and assets of transnational corporations (TNCs) all increasing. TNCs’ production worldwide generated value-added of approximately $16 trillion in 2010, about a quarter of global GDP. Foreign affiliates of TNCs accounted for more than 10 per cent of global GDP and one-third of world exports. State-owned TNCs are an important emerging source of FDI. There are at least 650 State-owned TNCs, with 8,500 foreign affiliates across the globe. While they represent less than 1 per cent of TNCs, their outward investment accounted for 11 per cent of global FDI in 2010. The ownership and governance of State-owned TNCs have raised concerns in some host countries regarding, among others, the level playing field and national security, with regulatory implications for the international expansion of these companies. INVESTMENT POLICY TRENDS Investment liberalization and promotion remained the dominant element of recent investment policies. Nevertheless, the risk of investment protectionism has increased as restrictive investment measures and administrative procedures have accumulated over the past years. The regime of international investment agreements (IIAs) is at the crossroads. With close to 6,100 treaties, many ongoing negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, it has come close to a point where it is too big and complex to handle for governments and investors alike, yet remains inadequate to cover all possible bilateral investment relationships (which would require a further 14,100 bilateral treaties). The policy discourse about the future orientation of the IIA regime and its development impact is intensifying. FDI policies interact increasingly with industrial policies, nationally and internationally. The challenge is to manage this interaction so that the two policies work together for development. Striking a balance between building stronger domestic productive capacity on the one hand and avoiding investment and trade protectionism on the other is key, as is enhancing international coordination and cooperation. The investment policy landscape is influenced more and more by a myriad of voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards. Governments can maximize development benefits deriving from these standards through appropriate policies, such as harmonizing corporate reporting regulations, providing capacity-building programmes, and integrating CSR standards into international investment regimes.
xiKEY MESSAGES NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT In today’s world, policies aimed at improving the integration of developing economies into global value chains must look beyond FDI and trade. Policymakers need to consider non-equity modes (NEMs) of international production, such as contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, franchising, licensing, management contracts, and other types of contractual relationship through which TNCs coordinate the activities of host country firms, without owning a stake in those firms. Cross-border NEM activity worldwide is significant and particularly important in developing countries. It is estimated to have generated over $2 trillion of sales in 2009. Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing accounted for $1.1–1.3 trillion, franchising $330–350 billion, licensing $340–360 billion, and management contracts around $100 billion. In most cases, NEMs are growing more rapidly than the industries in which they operate. NEMs can yield significant development benefits. They employ an estimated 14–16 million workers in developing countries. Their value added represents up to 15 per cent of GDP in some economies. Their exports account for 70–80 per cent of global exports in several industries. Overall, NEMs can support long- term industrial development by building productive capacity, including through technology dissemination and domestic enterprise development, and by helping developing countries gain access to global value chains. NEMs also pose risks for developing countries. Employment in contract manufacturing can be highly cyclical and easily displaced. The value added contribution of NEMs can appear low if assessed in terms of the value captured out of the total global value chain. Concerns exist that TNCs may use NEMs to circumvent social and environmental standards. And to ensure success in long-term industrial development, developing countries need to mitigate the risk of remaining locked into low-value-added activities and becoming overly dependent on TNC-owned technologies and TNC-governed global value chains. Policy matters. Maximizing development benefits from NEMs requires action in four areas. First, NEM policies need to be embedded in overall national development strategies, aligned with trade, investment and technology policies and addressing dependency risks. Second, governments need to support efforts to build domestic productive capacity to ensure the availability of attractive business partners that can qualify as actors in global value chains. Third, promotion and facilitation of NEMs requires a strong enabling legal and institutional framework, as well as the involvement of investment promotion agencies in attracting TNC partners. Finally, policies need to address the negative consequences and risks posed by NEMs by strengthening the bargaining power of local NEM partners, safeguarding competition, protecting labour rights and the environment.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxii OVERVIEW FDI TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FDI recovery to gain momentum in 2011 Global foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows rose modestly by 5 per cent, to reach $1.24 trillion in 2010. While global industrial output and world trade are already back to their pre-crisis levels, FDI flows in 2010 remained some 15 per cent below their pre-crisis average, and nearly 37 per cent below their 2007 peak. UNCTAD predicts FDI flows will continue their recovery to reach $1.4–1.6 trillion, or the pre-crisis level, in 2011. They are expected to rise further to $1.7 trillion in 2012 and reach $1.9 trillion in 2013, the peak achieved in 2007. The record cash holdings of TNCs, ongoing corporate and industrial restructuring, rising stock market valuations and gradual exits by States from financial and non-financial firms’ shareholdings, built up as supporting measures during the crisis, are creating new investment opportunities for companies across the globe. However, the post-crisis business environment is still beset by uncertainties. Risk factors such as the unpredictability of global economic governance, a possible widespread sovereign debt crisis and fiscal and financial sector imbalances in some developed countries, as well as rising inflation and signs of overheating in major emerging market economies, may yet derail the FDI recovery. Emerging economies are the new FDI powerhouses Developing economies increased further in importance in 2010, both as recipients of FDI and as outward investors. As international production and, recently, international consumption shift to developing and transition economies, TNCs are increasingly investing in both efficiency- and market-seeking projects in those countries. For the first time, they absorbed more than half of global FDI inflows in 2010. Half of the top-20 host economies for FDI in 2010 were developing or transition economies. FDI outflows from developing and transition economies also increased strongly, by 21 per cent. They now account for 29 per cent of global FDI outflows. In 2010, six developing and transition economies were among the top-20 investors. The dynamism of emerging-market TNCs contrasts with the subdued pace of investment from developed-country TNCs, especially those from Europe. Their outward investment was still only about half of their 2007 peak. Services FDI subdued, cross-border M&As rebound Sectoral patterns. The moderate recovery of FDI inflows in 2010 masks major sectoral differences. FDI in services, which accounted for the bulk of the decline in FDI flows due to the crisis, continued on its downward path in 2010. All the main service industries (business services, finance, transport and communications and utilities) fell, although at different speeds. FDI flows in the financial industry experienced one of the sharpest declines. The share of manufacturing rose to almost half of all FDI projects. Within manufacturing, however, investments fell in business-cycle-sensitive industries such as metal and electronics. The chemical industry (including pharmaceuticals) remained resilient through the crisis, while industries such as food, beverages and tobacco, textiles and garments, and automobiles, recovered in 2010. FDI in extractive industries (which did not suffer during the crisis) declined in 2010. Modes of entry. The value of cross-border M&A deals increased by 36 per cent in 2010, but was still only around one third of the previous peak in 2007. The value of cross-border M&As into developing economies
xiiiOVERVIEW doubled. Greenfield investments declined in 2010, but registered a significant rise in both value and number during the first five months of 2011. Components of FDI. Improved economic performance in many parts of the world and increased profits of foreign affiliates lifted reinvested earnings to nearly double their 2009 level. The other two FDI components – equity investment flows and intra-company loans – fell in 2010. Special funds. Private equity-sponsored FDI started to recover in 2010 and was directed increasingly towards developing and transition economies. However, it was still more than 70 per cent below the peak year of 2007. FDI by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) dropped to $10 billion in 2010, down from $26.5 billion in 2009. A more benign global economic environment may lead to increased FDI from these special funds in 2011. International production picks up Indicators of international production, including foreign sales, employment and assets of TNCs, showed gains in 2010 as economic conditions improved. UNCTAD estimates that sales and value added of foreign affiliates in the world reached $33 trillion and $7 trillion, respectively. They also exported more than $6 trillion, about one-third of global exports. TNCs worldwide, in their operations both at home and abroad, generated value added of approximately $16 trillion in 2010 – about a quarter of total world GDP. State-owned TNCs in the spotlight State-owned TNCs are causing concerns in a number of host countries regarding national security, the level playing field for competing firms, and governance and transparency. From the perspective of home countries, there are concerns regarding the openness to investment from their State-owned TNCs. Discussions are underway in some international forums with a view to addressing these issues. Today there are at least 650 State-owned TNCs, constituting an important emerging source of FDI. Their more than 8,500 foreign affiliates are spread across the globe, bringing them in contact with a large number of host economies. While relatively small in number (less than 1 per cent of all TNCs), their FDI is substantial, reaching roughly 11 per cent of global FDI flows in 2010. Reflecting this, State-owned TNCs made up 19 of the world’s 100 largest TNCs. State-owned TNCs constitute a varied group. Developing and transition economies are home to more than half of these firms (56 per cent), though developed countries continue to maintain a significant number of State-owned TNCs. In contrast to the general view of State-owned TNCs as largely concentrated in the primary sector, they are diversified and have a strong presence in the services sector. Uneven performance across regions The rise of FDI to developing countries masks significant regional differences. Some of the poorest regions continued to see declines in FDI flows. Flows to Africa, least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS) continued to fall, as did those to South Asia. At the same time, major emerging regions, such as East and South-East Asia and Latin America, experienced strong growth in FDI inflows. FDI flows to Africa fell by 9 per cent in 2010. At $55 billon, the share of Africa in total global FDI inflows was 4.4 per cent in 2010, down from 5.1 per cent in 2009. FDI to the primary sector, especially in the oil industry, continued to dominate FDI flows to the continent. It accounted for the rise of Ghana as a major host country, as well as for the declines of inflows to Angola and Nigeria. Although the continuing pursuit of natural resources, in particular by Asian TNCs, is likely to sustain FDI flows to sub-Saharan Africa, political uncertainty in North Africa is likely to make 2011 another challenging year for the continent as a whole.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxiv Although there is some evidence that intraregional FDI is beginning to emerge in non-natural resource related industries, intraregional FDI flows in Africa are still limited in terms of volume and industry diversity. Harmonization of Africa’s regional trade agreements and inclusion of FDI regimes could help Africa achieve more of its intraregional FDI potential. Inflows to East Asia, South-East Asia and South Asia as a whole rose by 24 per cent in 2010, reaching $300 billion. However, the three subregions experienced very different trends: inflows to ASEAN more than doubled; those to East Asia saw a 17 per cent rise; FDI to South Asia declined by one-fourth. Inflows to China, the largest recipient of FDI in the developing world, climbed by 11 per cent, to $106 billion. With continuously rising wages and production costs, however, offshoring of labour-intensive manufacturing to the country has slowed down, and FDI inflows continue to shift towards high-tech industries and services. In contrast, some ASEAN member States, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam, have gained ground as low- cost production locations, especially for low-end manufacturing. The decline of FDI to South Asia reflects a 31 per cent slide in inflows to India and a 14 per cent drop in Pakistan. In India, the setback in attracting FDI was partly due to macroeconomic concerns. At the same time, inflows to Bangladesh, an increasingly important low-cost production location in South Asia, jumped by 30 per cent to $913 million. FDI outflows from South, East and South-East Asia grew by 20 per cent to about $232 billion in 2010. In recent years, rising FDI outflows from developing Asia demonstrate new and diversified industrial patterns. In extractive industries, new investors have emerged, including conglomerates such as CITIC (China) and Reliance Group (India), and sovereign wealth funds, such as China Investment Corporation and Temasek Holdings (Singapore). Metal companies in the region have been particularly active in ensuring access to overseas mineral assets, such as iron ore and copper. In manufacturing, Asian companies have been actively taking over large companies in the developed world, but face increasing political obstacles. FDI outflows in the services sector have declined, but M&As in such industries as telecommunications have been increasing. FDI flows to West Asia in 2010 continued to be affected by the global economic crisis, falling by 12 per cent, but they are expected to bottom out in 2011. However, concerns about political instability in the region are likely to dampen the recovery. FDI outflows from West Asia dropped by 51 per cent in 2010. Outward investment from West Asia is mainly driven by government-controlled entities, which have been redirecting some of their national oil surpluses to support their home economies. The economic diversification policies of these countries has been pursued through a dual strategy: investing in other Arab countries to bolster their small domestic economies; and also investing in developed countries to seek strategic assets for the development and diversification of the industrial capabilities back at home. Increasingly this policy has been pursued with a view to creating productive capabilities that are missing at home, such as motor vehicles, alternative energies, electronics and aerospace. This approach differs from that of other countries, which have generally sought to develop a certain level of capacity at home, before engaging in outward direct investment. FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 13 per cent in 2010. The strongest increase was registered in South America, where the growth rate was 56 per cent, with Brazil particularly buoyant. FDI outflows from Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 67 per cent in 2010, mostly due to large cross-border M&A purchases by Brazilian and Mexican TNCs. Latin America and the Caribbean also witnessed a surge of investments by developing Asian TNCs particularly in resource-seeking projects. In 2010, acquisitions by Asian TNCs jumped to $20 billion, accounting for more than 60 per cent of total FDI to the region. This has raised concerns in some countries in the region about the trade patterns, with South America exporting mostly commodities and importing manufactured goods.
xvOVERVIEW FDI flows to transition economies declined slightly in 2010. Flows to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) rose marginally by 0.4 per cent. Foreign investors continue to be attracted to the fast-growing local consumer market, especially in the Russian Federation where flows rose by 13 per cent to $41 billion. In contrast, FDI flows to South-East Europe dropped sharply for the third consecutive year, due partly to sluggish investment from EU countries. South–East interregional FDI is growing rapidly. TNCs based in transition economies and in developing economies have increasingly ventured into each other’s markets. For example, the share of developing host countries in greenfield investment projects by TNCs from transition economies rose to 60 per cent in 2010 (up from only 28 per cent in 2004), while developing-country outward FDI in transition economies increased more than five times over the past decade. Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation are the most important targets of developing-country investors, whereas China and Turkey are the most popular destinations for FDI from transition economies. Such South–East interregional FDI has benefited from outward FDI support from governments through, among others, regional cooperation (e.g. the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and bilateral partnerships. FDI flows to the poorest regions continue to fall In contrast to the FDI boom in developing countries as a whole, FDI inflows to the 48 LDCs declined overall by a further 0.6 per cent in 2010 – a matter of grave concern. The distribution of FDI flows among LDCs also remains highly uneven, with over 80 per cent of LDC FDI flows going to resource-rich economies in Africa. However, this picture is distorted by the highly capital-intensive nature of resource projects. Some 40 per cent of investments, by number, were in the form of greenfield projects in the manufacturing sector and 16 per cent in services. On the occasion of the 2011 Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, UNCTAD proposed a plan of action for investment in LDCs. The emphasis is on an integrated policy approach to investment, technical capacity-building and enterprise development, with five areas of action: public-private infrastructure development; aid for productive capacity; building on LDC investment opportunities; local business development and access to finance; and regulatory and institutional reform. Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) saw their FDI inflows fall by 12 per cent to $23 billion in 2010. These countries are traditionally marginal FDI destinations, and they accounted for only 4 per cent of total FDI flows to the developing world. With intensified South–South economic cooperation and increasing capital flows from emerging markets, prospects for FDI flows to the group may improve. FDI inflows to small island developing States (SIDS) as a whole declined slightly by 1 per cent in 2010, to $4.2 billion. As these countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, SIDS are looking to attract investment from TNCs that can make a contribution to climate change adaptation, by mobilizing financial and technological resources, implementing adaptation initiatives, and enhancing local adaptive capacities. FDI to developed countries remains well below pre-crisis levels In 2010, FDI inflows in developed countries declined marginally. The pattern of FDI inflows was uneven among subregions. Europe suffered a sharp fall. Declining FDI flows were also registered in Japan. A gloomier economic outlook, austerity measures and possible sovereign debt crisis, as well as regulatory concerns, were among the factors hampering the recovery of FDI flows. Inflows to the United States, however, showed a strong turnaround, with an increase of more than 40 per cent. In developed countries, the restructuring of the banking industry, driven by regulatory authorities, has resulted in a series of significant divestments of foreign assets. At the same time, it has also generated new FDI as assets changed hands among major players. The global efforts towards the reform of the financial
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxvi system and the exit strategy of governments are likely to have a large bearing on FDI flows in the financial industry in coming years. The downward trend in outward FDI from developed countries reversed, with a 10 per cent increase over 2009. However, this took it to only half the level of its 2007 peak. The reversal was largely due to higher M&A values, facilitated by stronger balance sheets of TNCs and historic low rates of debt financing. INVESTMENT POLICY TRENDS National policies: mixed messages More than two-thirds of reported investment policy measures in 2010 were in the area of FDI liberalization and promotion. This was the case for Asia in particular, where a relatively high number of measures eased entry and establishment conditions for foreign investment. Most promotion and facilitation measures were adopted by governments in Africa and Asia. These measures included the streamlining of admission procedures and the opening of new, or the expansion of existing, special economic zones. On the other hand, almost one-third of all new measures in 2010 fell into the category of investment- related regulation and restrictions, continuing its upward trend since 2003. The recent restrictive measures were mainly in a few industries, in particular natural resource-based industries and financial services. The accumulation of restrictive measures over the past years and their continued upward trend, as well as stricter review procedures for FDI entry, has increased the risk of investment protectionism. Although numerous countries continue to implement emergency measures or hold considerable assets following bail-out operations, the unwinding of support schemes and liabilities resulting from emergency measures has started. The process advances relatively slowly. As of April 2011, governments are estimated to hold legacy assets and liabilities in financial and non-financial firms valued at over $2 trillion. By far the largest share relates to several hundred firms in the financial sector. All this indicates a potential wave of privatizations in the years to come. The international investment regime: too much and too little With a total of 178 new IIAs in 2010 – more than three new treaties per week – the IIA universe reached 6,092 agreements at the end of the year. This trend of treaty expansion is expected to continue in 2011, the first five months of which saw 48 new IIAs, with more than 100 IIAs currently under negotiation. How the FDI-related competence shift from EU member States to the European level will affect the overall IIA regime is still unclear (EU member States currently have more than 1,300 BITs with non-EU countries). At least 25 new treaty-based investor–State dispute settlement cases were initiated in 2010 and 47 decisions rendered, bringing the total of known cases to 390, and those closed to 197. The overwhelming majority of these cases were initiated by investors from developed countries, with developing countries most often on the receiving end. The 2010 awards further tilted the overall balance in favour of the State, with 78 cases won against 59 lost. As countries continue concluding IIAs, sometimes with novel provisions aimed at rebalancing the rights and obligations between States and firms, and ensuring coherence between IIAs and other public policies, the policy discourse about the future orientation of the IIA regime and how to make IIAs better contribute to sustainable development is intensifying. Nationally, this manifests itself in a growing dialogue among a broad set of investment stakeholders, including civil society, business and parliamentarians. Internationally, inter- governmental debates in UNCTAD’s 2010 World Investment Forum, UNCTAD’s Investment Commission and the joint OECD-UNCTAD investment meetings serve as examples.
xviiOVERVIEW With thousands of treaties, many ongoing negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, today’s IIA regime has come close to a point where it is too big and complex to handle for governments and investors alike. Yet it offers protection to only two-thirds of global FDI stock and covers only one-fifth of possible bilateral investment relationships. To provide full coverage a further 14,100 bilateral treaties would be required. This raises questions not only about the efforts needed to complete the global IIA network, but also about the impact of the IIA regime and its effectiveness for promoting and protecting investment, and about how to ensure that IIAs deliver on their development potential. Intensifying interaction between FDI policies and industrial policies FDI policies increasingly interact with industrial policies, nationally and internationally. At the national level, this interface manifests itself in specific national investment guidelines; the targeting of types of investment or specific categories of foreign investors for industrial development purposes; investment incentives related to certain industries, activities or regions; and investment facilitation in line with industrial development strategies. Countries also use selective FDI restrictions for industrial policy purposes connected to the protection of infant industries, national champions, strategic enterprises or ailing domestic industries in times of crisis. At the international level, industrial policies are supported by FDI promotion through IIAs, in particular when the respective IIA has sector-specific elements. At the same time, IIA provisions can limit regulatory space for industrial policies. To avoid undue policy constraints, a number of flexibility mechanism have been developed in IIAs, such as exclusions and reservations for certain industries, general exceptions or national security exceptions. According to UNCTAD case studies of reservations in IIAs, countries are more inclined to preserve policy space for the services sector, compared to the primary and manufacturing sectors. Within the services sector, most reservations exist in transportation, finance and communication. The overall challenge is to manage the interaction between FDI policies and industrial policies, so as to make the two policies work for development. There is a need to strike a balance between building stronger domestic productive capacity on the one hand and preventing investment and trade protectionism on the other. Better international coordination can contribute to avoiding “beggar thy neighbour” policies and creating synergies for global cooperation. CSR standards increasingly influence investment policies Over the past years, corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards have emerged as a unique dimension of “soft law”. These CSR standards typically focus on the operations of TNCs and, as such, are increasingly significant for international investment as efforts to rebalance the rights and obligations of the State and the investor intensify. TNCs in turn, through their foreign investments and global value chains, can influence the social and environmental practices of business worldwide. The current landscape of CSR standards is multilayered, multifaceted, and interconnected. The standards of the United Nations, the ILO and the OECD serve to define and provide guidance on fundamental CSR. In addition there are dozens of international multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), hundreds of industry association initiatives and thousands of individual company codes providing standards for the social and environmental practices of firms at home and abroad. CSR standards pose a number of systemic challenges. A fundamental challenge affecting most CSR standards is ensuring that companies actually comply with their content. Moreover, there are gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies between standards in terms of global reach, subjects covered, industry focus and uptake among companies. Voluntary CSR standards can complement government regulatory efforts, but they can also undermine, substitute or distract from these. Finally, corporate reporting on performance relative to CSR standards continues to lack standardization and comparability.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxviii Governments can play an important role in creating a coherent policy and institutional framework to address the challenges and opportunities presented by the universe of CSR standards. Policy options for promoting CSR standards include supporting the development of new CSR standards; applying CSR standards to government procurement; building capacity in developing countries to adopt CSR standards; promoting the uptake of CSR reporting and responsible investment; adopting CSR standards as part of regulatory initiatives; strengthening the compliance promotion mechanisms of existing international standards; and factoring CSR standards into IIAs. The various approaches already underway increasingly mix regulatory and voluntary instruments to promote responsible business practices. While CSR standards generally aim to promote sustainable development goals, in the context of international production care needs to be taken to avoid them becoming barriers to trade and investment. The objective of promoting investment can be rhymed with CSR standards. Discussions on responsible investment are ongoing in the international community; for example, in 2010, G-20 leaders encouraged countries and companies to uphold the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) that were developed by UNCTAD, the World Bank, IFAD and FAO, requesting these organizations to develop options for promoting responsible investment in agriculture. NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT International production, today, is no longer exclusively about FDI on the one hand and trade on the other. Non-equity modes (NEMs) of international production are of growing importance, generating over $2 trillion in sales in 2010, much of it in developing countries. NEMs include contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, franchising, licensing, management contracts and other types of contractual relationships through which TNCs coordinate activities in their global value chains (GVCs) and influence the management of host-country firms without owning an equity stake in those firms. From a development perspective, both NEM partnerships and foreign affiliates (i.e. FDI) can enable host countries to integrate into GVCs. A key advantage of NEMs is that they are flexible arrangements with local firms, with a built-in motive for TNCs to invest in the viability of their partners through dissemination of knowledge, technology and skills. This offers host economies considerable potential for long-term industrial capacity building through a number of key channels of development impact such as employment, value added, export generation and technology acquisition. On the other hand, by establishing a local affiliate through FDI, a TNC signals its long-term commitment to a host economy. Attracting FDI is also the better option for economies with limited existing productive capacity. NEMs may be more appropriate than FDI in sensitive situations. In agriculture, for example, contract farming is more likely to address responsible investment issues – respect for local rights, livelihoods of farmers and sustainable use of resources – than large-scale land acquisition. For developing country policymakers, the rise of NEMs not only creates new opportunities for productive capacity building and integration into GVCs, there are also new challenges, as each NEM mode comes with its own set of development impacts and policy implications. The TNC “make or buy” decision and NEMs as the “middle-ground” option Foremost among the core competencies of a TNC is its ability to coordinate activities within a global value chain. TNCs can decide to conduct such activities in-house (internalization) or they can entrust them to other firms (externalization) – a choice analogous to a “make or buy” decision. Internalization, where it has a cross-border dimension, results in FDI, whereby the international flows of goods, services, information and other assets are intra-firm and under full control of the TNC. Externalization results in either arm’s-length trade, where the TNC exercises no control over other firms or, as an intermediate “middle-ground” option,
xixOVERVIEW in non-equity inter-firm arrangements in which contractual agreements and relative bargaining power condition the operations and behaviour of host-country firms. Such “conditioning” can have a material impact on the conduct of the business, requiring the host-country firm to, for example, invest in equipment, change processes, adopt new procedures, improve working conditions, or use specified suppliers. The ultimate ownership and control configuration of a GVC is the outcome of a set of strategic choices by the TNC. In a typical value chain, a TNC oversees a sequence of activities from procurement of inputs, through manufacturing operations to distribution, sales and aftersales services. In addition, firms undertake activities – such as IT functions or R&D – which support all parts of the value chain. In a fully integrated company, activities in all these segments of the value chain are carried out in-house (internalized), resulting in FDI if the activity takes place overseas. However, in all segments of the value chain TNCs can opt to externalize activities through various NEM types. For example, instead of establishing a manufacturing affiliate (FDI) in a host country, a TNC can outsource production to a contract manufacturer or permit a local firm to produce under licence. The TNC’s ultimate choice between FDI and NEMs (or trade) in any segment of the value chain is based on its strategy, the relative costs and benefits, the associated risks, and the feasibility of available options. In some parts of the value chain NEMs can be substitutes for FDI, in others the two may be complementary. NEMs are worth more than $2 trillion, mostly in developing countries Cross-border NEM activity worldwide is estimated to have generated over $2 trillion of sales in 2010. Of this amount, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing accounted for $1.1–1.3 trillion, franchising for $330–350 billion, licensing for $340–360 billion, and management contracts for around $100 billion. These estimates are incomplete, including only the most important industries in which each NEM type is prevalent. The total also excludes other non-equity modes such as contract farming and concessions, which are significant in developing countries. For example, contract farming activities by TNCs are spread worldwide, covering over 110 developing and transition economies, spanning a wide range of agricultural commodities and accounting for a high share of output. There are large variations in relative size. In the automotive industry, contract manufacturing accounts for 30 per cent of global exports of automotive components and a quarter of employment. In contrast, in electronics, contract manufacturing represents a significant share of trade and some three-quarters of employment. In labour-intensive industries such as garments, footwear and toys, contract manufacturing is even more important. Putting different modes of international production in perspective, cross-border activity related to selected NEMs of $2 trillion compares with exports of foreign affiliates of TNCs of some $6 trillion in 2010. However, NEMs are particularly important in developing countries. In many industries, developing countries account for almost all NEM-related employment and exports, compared with their share in global FDI stocks of 30 per cent and in world trade of less than 40 per cent. NEMs are also growing rapidly. In most cases, the growth of NEMs outpaces that of the industries in which they operate. This growth is driven by a number of key advantages of NEMs for TNCs: (1) the relatively low upfront capital expenditures required and the limited working capital needed for operation; (2) reduced risk exposure; (3) flexibility in adapting to changes in the business cycle and in demand; and (4) as a basis for externalizing non-core activities that can often be carried out at lower cost by other operators. NEMs generate significant formal employment in developing countries UNCTAD estimates that worldwide some 18–21 million workers are directly employed in firms operating under NEM arrangements, most of whom are in contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and franchising
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxx activities. Around 80 per cent of NEM-generated employment is in developing and transition economies. Employment in contract manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, services outsourcing, is predominantly based in developing countries. The same applies in other NEMs, although global figures are not available; in Mozambique, for instance, contract farming has led to some 400,000 smallholders participating in global value chains. Working conditions in NEMs based on low-cost labour are often a concern, and vary considerably depending on the mode and the legal, social and economic structures of the countries in which NEM firms are operating. The factors that influence working conditions in non-equity modes are the role of governments in defining, communicating and enforcing labour standards and the sourcing practices of TNCs. The social responsibility of TNCs has extended beyond their own legal boundaries and has pushed many to increase their influence over the activities of value chain partners. It is increasingly common for TNCs, in order to manage risks and protect their brand and image, to influence their NEM partners through codes of conduct, to promote international labour standards and good management practices. An additional concern relates to the relative “footlooseness” of NEMs. The seasonality of industries, fluctuating demand patterns of TNCs, and the ease with which they can shift NEM production to other locations can have a strong impact on working conditions in NEM firms and on stability of employment. NEMs often make an important contribution to GDP The impact of NEMs on local value added can be significant. It depends on how NEM arrangements fit into TNC-governed GVCs and, therefore, on how much value is retained in the host economy. It also depends on the potential for linkages with other firms and on their underlying capabilities. In efficiency seeking NEMs, such as contract manufacturing or services outsourcing, it is possible for value capture in the host economy to be relatively small compared to the overall value creation in a GVC, when the scope for local sourcing is limited and goods are imported, processed and subsequently exported, as is often the case in the electronics industry, for example. Although value captured as a share of final-product sales price may be limited, it can nevertheless represent a significant contribution to the local economy, adding up to 10–15 per cent of GDP in some countries. Local sourcing and the overall impact on host-country value added increases if the emergence of contract manufacturing leads to a concentration of production and export activities (e.g. in clusters or industrial parks). The greater the number of plants and the more numerous the linkages with TNCs, the greater will be the spillover effects and local value added. In addition, clustering can reduce the risk of TNCs shifting production to other locations by increasing switching costs. NEMs can generate export gains NEMs are inextricably linked with international trade, shaping global patterns of trade in many industries. In toys, footwear, garments, and electronics, contract manufacturing represents more than 50 per cent of global trade. NEMs can thus be an important “route-to-market” for countries aiming at export-led growth, and an important initial point of access to TNC governed global value chains, before gradually building independent exporting capabilities. Export gains can be partially offset by higher imports, reducing net export gains, where local value added is limited, especially in early stages of NEM development. NEMs are an important avenue for technology and skills building NEMs are in essence a transfer of intellectual property to a host-country firm under the protection of a contract. Licensing involves a TNC granting an NEM partner access to intellectual property, usually with contractual conditions attached, but often with some training or skills transfer. International franchising
xxiOVERVIEW transfers a business model, and extensive training and support are normally offered to local partners in order to properly set up the new franchise with wide-ranging implications for technology dissemination. In some East and South-East Asian economies in particular, but also in Eastern Europe, Latin America and South Asia, technology and skills acquisition and assimilation by NEM companies in electronics, garments, pharmaceuticals, IT-services and business process outsourcing (BPO) have led to their transformation into TNCs and technology leaders in their own right. Although technology acquisition and assimilation through NEMs is a widespread phenomenon, this is not a foregone conclusion, especially at the level of second and third tier suppliers, where linkages may be insufficient or of low quality. A key factor is the absorptive capacity of local NEM partners, in the form of their existing skills base, the availability of workers that can be trained to learn new skills, and the basic prerequisites to turn acquired skills into new business ventures, including the regulatory framework, the business environment and access to finance. Another important factor is the relative bargaining power of TNCs and local NEM partners. Both factors can be influenced by appropriate policies. Social and environmental pros and cons of NEMs Concerns exist that cross-border NEMs in some industries may be a mechanism for TNCs to circumvent high social and environmental standards in their production network. Pressure from the international community has pushed TNCs to take greater responsibility for such standards throughout their global value chains. There is now a significant body of evidence to suggest that TNCs are likely to use more environmentally friendly practices than domestic companies in equivalent activities. The extent to which TNCs guide NEM operations on social and environmental practices depends, first, on their perception of and exposure to legal liability risks (e.g. reparations in the case of environmental damages) and business risks (e.g damage to their brand and lower sales); and, secondly, on the extent to which they can control NEMs. TNCs employ a number of mechanisms to influence NEM partners, including codes of conduct, factory inspections and audits, and third-party certification schemes. NEMs can help countries integrate in GVCs and build productive capacity The immediate contributions to employment, to GDP, to exports and to the local technology base that NEMs can bring help to provide the resources, skills and access to global value chains that are prerequisites for long-term industrial capacity building. A major part of the contribution of NEMs to the build-up of local productive capacity and long-term prospects for industrial development is through the impact on enterprise development, as NEMs require local entrepreneurs and domestic investment. Such domestic investment, and access to local or international financing, is often facilitated by NEMs, either through explicit measures by TNCs providing support to local NEM partners, or through the implicit guarantees stemming from the partnership with a major TNC itself. While the potential contributions of NEMs to long-term development are clear, concerns are often raised (especially with regard to contract manufacturing and licensing), that countries relying to a significant extent on NEMs for industrial development risk remaining locked-in to low-value-added segments of TNC-governed global value chains and remaining technology dependent. In such cases, developing economies would run a further risk of becoming vulnerable to TNCs shifting productive activity to other locations, as NEMs are more “footloose” than equivalent FDI operations. The related risks of “dependency” and “footlooseness” must be addressed by embedding NEMs in the overall development strategies of countries. The right policies can help maximize NEM development benefits Policies are instrumental for countries to maximize development benefits and minimize the risks associated with the integration of domestic firms into NEM networks of TNCs. There are four key challenges for
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxxii policymakers: first, how to integrate NEM policies into the overall context of national development strategies; second, how to support the building of domestic productive capacity to ensure the availability of attractive business partners that can qualify as actors in global value chains; third, how to promote and facilitate NEMs; and fourth, how to address negative effects of NEMs. NEM policies appropriately embedded in industrial development strategies will: • ensure that efforts to attract NEMs through building domestic productive capacity and through facilitation and promotion initiatives are directed at the right industries, value chains and specific activities or segments within value chains; • support industrial upgrading in line with a country’s development stage, ensuring that firms move to higher value-added stages in the value chain, helping local NEM partners reduce their technology dependency, develop their own brands, or become NEM originators in their own right. An important element of industrial development strategies that incorporate NEMs are measures to prevent and mitigate impacts deriving from the “footlooseness” of some NEM types, balancing diversification and specialization. Diversification ensures that domestic companies are engaged in multiple NEM activities, both within and across different value chains, and are connected to a broad range of NEM partners. Specialization in particular value chains improves the competitive edge of local NEM partners within those chains and can facilitate, in the longer term, upgrading to segments with greater value capture. In general, measures should aim at maintaining and increasing the attractiveness of the host country for TNCs and improve the “stickiness” of NEMs by building up local mass, clusters of suppliers, and the local technology base. Continuous learning and skills upgrading of domestic entrepreneurs and employees are also important to ensure domestic firms can move to higher value-added activities should foreign companies move “low end” production processes to cheaper locations. Improving the capacity of locals to engage in NEMs has several policy aspects. Pro-active entrepreneurship policies can strengthen the competitiveness of domestic NEM partners and range from fostering start-ups to promoting business networks. Embedding entrepreneurship knowledge into formal education systems, combined with vocational training and the development of specialized NEM-related skills is also important. A mix of national technology policies can improve local absorptive capacity and create technology clusters and partnerships. Access to finance for domestic NEM partners can be improved through policies reducing borrowing costs and the risks associated with lending to SMEs, or by offering alternatives to traditional bank credits. Facilitation efforts can also include initiatives to support respect for core labour standards and CSR. Promoting and facilitating NEM arrangements depends, first, on clear and stable rules governing the contractual relationships between NEM partners, including transparency and coherence. This is important, as NEM arrangements are often governed by multiple laws and regulations. Conducive NEM-specific laws (e.g. franchising laws, rules on contract farming) and appropriate intellectual property (IP) protection (particularly relevant for IP-intensive NEMs such as licensing, franchising and often contract manufacturing) can also help. While the current involvement of investment promotion agencies in NEM-specific promotion is still limited, they could expand their remit beyond FDI to promote awareness of NEM opportunities, engage in matchmaking services, and provide incentives to start-ups. To address any negative impacts of NEMs, it is important to strengthen the bargaining power of local NEM partners vis-à-vis TNCs to ensure that contracts are based on a fair sharing of risks and benefits. The development of industry-specific NEM model contracts or negotiation guidelines can contribute to achieving this objective. If TNCs engaged in NEMs acquire dominant positions, they may be able to abuse their market power to the detriment of their competitors (domestic and foreign) and their own trading partners. Therefore, policies to promote NEMs need to go hand in hand with policies to safeguard competition. Other public interest criteria may require attention as well. Protection of indigenous capacities and traditional
xxiiiOVERVIEW activities, that may be crowded out by a rapid increase in market shares of successful NEMs, is essential. In the case of contract farming for instance, policies such as these would result in model contracts or guidelines supporting smallholders in negotiations with TNCs; training on sustainable farming methods; provision of appropriate technologies and government-led extension services to improve capacities of contract farmers; and infrastructure development for improving business opportunities for contract farmers in remote areas. If contract farming was given more pride of place in government policies, direct investment in large-scale land acquisitions by TNCs would be less of an issue. Finally, home-country initiatives and the international community can also play a positive role. Home-country policies that specifically promote overseas NEMs include the expansion of national export insurance schemes and political risk insurance to also cover some types of NEMs. Internationally, while there is no comprehensive legal and policy framework for fostering NEMs and their development contribution, supportive international policies range from relevant WTO agreements and, to a limited extent, IIAs, to soft law initiatives contributing to harmonizing the rules governing the relationship between private NEM parties or guiding them in the crafting of NEM contracts. * * * Foreign direct investment is a key component of the world’s growth engine. However, the post-crisis recovery in FDI has been slow to take off and is unevenly spread, with especially the poorest countries still in “FDI recession”. Many uncertainties still haunt investors in the global economy. National and international policy developments are sending mixed messages to the investment community. And investment policymaking is becoming more complex, with international production evolving and with blurring boundaries between FDI, non-equity modes and trade. The growth of NEMs poses new challenges but also creates new opportunities for the further integration of developing economies into the global economy. The World Investment Report 2011 aims to help developing-country policymakers and the international development community navigate those challenges and capitalize on the opportunities for their development gains. Geneva, June 2011 Supachai Panitchpakdi Secretary-General of the UNCTAD
Wir2011 en
Global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows rose moderately to $1.24 trillion in 2010, but were still 15 per cent below their pre-crisis average. This is in contrast to global industrial output and trade, which were back to pre-crisis levels. UNCTAD estimates that global FDI will recover to its pre- crisis level in 2011, increasing to $1.4–1.6 trillion, approaching its 2007 peak in 2013. This positive scenario holds, barring any unexpected global economic shocks that may arise from a number of risk factors still in play. For the first time, developing and transition economies together attracted more than half of global FDI flows. Outward FDI from those economies also reached record highs, with most of their investment directed towards other countries in the South. Furthermore, interregional FDI between developing countries and transition economies has been growing rapidly. In contrast, FDI inflows to developed countries continued to decline. Some of the poorest regions continued to see declines in FDI flows. Flows to Africa, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States all fell, as did flows to South Asia. At the same time, major emerging regions, such as East and South-East Asia and Latin America, experienced strong growth in FDI inflows. International production is expanding, with foreign sales, employment and assets of transnational corporations (TNCs) all increasing. TNCs’ production worldwide generated value added of approximately $16 trillion in 2010 – about a quarter of global GDP. Foreign affiliates of TNCs accounted for more than one-tenth of global GDP and one-third of world exports. State-owned TNCs are an important emerging source of FDI. There are some 650 State-owned TNCs, with 8,500 foreign affiliates across the globe. While they represent less than 1 per cent of TNCs worldwide, their outward investment accounted for 11 per cent of global FDI in 2010. The ownership and governance of State-owned TNCs have raised concerns in some host countries regarding, among others, the level playing field and national security, with regulatory implications for the international expansion of these companies. CHAPTER I GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development2 A. GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS: RECOVERY OVER THE HORIZON 1. Overall trends As stimulus packages and other public fiscal policies fade, sustained economic recovery becomes more dependent on private investment. At present, transnational corporations (TNCs) have not yet taken up fully their customary lead role as private investors. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows rose modestly in 2010, following the large declines of 2008 and 2009. At $1.24 trillion in 2010, they were 5 per cent higher than a year before (figure I.1). This moderate growth was mainly the result of higher flows to developing countries, which together with transition economies – for the first time – absorbed more than half of FDI flows. While world industrial production and trade are back to their pre-crisis levels, FDI flows in 2010 remained some 15 per cent below their pre-crisis average, and 37 per cent below their 2007 peak (figure I.1). The moderate recovery of FDI flows in 2010 revealed an uneven pattern among components and modes of FDI. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) rebounded gradually, yet greenfield projects – which still account for the majority of FDI – fell in number and value. Increased profits of foreign affiliates, especially in developing countries, boosted reinvested earnings – one of the three components of FDI flows – while uncertainties surrounding global currency markets and European sovereign debt resulted in negative intra-company loans and lower levels of equity investment – the other two components of FDI flows. While FDI by private equity firms regained momentum, that from sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) fell considerably in 2010. FDI inward stock rose by 7 per cent in 2010, reaching $19 trillion, on the back of improved performance of global capital markets, higher profitability, and healthy economic growth in developing countries. UNCTAD predicts FDI flows will continue their recov- ery to reach $1.4 –1.6 trillion, or the pre-crisis level, in 2011. In the first quarter of 2011, FDI inflows rose compared to the same period of 2010, although this level was lower than the last quarter of 2010 (figure I.2). They are expected to rise further to $1.7 trillion in 2012 and reach $1.9 trillion in 2013, the peak achieved in 2007. The record cash holdings of TNCs, ongoing corporate and industrial restructur- ing, rising stock market valuations and gradual ex- its by States from financial and non-financial firms’ shareholdings built up as supporting measures during the crisis, are creating new investment opportunities for companies across the globe. However, the volatility of the business environment, particularly in developed countries, means that TNCs have remained relatively cautious regarding their investment plans. In addition, risk factors such as unpredictability of global economic governance, a possible widespread sovereign debt crisis and fis- cal and financial sector imbalances in some devel- oped countries, rising inflation and apparent signs of overheating in major emerging market economies, among others, might derail FDI recovery. 1 472 1 971 1 744 1 185 1 244 2005-2007 average 2007 2008 2009 2010 ~15% ~37% Figure I.1. Global FDI inflows, average 2005–2007 and 2007 to 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on annex table I.1 and the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Global FDI flows rose modestly in 2010, but the share of developing and transition economies in both global inflows and outflows reached record highs.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 3 Figure I.2. UNCTAD’s Global FDI Quarterly Index,a 2007 Q1–2011 Q1 (Base 100: quarterly average of 2005) Figure I.3. FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1980–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on annex table I.1 and the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/ fdistatistics). Developing economies Developed economies Transition economies 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 World total 52% 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 a. Current trends Global FDI inflows in 2010 reached an estimated $1,244 billion (figure I.1) – a small increase from 2009’s level of $1,185 billion. How- ever, there was an uneven pattern between regions and also between subregions. FDI inflows to devel- oped countries and transition economies contract- ed further in 2010. In contrast, those to developing economies recovered strongly, and together with transition economies – for the first time – surpassed the 50 per cent mark of global FDI flows (figure I.3). FDI flows to developing economies rose by 12 per cent (to $574 billion) in 2010, thanks to their relatively fast economic recovery, the strength of domestic demand, and burgeoning South– South flows. The value of cross-border M&As into developing economies doubled due to attractive valuations of company assets, strong earnings growth and robust economic fundamentals (such as market growth). As more international production moves to developing and transition economies, TNCs are increasingly investing in those countries to maintain cost-effectiveness and to remain competitive in the global production networks. This is now mirrored The shift of FDI inflows to developing and transition economies accelerated in 2010: for the first time, they absorbed more than half of global FDI flows. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: UNCTAD. a The Global FDI Quarterly Index is based on quarterly data of FDI inflows for 87 countries, which together account for roughly 90 per cent of global flows. The index has been calibrated such that the average of quarterly flows in 2005 is equivalent to 100.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development4 by a shift in international consumption, in the wake of which market-seeking FDI is also gaining ground. This changing pattern of FDI inflows is confirmed also in the global ranking of the largest FDI recipients: in 2010, half of the top 20 host economies were from developing and transition economies, compared to seven in 2009 (figure I.4). In addition, three developing economies ranked among the five largest FDI recipients in the world. While the United States and China maintained their top position, some European countries moved down in the ranking. Indonesia entered the top 20 for the first time. The shift towards developing and transition economies in total FDI inflows was also reflected in a change in the ranking of host countries by UNCTAD’s Inward FDI Performance Index, which measures the amount of FDI that countries receive relative to the size of their economy (GDP). The index for developed countries as a group is below unity (the point where the country’s share in global FDI flows and the country’s share in global GDP are equal), and their ranking has fallen in the after-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period of 2005– 2007. In contrast, developing countries increased their performance index in the period 2005–2010, and they all have indices above unity (figure I.5). The rise of FDI to devel- oping countries hides significant regional dif- ferences. Some of the poorest regions con- tinued to see declines in FDI flows. In addition to least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island de- veloping States (SIDS) (chapter II), flows to Africa continued to fall, as did those to South Asia. In contrast, major emerging regions, such as East and South-East Asia and Latin America experienced strong growth in FDI inflows (figure I.6). FDI flows to South, East and South-East Asia picked Figure I.4. Global FDI inflows, top 20 host economies, 2009 and 2010 a (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on annex table I.1 and the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Ranked on the basis of the magnitude of 2010 FDI inflows. Note: The number in bracket after the name of the country refers to the ranking in 2009. British Virgin Islands, which ranked 12th in 2010, is excluded from the list. 153 5 13 15 30 21 9 36 26 32 26 34 15 36 71 38 26 24 52 95 13 15 19 20 23 25 25 26 28 32 34 39 41 46 46 48 62 69 106 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Indonesia (43) Chile (26) Mexico (21) Luxembourg (12) Canada (18) Spain (30) India (8) Ireland (14) Saudi Arabia (11) Australia (16) France (10) Singapore (22) Russian Federation (7) United Kingdom (3) Germany (6) Brazil (15) Belgium (17) Hong Kong, China (4) China (2) United States (1) 228 2010 2009 Slow growth of FDI flows globally masks diverging trends between and within regions. Some of the poor- est regions continued to see declines.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 5 Developing economies Developed economies 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 2005-2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure I.5. Inward FDI Performance Index,a developed and developing economies, average of 2005–2007 and 2008–2010 Source: UNCTAD, based on data from FDI/TNC database (www/unctad.org/fdistatistics). a The Inward FDI Performance Index is the ratio of a country/ region’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP. A value greater than 1 indicates that the country/ region receives more FDI than its relative economic size, a value below 1 that it receives less. Note: A full list of countries ranked by the index is available at www.unctad.org/wir. up markedly, outperforming other developing regions. Inflows to the region rose by about 24 per cent in 2010, reaching $300 billion, rising especially in South-East Asia and East Asia. Similarly, strong economic growth, spurred by robust domestic and external demand, good macroeconomic fundamentals and higher commodity prices, drove FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean to $159 billion. Cross-border M&As in the region rose to $29 billion in 2010, after negative values in 2009. Nearly all the big recipient countries saw inward flows increase, with Brazil the largest destination. In contrast, inflows to Africa, which peaked in 2008 driven by the resource boom, continued the downward trend which started in 2009. Inflows to South Africa declined to little more than a quarter of those for 2009. North Africa saw its FDI flows fall slightly (by 8 per cent) in 2010; the uprisings which broke out in early 2011 impeded FDI flows in the first quarter of 2011 (see box II.1). FDI flows to West Asia, at $58 billion decreased, despite the steady economic recovery registered by the economies of the region. Sizeable increases in government spending by oil-rich countries helped bolster their economies, but business conditions in the private sector remained fragile in certain countries. The transition economies of South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) registered a marginal decrease in FDI inflows in 2010, of roughly 5 per cent, to $68 billion, having fallen by 41 per cent in 2009. FDI flows to South- East Europe continued to decline sharply due to sluggish investment from EU countries – traditionally the dominant source of FDI in the subregion. The CIS economies saw their flows increase by less than 1 per cent despite stronger commodity prices, a faster economic recovery and improving stock markets. FDI inflows to developed countries contracted moderately in 2010, falling by less than 1 per cent to $602 billion. Europe stood out as the subregion where flows fell most sharply, reflecting uncertainties about the worsening sovereign debt crisis. However, Figure I.6. FDI inflows to developing and transition economies, by region, average of 2005–2007 and 2008 to 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). 0 100 200 300 Africa Latin America and the Caribbean South, East and South- East Asia West Asia Transition economies average 2005-2007 2008 2009 2010
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development6 Box I.1. Why are data on global FDI inflows and outflows different? The discrepancy between reported global inward and outward FDI flows has been significant (box figure I.1.1). This is a major problem for policymakers worldwide, as sound policy analysis and informed policymaking on this issue require reliable, accurate, timely and comparable data (Fujita, 2008). The discrepancy is due to several reasons. First, there are inconsistencies in the data collection and reporting methods of different countries. Examples include different methods used by host and home countries recording the same transactions, uneven coverage of FDI flows between countries (e.g. treatment of reinvested earnings), and different exchange rates used for recording FDI transactions. Second, the changing nature (e.g. investment through exchange of shares between investors and acquired firms, investment from indirect sources) and the increasing sophistication of FDI-related transactions (that involve not only funds from parent firms, but also government loans and development assistance in the same package) often make it difficult to attribute exact values to FDI. Third, the distinction between FDI transactions with “portfolio-like behaviour” and portfolio investment, including hot money, is blurred. Finally, the accuracy of FDI reporting may itself be a victim of the global crisis, which caused increasing volatility in exchange rates, making an exact correspondence between home- and host-country reporting more uncertain (as differences in the timing of records may coincide with major exchange-rate differences). This situation calls for a continuous improvement of both FDI-related definitions and data collection, especially in developing countries. As considerable efforts by UNCTAD and other international organizations are underway to harmonize definitions and data collection, it can be expected that the discrepancy between reports on inflows and outflows will narrow over time. Source: UNCTAD. while Italy and the United Kingdom suffered, FDI in some of the region’s other major economies fell only slightly (e.g. France) or increased (e.g. Germany). Declining FDI flows were also registered in Japan, where there were a number of large divestments. In contrast, FDI flows to the United States surged by almost 50 per cent largely thanks to a significant recovery in the reinvested earnings of foreign affiliates. However, FDI flows were still at about 75 per of their peak level of 2008. At $1,323 billion, global FDI outflows in 2010, while increasing over the previous year, are still some 11 per cent below the pre- crisis average, and 39 per cent below the 2007 peak (see box I.1 for differences between FDI inflows and outflows). As in the case of inflows, there was an uneven pattern among regions. FDI flows from developing and transition economies picked up strongly, reflecting the strength of their economies, the dynamism of their TNCs and their growing aspiration to compete in new markets. The downward trend in FDI from developed countries reversed, with an 10 per cent increase over 2009. However, it remained at half the level of its 2007 peak. Outward FDI from developing and transition economies reached $388 billion in 2010, a 21 per cent increase over 2009 (figure I.7; annex table I.1). Their share in global outflows of 29 per cent was up from 16 per cent in 2007, the year prior to the financial crisis. Behind this general increase there lie significant differences between countries. Investors from South, East and South-East Asia and Latin America were the major drivers for the 1 171 74 90 -1 -188 100 56 -204 -166 15 -80 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Box figure I.1.1. The difference between global FDI inflows and outflows, 1999–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD. Note: Positive value means inflows are higher than outflows, and vice versa. Outward FDI from develop- ing and transition economies reached a record high, with most of their investment directed towards other econo- mies within these regions.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 7 strong growth in FDI outflows. Outflows from the largest FDI sources – Hong Kong (China) and China – increased by more than $10 billion each, reaching historical highs of $76 billion and $68 billion, respectively. Chinese companies continued their buying spree, actively acquiring overseas assets in a wide range of industries and countries, and overtaking Japanese companies in total outward FDI. All of the big outward investor countries from Latin America – Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico – bolstered by strong economic growth at home, increased their acquisitions abroad, particularly in developedcountrieswhereinvestmentopportunities have arisen in the aftermath of the crisis. In contrast, outflows from major investors in West Asia fell significantly, due to large-scale divestments and redirection of outward FDI from government- controlled entities to support their home economies weakened by the global financial crisis. FDI outflows from transition economies grew by 24 per cent, reaching a record $61 billion. Most of the outward FDI projects, as in previous years, were carried out by Russian TNCs, followed by TNCs from Kazakhstan. The quick recovery of natural resource-based companies in transition economies was boosted by strong support by the State,1 and by recovering commodity prices and higher stock market valuations, easing the cash flow problems these firms had faced in 2009. Developed countries as a group saw only a limited recovery of their outward FDI. Reflecting their diverging economic situations, trends in FDI outflows differed markedly between countries and regions: outflows from Europe and the United States were up (9.6 and 16 per cent, respectively), while Japanese outward FDI flows dropped further in 2010 (down 25 per cent). The lingering effects of the crisis and subdued prospects in developed countries forced many of their TNCs to invest in emerging markets in an effort to keep their markets and profits: in 2010 almost half of total investment (cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI projects) from developed countries took place in developing and transition economies, compared to only 32 per cent in 2007 (figure I.8).2 In 2010, six developing and transition economies were among the top 20 investors (figure I.9). UNCTAD’s World Investment Prospects Survey 2011–2013 (WIPS) confirms that developing and transition economies are becoming important investors, and that this trend is likely to continue in the near future (UNCTAD, forthcoming a). Many TNCs in developing and transition economies are investing in other emerging markets, where recovery is strong and the economic outlook better. Indeed, in 2010, 70 per cent of FDI projects (cross- border M&A and greenfield FDI projects) from these economies were invested within the same regions (figure I.8). TNCs, especially large State-owned enterprises, from the BRIC countries – Brazil, the Figure I.7. FDI outflows from developing and transition economies, by region, average of 2005–2007 and 2008 to 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). 0 100 200 300 average 2005-2007 2009 2010 Africa Latin America and the Caribbean South, East and South-East Asia West Asia Transition economies 2008
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development8 Russian Federation, India and China – have gained ground as important investors in recent years as the result of rapid economic growth in their home countries, abundant financial resources and strong motivations to acquire resources and strategic assets abroad (section C). In 2010 there were seven mega-deals (over $3 billion) involving developing and transition economies (or 12 per cent of the total) (annex table I.7), compared to only two (or 3 per cent of the total) in 2009. Firms from developing Asia expanded their acquisitions in 2010 beyond their own regions. For example China’s outward FDI showed substantial increases in Latin America (chapter II; ECLAC, 2011). Transition-economy firms also increased their purchases in other transition economies in 2010. b. FDI by sector and industry The unchanged level of overall FDI in 2010 also obscures some major sectoral differences. Data on FDI projects (both cross- border M&As and greenfield investment) indicate that the value and share of manufacturing rose, accounting for almost half of the total. The value and share of the primary and services sector declined (figure I.10). Compared with the pre-crisis level (2005–2007), the picture In the aftermath of the crisis, FDI in manufactur- ing bounced back while services sector FDI is still in decline. is quite different. While the primary sector has recovered, services are still less than half, and manufacturing is 10 per cent below their pre-crisis levels (annex table I.5). The value of FDI projects in manufacturing rose by 23 per cent in 2010 compared to 2009, reaching $554 billion. The financial crisis hit a range of manufacturing industries hard, but the shock could eventually prove to be a boon to the sector, as many companies were forced to restructure into more productive and profitable activities – with attendant effects on FDI. In the United States, for example, FDI in manufacturing rose by 62 per cent in 2010, accompanied by a substantial rise in productivity (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). Within manufacturing, business-cycle sensitive industries such as metal and metal products, electrical and electronics equipment and wood and wood products were hit by the crisis, in terms of sales and profits (annex table I.5). As a result, investment fell in these industries, which suffered from serious overcapacity and wished to use cash to restore their balance sheet. In addition, their prospects for higher demand and market growth remained gloomy, especially in developed countries. Some manufacturing industries such as chemicals (including pharmaceuticals) remained more resilient to the crisis; while other industries, such as food, beverages and tobacco, textile and garments, and Figure I.8. Distribution of FDI projects,a by host region, 2007 and 2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border M&A database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Including both cross-border M&As and greenfield FDI projects. To transition economies To developing economies To developed economies 2007 2010 2007 2010 68 51 38 30 58 63 5 7 26 45 6 4 (b) by developing and transition country TNCs(a) by developed country TNCs
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 9 Figure I.9. Global FDI outflows, top 20 home economies, 2009 and 2010a (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on annex table I.1 and the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Ranked on the basis of the magnitude of 2010 FDI outflows. Note: The number in bracket after the name of the country refers to the ranking in 2009. British Virgin Islands, which ranked 16th in 2010, is excluded from the list. 16 27 19 17 18 21 10 16 26 27 42 44 75 33 57 64 103 78 15 18 18 19 20 21 22 26 30 32 38 39 52 56 58 68 76 84 105 0 50 100 150 200 India (21) Ireland (13) Luxembourg (17) Korea, Republic of (19) Singapore (18) Italy (16) Spain (23) Australia (20) Sweden (14) Netherlands (12) Belgium (156) Canada (9) Russian Federation (8) Japan (4) Switzerland (10) China (6) Hong Kong, China (5) France (2) Germany (3) United States (1) 329 283 2010 2009 Figure I.10. Sectoral distribution of FDI projects,a 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD. a Comprises cross-border M&As and greenfield investments. The latter refers to the estimated amounts of capital investment. 554 361 449 392 254 338 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Primary Manufacturing Services 2009 2010 37% 48%30% 22% 33% 30% automobiles,recoveredin2010.Thepharmaceutical industry, for example, remained attractive to foreign investment, thanks to the dynamism of its final markets – especially in emerging economies. This rests, first, on the necessity of setting up or acquiring production facilities, as the patent protection for a number of major drugs marketed by global pharmaceutical firms is about to expire, and secondly on the ageing demography of most developed countries. Restructuring continued in 2010, as witnessed by two large deals that took place in the industry.3 Opportunities for business deals exist due to rapid growth in the number of scientists and pharmaceutical firms in emerging economies, most notably in China and India. In food, beverages and tobacco the recovery was due to the sustained demand for basic items, especially in developing countries. For many large TNCs in this industry, profits soared in 2010, and a number of large acquisitions were made.4 In the case of textiles and clothing, the recovery is prompted by a growth in consumer spending, particularly in some emerging countries. Garment production is fairly cost-sensitive, which may prompt accelerated
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development10 relocation to countries where there is cheap labour. FDI in the primary sector decreased in 2010 despite growing demand for raw materials and energy resources, and high commodity prices. FDI projects (including cross-border M&A and greenfield investments) amounted to $254 billion in 2010, raising the share of the primary sector to 22 per cent, up from 14 per cent in the pre-crisis period. Natural resource-based companies with sound financial positions, mainly from developing and transition economies, made some large acquisitions in the primary sector. Examples include the purchase of Repsol (Brazil) by China’s Sinopec Group for $7 billion, and the purchase of the Carabobo block in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by a group of investors from India for $4.8 billion (annex table I.7). The value of FDI projects in the services sector continued to decline sharply in 2010, with respect to both 2009 and the pre-crisis level of activity. All main service industries (business services, finance, transport and communications and utilities) fell, although at different speeds. Business services declined by 8 per cent compared to the pre- crisis level, as TNCs are outsourcing a growing share of their business support functions to external providers, seeking to cut internal costs by externalizing non-core business activities (chapter IV). Transportation and telecommunication services suffered equally in 2010 as the industry’s restructuring is more or less completed after the round of large M&A deals before the crisis, particularly in developed countries. FDI in the financial industry – the epicentre of the current crisis – experienced the sharpest decline, and is expected to remain sluggish in the medium term. Over the past decade, its expansion was instrumental in integrating emerging economies into the global financial system, and it has brought substantial benefits to host countries’ financial systems in terms of efficiency and stability. However, it also produced a bubble of unsustainable lending, which had to burst. In the period of post-bubble correction, issues relating to the management of country risk and the assessment of conditions in host-country financial systems play a major role in supporting expansion abroad. Utilities were also strongly affected by the crisis, as some investors were forced to reduce investment or even divest due to lower demand and accumulated losses. c. FDI by modes of entry There are diverging trends between the two main modes of FDI entry: M&As and greenfield (new) investment. The value of cross-border M&A deals increased by 36 per cent in 2010, to $339 billion, though it was still roughly one-third of the previous peak in 2007 (figure I.11). Higher stock prices increased the purchasing power of investors to invest abroad, as higher values of corporate assets in 2010 raised the leverage of investors in undertaking M&As by using shares in part- payment. At the same time, the ongoing corporate and industrial restructuring is creating new acquisition opportunities, in particular for cash-rich TNCs, including those from emerging markets. On the other hand, greenfield investment – the other mode of FDI – declined in 2010. Differing trends between cross-border M&As and greenfield FDI are not surprising, as to some extent companies tend to consider the two modes of market entry as alternative options. However, the total project value of greenfield investments has been much higher than that of cross-border M&As since the crisis. Developing and transition economies tend to host greenfield investment rather than cross- border M&As. More than two-thirds of the total value of greenfield investment is directed to these economies, while only 25 per cent of cross-border M&As are undertaken there. At the same time, investors from these economies are becoming increasingly important players in cross-border M&A markets, which previously were dominated by developed country players. During the first five months of 2011, both greenfield investments and cross-border M&As registered a significant rise in value (figure I.11; annex tables I.3–6 and I.8). Cross-border M&As rose by 58 per cent, though from a low level, compared with the corresponding period of 2010. Greenfield investment has become much larger than cross-border M&As. Recovery of FDI flows in 2011 relies on the rise of both greenfield investments and cross-border M&As.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 11 Figure I.11. Value and number of cross-border M&As and greenfield FDI projects, 2007–May 2011 Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border M&A database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: Data for value of greenfield FDI projects refer to estimated amounts of capital investment. M&A value Greenfield FDI value M&As number Greenfield FDI number $ billion 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 1 800 2007 2008 2009 2010 Thousands 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 2010 (Jan-May) 2011 (Jan-May) d. FDI by components Stagnant global flows in 2010 were accompanied by diverging trends in the components of FDI inflows (figure I.12). Improved economic performance in many parts of the world, and increased profits of foreign affiliates, lifted reinvested earnings to nearly double their 2009 level (figure I.13). This reflects the general increase in profits globally. For example, the profits to sales ratio of the United States’ S&P 500 firms in 2010 improved further, while profits of Japanese firms also rose in 2010. Also in developing countries, operating profits of companies from China and the Republic of Korea rose significantly in 2010. However, not all reinvested earnings are actually reinvested in productive capacity. They may be put aside to await better investment opportunities in the future, or to finance other activities (box I.2), including those that are speculative (box I.5). About 40 per cent of FDI income was retained as reinvested earnings in host countries in 2010 ( figure I.13). The increase in reinvested earnings compensated for the decline in equity capital flows, which were down slightly despite an up-tick in cross-border M&As. The continuing depressed level of equity investments was still the key factor keeping FDI In 2010, reinvested earnings grew fast, while equity capital investment and intra-company loans declined. Cash reserves of foreign affiliates grew substantially. Figure I.12. FDI inflows by component, 2007–2010a (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on data from FDI/TNC database (www/unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Based on 106 countries that account for 85 per cent of total FDI inflows during the period 2007-2010. 0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 1 800 2007 2008 2009 2010 Other capital Reinvested earnings Equity Figure I.13. FDI income, 2005–2010a (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD. a Based on 104 countries that account for 81 per cent of total FDI inflows during the period 2005-2010. $ billion Per cent 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Reinvested earnings Repatriated earnings on Inward FDI Reinvested earnings as a % share of income
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development12 Box I.2. FDI flows and the use of funds for investment FDI is traditionally broken down into three components: equity capital, intra-company loans, and reinvested earnings of foreign affiliates. These component parts can be considered as sources of funds for investment, additional to funds raised on local and international capital markets. However, the decision by a TNC to finance an investment in productive assets in a host country through an increase in equity capital, a loan, or by using income earned in the host country is driven by a wide range of factors, most of which are beyond the reach of host-country policymakers to influence. From a policymaker’s perspective, it may be more relevant to see how FDI flows are used (use of funds). TNCs can employ FDI (1) for the creation, expansion or improvement of productive assets, generating additional productive capacity, (2) to finance changes in ownership of assets (MAs), or (3) to add to the financial reserves of foreign affiliates. The latter may be motivated by decisions on the level of financial leverage of the firm, by the need to retain cash for planned future investments, by fiscal considerations (e.g. to defer tax liabilities upon repatriation of profits), or by other factors, including opportunistic behaviour on the part of TNCs to profit from changes in exchange rates or local asset-price rises. The traditional method of analysing FDI by sources of funds tends to overlook the significance of such “parked funds” held in foreign affiliates of TNCs. “Reinvested earnings” consist of income earned by foreign affiliates that is not repatriated to the home country of the parent firm; firms do not necessarily reinvest this income in additional productive capacity. The difference between FDI flows and actual capital expenditures by foreign affiliates represents FDI not immediately employed for the creation of additional productive capacity and, as such, it is a good proxy for the increase in cash reserves in foreign affiliates. Box figure I.2.1. Estimated value of the “non-used” part of FDI by United States TNCs, 2001–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD based on FDI database and Bureau of Economic Analysis. This proxy indicator for overseas cash reserves of United States firms over the last 10 years shows a peak in 2004, a steep drop in 2005 and an ascent to new heights in 2008 – with estimates for 2009 and 2010 equally high (box figure I.2.1). The 2004 peak and the 2005 trough can be explained by the Homeland Investment Act which provided a tax break on repatriated profits in 2005. Anticipating the tax break, firms hoarded cash in their overseas affiliates in 2004 and brought back several years’ worth of retained earnings in 2005 (some $360 billion). For the last three years, levels have been similar to the anomalous 2004 peak, leading to the conclusion that cash reserve levels in foreign affiliates may well exceed what is required for normal operations. The sensitivity of overseas cash reserves to the tax rate on fund repatriation can also be observed in Japan. A 2009 tax change on the repatriation of foreign earnings is estimated to bring back an additional $40 billion in overseas funds annually (chapter II; WIR10). The implications are significant. Under-employed cash reserves of TNCs represent untapped funds that could be gainfully employed to stimulate the global economy, create jobs and finance development. Source: UNCTAD. -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 13 flows relatively low. It is a source of concern, as among the components of FDI, equity investment compared with reinvested earnings and intra- company loans is the one that is related most directly to TNCs’ long-term international investment strategies. Intra-company loans declined also, as parent firms withdrew or were paid back loans from their affiliates, in particular those in developed host countries, in order to strengthen their balance sheets. This was especially true of European TNCs which, facing fears of a sovereign debt crisis spreading in many parts of the euro zone, significantly reduced loans to their affiliates in the United Kingdom and the United States. Given the fact that foreign affiliates hold a significant amount of retained earnings on their balance sheets (box I.2), unless they are repatriated to their parent firms in home countries, reinvested earnings continue to play an important role in determining the level of investment flows. e. FDI by special funds: private equity and sovereign wealth funds Private equity funds In 2010, the value of private equity-sponsored cross- border MAs increased by 14 per cent to $122 billion, compared to $107 billion in 2009 after two years of consecutive decline (table I.1).5 At the same time, the corresponding number of cross-border MAs reached a record high, with 2,050 deals completed. The factors behind the increase in FDI by private equity funds are largely related to the stabilization of macroeconomic conditions. Also, investors were looking for yields, in a declining interest rate environment. Positive trends were supported by stronger private equity activity in emerging markets (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association, 2011). Thus 31 per cent of FDI by private equity firms, amounting to $38 billion, was directed to developing and transition economies in 2010 (figure I.14), up from 26 per cent in 2009. This rise reflects the increasing interest of private equity Private equity-sponsored FDI has regained momentum, although it fell short of its pre-crisis level. It is directed more towards developing and transition economies, secondary buyouts and smaller acquisitions. firms in developing country firms and venture capital business, which provide better business opportunities than before. Despite stronger private equity-sponsored cross- border MAs in 2010, their value is still more than 70 per cent lower than the peak level in 2007. The relative contribution of private equity to global FDI continues to decline. The volume share of private equity in total cross-border MAs fell from 19 per cent in 2009 to 17 per cent in 2010 (table I.1). The relative contribution of private equity funds to total FDI contracted by nearly 40 per cent from 2004, its peak year, to 2010. A more benign global economic environment should see fundraising and investment picking up in 2011, also bolstering a more positive outlook for private equity-sponsored FDI. Private equity investors were estimated to have held nearly a trillion dollars of uninvested capital at the beginning of 2010, including reserves for future use, that could result Table I.1. Cross-border MAs by private equity firms, 1996–May 2011 (Number of deals and value) Number of deals Value Year Number Share in total (%) $ billion Share in total (%) 1996 932 16 42 16 1997 925 14 54 15 1998 1 089 14 79 11 1999 1 285 14 89 10 2000 1 340 13 92 7 2001 1 248 15 88 12 2002 1 248 19 85 18 2003 1 488 22 109 27 2004 1 622 22 157 28 2005 1 736 20 207 22 2006 1 698 18 271 24 2007 1 917 18 457 27 2008 1 785 18 322 25 2009 1 993 25 107 19 2010 2 050 22 122 17 2011 591 17 91 20 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad. org/fdistatistics). Note: Value is on a gross basis, which is different from other MA tables based on a net value. The table includes MAs by hedge funds. Private equity firms and hedge funds refer to acquirers as “investors not elsewhere classified”. This classification is based on the Thomson Finance database on MAs.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development14 in a surge in volume of cross-border MAs in 2011 (Bain Co., 2011). Onthesupplyside,therearenowmoreopportunities. There are two factors. First, companies owned by private equity firms are becoming targets for other private equity firms. The relative performance of these secondary buyouts (i.e. buyouts of private equity invested firms) is only slightly lower than that of primary buyouts: this is because the former can be executed faster than the latter in issuing IPOs (initial public offerings), and because secondary buyouts entail a lower risk profile.6 Second, private equity firms are now seeking smaller firms, and are engaged in smaller-scale buyouts. This is an area to which private equity firms have not paid much attention in the past, yet one where many attractive firms are to be found. However, private equity funds continue to face regulations in response to the global financial crisis, partly due to the G-20’s commitment to subject all significant financial market actors to appropriate regulation and supervision. For example, the EU Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive7 and the United States' Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act8 will affect directly and indirectly the operations of private equity funds and their fund-raising ability, and in consequence their contribution to FDI. Figure I.14. Cross-border MAs by private equity funds directed to developing and transition economies, 2005–2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad. org/fdistatistics). Note: Figures in parenthesis refer to the percentage share in total private equity. Data for 2005–2007 and 2008–2010 are annual averages. 0 10 20 30 40 50 2005–2007 2008–2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 (13%) (20%) (10%) (14%) (26%) (31%) Average Sovereign wealth funds Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are s p e c i a l - p u r p o s e investment funds or arrangements that are owned by gov- ernment.9 At the end of 2009, more than 80 SWFs, with an estimated total of $5.9 trillion in assets, could be identified.10 In 2010 alone, nearly 20 governments, mostly from emerging econo- mies, considered or decided to establish an SWF. While funds that invest mainly in debt instruments (e.g. government bonds) were largely unaffected by the global financial crisis, SWFs with considerable equity exposure suffered a dramatic erosion of the value of their investments. By the end of 2009, however, with the recovery of stock markets worldwide, almost all SWFs had been able to recoup their losses from 2008. In 2010 the positive outlook for most SWFs held firm, supported by the overall recovery in equity markets. However, total SWF-sponsored FDI in 2010 amounted to only $10.0 billion, a significant drop from 2009’s $26.5 billion (figure I.15). The largest SWF-sponsored deals included investments in infrastructure, retail, transportation, natural resources and utilities in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (table I.2). The fall in SWF-sponsored FDI in 2010 is a considerable deviation from the trend of SWFs becoming more active foreign direct investors, that started in 2005. There are two reasons for this slump. First, unlike in earlier years, in 2010 FDI by SWFs based in the Gulf region (e.g. United Arab Emirates) was almost absent (table I.2). Asian and Canadian SWFs were the main investors in 2010. Second, while SWF-sponsored FDI is not necessarily pro-cyclical, the low appetite for direct investments in 2010 can be traced back to the exceptionally uncertain global financial environment of previous years. Because of that uncertainly, in 2010 SWFs directed about one-third of their FDI to acquire shares of, or inject capital into, private equity funds and other funds,11 rather than investing in acquiring shares issued by industry SWF-sponsored FDI declined substantially because of severely reduced investment from the Gulf region. However, its long-term potential as a source of investment remains.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 15 Figure I.15. Cross-border MAs by SWFs, 2001–2010 (Million dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Per cent$ billion Value Share in global outflows Table I.2. Selected large FDI deals by SWFs in 2010 Value ($ million) Acquiring company Acquiring nation Target company Target nation Industry of the acquired company 3 090 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Canada Intoll Group Australia Finance 2 227 Qatar Holding LLC Qatar Harrods United Kingdom Retail 1 581 China Investment Corp China AES Corp United States Electricity, gas and water 881 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Canada 407 ETR Concession Co Canada Transport, storage and communications 800 China Investment Corp China Penn West Energy Trust Canada Mining, quarrying and petroleum 576 Ontario Teachers Pension Plan Canada Camelot Group PLC United Kingdom Community, social and personal service activities 400 Temasek Holdings(Pte)Ltd Singapore Odebrecht Oleo Gas SA Brazil Mining, quarrying and petroleum 259 Caisse de Depot Placement du Quebec Canada HDF(UK)Holdings Ltd United Kingdom Finance 194 GIC Real Estate Pte Ltd Singapore Salta Properties-Industrial Property Portfolio Australia Business services 100 Temasek Holdings(Pte)Ltd Singapore Platmin Ltd South Africa Mining, quarrying and petroleum 91 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Canada Vornado Realty Trust United States Business services 43 Oman Investment Fund Oman Petrovietnam Insurance Joint Stock Corp Viet Nam Finance Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). (e.g. the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board’s investment in Intoll Group, an infrastructure fund, for $3 billion – table I.2). While expenditure on FDI has declined, the fundamental drivers for stronger SWF-sponsored FDI activity remain robust. Strong commodity prices in 2010 in particular have created a positive funding environment for SWFs, including those that have been actively involved in FDI in previous years. The foreign assets of the Qatar Investment Authority, an active strategic investor, were estimated to grow from $65 billion in 2009 to $90 billion in 2010, and $120 billion in 2011.12 It has been suggested that the China Investment Corporation, established in 2007 with a mandate to diversify China’s foreign exchange holdings, and an active investor in energy, natural resources, and infrastructure-related assets, received $100–200 billion in new funds in 2010.13 Other SWFs have seen strong returns in 2010, supporting policy decisions to become more
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development16 proactive sponsors of FDI. Since 2009, for example, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, with more than $400 billion under management and owning roughly 1 per cent of the world’s equity, is now allowed to own up to 10 per cent of a listed company – the threshold to be considered FDI – making the fund a considerable potential source of FDI.14 Greater availability of funds, as well as policies that give SWFs more leeway to acquire larger stakes in attractive assets, together with improved in-house fund management capacity, will result in SWFs becoming more visible sources of FDI. 2. Prospects Judging from the data on FDI flows, cross-border MAs and greenfield investment for the first few months of 2011, the recovery of FDI is relatively strong. This trend may well continue into the remaining period of 2011. New investment opportunities await for cash-rich companies in developed and developing countries. Emerging economies, particularly Brazil, China, India and the Russian Federation, have gained ground as sources of FDI in recent years. A recovery in FDI is on the horizon. However, the business environment remains volatile, and TNCs are likely to remain relatively cautious regarding their investment plans. Consequently, medium-term prospects for FDI flows – which have not really picked up yet after the sharp slump in 2008 and 2009, and which had only a moderate recovery in 2010 – may vary substantially, depending on whether or not the potential risks in the global economy materialize or not. To illustrate these uncertainties, UNCTAD proposes baseline and pessimistic scenarios for future FDI growth (figure I.16). The former scenario is based on the results of various leading indicators, including UNCTAD’s World Investment Prospects Survey 2011—2013 (WIPS) (UNCTAD, forth­ coming a), an econometric model of forecasting FDI inflows (box I.3), and data for the first four to five months of 2011 for cross-border MAs and greenfield investment values. Taking these various indicators together, FDI flows could range from $1.4–1.6 trillion in 2011 (with a baseline scenario of $1.52 trillion) — the pre-crisis average of Recovery is underway, but risks and uncertainties remain. 2005–2007. They are expected to rise further to $1.7 trillion in 2012 and reach $1.9 trillion in 2013, the peak achieved in 2007. However, there is also a possibility of stagnant FDI flows (pessimistic scenario) if the above–mentioned risks such as the unpredictability of global economic governance, worsening sovereign debt crisis, and fiscal and financial imbalances were to materialize. After the sharp recession at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, the economic environment has improved significantly over the past two years. The recovery in world output growth rests on a number of factors, including stabilization of the financial system, the resilient growth of emerging markets, the stimulus package programmes implemented in various major economies in the world, and the pick- up in final demand in developed countries, following a return to confidence for both households and companies. Recent forecasts suggest that global GDP will grow by 3 per cent in 2011. Moreover, domestic investment, is expected to pick up strongly not only in developing countries but also in advanced economies (table I.3). Take for example the Republic of Korea, where investment expenditure in 2011 is expected to rise by nearly 10 per cent, to a record high.15 The improvement in the global macroeconomic outlook has had a direct positive effect on the capacity of TNCs to invest. After two years of slump, profits of TNCs picked up significantly in 2010 (figure I.17), and have continued to rise in 2011: in the first quarter the SP 500 United States Figure I.16. Global FDI flows, 2002–2010, and projection for 2011–2013 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD. 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Pessimistic scenario Baseline
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 17 Box I.3. Forecasting global and regional flows of FDI Part of UNCTAD’s forecast for FDI flows is based on an econometric model, by which not only global but also regional estimations are made possible for 2011–2013. As FDI decisions are a strategic choice by firms choosing among alternative locations, the single country/region model cannot demonstrate how a TNC chooses a particular location over others. Existing studies typically portray FDI as reacting to individual host country/region factors, but fail to capture the impact of factors elsewhere on the other regions that may attract investment to, or divert investment from, the country in question. Consequently, in order to explain and forecast global and regional FDI, factors in all regions must be taken into consideration simultaneously. UNCTAD’s econometric model for FDI uses panel data for the period 1995–2010 from 93 countries, which account for more than 90 per cent of FDI in their own respective regions (Africa, West Asia, South, East and South-East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, EU and other developed countries).a The variables employed in the model include: market growth of G-20 countries as main home and host countries of global FDI (G-20 growth rate), market size (one year lagged GDP of each individual country), the one-year lagged price of oil to capture natural-resource FDI projects, trade openness (the share of exports plus imports over GDP), and the lagged dependent variable of FDI to capture the effects of FDI in the previous periods (autocorrelation). The regression results are summarized in box table I.3.1. Based on this model, FDI flows are projected to pick up in 2011 reaching the pre-crisis level mainly due to dynamism in the economic growth of G-20 countries. FDI inflows are expected to reach the peak level of 2007 in 2013 (box table I.3.2). However, the results of the model are based mainly on economic fundamentals and do not take into account the various risk factors mentioned in the Report. This is due to difficulties in quantifying them. Source: UNCTAD. a The only exception is Latin America and the Caribbean, where the countries included represent around 70 per cent of FDI inflows. Lower coverage is due to the absence of macroeconomic data for the Caribbean. firms increased their profits by 12 per cent over the corresponding period of 2010. For Japan, despite a negative economic growth rate due to the natural disaster, listed firms still achieved profits,16 and even in the aftermath of the disaster, Japanese firms are vigorously investing abroad (box I.4). Firms now Box table I.3.1. Regression results of FDI forecasting model, fixed effects panel regressiona Explanatory variable Coefficients G20 growth 0.37 (3.87)*** GDP (-1) 0.01 (3.32)*** Openness 0.01 (3.48)*** Oil price (-1) 0.02 (3.9)*** FDI(-1) 0.50 (7.2)*** Constant -0.63 (-0.58) R2 0.81 Observations 1395 Source: UNCTAD estimates, based on UNCTAD (for FDI inflows), IMF (G20 growth, GDP and openness), United Nations (oil price) from the Link project. a The following model FDIjt =αo +α1 *G20t +α2 *GDPjt-1 +α3 *Openessjt +α4 *Oil_pricejt-1 +α5 *FDIjt-1 +ejt is estimated with fixed effect panel regression using estimated generalized least squares with cross-sections weights. Coefficients computed by using white heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Statistical significance at the 1 per cent (***) and 5 per cent (**) levels. Box table I.3.2. Summary of econometric medium-term baseline scenarios of FDI flows, by groupings (Billions of dollars) Averages Projections 2005-2007 2008-2010 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Global FDI flows 1 471 799 1 390 934 1 185 030 1 243 671 1 523 598 1 685 792 1 874 620 Developed countries 967 947 723 284 602 835 601 906 790 183 887 729 1 026 109 Developing countries 444 945 580 716 510 578 573 568 655 800 713 946 749 531 Transition economies 58 907 86 934 71 618 68 197 77 615 84 117 98 980 Source: UNCTAD.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development18 Table I.3. Real growth rates of GDP and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), 2010–2012 (Per cent) Variable Region 2010 2011 2012 World 3.6 3.1 3.5 GDP growth rate Developed economies 1.6 1.3 1.7 Developing economies 7.1 6.0 6.1 Transition economies 3.8 4.0 4.2 World 5.9 6.5 7.2 GFCF growth rate Advanced economiesa 2.5 4.2 6.2 Emerging and developing economiesa 9.6 8.9 8.2 Source: UNCTAD, based on United Nations, 2011 for GDP and IMF, 2011a for GFCF. a IMF’s classifications of advanced, emerging and developing economies are not the same as the United Nations’ classifications of developed and developing economies. have record levels of cash holdings. TNCs’ sales have also increased significantly as compared to 2009, both globally and for their foreign affiliates (section C). These improvements at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels are reflected in TNCs’ opinions about the global investment climate. According to 2011’s World Investment Prospects Survey (WIPS),17 TNCs exhibit a growing optimism going towards 2013 (figure I.18). Some 34 per cent of respondents expressed “optimistic” or “very optimistic” views for the global investment environment in 2011, compared to more than half Figure I.17. Profitability a and profit levels of TNCs, 1997–2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Thomson One Banker. a Profitability is calculated as the ratio of net income to total sales. Note: The number of TNCs covered in this calculation is 2,498. -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 - 200 0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Per cent$ billion Profits Profitability (53 per cent) in 2013. Perhaps more strikingly, the share of TNCs responding that they were “pessimistic” or “very pessimistic” for 2013 fell to 1 per cent. Responses to the WIPS also suggest strongly the continuing importance of developing and transition economies as destinations for FDI (figure I.19). While the composition of the top five destinations has not changed much in recent years – for example, in 2005 the top five were China, India, United States, Russian Federation, and Brazil – the mix of the second tier of host economies has shifted over time. Reflecting the spread of FDI in developing Asia beyond the top destinations, the rankings of economies such as Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Taiwan Province of China have risen markedly compared to previous surveys. Peru and Chile have likewise improved their position as Latin American destinations, thanks largely to their stable investment climates and strong macroeconomic factors. African countries are conspicuous by their absence from the list of top potential host economies for TNCs. While improving macro- and microeconomic fundamentals, coupled with rising investor optimism and the strong pull of booming emerging markets, should signal a strong rebound in global FDI flows, risks and uncertainties continue to hamper the realization of new investment opportunities. Such factors include the unpredictability of global governance (financial system, investment regimes, Figure I.18. Level of optimism of TNCs regarding the investment environment, 2011–2013 (Percentage of responses by TNCs surveyed) Source: UNCTAD, forthcoming a. 34% 49% 53% 2011 2012 2013
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 19 Box I.4 Effects of the natural disaster on Japanese TNCs and outward FDI On 11 March 2011, the northern part of Japan experienced a devastating earthquake and tsunami. The region that was most badly affected is home to a number of niche hi-tech companies, all major producers of specialized components (e.g. Renasas Electronics, which controls a 30 per cent share of the global market for microcontrollers). The earthquake itself and the subsequent interruption of power supplies resulted in a severe disruption of supply chains, not only in Japan but internationally. Despite the severity of the damage, by June most of the supply chains had been restored: for example, production at Toyota had recovered to 90 per cent of its pre-earthquake level. While Japanese firms have shown remarkable resilience, the chain of events has prompted Japanese manufacturers to reconsider their procurement strategies. In a recent survey of Japanese firms by the Nikkei,a one-quarter of the respondents said that they would increase procurement from abroad, while a further fifth intended to diversify their procurement sources within Japan. The survey indicated that about two-thirds of the firms intended to maintain or increase their level of total investment in the aftermath of this natural disaster. In the short term, the supply disruption will have reduced the revenues of those foreign affiliates of Japanese TNCs that were affected by supply disruption, and thus their reinvested earning. On the other hand, the temporary loss of revenues might have induced the parent companies of these affiliates to extend intra-company loans. In the medium term, the strategy of diversifying procurement sources could strengthen outward FDI. However, the overall impact of the earthquake on outward FDI from Japan is likely to be limited, especially against the backdrop of buoyant outward FDI through MA by Japanese firms. Over the long run, Japan will again be a leading investor for outward FDI. Source: UNCTAD. a Based on a survey of 100 CEOs by the Nikkei (29 May 2011). etc.); the worsening sovereign debt crisis in some developed countries and the resultant fiscal austerity; regional instability; energy price hikes and risks of inflation; volatility of exchange rates; and fears of investment protectionism. Although each can serve as a disincentive to investment in its own right, the prominence of all of these risks at the same time could seriously obstruct FDI globally. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 China UnitedStates India Brazil RussianFederation Poland Indonesia Australia Germany Mexico VietNam Thailand UnitedKingdom Singapore TaiwanProvinceofChina Peru CzechRepublic Chile France Colombia Malaysia Figure I.19. Top host economies for FDI in 2011–2013 (Number of times the country is mentioned as a top FDI priority by respondent TNCs) Source: UNCTAD, forthcoming a.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development20 * * * UNCTAD’s WIPS and econometric model projections for FDI flows in the coming years paint a picture of cautious but increasing optimism, with global FDI flows set to increase to between $1.4 and $1.6 trillion in 2011, building upon the modest recovery experienced in 2010. At the high end of that range, FDI flows would be slightly more than the average pre-crisis level, yet would still be below the 2007 peak of $2 trillion. World trade, by contrast, is already back at pre-crisis levels (table I.5). While the FDI recovery resumes, the worldwide demand for private productive investment is increasing as public investment, which rescued the global economy from a prolonged depression, declines in one country after another. With unsustainably high levels of public debt at both national and sub-national levels in many countries, and with nervous capital markets, governments must now rein in their deficits and let private investment take over the lead role in generating and supporting a sustained recovery. The FDI recovery in 2010 was slow not because of a lack of funds to invest, or because of a lack of investment opportunities. Responses by TNCs to UNCTAD's WIPS (UNCTAD, forthcoming a) indicate increasing willingness to invest, and clear priority opportunity areas. However, the perception among TNC managers of a number of risks in the global investment climate, including financial instability and the possibility of a rise in investment protectionism, is acting as a brake on renewed capital expenditures. A number of developed countries, where the need for private investment to take over from dwindling public investment is greatest, are ranked far lower on the investment priority list of TNCs than either the size of their economies or their past FDI performance would seem to warrant. Policymakers from those countries would be well advised to take a lead role among their international peers in continuing to ensure a favourable and stable global investment climate.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 21 Domestic investment still accounts for the majority of the total investment in developing and transition economies.18 Foreign investment can only complement this. However, each form of foreign investment plays a distinct and important role in promoting growth and sustainable development, boosting countries’ competitiveness, generating employment, and reducing social and income disparities. Non-FDI flows may work either in association with FDI, or separately from it. As no single type of flow alone can meet investment needs, it is vital to leverage their combinations to maximize their development impact. This section will discuss the development implications of various forms of investment, and the benefits of combining FDI with other sources of external finance, be they private or public. Foreign investors may finance their activities using a range of instruments in addition to FDI. These have different motivations, behave differently, and consequently have different impacts on development. This makes it necessary to review each instrument and the synergies between them. Differing motivations, characteristics and responses also drive different groups of investors in an enterprise – for instance, private investors (individuals, enterprises, funds etc.) and public investors (e.g. via ODA and other official finance). There is a sign of continued recovery in capital flows, but caution is needed. Since the first half of 2009, private capital flows to emerging and developing economies have been rebounding, led by FDI, but these remain below their peak of 2007 (table I.4). However, is the recovery in development finance to developing and transition economies sustainable? The recovery is due to a combination of structural (long-term) and cyclical (short-term) pull and push factors. High expected GDP growth in developing B. FDI AS EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FINANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES The recovery of external capital flows to developing countries is under way, led by FDI. However, caution is needed as to its sustainabil- ity, as FDI may be volatile. Table I.4. Capital flows to developing countries, 2005–2010 (Billions of dollars) Type of flows 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 579 930 1 650 447 656 1 095 FDI 332 435 571 652 507 561 Portfolio investment 154 268 394 -244 93 186 Other investmenta 94 228 686 39 56 348 Memorandum Official grants, excluding technical cooperation 56.9 106.9 76.1 86.4 95 .. Change in reserves 539 647 1 063 774 673 927 Workers' remittances 173 204 245 288 281 297 Source: UNCTAD, based on data from IMF, 2011a (on portfolio, other investment and reserve assets), from UNCTAD (on FDI inflows and workers’ remittances) and from the World Bank (on official grants excluding technical cooperation). a Other investments include loans from commercial banks, official loans and trade credits. countries is heralding profitable investment opportunities (cyclical pull), while policy frameworks are perceived to be more resilient to future shocks, especially in Asia (structural pull). Developed countries with excess liquidity, thanks to quantitative easing and low interest rates, are motivated to invest in developing countries with relatively higher rates and returns (cyclical push) (Akyuz, 2011; IMF, 2011b).19 However, there remain concerns about volatility. First, the capital surge is exposing developing and transition economies to greater instability, putting direct upward pressure on their exchange rates. And the low interest rate environment in developed economies cannot be sustained indefinitely.20 As a positive sign for emerging and developing economies, FDI has been the main source of inflows during 2009–2010, implying greater stability and a return to confidence for longer-term, productive investment. Less positively, the global recovery may be more fragile, because FDI is relatively less significant this time in developed economies, which are now highly exposed to volatile portfolio and especially other capital elements such as bank loans.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development22 Second, FDI in recent years is gradually becoming morevolatileindevelopingandtransitioneconomies, although it remains much less volatile than portfolio and other investments (such as commercial loans and trade credits) (figure I.20). It is argued that this might reflect its changing composition, for example a shift from equity to debt components, which would also make it more sensitive to the changes in United States monetary policy that have triggered previous crises. As a consequence, assumptions about FDI’s stability relative to other types of capital should be treated with caution especially for emerging economies (IMF, 2011a), bearing in mind the dramatic rise and fall in FDI inflows to such countries as Brazil ($45 billion in 2008, $26 billion in 2009 and $48 billion in 2010), the Republic of Korea ($8.4 billion in 2008, $7.5 billion in 2009 and $6.9 billion in 2010) and South Africa ($9 billion in 2008, $5.4 billion in 2009 and $1.6 billion in 2010). FDI is also likely to contain some short-term and volatile flows, or “hot money”. Stabilization of capital flows now represents an important challenge to many developing countries (box I.5). Each of the three components of FDI flows (equity investment, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans) has reasons for fluctuation. Intra-company debt generally comes with more flexible terms and conditions than commercial loans, being related more to the decisions of the parent company in order to help its foreign affiliates to expand or cover the running costs during start-up, restructurings, or upswings.21 Reinvested earnings fluctuate quite significantly, depending on profitability and the level of repatriation from abroad in the form of dividend payments. Although equity investment continues to be the most stable component of FDI, global production chains have changed considerably and it has become much easier for equity to relocate. Despite the instability of FDI flows in recent years, the fact that net private flows to developing countries remain positive is largely due to FDI: the recovery has not extended yet to all private flows in all regions, and non-FDI flows were negative in many years and regions even during the FDI boom (figure I.21). FDI would therefore appear to be much less volatile than these other private flows (namely private portfolio and private other capital). All private foreign capital flows – portfolio investment, bank loans and FDI – contribute to development. Thus, the recent crisis, and the nature and inherent fragility of the current upswing, are both matters of concern to developing countries. This makes the role of official development assistance (ODA) very important. ODA is less prone to fluctuations; however, failure by developed countries to meet stipulated objectives has led to deep scepticism about its effectiveness in addressing core development needs of beneficiary countries. Figure I.20. The volatility of private capital flows, by type, 2003–2010 Source: UNCTAD. a In 2003 and 2004, the value of standard deviation exceeded 3. Note: The volatility of each type of capital flow is calculated as relative standard deviation for the immediately preceding 10 years. The relative standard deviation of 2010 is based on flows between 2001 and 2010. 0 1 2 3 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 1 2 3 2003a 2004a 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Other investment FDI Portfolio investment Other investment FDI Portfolio investment Developed countries Developing and transition economies
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 23 Some developing countries are concerned that a surge in capital inflows could exacerbate imbalanc- es and complicate their macroeconomic policies. Against this backdrop, capital controls are back on their policy agenda. The IMF also has now softened its customary stance against capital controls (Ostry et al., 2011), making it easier for some Asian and Latin American countries to introduce measures to restrict short-term, volatile flows, while maintaining the more preferential treatment of long-term capital. In principle, these measures should not affect FDI, as the latter should contain only long-term flows. Reality is more complex, as flows recorded statistically under FDI could encompass some short-term flows. In 2010, FDI flows rose significantly to some develop- ing countries. In certain cases, the increase of FDI was not necessarily accompanied by investment in fixed assets or cross-border acquisitions. A part of this money might have entered developing host countries for the purpose of short-term capital gains. In coun- tries where FDI inflows exceed considerably the capi- tal expenditures of foreign affiliates, the latter may hold part of the funds received from their parent firms in assets other than immediate investment, for example speculative funds. Moreover, short-term speculative flows may be misre- ported under FDI outflows when they leave the home country, but are not recorded as FDI inflows in host countries as the money transferred is spent instanta- neously for speculative purposes, and does not stay long enough in the accounts of foreign affiliates. This kind of money is either reserved for special-purpose entities and financial holding companies, or is invest- ed in real estate and property which may easily be liquidated. Indeed FDI in real estate is rising in many countries, in particular in China (chapter II) and in Latin America – as it at one time was in pre-crisis West Asia. Such misreporting happens because the distinction between long-term capital flows (FDI) and short-term capital flows is increasingly blurred. As a result of the growth of this short-term capital, recently FDI flows have become more volatile than before (figure I.20). While some speculative short-term private capital flows may have become part of FDI statistics, most continue to be recorded under errors and omissions, as they usually escape being captured in the estab- lished items of the balance of payments. In 2009 (the most recent year for which data are available), the val- ue of errors and omissions was equivalent to almost half that of all FDI inflows globally, up from only about 10 per cent in previous years. As the markets for different types of capital flows are interrelated, the establishment of measures targeting exclusively short-term capital flows is increasingly diffi- cult. Take for example the capital controls introduced in 2009–2010 in the real estate markets of various Asian economies: direct controls to limit the size of flows affected both short- and long-term capital flows (IMF, 2011a). Source: UNCTAD Box I.5. FDI and capital controls Figure I.21. Composition of private capital flows to developing and transition economies, 2004–2010 (Billions of dollars) - 40 - 20 - 20 40 60 80 100 - 300 - 200 - 100 - 100 200 300 400 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 - - 150 - 100 - 50 - 50 100 150 200 250 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Africa South, East, and South-East Asia Latin America and the Caribbean FDI Portfolio Other Capital Source: UNCTAD, based on data from IMF, 2011a.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development24 1. Accelerating internationalization of firms International production is expanding, with sales, employment and assets of foreign affiliates all increasing (table I.5). UNCTAD estimates that TNCs worldwide, in their operations both at home and abroad, generated value added of approximately $16 trillion in 2010 (figure I.22), accounting for more than a quarter of global GDP. In 2010, foreign affiliates accounted for more than one-tenth of global GDP and one-third of world exports. International production by TNCs (i.e. value added by foreign affiliates) accounts for around 40 per cent of TNCs’ total value added (figure I.22), up from around 35 per cent in 2005. International production networks thus continue to expand, although the rate of growth was slower during the crisis, due to the drop in FDI flows. This continuing expansion reflects the consistently high rates of return obtained by TNCs on FDI – back up to 7.3 per cent in 2010, after a one-year dip during the crisis (table I.5). Returns are thus back to pre-crisis levels, despite a steady decrease in leverage, as proxied by outward FDI stock over foreign assets. Leverage peaked during the FDI boom years from 2005 to 2007, with the stock (equity) over assets ratio declining from nearly 40 per cent to 25 per cent, but it has since decreased, with the equity/asset ratio climbing up to 36 per cent in 2009 and 2010. Other indicators of international production also showed positive gains in 2010. Sales of foreign affiliates rose 9.1 per cent, reflecting strong revenues in developing and transition economies. Employment continued to expand, as efficiency- seeking investments expanded during the crisis. C. FURTHER EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION Table I.5. Selected indicators of FDI and international production, 1990–2010 Item Value at current prices Annual growth rate or change on return (Billions of dollars) (Per cent) 1990 2005–2007 average 2008 2009 2010 1991– 1995 1996– 2000 2001– 2005 2009 2010 FDI inflows 207 1 472 1 744 1 185 1 244 22.5 40.1 5.3 -32.1 4.9 FDI outflows 241 1 487 1 911 1 171 1 323 16.9 36.3 9.1 -38.7 13.1 FDI inward stock 2 081 14 407 15 295 17 950 19 141 9.4 18.8 13.4 17.4 6.6 FDI outward stock 2 094 15 705 15 988 19 197 20 408 11.9 18.3 14.7 20.1 6.3 Income on inward FDI 75 990 1 066 945 1 137 35.1 13.1 32.0 -11.3 20.3 Rate of return on inward FDI a 6.6 5.9 7.3 7.0 7.3 -0.5 - 0.1 -0.3 0.3 Income on outward FDI a 122 1 083 1 113 1 037 1 251 19.9 10.1 31.3 -6.8 20.6 Rate of return on outward FDI a 7.3 6.2 7.0 6.9 7.2 -0.4 - - -0.2 0.3 Cross-border MAs 99 703 707 250 339 49.1 64.0 0.6 -64.7 35.7 Sales of foreign affiliates 5 105 21 293 33 300 30 213b 32 960b 8.2 7.1 14.9 -9.3 9.1 Value-added (product) of foreign affiliates 1 019 3 570 6 216 6 129b 6 636b 3.6 7.9 10.9 -1.4 8.3 Total assets of foreign affiliates 4 602 43 324 64 423 53 601b 56 998b 13.1 19.6 15.5 -16.8 6.3 Exports of foreign affiliates 1 498 5 003 6 599 5 262c 6 239c 8.6 3.6 14.7 -20.3 18.6 Employment by foreign affiliates (thousands) 21 470 55 001 64 484 66 688b 68 218b 2.9 11.8 4.1 3.4 2.3 GDP 22 206 50 338 61 147 57 920d 62 909d 6.0 1.4 9.9 -5.3 8.6 Gross fixed capital formation 5 109 11 208 13 999 12 735 13 940 5.1 1.3 10.7 -9.0 9.5 Royalties and licence fee receipts 29 155 191 187 191 14.6 10.0 13.6 -1.9 1.7 Exports of goods and non-factor services 4 382 15 008 19 794 15 783d 18 713d 8.1 3.7 14.7 -20.3 18.6 Source: UNCTAD. a Calculated with FDI income for the countries that have the data for both this and FDI stock. b Data for 2009 and 2010 are estimated based on a fixed effects panel regression of each variable against outward stock and a lagged dependent variable for the period 1980-2008. c Data for 1995–1997 are based on a linear regression of exports of foreign affiliates against inward FDI stock for the period 1982–1994. For 1998–2010, the share of exports of foreign affiliates in world export in 1998 (33.3%) was applied to obtain values. d Based on data from IMF, 2011a. Note: Not included in this table are the value of worldwide sales by foreign affiliates associated with their parent firms through non-equity relationships and of the sales of the parent firms themselves. Worldwide sales, gross product, total assets, exports and employment of foreign affiliates are estimated by extrapolating the worldwide data of foreign affiliates of TNCs from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for sales; those from the Czech Republic, France, Israel, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for value-added (product); those from Austria, Germany, Japan and the United States for assets; those from Czech Republic, Japan, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for exports; and those from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao (China), Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States for employment, on the basis of the shares of those countries in worldwide outward FDI stock.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 25 Underlying this improvement in international production has been an acceleration of the internationalization of TNCs – and, indeed, of the initial internationalization of previously non-TNC firms. Three of the major factors driving this “new” burst of internationalization are: first, the crisis caused firms to rationalize their corporate structure and increase efficiencies wherever possible (including the options to close down or to sell to others), often by relocating business functions to cost-advantageous locations; second, the rapid recovery in emerging market economies, compared to the relatively weak response in developed economies, forced many TNCs to embrace these markets, in an effort to protect profits and generate growth; and the rise of emerging market TNCs including State-owned TNCs. During the economic and financial crisis, many companies embarked on sig- nificant layoffs and organizational restructuring in order to remain prof- itable. For TNCs in developed economies, which make up nearly 80 per cent of the TNCs in the world, and account for some 70 per cent of global FDI outflows, this often meant making cuts in their In 2010, foreign activity of the largest non-financial TNCs rebounded, and its share in total activity remained high. home economy operations, while moving or open- ing new facilities abroad to take advantage of spe- cific comparative advantages in those locations. In 2010, foreign activity of the largest non-financial TNCs’ rebounded, and its share in total activity re- mained high. However not all of the largest TNCs increased their internationalization. Financial TNCs, for example, experienced significant difficulties in 2010 (box I.6). These trends are plainly manifest in the findings of UNCTAD’s annual survey of the largest TNCs in the world (table I.6). These firms, predominantly from developed economies, expanded their footprint outside their home countries, registering a continued increase in their foreign assets in 2010. Rising cross-border MA activity by the largest TNCs, especially targeting strategic firms, has given further momentum to the expansion of foreign assets.22 Employment and sales also rose both at home and abroad. The largest TNCs from developing and transition economies experienced subtly differing pressures. Given the tremendous growth registered in many of their home economies, in some cases stoked by significant public stimulus packages, these TNCs struggled to balance responding to growth at home Figure I.22. TNCs account for one-quarter of world GDP, 2010 (Per cent and trillions of dollarsa ) Source: UNCTAD. a Current prices, current exchange rates. b ISIC L, M, N, Q, X, 92, P (Public administration, Defence, Social security, Health, Sanitation, Community services, Private household employment). c As estimated by the weighted average size of home economies. d Table I.5 in this report. 100% 24% 76% 50% 25% 14% 10% World GDP Public sectorb Private sector Domestic businesses TNCs Home countryc Foreign affiliatesd (6.6) (62.9) (47.8) ( )15.6 (9.0)
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development26 with long-term internationalization goals and the desire to acquire international brands, technologies, and access to natural resources. Therefore, the share of foreign operations in total activity (i.e. sales and employment) continued to rise (table I.6). These firms continued to expand their balance sheets abroad at a rapid pace, with foreign assets rising 11 per cent in 2009 (the latest year for which data are available) to almost $1 trillion (table I.6). The rising importance of developing and transition economies The crisis drew attention to the importance of developing and transition economies, especially the emerging markets of Brazil, India, China and the Russian Federation (BRICs), as key destinations for both efficiency- and market-seeking investors. Not only are these economies attractive for their lower labour costs, they are also seen increasingly as important markets in their own right. This trend is apparent Box I.6. Recent trends in internationalization of the largest financial TNCs in the world Financial TNCs, which accounted for more than 20 per cent of FDI outflows during 2006–2008, have seen their fortunes fluctuate dramatically over recent years. Since the crisis, during which a number were forced into government receivership, they have been stabilizing their situations – as witnessed by the strong rebound in their profits.a Nevertheless, the crisis has played havoc with the internationalization programmes of many of the largest financial TNCs. In some cases, firms were forced to consolidate by regulators, or by their new State owners, shifting their focus to domestic markets at the expense of foreign businesses. For example, RBS (United Kingdom), which was saved only by significant government intervention, has sold a number of its foreign assets. Icelandic and Irish banks suffered the same fate. In other cases the crisis hastened previously laid plans, for example Citigroup’s (United States) sale of non-retail banking assets in Japan (chapter II).b Given the pressures facing the largest financial TNCs, a slowdown in their internationalization in 2010 was almost inevitable. UNCTAD’s measure of the average geographical spreadc of the 50 largest financial TNCs rose only 1.4 points to 44.9 for the year, compared to 43.5 in 2009. Individual firm performance was mixed, with sharp drops registered by a number of European financial institutions. A number of financial TNCs in the United States also posted declines. Japanese financial TNCs, in contrast, increased their internationalization, making strategic international acquisitions during the crisis.d A new wave of financial industry MAs may materialize in the coming years, but financial TNCs in developed markets may find that their entry into fast-growing developing markets encounters various capital control measures (box I.5). During the crisis, policymakers in many of the largest developing countries, in particular Brazil and China, viewed State-owned financial institutions as important agents of healthy financial markets. Without easy access to the largest and fastest-growing markets, financial TNCs will find it difficult to uphold the long-term rationale for internationalization: balancing the earnings of developed, relatively stable, markets with those of quick-growing, and volatile, developing markets (Schildbach, 2009). Source: UNCTAD. a “Banking industry posts best quarter of profits since early 2007”, Washington Post, 25 May 2011. b “Citigroup to sell shares in Japanese brokerage monex”, Bloomberg, 21 September 2010. c Geographical spread is calculated as the square root of the share of foreign affiliates in total affiliates (the Internationalization Index), multiplied by the number of host economies. d “The big boys are back”, Economist, 25 September 2008. Strong profits of TNCs in emerging markets incentivizes further investments in both the share of operating profits generated in these economies, and the number of investments targeting them. Corporate profits, which were slashed by the crisis, have rebounded sharply for many of the largest TNCs in the world (section A). The swift economic recovery of the largest developing economies played an important role in restoring these firms to income growth. In some cases, income from developing and transition economies has grown to account for a significant share of TNCs’ operating income. This trend spans industries, with TNCs as varied as Coca-Cola (United States), Holcim (Switzerland), and Toyota Motors (Japan) deriving more than one-third of their operating income from developing economies (figure I.23). Investment activity by the 100 largest TNCs in the world has now shifted decidedly towards develop- ing and transition economies. Comparing interna- tional greenfield projects between 2007–2008 and 2009–2010, the number of projects targeting these economies increased by 23 per cent, compared
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 27 Table I.6. Internationalization statistics of the 100 largest non-financial TNCs worldwide and from developing and transition economies (Billions of dollars, thousands of employees and per cent) 100 largest TNCs worldwide 100 largest TNCs from developing and transition economies Variable 2008 2009 2008–2009 % change 2010b 2009–2010 % change 2008 2009 % change Assets Foreign 6 161 7 147 16.0 7 512 5.1 899 997 10.9 Total 10 790 11 543 7.0 12 075 4.6 2 673 3 152 17.9 Foreign as % of total 57 62 4.8 a 62 0.3 a 34 32 -2.0 a Sales Foreign 5 168 4 602 -10.9 5 005 8.8 989 911 -7.9 Total 8 406 6 979 -17.0 7 847 12.4 2 234 1 914 -14.3 Foreign as % of total 61 66 4.5 a 64 -2.2 a 44 48 3.3 a Employment Foreign 9 008 8 568 -4.9 8 726 1.8 2 651 3 399 28.2 Total 15 729 15 144 -3.7 15 489 2.3 6 778 8 259 21.9 Foreign as % of total 57 57 -0.7 a 56 -0.2 a 39 41 2.0 Source: UNCTAD. a In percentage points. b Preliminary results. Note: From 2009 onwards, data refer to fiscal year results reported between 1 April of the base year to 31 March of the following year. 2010 data are unavailable for the 100 largest TNCs from developing and transition economies due to lengthier reporting deadlines in these economies. to only a 4 per cent rise in developed economies. While investments in developing Asia have domi- nated, growing poles of investment are now dis- cernible in Latin America and in Africa (figure I.24). Metro AG (Germany) is pursuing growth in both developing and transition economies, opening new stores in the Russian Federation (17), China (7), Kazakhstan (4), and Viet Nam (4) during 2010, while Figure I.23. Operating profits derived from operations in developing and transition economies, selected top 100 TNCs, 2010 (Billions of dollars and share of total operating profits) Source: UNCTAD. Note: Regional reporting by TNCs differs, in this case segments that were either completely or mainly located in developing or transition economies were included. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Bayer Honda Motor BASF Nissan Motor British American Tobacco Holcim Barrick Gold Nestlé SABMiller Unilever Toyota Motor Coca-Cola GlaxoSmithKline Anheuser-Busch InBev Anglo American 91 44 25 45 68 36 76 19 52 41 83 27 32 19 26 % of operating income
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development28 closing stores in developed markets in Europe.23 General Electric (United States), the world’s largest TNC in terms of foreign assets, is also emblematic of this shift, having announced recently that it in- tends to intensify its focus on emerging markets – which account for 40 per cent of the firm’s industrial revenues – in order to reduce costs and increase revenue growth.24 Figure I.24. Greenfield investments by the largest 100 TNCs in the world, by host region, 2007–2008 and 2009–2010 (Number of projects and percent change between periods) Source: UNCTAD. 0 500 1 000 1 500 Transition economies West Asia South, East and South- East Asia and Oceania Latin America and the Caribbean Africa Developing economies Developed economies 2009–2010 2007–2008 4 5 41 9 61 23 23 2. State-owned TNCs The internationalization of large State-owned enterprises (SOEs) from developing and transition economies constitutes an impor- tant component of FDI. State-owned TNCs from developed countries are also extant internationally, albeit not widely recog- nized. The ownership difference from traditionally private or shareholder-owned TNCs – putatively impacting on their objectives, motives and strate- gies – has become an issue of intense interest and debate, if not yet of extensive research. State-owned TNCs are defined as enterprises comprising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates in which the government has a controlling interest (full, majority, or significant minority), whether The emergence of State-owned TNCs, especially those from developing economies, as important outward investors, has implications for both home and host economies. or not listed on a stock exchange. Definitions of what constitutes a controlling stake differ, but in this Report, control is defined as a stake of 10 per cent or more of the voting power, or where the government is the largest single shareholder. State- owned refers to both national and sub-national governments, such as regions, provinces and cities. Importantly, this definition excludes international investments by SWFs, which have become more visible investors in recent years25 (see section A.1.e for a review of recent trends in SWF-sponsored FDI), because they are not enterprises and are not necessarily governed by the usual corporate mechanisms. Some illustrative examples of factors determining what constitutes a State-owned TNC – for example, France Telecom, in which the State has a roughly 26 per cent-stake – are included in box I.7. a. The universe of State-owned TNCs In 2010 there were at least 650 State-owned TNCs, with more than 8,500 foreign affiliates, operating around the globe.26 While this makes them a minority in the universe of all TNCs (see section C.1 for more details), they nevertheless constituted a significant number (19 companies) of the world’s 100 largest TNCs of 2010 (also in 2009), and, more especially, of the top 100 TNCs from developing and transition economies of 2009 (28 companies). The largest 15 of these State- owned TNCs, from both developed and developing economies, are a relatively well-known group with recognizable names (table I.7). It is important to note that this enumeration of State-owned TNCs refers only to parent firms, which has the effect of reducing some widespread conglomerates to a single entry. Additionally, a number of the State-owned TNCs are identified such only due to a recent crisis- induced intervention, thus their membership on this list should be considered temporary (General Motors, for example). Government control of State-owned TNCs spans a spectrum from full control to substantive influence. Roughly 44 per cent of State-owned TNCs are majority-owned by their respective governments (figure I.25). These include companies that are fully Relatively small as a group, State-owned TNCs nev- ertheless rank among the largest TNCs in the world.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 29 integrated into the State, usually as an extension of a particular ministry, as well as those firms which are publically listed, but in which the State owns more than 50 per cent of the voting shares. For 42 per cent of identified State-owned TNCs, the government had a stake of less than 50 per cent. Of these, 10 per cent had a stake of less than 10 per cent. For these firms the government is often the largest of the minority stakeholders, or holds so-called “golden shares” and therefore exerts a significant or preponderant influence on the composition of the board of directors and the management of the enterprise. Geographically, 56 per cent of State-owned TNCs worldwide are from developing and transition economies (table I.8). Among these economies, South Africa (54), China (50), Malaysia (45), United Arab Emirates (21) and India (20) are the top five source countries. In developed economies, the majority of State-owned TNCs are located in Europe, especially in Denmark (36), France (32), Finland (21) and Sweden (18). These overall figures, however, belie very different government ownership strategies: for example, South Africa owes its relatively large number of SOEs to investment of public pension funds (through the Public Investment Box I.7. What is a State-owned enterprise: the case of France In France there is no specific law defining “State-owned” or “State-controlled” enterprises. The economic definition, as given by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), is as follows: “[a] State-owned enterprise is a company in which the State holds, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence, due to the owning of the property or of a financial participation, by owning either the majority of the capital or the majority of votes attached to the emitted shares.” This very broad definition encompasses a large variety of situations and types of company, and should be analysed in terms of “control” rather than mere “ownership”. Basically, it is possible to identify four main categories of “State-owned” enterprises falling under the INSEE definition: 1. Non-listed companies totally owned by the State, the so-called public establishments (Etablissements pub- lics). These firms fill a specific function and may not diversify. Examples include RATP, SNCF, Réseau Ferré de France, Banque de France, etc. 2. Listed companies totally owned by the State.a These firms, falling within the legal framework of the “free mar- ket”, may diversify their activities. The French State’s stake may be reduced or eliminated at any time, unless this is prohibited by law in a particular case. Examples include La Poste. 3. Listed companies in which the French State has a stake of more than 50 per cent, allowing it full control of the company’s management. Examples include EDF (a former “public establishment”), Aéroport de Paris, and vari- ous other large airports and ports in the country. 4. Listed companies in which the French State has a direct or indirect stake of less than 50 per cent. Examples include France Telecom (a former “public establishment”, 26 per cent stake) and GDF-Suez (formed through the merger of GDF, a former “public establishment”, and Suez, a private firm). Source: UNCTAD. a This situation is possible when the SOE has to be privatized or become publicly-owned. The State owns 100 per cent of shares before they are sold publicly. Figure I.25. Ownership structure of State-owned TNCs, 2011 (Per cent of State-owned TNCs by size of government stake) Source: UNCTAD, based on 653 TNCs. a The State is the largest shareholder or owns golden shares. b Includes those State-owned TNCs where the government stake is unknown, but is assumed to be majority-owned. 10% 32% 44% 14% 10%a 10-50% 51-100%b 100% Corporation) in various businesses throughout the domestic economy, resulting in the State taking a stake in a number of firms, though normally a small (less than 15 per cent) stake. State-owned TNCs from China, on the other hand, tend to be more firmly controlled directly by the State, through majority or full-ownership stakes. These numbers
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development30 TableI.7.Thetop30non-financialState-ownedTNCs,rankedbyforeignassets,2009a (Millionsofdollarsandnumberofemployees) CorporationHomeeconomy Government stakeb Industryc AssetsSalesEmployment TNIe (percent)ForeignTotalForeignTotalForeignd Total EnelSpAItaly34.7Electricity,gasandwater1572314486438157.2 VolkswagenGroupGermany20.0Motorvehicles15625510514619636961.9 GDFSuezFrance36.4Utilities(Electricity,gasandwater)146247681119619756.5 EDFSAFrance84.7Utilities(Electricity,gasandwater)13434840925816939.0 DeutscheTelekomAGGermany31.7Telecommunications113184539010825854.1 EniSpAItaly30.3Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.10216978117407859.2 GeneralMotorsCoUnitedStates32.0Motorvehicles761365510511421753.7 FranceTelecomSAFrance26.7Telecommunications7313331646416747.0 EADSNVFrance22.4Aircraft7211654607512071.9 VattenfallABSweden100Electricity,gasandwater72832227344084.9 VeoliaEnvironnementSAFrance10.7Utilities(Electricity,gasandwater)5272294821231366.9 CITICGroupChina100Diversified4431511312512523.2 StatoilASANorway67.0Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.43971774112934.4 DeutschePostAGGermany30.5Transportandstorage3950446725842568.3 ValeSABrazil 5.5 (12goldenshares) Miningquarrying391022024136048.2 Petronas-PetroliamNasionalBhdMalaysia100Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.34126286384130.7 TeliaSoneraABSweden37.3Telecommunications32371014202973.3 RenaultSAFrance18.3Motorvehicles309229476612150.2 JapanTobaccoIncJapan50.0Food,beveragesandtobacco30422966255055.4 FinmeccanicaSpaItaly30.2Machineryandequipment29442025327362.7 ChinaOceanShipping(Group)CompanyChina100Transportandstorage2836182847249.7 LukoilOAORussianFederation13.4Petroleumandnaturalgas247938682214334.0 SingaporeTelecommunicationsLtdSingapore54.4Telecommunications2327812102364.3 ZainKuwait49.2Telecommunications192078121392.1 QatarTelecomQatar55.0Telecommunications1823571278.0 TataSteelLtdIndia12.9Metalandmetalproducts16241622478165.2 PetroleoBrasileiroSABrazil39.8Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.152002911687714.2 AbuDhabiNationalEnergyCoPJSCUnitedArabEmirates100Utilities(Electricity,gasandwater)1425353467.2 PetróleosdeVenezuelaSAVenezuela,BolivarianRep.of100Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.12150337559219.0 ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationChina100Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.1232551783015852.7 Source: UNCTAD. a Alldataarebasedonthecompanies’annualreportsunlessotherwisestated. b BasedonmostrecentdataavailablefromThomsonWorldscope(retrieved31May2011). c IndustryclassificationforcompaniesfollowstheUnitedStatesStandardIndustrialClassificationasusedbytheUnitedStatesSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC). d Inanumberofcasesforeignemploymentdatawerecalculatedbyapplyingtheshareofforeignemploymentintotalemploymentofthepreviousyeartototalemploymentof 2009. e TNI,theTransnationalityIndex,iscalculatedastheaverageofthefollowingthreeratios:foreignassetstototalassets,foreignsalestototalsalesandforeignemploymenttototal employment.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 31 also are dwarfed, in most cases, by the total number of SOEs in each respective economy. For example, there are some 900 SOEs in France, while in China, State sole-funded enterprises and enterprises with the State as the largest shareholder numbered roughly 154,000 in 2008. This suggests that the number and proportion of SOEs that have become transnational is relatively small. State-owned TNCs tend to be most active in financial services and industries that are capital- intensive, require monopolistic positions to gain the necessary economies of scale, or are deemed to be of strong strategic interest to the country. Roughly 70 per cent of State-owned TNCs operate Table I.8. Distribution of State-owned TNCs by home region/economy, 2010 Region/economy Number Share World 653 100 Developed countries 285 43.6 European Union 223 34.2 Denmark 36 5.5 Finland 21 3.2 France 32 4.9 Germany 18 2.8 Poland 17 2.6 Sweden 18 2.8 Others 81 12.4 Other European countries 41 6.3 Norway 27 4.1 Switzerland 11 1.7 Others 3 0.5 United States 3 0.5 Other developed countries 18 2.8 Japan 4 0.6 Others 14 2.1 Developing economies 345 52.8 Africa 82 12.6 South Africa 54 8.3 Others 28 4.3 Latin America and the Caribbean 28 4.3 Brazil 9 1.4 Others 19 2.9 Asia 235 36.0 West Asia 70 10.7 Kuwait 19 2.9 United Arab Emirates 21 3.2 Others 30 4.6 South, East and South-East Asia 165 25.3 China 50 7.7 India 20 3.1 Iran, Islamic Republic of 10 1.5 Malaysia 45 6.9 Singapore 9 1.4 Others 31 4.7 South-East Europe and the CIS 23 3.5 Russian Federation 14 2.1 Others 9 1.4 Source: UNCTAD. Note: While the number is not exhaustive, major SOE investors are covered. in the services sector, led by financial services, which accounts for 19 per cent of all State-owned TNCs, transport, storage and communications (16 per cent) and electricity, gas, and water (10 per cent). Some 22 per cent of State-owned TNCs are in manufacturing industries, mainly automotive and transport equipment (4 per cent of all State- owned TNCs), chemicals and chemical products (3 per cent) and metals and metal products (3 per cent) (table I.9). The remaining 9 per cent are located in the primary sector and are mainly active in extractive industries. Table I.9. Distribution of State-owned TNCs by sector/industry, 2010 Sector/industry Number Share Total 653 100 Primary 56 8.6 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 48 7.4 Others 8 1.2 Manufacturing 142 21.7 Food, beverages and tobacco 19 2.9 Wood and wood products 12 1.8 Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel 11 1.7 Chemicals and chemical products 20 3.1 Metals and metal products 20 3.1 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 27 4.1 Others 33 5.1 Services 455 69.7 Electricity, gas and water 63 9.6 Construction 20 3.1 Trade 42 6.4 Transport, storage and communications 105 16.1 Finance 126 19.3 Holding 27 4.1 Insurance 17 2.6 Rental activities 14 2.1 Business services 18 2.8 Others 23 3.5 Source: UNCTAD. Note: While the number is not exhaustive, major SOE investors are covered. The transnationality index (table I.7), and the share of their affiliates located abroad (figure I.26), are each indicative of the internationalization of State- owned TNCs. State-owned TNCs from West Asia show the highest levels of internationalization by the latter measure (the former measure is not available for many developing country State-owned TNCs), with on average 47 per cent of their affiliates being located abroad. Those based in the other major developing regions – Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South, East, and South-East Asia – are less internationalized, with less than half of
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development32 their affiliates located in foreign countries. These numbers are, however, very small compared with the internationalization of the world’s top 100 TNCs, which on average have roughly 70 per cent of their affiliates abroad, or compared with the largest 100 TNCs from developing countries, which on average have 51 per cent of their affiliates abroad (WIR08). The geographical spread of State-owned TNCs’ operations appears to be relatively limited: in terms of the number of host economies in which they operate, State-owned TNCs from Europe have a wider footprint (operating in 8.2 foreign economies, on average) compared to their counterparts from developing and transition economies (between 2.7 and 6.3 foreign economies, on average) (figure I.26). b. Trends in State-owned TNCs’ FDI An analysis of FDI proj- ects (including both cross-border MA pur- chases and greenfield in- vestments) indicates that State-owned TNCs are ac- tive investors around the world.27 In 2010, their FDI, as measured by the value of these proj- ects, totalled some $146 billion, or roughly 11 per cent of global FDI flows (figure I.27), a higher share than represented by their number in the uni- verse of TNCs (less than one per cent of all TNCs). During 2003–2010, FDI projects by State-owned TNCs made up an average of 32 per cent of total outflows from developing countries. Emblematic of this surge is the number of developing coun- try State-owned TNCs responsible for the largest mega-deals in the past five years (table I.10). Four of the six FDI projects with a value of more than $10 billion (one MA deal and three greenfield in- vestment projects) were undertaken by developing country State-owned TNCs. While official statistics of the FDI stock controlled by State-owned TNCs do not exist, a rough estimate suggests that in 2010 their share of global outward stock was no less than 6 per cent.28 State-owned TNCs as major international investors are a relatively new phenomenon, judging by their cross-border MA purchases from the early 1980s to 2010. During that period there appear to have been two key phases of activity: first, the period from the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s, when State-owned TNCs from developed countries were more important in FDI flows; and secondly, from the beginning of 2000 onwards, when surging outward FDI by State-owned TNCs from developing economies made up the majority of State-owned TNC FDI flows (figure I.28). During 2003–2010, a period for which data on both MAs and greenfield investments are available, outward FDI of all State-owned TNCs was tilted towards developing and transition economies (56 per cent of the total) (table I.11). State-owned TNCs from developing and transition economies are significant players in South–South investment flows, investing $458 billion in FDI projects in other developing and transition economies over the period, or slightly more than two-thirds of all FDI projects from those economies ($663 billion). The direction of FDI also differs by mode of investment: in the case of cross-border MAs, two-thirds of such deals conducted by State-owned TNCs worldwide were directed to developed countries; in contrast, developing and transition economies received 68 per cent of total greenfield investment. Differences by mode of investment and by source also appear in sectoral/industry activity. While Surging FDI by State-owned TNCs, especially those from developing economies, has raised their profile on the global investment scene. 28% 32% 34% 35% 35% 40% 44% 47% Other developed economies Latin America and the Caribbean Commonwealth of Independent States Africa South, East, and South-East Asia World Europe West Asia 3.8 3.1 2.7 6.3 4.1 3.7 8.2 5.6 Figure I.26. West Asian State-owned TNCs are more internationalized than others, 2011 (Average internationalization indexa and average number of host economies) Source: UNCTAD. a Calculated as the number of foreign affiliates divided by the number of all affiliates.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 33 about 40 per cent of State-owned TNCs’ FDI projects, in terms of value, are in the primary sector, the shares of manufacturing and services sectors differ somewhat between cross-border MAs and greenfield investments. State-owned TNCs’ cross-border MAs between 1981 and 2010 largely targeted extractive industries, utilities, and telecommunications (figure I.29). However, FDI from State-owned TNCs based in developed economies largely focused on utilities (33 per cent of the total), such as electricity, gas and water, and telecommunications (19 per cent); whereas State-owned TNCs from developing and transition economies, in contrast, targeted extractive industries (37 per cent) and telecommunications (20 per cent). The difference between the patterns of investment by State-owned TNCs from developed as opposed to developing countries reflects, to some extent, the principal actors involved and their differing strategic aims. The most active State-owned TNCs from developed economies are large national utilities, which engage in FDI in order to capitalize on their firm-specific advantages and to generate 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 50 100 150 200 250 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Cross-border MAs Greenfield investments Share in global FDI outflows $billion % Figure I.27. The value of FDI projectsa by State-owned TNCs,b and its share in total FDI outflows, 2003–2010 Source: UNCTAD. a Comprises cross-border MAs and greenfield investments. The latter refers to the estimated amounts of capital investment. b Cross-border MA data refers only to TNCs in which the State has a stake of 50 per cent or more. Note: The values may be overestimated, as the value of greenfield FDI refers to estimated amount of capital investment of the entire project. Figure I.28. Cross-border MA purchases by State-owned TNCs,a by home region, 1981–2010 (Millions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD. a Refers only to TNCs in which the State has a stake of 50 per cent or more. Developed economies Developing economies Transition economies 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development34 growth in markets outside their own. In contrast, State-owned TNCs active in extractive industries are more commonly from developing economies. This is largely in keeping with many emerging economies’ national goals to secure access to necessary natural resources. c. Issues related to corporate governance There is a significant di- versity in the behaviour of SOEs around the world, as State-owners differ in their interest and politi- cal systems. Even SOEs owned by the same State differ, for instance in their mission, technologies, industry and market context. SOEs may have multiple objectives – for instance, political, social, or cultural, or income re- distribution. Many of them were created originally to pursue public policy objectives. These aspects complicate the understanding (in comparison with private companies) of how SOEs operate, the way they are governed and how their relationship with the State plays out.29 At a general level, the development of SOEs as TNCs is influenced by the political and economic underpinnings of the country of origin. First, it is important to distinguish between countries where free market policies or interventionism are preponderant. Second, State-owned TNCs’ internationalization process may be influenced by the level of development of the country. The less developed a country, it can be argued, the more the State will tend to intervene in SOE management as SOEs become an important tool for the country’s development. In some cases the government might hinder FDI by SOEs, as this could reduce their contribution and role (e.g. social, industrial) in the domestic economy; however, in other cases, the State might be willing to support FDI by SOEs as this may help to build economies of scale and/or further develop the competitive position of the firm and that of the home country (e.g. Deng, 2004; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Third, influencing the possibilities and modalities of SOEs’ internationalization are specific government industrial, technological, fi­ nancial, social and foreign policies. Thus, it is important to distinguish between cases where the link to the State might either hinder or support SOEs’ FDI and performance: • Government as hindrance to international- ization (e.g. in Italy, where there has been re- peated concern about the potential effects of SOEs’ internationalization on local unemploy- ment rates). Figure I.29. Cumulative cross-border MA purchases by State-owned TNCs,a by economic grouping of ultimate acquirer and industry of target, 1981–2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD. a Refers to the TNCs in which the State has a 50 per cent or more stake only. b) Developing and transition economiesa) Developed countries 33% 19% 11% 8% 5% 4% 20% Electricity, gas and water Transport, storage and communications Food, beverages and tobacco Mining, quarrying and petroleum Finance All other Business services 37% 20% 7% 6% 5% 4% 21% Mining, quarrying and petroleum Transport, storage and communications Chemicals and chemical products Finance Electricity, gas and water Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel All other Corporate governance struc- tures play an important role in determining FDI decisions of State-owned TNCs – raising concerns in host economies.
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 35 Table I.10. The 10 largest cross-border MA purchases and 10 largest greenfield investments by State-owned TNCs, 2006–2010 (Millions of dollars and per cent) (a) Cross-border MAs Year Value ($ million) Host economy Acquired company Industry of acquired company Ultimate acquiring company Ultimate home economy Shares acquired (%) 2009 16 938 United Kingdom British Energy Group PLC Electric services EDF France 73 2007 14 684 United Kingdom Gallaher Group PLC Cigarettes Japan Tobacco Inc Japan 100 2007 11 600 United States GE Plastics Plastics materials and synthetic resins SABIC Saudi Arabia 100 2009 7 157 Switzerland Addax Petroleum Corp Crude petroleum and natural gas Sinopec Group China 100 2010 7 111 Brazil Repsol YPF Brasil SA Crude petroleum and natural gas Sinopec Group China 40 2006 6 899 United Kingdom Peninsular Oriental Steam Navigation Co Deep sea foreign transportation of freight Dubai World United Arab Emirates 100 2008 6 086 United Kingdom British Energy Group PLC Electric services EDF France 26 2007 5 483 Italy FASTWEB SpA Information retrieval services Swisscom AG (Swiss Confederation) Switzerland 82 2009 4 500 United States Constellation Energy Nuclear Group LLC Electric services EDF France 50 2006 4 388 Hong Kong, China Hutchison Port Holdings Ltd Marine cargo handling PSA Corp Ltd (Ministry of Finance) Singapore 20 (b) Greenfield investments Year Value ($ million) Host economy Investing company Industry of investing company Home economy 2006 18 725 Pakistan Emaar Properties PJSC Real estate United Arab Emirates 2010 16 000 Australia Petroliam Nasional Berhad Coal, oil and natural gas Malaysia 2007 14 000 Tunisia Dubai Holding LLC Real estate United Arab Emirates 2006 9 000 China Kuwait Petroleum Corporation Coal, oil and natural gas Kuwait 2006 6 000 Turkey Indian Oil Corporation Ltd Coal, oil and natural gas India 2010 5 800 Cuba China National Petroleum Corporation Coal, oil and natural gas China 2010 5 740 Nigeria China State Construction Engineering Corporation Coal, oil and natural gas China 2008 5 000 Morocco International Petroleum Investment Company PJSC Coal, oil and natural gas United Arab Emirates 2010 5 000 Cameroon GDF Suez SA Coal, oil and natural gas France 2008 4 700 United States AREVA Group Alternative/renewable energy France Source: UNCTAD. • Government as supporter of internationaliza- tion (e.g. China’s “Go Global” policy, GCC countries’ economic diversification policy (see chapter II.A.3), the Republic of Korea’s Over- seas Investment Policy Package, and South Africa’s outward FDI policies – WIR06). • Government as indifferent to SOE internation- alization, but with general support and with greater regard to developmental impact (e.g. Vattenfall (Sweden) in Africa). In general terms it is argued that the extent to which SOEs are free of, or subject to, government involvement in operational and management matters (including FDI) is critical. Active government participation in SOEs is often regarded as a limit to good economic performance. However, if the degree of autonomy is very high, the SOE could behave just like a private firm, and this may impact on its original mission and public policy role. This situation suggests that although a certain level
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development36 Table I.11. Cumulative value of FDI projectsa by State-owned TNCsb , by source and target economy, 2003–2010 (Millions of dollars and per cent) Source economy Host economy (a) By value (millions of dollars) Developed economies Developing economies Transition economies Total Developed economies 292 109 180 641 45 748 518 498 Developing economies 176 314 394 935 18 826 590 076 Transition economies 28 556 16 916 26 987 72 460 Total 496 979 592 493 91 562 1 181 034 (b) By destination of source economy (per cent) Developed economies Developing economies Transition economies Total Developed economies 56 35 9 100 Developing economies 30 67 3 100 Transition economies 39 23 37 100 Total 42 50 8 100 Source: UNCTAD. a Comprises cross-border MAs and greenfield investments. The latter refers to the estimated amounts of capital investment. b Cross-border MA data refers only to TNCs in which the State has a stake of 50 per cent or more. Note: The value may be overestimated as the value of greenfield FDI refers to estimated amount of capital investment of the entire project. of State intervention can be good for SOEs’ performance, including international diversification, too much State intervention might be detrimental. The level and mode of FDI by SOEs is also influenced by host country policies that regulate inward FDI. State-owned TNCs might be perceived either favourably or unfavourably, depending on conditions and the attitude of the host country. For example, there are persistent claims of “unfair” competition by State-owned TNCs, as well as concerns about State-owned TNCs as instruments of foreign policy (e.g. Mazzolini, 1980; Mascarenhas, 1989; Anusha and Nandini, 2008; Athreye and Kapur, 2009). Partly in response, host countries – particularly in the developed world – have over the past few years focused attention on developing legal frameworks and processes to provide the necessary instruments for identifying and preventing deemed adverse consequences arising from State-owned TNC investments (e.g. Australia, Canada). However, there are also countries with more favourableattitudesconcerningFDIbyforeignSOEs. For instance there are cases in which two States, because they do not yet have established political ties, perceive FDI by their SOEs as a step – among others – towards establishing a closer relationship between them. Examples include the case of Malaysian State-owned TNCs such as Petronas and some African countries, in which investments were often fostered by the Government of Malaysia (WIR06). There are also cases in which, because of the already existing strong ties between States, FDI by SOEs is perceived as further strengthening these ties. Their international business operations became part of ODA packages. Typical potential corporate governance concerns regarding State-owned TNCs are related to their objectives arising from State ownership (which may diverge from the commercial norms), a perceived lower level of transparency, potentially inexperienced boards of directors, and poor relationships with other shareholders and stakeholders.30 As many SOEs may have no public reporting requirements, and relevant information may only be available to the State, this hinders monitoring, limits accountability and, under some conditions, may create opportunities for corruption. In light of this situation, the future policy agenda that host governments may wish to deal with revolves around the core differences between State-owned and private TNCs, and focuses on alleviating these concerns: • National security concerns were particularly prominent when State-owned TNC activity in- creased in the mid-2000s. It was argued that sometimes their investments would endanger the national security position of any host coun- try. For instance, an acquisition of port man- agement businesses in six major United States seaports in the United States by DP World (UAE) in 2006 came under close scrutiny, be- cause of fears of compromising port security. Political resistance ultimately forced DP World to divest these assets. Explicitly defining and reaching an agreement (between the State and SOE governance) on SOE objectives can help reduce concerns in both host and home coun- tries, clarify management goals, improve per- formance monitoring, and reduce opportunism. • Competition concerns may be voiced where foreign investment is deemed a threat to na- tional core industries and “national champi-
CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 37 ons”, but they may also be raised in the con- text of knowledge and technology transfer issues. A recent controversial case that failed for these reasons concerned a proposed sec- ond deal in 2009, in the mining industry, which otherwise would have led to the Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco), China’s State- owned metals group, purchasing more stake in Rio Tinto (Australia/United Kingdom), a leading global mining company. • Concerns over governance and social and en- vironmental standards might become more prominent in the future for host countries as investments from State-owned TNCs increase, although such concerns are already being voiced with regard to extractive industries and agriculture. To improve transparency, SOEs are also expected to comply with high standards of accounting and auditing. In reality, less than one-fifth, or 119 firms, of 653 State-owned TNCs in UNCTAD’s database subscribe to the United Nations’ Global Compact, and only 3 per cent (or 17 firms) use the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards, compared to 60 per cent in both initiatives for the world’s top 100 TNCs (UNCTAD, 2011e).31 The OECD has pre- pared guidelines regarding provision of an ef- fective legal and regulatory framework (OECD, 2005). Also, from the perspective of home countries, there are concerns regarding the openness to investment from their State-owned TNCs. Given the current absence of any broader consensus on the future rules of engagement of State-owned TNCs as sources of FDI, it is critical that home and host economies determine and define more clearly the rules and regulations under which State-owned TNCs pursue their investment activities. This policy agenda determines part of future work in this area. Research should look at how specific government industrial and technological, financial, social and foreign policies influence the possibilities and modalities of SOEs’ internationalization. In particular, SOEs’ internationalization drivers should be identified and examined, as should be SOEs’ FDI impact on key aspects such as employment conditions, technology transfer, market access and environmental issues. Notes 1 In October–December 2008 the Russian Gov- ernment provided financial help amounting to $9.78 trillion to the largest Russian companies through the State corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Filippov, 2011). 2 Due to unavailability of data on FDI flows (on a balance-of-payments basis) by sector or by country, data on FDI projects (cross-border MAs and greenfield investments) are used in this Report. 3 The acquisition of Solvay Pharmaceuticals (Belgium) by Abbott Laboratories (United States) for $7.6 billion and the takeover of Millipore (United States) by the drug and chemical group Merck (Germany) for $6 billion (annex table I.7). 4 Nestlé, for example, registered a net profit of $34 billion in 2010, while the acquisition of Cadbury (United Kingdom) by Kraft Foods (United States) for $19 billion was the largest deal recorded in 2010 (annex table I.7). 5 Private equity firms are engaged in buying out or acquiring a majority of the existing firms, rather than establishing new companies (greenfield investment). 6 Bain Company, Global Private Equity Report 2011, Boston. 7 Commission of the European Communities, 2009. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, COM(2009) 207 final, Brussels: European Commission. 8 Public Law 111-202-July 21, 2010, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 9 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices, the Santiago Principles, 8 October 2008. 10 Truman (2011: 11). Note that the size of the SWF universe depends on the qualifying criteria used in the underlying SWF definition. The Monitor Group, for example, includes 33 funds in its Monitor-FEEM SWF Transaction Database. The membership base of the International Working Group for Sovereign Wealth Funds comprises 26 SWFs from 23 countries, managing assets of around $2.3 trillion. The analysis in this report is based on a consolidated universe drawn from these two samples. 11 Some SWFs have acquired large stakes in leading private equity firms, such as the Carlyle Group, Blackstone Group and Apax Partners. A good example for a private equity-SWF investment syndication is the co-ownership of Gatwick Airport by the California Public Employees Retirement System, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Republic of Korea’s National Pension Service, the Australian Future Fund and the private equity firm
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development38 Global Infrastructure Partners (“Future fund gets Gatwick go-ahead”, Financial Times, 20 December 2010). 12 Institute of International Finance, GCC Regional Overview, 29 October 2010. 13 “CIC set for up to $200bn in fresh funds”, Financial Times, 25 April 2011. 14 Government Pension Fund Global, Annual Report 2009, Oslo: Norges Bank Investment Management, p.22. 15 Based on 600 major companies. Nikkei, 12 April 2011. 16 For United States firms, data from Thomson Reuter (Nikkei, 10 April 2011) and for Japanese firms, compiled by the Nikkei (14 May 2011). 17 This year’s survey provides an outlook on future trends in FDI as seen by 205 largest TNCs and 91 IPAs. 18 For detailed discussion on FDI and domestic investment, see UNCTAD, 2010a and 2011a. 19 This is because in home economies, banks are reluctant to lend, as there are concerns about the recovery, heavily indebted consumers have little appetite to borrow or spend, and enterprises facing weak market prospects are discouraged from investing. 20 For example, sudden increases in United States interest rates especially have in the past triggered crises in developing countries, including the debt crisis of the 1980s, and various emerging markets crises of the 1990s. 21 Intra-company loans often have flexible terms and conditions. including low or zero interest rates, and variable grace and maturity periods (Bhinda and Martin, 2009). 22 Examples include a $18.8 billion acquisition of Cadbury (United Kingdom) by Kraft Foods (United States) – the largest MA deal of the year (annex table I.7). 23 Annual Report 2010, Metro AG. 24 Annual Report 2009, General Electric. 25 TNCs where the State’s stake is held by an SWF (e.g. Singapore Telecom − which is majority owned by Temasek, an SWF) are included in the universe of State-owned TNCs. 26 In those cases where it was not possible to fully apply the restriction related to government stakes of less than 10 per cent, the State-owned TNC in question was retained in the count. 27 Due to data limitations, the analysis presented in this section refers to the State-owned TNCs where the State has a 50 per cent or greater stake. This data also excludes FDI projects of SWFs, which are reviewed in section A.1.e. 28 Comparing the cumulative sum of their gross cross-border MA purchases and greenfield capital expenditures from 2003–2010. 29 A more extensive study on the issue of State-owned TNCs’ governance and FDI is ongoing and will be published soon by UNCTAD. 30 At SOE firm-level discussions on governance typically revolve around specific governance decisions, such as who should be appointed as board members and CEO, compensation and incentives for management, amount of reporting and new investments. 31 This 100 TNC list, which is used for the study on CSR (UNCTAD 2011e), includes 14 State-owned TNCs, all of which are signatories to the Global Compact and two use the GRI reporting standard.
The slow recovery of FDI flows in 2010 masked starkly divergent trends among regions: while East and South-East Asia and Latin America experienced strong growth in FDI inflows, those to Africa, South Asia, West Asia, transition and developed countries continued to decline. Inward FDI flows to Africa varied between subregions. In developing Asia, ASEAN and East Asia attracted record amounts of FDI, while in West Asia the impact of the global economic crisis continued to hold back FDI. Latin America and the Caribbean witnessed a surge in cross-border MAs, mainly from developing Asia. In transition economies, the marginal rise of flows to the CIS did not compensate for the sharp drop in South-East Europe. Among developed countries, flows to Europe and Japan declined, overshadowing the increased flows to the United States. All three groups in the structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies – LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS – saw their FDI inflows fall. Some major developments feature in regional FDI: • Intraregional FDI in Africa is increasing but has yet to realize its potential. • FDI outflows from South, East and South-East Asia have been rising rapidly, demonstrating new and diverse industrial patterns. • State-owned enterprises lead outward FDI from West Asia with a strategy of improving the competitiveness of the home economies. • Latin America and the Caribbean are witnessing a surge in resource-seeking FDI from developing Asia. • The investment link between developing and transition economies is gaining momentum, fuelled by the commodity boom and government support within both group of economies. • The restructuring of the banking industry in developed countries resulted in both significant divestments of foreign assets and the generation of new FDI. • A new plan of action for LDCs is proposed within an integrated policy framework on investment, technical capacity-building and enterprise development. • TNC participation has led to significant infrastructure build-up in LLDCs. • TNCs are contributing to the economic challenges of climate change adaptation in SIDS. CHAPTER II REGIONAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development40 1. Africa a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $3.0 billion Angola, Egypt, Nigeria and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya .. $2.0 to $2.9 billion Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Ghana, and Algeria .. $1.0 to $1.9 billion Sudan, South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco and Zambia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Egypt and Angola $0.5 to $0.9 billion Niger, Madagascar, Namibia, Uganda, Mozambique, Chad, United Republic of Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea and Botswana Nigeria and Morocco $0.1 to $0.4 billion Mauritius, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Seychelles, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, Malawi, Kenya, Somalia, Cape Verde, Benin and Zimbabwe South Africa, Zambia, Algeria, Senegal and Mauritius Below $0.1 billion Swaziland, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Lesotho, Rwanda, Togo, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Burundi, Mauritania, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Principe. Gabon, Tunisia, Sudan, Liberia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Niger, Ghana, Swaziland, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Benin, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Principe, Mali, Mauritania, Cameroon, Malawi, Mozambique, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Guinea- Bissau, Namibia, Togo and Botswana a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Africa 60.2 55.0 5.6 6.6 5.1 7.6 2.7 3.2 North Africa 18.5 16.9 2.5 3.4 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.5 East Africa 3.6 3.7 0.1 0.2 - 0.3 0.2 0.2 West Africa 12.7 11.3 1.5 1.1 - 0.2 0.4 - - Southern Africa 20.0 15.1 1.4 1.9 3.9 5.6 1.5 1.5 Central Africa 5.4 8.0 0.1 0.1 - 0.2 - - Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Africa 488.8 554.0 106.0 122.4 39.2 50.1 2.2 2.7 North Africa 190.7 206.1 20.2 23.6 8.7 12.7 0.5 0.7 East Africa 27.5 30.9 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.2 West Africa 84.1 95.4 5.7 6.8 12.2 15.3 0.3 0.4 Southern Africa 153.6 182.8 78.2 90.0 14.0 17.2 1.1 1.2 Central Africa 32.9 38.8 1.0 1.0 3.5 4.3 0.1 0.2 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 5 140 7 608 2 702 3 184 Primary 2 579 2 149 621 - 81 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 2 579 2 149 621 - 81 Manufacturing - 110 303 138 381 Food, beverages and tobacco - 263 39 2 Wood and wood products 11 - 1 - 1 Chemicals and chemical products - 620 5 - - 38 Non-metallic mineral products 250 - - 4 416 Metals and metal products 248 32 102 - Machinery and equipment - 2 - - Electrical and electronic equipment - - 9 - - Precision instruments - 10 - - Services 2 672 5 157 1 942 2 885 Construction - - - 103 - Trade - 84 - 1 - 26 Hotels and restaurants - 117 136 3 - Transport, storage and communications 3 058 1 912 - - Finance - 295 38 1 643 2 572 Business services 21 3 003 32 340 Health and social services 5 - - - Community, social and personal service activities 0 - 23 369 - 1 Other services - 6 - - Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 5 140 7 608 2 702 3 184 Developed economies 4 328 6 355 1 378 1 336 European Union 3 159 1 459 782 1 224 United States 1 125 1 927 - 45 Japan - 3 199 - - Developing economies 797 952 1 124 1 460 Africa 927 268 927 268 North Africa 324 - - 54 Sub-Saharan Africa 603 268 927 214 South Africa 597 100 500 - 88 Uganda - 257 - - Zambia - - 11 257 Zimbabwe - - 62 51 Latin America and the Caribbean - 70 - 84 395 - 75 South America - 383 - 75 Caribbean - 84 12 - Asia - 60 768 102 1 267 West Asia -10 653 - 965 South, East and South-East Asia 11 421 102 302 Oceania - - - 300 - South-East Europe and the CIS - 51 200 388 Russian Federation - 16 200 388 A. REGIONAL TRENDS - 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 $billion Southern Africa North Africa East Africa West Africa Central Africa 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 30Central Africa Southern Africa West Africa East Africa North Africa FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation $billion % Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 41 Inflows to Africa, which peaked in 2008 amidst the resource boom, continued their downward trend in 2010, although there were significant subregional variations. For the region as a whole, FDI in 2010 stood at $55 billon, 9 per cent down from 2009 (figure A). Other developing regions performed considerably better, leading Africa’s share of FDI inflows among developing countries to fall from 12 per cent in 2009 to 10 per cent in 2010. Inflows to North Africa account for roughly one- third of the total in Africa. These fell for the second year running, although the rate of decline was much reduced and the picture uneven. Indeed, inflows to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya rose over 40 per cent in 2010, though this rebound seems certain to be short-lived, given the current political situation in the country. In West Africa, the two largest recipients had contrasting fortunes: inflows increased significantly in Ghana, but not enough to compensate for the large fall in Nigeria to reverse the downward trend of this subregion. In both countries, the major factor was the oil industry. In Nigeria, uncertainty over the Petroleum Industry Bill,1 which is perceived as unfavourable for TNCs, and the unresolved political problem in the Niger Delta, discouraged foreign investors and, for instance, allegedly led Shell to sell a number of its onshore licences. As for Ghana, the start of major oil production has attracted the interest of TNCs, some of which are seeking an alternative subregional source of oil to Nigeria. In Southern Africa, inflows fell by 24 per cent. One of the two major recipients in the subregion, South Africa, saw its inflows fall by over 70 per cent to $1.6 billion, a level amounting to one-sixth of the peak recorded in 2008. Inflows to Angola, the region’s largest recipient, fell by 15 per cent. Although the decline was large, the inflow levels achieved in 2008 ($16.6 billion) and 2009 ($11.7 billion), when there had been major investments in oil and agriculture, were perhaps not sustainable, considering that inflows to Angola had been just over $5 billion in 2003 when the civil war in the country ended. One of the problems of Angola’s oil industry is that its production has exceeded Angola’s OPEC quota. Elsewhere in West and Southern Africa, oil and gas TNCs are divesting their downstream businesses. In April 2010, Shell announced its plan to withdraw from the downstream markets – considered “low- margin” – in 21 African countries. Similarly, BP announced plans to divest from five Southern African countries. In Central Africa and East Africa, inflows of FDI increased in 2010 to reach $8.0 billion and $3.7 billion, respectively. The inflows to the larger recipients in Central Africa (Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) were mostly due to oil- related investments. The only significant instance of FDI in non-primary sectors was investment in telecommunications in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. East Africa’s increase was modest (2.5 per cent), as inflows to the subregion’s largest recipient, Madagascar, fell substantially (19 per cent). FDI to the subregion’s two other large recipients, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, have tended to be stable in recent years and held broadly steady in 2010. The source countries and industry distribution of FDI to Africa can be gauged from the expansion of TNCs’ affiliate networks in Africa through cross- border MAs (tables D and E) and greenfield projects. As in previous years, TNCs investing in Africa in 2010 were mostly from developed countries. Among developing countries, China, India and the United Arab Emirates were the main source countries in 2010. In terms of industry distribution, the primary sector (mainly coal, oil and gas) accounted for 43 per cent, manufacturing for 29 per cent (of which almost half was in the metal industry) and services (mainly communications and real estate) for 28 per cent. One of the largest MA deals worldwide in 2010 was the acquisition of the telecoms operations of Zain (Kuwait) in 15 African countries (not including those in North Africa) by the Indian mobile operator Bharti Airtel, for $10.7 billion. Although the deal itself did not bring in any net external finance to Africa, the new owner announced that it would invest $1 billion to expand its operations in 2011.2 As for the future, inflows to North Africa seem likely to fall significantly, due to the military conflict in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the general political uncertainty hanging over the subregion (box II.1).
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development42 It would require a major upturn in sub-Saharan Africa to reverse the downward trend of FDI inflows to the continent. Data on FDI projects (greenfield investments and cross-border MA deals) for the first few months of 2011 show a 9 per cent rise over the same period of 2010 in Africa as a whole, but this rise was mainly driven by a large investment in Ghana.3 FDI projects in North Africa fell by half in this period (annex tables I.3 and I.8). The continuing pursuit of natural resources by Chinese TNCs, and the increasing interest in Africa of Indian TNCs, which also have a significant presence in other sectors, could provide a boost. The nascent oil industry in Ghana perhaps represents the single most important positive prospect. Overall, however, 2011 is likely to be another challenging year for FDI inflows to Africa. b. Intraregional FDI for development The extent of intraregional FDI in Africa is limited. Judging from data on FDI projects, intra-regional FDI accounts for only 5 per cent of the total in terms of value and 12 per cent in terms of number (table II.1). The large share accounted for by FDI projects within sub-Saharan Africa suggests that South African investors are playing a large role. The pattern indicates that aside from South Africa, which has an exceptional propensity to invest regionally, intraregional FDI is particularly underdeveloped in Africa. Table II.1. Intraregional FDI projectsa in Africa: the value and number of projects and their shares in Africa’s totals, cumulative 2003−2010 Total and intraregional FDI Value Projects $ billion % share Number % share All intraregional FDI projects 46 5 570 12 North Africa to North Africa 8 1 65 1 Sub-Saharan Africa to sub-Saharan Africa 35 4 461 10 North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa 2 0.2 43 1 Sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa 0.2 0 1 0 Memorandum Total FDI projects in Africa 848 100 4 702 100 Source: UNCTAD. a Including cross-border MA and greenfield FDI projects. Intra-African FDI offers a huge potential; subregional organizations can do more to boost these flows. From a development perspective, the lack of intra­ regional FDI is suggestive of a missed opportu- nity. Geographical proximity and cultural affinity are thought to give regional TNCs an advantage in terms of familiarity with the operational envi- ronment and business needs in the host country. From the host country’s point of view, developing country TNCs are likely to be in possession of more appropriate technologies – with a greater potential for technology transfer – and better able to address the needs of local consumers, especially the poor (UNCTAD, 2011b). Indeed, there is some anecdotal evidence of regional FDI bringing positive development impacts to host countries in Africa. For example, investments from foreign farmers have played a role in revitalizing agriculture in Zambia. Mozambique has offered generous incentives to foreign farmers to invest, and other countries have considered similar packages (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda).4 The scope for joint ventures between domestic and foreign partners in the African context is often constrained by the absence of domestic partners with the required technical and financial capacity. In manufacturing, Coleus Crowns (Uganda) provides a successful example of a joint venture at the intraregional level. It is a joint venture between the Madhvani Group (Uganda) and Coleus Packaging (South Africa), which began production of bottle crowns in 2007. Since then, it has succeeded in establishing itself as a supplier to major TNCs
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 43 such as Nile Breweries (an affiliate of SABMiller), Pepsi Uganda and Coke Uganda. It also serves the regional markets in Burundi, Rwanda and the Sudan.5 In services, some African TNCs in telecommuni- cations and banking have actively engaged in re- gional expansion. Leading players in the region's telecommunications industry include MTN (South Africa), Orascom (Egypt) and Seacom (Mauritius). In the financial industry, a number of banks based in Nigeria and South Africa have established a re- gional/subregional presence. Nigerian banks have a reputation of bringing in innovative services to neighbouring countries in West Africa, and many of the leading banks have an extensive presence throughout the region. In spite of these successful instances, the extent of intraregional FDI is limited. There is a paucity of disaggregate data on the source countries of FDI in Africa, but such data as are available reveal intraregional FDI in Africa to have a skewed and underdeveloped nature. Most of the intraregional flows are attributable to investment from South Africa in neighbouring countries in East and Southern Africa. Countries with high shares of intraregional FDI flows/stock (i.e. Botswana, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia and the United Republic of Tanzania) are those in which investors from South Africa are active, primarily in natural resource-related industry. For South Africa, the importance of Africa in its outward investment has increased over time. The share of Africa in its outward FDI stock rose from 8 per cent in 2005 to 22 per cent in 2009 (table II.2). The dominant role of South Africa is also confirmed by data on the expansion of TNCs’ affiliate networks through greenfield projects and MAs. Given the geographical proximity and cultural affinity, there ought to be potential for diverse intraregional FDI in terms of industry and source country. However, available country-level evidence indicates that the actual picture in this regard is very mixed. For instance, Senegalese FDI in the Gambia is relatively diverse, covering finance, manufacturing, real estate, wholesale and retail. In contrast, outward FDI from Nigeria is concentrated in finance. In the United Republic of Tanzania, FDI from Kenya is diversified into various manufacturing, finance and service activities, while FDI from South Africa has mainly been in mining, although Box II.1. The Arab Spring and prospects for FDI in North Africa The Arab Spring led to a blossoming of democratic expression in the subregion, but it has dampened investor confidence in the short term. The available data for the first few months of 2011 indicate that FDI inflows, as shown by greenfield investments and cross-border MAs (annex tables I.3 and I.8) to the subregion declined substantially. For example, there was no record of cross-border MAs in North Africa for the first five months (annex table I.3). It could take months before confidence among investors in those countries is restored. In Egypt, where greenfield investments fell by 80 per cent in the first four months of 2011 compared to the corresponding period of 2010 (annex table I.8), the most important investor country is the United States, which reportedly accounted for about $9 billion out of $11.1 billion of foreign investment (both FDI and portfolio) in the country. In May 2011, the United States offered loan guarantees of up to $1 billion through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to finance infrastructure development and boost job creation in Egypt. It was also reported that some Gulf States had agreed to contribute to a fund worth about $170 million set up by the Government of Egypt to encourage investment. In addition to international support, the Government has approved measures to simplify the procedure for approving new industrial projects and to ease the restrictions on setting up franchises. However, the impact of investment incentives might be limited in the current climate of political transition, and the return of investor confidence is likely to depend on the overall political settlement and the geopolitical situation surrounding the country. In the long term, democratization should result in better governance and thus lead to a more sustainable growth of economic activities, including FDI. Source: UNCTAD.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development44 the greater value of investment projects in mining obscures the significant number of investment projects in other sectors (Bhinda and Martin, 2009). The current situation calls for more efforts to encourage FDI at the regional and subregional levels. Various subregional initiatives have been introduced to this end. The Free Trade Area of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)6 was established with the objective of promoting, among other activities, FDI and domestic investment, by creatingalargersinglemarket(RwelamiraandKaino, 2008). SADC has concluded a Protocol on Finance and Investment, which sets out the legal basis for regional cooperation and harmonization in the area of finance, investment and macro-economic policy. SADC also has a services protocol, though not yet in force, which would also have implications for FDI. The East African Community (EAC)7 has discussed the need to promote FDI into the subregion, but there seems to be no well-developed structure in place to promote intra-subregional FDI. There are also initiatives to promote FDI between the regional groupings, most notably by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Fujita, 2009; UNCTAD, 2008a). Its Common Investment Area is aimed at promoting intra-COMESA and international FDI into infra­ structure, information technology, telecoms, energy, agriculture, manufacturing and finance.8 One major problem with regional groupings in Africa is their great proliferation, resulting in overlaps and inconsistencies. There are around 30 regional trade agreements (RTAs) in Africa, each country typically belonging to several such groupings. Recognizing this, COMESA, EAC, and SADC started a process to enhance integration among their members in 2008 (Brenton et al., 2011). The harmonization of Africa’s RTAs, and accelerated and closely coordinated planning with respect to FDI, would help Africa to achieve its full intraregional FDI potential. Table II.2. Intraregional FDI in Africa, various years Country Period average / year Source region ($ million) Share of Africa in world (%)From Africa From the World FDI inflows Egypt 2007-2009 162.6 13 882.1 1.2 Ethiopia 1997-1999 0.8 206.4 0.4 2002-2004 37.3 421.7 8.8 Mauritius 1990-1992 1.8 24.9 7.3 2007-2009 45.6 348.1 13.1 Morocco 1996-1998 20.3 664.7 3.1 2006-2008 41.0 3 735.2 1.1 Mozambique 2007-2009 229.1 636.3 36.0 Namibia 1991-1993 78.4 98.0 80.0 2006-2008 522.7 653.4 80.0 Tunisia 1990-1992 8.4 261.7 3.2 2007-2009 70.6 2 020.7 3.5 Inward FDI stock Botswana 1997 769.7 1 280.2 60.1 2007 310.0 968.9 32.0 Malawi 2000 103.6 357.7 29.0 2004 151.5 562.3 26.9 Morocco 2004 236.1 19 883.1 1.2 2008 303.1 39 388.3 0.8 South Africa 2000 301.1 43 451.0 0.7 2009 802.4 117 434.1 0.7 United Rep. of Tanzania 1998 924.3 3 352.5 27.6 2005 2 224.9 5 141.6 43.3 Outward FDI stock To Africa To the World South Africa 2005 3 017.0 36 826.0 8.2 2009 15 676.0 72 583.0 21.6 Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 45 2. South, East and South-East Asia a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $50 billion China and Hong Kong (China) Hong Kong (China) and China $10 to $49 billion Singapore, India and Indonesia Singapore, Republic of Korea, India, Malaysia and Taiwan Province of China $1.0 to $9.9 billion Malaysia, Viet Nam, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Islamic Republic of Iran, Macao (China), Taiwan Province of China, Pakistan, Philippines and Mongolia Thailand and Indonesia $0.1 to $0.9 billion Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, Sri Lanka, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Timor- Leste and Maldives Viet Nam, Philippines and Islamic Republic of Iran Below $0.1 billion Afghanistan, Nepal, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Bhutan Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Macao (China) a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 34 748 32 089 40 467 93 521 Primary 1 597 - 428 12 962 23 948 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 4 180 - 54 72 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 1 593 - 608 13 016 23 875 Manufacturing 17 084 17 806 2 798 8 812 Food, beverages and tobacco 3 298 2 896 - 142 4 152 Textiles, clothing and leather 86 367 235 981 Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2 212 265 - 1 299 Chemicals and chemical products 1 038 5 950 154 1 361 Rubber and plastic products 14 460 35 35 Metals and metal products - 351 1 557 958 - 557 Machinery and equipment 1 119 300 531 - 127 Electrical and electronic equipment 9 441 918 787 - 499 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 88 4 201 206 2 000 Services 16 067 14 711 24 707 60 761 Electricity, gas and water 2 241 408 7 973 1 048 Trade 2 609 239 2 273 1 765 Hotels and restaurants - 3 138 262 1 144 Transport, storage and communications 5 758 2 165 -3 639 13 768 Finance 2 839 1 650 17 876 39 271 Business services 2 532 4 837 947 138 Health and social services - 236 3 330 41 3 101 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 34 748 32 089 40 467 93 521 Developed economies 11 320 14 936 19 966 42 661 European Union 1 031 1 446 2 875 18 594 United States 3 985 5 780 1 014 8 329 Australia 206 910 3 529 9 383 Japan 5 473 4 840 350 625 Developing economies 23 195 16 223 18 796 50 816 Africa 102 302 105 11 421 Latin America and the Caribbean 374 - 618 1 018 19 935 South America - 39 981 19 353 Central America 246 9 - 25 Asia 22 497 16 539 17 649 19 284 West Asia 5 005 -2 143 158 602 South, East and South-East Asia 17 491 18 682 17 491 18 682 China 4 519 7 024 9 333 2 536 Hong Kong, China 7 746 1 790 2 403 8 924 Korea, Republic of 276 3 536 243 - 318 Malaysia 2 637 1 061 323 2 119 Singapore 2 482 3 192 4 940 4 448 South-East Europe and the CIS 13 - 1 706 44 Kazakhstan - - 1 359 24 Russian Federation 13 - 347 16 Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 South, East and South-East Asia 241.5 299.7 193.2 231.6 34.7 32.1 40.5 93.5 East Asia 161.1 188.3 142.9 174.3 15.7 16.1 35.9 53.1 South Asia 42.5 32.0 16.4 15.1 6.1 5.6 0.3 26.4 South-East Asia 38.0 79.4 33.8 42.2 12.9 10.4 4.3 14.0 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 South, East and South-East Asia 2 565.6 3 087.8 1 766.1 2 115.2 190.6 232.4 99.1 116.8 East Asia 1 599.4 1 888.4 1 365.5 1 586.5 145.6 177.9 90.9 107.6 South Asia 220.0 261.0 83.7 97.2 16.2 17.0 1.5 1.4 South-East Asia 746.3 938.4 317.0 431.5 28.8 37.4 6.7 7.7 $billion 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 East Asia South Asia South-East Asia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 $billion 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 % South-East Asia South Asia East Asia FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development46 In 2010, FDI inflows to South, East and South- East Asia rose 24 per cent, to $300 billion (figure A). However, the performance of major economies within the region varied significantly: inflows to the 10 ASEAN countries more than doubled; those to China and Hong Kong (China) enjoyed double-digit growth; while those to India, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China declined (table B). FDI to ASEAN surged to $79 billion in 2010, surpassing 2007’s previous record of $76 billion. The increase was driven by sharp rises in inflows to Malaysia (537 per cent), Indonesia (173 per cent) and Singapore (153 per cent) (table A; annex table I.1). Proactive policy efforts at the country level contributed to the good performance of the region, and seem likely to continue to do so: in 2010, Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines liberalized more industries; Indonesia improved its FDI-related administrative procedures; and the Philippines strengthened the supportive services for public- private partnerships (PPPs) (chapter III). In Singapore, which accounted for half of ASEAN’s FDI, inflows amounted to a historic level of $39 billion in 2010. As a global financial centre and a regional hub of TNC headquarters, the island State has benefited considerably from increasing investment in developing Asia, against a background of rising capital flows to the emerging economies in general in the post-crisis era. Due to rising production costs in China, some ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam, have gained ground as low-cost production locations, especially for low- end manufacturing.9 ASEAN LDCs also received increasing inflows, particularly from neighbouring countries like China and Thailand. For instance, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic has been successful in attracting foreign investment in infrastructure in recent years; as a result of Chinese investment in an international high-speed rail network, FDI to the country is likely to boom in the coming years (section II.B.2). FDI to East Asia rose to $188 billion, thanks to growing inflows to Hong Kong (China) (32 per cent) and China (11 per cent) (table A). Benefiting greatly from its close economic relationship with mainland China, Hong Kong (China) quickly recovered from the shock of the global financial crisis, and FDI inflows recorded a historic high of $69 billion in 2010. However, inflows to the other two newly industrializing economies, namely the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, declined by 8 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. China continues to experience rising wages and production costs, so the widespread offshoring of low-cost manufacturing to that country has been slowing down and divestments are occuring from the coastal areas. Meanwhile, structural transformation is shifting FDI inflows towards high- technology sectors and services. For instance, FDI in real estate alone accounted for more than 20 per cent of total inflows to China in 2010, and the share was almost 50 per cent in early 2011. Mirroring similar arrangements in some developed countries, China established a joint ministerial committee in 2011 to review the national security implications of certain foreign acquisitions. FDI to South Asia declined to $32 billion, reflecting a 31 per cent slide in inflows to India and a 14 per cent drop in Pakistan, the two largest recipients of FDI in the subcontinent. In India, the setback in attracting FDI was partly due to macroeconomic concerns, such as a high current account deficit and inflation, as well as to delays in the approval of large FDI projects;10 these factors are hindering the Indian Government’s efforts to boost investment, including the planned $1.5 trillion investment in infrastructure between 2007 and 2017. In contrast, inflows to Bangladesh increased by nearly 30 per cent to $913 million; the country is becoming a major low-cost production location in South Asia. Cross-border MAs in the region declined by about 8 per cent to $32 billion in 2010. MAs in manufacturing rose slightly while they declined by 8 per cent in services. Within manufacturing, the value of deals surged in industries such as chemical products ($6.0 billion), motor vehicles ($4.2 billion) and metal products ($1.6 billion), but dropped in industries such as food and beverages ($2.9 billion) and electronics ($920 million) (table D). Greenfield investment remained stable in 2010, after a significant slowdown due to widespread divestments and project cancellations in 2009 (annex table I.8). FDI inflows to East Asia should continue to grow in the near future, and those to South Asia are likely to
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 47 regain momentum. The competitiveness of South- East Asian countries in low-cost production will be strengthened, and further FDI increases can be expected. Prospects for inflows to the LDCs in the region are promising, thanks to intensified South- South economic cooperation, fortified by surging intraregional FDI. Indeed, countries in the region have made significant progress in their regional economic integration efforts (within Greater China, and between China and ASEAN, for example), which will translate into a more favourable investment climate for intraregional FDI flows. b. Rising FDI from developing Asia: emerging diversified industrial patterns FDI outflows from South, East and South- East Asia rose by 20 per cent to about $230 billion in 2010 (figure B), driven by increased outflows from China, Hong Kong (China), Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. Outflows from the region’s two largest FDI sources – Hong Kong (China) and China – increased by more than $10 billion each and reached historic highs of $76 billion and $68 billion, respectively. In 2010, China exceeded Japan for the first time in outward FDI, as well as in GDP. Asian companies actively acquired overseas assets through large deals covering a wide range of industries and countries (annex table I.7). As a result, cross-border MA purchases surged to nearly $94 billion in 2010, a record level, with China alone accounting for over 30 per cent of the total. MA purchases by India boomed, while FDI outflows were down by 8 per cent,11 perhaps reflecting the fact that a few large deals, such as the Bharti Airtel–Zain acquisition, discussed later, were not included in the official statistics. FDI outflows from the region have been rising rapidly since 2005, with only a modest setback in 2008 due to the global financial crisis (figure B). The region’s share in global FDI outflows jumped from below 10 per cent before 2008 to around 17 per cent in the past two years. The rise in FDI outflows has been driven by various corporate motives and strategies, and is a manifestation of new and diversified industrial patterns in recent years. FDI outflows in extractive industries. FDI in extractive industries (including oil and gas, metal mining, as well as other extractive activities) accounts for a significant part of total FDI from South, East and South-East Asia, with China, India, the Republic of Korea and Malaysia being the major investor countries. In terms of FDI stock, the share of extractive industries might seem unimpressive, but their share in FDI outflows from the region has been rising.12 For example, although Chinese companies have been actively acquiring mineral assets abroad and extractive industries has accounted for well above 20 per cent of FDI outflows from China in recent years, the share of these industries in China’s total FDI stock was nevertheless at a modest level of 16 per cent at the end of 2009. The number and value of recorded greenfield projects show a certain degree of fluctuation, while the number and value of cross-border MAs have kept rising (figure II.1). Due to the capital-intensive nature of projects in extractive industries, although the number of deals is small, the amount of total investment is very large. Indeed, during the period 2003-2010, about 560 cross-border MAs and 500 greenfield projects were recorded in extractive industries, but the total investment was $65 billion and $258 billion (19 per cent and 25 per cent of the total), respectively. The growth in FDI outflows in extractive industries has been driven by the rising demand for oil and gas and minerals in economies such as China and India, to support their rapid economic growth, industrialization and urbanization, as well as by the need of both governments and companies to guarantee a long-term, stable supply of natural resources against a background of rising commodity prices. Beyond that, a national energy security strategy has further reinforced the motivation of State-owned companies to acquire mineral assets abroad. The major oil and gas companies and mining companies from the region are traditional natural- resource acquirers (table II.3), but new investors have been emerging, including metal companies, conglomerates, such as CITIC (China) and Rising FDI outflows from developing Asia display new and diverse patterns in the primary sector, manufacturing and services.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development48 Reliance Group (India), and sovereign wealth funds, such as China Investment Corporation and Temasek Holdings (Singapore). In particular, metal companies have been increasingly involved in a vertical relationship along the value chain in order to gain access to upstream mineral assets, such as iron ore and copper. For instance, a number of steel companies in the region have invested in overseas iron ore production bases (table II.3); facing rising iron ore prices, they have been actively acquiring mines around the world in order to secure stable supplies. China’s position as a leading investor in extractive industries has been strengthened. The country overtook the United States to become the world’s largest energy user in 2010,13 and Chinese oil companies have continued their buying spree, spending $25 billion on overseas assets, accounting for around one-fifth of all global deal activities.14 Mining companies from the country spent much less – $4.5 billion – but are catching up, as highlighted by the $6.5 billion bid for Equinox Minerals (Australia and Canada) by Minmetals Corporation. As a result of such investments, China has become the leading foreign investor in Australia. FDI in extractive industries from developing Asia has targeted resource-rich countries all around the world (table II.3). Major investment locations include mineral-rich Australia and Canada in the developed world, and oil-abundant developing and transition economies, such as Iraq, Sudan and Uzbekistan. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be a major target, 15 but Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania (section B.3) have also appeared on the radar screens of Asian resource acquirers.16 FDI outflows in manufacturing. Outflows in manu­ facturing from South, East and South-East Asia have been mainly via greenfield investment. For the region as a whole, manufacturing accounts for about half of accumulated outward FDI through greenfield investment, but less than 15 per cent of the total amount of cross-border MA purchases. In 2010, the total value of deals in manufacturing was $9 billion, equivalent to about 9 per cent of all MA purchases. Major industrial targets of FDI outflows from East and South-East Asia are electronics, metal and metal products, motor vehicles, and chemicals and chemical products (figure II.2). As the global centre of electronics production, the region is also the major source of FDI in the electronics industry. Indeed, this industry accounts for more than one- quarter of both greenfield projects and cross-border MAs in the region, in value terms. The significance of electronics in outward FDI from the region is in line with the international competitiveness of Asian 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Value of MAs Value of greenfield projects Number of MAs Number of greenfield projects $billion Number Figure II.1. Number and value of extractive industry projects undertaken by firms based in South, East and South-East Asia, 2003–2010 Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 49 companies in the industry, particularly the contract manufacturers, which have become a dominant forceattheproductionstageoftheglobalelectronics value chain (chapter IV). For instance, Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) has become the world’s largest contract manufacturer, with about $60 billion sales and 1,000,000 employees in 2010.17 So far its production activities are concentrated in East Asia, most notably China. However, the company is establishing new production locations both within and outside the region, such as in South-East Asia (Malaysia and Viet Nam) and the Czech Republic; it is also considering a multi-billion investment in Brazil. Within China, Hon Hai is aggressively investing in large-scale production bases in inner land areas such as Chongqing, Henan, Sichuan and Shanxi. As illustrated by the case of electronics, greenfield investment in manufacturing from South, East and South-East Asia is concentrated within the region. Driven by market- and efficiency- seeking motivations, manufacturers from a wide range of industries have been investing mainly in neighbouring countries. However, as the industrial landscape in the world evolves, with rising production costs in some economies in the region and shifting corporate strategies, the pattern of outward FDI from the region has started to change. New production locations outside of the region have emerged. Although the scale of Asian FDI in manufacturing in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean remains small so far, the potential seems to be large. A new round of industrial restructuring and upgrading is taking place in China, and some Table II.3. Major foreign production locations of selected oil and gas, mining and steel companies based in South, East and South-East Asia, 2010 Major foreign production location Oil and gas companies Mining companies Steel companies CNPC (China) ONGC (India) KNOC (Republic of Korea) PETRONAS (Malaysia) Minmetal (China) MSC Group (Malaysia) Sinosteel (China) Tata Steel (India) Algeria X X Australia X X X X X Azerbaijan X X Cameroon X X Canada X X X X Chad X X Guinea X Indonesia X X X X X Iran, Islamic Rep. of X X Iraq X X X X Kazakhstan X X X Libyan Arab Jamahiriya X X X Mauritania X X Myanmar X X X Niger X Nigeria X X X Oman X X Peru X X X Philippines X X Russian Federation X X X Sudan X X Syrian Arab Republic X X United States X X X Thailand X X Uzbekistan X X Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of X X X Viet Nam X X X X Source: UNCTAD, based on company annual reports and UNCTAD’s database on cross-border MAs.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development50 low-end, export-oriented manufacturing activities have been shifting from coastal China to low income countries in South-East Asia and also Africa. In recent years, companies from major economies in the region, including China, India, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, have actively been taking over companies in developed countries, as highlighted by a number of mega-deals (table II.4). For Asian companies eager to tackle global markets, accumulate ownership advantages and enhance international competitiveness, strategic assets-seeking investment through cross-border MA is a particularly attractive choice. For example, Chinese companies are often attracted by various intangible assets, such as advanced, proprietary technologies, brand names and distribution channels (Buckley et al., 2007). MA opportunities in developed countries, triggered by industrial restructuring during and after the global financial crisis, and high profitability and abundant bank lending at home, also help boost outward FDI in manufacturing. Asian companies have been facing political obstacles in undertaking strategic assets-seeking FDI as they become important players in MA markets in developed countries. This is illustrated by the failed attempts by Huawei Technologies (China) to take over 3Com and 3Leaf in the United States in 2008 and 2010.18 How to clear such hurdles for Chinese investors became an important issue discussed at the third China-United States Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2011. FDI outflows in services. As the major target of international investment by Asian firms, services account for about 70 per cent of accumulated outward FDI through cross-border MA purchases. In contrast, the share is below 30 per cent for greenfield investment. The main target services for FDI outflows from South, East and South- East Asia are real estate, hotels and tourism, telecommunications, transportation, and financial services (figure II.3). During the past few years, although FDI outflows from the region in the services sector have declined, market-seeking MAs in specific service industries, such as hotels, health services and telecommunications, have been increasing, targeting economies both in and outside the region. In the meantime, FDI outflows in financial services have also rebounded since the global financial crisis. In 2010, the value of deals in finance more than doubled to $39 billion. Figure II.2. Outward FDI from South, East and South-East Asia in manufacturing, top 5 industries, cumulative 2003−2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: Figures in parenthesis show the share of the industry in the region’s total amount of investment. 0 60 120 180 Food, beverages and tobacco Chemicals and chemical products Motor vehicles others Electronics Metal and metal products Greenfield projects 0 9 18 27 Metal and metal products Food, beverages and tobacco Chemicals and chemical products Machinery and equipment Electronics Cross-border MAs (28%) (26%) (15%) (11%) (4%) (27%) (13%) (12%) (12%) (10%)
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 51 In telecommunications, the total value of deals surged to about $14 billion in 2010. Bharti Airtel (India) alone spent $10.7 billion to buy Zain’s (Kuwait) mobile operations in Africa (annex table I.7). Through this aggressive market-seeking deal, Bharti Airtel gained access to mobile markets in 15 African countries and became the world’s fifth largest mobile telecom operator, by number of subscribers. The Indian company aims to have 100 million subscribers and $5 billion annual revenue in Africa by 2013, growing from the baseline of 42 million subscribers and $3.6 billion revenue in 2010. However, it faces challenges to streamline its operations across the 15 different countries, and turn around loss-making assets.19 In the hotel industry, HNA (China) paid $620 million for a 20 per cent stake in NH Hotels (Spain) in May 2011, aiming at market expansion in Europe.20 Figure II.3. Outward FDI from South, East and South-East Asia in the services sector, top 5 industries, cumulative 2003−2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: Figures in parenthesis show the share of the industry in the region’s total amount of investment. Greenfield projects Cross-border MAs 0 60 120 180 Finance Communications Transportation Hotels and tourism Real estate (43%) (15%) (14%) (10%) (5%) 0 100 200 300 Wholesale and retail trade Business activities Utilities Transport, storage and communications Finance (52%) (28%) (7%) (4%) (3%) Table II.4. Selected MA mega-deals in manufacturing undertaken by firms from South, East and South-East Asia in developed countries, 2007−2011 Acquiring company Target company Industry Value ($ million) Year Tata Steel (India) Corus Group (United Kingdom) Steel 11 791 2007 Hindalco Industries (India) Novelis Inc. (United States) Aluminium 5 789 2007 Doosan (Republic of Korea) Ingersoll-Rand Co. (United States) Construction equipment 4 900 2007 Flextronics (Singapore) Solectron Corp. (United States) Electronics 3 675 2007 Tata Motors Ltd. (India) Jaguar Cars Ltd. (United Kingdom) Motor vehicles 2 300 2008 China National Agrochemical Elkem AS (Norway) Aluminium 2 179 2011 Wanhua Polyurethanes (China) BorsodChem Zrt (Hungary) Chemical products 1 701 2011 Essar Steel Holdings (India) Algoma Steel Inc. (Canada) Steel 1 603 2007 United Spirits (India) Whyte Mackay (United Kingdom) Food and beverages 1 176 2007 Geely Holding Group (China) Volvo (Sweden) Motor vehicles 1 500 2010 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development52 Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $10 billion Saudi Arabia .. $5.0 to $9.9 billion Turkey and Qatar .. $1.0 to $4.9 billion Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan, Iraq and Syrian Arab Republic Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Turkey Below $1.0 billion Bahrain, Palestinian Territory, Kuwait and Yemen Lebanon, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic and Palestinian Territory a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 West Asia 66.0 58.2 26.3 13.0 3.5 4.6 26.8 - 15.6 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 47.1 39.9 23.4 10.5 0.6 2.0 26.6 - 15.5 Turkey 8.4 9.1 1.6 1.8 2.8 2.1 - - Other West Asia 10.5 9.3 1.4 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.3 - 0.0 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 West Asia 487.6 575.2 151.1 161.0 19.8 21.0 6.7 6.9 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 274.9 314.9 119.2 127.0 14.2 14.6 5.7 5.7 Turkey 143.6 181.9 22.3 23.8 2.9 3.0 0.2 0.2 Other West Asia 69.1 78.4 9.5 10.2 2.7 3.3 0.9 1.0 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 3 543 4 617 26 843 -15 560 Primary 8 170 52 1 484 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 8 170 52 1 484 Manufacturing 199 2 126 142 8 Food, beverages and tobacco 91 32 113 - Textiles, clothing and leather - 32 - - Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel - 1 525 - - Chemicals and chemical products - 56 19 - 4 - 19 Non-metallic mineral products - 44 - - 20 Metals and metal products 110 410 33 - Electrical and electronic equipment 97 107 - - Services 3 336 2 321 26 648 -17 052 Electricity, gas and water 2 361 - 59 724 400 Construction 78 14 - - Trade 85 74 85 12 Hotels and restaurants - 331 - - 15 Transport, storage and communications 41 100 1 645 -10 736 Finance 550 1 637 24 510 -1 897 Business services 120 146 297 556 Public administration and defence - - - 612 -5 372 Health and social services 100 112 - - Community, social and personal service activities - - 38 - - Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 3 543 4 617 26 843 -15 560 Developed economies 3 174 2 357 21 451 -2 909 European Union 2 457 1 472 16 387 -1 037 United States 349 112 3 012 -2 333 Australia - 3 1 143 322 Japan - 343 146 - Developing economies 358 1 673 5 362 -12 691 Africa - 965 - 164 -10 653 North Africa - 965 - 164 47 Sub-Saharan Africa - - - -10 700 Latin America and the Caribbean - - 320 - Asia 358 708 5 206 -2 038 West Asia 201 105 201 105 Jordan - - 15 101 - Saudi Arabia 114 27 12 66 Turkey - - 118 49 South, East and South-East Asia 158 602 5 005 -2 143 Korea, Republic of - 122 49 -2 234 Singapore - 2 3 923 - 92 South-East Europe and the CIS - 21 30 40 Armenia - - 30 - Russian Federation - 21 - 40 3. West Asia a. Recent trends $billion 0 10 20 30 40 50 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Turkey Other West Asia Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 20 40 60 80 100 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 $billion % Other West Asia Turkey Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 53 FDI flows to West Asia in 2010 continued to be affected by the global economic crisis. They decreased by 12 per cent to $58 billion (table B and figure A), despite the steady economic recovery registered in 2010 in most of the economies of the region, underpinned by sizeable increases in government spending in oil-rich countries. Private investors however remained cautious. The estimated value of greenfield FDI projects fell in both 2009 (by 42 per cent) and 2010 (by 44 per cent). Cross-border MA sales – traditionally concentrated mainly in Turkey – whilst increasing by 30 per cent in 2010, remained at a very low level ($4.6 billion), due to the ending of the privatization process in this country. The fall in FDI inflows in 2010 varied by country. For example, they dropped by 12 per cent in Saudi Arabia, where a number of flagship mega- projects in the petrochemical industry involving joint ventures between the State-owned Saudi Aramco and foreign TNCs saw the withdrawal of foreign partners (ConocoPhillips from the Yanbu project), or were temporarily frozen (such as the Ras Tanura integrated project with Dow Chemical), or failed to attract enough foreign investment, and became domestic operations fully funded by Saudi Aramco (as for example the Jazan refinery). In Qatar, FDI inflows fell by 32 per cent as the last of four LNG Qatargas plants, that had bolstered FDI in 2009, was completed in 2010. In the United Arab Emirates FDI stayed at the same low level as in 2009, when it had plummeted to $4 billion due to the economic crisis. The 8 per cent rise in Turkey mainly resulted from a 40 per cent increase in real estate investment. FDI inflows are now expected to bottom out, as cross-border MAs have risen fivefold during the first five months of 2011 from the low value reg- istered during the corresponding period of 2010, due to a large acquisition in Turkey,21 and greenfield investments increased by 9 per cent in the first four months of 2011 over the corresponding period of 2010. However, concerns about the political stabil- ity of the region are likely to remain, holding back its recovery, as foreign companies will be reluctant to sink large sums of money into projects until the political outlook becomes clearer. This uncertainty is likely to affect both inflows and outflows, given the importance of both intra- regional investments and West Asia’s invest- ment in North Africa. For example in March 2011, AES (United States) withdrew from bidding for a power plant project in Saudi Arabia. Qatar Elec- tricity Company is evaluating the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic before proceeding with plans to build a plant there. In addition, the tel- ephone company Etisalat (United Arab Emirates) recently cancelled its $12 billion bid for Zain, a Kuwaiti rival, citing unrest as one of the reasons.22 Unrest is also affecting outward investment by putting pressure on governments and government-control- led entities to direct more investment into their own economies and to finance higher social spending to pre-empt or respond to popular discontent. Long- term prospects for outward investments are never- theless positive on the whole, as oil prices prospects suggest that funds available for investment abroad will continue to rise. b. Outward FDI strategies of West Asian TNCs FDI outflows from West Asia declined significantly for the second consecutive year (table B and figure B). They fell by 51 per cent in 2010 due to divestments by West Asian firms. The largest ones included the $10.7 billion sale by Zain Group (Kuwait) of its African operations to Bharti Airtel (India), and the $2.2 billion sale by International Petroleum Investment Company of a 70 per cent stake in Hyundai Oilbank in the Republic of Korea to Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. At the same time, the estimated value of West Asian greenfield projects abroad dropped by 52 per cent. Outward investment from West Asia is driven mainly by government-controlled entities that have been redirecting part of their investment to support their home economies, weakened by the global financial crisis. In addition, outward investment by the private sector has been affected by the tightening of lending by local banks to the private sector amid the financial crisis. State-owned entities from oil-rich countries have led West Asia’s outward FDI boom since the early 2000s. Their strategy is driven not only by financial returns, but also by economic and political objectives.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development54 The decline of outward FDI from West Asia since 2009 came after a period of notable increase that began in 2004, raising outward FDI stock from $25 billion in 2003 to $161 billion in 2010. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries accounted for 79 per cent of the total, led by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia which together accounted for 45 per cent of the region’s total outward FDI stock (annex table I.2). A number of factors explain this surge of outward FDI from rich Arab countries. These include the accumulation of considerable surpluses, thanks to the surge in oil prices; low interest rates and high volatility of equity markets, which diverted part of these surpluses from purely financial investment; and the adoption of a policy of economic diversification that includes investing abroad in industries perceived as strategic for the development and diversification of their national economies. The outward FDI boom was largely driven by State- owned enterprises. These companies accounted for 73 per cent of the amount of cross-border acquisitions by West Asian firms and for 47 per cent of the region’s greenfield outward FDI projects during the period 2004–2010. Companies from the United Arab Emirates have been by far the most active investors abroad. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait have been other significant outward investors (table II.5). Targeted regions and sectors. In terms of geographical distribution, developed countries have been the preferred destination of cross-border MA purchases by West Asian firms, attracting 68 per cent of net purchases during 2004-2010 (table II.6). In contrast, developing and transition economies are by far the main destination of West Asian greenfield FDI abroad: between 2003 and 2010, they attracted 93 per cent of the total, the main destinations being West Asia (31 per cent) and North Africa (29 per cent) (table II.7). In sectoral terms, 59 per cent of the estimated value of greenfield projects during 2003 and 2010 concerned real estate, located mainly in developing and transition economies (98 per cent), particularly in North Africa and West Asia. Other significant industries in West Asian outward greenfield projects are oil and gas (10 per cent) and hotels and tourism Table II.5. West Asia: cross-border MA purchases and greenfield outward FDI projects by ownership type and by home economy, cumulative 2004−2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Home economy Net cross-border MA purchases Greenfield FDI projectsa State ownedb Private owned Total State ownedb Private owned Total Value Per cent Value Per cent Bahrain 0.3 4.0 4.3 3 41.1 35.9 76.9 13 Iraq - - - - - 0.1 0.1 - Jordan - 0.3 0.3 - 0.2 4.4 4.6 1 Kuwait -6.5 6.6 0.1 - 18.0 38.0 56.0 10 Lebanon - 1.1 1.1 1 - 9.7 9.7 2 Oman 0.3 0.8 1.1 1 2.4 1.0 3.4 1 Palestinian territory - - - - - 0.3 0.3 - Qatar 21.8 1.5 23.2 18 24.5 5.2 29.7 5 Saudi Arabia 20.8 9.1 29.9 23 13.2 28.0 41.2 7 Syria - - - - - 0.4 0.4 - Turkey - 2.7 2.7 2 - 21.8 21.8 4 United Arab Emirates 56.5 8.7 65.2 51 169.6 157.5 327.1 57 Yemen - - - - - 0.1 0.1 - Total 93.1 34.7 127.8 100 268.9 302.4 571.3 100 Total, per cent 73 27 100 - 47 53 100 - Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a The value refers to the estimated amounts of capital investment. b Refers to TNCs in which the State has a controlling stake.
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 55 (6 per cent). In the case of cross-border MAs, purchases in developed countries have targeted companies that operate mainly in the chemicals, motor vehicle, extractive, transport and hotel industries, in that order (table II.6). In developing countries, the preferred purchase targets have been telecommunications, and electrical and electronic equipment in South, East and South-East Asia. Table II.6. West Asia: cross-border MA purchases by region/industry of destination, cumulative 2004−2010 (Millions of dollars and per cent) Sector / industry Developed economies Developing and transition economies World Total North America Europe Total West Asia South, East and South-East Asia Value Per cent Primary, of which 15 253 7 932 5 616 - 991 228 -1 922 14 261 11 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 14 910 7 932 5 616 - 991 228 -1 922 13 918 11 Secondary, of which 38 343 20 517 17 040 11 136 315 9 632 49 479 39 Chemicals and chemical products 18 005 13 826 4 178 3 887 - 44 3 128 21 892 17 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 14 954 1 800 13 154 2 136 82 2 054 17 090 13 Electrical and electronic equipment 3 220 3 216 3 4 070 97 3 972 7 289 6 Tertiary, of which 32 929 10 731 21 914 31 229 19 420 13 795 64 158 50 Post and communications 3 947 - 13 3 900 16 735 13 380 9 736 20 683 16 Transport 9 479 1 249 8 299 1 092 161 - 40 10 571 8 Business activities 7 209 1 677 5 459 2 377 947 1 515 9 586 7 Hotels and restaurants 8 928 7 349 1 550 580 0 352 9 508 7 Total 86 525 39 180 44 571 41 374 19 963 21 505 127 899 100 Total, per cent 68 31 35 32 16 17 100 - Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Table II.7. West Asia: greenfield outward FDI projects by region/industry of destination, cumulative 2004−2010 (Millions of dollars and per cent) Sector / industry Developed economies Developing and transition economies World Total North America Europe Total West Asia North Africa South, East and South- East Asia Value Per cent Primary, of which 3 016 38 2 177 59 698 11 018 11 948 23 073 62 713 10.7 Coal, oil and natural gas 2 478 22 1 657 56 773 10 769 11 345 21 497 59 251 10.1 Secondary, of which 15 921 3 158 12 314 66 308 19 819 10 922 26 349 82 229 14.0 Metals 103 10 93 22 112 6 603 6 563 7 551 22 216 3.8 Chemicals 1 342 5 971 14 317 828 292 11 711 15 658 2.7 Non-metallic minerals 1 545 2 1 543 10 162 4 213 505 3 434 11 707 2.0 Food, beverages and tobacco 448 18 430 9 206 5 026 2 054 981 9 655 1.6 Plastics 6 712 88 6 621 633 185 37 288 7 345 1.3 Tertiary, of which 20 327 3 408 16 397 421 253 149 237 148 309 60 130 441 580 75.3 Real estate 6 297 2 272 4 025 338 395 118 449 132 424 40 581 344 692 58.8 Hotels and tourism 6 757 - 6 687 26 219 16 071 3 487 3 582 32 976 5.6 Communications 1 013 105 908 18 934 3 170 3 346 3 938 19 947 3.4 Transportation 3 964 370 3 493 13 942 509 2 311 7 238 17 906 3.1 Leisure and entertainment 580 324 256 11 480 5 444 5 746 223 12 060 2.1 Total 39 264 6 604 30 888 547 258 180 074 171 179 109 552 586 522 100 Total, per cent 7 1 5 93 31 29 19 100 - Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: The value refers to the estimated amounts of capital investments.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development56 The most important investors and their strategy. Investors from West Asia have traditionally played a passive role, focusing on liquidity and safety rather than return on investments. However, with access to increasing funding derived from high commodity prices, and with higher levels of managerial skill, they have become increasingly active in direct acquisitions and greenfield FDI projects that entail a long-term relationship and involvement in management. West Asia’s outward investment flows are concentrated in a small number of companies – 10 companies accounted for 83 per cent of cross- border MA purchases between 2004 and 2010. Of these, only three undertake specific activities (such as petrochemicals, telecom, construction), the others are holding groups or investment companies. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates is home to half of them. All but two of these companies are owned by or strongly related to the State. Most of them were created in the 2000s (table II.8). The FDI strategies of these State-owned investors are generally linked to the economic and political objectives of their respective governments. They aim not only at achieving revenue maximization and diversification, but also at building international partnerships and strategic alliances that generally support economic and political objectives. It is also common that the State-owned entities use foreign alliances and partnerships built through outward FDI as a tool to attract FDI and enhance its impact on the host economy. The example of two State- owned entities or SWFs established during the 2000s - the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and Mubadala - illustrates this new trend. Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) has been making a number of high-profile international direct investments in the financial services, automotive, aerospace and construction industries, and in real estate.23 These include the acquisition of 17 per cent of the voting rights in Volkswagen, which was accompanied by a memorandum of understanding seeking to establish RD collaboration, testing and training facilities in Doha; the acquisition of the German construction firm Hochtief in 2010, aimed at facilitating the transfer of advanced technology and know-how to Qatar;24 and the acquisition of an 8 per cent share in the French public works company Vinci in 2009 (becoming the top shareholder after its employees), which reinforced its partnership with this company, and widened the scope of Vinci’s activities in Qatar.25 Mubadala aims to develop world-leading clusters of expertise in strategically important sectors, and ac- cordingly has created nine business units. Amongst them, Mubadala Aerospace aims at turning Abu Dhabi into a global aerospace hub. Mubadala In- dustry is pursuing investment and development opportunities in capital, energy and intellectual property-intensive sectors, and Mubadala Informa- tion Communications Technology is creating a portfolio of global ICT assets to develop industry- leading facilities at home and in the region. Other projects include the energy, healthcare, real estate, infrastructure and services sectors. For example, in recent years, Mubadala has acquired stakes in the aircraft manufacturing company Piaggio Aero (Italy), the semiconductor company Advanced Micro De- vices (United States) , the provider of technical so- lutions to airlines SR Technics (United States), the oil and gas company Pearl Energy (Singapore), the car manufacturer Ferrari (Italy), and the global in- vestment firm Carlyle Group (United States). It has also developed joint ventures and funds with nota- ble investors and industry leaders such as Credit Suisse and General Electric. 26 Given the high levels of their foreign exchange reserves and the relatively small sizes of their respective economies, GCC countries can afford to spend large amounts of foreign currency on overseas investments. It is important, however, that they assess the performance and effectiveness of their strategy of using outward FDI as an instrument for economic development. The economic diversification policies of GCC coun- tries has been pursued by a dual strategy. In sec- tors such as construction and real estate, finance, telecommunications, and transport, Gulf countries have developed a certain level of expertise at home that has allowed them to engage in outward direct investment in these fields. This outward FDI has aimed mainly at building a presence in other Arab countries in West Asia and North Africa to compen- sate for the small size of their domestic economies. Lacking strong proprietary assets, West Asian firms have expanded to neighbouring countries where
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 57 Table II.8. The top 10 West Asian companies, ranked by the total value of cross-border MA purchases, cumulative 2004–2010 (Millions of dollars) Company name Home country Cross- border MA purchasesa Activity Creation date Ownership Information about the company Dubai World United Arab Emirates 18 282 Holding company 2006 State-owned Owned by the Government of Dubai. Its mandate is to manage and supervise a portfolio of businesses and projects for the Dubai Government across a wide range of industries. Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) Qatar 14 293 SWF 2005 State-owned Its mandate is to diversify the Qatari national economy. SABIC Saudi Arabia 12 411 Petrochemical company 1976 State-owned Created in 1976, it is 70% State-owned. It produces chemicals, fertilizers, plastics and metals. International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) United Arab Emirates 12 255 Energy investment fund 1984 State-owned Owned by the Government of Abu Dhabi with a mandate to invest in the energy sector across the globe. Dubai Holding United Arab Emirates 10 754 Holding company 2004 State-owned 99.67% owned by the ruler of Dubai. Its mandate is to consolidate the various large scale infrastructure and investment projects in Dubai that were created over the past five years as well as to identify and execute future major projects. Arcapita Bahrain 10 163 Islamic Investment Bank 2005 Private It acquires controlling interests in foreign companies with the aim of providing investments with strategic and financial support when necessary, and to exit at the right time and price. TAQA United Arab Emirates 9 848 Energy investment company 2005 State-owned 51% owned by ADWEA, wholly owned by the Abu Dhabi Government. Its mandate is to own, invest in and/or operate companies engaged in the oil and gas, power generation, water, energy and infrastructure sectors, in addition to making other investments as considered appropriate to meet its objectives. Mubadala United Arab Emirates 7 808 Investment Company 2002 State-owned Owned by the Government of Abu Dhabi. Its mandate is to facilitate the diversification of Abu Dhabi’s economy. STC Saudi Arabia 5 900 Telecom company 1998 State-owned 70% State-owned. It is Saudi Arabia’s largest telecom service provider and the only integrated service provider. Saudi Oger Saudi Arabia 4 215 Construction and infrastructure 1978 Private Founded as a construction company, it covers several activities including telecommunication, real estate development, printing, utilities and IT services. Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Estimated value. Includes only deals involving the acquisition of at least 10 per cent of the shares. they took advantage of their financial capacities and cultural proximity, which contributed to increasing their expertise and improving their competitiveness. In investing in developed countries and Asian emerging economies, consisting mainly in using MAs, the region has a different strategy to aim at enhancing capabilities in industries existing at home - such as finance, hotels and petrochemicals - but also and increasingly to develop capabilities in industries not actually present at home, such as motor vehicles, aerospace, alternative energies and electronics. This approach differs from that of other countries, which have generally first developed a certain level of capacity at home, before engaging in outward direct investment. It is generally through the medium of exchanges between parent companies and foreign affiliates - such as transfer of technological knowledge, movement of employees and intra-firm trade - that outward FDI can become a source of improved competitiveness at home. In the absence of a parent company that performs related activities at home, a question is raised about the nature of the channels through which cross-border purchases of enterprises can contribute to the development and diversification of the region's economies.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development58 Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $10 billion Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Mexico, Chile and Cayman Islands British Virgin Islands, Mexico and Brazil $5.0 to $9.9 billion Peru, Colombia and Argentina Chile, Cayman Islands and Colombia $1.0 to $4.9 billion Panama, Uruguay, Dominican Republic and Costa Rica Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Panama $0.1 to $0.9 billion Bahamas, Honduras, Guatemala, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Jamaica, Guyana, Suriname, Ecuador, Aruba, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Netherlands Antilles and Antigua and Barbuda Argentina and Peru Less than $0.1 billion Saint Lucia, Belize, Turks and Caicos Islands, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, Cuba, Barbados, El Salvador, Dominica, Anguilla, Montserrat and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Jamaica, Guatemala, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Turks and Caicos Islands, Aruba, Barbados, Belize, Honduras, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Plurinational State of Bolivia a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Latin America and the Caribbean 141.0 159.2 45.5 76.3 - 4.4 29.5 3.7 15.7 South America 55.3 86.5 4.1 30.3 - 5.3 18.0 3.1 11.7 Central America 20.5 24.6 9.4 16.8 0.2 8.9 3.4 3.3 Caribbean 65.2 48.1 32.1 29.2 0.8 2.6 - 2.8 0.7 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Latin America and the Caribbean 1 507.7 1 722.3 664.4 732.8 77.7 91.4 7.7 8.8 South America 787.8 899.5 272.4 307.5 63.0 77.7 7.2 7.4 Central America 352.6 407.7 94.5 98.6 12.1 10.9 0.1 0.9 Caribbean 367.3 415.1 297.5 326.7 2.6 2.8 0.5 0.5 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total -4 358 29 481 3 740 15 710 Primary -2 327 11 692 4 689 2 112 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 43 423 - 1 96 Mining, quarrying and petroleum -2 370 11 269 4 690 2 016 Manufacturing -2 768 8 092 859 4 962 Food, beverages and tobacco 404 6 771 3 224 2 834 Wood and wood products 61 - 115 - - 130 Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel - 57 - 947 - Chemicals and chemical products 61 -1 221 63 373 Non-metallic mineral products 125 695 -1 337 990 Metals and metal products -3 219 82 5 672 Electrical and electronic equipment - 90 1 742 - 188 - Motor vehicles and other transport equipment - 134 72 - 150 Services 737 9 697 -1 808 8 637 Electricity, gas and water -2 642 409 - 103 1 227 Construction - 12 18 - 12 49 Trade 1 575 1 410 - 14 762 Transport, storage and communications 3 421 2 962 120 164 Finance -2 353 1 565 -2 113 4 105 Business services 735 2 437 379 1 070 Education 18 503 - - Community, social and personal service activities 1 217 - 1 200 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World -4 358 29 481 3 740 15 710 Developed economies -6 815 3 581 3 475 11 544 European Union -3 023 946 -1 233 2 534 United States - 797 - 512 5 603 5 225 Japan - 89 4 508 561 125 Developing economies 1 850 24 970 420 4 313 Africa 395 - 75 - 70 - 84 Latin America and the Caribbean 116 5 015 116 5 015 South America 2 288 4 086 - 62 2 062 Brazil 1 659 386 - 90 257 Colombia 211 3 116 796 182 Central America 16 747 177 2 839 Mexico 16 761 10 193 Caribbean -2 188 182 2 115 Asia 1 338 19 935 374 - 618 West Asia 320 - - - South, East and South-East Asia 1 018 19 935 374 - 618 China 133 12 915 374 281 Korea, Republic of 893 720 161 - India - 5 460 64 - 735 South-East Europe and the CIS - - 3 - 156 - 147 Russian Federation - - 3 - 159 - 156 4. Latin America and the Caribbean a. Recent trends $billion 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 South AmericaCentral AmericaCaribbean 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Caribbean Central America South America FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation $billion % 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 59 FDI inflows to Latin America and the Caribbean rose 13 per cent to $159 billion in 2010 (table B), following a 32 per cent decline in 2009. However, they remained below their 2008 level (figure A). The strongest increase was in South America, where FDI rose by 56 per cent to $86 billion, with Brazil alone accounting for 56 per cent of this amount. Inflows to Central America increased by 20 per cent to $25 billion, of which Mexico attracted $19 billion. Those to the Caribbean decreased by 26 per cent, to $48 billion, of which offshore financial centres accounted for 95 per cent. The FDI rebound in 2010 was due mainly to the strong rise in cross-border MAs. These rose from negative values (because of divestment) in 2009 to $29 billion in 2010 (tables D and E), the highest level since 2000. This shows a renewed interest by foreign firms in the acquisition of Latin American enterprises, after a decade of sluggish cross- border MA activities in the region. On the other hand, the estimated value of greenfield projects in 2010 increased by 8 per cent - after a 13 per cent decrease in 2009 - sustaining the recovery of FDI inflows from the impact of the global financial crisis. Inanunprecedentedsurgeofinvestment,developing Asian countries (mostly China and India) became the main acquirers of Latin American and Caribbean firms in 2010 (see section 4.b). Their acquisitions totalled $20 billion or 68 per cent of the total. The share of developed countries was only 12 per cent, and that of Latin America and the Caribbean 17 per cent. In the case of greenfield investment, however, developed countries were responsible for 79 per cent of the total amount of projects in 2010, while Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 10 per cent and developing Asia for 9 per cent. The sectoral breakdown in 2010 differs by entry mode. Cross-border MA predominantly concerned the primary sector (40 per cent of total amount), while greenfield projects were mostly in the manufacturing sector (58 per cent of total estimated amounts), especially the metal industry. All the main recipient countries, except for Colombia, registered significant increases in FDI inflows in 2010. The highest growth (87 per cent) occurred in Brazil and resulted from the doubling of equity capital, mainly in the primary sector, but also in manufacturing (16 per cent). In Mexico (22 per cent) and Chile (17 per cent), the increases were due to the growth of cross-border MA sales, while the 58 per cent growth in Argentina stemmed from intra-company loans. The decrease of FDI to Colombia (down 5 per cent) was due mainly to a 32 per cent decrease in FDI into metal mining . FDI inflows are expected to increase in 2011, due to a jump of FDI inflows to Brazil, the main recipient country, which absorbed 30 per cent of the region’s total FDI inflows in 2010. Preliminary data show that in the first four months of 2011, FDI into Brazil amounted to $23 billion, a threefold increase over the corresponding period of 2010. This resulted from a strong increase in both equity capital (an increase of 147 per cent to $18 billion) and intra-company loans (15-fold increase to $5 billion). Greenfield FDI projects into the region also registered a significant increase in the four first months of 2011: their estimated value was 94 per cent above the corresponding period of the previous year. After plummeting in 2009, FDI outflows from Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 67 per cent to $76 billion in 2010 (table B). Strong increases were registered in the region’s two main outward investor countries: Mexico and Brazil. In the latter, outflows jumped from a large negative value in 2009 (−$10 billion) to $11.5 billion in 2010, and they increased by 104 per cent in Mexico. This rise in outward FDI − the strongest among the world’s economic regions − is mainly due to the surge in cross-border MA purchases, which increased more than fourfold to $15.7 billion (tables D and E). Greenfield projects abroad also increased (23 per cent) in 2010, after declining by 19 per cent in 2009. The region’s TNCs, bolstered by strong economic growth at home, have increased their investments abroad, in particular in developed countries (table E), where investment opportunities have arisen in the aftermath of the crisis. Brazilian companies such as Vale, Gerdau, Camargo Correa, Votorantim, Petrobras and Braskem have made acquisitions in the iron ore, steel, food, cement, chemical, and petroleum-refining industries in developed
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development60 countries. Mexican firms such as Grupo Televisa, Sigma Alimentos, Metalsa and Inmobiliaria Carso purchased firms in the United States in industries such as media, food, motor vehicles and services. There have been also some important intraregional acquisitions (table E), the most significant being the $1.9 billion purchase by Grupo Aval (Colombia) of BAC Credomatic, a Panamanian affiliate of General Electric. While 73 per cent of the region’s cross-border MA purchases were concentrated in developed countries in 2010 (table E), an estimated 75 per cent of outward greenfield projects were located in developing countries. Of these, 78 per cent targeted Latin America and the Caribbean, 13 per cent South, East and South-East Asia, and 5 per cent Africa. FDI from the region is expected to decrease in 2011, as preliminary data for the first four months of 2011 show high negative values for FDI outflows from Brazil (minus $9 billion). This is the result of a more than sevenfold increase (to $14 billion) in repayment of loans (intra-company loans) from foreign affiliates to their parent company in Brazil. Outflows from Mexico also decreased in 2011, accounting in the first quarter of 2011 for only one-fifth of their value in the same period of 2010. b. Developing country TNCs' inroads into Latin America Direct investment by TNCs from developing countries has been on the rise in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 2000s. This follows decades during which TNCs based in developed countries were the most dynamic foreign source of direct investment into the region. This trend is obvious in the region’s cross-border MA market, where the average amount of annual purchases by developing economy-based TNCs increased from $1.3 billion in 1991–2000 to $5.6 billion in 2001–2010, which brought their share in the total from 8 to 43 per cent. TNCs based in Latin America and Asia are the main investors from developing regions.27 At the intraregional level, both cross-border MAs and greenfield FDI projects followed a rising trend during the 2000s, reflecting the growing strength of Latin American firms, bolstered by the region’s strong economic recovery. Greenfield FDI projects reached an estimated $11.6 billion in 2010 (up from $4.5 billion in 2003), and their share in the total grew from 5 per cent in 2003 to 10 per cent in 2010. In the case of cross-border MAs, the share of intraregional deals in the total increased considerably from the early 2000s: during the period 1995–2002, Latin American companies were the origin of only 5 per cent of the total amount of cross-border MA sales in the region; this share rose to 36 per cent during the period 2003–2010 (table II.9). This increase was favoured by a relative retrenchment of developed country-based TNCs (see figure II.4), that resulted from a number of factors, among which were the region’s economic stagnation between 1998 and 2003, the rise of regulatory problems with the privatized companies involving investment from developed country TNCs, and the dot com crisis in the 2000s that affected developed country TNCs’ financial capacities. The recent global financial crisis had a strong impact on the region’s cross-border MA market, including on intraregional acquisitions that fell to zero in value in 2008 and 2009, though they resumed growth in 2010 (figure II.4). The surge of developing Asian TNCs in the Latin American and the Caribbean cross-border MA market in 2010. Firms based in developing Asia had been only marginal investors in the region’s cross-border MA market until 2010, their FDI activity being undertaken mainly through greenfield FDI projects, where their share represented 10 per cent of the region’s total during 2003–2010.28 In 2010, however, the region’s cross-border MA market witnessed a notable and unprecedented surge of investment by developing Asian TNCs, following their near-inactivity of previous years. Acquisitions by these companies jumped to $20 billion in 2010, accounting for 68 per cent of the total, and more than three times their total accumulated acquisitions in the region over the previous two decades. Most of these acquisitions were undertaken by Chinese enterprises (44 per cent), and took Intraregional FDI gained strength during the 2000s, and investments in resource- seeking activities from developing Asia surged in 2010.
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 61 place in South America in oil and gas and energy activities. Two Chinese oil and gas companies – China Petrochemical Corp. (Sinopec) and CNOOC – made big upstream acquisitions in Argentina and Brazil in 2010 and 2011 that totalled $12.6 billion (annex table I.7). In addition, China’s State Grid Corporation acquired seven Brazilian power transmission companies for $1.7 billion. India was also the source of significant resource-seeking acquisitions in the region, especially in the oil and Table II.9. Latin America and the Caribbean: cross-border MAs by main acquiring regions and countries and main targeted industries, 2003−2010 (Per cent) Sector/industry - Investing country World Developed economies Developing economies Latin America and the Caribbean Developing Asia Total Mexico Brazil Total China Hong Kong (China) India Total sectors 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Primary 18.7 -11.4 44.4 11.1 - 33.1 81.0 81.3 95.1 Mining of metal ores 15.4 29.0 4.7 4.7 - 10.4 6.6 5.9 - Petroleum 1.3 -43.3 37.6 3.7 - 16.0 72.5 74.6 89.3 Manufacturing 24.3 32.6 18.0 24.7 13.4 48.3 9.2 12.4 3.8 Food, beverages and tobacco 14.3 26.8 4.6 7.5 7.0 10.8 1.4 0.8 3.6 Metal and metal products 3.0 3.4 2.8 5.5 -0.3 15.3 0.1 0.1 - Services 57.0 79.8 37.6 64.1 86.6 18.6 9.9 6.3 1.0 Finance 20.0 37.5 6.3 9.1 - 12.8 2.9 5.1 - Post and communications 13.4 10.1 16.1 30.8 80.1 - 1.8 - - Business activities 10.5 22.0 1.2 0.7 0.1 - 0.5 0.7 0.3 Total sectors, in $billion 99.6 43.9 54.0 26.8 10.1 7.6 26.6 15.9 6.8 Share in total world 100 44 54 27 10 8 27 16 7 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Note: Africa and South-East Europe and the CIS are not shown in this table because of the small amounts. Figure II.4. Latin America and the Caribbean: cross-border MA sales by main acquiring regions, 1993–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MAs database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Note: Africa and South-East Europe and the CIS are not represented in this figure because of the small amounts involved. -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Developed countries Latin America and the Caribbean South, East and South-East Asia
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development62 gas industry in Venezuela and in the sugar cane industry in Brazil.29 TNCs from developing Asia accounted for one- tenth of the total estimated value of greenfield FDI projects in the region during 2003–2010, with China and Hong Kong (China) alone the source of 47 per cent of the projects from developing Asian countries. As with their MA activities, resources were the main attraction, with metals and oil and gas the underlying reason for most of the projects (table II.10). The strong increase in resource-seeking FDI from developing Asia into South America in 2010–2011 raises concerns by some countries in the region about the trade patterns, with South America exporting mostly commodities and importing manufactured goods.30 Table II.10. Greenfield FDI projects by main investing regions and countries and main targeted industries, 2003–2010 (Per cent) Sector/industry Investing country World Developed economies Developing economies Latin America and the Caribbean Developing Asia Total Brazil Chile Mexico Total China Hong Kong (China) India Korea, Rep. of Total sectors 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Primary 25 24 28 24 29 12 4 26 23 41 6 Coal, oil and natural gas 19 17 24 19 18 10 4 25 23 35 6 Manufacturing 58 58 56 54 68 63 29 60 65 53 91 Metals 27 27 27 14 25 - 10 36 50 33 37 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 9 10 8 1 1 - - 12 11 14 18 Automotive OEM 7 7 7 1 - - - 11 11 14 17 Food, beverages and tobacco 5 6 3 6 1 23 6 1 2 - - Chemicals and chemical products 4 4 3 4 - 17 3 2 - 5 2 Services 18 18 16 22 4 25 67 14 12 7 3 Communications 5 6 4 10 - 1 56 1 1 - 1 Business activities 4 4 3 4 - 17 3 2 - 5 2 Transportation 3 3 4 1 2 - - 7 8 - - Total sectors, in $ billion 708 566 142 55 25 8 6 74 35 13 12 Share in total world 100 80 20 8 4 1 1 10 5 2 2 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: The values refer to estimated amounts of capital investments.
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 63 5. South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $5.0 billion Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine Russian Federation and Kazakhstan $1.0 to $4.9 billion Turkmenistan, Belarus, Serbia and Albania .. $0.5 to $0.9 billion Uzbekistan, Montenegro, Croatia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Ukraine Below $0.5 billion The FYR of Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Tajikistan Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Montenegro, Armenia, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, the FYR of Macedonia, Albania and Croatia a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 South-East Europe and the CIS 71.6 68.2 48.8 60.6 7.1 4.3 7.4 9.7 South-East Europe 7.8 4.1 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 - 0.2 0.3 CIS 63.8 64.1 47.4 60.5 6.6 4.1 7.6 9.4 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 South-East Europe and the CIS 626.6 687.8 337.7 472.9 58.7 72.3 10.8 17.4 South-East Europe 77.3 76.4 11.2 8.8 2.6 2.8 0.1 0.3 CIS 549.4 611.4 326.5 464.1 56.1 69.5 10.7 17.2 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 7 125 4 321 7 432 9 698 Primary 5 037 - 85 7 897 1 965 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 5 033 - 85 7 897 1 965 Manufacturing 522 1 857 1 032 270 Food, beverages and tobacco 175 1 366 - 325 Wood and wood products - 51 - 126 Publishing and printing 12 20 - - Chemicals and chemical products 52 - 7 - - 7 Non-metallic mineral products - 50 - - Metals and metal products 7 12 1 015 - 174 Machinery and equipment 7 - 17 - Electrical and electronic equipment - 350 - - Precision instruments - 14 - - Services 1 565 2 549 -1 497 7 463 Electricity, gas and water 259 625 4 - Construction 3 6 - 519 Trade 716 330 - 13 Hotels and restaurants - 15 8 - Transport, storage and communications 111 1 020 - 5 077 Finance 356 543 590 1 248 Business services 120 185 2 7 Public administration and defence - - -2 101 599 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 7 125 4 321 7 432 9 698 Developed economies 5 336 -3 076 7 616 3 464 European Union 4 320 2 202 6 536 1 888 United States 265 119 1 072 205 Japan 174 - - - Developing economies 1 779 325 13 69 Africa 200 388 - 51 Latin America and the Caribbean - 156 - 147 - - 3 South America - 78 - - - 3 Caribbean - 82 - 156 - - Asia 1 736 84 13 21 West Asia 30 40 - 21 South, East and South-East Asia 1 706 44 13 - China 3 843 - 5 - Korea, Republic of 426 20 - - India - 24 8 - Indonesia -2 604 - - - South-East Europe and the CIS - 197 6 166 - 197 6 166 South-East Europe - 167 - - 157 4 CIS - 30 6 166 - 40 6 163 Russian Federation - 30 6 152 - - Ukraine - 15 158 5 519 Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 $billion Commonwealth of Independent States South-East Europe 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 $billion % Commonwealth of Independent States South-East Europe FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development64 In 2010, FDI inflows to South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)31 declined by 5 per cent (to $68 billion), after falling more than 40 per cent in 2009 (figure A and table B). FDI flows to the CIS rose marginally by less than 1 per cent, thanks to favourable commodity prices, economic recovery and improving stock markets. In the Russian Federation, FDI flows rose by 13 per cent (to $41 billion) (table A). Foreign investors continue to be attracted to the fast-growing local consumer market. The acquisition of the Russian soft drinks brand Wimm-Bill-Dann by PepsiCo for $3.8 billion was seen as a sign of investor confidence in the country. However, some foreign banks, such as Morgan Stanley and Spain’s Santander, divested or downsized their operations.32 FDI flows to Ukraine increased by 35 per cent, due to better macroeconomic conditions and the revival of cross-border acquisitions by Russian companies. FDI inflows declined in Kazakhstan in 2010, even though it remained the second largest recipient in the subregion. In contrast to the CIS, FDI flows to South-East Europe fell, for the third consecutive year (by 47 per cent in 2010), partly as a result of the sluggishness of investment from EU countries (traditionally the dominant source of FDI in this subregion). In particular, Greece, which used to be a gateway or conduit for foreign investors into South-East Europe, ceased to be an entry point as its domestic economic crisis worsened. Another reason for the sluggishness of FDI is structural: investors rarely set up export-oriented projects in the subregion, which has been excluded from international production networks – the engine of recovery in 2010. FDI flows to Croatia and Serbia declined sharply in 2010, while Albania saw its FDI rise to more than $1 billion for the first time ever, making it the second- largest FDI recipient country in the subregion after Serbia (table A). Cross-border MA sales in the region declined by 39 per cent in 2010 (tables D and E), whereas the value of greenfield projects declined by 4 per cent. A large increase in intraregional MA purchases – mainly from the Russian Federation – could not compensate for the slump in MA activity by developed country firms, whose net value (new MAs less divested projects) became negative for the first time ever, due to the divestment by Telenor (Norway) of ZAO Kyivstar GSM (Ukraine) to the Russian firm VimpelCom ($5.5 billion, annex table I.7). Developed countries remained the largest source of greenfield projects in the transition economies (more than two-thirds), despite a continued rise in the share of developing countries. In both greenfield and MA projects, the share of manufacturing continued to rise in 2010 at the expense of the primary and services sectors, especially in “non-strategic” industries, which are open to foreign investors (e.g. food and beverages, motors vehicles and chemicals). Outward FDI flows rose by 24 per cent in 2010 to a record $61 billion (table B), thanks to better cash flows of TNCs located in the region, higher commodity prices, economic recovery and strong support by the State.33 Most of the outward FDI projects, as in past years, were carried out by Russian TNCs, followed by those from Kazakhstan. Both cross-border MA purchases and greenfield projects rose in 2010. Transition-economy firms increased their purchases within the region and in developing countries in 2010 (section 5.b). More than 60 per cent - a record share - of greenfield investment projects by transition-economy firms took place in developing countries. Prospects for inward FDI are positive. FDI inflows are expected to increase in 2011 on the back of a more investor-friendly environment, the anticipated WTO accession of the Russian Federation, and a new round of privatizations in the major host countries of the region (the Russian Federation and Ukraine).34 Outward FDI is expected to pick up in 2011–2013, due to stronger commodity prices and economic recovery in countries with large natural resources. In the first five months of 2011, the cross-border MA purchases of the region increased by more than seven times compared with the same period in 2010.
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 65 b. East−South interregional FDI: trends and prospects The landscape of in- ternational investment has gained an impor- tant new dimension in recent years with the expansion of FDI from developing and transi- tion economies. Rapid economic growth, high commodity prices and liberalization have been feeding a boom in outward investment from these economies. This reached a record level of $388 billion in 2010, representing almost 30 per cent of world outflows (chapter I). Ten years ago, that share was only 11 per cent. Although the bulk of South–South FDI (including the flows to and from transition economies) is intra- regional, TNCs based in developing and transitions economies have increasingly ventured into each other’s markets. Trends Bilateral FDI flows between developing and transition economies are relatively small. However, they have grown rapidly during the past decade and this process is expected to continue to gain momentum. Increasingly, transition-economy TNCs are finding their way to Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, in 2010, the share of developing countries in greenfield investment projects from transition economies rose to 60 per cent, up from only 30 per cent in 2004 (figure II.5). Similarly, South to East FDI has been on the rise: developing countries' share in transition economies' greenfield investment projects rose from 9 per cent in 2004 to 21 per cent in 2010. Central Asian countries have been increasingly targeted by neighbouring Chinese TNCs (box II.2). The growing demand for energy in developing countries, especially China and India, has prompted TNCs from these countries to actively pursue joint ventures and other forms of collaboration in resource-rich transition economies. For example, CNPC (China) formed a joint-venture with Rosneft (Russian Federation) to develop oil extraction projects in the Russian Federation and downstream operations in China. In another large project, India’s State-owned ONGC Videsh participated in the development of the Sakhalin I oil and gas exploration project. In contrast to TNCs from developing countries, the main aim of transition-economy TNCs is not simply to ensure the supply of raw materials to their home countries, but rather to expand their control over Bilateral FDI between transition and developing economies is gaining momentum, reflecting the priorities and strategies of their governments. Figure II.5. Cross-border MAs and greenfield FDI projects undertaken in developing countries by transition economy TNCs, 2004–2010 (Billions of dollars and as a per cent of total) Source: UNCTAD. Note: Data for value of greenfield FDI projects refer to estimated amounts of capital investment. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % MA value Greenfield value Share in total total cross-border MAs by transition economy TNCs Share in total greenfield investment projects by transition economy TNCs $billion
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development66 the value chain of their natural resources, to build sustainable competitive advantages vis-à-vis other firms, and to strengthen their market positions in key developing countries. East–South investment links are concentrated in a handful of countries. While Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation are the most important targets of developing-country investors, China and Turkey are the most popular destinations for FDI from transition economies (figure II.6). Africa also has attracted important investment flows from the Russian Federation (box II.3). As for the host country pattern, there is a limited number of home countries in South to East bilateral investments. While the Russian Federation is the dominant transition-economy investor in developing countries, Turkey, China, India and the Republic of Korea are major investors in transition economies. In 2009, more than one- third of Turkey’s outward FDI stock was located in Box II.2. China’s rising investment in Central Asia China initiated its investment in Central Asia through the signing in April 1996 of general economic and security agreements with the Central Asian economies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Since then, Chinese investment in the subregion has increased dramatically. Chinese firms built two oil and gas pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China (inaugurated in 2006 and 2009, respectively), laying the ground for large- scale exploration and development of oil and gas fields. In Turkmenistan, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the only foreign company possessing an onshore contract for oil and gas exploration. In Kazakhstan, the China Investment Corporation bought a 14.5 per cent stake in KazMunaiGas, and CNPC bought a 49 per cent share of Mangistaumunaigaz for $2.6 billion, both in 2009. In the electricity industry, China’s Tebian Electric Apparatus is building power transmission lines and substations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In an offsetting deal, this company has acquired the right to extract gold, silver, copper and tungsten in the Pamir Mountains of Tajikistan. Another company, XD Group, is modernizing the electricity system in the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.a In nuclear energy, CNPC formed a joint venture with Kazakhstan’s State-owned Kazatomprom to invest in uranium production in Kazakhstan, and an affiliate of the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation is in a joint venture to develop black-shale uranium in the Navoi Province of Uzbekistan. Source: UNCTAD. a “Chinese-Central Asian Relationship Requires Delicate Balancing Act”, Radio Free Europe, 4 April 2010. Figure II.6. Top 5 destinations of FDI projects,a cumulative 2003–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Including both cross-border MAs and greenfield FDI projects. 4 4 6 17 68 Georgia Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Russian Federation 6 7 9 14 19 Viet Nam Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Syrian Arab Republic Turkey China 4 4 6 17 68 Georgia Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Russian Federation 6 7 9 14 19 Viet Nam Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Syrian Arab Republic Turkey China a) From developing to transition economies b) From transition to developing economies
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 67 transition economies; in the cases of China and the Republic of Korea, that share was only 2–3 per cent (figure II.7). South to East FDI benefited from outward FDI support (e.g. from the Governments of China and India) and from geographical proximity, cultural affinity and historical relationships. TNCs often invest in countries with common cultural and ethnic ties and heritage (e.g. Turkish investment in South- East Europe and Central Asia, Chinese investment in Central Asia), or with which their countries have historical links (e.g. in the case of the Russian– Vietnamese cooperation in coal mining, electricity and natural gas). As developing-country investors are interested in the fast-growing consumer markets of large transition economies such as Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, most of the acquisitions took place in the services sector (figure II.8). Examples of market-seeking projects include investments of Chinese companies and companies from West Asia in real estate construction projects in the Russian Federation, and the expansion of the Turkish retail group Migros (part of Koc Group) in this country and Kazakhstan. Investments by Korean firms (e.g. Ssangyong Motor’s $480 million production agreement and Hyundai’s $400 million new car assembly plant, both in the Russian Federation) are also of this type. The primary sector accounts for almost one-third of FDI projects, and the largest acquisitions took place in this sector.35 A greater proportion of acquisitions by transition- economy TNCs were made in the primary sector, followed by manufacturing and services, mainly in telecommunications. Policy response. FDI between developing countries and transition economies often involves large State-owned TNCs, following national strategic objectives. For this reason, integration schemes and regional cooperation encompassing these groups, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),36 play an important role. Other important measures are bilateral partnerships which can underpin cooperation conducive to East–South investment links.37 The Silk Road Initiative seeks to enhance regional cooperation between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The initiative is an important step in establishing networks, encouraging dialogue, bridging cultural divides Box II.3. Russian TNCs expand into Africa The expansion of Russian TNCs in Africa is fairly recent. The arrival of these TNCs has been motivated by a desire to enhance raw-material supplies and to expand to new segments of strategic commodities, as well as a desire to access local markets. For example RusAl, the world’s largest aluminium producer, has operations in Angola, Guinea, Nigeria and South Africa. Russian TNCs have acquired certain assets directly, such as South Africa’s Highveld Steel and Vanadium (by Evraz group) or Burkina Faso’s High River Gold (by Severstal); in other cases they acquired the parent firms of African assets in developed countries. Other forms of investment include joint ventures, such as in the case of Severstal’s $2.5 billion iron mining project in Liberia, in collaboration with African Aura Mining (United Kingdom). Russian banks are also moving into Africa. Vneshtorgbank for instance opened the first foreign majority-owned bank in Angola, and then moved into Namibia and Côte d’Ivoire, while Renaissance Capital owns 25 per cent of the shares in Ecobank, one of the largest Nigerian banks, with branches in 11 other African countries. In Southern Africa, Russian mining companies are currently involved in developing manganese deposits in the Kalahari Desert (Renova Group, a leading Russian asset management company, has invested up to $1 billion). The largest Russian diamond producer, Alrosa, is building electric power plants in Namibia and a hydroelectric dam in Angola. In the latter case, the project is coupled with a licence to explore for oil and gas. In North Africa, Gazprom has signed three exploration and production-sharing agreements with the National Oil Corporation (NOC) of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In Egypt, the Government of Russia has signed an agreement on civilian nuclear development, allowing Russian companies to bid for nuclear power plant construction contracts. Source: UNCTAD.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development68 and promoting awareness of the potential for cooperation in the investment area between countries of the region. A growing number of bilateral agreements such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DTTs) have been concluded between developing countries and transition economies. As of the end of 2010, 233 BITs had been concluded. Transition economies have signed the largest number of BITs with Asia, followed by Africa and then Latin America. The Russian Figure II.7. Major developing country investors in transition economies, outward FDI stock in 2009 (Millions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Note: Figures in parenthesis show the share of transition economies in the country’s total outward FDI stock in 2009. Data for India refer to 2005 and are on an approval basis. (20%) (3%) (2%) (34%) 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 3 000 3 500 4 000 4 500 5 000 5 500 6 000 India Korea, Rep. of China Turkey Federation is the transition country with the largest number of BITs concluded with developing countries (31); among developing countries China has signed BITs with all transition economies (17). By the end of 2010, the number of East-South DTTs had grown to 175. Prospects. Despite the recent financial crisis, and stricter regulations and conditions governing natural resources projects in the Russian Federation and other transition economies, developing country TNCs have continued to access the natural resources of these economies. In addition, the fast growing consumer market of transition economies and the rise of commodity prices will induce further investment by developing country TNCs in the East. Governments could also consider nurturing long- lasting relationships by focusing on businesses based on comparative advantages and by providing specific mesures to promote investment. For the former, FDI based on technology and other firm-specific advantages is crucial for firms from developing countries and transition economies to increase their investment links.38 For the latter, for example, in the Russian Federation, the launch of a $10 billion FDI fund to attract foreign investors in the country can be expected to further increase FDI, including from developing countries. Outward FDI from transition economies, mainly the Russian Federation, is expected in particular to grow fast in the near future. It will include Africa. Some large resource-based firms are seeking to become regional and global players, while some banks are expanding into other countries in the region. State-owned TNCs such as Gazprom can play a major role in that expansion. Figure II.8. Sectoral distribution of FDI projects,a cumulative, 2004–2010 (Per cent of total value) Source: UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Including both cross-border MAs and greenfield FDI projects. 23% 42% 28% 30% 49% 28% Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary a) From South to East b) From East to South
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 69 6. Developed countries a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $100 billion United States United States and Germany $50 to $99 billion Belgium France, Switzerland and Japan $10 to $49 billion Germany, United Kingdom, France, Australia, Ireland, Spain, Canada, Luxembourg and Norway Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom and Austria $1 to $9 billion Poland, Italy, Czech Republic, Austria, Sweden, Israel, Cyprus, Finland, Romania, Iceland, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Estonia, Portugal and Malta Finland, Israel, Poland, Cyprus, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary and Greece Below $1 billion Slovenia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Slovakia, Latvia, Bermuda, Gibraltar, Japan, Denmark, Switzerland and Netherlands Bermuda, New Zealand, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, Latvia, Iceland and Portugal a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Developed economies 602.8 601.9 851.0 935.2 203.5 251.7 160.8 215.7 European Union 346.5 304.7 370.0 407.3 116.2 113.5 89.7 17.3 Other developed countries 40.7 37.1 92.5 91.9 18.2 33.6 17.6 63.2 Other developed Europe 41.3 8.4 64.2 68.5 17.6 9.8 13.0 16.5 North America 174.3 251.7 324.4 367.5 51.5 94.7 40.5 118.7 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Developed economies 12 263.7 12 501.6 16 171.4 16 803.5 558.5 669.2 910.5 1 098.2 European Union 7 296.1 6 890.4 9 080.9 8 933.5 353.8 387.1 439.4 524.9 Other developed countries 762.6 874.2 1 153.1 1 320.2 41.6 55.2 59.6 57.3 Other developed Europe 655.1 724.5 1 012.9 1 090.4 47.9 44.9 61.5 73.4 North America 3 550.0 4 012.5 4 924.4 5 459.5 115.3 182.0 350.0 442.6 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 203 530 251 705 160 785 215 654 Primary 41 198 50 945 2 875 23 548 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 40 216 46 107 1 344 23 041 Manufacturing 61 153 98 998 32 663 105 333 Food, beverages and tobacco 5 669 27 797 -4 038 27 603 Chemicals and chemical products 32 084 27 496 28 648 41 409 Non-metallic mineral products - 139 2 436 728 3 050 Metals and metal products 252 - 155 - 680 2 832 Machinery and equipment 1 305 7 619 2 086 5 870 Electrical and electronic equipment 8 315 10 129 1 281 6 902 Precision instruments 3 841 9 303 4 798 7 331 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 8 546 3 210 - 686 4 488 Services 101 179 101 762 125 247 86 773 Electricity, gas and water 59 408 -3 265 39 015 -21 331 Construction 10 254 6 301 -1 641 -2 700 Trade -1 327 12 331 1 017 7 001 Hotels and restaurants 1 535 4 712 400 - 43 Transport, storage and communications 3 523 7 603 14 062 7 112 Finance 8 434 26 496 60 286 63 832 Business services 13 638 35 025 15 995 24 914 Health and social services 1 254 5 613 - 1 698 Community, social and personal service activities 3 175 4 080 - 291 5 195 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 203 530 251 705 160 785 215 654 Developed economies 143 163 182 657 143 163 182 657 European Union 81 751 9 804 88 575 84 910 France 38 372 2 451 - 342 3 496 Germany 20 372 6 293 1 561 9 665 United Kingdom -6 307 -7 516 21 678 42 782 United States 18 834 79 091 26 640 66 819 Japan 11 882 18 126 -6 945 3 051 Developing economies 46 272 52 629 12 286 36 073 Africa 1 378 1 336 4 328 6 355 Latin America and the Caribbean 3 475 11 544 -6 815 3 581 South America 959 7 561 -6 681 -4 129 Central America 3 169 2 559 16 5 787 Asia 41 417 39 752 14 494 17 294 West Asia 21 451 -2 909 3 174 2 357 South, East and South-East Asia 19 966 42 661 11 320 14 936 China 12 994 9 047 1 418 2 976 India 40 7 949 5 573 7 465 Oceania 2 - 4 280 8 843 South-East Europe and the CIS 7 616 3 464 5 336 -3 076 Russian Federation 7 616 2 896 4 487 1 719 Ukraine - - 12 - 14 -5 206 $billion 0 400 800 1 200 1 600 2 000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 European Union Other developed countries Other developed Europe North America Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 $billion % 0 300 600 900 1 200 1 500 0 5 10 15 20 25 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Other developed countries European Union North America Other developed Europe Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development70 In 2010, FDI inflows to developed countries declined marginally. At $602 billion, FDI inflows to the region were only 46 per cent of the peak level in 2007 (figure A). From a global perspective, the developed countries’ share of FDI inflows in the world total fell below 50 per cent for the first time in 2010. A gloomier economic outlook prompted by government austerity measures, looming sovereign debt crises and regulatory concerns were among the factors hampering the recovery of FDI flows in developed countries. The overall figures, however, mask wide subregion- al variations among developed countries. In North America, inflows of FDI showed a strong turna- round with a 44 per cent increase over the previous year to $252 billion (table A). In contrast, inflows to Europe were down by 19 per cent. In addition to a 36 per cent fall in the United Kingdom, which has been one of the largest recipients in Europe, large divestments from two of the subregion’s small open economies, namely the Netherlands and Switzerland, dragged down the total. Significant divestments also occurred in Japan where growth prospects were perceived to be poor, especially in comparison with emerging economies. The divergent pace of economic recovery is reflect- ed, to an extent, in the components of inward FDI. In the two large economies leading the recovery of FDI in the grouping, namely Germany and the United States, there was a more robust economic recovery, resulting in strong growth of reinvested earnings, which increased more than threefold compared with the 2009 level in both economies. In contrast to the declining inflows, FDI outflows from developed countries reversed their downward trend, with a 10 per cent increase over the previ- ous year. FDI from developed countries amounted to $935 billion, still accounting for 71 per cent of the world total (figure B). TNCs in developed countries accumulated an unprecedented amount of cash on their balance sheets and the rates of debt financing were at a historic low, facilitating their overseas expansion. Furthermore, MA remained an attractive strategy for firms seeking growth as well as for those seeking cost-cutting through synergy. Although these factors appear to have generated a sizeable recovery of outward FDI from developed countries, the total for the region as a whole was half of its peak in 2007. By subregion, the recovery of FDI outflows in developed countries was, like inflows, driven by North America. Cross-border MA deals by United States firms more than tripled, resulting in a 16 per cent increase in total outflows from the United States. Furthermore, the value of reinvested earnings increased by 35 per cent. In addition to the increase in profits, a greater share of profits was reinvested rather than repatriated.39 In Europe, despite a 67 per cent fall in cross-border MA deals by European TNCs, outflows of FDI overall increased by 10 per cent, due largely to the upswing of intra-company loans. For Germany, for example, intra-company loans from its TNCs turned from a negative $25 billion in 2009 to nearly $18 billion in 2010. Similarly, intra-company loans from Swiss TNCs increased from a negative $7 billion in 2009 to $11 billion in 2010. Cross-border MA deals by Japanese firms almost doubled, but this was still not enough to compensate for the fall in intra-company loans and reinvested earnings at Japanese affiliates abroad. Japanese TNCs continued to repatriate much of the profits from their affiliates to take advantage of the tax break on dividends introduced in 2009 (WIR10). At the industry level, MA activities in the natural resource-relatedindustriesdrewmuchattention,not least because of the political sensitivity associated with them. For instance, the takeover of Dana Petroleum (United Kingdom) by Korea National Oil Corporation in 2010 was thought to have been the first hostile bid for a developed country-based firm by a State-owned company from an emerging economy.40 Some proposed mega-deals in the sector, namely the separate bids by BHP Billiton and Sinochem for PotashCorp (Canada), as well as the plan to merge the Australian iron ore operations of BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, did not materialize, as they failed to address regulatory concerns. Another active industry in terms of MAs was the pharmaceutical industry. The populations in many developed countries are ageing, and consequently,
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 71 the long-term prospects for the healthcare-related industries are regarded as favourable. Furthermore, the patents of a number of top-selling drugs will shortly expire, prompting takeovers of smaller pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms with products and technologies by large international pharmaceutical companies. One of the largest MA deals in 2010 was the takeover of Millipore (United States) by the drug and chemical group Merck (Germany) (annex table I.7). Other reported deals included the acquisition of Talecris Biotherapeutics (United States) by Grifols (Spain) and of OSI Pharmaceuticals (United States) by Astellas Pharma (Japan). This trend has continued into 2011. As for the prospect, the comparison of the first several months of 2011 and those of 2010 suggests a more solid recovery of FDI flows in 2011. The value of greenfield projects indicates that outflows will continue their recovery – at a faster rate. The values of greenfield projects from all the subregions in the first four months of 2011 are showing a 20– 25 per cent increase over the same period of 2010. Despite suffering from a serious natural disaster, Japan’s outward FDI flows are buoyant, in particular through cross-border MAs in 2011. For inflows, the picture is more mixed. Data on greenfield projects show a small overall decline for the region. In contrast, MA data show a similar pattern to 2010: a robust increase in North America but declines in Europe and Japan. As growth prospects for major economies in the region, including the United States, are uncertain, the return of confidence and a recovery of inward FDI may take longer than was the case after previous FDI downturns. b. Bailing out of the banking industry and FDI The financial crisis and the banking industry. Amid the turmoil in the financial markets which followed the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, some of the largest banks in the world sought injections of capital from SWFs, rival banks or governments to shore up their balance sheets. In some cases, the bail-outs by foreign banks and SWFs were large enough to qualify as FDI.41 The bail-outs by national governments were followed by a restructuring process of those banks, which in some cases resulted in divestments of foreign assets but in others generated new FDI (table II.11). Over the period from September 2008 to December 2010, divestment of foreign assets by the rescued banks resulted in a net decrease of FDI (i.e. assets abroad sold to a domestic bank in the host country) by about $45 billion. In the same period, the sell-offs of nationalized banks and their assets generated FDI worth about $35 billion.42 Therestructuringofthebanksthatwerebeneficiaries of government rescue – a process which is still ongoing in 2011 – has been driven by concerns over competition in the banking industry and efforts towards the reform of the financial system. The future policy discourse over these issues is likely to have implications for the FDI flows of the financial industry for years to come. Restructuring and divestment. The bail-outs of the banks left governments holding substantial amounts of equity in the rescued banks. As financial markets around the world recovered some stability in the course of 2009 and 2010, governments began to seek exit from holding major stakes in the banks. In some cases, governments simply sold off their equity holdings through public offerings.43 In others, banks were required to restructure and to sell off assets while under government control. This process has generated FDI, resulting in further transnationalization of the banking industry, especially in Europe, where the competition policy of the European Commission was the major driving force behind the restructuring. The concerns of the European Commission were twofold. First, injection of public funds should not give the recipient banks an unfair competitive advantage. Second, consolidation of the industry resulting from acquiring weaker banks should not reduce competition in the industry. In the United Kingdom, for instance, in 2008 the Government injected £37 billion into its two largest banks, Lloyds Banking Group and the Royal Bank of Scotland, followed by additional support measures in the following year.44 As the price for the State bail-out, the European Commission required Lloyds to sell at least 600 branches and reduce its The restructuring of the banking industry following government bail-outs in Europe and the United States has resulted in both divestment of foreign assets and generation of new FDI.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development72 market share by an agreed percentage by selling some of its operations.45 Similarly, the Royal Bank of Scotland was told to sell 318 branches, which were subsequently purchased by Santander (Spain) for £1.65 billion. The Spanish bank announced that it would inject £4.46 billion of equity capital to its affiliates in the United Kingdom, although the deal is not expected to be completed until 2012.46 Furthermore, the Royal Bank of Scotland announced in 2010 an agreement to sell an 80 per cent share in its payment processing business to a consortium of United States private equity funds, Advent International and Bain Capital, for £2 billion.47 Table II.11. Selected cases of government bail-out of international banks, 2008−2010 Bank Government Bail-out, 2008–2010 Implications for FDI flows Hypo Group Alpe Adria Austria €450 million 67% stake worth €3 billion held by Bayerische Landesbank (Germany) written off when nationalized in 2009. Dexia Belgium €3 billion 20% stake in Credit du Nord (France) sold for €645 million in 2009. 70% stake in Dexia Crediop (Italy) and 85.5% stake in Dexia Banka Slovensko (Slovakia) to be divested by October 2012; 60% stake in Dexia Sabadell (Spain) by December 2013. France €3 billion Luxembourg €376 million Fortis Belgium/Luxembourg €9.4 billion/€2.5 billion Sold to BNP Paribas (France) in 2009 Netherlands €16.8 billion Amlin (United Kingdom) acquiring Fortis Corporate Insurance from the Government of the Netherlands for €350 million in 2009. KBC Group Belgium €7 billion Investment banking unit, KBC Peel Hunt (United Kingdom), global convertible bonds and Asian equity derivatives businesses, and its reverse mortgage activities in the United States all divested. Commerzbank Germany €18.2 billion Its Swiss affiliates Dresdner Bank (Switzerland) and Commerzbank (Switzerland) divested in 2009. The following assets divested in 2010: Privatinvest Bank (Austria), Dresdner VPV (Netherlands), Dresdner Van Moer Courtens (Netherlands), and the Belgian affiliate of Commerzbank International (Luxembourg), Commerzbank International Trust Singapore, its United Kingdom affiliates, Channel Islands Holdings and Kleinwort Benson Private Bank, Allianz Dresdner Bauspar AG (ADB) (Austria), Dresdner Bank Monaco. Its affiliate in Germany Montrada GmbH, a card payments processing company, sold to a Dutch firm in 2010. IKB Deutsche Industriebank Germany $3.1 billion Bailed out through State-owned development bank, KFW. Its 90.8% stake sold to the United States private equity fund Lone Star for $150 million in 2008. Allied Irish Bank Ireland €9.2 billion 22.4% stake in MT Bank (United States) sold though public offering (agreed in October 2010). Bank Zachodni WBK (Poland) sold to Banco Santander (Spain) for €4 billion (purchase completed in March 2011). Bank of Ireland Ireland €5.5 billion 50% stake in Paul Capital Investments (United States), a private equity fund, and its United States-based foreign currency business sold in 2011. ING Netherlands €10 billion Swiss private banking unit sold to Julius Baer (Switzerland) for $505 million; 51% equity stakes in ING Australia and ING New Zealand sold to the ANZ Bank (Australia) for €1.1 billion; and Asian Private Banking business sold for $1 billion in 2010. Most of its real estate investment management business around the world sold for $1.1 billion in 2011. Lloyds TSB/HBOS United Kingdom £17 billion 632 branches in the United Kingdom put up for sale in 2011 as agreed with the European Commission. Bank of Western Australia sold for $1.4 billion in 2008. RBS United Kingdom £20 billion 318 branches sold to Santander (Spain) in 2010. RBS WorldPay sold for £2 billion. Bank of America United States $45 billion Its stake in a Chinese affiliate reduced in 2009 and stake in Mexican affiliate disposed in 2010. Citigroup United States $25 billion Nikko Cordial Securities (Japan) sold for $5.8 billion and Nikko Asset Management (Japan) for $1.2 billion in 2009. Citi Cards Canada sold for $1 billion in 2009. Source: UNCTAD, based on media reports, corporate press releases and annual reports.
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 73 In the case of the banks in the United Kingdom, some of the required sell-offs took the form of the sale of domestic assets to foreign investors, thus generating inward FDI. For other European banks, it often resulted in divestment of foreign assets, i.e. negative outward FDI. For instance, in return for receiving State support amounting to €18.2 billion over the period 2008–2010, Commerzbank was required by the European Commission to reduce its assets by 45 per cent, including its private bank operations in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The sell-off of foreign assets has not been limited to European Banks. To address regulatory concerns, Bank of America sold part of its equity holdings in China Construction Bank for $7.3 billion in 2009 and its entire 24.9 per cent stake in Grupo Financiero Santander (Mexico) for $2.5 billion in 2010. A much more complex process of restructuring took place in the aftermath of the bail-out of Fortis (Belgium). In September 2008, the Governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg took the decision to buy 49 per cent stakes in Fortis’s respective national arms, jointly injecting €11.2 billion. Subsequently, the Government of the Netherlands renegotiated the bail-out package, to buy all of Fortis’s Dutch operation as well as the Dutch operation of ABN Amro, also previously owned by Fortis, for €16.8 billion. The Belgian part of Fortis, Fortis Bank, was fully nationalized in October 2008. In the following year, an agreement was reached between the Government of Belgium and BNP Paribas (France), whereby France’s largest bank took over a 75 per cent stake of Fortis Bank in an all-share exchange transaction. This deal left the Government of Belgium as the largest shareholder of BNP Paribas, with a stake of around 11.7 per cent in the French bank, which became the biggest bank in Europe in terms of deposits. For the Dutch part of the assets, it was reported in June 2009 that Lloyds of London insurer Amlin had agreed to buy Fortis Corporate Insurance for €350 million. Nationalization of Icelandic banks. One of the most spectacular banking failures during the financial crisis was the collapse of the Icelandic banks. The three largest banks in Iceland, Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir had to be nationalized in October 2008, and the fourth largest, Straumur, followed suit in March 2009. In the process of subsequent restructuring, unsecured creditors (mostly foreign) agreed to a deal involving a debt- equity swap, as a result of which the foreign creditors took control of the remnants of three of those banks. The Government of Iceland reached an agreement in November 2008 to hand over 95 per cent of Glitnir, renamed Islandsbanki, to creditors, which included RBS and Mitsui-Sumitomo Bank. Similarly, in December 2009, creditors of Kaupthing agreed to take an 87 per cent stake in Arion Bank, the successor to Kaupthing, that took over its healthy assets, as compensation and to inject further capital worth more than $500 million. Finally, an agreement was reached in September 2010 whereby holders of unsecured debt issued by Straumur, including hedge funds Davison Kempner and Varde Partners, assumed 100 per cent ownership of the bank’s remaining businesses. The exact equity shares taken over by foreign creditors in those deals are not known, but some of them are likely to have been over 10 per cent, in effect, turning their portfolio investment into FDI. At the same time, the restructuring of Icelandic banks has resulted in divestment of their foreign assets (e.g. retailers based in the United Kingdom), resulting in negative outward FDI from Iceland, but which, in turn, have generated FDI by private equity groups from a third country (mostly the United States). Prospects. The process of restructuring is still ongoing. In developed countries, the nationalization of banks is only a temporary measure and the equity held by governments will be sold off. Thus, FDI flows in the banking industry in the coming years are likely to be influenced by the policies of the competition authorities as well as the exit strategies of governments. In the longer term, the global efforts towards reforming the financial system could have important implications. For instance, Basel III, the revised international bank capital and liquidity framework, imposes tougher bank capital requirement rules. Although the implementation of these rules is to be gradually phased in, starting in 2013 up to January 2019, there is some evidence that banks have been reconfiguring their assets, including divestment of their foreign assets, in an effort to strengthen their capital base.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development74 1. Least developed countries a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $10.0 billion .. .. $2.0 to $9.9 billion Angola and Democratic Republic of the Congo .. $1.0 to $1.9 billion Sudan and Zambia Angola $0.5 to $0.9 billion Niger, Bangladesh, Madagascar, Uganda, Mozambique, Cambodia, Chad, Myanmar, United Republic of Tanzania and Equatorial Guinea .. $0.1 to $0.4 billion Lao People's Democratic Republic, Guinea, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Solomon Islands, Senegal, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, Malawi, Somalia and Benin Zambia and Senegal Below $0.1 billion Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Lesotho, Rwanda, Togo, Nepal, Vanuatu, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Burundi, Mauritania, Bhutan, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, São Tomé and Principe, Samoa, Tuvalu and Yemen Yemen, Sudan, Liberia, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Niger, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Benin, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Principe, Mali, Mauritania, Solomon Islands, Malawi, Vanuatu, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Kiribati, Guinea-Bissau, Samoa and Togo a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. B. Trends in structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Least developed countries (LDCs) 26.5 26.4 0.4 1.8 - 0.8 2.2 - 0.4 LDCs: Africa 23.8 23.1 0.3 1.7 - 0.5 2.0 - 0.3 LDCs: Latin America and the Caribbean - 0.2 - - - 0.1 - - LDCs: Asia 2.6 2.9 0.1 0.1 - 0.3 0.1 - - LDCs: Oceania 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 0.1 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Least developed countries (LDCs) 127.8 151.7 7.4 10.9 16.3 19.6 0.3 0.4 LDCs: Africa 100.2 121.0 6.5 9.9 10.7 13.0 0.3 0.4 LDCs: Latin America and the Caribbean 0.5 0.6 - - - - - - LDCs: Asia 26.2 28.9 0.9 1.0 5.4 6.4 - - LDCs: Oceania 0.9 1.2 - 0.1 0.2 0.2 - - Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total - 774 2 201 16 354 Primary 8 1 094 16 2 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 8 1 094 16 2 Manufacturing 11 94 - 96 Food, beverages and tobacco - 65 - 95 Textiles, clothing and leather - 10 - - Wood and wood products 11 - - - Chemicals and chemical products - 20 - - Metals and metal products - - - 1 Machinery and equipment - - - - Electrical and electronic equipment - - - - Precision instruments - - - - Services - 793 1 013 - 257 Electricity, gas and water - 110 - - Trade - - - - Transport, storage and communications - 346 903 - - Finance - 354 - - 257 Business services - 94 - - - Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World - 774 2 201 16 354 Developed economies -1 156 1 655 - 2 European Union -1 160 786 - 1 United States - 15 1 300 - - Australia - - 427 - - Developing economies 372 511 16 352 Africa 354 252 - 257 North Africa 324 - - - Sub-Saharan Africa 30 252 - 257 Uganda - 257 - - Zambia - - - 257 Latin America and the Caribbean - 5 - 16 95 Panama - - - 95 Asia 23 259 - - West Asia - - 280 - - South, East and South-East Asia 23 539 - - South-East Europe and the CIS - 35 - - Ukraine - 35 - - $billion 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Africa Latin America and the Caribbean Asia Oceania Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 $billion 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 % Oceania Asia Latin America and the CaribbeanAfrica FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 75 FDI inflows to the 48 LDCs declined by a further 0.6 per cent in 2010 to $26 billion, following the 20 per cent fall a year earlier that had interrupted the upwards trend of the previous decade (table B and figure A). Almost two-fifths of the LDCs – in particular Yemen, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Rwanda, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan – saw their FDI inflows reduced. This unprecedented two-year retreat in FDI inflows to LDCs has taken place against a backdrop of rising commodity prices, a modest recovery in global FDI flows, and a 10 per cent increase in inflows to developing and transition economies. The delay in recovery of FDI flows to LDCs is a mat- ter of grave concern, as FDI is a major contributor to their capital formation (figure A). This is especially so in African LDCs, where FDI flows were equiva- lent to as high as 25 per cent of gross fixed capital formation over most of the past decade. In addition, FDI is a key source of technology and management know-how, which are of particular importance for LDCs. Most investments in 2010 were in the form of greenfield projects, which totalled $37.1 billion in their combined (foreign and domestic) capital expenditures (annex table I.8). There were 288 such projects of a significant size (annex table I.9), which generated a total of 67,400 jobs (UNCTAD, 2011b). The projects were concentrated in the primary and manufacturing sectors, accounting for 44 and 39 per cent of the total, respectively, compared with 17 per cent in services. Many large FDI projects were in base metals and oil prospecting and exploitation. In Africa, extraction activities account for the majority of inflows, while in Asian LDCs services industries such as telecommunications and electricity have attracted more foreign investment. In terms of the number of deals, service industries such as financial services, transportation and communications represented the majority of investments, accounting for 48 per cent of the total, followed by manufacturing (36 per cent). The primary sector accounted for just 11 per cent of the deals. FDI in telecommunications is on the rise in African LDCs, while FDI to Asian LDCs is primarily in manufacturing or services such as electricity. Fifty- six per cent of the deals originated from developing and transition economies, rather than developed economies. FDI via MAs is still limited in LDCs, but their number has nearly doubled over the last decade. In particular, some of the large investments, such as in telecommunications, were through mergers and acquisitions. Cross-border MA sales turned positive in 2010, amounting to $2.2 billion in 2010 (tables D and E), in contrast to 2008 and 2009, when they were negative. The distribution of FDI flows among LDCs remains highly uneven. The accumulated stock of inward FDI in LDCs now stands at $152 billion. However the 10 countries (Angola, Sudan, Zambia, Myanmar, the United Republic of Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Uganda and Mozambique, in that order) with FDI stocks of more than $5 billion as of 2010, account for two-thirds of the total inward stock. Four mostly natural resources exporting countries – Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Zambia – received over half of total FDI into LDCs. This concentration of FDI in a limited number of resource-rich countries continues to increase. The FDI pattern in LDCs is also evident from the expanding presence of the largest TNCs, whose presence in LDCs doubled over the past decade. There was a particularly impressive expansion of global TNCs investing in Mozambique, Malawi, Bangladesh and Uganda. However, some 75 TNCs have pulled out from LDCs during the past decade (UNCTAD, 2011b). As of 2010, judging by FDI project data (cross- border MA and greenfield investment projects), European companies accounted for the largest share of FDI flows from developed countries to LDCs, with over 36 per cent of the world total (UNCTAD, 2011b). Substantial shifts are taking place in world FDI patterns, due to the emergence of FDI from developing economies, which have become major players with respect to international investment, exports and technology flows into LDCs. Currently, the shares of developing and transition economies in LDCs’ FDI stock vary from 30 per cent in Malawi to more than 70 per cent in Cambodia, and most countries have seen a considerable increase in their
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development76 proportion in recent years. Although starting from a low base, FDI from Brazil, China, India and South Africa, in particular, has become sizeable in many African LDCs. While such investments focused principally on extractive industries at first, they have become more diversified in recent years in a number of host countries, ranging from manufacturing, to commerce and finance, to agriculture. In addition, investments from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in African LDCs have recently increased in industries such as telecoms, tourism, finance, infrastructure, mining, oil and gas and agriculture. South-South FDI is likely to play an increasing role for LDCs in the future, and holds the potential to boost productivity and significantly affect development patterns in LDCs. It has been less volatile than that from developed countries, and has been more resilient during the recent global economic crisis, partly because it is less dependent on debt financing. FDI prospects for LDCs remain challenging. Data for the first four months of 2011 on greenfield investment, which is the main mode of investment in LDCs, rather than cross-border MA, show further decline of 25 per cent (annex table I.8). The regulatory conditions established in many LDCs are on a par with those in other developing countries, and recent regulatory reforms have made several LDC economies more attractive to FDI. Increased attention has been paid by many LDCs to policy initiatives at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels in order to enhance international cooperation and/or integration in matters relating to FDI. By the end of 2010, LDCs had concluded a total of 455 BITs and 188 DTTs. On average, LDCs concluded nine BITs and four DTTs per country, compared with 14 BITS and 12 DTTs for all developing countries. On the partners' side, Germany is the country that has signed most BITs with LDCs (33), followed by Switzerland (26) and China (19). However, there are serious challenges that require renewed policy efforts at the national and international levels if FDI is to effectively contribute to sustainable development in LDCs (see the following section). An ambitious new plan of action for FDI in LDCs to enhance productive capacities is urgently needed. b. Enhancing productive capacities through FDI In preparation for the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Devel- oped Countries, held in Istanbul, Turkey, in May 2011, UNCTAD carried out a broad review of FDI trends in LDCs over the past decade since the Brussels Declaration and the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries (BPoA), examining the impact of FDI on their economies with a view to proposing a plan of action to enhance its effectiveness (UNCTAD, 2011b). The report focuses on the challenges LDCs face in attracting and benefiting from FDI, and on what can be done to improve the situation in the light of UNCTAD´s long-standing work on FDI in LDCs. The study found that despite the recent setback, FDI flows to LDCs had grown at an annual rate of 15 per cent during the last decade, raising their share in global FDI flows from less than 1 per cent to over 2 per cent by 2010. Some LDCs have succeeded in diversifying the type of FDI they attract, but over 80 per cent of total FDI flows went to resource-rich economies in Africa, with a weak impact on employment generation, and inflows have stagnated or declined in some countries. In addition, LDCs as a whole still remain at the margin of global value chains, accounting for only 1 per cent of world trade flows (exports plus imports) in industrial goods. Also, the predominance of FDI in natural-resource extraction has reinforced the commodity dependence of LDCs, exacerbating their unbalanced economic structures and vulnerability to external shocks. The geographic concentration of FDI flows has increased over the past decade, contributing to further divergence in economic performance among LDCs, and regional disparities inside countries remain acute. Most LDCs are still characterized by a dual economy in which a relatively small formal private sector coexists with a large informal segment, which includes subsistence agriculture. FDI linkages with the domestic economy have been hard to establish, and transfers of skills and know- how have been limited.48
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 77 Technological advances and organizational changes in the global economy and within TNCs are fundamentally altering the way goods and services are produced. Global value chains with a high degree of specialization have become the norm. TNCs are increasingly outsourcing parts of their value chains, in order to increase their efficiency and competitiveness and avail of the lowest worldwide cost options. This in turn requires new approaches and development policies for LDCs. The relevant new paradigm implies a more proactive approach to developing productive capacities, with a better balance between markets and the State, and places production and employment at the heart of policies. UNCTAD’s plan of action for LDCs builds on the reforms and efforts that have been undertaken in recent times, but strives to present new ways of addressing old problems, taking into account the changed circumstances and the lessons of the past decade. The emphasis is on an integrated policy approach to investment, capacity-building and enterprise development. The plan calls for steps to be taken by all key stakeholders involved – governments in LDCs, development partners and home countries of TNCs – and envisages a clear role for the private sector itself. There are five key areas: • Public–private initiatives in infrastructure. Poor physical infrastructure constrains not just FDI, but more generally the development of productive ca- pacities and LDCs’ ability to reap the benefits of economic globalization. Successfully addressing the problem calls for strengthened PPP initiatives for infrastructure development and a strong role for private investment. • Aid for productive capacity. Shortfalls in terms of skills and human capital are at least as big a constraint on development in LDCs as poor physical infrastructure. An aid-for-productive- capacity programme focusing on education, training and transfer of skills is called for. • Building on investment opportunities. Efforts need to be redoubled to enable firms of all sizes to capture opportunities in LDCs. Large TNCs frequently bypass investment opportunities in LDCs, where markets are typically small and operating conditions are more challenging. However, LDCs offer significant untapped business opportunities for nimble and innovative investors of a more modest size, as well as potential for high returns on investment. • Local business development and access to finance. The presence of efficient and dynamic local businesses is particularly important for efficiency- seeking foreign investors, which LDCs need to attract on a much larger scale and sustainable basisiftheyaretointegrateintoglobalvaluechains. New initiatives to support SME development and linkages with TNCs are essential. • Regulatory and institutional reform. LDCs need to launch the next wave of regulatory and institutional reforms to further strengthen the relevant State institutions and their implementation capacities within a partnership-based approach. While significant reforms have been carried out in LDCs in this area in the past 10 years, much remains to be done. In these five areas of action, there are specific measures to be taken by each stakeholder. These are summarized in table II.12.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development78 Table II.12. Plan of action for investment in LDCs Actions Selected measures on the part of… LDC governments Development partners Strengthen public-private infrastructure development efforts • Pursuing a liberalization of infrastructure sectors and stable regulatory frameworks to ensure competitive outcomes and protect the national interest. • Legal and regulatory framework for PPPs, with pipeline of projects and regional coordination. • LDC infrastructure development fund focused on infrastructure PPPs: risk coverage, direct participation and lending on soft terms. • Technical assistance for regulation and implementation of infrastructure PPPs. Boost aid for productive capacity • Increased public investment in technical and vocational training. • Reform of immigration and work permitting procedures. • Aid-for-productive capacity funds, including support for technical and vocational training and entrepreneurship. Enable firms of all sizes to capture LDC opportunities • Proactive targeting of SME FDI and “impact investors”. • Proactively promoting of the primary sector with opportunities for fast technological catching-up, e.g. telecom services, renewable energy. • Risk coverage institutions at the national level to service SME FDI. • Home-country measures to help firms tap into business opportunities in LDCs: IPA–EPA coordination mechanisms, “impact investment” regulatory framework. Foster local business and ease access to finance • Credit guarantee schemes for micro, small and medium-sized firms, and strengthened development banks. • Regulatory reform to enable SME access to bank lending and strengthen financial infrastructure. • Simplification of procedures for formal business development. • Technical support for the development of financial infrastructure and regulatory and institutional environment. • Support for increased lending and credit guarantee schemes for SMEs. Start the next wave of regulatory and institutional reform • New reform to put increasing emphasis on aspects of regulations that shape FDI impact and strengthen State institutions, including taxation and competition. • Building on mutually reinforcing interests: avoid command and control regulatory bias, establish systematic consultation mechanisms with investors on draft laws. • Build client-oriented investment institutions. • Strengthened efforts to combat corruption under top to bottom zero-tolerance policy. • Strengthened technical assistance on key regulatory issues, including taxation and competition. • Systematic institution twinning. • Adoption of home-country measures to support LDCs: tax engineering avoidance, oversight of business practices by TNCs. Source: UNCTAD, 2011b.
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 79 2. Landlocked developing countries a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $1 billion Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia and Zambia Kazakhstan $500 to $999 million Niger, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Chad, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Botswana .. $100 to $499 million Paraguay, Lao People's Democratic Republic, the FYR of Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi and Zimbabwe Zambia and Azerbaijan $10 to $99 million Swaziland, Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Tajikistan, Rwanda, Nepal, Burkina Faso, Burundi and Bhutan Mongolia, Zimbabwe and Niger Below $10 million .. Armenia, Swaziland, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mali, Republic of Moldova, the FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Botswana and Plurinational State of Bolivia a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Landlocked countries (LLCs) 26.2 23.0 3.8 8.4 1.7 0.6 - 0.5 Africa 4.2 5.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 - 0.3 Latin America and the Caribbean 0.6 1.0 - - 0.1 - 0.1 - - - Asia and Oceania 1.2 2.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 - - Transition economies 20.1 14.8 3.5 8.1 1.4 0.2 - 0.3 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Landlocked countries (LLCs) 149.1 169.6 15.6 27.1 19.6 25.2 - 0.2 - 0.1 Africa 29.6 34.0 2.4 4.5 2.9 3.4 0.2 0.2 Latin America and the Caribbean 9.1 10.0 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.5 - - Asia and Oceania 6.4 8.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.7 - - Transition economies 104.0 117.0 12.8 22.2 15.1 19.6 - 0.5 - 0.4 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 1 708 639 - 8 518 Primary 1 614 45 1 216 123 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 1 614 45 1 216 123 Manufacturing 25 44 - - Food, beverages and tobacco - 0 - - Wood and wood products 11 - - - Chemicals and chemical products 10 42 - - Non-metallic mineral products - - - - Metals and metal products - - - - Machinery and equipment 4 - - - Electrical and electronic equipment - 1 - - Services 70 551 -1 224 395 Electricity, gas and water - 247 110 - - Trade 335 0 - - Transport, storage and communications 0 371 - - Finance - 24 69 - 396 Public administration and defence - - -1 224 - 1 Other services 5 - - - Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 1 708 639 - 8 518 Developed economies 75 88 - 261 European Union - 418 89 - 260 United States - 53 - 17 - - Japan 52 - 3 - - Developing economies 1 831 550 - 8 257 Africa 74 303 - 257 Latin America and the Caribbean - - 16 - British Virgin Islands - - 16 - Asia 1 757 246 - 24 - West Asia 30 0 - - South, East and South-East Asia 1 727 246 - 24 - China 3 558 46 - 24 - India - 80 - - Indonesia -2 604 - - - Thailand - 110 - - South-East Europe and the CIS - 198 - - - Russian Federation - 198 - - - $billion 0 2 4 6 8 10 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 AfricaLatin America and the Caribbean Asia and OceaniaTransition economies Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 $billion 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 % FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Transition economies Asia and Oceania Latin America and the Caribbean Africa Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development80 In 2010, FDI inflows to the 31 landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)49 declined by 12 per cent to $23 billion (table B and figure A). LLDCs accounted for 3.6 per cent of FDI flows to all developing and transition economies, down from 4.5 per cent in 2009. Inherent geographical disadvantages and structural macroeconomic weaknesses have hampered the overall economic performance of these countries. They also face severe constraints in attracting FDI inflows, including the small size of their economies, weak infrastructure and high transportation costs. However, some of them have made significant progress in attracting FDI inflows over the past decade, as the result of economic reforms, investment liberalization and favourable external economic conditions (WIR10). The five largest recipients of FDI in this special grouping of structurally weak economies were Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan (both in the CIS), Mongolia (East Asia), Zambia (Southern Africa) and Niger (West Africa), with inflows of $10 billion, $2.1 billion, $1.7 billion, $1 billion and $950 million, respectively (table A). Large cross-border MA deals in LLDCs have been increasingly targeting services (table II.13), while in Zambia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, privatization in telecommunications led to significant foreign investment through MAs, including from other developing countries. Large cross-border MAs also took place in financial services. In the LLDCs, greenfield investments are more significant than cross-border MAs, covering a wider range of industries and business functions. While the largest projects were concen­trated in extractive industries (table II.14), a significant amount of investment also took place in manufac- turing, including in automotives, chemicals, elec- tronics, food and beverages, and textiles. Some large greenfield projects highlight the success of a number of LLDCs in attracting FDI, thereby en- hancing their productive capabilities and generating employment. For instance, Xinxiang Kuroda (China) invested $67 million in a project in the textiles indus- try in Ethiopia, creating about 1,100 jobs.50 Similarly, an Indian-funded project in the food industry, also in Ethiopia, is expected to create about 340 jobs. Though not yet reflected in FDI statistics, some projects announced in 2010 will be implemented in the years to come and drive up FDI inflows to countries such as Uganda. The performance of LLDCs in attracting FDI inflows varies widely (table A). For instance, Mongolia has demonstrated high performance in attracting FDI (up by 171 per cent to $1.7 billion in 2010), but inflows to the country have concentrated in mining industries. In contrast, a number of countries in different regions, such as Ethiopia (Africa), Paraguay (Latin America) and Uzbekistan (Central Asia), have received more diversified FDI inflows. For instance, Uzbekistan attracted greenfield FDI projects in a number of manufacturing industries in 2010, including the automotive industry, building materials, chemicals and consumer electronics (box II.4). Table II.13. The 10 largest cross-border MAs in LLDCs, 2010 Target company Country Acquiring company Home country Industry Value ($ million) Share (%) Zambia Telecommunications Co Ltd Zambia Libya Africa Investment Portfolio Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Telecommunications 257 75 Nam Theun 2 Power Co Ltd Lao PDR Investor Group Thailand Energy 110 15 TOO Mobile Telecom Service Kazakhstan Tele2 AB Sweden Telecommunications 77 51 Zimbabwe Alloys Chrome(Pvt)Ltd Zimbabwe Metmar Ltd South Africa Electrometallurgical products 51 40 Stopanska Banka AD Macedonia, TFYR National Bank of Greece SA Greece Banks 46 22 OAO Kyrgyztelekom Kyrgyzstan Investor Group Cyprus Telecommunications 40 78 Rwenzori Tea Investments Ltd Uganda McLeod Russel India Ltd India Food preparations, nec 30 100 Maamba Collieries Ltd Zambia Nava Bharat Ventures Ltd India Mining 26 65 AO Danabank Kazakhstan Punjab National Bank India Banks 24 64 Ovoot Coking Coal Project Mongolia Windy Knob Resources Ltd Australia Coal mining 8 100 Source: UNCTAD, cross border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 81 Table II.14. The 10 largest greenfield projects in LLDCs, 2010 Investor or project Industry Host country Home country Investment ($ million) Rio Tinto Group Metals Paraguay United Kingdom 6 000 Tullow Oil Coal, oil and natural gas Uganda United Kingdom 5 000 Kenol-Kobil Group (KenolKobil) Coal, oil and natural gas Uganda Kenya 1 701 International Petroleum Investment Company Chemicals Uzbekistan United Arab Emirates 1 340 Albatros Energy Coal, oil and natural gas Uganda Mauritius 749 Lukoil Coal, oil and natural gas Kazakhstan Russian Federation 500 Move One Transportation Afghanistan United Arab Emirates 497 Globalstar Communications Botswana United States 470 Dimension Data Holdings (DiData) Communications Uganda South Africa 468 Vale (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce) Metals Zambia Brazil 400 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Box II.4. Overcoming the disadvantages of being landlocked: experience of Uzbekistan in attracting FDI in manufacturing Uzbekistan is an LLDC with a GDP of $39 billion and GDP per capita of $1,400 in 2010. FDI to the country has increased since the mid-2000s as a result of a privatization programme.a In recent years, the country has attracted some large greenfield projects in manufacturing, with a number of them announced or implemented in 2010 (box table II.4.1). In the automotive components industry, for instance, Erae Cs Ltd (Republic of Korea) and Uztosanoat, a local company, established an international joint venture with a total investment of $13 million. The facility will supply 150,000 km of car cables per year to General Motors’ new plant in Uzbekistan, starting production in the second half of 2011.b In the petrochemicals industry, a $1.34 billion project is being funded from the United Arab Emirates, and a company from Singapore has signed a deal for a joint venture project for polyethylene production. These large projects illustrate the success of government policies in attracting FDI in manufacturing to Uzbekistan. A favourable investment climate and a sound framework of FDI legislation, which includes guarantees for foreign investors and certain preferences for them, have contributed to this success. It seems that institutional advantages can help LLDCs overcome their geographical disadvantages, and Uzbekistan provides an example in this regard. Source: UNCTAD. a For instance, the Government privatized more than 600 enterprises each year in 2006 and 2007, and foreign investors purchased 28 companies for $115 million in 2007 alone. b Currently, GM Uzbekistan produces seven models of automotive vehicles in the country. With a total investment of $136 million, the new plant will produce a compact sedan in late 2011. Box table II.4.1. Selected FDI projects in manufacturing in Uzbekistan, 2010 Investor or project Industry Home country Investment ($ million) International Petroleum Investment Company Chemicals United Arab Emirates 1 340 Omnivest Pharmaceuticals Hungary 100 Knauf Building materials Germany 50 EMG Ceramics and glass Iran, Islamic Republic of 24 CLAAS Industrial machinery Germany 20 Erae Cs Ltd Automotive components Korea, Republic of 13 LG Consumer electronics Korea, Republic of 9 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development82 With intensified South–South economic cooperation and increasing capital flows from emerging markets, prospects for FDI inflows to the grouping of LLDCs are promising, for 2011 and beyond. Indeed, the total amount of investment of recorded greenfield projects jumped by over 40 per cent in the first four months of 2011, compared with the same period of 2010. b. Leveraging TNC participation in infrastructure development Infrastructure devel- opment is crucial for LLDCs to reduce high transaction (communi- cation and transporta- tion) costs, overcome geographic disadvan- tages and move onto a path of sustainable development and pov- erty reduction. To realize the objective of rapid infra- structure build-up, governments need to introduce specific infrastructure development strategies, making use of the private sector and leveraging the potential contribution of TNCs (WIR08). In a number of LLDCs, greenfield investment and other forms of TNC participation have contributed to infrastructure development, in particular in electricity, transport and telecommunications. During 2005-2010, 12 large infrastructure development projects of at least $100 million each with TNC participation were undertaken in seven LLDCs, namely Uganda (three projects), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (two projects), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (two projects) and Afghanistan (two projects), as well as Azerbaijan, Bhutan and Rwanda (one project each) (table II.15). TNCs have been involved in these infrastructure projects through different modalities, including various forms of PPPs, such as build-operate- transfer (BOT), build-own-operate (BOO), and concession (table II.15). TNCs are often attracted by the growth potential in host developing countries and regions, as well as by business opportunities triggered by new liberalization and deregulation initiatives. Furthermore, PPP arrangements have helped infrastructure TNCs mitigate risks and overcome difficulties in their operations abroad. In some cases, TNCs from different home countries have set up joint ventures for a project. In other cases, TNCs form joint ventures with local partners, such as in the TE–TO Skopje electricity generation project in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Aktau airport terminal project in Kazakhstan. TNC participation has helped mobilize significant amounts of capital for the development of infrastructure in LLDCs. The projects listed in table II.15 were associated with a total investment of $5.3 billion, and, sometimes, multilateral support was involved, as in the two largest electricity projects in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Uganda, respectively.51 A few LLDCs have been particularly successful in leveraging TNC participation to improve their infrastructure, which is badly needed to bring them on a track of fast and sustainable development. For instance, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Uganda have successfully implemented a number of large electricity generation and transmission projects with the involvement of TNCs from both developed and developing countries. The impact on financing and investment varies by industry. Table II.15 shows that TNCs’ contributions have been high in electricity generation and mobile telecommunications. Few projects were recorded in water and sanitation, which is in line with the general situation of TNC participation in infrastructure in the developing world (WIR08), but a number of large projects for extending transport networks and building transport utilities in LLDCs have brought in substantial financial resources. For example, in 2005, Rift Valley Railways, a consortium led by Sheltam (South Africa), won a 25-year concession to operate the combined Kenya and Uganda railway system. The company underwent several rounds of restructuring, but has devoted a significant amount of investment to upgrade the century-old transport system and increase the traffic volume. A systematic turnaround strategy was implemented to improve the services and a considerable reduction in rail- related accidents bolstered customers’ confidence. Under appropriate regulatory frameworks and proactive policies, TNCs can help develop badly needed infrastructure in LLDCs, including through various forms of public-private partnerships.
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 83 At present the railway system handles less than 6 per cent of cargo passing through the Northern Corridor,52 and the Governments of Kenya and Uganda plan to build a new railway from the port of Mombasa.53 The example of the Maputo Corridor, in which TNCs are involved in the development of a transport network for facilitating trade and regional integration, provides useful lessons.54 In Asia, proactive national policies and regional integration efforts have brought benefits of infrastructure improvement and associated socio- economic development to LLDCs. For instance, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic has introduced a “land-linked” strategy in parallel with regional and subregional infrastructure development schemes, within the frameworks of ASEAN and the Greater Mekong Subregion.55 The ASEAN Highway Network Project has helped improve road transport in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.56 Construction of a high-speed railway system linking China and Singapore and passing through the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Malaysia will start in 2011. The project will bring a significant amount of foreign investment and advanced technology to related countries, and will play a particularly significant role in infrastructure Table II.15. Infrastructure development projects with TNC participation in LLDCs, with investment above $100 million, 2005−2010 Project Country Industry Segment Investment ($ million) TNCs involved Modality Year Nam Theun II Hydropower Project Lao PDR Energy Electricity generation 1250 Italian-Thai Development Public Company (Thailand), Electricite de France (France) BOT 2005 Bujagali Hydro Project Uganda Energy Electricity generation 799 Sithe Global Power (United States), Aga Khan Fund (Switzerland) BOT 2007 Nam Ngum 2 Hydro Power Plant Lao PDR Energy Electricity generation 760 Ch Karnchang Company Limited (Thailand), Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding Plc (Thailand) BOT 2006 Warid Telecom Uganda Limited Uganda Telecom- munications Various services 481 Abu Dhabi Group (United Arab Emirates), Essar Group (India) Greenfield 2007 Kenya-Uganda Railways Uganda Transport Railroads 404 Sheltam Rail Company (Pty) Ltd (South Africa), Trans Century Ltd. (Kenya) Concession 2006 Etisalat Afghanistan Afghanistan Telecom- munications Mobile access 340 Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat) (United Arab Emirates) Greenfield 2006 Azerfon Azerbaijan Telecom- munications Mobile access 300 Extel (United Kingdom), Siemens AG (Germany), Celex Communications (United Kingdom) Greenfield 2006 Skopje and Ohrid Airports Concession Macedonia, FYR Transport Airports 295 TAV Airports Holding Co. (Turkey) Concession 2008 TE-TO Skopje Macedonia, FYR Energy Electricity generation 233 Itera Holding Ltd. (Russian Federation), Toplifikacija (Macedonia, FYR), Sintez Group (Russian Federation) BOO 2007 Dagachhu Hydro Power Project Bhutan Energy Electricity generation 201 Tata Enterprises (India) BOO 2009 Areeba Afghanistan Afghanistan Telecom- munications Mobile access 133 MTN Group (South Africa) Greenfield 2005 Millicom Rwanda Rwanda Telecom- munications Mobile access 117 Millicom International (Luxembourg) Greenfield 2009 Source: UNCTAD, based on World Bank PPI database.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development84 development in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. The cases discussed above show that, in an enabling institutional environment (including a high-quality regulatory framework, an effective risk- mitigation system and proper investment promotion activities), TNCs can be engaged in various types of infrastructure development projects, and their involvement can help mobilize financial resources and increase investment levels in infrastructure industries in LLDCs. In particular, the development of region-wide transport infrastructure is a vital way for those countries to access regional markets and sea ports; and TNCs, particularly those from the South, can play an important role in this regard. Governments in LLDCs need to develop the capacity to assess the feasibility and suitability of different forms of infrastructure provision – whether public, private or through some forms of PPPs – as well as to identify the potential role of TNCs and to design the framework of specific projects. Capacity-building needs to be strengthened in this regard, and regional collaboration among developing countries should be encouraged.
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 85 3. Small island developing States a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $1 billion .. .. $500 to $999 million Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago .. $100 to $499 million Mauritius, Seychelles, Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Jamaica, Maldives, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Fiji, Cape Verde and Antigua and Barbuda Mauritius $50 to $99 million Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada and Barbados Jamaica $1 to $49 million Vanuatu, Dominica, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia, Comoros, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, São Tomé and Principe, Palau, Samoa and Tuvalu Seychelles, São Tomé and Principe, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Barbados and Vanuatu Below $1 million .. Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Cape Verde and Samoa a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Small island devel- oping states (SIDS) 4.3 4.2 - 0.2 - 9.7 0.4 0.2 Africa 0.7 0.9 - 0.1 - 0.2 0.2 - Latin America and the Caribbean 2.7 2.4 - 0.1 - 0.5 - 0.1 Asia 0.2 0.4 - - - - - - Oceania 0.7 0.5 - - - 9.0 0.2 0.1 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Small island devel- oping states (SIDS) 56.6 60.6 3.4 3.6 2.0 2.0 0.5 0.5 Africa 4.8 5.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 - - Latin America and the Caribbean 46.2 48.3 2.4 2.5 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.5 Asia 0.8 1.2 - - - - - - Oceania 4.8 5.5 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.9 - - Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 31 9 735 393 161 Primary - 9 037 - - 11 Mining, quarrying and petroleum - 9 037 - - 11 Manufacturing - - - 95 Food, beverages and tobacco - - - 95 Chemicals and chemical products - - - - Metals and metal products - - - - Machinery and equipment - - - - Services 31 699 393 77 Electricity, gas and water - 82 6 - Trade - - - - Hotels and restaurants - 136 - - Transport, storage and communications - - - - 3 Finance 25 480 385 - 23 Business services - 1 2 3 Health and social services 5 - - - Other services - - - 100 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 31 9 735 393 161 Developed economies - 207 9 038 31 113 European Union 22 28 - 10 18 United States - 188 - 175 - 100 Australia 220 8 987 - - 4 Japan - 320 - 28 1 Developing economies 237 698 361 48 Africa - 300 - 6 - 88 Latin America and the Caribbean - 94 - 90 Asia 537 603 355 47 West Asia 320 - - - South, East and South-East Asia 217 603 355 47 China - 328 - 10 Hong Kong, China - - 63 172 - India 5 163 181 38 Malaysia 192 176 - - 1 South-East Europe and the CIS - - - - $billion 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Africa Latin America and the Caribbean Asia Oceania Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 Oceania Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Africa FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation $billion % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development86 FDI inflows to small island developing States (SIDS) dropped marginally by less than 1 per cent, to $4.2 billion in 2010 (table B and figure A), following a 47 per cent decline in 2009. The largest five recipients of FDI in this special grouping of structurally weak economies were Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago (both in the Caribbean), Mauritius, Seychelles (both in East Africa) and Timor-Leste (South-East Asia), with inflows ranging between $977 million and $280 million (table A). Geographically and culturally diverse, the 29 SIDS57 nevertheless share similar development challenges: small but rapidly growing populations, low availability of resources, remoteness, susceptibility to natural disasters, and a lack of economies of scale. They also face a number of difficulties in attracting FDI, such as the small size of their economies, a lack of human resources, and high transportation and communication costs. As a result, total inflows to these economies remain at a very low level, accounting for less than 1 per cent of total FDI inflows to the developing world in recent years. Despite a number of large cross-border MA deals in industries such as mining and hotels (table II.16), FDI flows to SIDS stagnated in 2010. The $9 billion acquisition of Lihir Gold by Newcrest Mining (Australia) was not reflected in FDI inflows to Papua New Guinea in 2010, as this transaction was between foreign investors, involving a change in foreign ownership only. However, other deals by firms from developing counties may drive inflows to the country to new highs in 2011. FDI inflows in SIDS have traditionally been concentrated in extractive industries and services, including hotels and tourism, financial services and real estate. In 2010, there were a number of greenfield investments in these industries (table II.17). The Maldives accounted for most of the large projects in hotels and tourism, as well as in other services, while Papua New Guinea hosted a major share of large mining projects. Noteworthy were two investments in manufacturing in Mauritius: one Table II.16. Selected large cross-border MAs in SIDS, 2010 Target company Country Acquiring company Home country Industry Value ($ million) Shares (%) Lihir Gold Ltd Papua New Guinea Newcrest Mining Ltd Australia Gold ore 9 018 100 Garden Plaza Capital SRL Barbados Fosun Intl Hldgs Ltd China Holding companies 328 100 CTP(PNG)Ltd Papua New Guinea Kulim(Malaysia)Bhd Malaysia Vegetable oil mills 175 80 Darius Holdings Ltd Mauritius Asian Hotels (North) Ltd India Hotels 136 53 Digicel Pacific Ltd Fiji Digicel Group Ltd Jamaica Telecommunications 132 100 Light Power Holdings Ltd Barbados Emera Inc Canada Investors 85 38 Source: UNCTAD, cross border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Table II.17. The 10 largest greenfield projects in SIDS, 2010 Investor or project Industry Host country Home country Investment ($ million) Eni SpA (Eni) Coal, oil and natural gas Timor-Leste Italy 1 000 InterOil Coal, oil and natural gas Papua New Guinea Australia 550 Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering Coal, oil and natural gas Papua New Guinea Korea, Republic of 406 Pruksa Real Estate Real estate Maldives Thailand 373 Allied Gold Metals Solomon Islands Australia 217 Mubadala Development Hotels and tourism Maldives United Arab Emirates 170 Fairmont Raffles Hotels International Hotels and tourism Maldives Canada 170 Shangri-La Hotels and Resorts Hotels and tourism Maldives Hong Kong, China 165 Dubai Holding Hotels and tourism Maldives United Arab Emirates 160 Fairmont Raffles Hotels International Hotels and tourism Seychelles Canada 128 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 87 undertaken by Pick n Pay (South Africa) in the food industry, and the other by Mango (Spain) in textiles. FDI inflows were still biased towards relatively large economies and tax havens. In 2010, 62 per cent of the grouping’s total FDI inflows targeted the top five recipients noted above (table A), and 38 per cent went into the tax havens;58 however the latter share might drop as TNCs move less funds to these economies in the future. In relative terms, a number of SIDS performed well in attracting FDI inflows, and resource-rich Papua New Guinea stands out as one of the winners, resulting from booming investment in its extractive industries (box II.5). Rising greenfield investments and cross-border MAs will drive up FDI inflows to SIDS in 2011. Total investment of recorded greenfield projects had jumped by 90 per cent in the first four months of 2011, compared with the same period of 2010. In the meantime, the value of cross-border MA purchases rose to over $200 million. Considering the high potential of capital flows from emerging economies, FDI inflows to SIDS seem likely to increase in the years to come. b. Roles of TNCs in climate change adaptation SIDS are perhaps the countries that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. A warming of the ocean surface and a rise in sea level around these island economies have been detected, and this is expected to continue (UNFCCC, 2007). The associated adverse impacts pose a serious danger to many aspects of economic development in SIDS.59 For instance, the tourist industry, which the economies of SIDS particularly depend on, will be strongly affected - the shift of tourism to higher altitudes and latitudes is expected to result in a significant drop in the tourist industry in such SIDS as the Maldives (Morin, 2006). To avoid the grave danger posed by climate change, aggressive mitigation action by the major green house gas (GHG) emitters is crucial, while SIDS themselves have an urgent need for adaptation activities.60 For this grouping of structurally vulnerable economies, the cost of inaction would be tremendous.61 The governments of SIDS are taking various initiatives to incorporate adaptation practices into their economic planning and investment activities. Key industries identified in this process are agriculture, tourism, public health and water infrastructure, while the actors involved range from individuals, governments, local communities and international organizations to the private sector and civil society (AOSIS and UNF, 2008). The SIDS have dedicated their own resources to this critical area, and are calling for action among the international community. The private sector is a crucial actor in the fight against the negative impacts of global warming in SIDS. In particular, TNCs can play an important role. First, the participation of and optimal use of TNCs’ resources is useful in filling the financial and technological gaps for climate change adaptation in SIDS. Considerable funds are needed to implement climate change adaptation activities (including improving land and water management and introducing new agricultural production technologies) and to enhance the countries’ adaptive capacities (including improving education, information and infrastructure). Various multilateral and bilateral sources of funding are available,62 but they are not of the magnitude needed (AOSIS and UNF, 2008). Evidence shows that TNCs can make a significant contribution through mobilizing resources and undertaking necessary investments, but lack of data prevents a systematic assessment of the extent of the financial and technological contributions of TNCs. Secondly, foreign affiliates have strengthened host countries’ adaptation efforts by undertaking their own adaptation activities as private sector participants, as well as indirectly through demonstration effects. In important industries such as tourism, which accounts for a large share of the economy of many SIDS,63 TNCs’ contribution in dealing with the economic challenges of climate change is considerable (box II.6). Thirdly, TNC involvement can enhance the adaptive capacities of host countries by improving infrastructure. To respond successfully to the risks of economic disruption, SIDS need infrastructure Highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, SIDS are looking to attract TNCs and FDI projects that can contribute to adaptation efforts.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development88 systems that are modern and resilient to climate change. There are many interdependencies between the infrastructure industries, all of which are important for adaptive capacities (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2011),64 but for most SIDS a resilient water industry (including water storage facilities, potable and waste water treatment plants, transmission lines, local distribution systems etc.) is a priority. A number of projects with TNC participation have contributed to infrastructure development in SIDS, helping to reduce the vulnerability of SIDS to natural disasters and the anticipated rise in sea level. For instance, Berlinwasser (Germany) invested in a water and sewerage project in Mauritius in 2008, raising standards and improving the efficiency and resilience of the water industry in the country.65 In the Maldives, Hitachi Plant Technologies Group (Japan) acquired a 20 per cent stake in a major water and sewage treatment company in 2010, and helped streamline and update operations by leveraging the company’s strengths and know-how.66 Some TNCs involved in infrastructure industries are also from developing countries, and sometimes they have cooperated with international organizations which provide multilateral support on climate change adaptation as well as related infrastructure development to SIDS.67 Effective climate change adaptation in SIDS is beyond the scope and capability of any single organization; it should involve partnerships among all relevant entities and stakeholders to achieve scale-up (AOSIS and UNF, 2008). With a proper institutional framework in place, TNCs can participate and play an important role. However, a number of barriers still exist to the private financing of adaptation practices in SIDS, including the lack of local capacities and resources, weak domestic markets and institutions, as well as the lack of interest by international investors. PPPs are needed to overcome these barriers and for a creative leveraging of foreign private resources; capacity-building of host country governments is the crucial first step. In this context, the importance of data collection cannot be overstated, which is fundamental to any further research in the area. Box II.5. Natural resource-seeking FDI in Papua New Guinea: old and new investors Papua New Guinea is a SIDS with substantial mineral reserves, including gold, copper and nickel, as well as oil and gas. Those natural resources have traditionally attracted significant investment from big companies based in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States; but in recent years, these companies have been joined by investors from emerging economies. Companies from developed countries are still the major investors in extractive industries in Papua New Guinea and have been trying to strengthen their positions. In the oil and gas industry, for instance, ExxonMobil and its joint venture partners have invested $14 billion in a liquefied natural gas project, starting from early 2010.a In metal mining, the “majors” from the developed world, such as BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Xstrata, are the main players in the country. Xstrata, the world’s largest copper producer, has invested over $2 billion in Frieda River, a copper mine in Sandaun and East Sepik Provinces in Papua New Guinea in recent years. Now, mining companies from developing countries, mainly large emerging economies, such as China and India, are investing in a big way. For example, following an agreement signed with the Government of Papua New Guinea in 2005, Metallurgical Construction Group (China) has made significant investments in the country’s mining industries, including through the Ramu nickel-cobalt project, in which the Chinese corporation holds 85 per cent of equity. The total investment in the project in 2009 was $1.4 billion.b Source: UNCTAD. a Elizabeth Fry, “Exxon LNG project arranges $14bn in financing”, Financial Times, 16 December 2009. b EMJ’s Annual Survey of Global Mining Investment, project survey 2010.
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 89 Box II.6. TNCs and climate change adaptation in the tourism industry in SIDS The tourism industry is a key economic sector for SIDS in terms of income, employment and exports (box figure II.6.1), and is the major target of FDI inflows to these countries. The far-reaching consequences of climate change will affect the industry through increased infrastructure damage,a additional emergency preparedness requirements, higher operating expenses (e.g., insurance, back-up water and power systems, and evacuations), and business interruptions. Awareness of the need for climate-change mitigation measures is also changing the way that consumers think about tourism, all of which has significant implications for patterns of consumption and for the kinds of services that are desired or valued most. How to deal with these consequences has become a critical concern for SIDS such as Barbados and Dominica in the Caribbean, and Fiji and Vanuatu in Oceania. Foreign and domestic service providers (including hotel chains, tour operators, etc.) are active participants in sector- specific adaption plans for tourism in some SIDS. For example, a project of adaptation to “extreme temperatures and risk of tropical storms” was undertaken by the Caribbean Tourism Organization, the governments of several Carib- bean islands, as well as companies in the accommodation industry. Another project of “water impact and adapta- tion” was conducted by individual accommodation providers and tour operators in Fiji (Becken, 2005). The country receives the highest number of tourists in Oceania, and its major hotels are managed by global TNCs such as Accor, Intercontinental, Radisson, Sheraton, Warwick etc.b In this and other cases, a range of technological, managerial and behavioural adaptation measures have been utilized by foreign affiliates to deal with climate change impacts. Foreign affiliates can also play an indirect role in this regard. UNCTAD research in a number of developing countries found that foreign hotels were typically relatively early adopters of “green” technologies and approaches compared to local hotels and appeared to be able to recover from natural disasters more rapidly (UNCTAD, 2007). For instance, all four of Accor’s hotels in Fiji have reached benchmark status for achieving the Green Global certification. c A wide range of methodologies and decision tools exist to guide adaptation practices,d but none have been specifically applied to the tourism industry (UNWTO, UNEP and WMO, 2008). Therefore, in addition to raising the awareness of adaptation among domestic tourism operators, the adaptation activities conducted by foreign affiliates become important sources of possible “best practice” examples for local firms to learn from and imitate. Source: UNCTAD. a For instance, in Barbados: 70 per cent of the island’s hotels are located within 250 metres of the high water mark and are at a high risk of major structural damage. b Lengefeld, Klaus, “Sustainable tourism and climate change in the Pacific island region”, GTZ Sector Project, 2011. c Green Globe is an international environmental accreditation organization for travel and tourism operators. d These include the UNFCCC’s Compendium of Decision Tools to Evaluate Strategies for Adaptation to Climate Change, as well as those developed by organizations such as UNDP Adaptation Policy Framework, United States Country Studies Program and United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Antigua Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Dominicaa Fijia Jamaica Maldives Mauritius Seychellesa Vanuatua Exports GDP Employment Source: UNTCAD. a Share in total employment is estimated. Box figure II.6.1. Share of the hotel and tourism industry in total exports, GDP and employment, selected SIDS, 2007 or latest available year (Per cent)
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development90 Notes 1 Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) is aimed at reforming the legal and fiscal arrangements governing the oil industry. It has yet to be passed. Operating companies are concerned about maintaining their tax exemptions. The proposed bill would also require existing joint ventures to become incorporated with the restructured State-owned oil company, impose separate licences for oil and gas, preferential tax treatment for gas, relinquishment of licences for inactive fields and further reallocation of marginal fields to indigenous operators, enhanced environmental reporting, and higher local content mandates especially for professional and managerial staff. “Nigeria: Petroleum Industry Bill – of Senate warning and public agitation”, AllAfrica.com, 14 March 2011; Revenue Watch Institute (no date), “The Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill: key upstream questions for the National Assembly”, www.revenuewatch.org. 2 “Bharti sets USD1bn African budget in 2011”, TeleGeography, 25 May 2011. www.telegeography. com. 3 Hasan International (Hong Kong, China) invested an estimated $4 billion in metals in Ghana in 2011. 4 Is Zambia Africa's next breadbasket?, Mail and Guardian Online, 1 October 2010 (www.mg.co.za); The great trek north, BNet, July 2004 (www.findarticles. com). 5 “Coleus Crowns: past, present and future”, Madhvani Group Magazine, 18(1): 25, June 2010. 6 Members include Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 7 EAC member countries are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. 8 The Daily News Egypt, Member States push for infrastructure investment at COMESA, 13 April 2010 (www.trademarksa.org). 9 In 2010, for example, Viet Nam surpassed China to become the largest production face for Nike (United States). In 2011, Coach (United States) is planning to shift half of its production activities out of China to neighbouring Asian countries, due to rising labour costs. 10 Harsh Joshi, “Foreign capital shuns India”, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2011. 11 The decline in FDI outflows from India was due to the depressed level of equity investment by Indian companies. By component, of FDI outflows from India: reinvested earnings remained at the same level of 2009 ($1.1 billion); other capital flows (mainly intra-company loans) increased by 99 per cent in 2010, while equity investments dropped by 40 per cent. 12 It is difficult to estimate the share of extractive industries in the region’s total FDI stock due to lack of data at the country level, but it might be around 15 per cent, which is well above the global average of less than 10 per cent (Web table 24 – www.unctad.org/wir). 13 Source: International Energy Agency. 14 Sylvia Pfeifer, “Chinese demand for energy pumps up MA share”, Financial Times, 7 November 2010. 15 See e.g. “The Chinese are coming … to Africa”, The Economist, 22 April 2011. 16 Attractive mineral resources are, for instance, copper (in Chile and Peru), iron ore (in Brazil) and oil and gas (in Ecuador and Venezuela). 17 Source: company website (www.foxconn.com.cn). 18 Adam Goldberg and Joshua Galper, “Where Huawei went wrong in America”, Wall Street Journal, 3 March 2011. 19 Source: International Business Times (www.ibtimes. com). 20 As the target company runs 400 hotels in 25 countries, mainly in Europe, the deal has helped HNA realize its plan of European market expansion. 21 There was a $3.8 billion acquisition of Turkiye Garanti Bankasi by the Spanish Bank BBVA in March 2011. 22 “Arab unrest takes toll on foreign investment”, Financial Times, 30 March 2011. 23 QIA’s cross-border purchases have included investments in the London Stock Exchange, Credit Suisse, Barclays Bank, Volkswagen, the French electrical engineering group Cegelec, the French media and aerospace group Lagardère, Singapore’s Raffles Medical Group, the grocery stores Sainsbury (United Kingdom), the Industrial Commercial Bank of China, the German construction firm Hochtief, and the Brazilian affiliate of Banco Santander. 24 “Qatar Holding acquires 9.1 per cent stake in German industrial giant Hochtief”, Gulfnews.com, 7 December 2010, http://gulfnews.com. 25 The acquisition was through the swap of a 100 per cent share of the French electrical engineering group Cegelec (wholly owned by QIA) for an 8 per cent share of Vinci (Vinci Press release, 31 August 2009, www.vinci.com). 26 Mubadala, Annual Report 2009, Abu Dhabi, Mubadala website http://mubadala.ae. 27 They were the source of 99 per cent of the value of the region's cross-border MA sales to developing countries in 2001–2010, and 99 per cent of greenfield FDI projects by TNCs from developing countries in 2003–2010. Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDI markets (www.fDImarkets. com). 28 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDI Markets (www.fDImarkets. com).
CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 91 29 Shree Renuka Sugars (India) bought out stakes in two Brazilian sugar and ethanol production companies for a total amount of $492 million: 50.34 per cent of Equipav AA, and 100 per cent of Vale Do Ivai. 30 For example, in 2010, three commodities – iron ore, soya and crude oil – made up 84 per cent of Brazilian exports to China in 2010, while its imports from China were dominated almost entirely by manufactured goods (98 per cent). Source: Latin American Economy and Business, April 2011. See also the Economist Intelligence Unit, “Brazil/China economy: rebalancing the relationship”, Viewswire, 13 April 2011, and “Chinese investment in Brazil soars”, Financial Times, 31 January 2011. 31 Georgia is listed under CIS, although it formally ceased to be a member in 2009. 32 “Foreign banks are fleeing Russia”, Bloomberg Business Week, 3 March 2011. 33 See endnote 1 in Chapter I for this State support. 34 A government fund is to be set up in the Russian Federation to attract foreign investment and help modernize the economy, sharing risks with foreign investors in projects designed to help modernize the country. “Russia plans $10 billion investment in fund”, Wall Street Journal, 22 March 2011. 35 Examples include the acqusitions of OAO Udmurneft (Russia Federation) and OAO MangistauMunaiGaz (Kazakhstan) by two Chinese TNCs for $3.6 trillion and $2.6 trillion, respectively. 36 Its members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan are observer States, and Belarus and Sri Lanka dialogue partners. 37 Examples include the “Sino-Russian Beijing declaration”, guiding the two countries’ strategic partnership, and “Russian Federation-India declaration on strategic partnership”, signed in 2000. 38 For example, Tencent, the Chinese company that runs the country’s largest social networking and instant messaging service, is seeking to extend its business model overseas, initially through a 10 per cent stake in one of Russia’s leading internet companies, Digital Sky Technologies. Yin et al., 2011. 39 Repatriated earnings by United States TNCs rose from $99 billion in 2009 to $104 billion in 2010, whereas reinvested earnings rose from $219 billion to $296 billion. 40 This hostile bid received wide media coverage, e.g. “Smooth sailing in rough seas for merger arbitrageurs”, FT.com, 6 December 2010. 41 Examples of bail-outs by rival banks include the $9 billion investment in Morgan Stanley by Mitsubishi UFJ Financial, for 21 per cent of the equity. Though not in the period under study, the most well-known bail-out was that of Merrill Lynch in December 2007, which with additional investments in 2008 amounted to about $6 billion in total. 42 The calculations are based on the Thomson Reuters MA data base and media reports. 43 Examples include the sale of equity in UBS by the Government of Switzerland in 2009 and the sale of equity in Citigroup by the Government of the United States over the course of 2010. 44 The State bail-out left the Government owning 84 per cent of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group and 43 per cent of the Lloyds Banking Group. 45 “Too late for an ‘unbundling’ of Lloyds-HBSO”, Financial Times, 7 April 2011. 46 “Santander buys RBS branches, UK spin-off seen”, Reuters, 4 August 2010. 47 “RBS agrees to sell 80.01 per cent interest in Global Merchant Services to a consortium of Advent International and Bain Capital”, Press Release of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, 6 August 2010. 48 Some efforts, such as UNCTAD’s Business Linkages programme, have proved useful, as exemplified by the projects undertaken in four LDCs: Mozambique, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia, in 2008–2010. 49 The countries of this grouping include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Sixteen of the 31 LLDCs are classified as LDCs, and 9 are economies in transition. 50 China’s Xinxiang Kuroda Mingliang Leather Co. opened a $67 million leather factory in Ethiopia on 24 November 2010. The company financed 55 per cent of the project, with the remainder coming from the China- Africa Development Fund (Source: Bloomberg). 51 In the Nam Theun II Hydropower Project in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, multilateral supports were from IDA (Guarantee/$42 million/2005), IDA (Loan/$20 million/2005), MIGA (Guarantee/$91 million/2005), ADB (Guarantee/$50 million/2005), EIB (Loan/$55 million/2005), ADB (Loan/$70 million/2005), and others (Loan/$131 million/2005). In the Bujagali Hydro Project in Uganda, multilateral supports were from IFC (Loan/$130 million/2007), IDA (Guarantee/$115 million/2007), ADB (Loan/$110 million/2007), EIB (Loan/$130 million/2007), and MIGA (Guarantee/$115 million/2007) (Source: World Bank). 52 The Northern Corridor links Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan Uganda, and United Republic of Tanzania. 53 Source: Reuters.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development92 54 South Africa, Mozambique and other countries in Southern Africa have promoted the establishment of the Maputo Corridor with substantial public and private (including foreign) investment. The corridor is intended to stimulate sustainable growth and development in the area. 55 The Greater Mekong Subregion comprises Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Yunnan Province in China. 56 Launched in 1999, the ASEAN Highway Network Project aims to upgrade all designated national routes to Class I standards by 2020. The network consists of 23 designated routes totalling 38,400 km. 57 The countries of this group include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 58 According to the OECD, the following SIDS are tax havens: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, and Vanuatu. 59 The advserse impacts of global warming on SIDS include: increases in extreme weather events, rises in sea level, reductions in water resources, diminished marine resources, displacement of local species, and increased hazards to human health (Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and United Nations Foundation (UNF), 2008; Kelman and West, 2009). 60 In the context of climate change, mitigation refers to human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels more efficiently for industrial processes and electricity generation, switching to solar energy or wind power, improving the insulation of buildings, and expanding forests and other “sinks” to remove greater amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Adaptation refers to the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities (Source: UNFCCC). 61 In the absence of adaptation efforts, the annual costs of climate change impacts in exposed developing countries in general and SIDS in particular are expected to range from several per cent to tens of per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2006). 62 These sources of funding for adaptation available for SIDS include, for instance, the GEF Trust Fund, the Special Climate Change Trust Fund and the Least Developed Countries Trust Fund (administrated by the UN Global Environment Facility), the Adaptation Fund (administrated by the AF Board under the authority and guidance of CMP), and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 63 In the Caribbean, the industry accounts for 15 per cent of GDP, 13 per cent of employment, and 15 per cent of total exports; in Oceania the shares are 12 per cent, 12 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively (Nurse, 2009). 64 The interdependencies in many cases are quite straightforward: energy directly affects all other industries which require power to function; workers in all industries rely on transport to get to work, and can only work if water supplies are maintained; all other industries are reliant on a supply of electricity for energy and on the ICT for communication (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2011). 65 Source: World Bank PPI database. 66 The company operates water supply and sewerage systems on seven islands, including the island of Malé, where the capital is. Its services are used by 40 per cent of the population of the Maldives (source: hitachi- pt.com). 67 For example, Digicel (incorporated in Bermuda) has been actively investing in telecommunications in countries such as the Maldives (together with IFC) and Papua New Guinea (together with the Asian Development Bank). An energy and water project with the involvement of the Asian Development Bank has contributed to infrastructure in the Maldives, improving the country’s adaptive capability.
Investment liberalization and promotion remained the dominant element of recent investment policies. Nevertheless, the risk of investment protectionism has increased as restrictive investment measures and administrative procedures have accumulated over recent years. The regime of international investment agreements (IIAs) is at a crossroads. With close to 6,100 treaties, many ongoing negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, it has come close to a point where it is too big and complex to handle for governments and investors alike, yet remains inadequate to cover all possible bilateral investment relationships (which would require a further 14,000 bilateral treaties). The policy discourse about the future orientation of the IIA regime and its development impact is intensifying. FDI policies interact increasingly with industrial policies, nationally and internationally. The challenge is to manage this interaction so that the two policies work together for development. Striking a balance between building stronger domestic productive capacity on the one hand and avoiding investment and trade protectionism on the other is key, as is enhancing international coordination and cooperation. The investment policy landscape is influenced more and more by a myriad of voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards. Governments can maximize development benefits deriving from these standards through appropriate policies, such as harmonizing corporate reporting regulations, providing capacity-building programmes, and integrating CSR standards into international investment regimes. CHAPTER III RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development94 A. NATIONAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS In 2010, at least 74 countries around the globe adopted upwards of 149 policy measures affecting foreign investment (table III.1). Of these measures, 101 related to investment liberalization, promotion and facilitation, while 48 introduced new restrictions or regulations relevant to FDI. Compared to 2009, the percentage of more restrictive policy measures increased only slightly, from approximately 30 per cent to 32 per cent. Table III.1. National regulatory changes, 2000–2010 (Number of measures) Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Number of countries that introduced changes 70 71 72 82 103 92 91 58 54 50 74 Number of regulatory changes 150 207 246 242 270 203 177 98 106 102 149 Liberalization/promotion 147 193 234 218 234 162 142 74 83 71 101 Regulations/restrictions  3 14 12 24 36 41 35 24 23 31 48 Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database. Figure III.1. National Regulatory Changes, 2000–2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database. 0 20 40 60 80 100 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Liberalization/promotion Regulations/restrictions 98% 2% 68% 32% This maintains the long-term trend of investment policy becoming increasingly restrictive, rather than liberalizing (figure III.1). Overall, the percentage of investment liberalization and promotion measures was slightly higher in developing countries and transition economies than in developed countries. A closer look at the type of policy measures adopted reveals that most related to operational conditions for TNCs, followed by measures affecting the entry and establishment phase, and promotion and facilitation measures (table III.2). Overall, measures aimed at improving investment conditions continued to outnumber measures introducing new restrictions or regulations, but the margin is diminishing. The numerical difference was particularly large with regard to the entry and establishment category. As regards the geographical distribution (table III.2), developing countries were especially active in revising investment policy. Asian countries (including West Asia) were the most active (56 Investment liberalization and promotion have continued to figure prominently on the policy agendas of many countries. At the same time, the trend of recent years to- wards increased investment regulation has persisted. measures), followed by Africa (29) and Latin America (25). Asia stands out, with a total of 46 out of 56 measures being more favourable to FDI. Measures from West Asia, for instance, were mainly in the area of liberalization of entry conditions, whereas for South, East and South-East Asia, promotion and facilitation also played an important role. In Africa, governments focused particularly on new promotion and facilitation measures to foster a more favourable investment climate. Due principally to developments in a small number of Latin American countries, this region stands out for the number of policy measures that were less favourable to FDI. These measures involved the strengthening of State control (up to and including nationalization) over natural resources- based industries, including both agribusiness and extractive industries. For developed countries the number of more favourable and less favourable entry measures was equal, while in transition economies these measures mainly related to the introduction of new privatization schemes.
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 95 Table III.2. National regulatory changes in 2010, by type of measure and regiona (Number of measures) Entry and establishmentb Operationc Promotion and facilitationdMore favourable to FDI Less favourable to FDI More favourable to FDI Less favourable to FDI Total 40 16 34 33 35 Developed countries 6 6 10 6 4 Developing economies 30 10 19 24 27 Africa 4 2 8 4 11 South, East and South-East Asia 12 5 5 5 12 West Asia 10 0 4 0 3 Latin America and the Caribbean 4 3 2 15 1 South-East Europe and the CIS 4 0 5 3 4 Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database. a Since some of the measures can be classified under more than one type, overall totals differ from table III.1. b Entry measures and establishment: measures related to ownership and control or approval and admission conditions for (both inward and outward) FDI and other measures affecting the entry or establishment of TNCs. c Operation: measures related to non-discrimination, nationalization or expropriation, capital transfer, dispute settlement, performance requirements, corporate tax rates and other measures affecting the operating conditions for TNCs. d Promotion and facilitation: measures related to fiscal and financial incentives, procedural measures related to approval and admission, or investment facilitation and other institutional support. Approximately half of the investment policy measures taken in 2010 related to one or more specific industries. Many different industries were involved, some more than others (in particular, extractive industries and financial services). For most industries, measures in the area of liberalization or promotion of FDI dominated those of a restrictive nature (table III.3). The main exceptions to this were the extractive industries and to a lesser extent agribusiness. These industries were responsible for a large share of the restrictive measures in 2010, including measures such as the introduction of performance requirements and new tax regimes, and the renegotiation of contracts. 1. Investment liberalization and promotion Of the 40 new investment liberalization measures implemented in 2010, 25 were specifically taken to liberalize foreign investment, and 15 were of a more general nature improving the overall policy framework for FDI. These measures were most pronounced in Asia and related to a broad range of industries (table III.2 and box III.1). Of the 34 measures improving operational conditions for At least 56 countries adopted new investment liberalization or promotion measures in various indus- tries. The number of these measures increased from 71 in 2009 to 101 in 2010. TNCs, most relate to the lowering of corporate tax rates. Most of the measures to promote or facilitate foreign investment were taken by countries in Africa and Asia (table III.2). A few categories of facilitation and promotion measures stand out as having been frequently used. These include the streamlining of admission procedures and the opening of new – or the expansion of existing – special economic zones (box III.2). From a practical point of view, facilitation measures can often be more important for investors than a formal easing of investment restrictions. Informal Table III.3. National regulatory changes in 2010, by industry (Per cent) Liberalization/ promotion Regulations/ restrictions Total 67 33 No specific industry 84 16 Agribusiness 38 62 Extractive industries 7 93 Manufacturing 50 50 Electricity, gas and water 75 25 Financial services 59 41 Other services 61 39 Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development96 Box III.1. Examples of investment liberalization measures in 2010/2011 • Bhutan released its “FDI policy 2010”, according to which all activities not included in a “negative list” shall be open to FDI. It allowed 100 per cent foreign ownership in certain activities such as education, specialized health services, luxury hotels and resorts, and infrastructure facilities within the services sector.a • Canada removed foreign ownership restrictions regarding international submarine cables, earth stations that provide telecommunications services by means of satellites, and satellites.b • Guatemala passed a new insurance law that allows foreign insurance companies to establish branches.c • India issued a new consolidated FDI policy, which facilitates the expansion of established foreign owned enter- prises, allows the conversion of non-cash items into equity (with approval from the government) and permits FDI in certain agricultural activities.d • Indonesia has partially liberalized construction services, film and health services, as well as parts of electricity generation. e • Syrian Arab Republic issued a legislation that permits the private sector (both foreign and domestic) to invest in the generation and distribution of electricity.f • Taiwan Province of China partially liberalized outward investment to China with regard to a number of activities related to agriculture, manufacturing, services, and infrastructure.g It also announced the opening of a large part of its core hi-tech business, including semiconductor manufacturing, to investors from mainland China.h • Turkey adopted a law permitting foreign investors to hold up to 50 per cent of the shares in up to two broad- casting companies. i Source: UNCTAD. a Ministry of Economic Affairs, 21 May 2010. b Canada Telecommunications Act amended 12 July 2010, Art. 16 (5). c Decree No. 25-2010, published in the Official Gazette No. 3, 13 August 2010. d Consolidated FDI Policy Circular No.1, 1 April 2011. e Presidential Regulation No. 36, 2010. f Law No. 32, 14 November 2010. g Council for Economic Planning and Development, “Restrictions loosened on investment in China”, 9 April 2010. h Investment Commission, “The second phase of opening up the mainland investment in Taiwan Industry Project”, 2 March 2011. i Law No. 6112, 3 March 2011. barriers are regularly cited as major investment hurdles in developing countries. Removing such bottlenecks is also politically less sensitive than investment liberalization. Moreover, the smaller the differences between countries in their formal openness to FDI, the greater the importance of “soft” investment conditions, like a welcoming, competent and efficient administration. Investment promotion measures have also been taken in the context of industrial policy (section D). Several countries have taken steps to encourage FDI in specific economic activities, such as hi- tech industries or car manufacturing. Promotion measures included fiscal and financial incentives, and the establishment of special economic zones. 2. Investment regulations and restrictions Notwithstanding the continuing predominance of investment liberalization and promotion, numerous countries have adopted measures to strengthen the regulatory framework for investment, both domestic and foreign. The number of measures restricting or regulating FDI increased from 31 in 2009 to 48 in 2010. This has been the case The rebalancing of investor rights and obliga- tions continued, with a particular focus on the financial sector. Several countries increased the role of the State in natural resources based industries, such as agribusiness and extractive industries.
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 97 Box III.2. Examples of investment promotion measures in 2010/2011 • Bosnia and Herzegovina amended its Law on Foreign Direct Investment Policy, simplifying the registration pro- cess for foreign investment.a • Fiji adopted a one-stop shop policy to enhance processes relating to foreign and local investment applications in the country.b • In the Republic of Korea, the Government is offering an improved package of incentives to attract foreign inves- tors into special economic zones. The Government also extended FDI zones for the services sector.c • Myanmar passed a “Special Economic Zone Law”, which provides incentives for foreign investors in banking and insurance.d • The Philippines launched its Public–Private Partnership Centre to facilitate the coordination and monitoring of the PPP programmes and projects.e • The Russian Federation created a new special economic zone in the Samar Region with a view to attracting investors particularly in the car-making and related industries.f The country also introduced simplified rules for employing highly qualified foreign specialists.g Source: UNCTAD. a Law on the Policy on Foreign Direct Investment, Official Gazette No. 48/10. b Fiji Government Online Portal, “Cabinet approves one stop shop”, 18 January 2011. c Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “Free Economic Zone Promotion Plan”, 1 September 2010; Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “Modification of the Enforcement Decree on the FDI Act”, 5 October 2010. d Special Economic Zone Law No. 8/2011, Official Gazette of the Government of Myanmar, 27 January 2011. e Official Gazette, “PPP center launches 5 PPP projects”, 4 March 2011. f Government Resolution No. 621, 12 August 2010. g Federal Law No. 86-FZ, 19 May 2010. particularly in the financial sector, where several countries tightened existing rules in order to prevent future financial crises. Most of these measures have been taken by G-20 countries, and other members of the Basel Accord. In general, these new financial regulations focus on an increase in bank capital and liquidity requirements, reducing the existing risks in connection with financial institutions that are “too big to fail”, and reinforcing oversight.1 Different opinions exist as to the impact of the new regulations on FDI in the financial sector. Concerns have been expressed about the potential negative impact of the new regulations on existing investments, but regulators argue that the beneficial impact on the macro economy should more than offset the transitional adjustment costs.2 More State intervention also became apparent in the natural resources based industry. A number of countries, in particular in Latin America, pursued nationalization policies, with foreign investors being one target. Some nationalizations occurred also in other industries, including financial services. Likewise, a move towards stricter regulations manifested itself in new operational conditions for foreign investors, such as local content requirements. Once again, the extractive industry was particularly affected (box III.3). Compared to the quantity of nationalizations and new operating conditions for investment, new FDI entry and establishment restrictions have been less common (table III.2). In large part, these measures have related to screening and approval regulations (box III.4). No clear pattern emerged according to which certain industries would be specifically liable to new entry restrictions. The latter vary between countries due to individual political sensitivities. A few foreign investments have been rejected on national interest grounds. The reported nationalizations and sector-specific entry restrictions are part of broader developments in industrial policy, characterized by an extension of protective measures to national champions and strategic industries and by the intrusion of national security concepts into industrial policy
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development98 Box III.3. Examples of new regulatory measures affecting established foreign investors in 2010/2011 • In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Government nationalized, among others, the country’s pension system.a • Ecuador passed a new hydrocarbons law. It requires private oil companies to renegotiate their contracts from a production-sharing to a service arrangement.b The Government started to take over the oil fields of the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras after renegotiation of its licence failed.c • Kazakhstan adopted a Law on State-Owned Property, which regulates the nationalization of private property in cases of threats to national security.d • The Kyrgyz Republic nationalized one of the country’s largest banks, the foreign-controlled AsiaUniversalBank.e • The Russian Federation tightened the rules for foreign automobile producers with assembly plants in Russia. In order for such producers to continue to enjoy duty-free importation of components, they will have to signifi- cantly increase the overall volume of production in Russia and achieve a higher level of locally produced parts.f • In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, nationalizations affected various industries, including in the area of agriculture and power generation.g • Zimbabwe set out the requirements for the implementation of the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act and its supporting regulations as they pertain to the mining sector. This 2007 Act made provision for the indigenization of up to 51 per cent of all foreign-owned businesses operating in Zimbabwe.h Source: UNCTAD. a Law No.65, 10 December 2010. b Ley Reformatoria a la Ley de Hidrocarburos y a la Ley de Regimen Tributario Interno, 24 June 2010. c Government press release, 23 November 2010. d Law on State Property, No. 413-IV, of 1 March 2011. e Decree No.56, 7 June 2010. f Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Finance, Joint Order No.678/1289/184H, 24 December 2010. g Decree No. 7.394, 27 April 2010; Decree No. 7.700, 4 October 2010; Decree No. 7.713, 10 October 2010; Decree No. 7.751, 26 October 2010. h General Notice 114, 25 March 2011. considerations. Together, this raises important questions on how to safeguard adequate policy space for countries to adopt FDI restrictions that they consider necessary, while at the same time avoiding such policies degenerating into investment protectionism (section D). Although still a minority, overall the number of restrictive investment regulations and administrative practices has accumulated to a significant degree over the past few years. Together with their continued upward trend, as well as stricter review procedures for FDI entry, this poses the risk of potential investment protectionism. 3. Economic stimulus packages and State aid More than two and a half years after the outbreak of the financial crisis, some countries continue to hold considerable assets following bail-out operations, have substantial outstanding loans to individual firms, or continue emergency support schemes for the financial and non-financial sectors.3 However, in the financial sector, many countries have ceased to accept applications from financial firms to public assistance schemes. The phasing out of some of these schemes had already started in late 2009, and continued in 2010. Part of this process is due to the expiry of support schemes in the European Union, which included sunset clauses set by the European Commission. The closure of aid schemes also reflects an uneven but often low demand by businesses for this aid, which has been further weakened by the gradual tightening of the conditions of State support by governments (EC, 2011). With the closure of support schemes to new entrants, the main outstanding issue relates to the unwinding of assets and liabilities that remain on government books as a legacy of the emergency The unwinding of support schemes and liabilities resulting from emergency measures has started. So far this process has not overtly discriminated against foreign investors.
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 99 measures. So far, this process has advanced relatively slowly, and less than a fifth of the financial firms that received crisis-related support have repaid loans fully, repurchased equity or relinquished public guarantees. In the non-financial sectors, legacy assets and liabilities are much lower, but the number of companies that benefited from crisis-related government support is much greater. The unwinding of emergency aid to the non-financial sector has also started. For instance, in the automotive industry – one of the main industries at which aid was targeted – companies in Canada, France and the United States have partly repaid loans, and some of the government equity holdings in the companies have been acquired by private investors. In all, in April 2011, governments are estimated to hold legacy assets and liabilities in financial and non-financial firms valued at over $2 trillion. By far the largest share relates to several hundred firms in the financial sector. This indicates a potential wave of privatizations in years to come. Box III.4. Examples of entry restrictions for foreign investors in 2010/2011 • Australia rejected Singapore Exchange’s US$8.3 billion offer to take over Australian Securities Exchange, which it concluded was not in Australia’s national interest.a • Brazil reinstated restrictions on rural land-ownership for foreigners by modifying the way a law dating back to 1971 is to be interpreted. The reinterpreted law establishes that, on rural land-ownership, Brazilian companies which are majority owned by foreigners are subject to the legal regime applicable to foreign companies.b • The Minister of Industry of Canada announced the blocking of the Australian mining company “BHP Billiton’s” US$39 billion takeover of Potash Corp. (a Canadian fertilizer and mining company).c Source: UNCTAD. a Australian Treasury, Foreign Investment Decision, 8 April 2011. b New Interpretation of Law No. 5.709/71, Parecer CGU/AGU No. 01/2008, 23 August 2010. c Ministry of Industry Press Release , 3 November 2010.Catas dolor sint facia niatur rerendi dit intur sinventendae vel eostis Since 2009, following a request by G-20 leaders, UNCTAD, the WTO and OECD have monitored trade- and investment-related policy responses to the financial crisis. One of the main objectives is to scrutinize whether and to what extent countries resorted to trade or investment protectionism, as they grappled with the crisis. The five reports published so far by the three international organizations conclude that for the most part, emergency measures as well as unwinding of assets and liabilities did not overtly discriminate against foreign investors (WIR10; OECD-UNCTAD, 2010a, b and 2011; WTO-OECD-UNCTAD, 2009 and 2010). For instance, the United States has sold its holdings in financial institutions and an automotive company through auctions executed by private banks and parts of the assets were sold to foreign competitors.4 Furthermore, a study by the European Commission shows that several EU member States, including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, considered that emergency schemes for the non-financial sectors implemented in other countries did not harm their companies.5
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development100 B. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 1. Developments in 2010 In 2010, a total of 178 new IIAs were concluded (54 bilateral investment treaties (BITs),6 113 double taxation treaties (DTTs)7 and 11 IIAs other than BITs and DTTs (“other IIAs”).8 As a result, at the end of 2010 the IIA universe contained 6,092 agreements, including 2,807 BITs, 2,976 DTTs and 309 “other IIAs” (figure III.2). The trend seen in 2010 of rapid treaty expansion – with more than three treaties concluded every week – is expected to continue in 2011, the first five months of which saw the conclusion of 48 new IIAs (23 BITs, 20 DTTs and five “other IIAs”) and more than 100 free trade agreements (FTAs) and other economic agreements with investment provisions currently under negotiation. At the same time, it remains to be seen how the shift of responsibility for FDI from EU member States to the European level will affect the IIA regime (with EU member States being parties to more than 1,300 BITs with third countries) (box III.5). In terms of total numbers of IIAs, as of May 2011, the United Kingdom is party to 320 IIAs, followed by Germany (304) and France (297). Amongst the developing countries, China tops the list, with 249 IIAs, followed by the Republic of Korea (190) and Turkey (183). The Russian Federation (141) and Croatia (118) rank first among the transition economies. Twenty of the 54 BITs signed in 2010 were between developing countries and/or transition economies, as were four of the 11 other IIAs, a trend possibly related to developing countries’ growing role as outward investors. With respect to “other IIAs”, treaties concluded in 2010 continue to fall into the three categories: IIAs including obligations commonly found in BITs (three treaties in 2010);9 agreements with limited investment-related provisions (five treaties);10 and IIAs focusing on investment cooperation (three treaties).11 Countries continue to conclude IIAs, sometimes with novel provisions aimed at rebalancing the rights and obligations between States and investors and ensuring coherence between IIAs and other public policies. At the same time, the policy discourse about international investment policymaking intensifies at both domestic and international levels, amounting to a period of reflection on the future orientation of the IIA regime to make it work better for sustainable development. Nationally, different investment stakeholders have started to voice their concerns about the costs and As the IIA universe continues to expand, the policy discourse about how to enhance IIAs’ con- tribution to sustainable development is intensify- ing, at both the national and international levels. Figure III.2. Trends of BITs, DTTs and “other IIAs”, 2000–2010 Source: UNCTAD, based on IIA database. 0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 5 000 6 000 7 000 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 DTTs BITs Other IIAs All IIAs cumulative AnnualnumberofIIAs CumulativenumberofIIAs
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 101 Box III.5. EU FDI Policymaking The entry into force in December 2009 of the Lisbon Treaty shifted responsibility in the field of FDI from the member States to the EU (WIR10).While European member States continue concluding BITsa the shift of responsibility has given rise to a number of substantive and procedural questions about future EU investment policymaking at the international level. In that context, the relevant European institutions and non-governmental investment stakeholders have expressed their views. While there seems to be agreement among EU institutions on the general orientation of future EU IIAs (i.e. that they should contribute to sustainable and inclusive growth and be guided by the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action, notably human rights and sustainable development), differences of opinion have emerged regarding the details (e.g. provisions on scope and definition, the content and formulation of key substantive and procedural protection provisions, and the extent to which IIAs should refer to corporate social responsibility (CSR)). Opinions differ even more when considering non-governmental investment stakeholders. A number of civil society groups consider IIAs a threat to the public interest, and suggest that it is time for a radically new approach to foreign in­vestment. In contrast, some European industry groups highlight the positive role BITs play in increasing the competitiveness of European industry. The disagreement is compounded by questions about future development of the EU IIA regime, including how to deal with the selection of future negotiating partners, with ongoing negotiations and with existing EU BITs (both intra- and extra-EU BITs). The outcome of this debate is likely to have a major impact on the global IIA regime. EU member States are among the countries with the largest numbers of BITs (annex table III.1). Moreover, over the last three years, Europe as a whole accounted for approximately 30 per cent of global FDI flows. The EU debate offers great potential in so far as it allows the putting into practice of lessons learned regarding the design and substance of IIAs and their impact on sustainable development. However, open questions, attendant uncertainties, lack of predictability and stability will all serve to complicate the situation for EU negotiating partners and the IIA regime generally. Source: UNCTAD. a Thirty of the 54 BITs concluded in 2010 involved an EU member State. Seventeen of the 30 European BITs were renegotiated ones. benefits and the future orientation of IIAs, including civil society, business and parliamentarians. While IIAs have traditionally been negotiated by the relevant government ministry, there is now an emerging trend of inter-ministerial or inter-agency coordination. This process is particularly prominent at the European level (box III.5), but is also evident in EU member States and other countries around the globe. To the extent that countries are reviewing their model BITs (WIR10), or that IIAs need to undergo domestic ratification processes, the call for increasing transparency and inclusiveness of IIA-related decision-making is gaining additional traction. Internationally, the discourse was carried forward in forums such as the UNCTAD Investment Commission, the OECD Investment Committee, joint meetings of OECD and UNCTAD, regional conversations co-organized by UNCTAD to improve the investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) system, and particularly in the UNCTAD World Investment Forum 2010, which involved a broad range of investment stakeholders in the Ministerial Round Table and the IIA Conference 2010. With respect to ISDS, at least 25 new treaty-based cases were initiated in 2010 – the lowest number filed annually since 2001. This brought the total of known cases filed to 390 by the end of the year (figure III.3).12 These cases were mainly submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (including its Additional Facility), which continued to be the most frequently used international arbitration forum (with 18 new cases). This follows the long-term trend, with the majority of cases accruing under ICSID (245 cases in total). In 2010, the total number of countries involved in investment treaty arbitrations grew to 83, with Uruguay and Grenada each contesting the first claims directed against them. Fifty-one developing countries, 17 developed countries and 15 economies in transition have been on the responding side of ISDS cases. The overwhelming
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development102 majority of the claims were initiated by investors from developed countries. Forty-seven decisions were rendered in 2010, bringing the total number of cases concluded to 197 (UNCTAD, 2011c).13 Twenty of these decisions were awards, 14 of which were decided in favour of the State, five in favour of the investor, and one award embodied the parties’ settlement agreement. This has tilted the overall balance of awards further in favour of the State (with 78 won cases against 59 lost). 2. IIA coverage of investment The intended purpose of IIAs is to protect and to promote foreign investment. Today, about two-thirds of global FDI stock benefits from post- establishment protection with comprehensive sectoral coverage granted by BITs or “other IIAs”.14 However, this represents only one-fifth of possible bilateral relationships. To provide full coverage another 14,100 bilateral investment treaties would be required (figure III.4). These 14,100 treaties would include, on the one hand, many bilateral relationships with little propensity to invest (i.e. where FDI flows are negligible) or with little propensity to protect (e.g. between OECD member countries). On the other hand, they would also include a few bilateral relationships where substantial FDI stocks exist that are not covered by any existing investment protection agreement (e.g. China and the United States, Brazil and China). Thesefindingsbeganumberofquestionswithregard to the effectiveness of IIAs in terms of generating investment flows and promoting development gains (UNCTAD, 2009b). For example, the existence of considerable FDI stocks in the absence of post- establishment treaty coverage suggests that for some investment relationships, IIAs fall short of being a determining factor for investment. Furthermore, some of the FDI stock is subject to protection offered by two or more IIAs. In fact, 570 BITs at least partially duplicate the post-establishment protection offered by other agreements. The extent of overlap and risk of contradictory provisions depends on the precise formulation used in BITs and/or “other IIAs” in terms of protection granted and flexibilities offered (WIR10). This raises questions about the efficiency of the IIA regime – an issue that is already discussed with regard to the future of EU member States’ IIAs (box III.5). A further 630 BITs overlap with “other IIAs” that contain investment liberalization provisions only Today’s IIA regime offers protection to more than two-thirds of global FDI stock, but covers only one- fifth of possible bilateral investment relationships. Figure III.3. Known investment treaty arbitrations, 1987–2010 (Cumulative and newly instituted cases) Source: UNCTAD, ISDS database. 100 0 50 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 ICSID Non-ICSID All cases cumulative Annualnumberofcases Cumulativenumberofcases
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 103 (e.g. EU partnership, association and cooperation agreements), resulting in a situation where post-establishment protection (offered by BITs) complements pre-establishment protection/ liberalization (offered by “other IIAs”). Whether such comprehensive coverage is desirable is an important question, the answer to which is highly context- and situation-specific, and needs to be Figure III.4. IIA coverage of bilateral relationships and FDI stocks (Per cent and number) Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) and UNCTAD database on IIAs. a Includes EU, OIC, UCIAC, LAS, COMESA, SADC, ASEAN, CEFTA, CAFTA, APTA, UMA, Eurasian Economic Community, MERCOSUR,TEP,NAFTA, EFTA, the FTA between GCC-EFTA, as well as FTAs CARICOM, ASEAN, EFTA and GCC with third countries. Note: FDI stocks are estimated on the basis of treaty-partner shares of world FDI inflows and outflows. 192 UN member countries only. assessed against the overall objective of ensuring that IIAs promote investment for sustainable development.Furthermore,investmentrelationships have to be seen from a dynamic perspective, as the propensities to invest, and hence to protect through IIAs, may change over time (as witnessed by the growing interest of some emerging outward investing countries in IIAs). Bilateral relationships 10 10012 78 FDI stocks covered by regional economic groupings and FTAsa Total global FDI stocks FDI stocks covered by BITs only FDI stocks not covered by BITs or equivalent IIA 34 34 32 100 1 800 18 1002 200 14 100Number Per cent C. OTHER INVESTMENT-RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 1. Investment in agriculture Since the publication of the World Investment Report 2010, work has continued on the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) that were developed jointly by UNCTAD, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Bank (WIR10). The agricultural Supported by the G-20 Development Agenda, various international initiatives are being developed to promote positive development impacts through private investment. sector in low-income countries has been suffering from serious underinvestment for decades. Private investment can contribute to long-term solutions to food security and development, provided that such investment is socially responsible and environmentally sustainable (WIR09). The seven principles, once implemented, could contribute to enhancing the positive and reducing the potential negative effects of foreign investment in agricultural production. The coverage of food security and responsible investment in agriculture by the G-20 Multi-Year Action Plan on Development reflects growing concerns among policymakers regarding access to
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development104 food and food prices, the potential negative impacts of speculation and profiteering in commodities and land, and the social and environmental impacts of international investments in agriculture. At the Seoul Summit on 11–12 November 2010, the G-20 leaders encouraged countries and companies to uphold the PRAI and requested UNCTAD, the World Bank, IFAD, FAO and other appropriate international organizations to develop options for promoting responsible investment in agriculture. 2. G-20 Development Agenda At the Seoul Summit, the G-20 leaders considered the disproportionate effect of the financial crisis on the most vulnerable in the poorest countries, and the slow progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).15 The G-20 leaders committed to work in partnership with other developing countries, low-income countries (LICs) in particular, to help build the capacity to achieve and maintain their economic growth potential in line with the mandate from the G-20’s Toronto Summit.16 The Seoul Consensus consists of a set of principles and guidelines to achieve the MDGs. The six core principles focus on economic growth, global development partnership, global or regional systemic issues, private sector participation, complementarity, and outcome orientation. In addition, the G-20 leaders identified nine areas, or “key pillars”, where action is necessary to resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth in developing countries. These areas are: infrastructure, private investment and job creation, human resource development, trade, financial inclusion, growth with resilience, food security, domestic resource mobilization, and knowledge-sharing. The G-20 leaders also endorsed the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development, with deadlines running from 2012 to late 2014. This Plan includes 16 specific and detailed actions on the nine key pillars identified in the Seoul Consensus. Three pillars in the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development are closely related to investment. Under the “Private Investment and Job Creation” pillar, the G-20 leaders emphasized the importance of domestic and foreign private investment as a key source of employment, wealth creation and innovation, which in turn contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction in developing countries. The leaders committed to support and assist investors, developing countries and key development partners in their work to maximize the economic value-added of private investment. At the G-20’s request, UNCTAD, UNDP, ILO, OECD and the World Bank reviewed and developed key quantifiable economic and financial indicators for measuring and maximizing economic value-added and job creation arising from private sector investment in value chains, and developed policy approaches for promoting standards for responsible investment in value chains. G-20 leaders are expected to take further actions based on this work at their future summits in 2011 and 2012. Under the “Infrastructure” pillar the G-20 leaders looked at gaps in infrastructure, in particular with respect to energy, transport, communications, water and regional infrastructure, that are significant bottlenecks to increasing and maintaining growth in many developing countries. They committed to overcoming obstacles to infrastructure investment, developing project pipelines, improving capacity and facilitating increased finance for infrastructure investment in developing countries, in particular LICs. They requested regional development banks and the World Bank Group to work jointly to prepare action plans to increase public, semi-public and private finance and improve implementation of national and regional infrastructure projects, including in energy, transport, communications and water, in developing countries. Under the “Food Security” pillar, the G-20 leaders emphasized the need for increased investment and financial support for agricultural development, and encouraged additional contributions by the private sector, the G-20 and other countries to support country-led plans and ensure predictable financing. 3. Political risk insurance In the past few years, the investment community has been mainly concerned with the financial crisis and its impacts on FDI and the global economy. However, political risk considerations are expected to return to the fore of investors’ concerns, both
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 105 per cent in 12 months (MIGA, 2011). The slight pick-up in 2010 results from the modest recovery in FDI during the year. Political risk insurance evolved in 2010. For example, the Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy (NCBP) was updated to avoid the re-accumulation of external debt in low-income countries that have benefited from the “multilateral” debt relief initiative of 2006. Since April 2010, the NCBP has been successful in attracting an increased number of creditors to adhere to NCBP for promotion of financing of low-income countries (MIGA, 2011). Finally, political risk insurance has linkages with other areas of investment policymaking. For example, some entities condition the granting of political risk insurance on the existence of an IIA with the host country in question. in the developed and in the developing world. According to the 2010 MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey, political risk was perceived to be the single most important constraint on investment into developing countries over the medium term. This reflects numerous developments, including a trend towards greater regulation of FDI (section A) and recent political unrest in some parts of the world. So far, however, these concerns have not yet resulted in greater reliance on political risk insurance. As a consequence of the global economic crisis, the volume of liability underwritten by Berne Union (BU) investment insurers fell by 6 per cent to $137.1 billion from 2008 to 2009. Reflecting the recovery in new business, the volume of liability totalled over $142 billion as of June 2010, an increase of 7.7 D. INTERACTION BETWEEN FDI POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY Many governments have opted for more proactive industrial policy in recent years. The reasons for this are manifold and include, for instance, structural change and economic diversification, pressure from international competition, disappointment with the results of laissez- faire policy, the wish to “guide” development, a desire to strengthen and protect national champions, and State intervention in response to various crises. The success of industrial policy in countries such as Brazil, China, India or the Republic of Korea has given further impetus to this development. FDI policy interacts closely with industrial development strategies. In general, countries promote or restrict foreign investment within this context, depending on the industry in question and on the role they want to assign to FDI in domestic development. Investment promotion policy can be an important means to build productive capacity FDI policy increasingly interacts with industrial policy, both at the national and international levels. The challenge is to make the two work together for development, to avoid investment protectionism and to enhance interna- tional coordination. in developing countries, as TNCs bring capital, technology and know-how into the host country that can be crucial for the development of individual industries. Conversely, countries may choose to restrict FDI because they see a need to protect certain domestic industries − in particular infant or strategic industries – from foreign takeovers or competition. The interaction between FDI policy and industrial policy has both national and international dimensions. 1. Interaction at the national level The interface between FDI policies and industrial policies is most pronounced in specific national investment guidelines that define the role of FDI in domestic industrial development strategies and identify the policy tools to apply in this context. A number of countries have created such documents that specify to various degrees the extent to which FDI is prohibited, restricted, allowed or encouraged, and what FDI-related policy instruments to apply (e.g. China’s “Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue” and “Catalogue of Foreign Investment Advantageous Industries in Central
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development106 and Western China”, India’s “Consolidated FDI Policy”).17 Some guidelines specifically address the use of investment promotion instruments (e.g. the Republic of Korea’s “FDI Promotion Policy in 2011”, the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority’s “Invest in Malaysia” policy, and the Thailand Board of Investment’s “Investment Promotion Policy for Sustainable Development”).18 These guidelines may also relate to the interpretation of national laws and policies at the sub-national level. Many countries have policies to target individual companies or specific categories of foreign investors considered capable of making a particularly significant contribution to industrial development, such as hi-tech investments, environmentally friendly projects or labour intensive technologies. Investment promotion agencies (IPAs) have an important supporting role in this context, namely through their matchmaking and aftercare services. These “targeting” policies may be reinforced through linkage programmes, the promotion of industrial clusters, and incubation programmes to maximize spillover effects and other benefits. Industrial policy strategies often emerge with more general fiscal or financial incentive programmes. Investment incentives are subject to requirements related to development in certain industries, or regions, or with regard to specific development goals, such as export promotion, job creation, technology transfer and upgrading. Investment incentives are also used to help developing industries where as yet there is no sufficiently large market (e.g. renewables). Industrial policy can further be supported by specific investment promotion and facilitation measures for FDI in particular industries, in line with their development strategies. The establishment of special economic zones and incubators, such as “hi-tech zones” (e.g. the “Electronic City” in Bangalore, India),19 “IT corridors” (e.g. The Taipei Technology Corridor”)20 or “renewables zones” (e.g. “Masdar City” in Abu Dhabi),21 which aim at improving the “hard” and “soft” infrastructure of the host country, are cases in point.22 Industrial policy may also be pursued through selective FDI restrictions. In the past, restrictive FDI policy has been applied particularly with a 0 20 40 60 80 Construction, tourism retail Agriculture forestry Health care waste management Light manufacturing Mining, oil gas Finance Telecom Electricity Media Transport view to promoting infant industries, or for socio- cultural reasons (e.g. land ownership restrictions). Nowadays, this relatively narrow policy scope has given way to a broader approach, under which numerous countries have strengthened their FDI- related policy instruments, in particular with regard to approval and screening procedures, and where the beneficiaries of government protection also include national champions, strategic enterprises and critical infrastructure. Moreover, governments may see a need to protect ailing domestic industries and companies at times of financial crisis or to discourage or restrict outward foreign investment in order to keep employment “at home”. Increasingly, industrial policy considerations to justify FDI restrictions have become blurred with other policies to protect national security, thus further enlarging the scope of State intervention vis-à-vis foreign investors. The economic importance of such policies is huge. For instance, policies to protect national champions and strategic enterprises usually cover core industries such as natural resources, energy, telecommunications, financial services and the transport sector (OECD, 2009). Figure III.5 provides an indication of which industries are most often affected by certain foreign ownership limitations. Restrictions mainly apply to transport and media, with more than half of the countries limiting foreign investment in these industries, often allowing only minority ownership.23 Figure III.5. Share of countries with industry-specific restrictions on foreign ownership, by industry, 2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on World Bank, 2010.
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 107 2. Interaction at the international level The interaction between international investment policy and industrial policy is characterized by the dual nature of IIAs, potentially both supporting and constraining industrial policy. With respect to their potential to support industrial policy, IIAs are expected to encourage foreign investment through their functions of (i) protecting and liberalizing investment (e.g. by easing entry or by offering national treatment); (ii) improving the overall investment policy framework; and/or (iii) enlarging markets to serve (UNCTAD, 2009c). In addition, some IIAs include specific promotion-oriented provisions (UNCTAD, 2008b).24 However, as most IIAs apply on a cross-cutting basis, potential foreign investment enhancing effects would occur for all industries. On the other hand, IIAs also have the potential to constrain investment-related industrial policy. Provisions that deserve most attention in this context include, among others, IIA rules regarding (i) the entry of foreign investors (e.g. potentially precluding countries from restricting foreign investment at the entry level); (ii) national treatment (e.g. potentially precluding countries from granting subsidies exclusively to domestically owned enterprises);25 and/or (iii) performance requirements (e.g. potentially constraining policies aimed at generating certain local linkages or ensuring positive spill-overs from foreign investment). A potentially constraining impact may also arise from investment- related provisions in international trade agreements, such as the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures26 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (box III.6).27 The actual extent of constraints posed by IIA obligations is hard to anticipate in the abstract, and will depend on the industry, policy and IIA clause at issue. To avoid creating undue policy constraints, a number of flexibility mechanisms have been developed in some IIAs (WIR10), taking, amongst others, the form of exceptions/exclusions to the treaty or of country-specific lists of reservations. Those particularly relevant for industrial policy include: • Excluding certain industries, such as aviation, fisheries, maritime matters, financial services or cultural industries; • Excluding certain policies, such as taxation, subsidies, government procurement, or agri- cultural policies;28 and/or • Including general or national security excep- tions, which increasingly become relevant in the context of industrial policy (UNCTAD, 2009b). Certain sectors and industries stand out as ones to which policymakers give particular attention when seeking to preserve space for industrial policy. For example, as revealed by UNCTAD case studies on investment reservations (figure III.6), countries are generally reluctant to accept far-reaching international commitments in the services sector, a trend that has remained broadly unchanged over recent decades.29 Beyond specific industrial policy considerations a number of other aspects might also come within this context, notably: (i) the generally higher level of regulation (e.g. as a result of the greater scope for market failure in network services); (ii) greater political sensitivities (e.g. regarding the role of private – and foreign – providers in essential services sectors such as education, health and environmental services, including water distribution); (iii) national security concerns (e.g. with respect to strategic services); and (iv) the high level of State ownership (chapter I, section C.2) or governmental scrutiny (e.g. in sectors where monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures prevail) (UNCTAD, 2005, 2006). Within the services sector, policymakers are inclined to preserve policy space particularly with regard to transportation, finance (e.g. banking and insurance), business/professional services and communication (e.g. postal, courier, telecom and audiovisual services) (figure III.7).30 While the rationale for doing so may be different in each of the industries (e.g. (i) issues related to cabotage in the case of transport; (ii) issues regarding the integrity and stability of the sector in the case of financial services; and (iii) issues regarding the need to guarantee the supply of public services in the telecommunications sector), the quest for State ownership may also be relevant.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development108 Sometimes, policy space is preserved for specific aspects of investment policy that are closely related to industrial policy. Issues related to subsidies, the nationality of ships, public utilities, State-owned enterprises or land ownership serve as examples. The salient features characterizing the interaction between FDI policies and industrial policy at the international level correspond to what can be observed at the national level. At both levels, the services sector is much more affected by foreign ownership limitations, compared to manufacturing or primary (e.g. agriculture and forestry) sectors. Moreover, as indicated by figures III.5 (national policies) and III.7 (international policies), the services industries where countries are comparatively more Figure III.6. Investment-related reservations in IIAs, across sectors (Number of reservations) Source: UNCTAD, based on IIA database and UNCTAD (2005, 2006). Based on a survey of 16 IIAs. 0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 Horizontal Primary Manufacturing Services Box III.6. WTO TRIMS Agreement The WTO Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement) precludes WTO members from adopting certain goods-related performance requirements, such as requirements to use predetermined amounts of locally produced inputs.a The TRIMS Agreement therefore directly touches upon measures that traditionally fall within the realm of industrial policy. Moreover, the fact that the TRIMs Agreement applies to both foreign and domestic producers of goods, including agriculture-related goods, and that its list of prohibited measures is indicative rather than exhaustive, may suggest that the Agreement’s actual reach may be considerable. However, it has to be noted that the TRIMs Agreement acknowledges that all exceptions under GATT 1994 shall apply, as appropriate, to its provisions.b The Agreement also provides for a temporary exception for developing countries to maintain flexibility in their tariff structure enabling them to grant the tariff protection required for the establishment of a particular industry.c Furthermore, TRIMS applies to goods-related policies only and hence does not apply to WTO Members’ services-related policies (e.g. local services requirements). The TRIMS Agreement establishes transparency requirementsd and an institutional setting, the TRIMs Committee, for discussion and consultation. Several debates in the TRIMs Committee have touched on industrial policies, including China’s policies in the automobile and steel sectorse or Indonesia’s policies in the telecommunications, the mineral/coal and mining sectors.f Prohibitions on performance requirements can also be found in IIAs. A crucial difference, between these IIAs and TRIMs lies in the scope of application: IIAs are typically narrower than TRIMs, in so far as they do not restrain governments from regulating domestic investors; they may be deeper than TRIMs in so far as they sometimes add additional requirements (“TRIMs +”) (e.g. performance requirements for services or intellectual property rights) or do not have TRIMs-type exceptions. Source: UNCTAD. a TRIMS prohibits trade-related investment measures that are inconsistent with the GATT’s provisions on national treatment (Article III of GATT 1994) and quantitative restrictions (Article XI of GATT 1994). b Article 3 of the TRIMs Agreement. “General Exceptions” are contained in Article XX of GATT 1994. c Article 4 of the TRIMS Agreement, and Article XVIII of GATT 1994. d Article 6.2 of the TRIMS Agreement requires each Member to notify the publications in which TRIMs may be found, including those applied by regional and local governments and authorities within their territories. e E.g. the so-called “2+2” regulation, which stipulates that foreign investors cannot set up more than two Sino-foreign joint ventures for the production of passenger cars, and two for commercial vehicles. See G/TRIMS/M/27 and 29, and G/ TRIMS/W/55. f E.g. requirements to “prioritize” the utilization of local manpower and domestic goods and services in the mineral and coal mining sectors and to carry out processing and refining of the mining product inside the country. See G/TRIMS/W/70, G/ TRIMS/W/71 and G/TRIMS/W/74.
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 109 inclined to preserve regulatory space are similar at the national and international levels. On balance, this suggests that countries aim to consciously manage the interaction between investment and industrial policy, with a view to ensuring coherence at both the national and international levels. Figure III.7. Investment-related reservations in IIAs, across services industries (Share of reservations) Source: UNCTAD, based on IIA database and UNCTAD (2005, 2006). Based on a survey of 16 IIAs. 3. Challenges for policymakers These different kinds of interaction between FDI policy and industrial policy raise a number of important challenges for policymakers to make the two policies work together for development. a. “Picking the winner” One of the strongest criticisms of industrial policy relates to the difficulty in identifying the “right” industries for promotion (“picking the winner”). This difficulty relates not only to picking “winning industries”, but also to picking “winning firms”; the risk of wasting valuable and scarce resources if support is provided to “losers”; the risk of distorting market mechanisms to the long-term detriment of the economy; and the risk of succumbing to the pressure of lobbying . Industrial policy can be successful if governments are able to identify those industries or activities which possess existing or latent comparative advantages, and which will thereby benefit from new opportunities arising in a multi-polar growth world (Lin, 2011). Export-generating choices do not always have the greatest impact on employment and value added; domestic industries, including services, even in developing economies, often account for more than half of value added. Policy tools are needed (a checklist of indicators against which to assess domestic potential), together with institutional mechanisms reducing the risk of governments making the “wrong” choice. Some first suggestions have already been made in this regard (Rodrik, 2004; Lin and Monga, 2010; Lin, 2011). Successful strategies to pick winners also include a readiness to let losers go. Sometimes even the most obvious choices for industrial priorities, seemingly sure winners, will not work out in today’s uncertain economic environment. b. Nurturing the selected industries The interaction between FDI policies and industrial policy also implies designing the “right” investment promotion instruments. Horizontal policies are the basis, aiming at improving the hard and soft infrastructure of the host country. What is actually needed depends on the type of business activity to be developed, the technology and skills required for it, and the form of TNC involvement (FDI vs. non- equity modes).31 In countries with poor infrastructure and business environments that are perceived as unfriendly, special investment incentives may be needed to help overcoming barriers to entry. Such incentives may also be required with regard to emerging industries for which a market does not yet exist (e.g renewable energy) or where there is a “first mover” problem, because innovation is a risky process (Lin, 2011). By focusing on increasing industrial productivity, industrial policy can contribute to strengthening international competiveness. This underlines the need for close coordination between industrial policy, FDI policy and technology-related policy, so that they are coherent and mutually reinforcing. The dynamic nature of industrial development calls for regular review and adaptation of existing policy instruments. A case in point is recent changes in the international production networks of TNCs, resulting in a stronger emphasis on non-equity modes of international production (chapter IV). 0 10 20 30 40 Education Distribution Construction Environmental Tourism Recreational (incl. culture) Health related social Other Communication Business and professional Financial Transport
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development110 c. Safeguarding policy space Managing the interaction between international investment policy and industrial policy implies striking a balance between liberalizing and protecting FDI, while preserving space for the dynamics of industrial policy. This challenge extends to identifying industries and existing/potential future domestic policies, for which flexibilities are most needed; identifying IIA provisions that are particularly likely to impact on industrial policy; and recognising that industrial policy is likely to change over time. The latter is important in light of the so-called “lock-in” effect, implying that once a commitment is made to open an industry to foreign investment, host countries are bound by it as long as the IIA remains in force.32 The problem is further exacerbated if pre-establishment treaties contain “rollback” commitments with regard to remaining FDI restrictions, or so-called “ratchet clauses” according to which regulatory changes towards further liberalization are automatically reflected in a country’s commitments under the IIA (UNCTAD, 2006). In response, some selected IIAs establish a procedure for IIA signatories to modify or withdraw commitments in their schedules.33 In sum, carefully crafting IIA obligations in conjunction with exceptions and reservations can go a long way to concluding IIAs that are conducive to countries’ industrial policy objectives. d. Avoiding investment protectionism The inclusion of elements of investment restrictions within industrial policy has given rise to concerns about investment protectionism. These concerns have grown in the light of the recent financial crisis, as countries may be tempted to protect their domestic industries, to the detriment of foreign competitors.34 Achieving a balance between the sovereign right to regulate an industry, and the need to avoid investment protectionism, remains a major policy challenge.Itiscomplicatedbythefactthatthereisno internationally recognized definition of “investment protectionism”. Clarifying the term would require distinguishing between justified and unjustified reasons to restrict FDI. The motivations for FDI restrictions are manifold and include, for instance, sovereignty or national security concerns, strategic considerations, socio-cultural reasons, prudential policies in financial industries, competition policy, infant industry protection or reciprocity policies. In each case, countries may have very different perceptions of whether and under what conditions such reasons are legitimate. One initiative to monitor investment protectionism has been taken by the G-20 (section A.3). Since September 2009, following a request from the G-20 London and Pittsburgh Summits, UNCTAD and the OECD have regularly published joint reports on G-20 Investment Measures.35 Efforts to establish criteria for assessing whether investment restrictions are justified have been undertaken in the context of policy measures relating to national security reasons (OECD, 2009). e. Improving international coordination As more and more countries adopt forms of industrial policy, competition and conflict are bound to intensify and to become more complex. To avoid a global race to the bottom in regulatory standards, or a race to the top in incentives, and to avoid the return of protectionist tendencies, better international coordination is called for (Zhan, 2011). At the global level, such “coordination” is presently essentially limited to the control of certain forms of subsidies in the framework of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Better international coordination of industrial policy can also create important synergies through economies of scale, avoiding “beggar thy neighbour” policies, and strengthening the position of participating countries. Cross-border industrial cooperation can also present solutions in cases where the size, costs and risks of an industrial project are too big for one country alone to implement it. Efforts in this regard have materialized at the regional level, in particular the EU, where the example of the creation of the Airbus industry in the 1970s comes to mind. Other regions, such as ASEAN,36 ECOWAS37 and the Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council,38 also have developed
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 111 joint industrial development strategies. Regional industrial policy is further reinforced when there is a common FDI regime among the participants. * * * In conclusion, interaction between FDI policies and industrial policies is increasing, nationally and internationally. Development stages and related strategies differ between countries, and there can be no “one size fits all” solution in dealing with this interaction. The policy challenges are numerous, with some of them being relevant only at the domestic level, while others call for international attention. E. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY A further important investment policy development in recent years has been the emergence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards.39 Such standards can be contained in binding “hard law” instruments, such as national laws and regulations, or in voluntary non-binding “soft law” instruments. At present, international CSR standards are almost uniformly voluntary in nature and so exist as a unique dimension of “soft law”. This emergence of CSR has been further reinforced in the post-crisis era, as efforts to rebalance the rights and obligations of the State and the investor have intensified (WIR10). CSR standards, though applicable to all types of enterprises, are increasingly significant for international investment, as they typically focus on the operations of TNCs which, through their foreign investments and global value chains, can influence the social and environmental practices of businesses worldwide. Governments can consider a number of practical measures to apply these standards to their investment and enterprise governance mechanisms, with a view to maximizing the development impact of corporate activities. 1. Taking stock of existing CSR standards Over recent years, CSR standards have expanded in both number and form.40 While it would be difficult to provide an exhaustive account of every such standard and initiative, the universe of CSR The investment policy land- scape increasingly includes a combination of voluntary and regulatory initiatives to promote corporate social responsibility standards. standards can be categorized according to the organization that created them: i) intergovernmental organization standards, derived from universal principles as recognized in international declarations and agreements (three major sets of standards exist); ii) multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI) standards (dozens); iii) industry association codes (hundreds); and iv) individual company codes (thousands). This has resulted in a complex, multi- layered, multifaceted and interconnected universe of standards. a. Intergovernmental organization standards Universal principles as recognized by international declarations and agreements are the source of the most prominent and authoritative CSR standards. The three main sources of these international instruments are the United Nations, the ILO and the OECD. Three of the leading standards in this category are: • United Nations declarations and instruments: one of the most prominent examples is the UN Global Compact: launched in 2000, this is an initiative of the UN Secretary General’s office to translate the most relevant UN declarations into 10 guiding principles for enterprises (box III.7). • ILO conventions and declarations:41 there are 188 ILO conventions, the most relevant for TNC operations being the Tripartite Declara- tion of Principles concerning Multinational En- terprises and Social Policy (“MNE Declaration”) (first adopted in 1977, latest revision in 2006)
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development112 Box III.7. The 10 principles of the UN Global Compact Human Rights Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. Labour Standards Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  Environment Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.  Anti-Corruption Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery. Source: www.unglobalcompact.org. and the Declaration on Fundamental Princi- ples and Rights at Work (1998) (also known as “Fundamental Labour Standards”). • The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enter- prises (“OECD Guidelines”) (first edition 1976; latest revision 2011). The 42 adhering govern- ments are fewer in number than the signatories of UN and ILO conventions, but they include large developed economies whose corpora- tions accounted for 70 per cent of FDI in 2010 (chapter I, section A.1). The standards of the UN and its specialized agencies, including the ILO, along with the Guidelines of the OECD, cover the fundamental issues of CSR. In each of the categories of standards reviewed below, it is common to find references to these major intergovernmental organization standards. In addition to the three most commonly noted standards above, there is a large number of relevant intergovernmental organization standards and conventions emanating from the UN (and its specialized agencies, including the ILO) and the OECD. b. Multi-stakeholder initiative standards Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) are “cross- sectoral partnerships created with a rule-setting purpose, to design and steward standards for the regulation of market and non-market actors” (Litovsky et al., 2007). These partnerships contain a mix of civil society, business, labour, consumers and other stakeholders. MSI standards most often address non-product-related process and productionmethods(PPM),i.e.issuesrelatedtohow a product is produced, such as the environmental or social aspects of certain production methods. Although MSI standards are mostly developed by civil society and business actors, they often make reference to the normative frameworks of international soft law instruments (annex table III.2). A unique MSI is the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a non-governmental organization whose members are national standard-setting bodies. ISO standards are widely recognized by international institutions (e.g. the WTO) and national governments. In 2010, ISO launched the ISO 26000 standard “Guidance on Social Responsibility”, which serves as a significant reference point for defining the terms of “social responsibility”.42 c. Industry association codes and individual company codes An industry-specific code typically involves the adoption of a code jointly developed by the leading companies within an industry, to address social and/or environmental aspects of supply chains
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 113 and international operations (annex table III.3). There are thousands of individual company codes in existence, and they are especially common among large TNCs: more than three-quarters of large TNCs from both developed and developing countries have policies on social and environmental issues (UNCTAD, 2011e, UNCTAD, 2008c). About half of TNC codes that apply to value chains make reference to one or more intergovernmental organization standards (UNCTAD, forthcoming b). * * * The universe of voluntary CSR standards consists of a multitude of standards, each differing in terms of source, functions, addressees, and interrelationships, and each yielding influence and impacting on development in different ways. The proliferation of these standards has resulted in a number of systemic challenges related to standard- setting and standard implementation. 2. Challenges with existing standards: key issues a. Gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies Gaps between standards exist in terms of subjects covered and industry focus. The OECD Guidelines coverabroadrangeofresponsiblebusinesspractice, from human rights to taxation. However, they are negotiated by a more limited number of member States, compared to UN and ILO instruments. The ILO MNE Declaration focuses more specifically on employment practices and human rights, but applies to a larger group of member States that are directly addressed, alongside employers, workers and TNCs, to observe the MNE Declaration (OECD- ILO, 2008). Subject matter gaps exist among MSIs, as many standards focus either on the environment or on social issues, but not often to the same extent on both. An emerging trend among MSIs is the inclusion of social issues within environmental standards.43 Subject matter gaps can also include standards that focus on specific outcomes (e.g. minimum wage compliance) versus standards that focus on “process rights” (e.g. labour rights). Gaps also exist in industry focus, with not all industries (or parts of the value chain) being the subject of a standard. While the absence of a standard may reflect a gap that has yet to be filled,44 it can also represent either an area that does not necessarily require a standard, or where a standard is not considered the most appropriate way to address existing problems. Gaps also exist in uptake among companies: as uptake is driven by the concerns of consumers, media, and investors, CSR standards are primarily adopted by those companies that are most exposed to such concerns (Utting, 2002). While the adoption of standards by large TNCs can create a cascade effect that pushes sustainability across the value chain, this does not necessarily have a uniform impact on all members. Indeed there may be a tendency for some standards to favour concentration at different levels and to crowd out small enterprises and producers (Reed, Utting and Mukherjee-Reed, 2011). Nevertheless, as leading firms adopt and implement CSR standards, they set a benchmark for best practice against which other firms are measured. Among individual company standards, there can be both a high degree of overlap in the issues covered (e.g. labour practices, environment, human rights, bribery), and a high degree of inconsistency in detailed operational guidelines. As most companies refer to major intergovernmental organization standards for key issues, this reduces inconsistencies in the general subjects covered, but since many intergovernmental organization standards lack detailed micro-level operational guidance, companies are left to innovate these details themselves. The resulting inconsistencies mean that suppliers can be faced with differing requirements, adding complexity and higher compliance costs. The rise of industry-specific standards can help to alleviate this situation. In some industries, more than one MSI or industry association standard exists. This can cause confusion among companies, often leading them to opt for multiple certifications to ensure that all relevant issues have been addressed. MSIs are increasingly working together towards alignment between standards that address the same subject or the same industry.45
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development114 b. Inclusiveness in standard- setting The credibility of a standard is linked to the inclusion of a sufficiently broad range of stakeholders in the standard-setting process. Company codes and industry association codes are often challenged as being less credible because of the limited involvement of outside stakeholders. The intergovernmental organizations are perceived as authoritative standard-setters because they reflect international consensus. The popularity of MSI standards is due largely to their inclusive cross-sectoral process. Addressing the challenge of inclusiveness also means addressing the often limited participation of developing country stakeholders in CSR standard-setting processes, which arises out of resource constraints. c. Relationship between voluntary CSR standards and national legislation Voluntary CSR standards can complement government regulatory efforts; however, where they are promoted as a substitute for labour, social and environmental protection legislation, or where CSR standards are not based on national or international rules, then these voluntary standards can potentially undermine, substitute or distract from governmental regulatory efforts. Critics of voluntary standards have pointed out, for example, the contrast in the United States between legally required safety inspections of the Trans- Alaska Pipeline, and voluntary commitments from companies to ensure the safety of feeder pipelines; they note that the oil company BP only discovered severe problems with its feeder pipelines after it was required by the United States Government to undertake inspections, following a spill of over a quarter of a million barrels of oil (Reich, 2007). d. Reporting and transparency Despite tremendous growth in CSR reporting in recent years among TNCs of developed and developing countries, such reporting continues to lack uniformity, standardization and comparability. A number of initiatives promote a standardized CSR reporting framework, including UNCTAD’s Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR)46 and several MSIs (e.g. the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Carbon Disclosure Standards Board, and the International Integrated Reporting Committee). While uptake of such frameworks among companies is growing rapidly, it nevertheless remains relatively low47 and even among companies adopting a voluntary CSR reporting framework, implementation of the framework can be selective and incomplete. The reporting of MSIs and industry associations also raises transparency issues that make it difficult for stakeholders to evaluate and compare the performance of different initiatives. Some initiatives, however, have started to implement reporting programmes: the Fair Labour Association publishes an annual report and discloses information about the progress made by the companies that have adopted its standard. Some MSIs (e.g. Fair Wear Association) have created a reporting framework for companies adopting their standards. e. Compliance and market impact A critical challenge is to ensure that companies voluntarily adopting a standard actually comply with the standard. Failure to demonstrate compliance can lower the standard’s credibility and market impact.48 The compliance promotion mechanisms embodied in existing CSR standards range from none, to reporting requirements and redress mechanisms, to proactive mechanisms such as audits, factory inspections, etc. (table III.4). The major intergovernmental organization standards contain compliance mechanisms, including the UN Global Compact (the “integrity measures” and the “communication on progress”), the ILO MNE Declaration (the “interpretation procedure”), and the OECD Guidelines (“the specific instance procedures” and the system of “National Contact Points”). MSI standards and industry association standards often have certification or accreditation programmes which typically include inspections/ audits, corrective action programmes, reporting and consumer labelling schemes. To enhance credibility, many MSIs have separated their standards-setting process from the certification process, relying increasingly on professionalized third parties for the
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 115 Table III.4. Compliance mechanisms of selected international CSR standards Source of standard Proactive mechanisms (audits, inspections) Reporting requirements/ redress mechanisms No formal compliance mechanisms Inter- governmental Organization - • UN Global Compact • OECD Guidelines • ILO Tripartite Declaration - Multi- stakeholder/ NGO • ISO14000 • MSC • FSC • FLA RSPO • SA8000 • 4C Assoc. - • ISO 26000 • GRI Company/ Industry association • C.A.F.E. Practices • Leather Working Group • BSCI • International Council of Toy Industries - • EICC • Pharmaceutical Industry Principles for Responsible Supply Chain Management Source: UNCTAD. monitoring and auditing processes.49 The dynamic nature of the field of CSR standards also includes significant practices of “ratcheting-up” compliance mechanisms over time, e.g. adding new standards, tightening up inspection procedures, adding complaints procedures. While compliance promotion mechanisms can be an integral part of a standard, they can also be associated to a standard by third parties. As noted above, many intergovernmental organization standards are key references for some of the certifiablestandardsoftheMSI.Inthisway,company compliance with “soft law” intergovernmental organization standards can be driven by other CSR standards with proactive compliance mechanisms. A challenge associated with certification schemes and audits is that they may impose a higher burden on companies, and thus lead to lower rates of adoption of the standard, and reduced market impact. Conversely, a lack of compliance mechanisms can lead to high rates of voluntary adoption of the standard, but low, unclear and/or immeasurable rates of implementation. However, a number of MSI and industry association codes employ proactive compliance mechanisms and are nonetheless having a significant impact, with some influencing more than half of the global market for the industry in question (table III.5). With global market shares ranging between 5 and 10 per cent for some standards (such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)), the “proof of concept” phase has been passed; the challenge now is how to achieve widespread uptake of these standards. This is particularly so in highly fragmented industries, where adoption by many companies would be required to cover a large market share. In less fragmented industries, even individual company codes can have a significant impact (table III.5). f. Concerns about possible trade and investment barriers There are unresolved questions about whether social and environmental standards, especially non- product-related PPM standards, could potentially become barriers to trade and investment. It is not clear under WTO rules whether non-product PPM standards are covered by the WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement or other WTO agreements (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary measures; Agreement on Government Procurement). Outside of the TBT agreement, there was the “shrimp-turtle” case from the late 1990s, where environmental regulations in the United States led to an import ban for shrimp-exporting countries that did not use turtle-safe harvesting practices (which had already been introduced by the United States fishing industry on the basis of consumer demands).50 Similarly, it is possible for CSR standards to create barriers to (inward and outward) investment for companies that are unable to meet the requirements of the standards. In Guatemala, for example, forestry companies without FSC certification are prohibited from operating within the Mayan Biosphere reserve (FSC, 2009), and in Denmark, only companies meeting the Government’s CSR standard qualify for outward investment assistance. In both cases, the challenge is to distinguish where the use of a standard constitutes a legitimate application, and where it constitutes an abuse of protectionist intent. For example, the use of CSR standards can become a form of protectionism if they are applied in a discriminatory way, differentiating between companiesbynationalorigin.Itisimportanttherefore to monitor the application of CSR standards and to
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development116 Table III.5. Impact of selected MSI and industry association CSR standards and individual company codes Standard Compliance mechanisms Market impactCertification/ Audits Public reporting Multi-stakeholder initiative standards Forest Stewardship Council (1993) Yes Annual Report, Audit Results Covers 11% of global forests used for productive activities ISO14001 (1996) Yes Annual Report As of December 2009, 223,149 organizations in 159 countries are certified to ISO 14000 SA8000 (1997) Yes Annual Report Over 1.4 million workers are employed in over 2,400 SA8000 certified facilities in 65 countries, across 66 industrial sectors Marine Stewardship Council (1997) Yes Annual Report, Audit Results Covers 6% of global landed fish Fair Labor Association (1998) Yes Annual Report, Audit Results Covers 75% of the athletic footwear industry Fair Wear Foundation (1999) Yes Annual Report Audit Results FWF affiliates in 2009 sourced from a total of 1,153 factories,  with an estimated total of 300,000 workers (growth rate of 60% in the last 3 years) UTZ CERTIFIED (1999) Yes Annual Report Covers 5% of global coffee production 4C Association (2004) Yes Annual Report with performance data of member companies Covers 30% of global coffee production Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (2004) Yes Audit Results Covers 8% of global palm oil production Industry association codes Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) Code of Conduct (2002) Yes Annual Report 11,200 suppliers audited according to the BSCI code of conduct and 4,000 suppliers trained in 9 different countries International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI) Code of Conduct (2004) Yes Biennial Report 75% of the global toy business is committed to only source from suppliers certified by ICTI in the future Leather Working Group Principles (2005) Yes No The working group covers 10% of the global leather production Individual company codes Nike Supplier code of conduct Yes Yes 31% of the global market for athletic footwear; through its supplier code of conduct Nike influences the conditions of more than 800,000 employees in 700 factories in 45 countries Adidas Supplier code of conduct Yes Yes 22% of the global market for athletic footwear; through its supplier code of conduct Adidas influences the conditions of more than 775,000 employees in 1,200 factories in 65 countries Source: UNCTAD, based on data from MSI, industry associations, companies and FAO. identify discriminatory practices where they arise. Voluntary CSR standards may be less susceptible to challenge through WTO trade agreements, and less prone to questions of investment protectionism, since there is no requirement that firms must follow them. For example, a voluntary standard pertaining to organic foods gives firms the option of using the approach adopted in the standard, but does not require that firms use this standard as a condition of market entry. In this way, voluntary CSR standards may be less problematic than mandatory requirements, in terms of achieving public policy objectives (Webb and Morrison, 2004). That said, voluntary standards alone can create a risk of neglect and indifference on the part of firms. The balance between mandatory
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 117 and voluntary standards is delicate, but legitimate restrictions based on objective criteria of necessity and proportionality are permitted under trade and investment agreements.51 Equally, the State’s right to regulate may create legitimate restrictions on investors and their investments in the interests of public policy and economic development.52 Thus the challenge is to maintain an appropriate balance between mandatory and voluntary standards. 3. Policy options Governments can play an important role in creating a coherent policy and institutional framework to address the challenges and opportunities presented by the universe of CSR standards. In this regard, some governments are beginning to apply CSR standards to the architecture of corporate governance and international trade and investment. This approach aims to promote best practice in corporate compliance with national laws and international agreements in order to maximize the sustainable development impact of TNCs. A number of policy options follow. a. Supporting CSR standards development Governments can encourage and support the development of CSR standards, including through the provision of material support, technical expertise, and mobilizing the participation of relevant stakeholders (Vermeulen et al., 2010). For example, the 4C Association is a sustainability standard for the coffee industry, initiated by the Government of Germany and implemented by the German development agency. With support from the Government of Switzerland and other public and private sector representatives, the 4C Association has become an influential industry standard. Governments can support the development of national certifiable management system standards (MSSs). This approach provides enterprises with a certifiable standard to distinguish themselves in the area of CSR. Recent years have seen the creation of a number of national CSR MSSs, including standards in Brazil and Mexico in 2004, Portugal in 2008, Spain in 2009, and the Netherlands and Denmark in 2010. In some cases these national MSSs are based on or aligned with ISO standards. As national CSR MSSs proliferate, there may be increased interest in an international CSR MSS.53 b. Applying CSR to public procurement policy Governments can consider applying CSR standards to their purchasing policies, to promote good business practices on more environmentally friendly products, while being careful to avoid discriminatory practices that would be a form of protectionism. The Government of China, for instance, maintains a “green list” of environmentally friendly products which should be given preferential treatment in public procurement.54 The Government of Germany has made a commitment to purchase only wood and wood products that are verified as coming from legal and sustainable sources, and accepts the FSC certification as verification of this. The Netherlands also has a sustainable procurement policy; the Government of Switzerland is in the process of developing such a scheme; and the Government of the United Kingdom has laid out a strategy (“Government Sustainable Procurement Action Plan”) and has already committed to source fish for its public institutions (e.g. schools) exclusively from MSC-certified suppliers. While applying CSR standards to procurement policies can help promote the uptake of such standards by companies, it can also negatively effect the competitive position, and hence operations, of companies – especially those from poorer countries – that have limited capacity to adhere to such standards. c. Building capacity One factor that can lead to low uptake of standards is a lack of knowledge, skills and capabilities at various stages of a value chain. Thus, implementation of standards often requires a capacity-building component. This is part of creating “shared responsibility” within a value chain (which involves TNCs providing assistance to suppliers), as opposed to what critics call “off- loading responsibility” (wherein the compliance burden falls solely on developing country suppliers that may have little capacity for meeting CSR standards).
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development118 Developing country governments wishing to promote standards in their countries can partner with donor States to deliver capacity-building initiatives and technical assistance to local industry and regulatory bodies. A project between the Government of Bolivia and USAID, for example, promotes FSC certification in the Bolivian forestry industry. This has included capacity-building for companies that are willing to be certified, and assistance linking certified companies with export markets. As a result of this programme, Bolivia now has the largest area of FSC-certified tropical forest in the world (FSC, 2009). In Gambia, the Ministry of Fisheries works in partnership with USAID to obtain MSC certification for the country’s fisheries (USAID, 2010). Governments can further strengthen CSR capacity-building by engaging in the exchange of best practice at international forums, such as UNCTAD. d. Promoting CSR disclosure and responsible investment To enhance transparency and comparability of CSR practices, a number of stock exchanges – especially in emerging markets − have employed stock exchange listing rules to promote the uptake of CSR reporting to facilitate responsible investment practices (Responsible Research, 2010). In close cooperation with national policymakers, the Malaysian stock exchange, for example, has made CSR reporting mandatory for all listed companies, and the Shanghai Stock Exchange in China has published the Shanghai Environmental Disclosure Guidelines, with which listed companies are urged to comply.55 An alternative to developing a national CSR reporting framework is to adopt an existing framework developed by an international initiative. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa, for example, requires companies to use the GRI guidelines in preparing sustainability reports. Using a common framework like this can promote international comparability between reports. Policymakers interested in promoting an internationally harmonized approach to CSR reporting and encouraging responsible investment, including in the area of “impact investing” (box III.8), can work together through forums such as UNCTAD’s ISAR working group56 and/or the Sustainable Stock Exchanges initiative.57 e. Moving from soft law to hard law Governments can consider adopting some of the existing CSR standards as part of regulatory initiatives, turning hitherto voluntary standards (soft law) into mandatory requirements (hard law). For example, organic food standards originated in most countries as voluntary standards from civil society or industry associations, but today are usually regulated under national legislation.58 This model allows governments to use the dynamic space of voluntary standards as a laboratory for future government regulations. Another option is a mixed “public–private regulatory regime”, wherein regulatory initiatives ensure compliancewithstandardsdevelopedbycivilsociety and/or the private sector. In Sweden, for example, State-owned enterprises are required to prepare reports using the GRI standard. In Guatemala, the Government has made FSC certification mandatory for forestry firms operating in the Mayan Biosphere reserve. This approach can be useful for preserving the dynamism and aspirational nature of many multi-stakeholder standard-setting processes, while adding uniformity of implementation through regulation. f. Strengthening compliance promotion mechanisms among intergovernmental organization standards Governments could consider further strengthening the compliance promotion mechanisms of existing intergovernmental organization standards. As noted above, many intergovernmental organization standards already have some compliance promotion mechanisms in place. These organizations periodically review the efficacy of such instruments, including their redress mechanisms. In the case of the UN Global Compact, for example, the UN Joint Inspections Unit recently recommended that the UN “reinforce the implementation of the Integrity Measures and accountability in implementing the ten principles” (UN JIU, 2010).
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 119 Box III.8. Impact investing: achieving competitive financial returns while maximizing social and environmental impact Over time, responsible investment has become a multitrillion dollar industry. Responsible investing has various themes. It can be focused on negative screens that prohibit investment in firms that manufacture or promote certain products and services. It can also be focused on shareholder advocacy and positive environmental, social and governance (ESG) screens, to target investment in particular companies. “Impact investing” takes this a step further. It is the explicit incorporation of social, environmental and developmental objectives into the fabric of business and financial models. It is based on the fundamental belief that it is possible for investors to achieve competitive financial returns and social change simultaneously. The potential range of impact investment opportunities remains largely unknown. Analysts estimate that impact investments could reach between $500 billion and several trillions over the next decade. To illustrate the magnitude of opportunities in impact investing, a few examples are given below. To address climate change, the International Energy Agency estimates that $1.3 trillion in investment will be required to halve greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector by 2050. Another $41 trillion is needed by 2030 to modernize infrastructure systems worldwide. Water infrastructure, at $23 trillion, is the largest portion of this investment. McGraw Hill Construction estimates that the green building market will more than double worldwide to between $96 and $140 billion by 2013. Further, according to the World Resources Institute, the 4 billion people with annual incomes below $3,000 constitute a $5 trillion global consumer market. Moreover, the 1.4 billion people with per capita incomes between $3,000 and $20,000 represent an even larger $12.5 trillion market globally. Despite the enormous potential of impact investing, there are critical gaps in understanding the market conditions necessary for success, together with inadequate policy and regulatory frameworks, and limited knowledge of financial models that sufficiently incorporate environmental, social and developmental factors into valuations and alpha forecasts. Through its “20ii − Investing with Impact” initiative, the United States Department of State will work with UNCTAD, the OECD, and other institutions to address these gaps and galvanize sources of private capital to tackle high priority social and environmental challenges. Source: Contributed by the United States Department of State, in collaboration with Harvard University’s Initiative for Responsible Investment. g. Applying CSR to investment and trade promotion and enterprise development Governments could play an active role in promoting socially and environmentally sustainable inward and outward investment, while avoiding discriminatory practices that would be a form of protectionism. Governments can consider offering incentives for investments in sustainable industries (e.g. renewable energy) or for compliance with CSR standards. For example, the Brazilian National Economic Development Bank has introduced a code of ethics, based on intergovernmental organization standards, to which all of its clients must adhere. Similarly, the Government of Denmark requires companies receiving financial support from the Danish Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) to comply with IFU’s CSR policy. Some governments are also providing incentives through preferential trade agreements. For instance, the European Union has complemented its General System of Preferences (GSP) with the “GSP Plus” scheme, which offers additional tariff reductions for developing countries that have ratified and implemented 27 key international conventions related to CSR practices (e.g. the ILO Core Conventions).59 Care has to be taken, however, to ensure that those countries that do not a priori fulfil the criteria receive the required technical assistance in order to do so, and hence may benefit from such initiatives, in line with their overall development priorities and strategies. h. Introducing CSR into the international investment regime Governments can also consider introducing CSR into the international investment regime. While CSR- specific clauses do not currently feature prominently in IIAs, a small but growing number of agreements,
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development120 especially recent FTAs with investment chapters, include such provisions. While this process has its origins in the mid-1990s,60 specific references to CSR started appearing more recently. Today, three Canadian FTAs with investment provisions61 refer to CSR in the preamble and contain substantive provisions. For example, Article 816 of the Canada- Colombia FTA, the earliest of these references, states that: “each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of corporate social responsibility in their internal policies, such as statements of principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the Parties. These principles address issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, community relations and anti-corruption. The Parties remind those enterprises of the importance of incorporating such corporate social responsibility standards in their internal policies.” In addition, the preambles of the European Free Trade Association’s 2009 FTA with Albania and 2010 FTA with Peru refer to CSR-related issues.62 While BITs by EU member States do not include CSR clauses, the European Parliament has called for the inclusion of a CSR clause in every future FTA investment chapter concluded by the EU.63 Finally, a few countries have included innovative CSR provisions in their model agreements, referring to specific corporate contributions, such as human capital formation, local capacity-building, employment creation, training and transfer of technology).64 However, the implementation of CSR provisions in “real” IIAs remains to be seen. Whileitisdifficulttoassesstheirimpactonconditions “on the ground”, such clauses nevertheless serve to flag the importance of CSR in investor–State relations, which may also influence the interpretation of IIA clauses by tribunals in investor–State dispute settlement cases, and create linkages between IIAs and international CSR standards. Again, care has to be taken to ensure that increasing consideration of CSR does not open the door to justifying policy interventions with undue protectionist purposes. * * * Governments have a range of policy options for promoting CSR. Pioneering examples in both developing and developed countries suggest that it is time to mainstream CSR into national policies and international trade and investment regimes, while devising mechanisms for addressing unintended consequences and preventing possible protectionist abuses. While there are a number of policy implications, the various approaches already underway are increasingly taking the form of a combination of regulatory and voluntary instruments that work together to promote responsible business practices. Two critical components of this mix will be improved CSR reporting by companies (to better inform future policy development), and strengthened capacity-building programmes (to assist developing country enterprises to meet international best practice in this area). Notes 1 The Basel III rules were issued by the Basel Committee on 16 December 2010. A gradual schedule for the implementation of these rules will start in 2013 and should be fully phased in by January 2019. At the Seoul Summit in November 2010, G-20 leaders endorsed these and other recommendations to strengthen financial stability. 2 Bank for International Settlements (2010) “Basel III rules text and results of the quantitative impact study issued by the Basel Committee”. Available at: www.bis.org. 3 For further information see the UNCTAD-OECD Fifth Report on G-20 Investment Measures (2011). 4 E.g. British bank Bradford Bingley was sold to a Spanish bank, United States automaker GM, then majority-controlled by the United States Government, sold its Swedish subsidiary Saab to a Dutch/Austrian company, and United States Government co-owned Chrysler was partly sold to Italian automaker Fiat. 5 The European Commission conducted consultation using “Questionnaire on the application of the Temporary Framework”, from 18  March 2010 to 26 April 2010. 6 Twenty of the 2010 BITs were renegotiated, including seven by the Czech Republic, in an effort to bring its IIAs into conformity with EU law. 7 This includes DTTs on “income” and “income and capital”. 8 This includes, e.g., free trade agreements (FTAs), economic partnership agreements (EPAs) or framework agreements.
CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 121 9 The first category of “other IIAs” is those that contain substantive investment provisions, such as national treatment, most favoured nation (MFN) treatment, fair and equitable treatment (FET), protection in case of expropriation, transfer of funds and investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) (WIR10). 10 The second category focuses more on granting market access to foreign investors than on protecting investments once they are made (WIR10). 11 The third category of IIAs are agreements dealing with investment cooperation (WIR10). 12 Since most arbitration forums do not maintain a public registry of claims, the total number of actual treaty-based cases could be higher. UNCTAD, 2011c and UNCTAD’s database on investor–State dispute settlement cases (available at www.unctad. org/iia). 13 This includes 20 awards, five decisions on liability, 11 decisions on jurisdiction, and 11 other decisions. 14 This includes all post-establishment IIAs, including those that are only signed but not yet ratified. Treaties that offer post-establishment national treatment only, but no other typical protection provisions such as those on expropriation or ISDS (e.g. some of the EU treaties), are excluded. If individual treaty exclusions and reservations are taken into consideration a more nuanced picture would emerge. Multilateral investment-protection related agreements such as the TRIMs, and sector- specific agreements such as the Energy Charter Treaty are excluded, as well as DTTs. 15 See “The G-20 Seoul Summit Declaration” and “Annexes”, 11−12 November 2010. 16 At the Toronto summit on 26−27 June 2010, the G-20 leaders had agreed that “Narrowing the development gap and reducing poverty are integral to our broader objective of achieving strong, sustainable and balanced growth and ensuring a more robust and resilient global economy for all.” 17 For China, see http://works.bepress.com and www. chinalawinsight.com; for India see business. http:// mapsofindia.com, http://business.mapsofindia.com and www.indianground.com. 18 For the Republic of Korea, see Foreign Investment Committee, “FDI Promotion Policy in 2011”, endorsed and published on 31 January 2011. For Malaysia see www.mida.gov.my; for Thailand, see www.boi.go.th. 19 Other examples are the University of the Philippines Science Technology Park – joint venture between the university and private sector to establish an incubation centre for hi-tech projects, the “Technology Park Malaysia” − centre for research and development for knowledge-based industries, and Shenzhen Economic Zone. 20 Other examples include the “Ontario Technology Corridor” and the “Illinois Research Development Corridor”. 21 Examples are the “Aurora Pacific Economic Zone” in the Philippines to utilize wind power and solar cells for energy and fresh water springs for potable water, and the “Saemangeum Gunsan Free Economic Zone” in the Republic of Korea. 22 Examples of “hard” infrastructure are power, transport, telecommunication systems, health facilities and test bed facilities for RD. “Soft” infrastructure includes the financial system and regulation, the education system, the legal framework, social networks, values and other intangible structures in an economy. 23 The World Bank IAB 2010 report surveyed sectors with restricted entry for foreign investors for 87 countries, including 14 developed countries, 57 developing countries and 16 transition economies. The number of countries with data for specific sectors is: health care 86, telecoms 84, electricity 83, transport 80 and for all other industries 85 countries. Finance is a combination of banking and insurance from the original WB report and the share represents those countries that allow only less than full ownership for at least one of these sectors. 24 E.g. institutional mechanisms, financial or fiscal incentives. 25 The actual impact of the national treatment clause depends on its specific formulation, notably whether it contains the qualification of only applying to investments/investors “in like circumstances”. 26 For example, by requiring the use of local services or mandating technology transfer. 27 For example, the SCM Agreement disciplines the use of certain subsidies (e.g. by prohibiting subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export targets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods). 28 Some of the provisions refer explicitly to the industrial-policy related objectives of the subsidy in question, such as training or employing workers, or providing a service, locating production, constructing/expanding particular facilities, or carrying out research and development in a particular territory. 29 Case studies were conducted for 16 IIAs, including the OECD National Treatment Instrument (1991), NAFTA (1992), G3 (1994), Mercosur (1994), Canada-Chile FTA (1996), draft OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1998, but never concluded), Andean Community (2001) and the Chile-United States FTA (2003), CAFTA (2004), Panama-Singapore FTA (2005), United States- Uruguay BIT (2005), Canada-Peru BIT (2006), Rwanda-United States BIT (2007), Japan-Peru BIT (2009), Japan-Uzbekistan BIT (2009) and Japan- India FTA (2011). For further details on the eight earlier IIAs see UNCTAD, 2006. 30 Of interest is also the social services sector, where reservations have, over time, become
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development122 more frequent. An increasing consciousness of the pros and cons of submitting social services to international obligations, and experiences with ISDS touching upon essential services or social considerations, might have contributed to this development. 31 See also chapter IV. 32 The risks of the lock-in effect are particularly pronounced with regard to liberalization commitments based on a “top-down/negative list” approach. See UNCTAD, 2006. 33 For example, the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the draft Norwegian model BIT (2007). 34 See the WTO-OECD-UNCTAD Reports on G-20 Investment Measures (WTO-OECD-UNCTAD, 2009 and 2010; OECD-UNCTAD 2010a, 2010b and 2011). 35 Ibid. 36 ASEAN Secretariat (2003), “What is AlCo?”, available at www.asean.org/6402.htm. 37 ECOWAS (2010) “West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP)”. 38 Gulf Cooperation Council (2000) “Unified Industrial Developments Strategy for the Arab States of the Gulf Cooperation Council”. 39 The text in this section is based partially on UNCTAD’s contribution to a recent G-20 document on “Promoting standards for responsible investment in value chains”, which also benefited from comments by UNDP, ILO, OECD and the World Bank, and the Governments of Germany and Saudi Arabia. See report to the G-20 High-Level Development Working Group, June 2011. 40 Among others, the governments of the G-8 and the G-20 have taken a strong interest in CSR standards in recent years, focusing on promoting dissemination, adoption and compliance. See G-8 Leaders Declaration: Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, 2009 (para. 53) and G-20 Multi- Year Action Plan on Development, 2010 (page 5). 41 The ILO is a specialized agency of the UN. It is unique among UN agencies in that it has a “tripartite” governance structure, involving representatives of governments, employers and employees. 42 See www.iso.org/iso/social_responsibility. 43 For example the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 44 There are a number of standards still emerging in new areas, e.g. sustainable meat production and conflict minerals. 45 The 4C Association and the Rainforest Alliance for example have created a translation mechanism between each other’s standards, such that Rainforest Alliance certificate-holders can now apply for the 4C Licence without having to go through the entire 4C Verification Process. 46 See www.unctad.org/isar for more information. 47 The most popular and comprehensive CSR reporting framework is that of the GRI, which in 2010 was used by approximately 1,800 corporations. 48 Impact assessment of CSR standards is critically important. While various efforts are underway (e.g.  the Committee on Sustainability Assessment), there is no consensus approach. UNCTAD currently uses an industry-level analysis examining factors such as the market share of the companies using the standard or the number of enterprises or workers influenced by the standard. 49 For example ISO, MSC, FSC and UTZ, among others, use third party certification. 50 WTO cases No. 58 and 61. 51 See GATT 1994, e.g. GATS 1994 Art.XIV, Canada model BIT Art.10. 52 See further WIR03. 53 Note that ISO 2600 is not an MSS, rather it is a guidance standard, and not intended for certification. 54 See Ministry of Finance and State Environmental Protection Agency: Implementation Guidance on Public Procurement Based on Environmentally Labeled Products. www.ccgp.gov.cn (Chinese language). 55 See www.world-exchanges.org. 56 For more information, see www.unctad.org/isar. 57 For more information, see www.unpri.org. 58 EU policy on organic farming: http://ec.europa.eu/ agriculture. 59 See www.europa-eu-un.org. 60 See references to environmental and labour considerations (e.g. NAFTA preamble) and a recognition that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures (e.g. NAFTA investment chapter). 61 These are Canada’s FTAs with Colombia (2008), Peru (2009), and Panama (2010). 62 There are references to responsible corporate conduct and ILO Conventions in the former, and references to good corporate governance, corporate governance standards of the United Nations Global Compact and relevant ILO Conventions in the latter. 63 On 6 April 2011, the European Parliament adopted its Resolution on the future European international investment policy, INI/2010/2203. 64 For example, in Art. 12, Ghana’s model BIT (2008) states that foreign investors “shall to the extent possible, encourage human capital formation, local capacity building through close cooperation with the local community, create employment opportunities and facilitate training opportunities for employees, and the transfer of technology”. See also Art. 11, Botswana’s model BIT (2008).
CHAPTER IV NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT In today’s world, policies aimed at improving the integration of developing economies into global value chains must look beyond FDI and trade. Policymakers need to consider non-equity modes (NEMs) of international production, such as contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, franchising, licensing and management contracts. Cross-border NEM activity worldwide is significant and particularly important in developing economies. It is estimated to have generated over $2 trillion of sales in 2010. Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing accounted for $1.1–1.3 trillion, franchising $330–350 billion, licensing $340–360 billion, and management contracts around $100 billion. In most cases, NEMs are growing more rapidly than the industries in which they operate. NEMs can yield significant development benefits. They employ an estimated 14–16 million workers in developing countries. Their value added represents up to 15 per cent of GDP in some economies. Their exports account for 70–80 per cent of global exports in several industries. Overall, NEMs can enhance productive capacities in developing economies through their integration into global value chains. NEMs also pose risks for developing countries. Employment in contract manufacturing can be highly cyclical and easily displaced. The value added contribution of NEMs can appear low in terms of the value captured out of the total global value chain. Concerns exist that TNCs may use NEMs to circumvent social and environmental standards. Developing countries need to mitigate the risk of remaining locked into low-value-added activities. Policy matters. Maximizing development benefits from NEMs requires action in four areas. First, NEM policies need to be embedded in overall national development strategies. Second, governments need to support efforts to build domestic productive capacity. Third, promotion and facilitation of NEMs requires a strong enabling legal and institutional framework, as well as the involvement of investment promotion agencies in attracting TNC partners. Finally, policies need to address the negative consequences and risks posed by NEMs by strengthening the bargaining power of local NEM partners, ensuring fair competition, protecting labour rights and the environment.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development124 A. THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND TNC GOVERNANCE In the past, TNCs primarily built their international production networks through FDI (equity holdings), creating an internalized system of affiliates in host countries owned and managed by the parent firm. Over time, TNCs have also externalized activities throughout their global value chains. They have built interdependent networks of operations involving both their affiliates and partner firms in home and host countries. Depending on their overall objectives and strategy, the industry in which they operate, and the specific circumstances of individual markets, TNCs increasingly control and coordinate the operations of independent or, rather, loosely dependent partner firms, through various mechanisms. These mechanisms or levers of control range from partial ownership or joint ventures, through various contractual forms, to control based on bargaining power arising from TNCs’ strategic assets such as technology, market access and standards. Such mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and they can be as much complements as substitutes to FDI. In this chapter, we refer to these TNC networks as global value chains (GVCs). WIR11 focuses on “non-equity modes” of TNC international production (NEMs) as alternative forms of governance of TNC-controlled global value chains. NEMs include, for example, contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, franchising and licensing, as well as other types of contractual relationship through which TNCs coordinate and control the activities of partner firms in host countries. From a policy perspective, to pursue the integration of developing economies into global value chains it is no longer enough to focus on attracting FDI and TNC affiliates on the one hand, or to promote arm’s-length trade on the other. Policymakers need to consider a myriad of alternative networked forms of TNC operations, each of which comes with its own set of development impacts and policy implications. 1. TNC value chains and governance choices Foremost among the core competencies of a TNC is its ability to control and coordinate activities within a global value chain. TNCs, like all firms, can decide to conduct such activities in-house (internalization) or they can entrust them to other firms (externalization) – a choice analogous to a “make or buy” decision. Internalization, where there is a cross-border dimension, results in FDI, whereby the international flows of goods, services, information and other assets are intra-firm and under the full control of the TNC. Externalization results either in trade, where the TNC exercises no control over other firms, or in non-equity inter-firm arrangements in which contractual agreements condition the operations and behaviour of host- country partner firms. The choice between internalization and externalization is typically based on the relative costs and benefits, the associated risks, and the feasibility of each option (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 2001). Internalization of cross-border activities brings with it the costs of running complex, multi-plant, multi- currency operations, which tend to increase the greater the social, cultural and political differences between locations. It also implies internalizing the full extent of risk associated with the activity, including capital exposure and business uncertainty. Finally, it assumes that the technical capability, skills and know-how required to perform the activity are either present in the firm, or not prohibitively expensive or time-consuming to acquire. Balanced against the costs of internalization are the obvious advantages of retaining full control of value-chain activities. To start with, TNCs will want to maximize “value capture” – externalization clearly TNCs manage global value chains through internaliza- tion (ownership) and exter- nalization (including NEMs). NEMs and FDI can be sub- stitutes or complements, with the choice based on relative costs, benefits and associated risks.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 125 implies giving up part of the profits generated along the chain. Secondly, internalization avoids the transaction costs associated with finding suitable third parties and then stipulating contractual arrangements that tend to become more complex the greater the perceived risks associated with loss of control over parts of the value chain and over assets and valuable intellectual property (IP). Finally, internalization also eliminates the costs of managing relationships with NEM partners on a continuous basis, including flows of knowledge, goods and services; communication and information flows; and monitoring and control of compliance with contractual obligations. Externalization has a number of intrinsic advantages. These include shifting of certain costs and risks to third parties, as well as gaining rapid access to the assets and resources third parties may bring to the partnership. These can be “hard” assets such as plants and equipment, access to low-cost resources, technological capability and know- how, or often equally important “soft” assets, such as networks and relationships in host countries. Externalization allows the TNC to establish a more effective internal division of labour, freeing scarce resources to be used in other segments of its value chain – in other words, it allows a focus on “core business”. Externalization is clearly more feasible if the knowledge and intellectual property required to conduct the activity are transferable, i.e. not tacit and to some extent standardized or codified. From the TNC’s perspective, the terms of contracts underpinning non-equity relationships are aimed at minimizing the cost of externalization and at protectingtheassets,technologyandIPexchanged. Non-contractual levers of control can also play a role in minimizing costs and risks to the TNC – the superior bargaining power of the TNC will alleviate concerns related to giving up a measure of control over part of its value chain. The degree of control given up by the TNC, the costs and associated risks of externalization, and the type of contractual and non-contractual levers which come into play, vary by mode, context and relative bargaining power of TNCs and NEM partners (see below in section A.2). In building their international production networks, TNCs therefore have to decide not only on a location, but also on the mode of control and coordination Foreign direct investment Trade Non-equity modes of international production of international operations. In the classic economic model describing this decision-making process, the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) model (Dunning, 1980),2 the choice of mode in host countries is between ownership (FDI) and arm’s- length trade or licensing. Non-equity modes of international production represent an evolution of this model; they allow TNCs to enter a “middle ground” (figure IV.1) in their GVC governance by externalizing activities while still maintaining a level of control, i.e. improving the trade-off between the advantages and the costs of externalization (Hennart, 2009). The choice is thus no longer between control through ownership (FDI) or no control (trade), but between a range of modes in which control exercised in various configurations and to various degrees. Thus, in the case of wholly owned host country affiliates, control is defined purely by ownership; in the case of NEMs, control is exercised through contracts and bargaining power (table IV.1). Equity joint ventures are a special case in which TNCs control flows from a mix of equity and non-equity governance. Figure IV.1. Non-equity modalities: A middle ground between FDI and trade Source: UNCTAD. The ultimate ownership and control configuration of a GVC is thus the outcome of a set of strategic choices by the TNC. The type of non-equity modes that are available or appropriate along GVCs varies by value chain segment. Figure IV.2 shows that NEMs are not specific to any particular part of the value chain or type of activity – TNCs are generally prepared to externalize any activity that is not fundamental to its competitive advantage in its market or industry and that can be carried out at lower cost or more effectively by third parties (including overseas), when the risks associated with externalization are limited or can be contained. Activities that are knowledge-intensive or high value added are not precluded. While certain patterns of
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development126 NEM activity have emerged in different industries, it is useful to view the propensity of any given segment of a value chain to be externalized is entirely specific to the industry or the individual TNC. In some parts of the value chain NEMs and FDI may be substitutes, while in others the two may be complementary. Substitution occurs where a TNC has a choice between different modes and makes a cost-benefit trade-off, for example where a firm has the option of either building a plant to produce and supply products to an overseas market, or alternatively licensing the required technology and IP to a local manufacturer. It may also occur where the industry structure predetermines the outcome of the trade-off. For example in the electronics industry, in most cases construction of a fully owned new components or assembly plant by a design- or brand-owner no longer makes economic sense in the presence of large and sophisticated global contract manufacturing firms. Complementarity is a characteristic of TNC coordinated international production systems, which encompass a web of owned affiliates and third-party NEM relationships; both modes of operation are an integral part of the chain of global value creation. Moreover, complementarity may exist at the same stage in the value chain, where for example directly owned retail outlets coexist with franchise outlets, or where foreign affiliates are established to manage and facilitate NEM relationships (e.g. a commercial, procurement or logistics entity to support multiple contract manufacturing relationships in the same overseas market). The composition of a TNC-governed GVC, and its ownership and control configuration, are dynamic. The partners in NEM relationships evolve over time. In some industries, NEM partner firms have grown into TNCs in their own right, not unusually expanding their NEM operations to new production bases or Table IV.1. Different modes of TNC governance in global value chains Types of governance Translation to modes of international operation OLI-model Ownership advantages Locational advantages Internalization advantages Control through ownership FDI, direct participation in host-country firms √ √ √ Contractual levers of control Contractual agreement conditions the behaviour of a host- country firm √ √ - Control based on bargaining power Host-country firm dependence on access to TNC strategic assets and the TNC network conditions its behaviour √ √ - No control Arm’s-length market transactions, trade √ - - Source: UNCTAD, adapted from Dunning (1980). Figure IV.2. Selected NEM-types along the value chain Source: UNCTAD, based on Porter’s classic value chain representation (Porter, 1985). • Contract manufacturing (assembly/final product) • Out-licensing • Contract logistics • Franchising • Management contracts • Concessions • Brand-licensing • After sales services outsourcing • Call centres • Business process outsourcing Corporate services and support processes Technology/Intelectual property development • Contract RD, Contract design, In-licensing Operations/ manufacturing Out-bound logistics/ distribution - Sales, service provision, marketing Aftersales and services • Contract farming • Procurement hubs • Contract manufacturing (intermediates) Procurement/ in-bound logistics
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 127 Box IV.1. The evolution of retail franchising in transition economies One of the main economic challenges of transition economies in the early transition period was the reconstruction of the services sector. Retail services in particular needed modernization, as the distribution networks created for the centrally planned system had become unsustainable. Transition economies relied heavily on foreign investors for capital, technology and know-how in logistics, network development and marketing. International retailers entered the market almost exclusively through equity investments (FDI). The share of retail in the inward FDI stock of transition economies was between 5 and 7 per cent in the late 1990s, compared with less than 1 per cent in the rest of the world. For TNCs, FDI, including the acquisition of privatized firms, was the fastest way to enter the region. Moreover, the underdeveloped business environment and a lack of appropriate partners often precluded non-equity forms of operation (franchising). Gradually, as the transition economies advance, foreign operators are increasingly opting to develop their retail networks through franchising. Their foreign affiliates, including purchasing and marketing organizations, logistics networks and warehouses, often serve as a basis for building franchising operations. In addition, through their local operations they have built local capabilities and skills, both by bringing in expatriate staff and by training local personnel. Thus with the evolution of the local market, retail TNCs are shifting their operations from FDI to franchising, though many maintain an FDI presence. For example, in 2011, in the Russian Federation there were 305 foreign franchise systems out of 595, compared to only 33 in 1996. The number of franchisee outlets linked to foreign franchisors had risen to 3,446, up from only 440 in 1996. Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by the East European Franchise Association. markets through FDI. Examples include Foxconn (Taiwan Province of China) (contract manufacturing) and Arcos Dorados (Argentina) (franchising). The mix of FDI and NEMs within GVCs can also shift as technologies and standards change. The evolution of TNC strategies in transition economies, broadly from FDI to franchising after the region opened up to international investors, is a case in point (box IV.1). 2. Defining features of NEMs A cross-border non- equity mode of TNC operation3 arises when a TNC externalizes part of its operations to a host-country-based partner firm in which it has no ownership stake, while maintaining a level of control over the operation by contractually specifying the way it is to be conducted. Specifications may relate to, for example, the design and quality of the product or service to be delivered, the process and standards of production, or the business model that the partner firm must adhere to. In distinction to purely arm’s-length transactions, they have a material impact on the conduct of the business, requiring the host-country partner firm to, for example, make capital expenditure, change processes, adopt new procedures, improve working conditions, use specified suppliers, and so forth. Thus the defining feature of cross-border NEMs, as a form of governance of a TNC’s global value chain, is control over a host-country business entity by means other than equity holdings, although each type of NEM has its own particularities.4 A parallel can be drawn with FDI. The defining feature of FDI, to distinguish it from other forms of investment, is a significant level of control (a minimum equity stake of 10 per cent in host-country business entities) and a long-term interest in the host-country operation. This issue of a long-term interest also avises in the case of NEMs, as partner firms become an integral part of the TNC’s GVC and their performance is an integral part of the TNC’s overall competitiveness. The various forms of NEM, summarized in table IV.2, can also be compared to FDI in terms of their motivation. Some, such as contract farming, are resource-seeking; some are efficiency- seeking (contract manufacturing, outsourcing); and some are market-seeking (brand licensing, franchising). Furthermore, some types of NEM NEMs are contractual rela- tionship between TNCs and partner firms, without equity involvement. Bargaining power represents an additional lever with which TNCs influence their partners, and the sources of this power vary by mode.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development128 are similar to FDI in that they entail a “package” of assets, resources, technology and know-how to be put in the care of host-country firms, as in the case of contract manufacturing, outsourcing, franchising and concessions. Other NEM types are more “narrow asset transfers”, as in the case of licensing, management contracts, or some sub-types of franchising such as distributor ships or agencies. This report focuses on NEMs where the relationship between TNCs and partner firms is relatively simple – essentially the first five types of NEM in table IV.2, from contract manufacturing to management contracts – to enable a relatively unambiguous analysis based around GVCs, facilitating assessment of impact and policy issues. Strategic alliances, concessions and contractual joint ventures are complex NEM forms, with less clear-cut scope and implications meriting separate treatment. (Concessions in extractive industries and infrastructure, respectively, were dealt with in WIR07 and WIR08.) The defining features of NEMs – coordination and control of independent firms through contractual and non-contractual means, with a material impact on the conduct of their business – in some instances blur the rigid distinction between FDI, NEMs and trade. In some industries such as electronics, contract manufacturers are very large operators Table IV.2. Definitions of selected types of cross-border NEMs NEM type Definition Contract manufacturing Services outsourcinga Contractual relationships whereby an international firm contracts out to a host-country firm production, service or processing elements of its GVC (extending even to aspects of product development). All go under the general rubric of outsourcing. Services outsourcing commonly entails the externalization of support processes including IT, business and knowledge functions. Contract farming Contractual relationship between an international buyer and (associations of) host-country farmers (including through intermediaries), which establishes conditions for the farming and marketing of agricultural products. See also WIR09. Licensing Contractual relationship in which an international firm (licensor) grants to a host country firm (licensee) the right to use an intellectual property (e.g. copyrights, trade marks, patents, industrial design rights, trade secrets) in exchange for payment (a royalty). Licensing can take various forms, including brand licensing, product licensing and process licensing. In-licensing refers to a company acquiring a licence from another firm; out-licensing entails sale of intellectual property to other firms. See also WIR05. Franchising Contractual relationship in which an international firm (franchisor) permits a host country firm (franchisee) to run a business modelled on the system developed by the franchisor in exchange for a fee or a mark-up on goods or services supplied by the franchisor. Franchising includes international master franchising, with a single equity owner of all outlets in a market, and unit franchising, with individual entrepreneurs owning one or more outlets. Management contracts Contractual relationship under which operational control of an asset in a host country is vested to an international firm, the contractor, which manages the asset in return for a fee. Concessions Contractual relationship under which operational control of an asset in a host country is vested to an international firm, the concessionaire. The firm manages the asset in return for an entitlement to (part of) the proceeds generated by the asset. Concessions are normally complex agreements, such as build-own-transfer (BOT) arrangements, which might include elements of investment by the TNC or ownership of the asset for a period. Legally they can be structured in many ways, including as public–private partnerships (PPPs). See also WIR07 and WIR08. Strategic alliances Contractual joint ventures Contractual relationship between two or more firms to pursue a joint business objective. Partners may provide the alliance with products, distribution channels, manufacturing capability, capital equipment, knowledge, expertise, or intellectual property. Strategic alliances involve intellectual property transfer, specialization, shared expenses and risk. Contracts set forth terms, obligations, and liabilities of the parties but do not entail the creation of a new legal entity. Source: UNCTAD. a The generic terms “subcontracting” and “OEM” will be avoided in this report as they are used in a number of different ways in the literature and business.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 129 and TNCs in their own right. For example, Inventec (Taiwan Province of China) designs, builds and internationally distributes electronics products for lead TNCs such as Apple (United States), Fujitsu- Siemens (Japan), and Lenovo (China); and it does this from production affiliates in countries such as Malaysia, Czech Republic and Mexico. NEMs are therefore inextricably linked with international trade and FDI, shaping global patterns of trade in many sectors. In industry segments such as automotive components, consumer electronics, garments, hotels and IT and business process services, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing represent a very large share of total trade. NEMs are thus a major “route-to-market” for countries aiming at export-led growth, and a major point of access to TNC global value chains. TNC governance, control and coordination of host- country operations through NEMs can be indirect. In contract farming, the numbers of individual suppliers are so great that arrangements with TNCs are made by intermediaries. For example, in 2008 Olam (Singapore) sourced 17 agricultural commodities from approximately 200,000 suppliers in 60 countries (most of them developing countries). Similarly, in 2008 food manufacturer Nestlé (Switzerland) had more than 600,000 contract farmers in over 80 developing and transition economies as direct suppliers of various agricultural commodities (WIR09). Contractual relationship between a TNC and host-country farmers can be channelled through associations of farmers, cooperatives or other intermediaries, which then establish conditions for the production of farm products. In the garments industry, large intermediaries such as Li Fung (Hong Kong, China) arrange production in dozens of countries for branded clothing companies such as Gap (United States) via its long-standing relationship with independent contractors. Similarly, in franchising, extended networks of business outlets are often governed through a master franchisee that contracts rights for an entire market (a country or region) in which it manages relationships with individual unit franchisees. The means of control and the sources of bargaining power in NEM relationships vary by type. Partnerships are seldom equal, with power relationships depending on a range of factors which vary by NEM-type and industry, and include the capabilities and other assets possessed by TNCs and partner firms. In each NEM-type contractual levers of control are complemented with elements of soft bargaining power that strengthen TNCs’ governance of GVCs (table IV.3). At the same time, partner companies in host countries possess or can develop “countervailing power”, often with the support of their government. Sources of such countervailing power on the part of NEM partners include specialized knowledge (including patents and other intellectual property), advanced productive capabilities (e.g. the ability to scale operations quickly), access to key assets or resources (including human resources) or know- how related to the local market of the NEM partner. This countervailing power can also be exercised in a number of ways, including in negotiations defining the terms of a contract. Ultimately, it is the TNC which orchestrates the value chain. Thus, the most important source of TNC bargaining power, outweighing any countervailing forces that a host-country NEM may put forward, is its role as the coordinator of the GVC itself. This has implications for both partner firms and developing countries. The TNC’s governance of its integrated international production network and of the web of loosely dependent entities that make it up allows it to regulate access to the network and to set the conditions. Thus the segmentation or “fine-slicing” of value chains into ever more numerous and discrete activities that can be carried out by partner firms in any location plays into the hands of TNCs. It also makes them important interlocutors for policymakers aiming to stimulate the development of specific economic activities in specific locations, independent of whether such development is driven by FDI or domestic partners’ investment.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development130 To assess the extent to which TNCs govern global value chains it is no longer sufficient to consider equity ownership (FDI) alone as a control mechanism. However, analysing non-equity modes is complex, because the web of directly owned, partially owned, contract-based and arm’s-length forms of international operation of TNCs is tangled, and some of the distinctions between the different modes are blurred. Moreover, the relationship between FDI, NEMs and trade is also intertwined in many GVCs. In electronics contract manufacturing, for example, most of the top players, primarily from developing economies, have become TNCs in their own right. From the perspective of developing host countries, the activities of such firms are equivalent to FDI, B. THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF CROSS-BORDER NEMs NEMs are an important part of TNC-governed GVCs, and are growing rapidly. NEM activity is becoming ever more wide- spread geographically, though there are significant varia- tions by mode and industry. even if their productive capacity is employed to serve other TNCs. However, their NEM identity is vital information for policymakers – all the more so because such operations generate significant amounts of trade. Including the activities of such contract manufacturers in the measurement of non-equity modes of internationalization risks some “double-counting” between FDI and NEMs. Nevertheless, their inclusion in this section is essential in order to understand the nature and extent of value chain governance by individual TNCs. Measuring the scale and scope of cross-border NEMs is crucial to our understanding of the overall development of world trade and investment. Recognizing the complexity of NEMs and their interconnections with other aspects of TNC operations, the aim here is to establish a baseline to evaluate NEMs in a number of dimensions (box IV.2 describes the methodology used for the analysis and calculations). The overall methodology Table IV.3. TNCs’ contractual levers and sources of bargaining power Modes Contractual levers of TNC control over host-country firmsa Sources of TNC bargaining power Contract manufacturing Services outsourcing Contract farming • Specifications for design, process, product or service, and quality • Commercial terms and capital expenditure obligations/assurances • Supply guarantees and restrictions on side-selling • Obligations to purchase specific inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilizer) • Obligations regarding the TNC’s CSR practices • Access to the TNC internal market, guaranteed sales • Access to TNC know-how, supplies of inputs, logistics network • Existence of many potential contract suppliers Licensing • Obligations placed on the licensee restricting or conditioning the use of the intellectual property • Access to know-how, intellectual property • Access to the TNC internal market where part of a subcontracting arrangement •  Existence of many competing licensees Franchising • Obligations placed on the franchisee conditioning the use of the intellectual property and the running of the business (e.g. use of the supply network, choice of suppliers, service levels, capital expenditure, CSR) • Access to the TNC supply and business support network • Market strength of established brand names • Existence of alternative choices of franchisees Management contracts • Obligations regarding the state and maintenance of the asset and future investments (capital expenditure obligations/assurances) • Access to TNC managerial competencies and know-how, supply network, and intellectual property Source: UNCTAD. a Contractual arrangements also include obligations on the part of TNCs.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 131 Box IV.2. Methodological note Measurement of NEM activity is difficult, given the lack of national and international statistics that cover NEM-specific transactions. In order to provide some sense of the scale and scope of NEM activity worldwide, and specifically cross-border activities, UNCTAD employed a three-step methodology to establish estimates for WIR11. First, the prevalence of various forms of NEMs was mapped across industries. For example, contract manufacturing is most prevalent in industries such as electronics, automotive parts, garments, footwear etc. Where possible, overall NEM activity, measured by sales or exports, was gathered for all industry/mode combinations: • In some cases (contract manufacturing in electronics, automotive components, and pharmaceuticals; services outsourcing; franchising; and management contracts in hotels) estimates of global activity were obtained from recognized industry analysts, industry associations or consultancy firms. These estimates were then refined by analysing the major players in each market and adjusting total NEM sales by an appropriate internationalization ratio to derive cross-border sales. • In cases where NEM estimates do not exist in any form (contract manufacturing in garments, footwear, and toys) cross-border sales were estimated by taking world exports of those goods, subtracting re-exports, and applying an estimate of the share of exports related to the given mode/industry combination based on industry interviews and industry reports. Second, value added related to cross-border NEM sales was estimated in most cases by applying the ratio of value added (calculated as the sum of pre-tax income, personnel costs, and amortization/depreciation) to sales generated from a sample of representative companies in each industry. For franchising, the data was obtained through national franchise associations. Third, employment estimates, both total and in developing and transition economies, were also derived for each mode/industry combination: • In cases where the players in a given industry/mode combination are highly concentrated (contract manufac- turing: electronics, automotive components, and pharmaceuticals; and management contracts in hotels), the estimate of cross-border employment was constructed by taking the sum of their employment and inflating it by their share in the global NEM market for their industry/mode and applying an internationalization ratio. Estimates of employment in developing and transition economies were derived by applying the share of assets or employ- ment in these economies for the largest players to the total employment estimate. • In cases where the concentration of players is low (contract manufacturing: garments, footwear, and toys) total employment was estimated by using industrial data from UNIDO to determine worldwide employment in a given industry (2007 data, or latest available year) and applying industry-specific ratios related to the share of production destined for export and an estimate of the share of exports related to the given mode/industry combination. Estimates of employment in developing and transition economies were derived by applying the ratio of worldwide employment located in these economies to the total mployment estimate. • Data for franchising and IT services and business process outsourcing were obtained from national associa- tions and from industry reports. For franchising, an internationalization ratio (share of franchising activity carried out by foreigners) was applied to estimate cross-border NEM employment. For IT services and business pro- cess outsourcing, industry reports provided the necessary cross-border related employment. Estimates of em- ployment in developing and transition economies were constructed using information from the same sources. The data on major players used to derive estimates are included in annex tables IV.1–7. Source: UNCTAD. estimates a minimal size for NEMs, but the actual level is likely to be somewhat higher. The various contractual forms included in our discussion – contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, licensing, franchising and management contracts – are commonly also employed between firms within the same country. This section focuses only on those NEM activities that cross borders. Linkages between foreign affiliates and local firms that take the form of NEM contracts5 are, for the most part, excluded from the data presented here. The usage of NEMs in firm internationalization is common across many industries and in every segment of GVCs. This ubiquity creates difficulties for analysis of the phenomenon, given the general lack of relevant statistics. The report limits its analysis to a number of industries in which NEMs
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development132 are especially important; and in some cases, to particular stages of a GVC, for similar reasons.6 Finally, firms sometimes simulate internal markets, in which their affiliates compete with each other or with outside suppliers for contracts. Because of this, contractual types such as licensing, contract manufacturing and management contracts are also commonly used within a TNC, i.e. between different legal entities of the same parent company. However, such intra-firm arrangements are excluded from the scope of cross-border NEMs in this report, as by definition they cannot be considered “non-equity”; and also because including them would again result in double-counting with FDI. 1. The overall size and growth of cross- border NEMs Cross-border NEM activity worldwide is estimated to have generated about $2 trillion of sales in 2010 in selected modes. Of this amount, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing accounted for about $1 Figure IV.3. Estimated worldwide sales by type of NEM, 2010 (Trillions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: See box IV.2 for the methodology used. The dotted area depicts the range estimates for each item. These figures include additional estimates not covered in table IV.4 for contract manufacturing (sporting goods, white goods, textiles, and electronics components) and management contracts (infrastructure services). trillion, franchising for $330–350 billion, licensing for $340–360 billion, and management contracts for some $100 billion (figure IV.3). These estimates are incomplete, including only the most important industries in which each NEM type is prevalent. The total also excludes other NEMs – principally contract farming – for which reliable data are not available. Other non-equity forms such as strategic alliances and concessions are not in the scope of this report, as explained in section IV.A.7 Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing as a whole clearly top the list on all major indicators, including total sales generated, value added, exports, worldwide employment and employment in developing countries as indicated by selected industries (table IV.4). Nevertheless, other NEM types are often significant on individual quantitative indicators (e.g. franchising, for employment generation in developing countries) or in terms of qualitative impacts (section D). Looking at major indicators by NEM type also hides significant differences by industry. Sales, value added and employment in more technology-intensive industries such as electronics, automotive components and pharmaceuticals, where contract manufacturing is concentrated in a number of major international Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing Franchising Licensing Management contracts Total value of selected cross-border NEM types 1.1–1.3 ~0.3 ~0.3 ~0.1 1.8–2.1 Cross-border NEMs are worth at least $2 trillion in sales globally, much of it in developing countries. In most cases, NEMs are growing more rapidly than the industries in which they operate.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 133 Table IV.4. Key figures of cross-border NEMs, selected industries, 2010a (Billions of dollars and millions of employees) Estimated NEM-related worldwide Sales Value added Employment Employment in developing economies Contract manufacturing - selected technology/capital intensive industries Electronics 230–240 20–25 1.4–1.7 1.3–1.5 Automotive components 200–220 60–70 1.1–1.4 0.3–0.4 Pharmaceuticals 20–30 5–10 0.1–0.2 0.05–0.1 Contract manufacturing - selected labour intensive industries Garments 200–205 40–45 6.5–7.0 6.0–6.5 Footwear 50–55 10–15 1.7–2.0 1.6–1.8 Toys 10–15 2–3 0.4–0.5 0.4–0.5 Services outsourcing IT services and business process outsourcing b 90–100 50–60 3.0–3.5 2.0–2.5 Franchising Retail, hotel, restaurant, and catering, business and other services 330–350 130–150 3.8–4.2 2.3–2.5 Management contracts - selected industry Hotels 15–20 5–10 0.3–0.4 0.1–0.15 Estimated NEM-related worldwide Fees Associated sales Associated value added Licensing Cross-industry 17–18 340–360 90–110 Source: UNCTAD estimates. a Data for 2010 or latest available year. b For data reliability reasons this estimate only reflects pure cross-border sales and is therefore an underestimate of NEM activity in this industry. Note: See box IV.2 for the methodology used. All figures are cross-border, inter-firm NEM only. operators, are different from those in traditional labour-intensive industries such as garments, footwear and toys, which are characterized by large numbers of smaller producers, at best aggregated under international operators specializing in GVC coordination. Equally, grouping businesses as diverse as retail, quick-service restaurants and business services under the single banner of franchising undoubtedly hides wide variations in value added and employment. There are large variations in relative size. In the automotive industry, contract manufacturing accounts for 30 per cent of global exports of automotive components and a quarter of employment. In contrast, in electronics, contract manufacturing represents a much larger share of trade and employment. In labour-intensive industries such as garments, footwear and toys, contract manufacturing is even more important. Putting different modes of international production in perspective, cross-border activity related to selected NEMs of $2 trillion compares with exports of foreign affiliates of TNCs of some $6 trillion in 2010. However, NEMs are particularly important in developing countries, which in many industries account for almost all NEM-related employment and exports, compared with the developing country share in global FDI stocks of 30 per cent and in world trade of less than 40 per cent. NEMs are also growing rapidly. In most cases, the growth of NEMs outpaces that of the industries in which they operate (figure IV.4). 2. Trends and indicators by type of NEM a. Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing relationships across borders are extensive. They knit together the widely dispersed activities of many of the largest TNCs in the world. The bulk of integrated international manufacturing occurs within
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development134 the confines of TNCs’ global operations, manifesting itself through significant levels of intra-firm trade. Contract manufacturing with third parties, however, has grown rapidly in the past decade as TNCs move towards network forms of operation. Globally, UNCTAD estimates that the market for contract manufacturing and services outsourcing combined was in the range of $1.1–1.3 trillion in 2010 (figure IV.3). The use of contract manufacturing varies considerably across industries (figure IV.5). For instance, the toys and sporting goods, electronics and automotive industry are major users of contract manufacturing, outsourcing more than 50 per cent shareofcostofgoodssold.Contractmanufacturing, in industries such as pharmaceuticals, on the other hand, is relatively new and is still small measured as a percentage of cost of goods sold. The nature and origin of NEM players, the geographical dispersion of NEM operations and their scale and industrial concentration differ by industry. For example, whereas contract manufacturers in electronics and IT-BPO services (information technology and business process outsourcing) are major TNCs in their own right, with large-scale operations in a relatively small number of locations worldwide, those in industries such as garments and footwear are relatively small firms in low-cost locations with a very wide geographical dispersion (tables IV.5 and IV.6). In technology and capital-intensive industries a small number of NEMs – often TNCs – dominate. In automotive components, pharmaceuticals and IT- BPO, companies from developed countries are the largest contract manufacturers, while in electronics and semiconductors the situation is more mixed, but with developing country companies the more significant (tables IV.5 and IV.6). In the case of labour- intensive industries such as garments, footwear and toys, however, a number of developing country TNCs act as intermediaries or agents between lead TNCs and NEMs, managing the manufacturing part of the GVC. Many of these intermediaries, such as Li Fung Ltd (Hong Kong, China), have evolved from NEM roots. The examination of contract manufacturing in electronics, garments and IT-BPO that follows is illustrative of the various patterns of evolution, activity and geographic dispersal, which depend on the nature of industries and other conditions. Figure IV.5. Use of contract manufacturing by selected industries, estimated share of cost of goods sold Source: Polastro (2009). Contract manufacturing in the electronics industry evolved early. Offshoring up to the mid- 1980s took the form of manufacturing FDI, as TNCs took advantage of cheaper, relatively skilled labour8 in host countries to process and assemble intermediate goods for shipping back to their home economies. In the latter part of the Pharmaceuticals (branded) Pharmaceuticals (generic) Automotive Consumer electronics Toys/sporting goods ~ 90% ~ 80% ~ 60–70% ~ 40% ~ 20% 0 5 10 15 20 Garments (contract manufacturing) Toys (contract manufacturing) Retail (franchising) Footwear (contract manufacturing) Pharmaceuticals (contract manufacturing) Electronics (contract manufacturing Industry growth NEM growth Figure IV.4. Comparative growth rates of NEMs’ sales, selected industries, 2005-2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: Global industry growth estimates based on industry market research from Ibisworld (garments and footwear) and Datamonitor (all others). Estimates for NEM growth are based on data for the 10 largest contract manufacturers in each industry, except for franchising in retail, which is based on data available for 24 countries. Contract manufacturing/ services outsourcing, franchising and licensing are among the largest NEMs in terms of sales and employment. Other NEMs – such as contract farming and management contracts – are significant in various ways.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 135 1980s, a number of electronics companies started shedding manufacturing operations to concentrate on RD, product design and brand management. The manufacturing was taken up by electronics manufacturing services (EMS) companies, including Celestica, Flextronics and Foxconn. Some of these emerged from existing suppliers, especially those based in Taiwan Province of China (e.g. Foxconn); others were spinoffs,9 such as Celestica from IBM (McKendrick, Doner and Haggard, 2000; Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2010). A small number of contract manufacturers now dominate the industry, with the largest 10 by sales accounting for some two-thirds of the EMS activity. They produce for all major brands in the industry, from Dell and Hewlett-Packard in computing to Apple, Sony and Philips in consumer electronics (annex table IV.1), with overall sales in electronics contract manufacturing amounting to $230–240 billion in 2010 (table IV.4). All but three of the top 10 players in electronics contract manufacturing are headquartered in developing East Asia – the bulk of manufacturing production in the industry is centred on East and South-East Asia, particularly China. During the last decade, however, contract manufacturing firms in the industry have accelerated their spread to other regions, often by purchasing manufacturing facilities from lead TNCs. This has made them into large TNCs in their own right. Today, they own and run hundreds of facilities in developing economies that lie beyond their region of origin, including Brazil, India, Mexico and Turkey (annex table IV.1). In addition to these large global NEM firms, there are many smaller contract manufacturers in the industry, both established and emerging, in Table IV.5. Major developing economy players in contract manufacturing and services outsourcing, 2009 (Billions of dollars and thousands of employees) Company name Sales Employment Company name Sales Employment Electronics Garments Foxconn/Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) 59.3 611 Youngor Group Co. Ltd (China) 1.8 47 Flextronics (Singapore) 30.9 160 Luen Thai (Hong Kong, China) 0.8 20 Quanta (Taiwan Province of China) 25.4 65 Makalot Industrial (Taiwan Province of China) 0.4 21 Compal (Taiwan Province of China) 20.4 58 Tristate (Hong Kong, China) 0.4 15 Wistron (Taiwan Province of China) 13.9 39 High Fashion International (Hong Kong, China) 0.3 12 Automotive components Footwear LG Chem (Republic of Korea) 13.1 8 Pou Chen (Taiwan Province of China) 6.5 333 Hyundai Mobis (Republic of Korea) 11.2 6 Stella International (Taiwan Province of China) 1.0 50 Mando (Republic of Korea) 2.1 4 Feng Tay (Taiwan Province of China) 0.8 68 Nemak (Mexico) 1.9 15 Symphony (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 14 Randon (Brazil) 1.4 10 Kingmaker Footwear (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 12 Pharmaceuticals Toys Piramal Healthcare (India) 0.7 7 Kader (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 20 Jubilant Life Sciences (India) 0.7 6 Herald (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 8 Divi's Laboratories (India) 0.2 1 Lerado Group (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 5 Dishman Pharmaceuticals (India) 0.2 1 Dream International (Hong Kong, China) 0.1 9 Hikal (India) 0.1 1 Matrix (Hong Kong, China) 0.1 9 Semiconductors IT-BPO TSMC (Taiwan Province of China) 9.2 26 Tata Consultancy Services (India) 5.2 160 UMC (Taiwan Province of China) 2.9 13 Wipro (India) 4.2 108 Chartered Semiconductor (Singapore) 1.5 4 China Communications Services (China) 2.7 127 SMIC (China) 1.1 10 Sonda (Chile) 0.9 9 Dongbu HiTek (Republic of Korea) 0.4 3 HCL Technologies (India) 0.8 54 Source: UNCTAD Note: Data refers, where possible, to sales and employment associated with cross-border NEM activities.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development136 Table IV.6. Top 10 players in contract manufacturing and services outsourcing, selected industries, 2009 (Billions of dollars and thousands of employees) Company name Sales Employment Company name Sales Employment Electronics Foxconn/Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) 59.3 611 Inventec (Taiwan Province of China) 13.5 30 Flextronics (Singapore) 30.9 160 Jabil (United States) 13.4 61 Quanta (Taiwan Province of China) 25.4 65 TPV Technology (Hong Kong, China) 8.0 24 Compal (Taiwan Province of China) 20.4 58 Celestica (Canada) 6.5 35 Wistron (Taiwan Province of China) 13.9 39 Sanmina-SCI (United States) 5.2 32 Automotive components Denso (Japan) 32.0 120 LG Chem (Republic of Korea) 13.1 13 Robert Bosch (Germany) 25.6 271 Faurecia (France) 13.0 58 Aisin Seiki (Japan) 22.1 74 Johnson Controls (United States) 12.8 130 Continental (Germany) 18.7 148 Delphi (United States) 11.8 147 Magna International (Canada) 17.4 96 ZF Friedrichshafen (Germany) 11.7 60 Pharmaceuticals Catalent Pharma Solutions (United States) 1.6 9 Jubilant Life Sciences (India) 0.7 6 Lonza Group (Switzerland) 1.3 4 NIPRO Corp. (Japan) 0.6 10 Boehringer Ingelheim (Germany) 1.1 6 Patheon (Canada) 0.5 4 Royal DSM (Netherlands) 1.0 4 Fareva (France) 0.4 5 Piramal Healthcare (India) 0.7 7 Haupt Pharma (Germany) 0.4 2 Semiconductors TSMC (Taiwan Province of China) 9.2 26 Dongbu HiTek (Republic of Korea) 0.4 3 UMC (Taiwan Province of China) 2.9 13 VIC (Taiwan Province of China) 0.4 3 Chartered Semiconductor (Singapore) 1.5 4 TowerJazz (Israel) 0.3 2 Globalfoundries (United States) 1.1 10 Samsung Electronics (Republic of Korea) 0.3 .. SMIC (China) 1.1 10 IBM Microelectronics (United States) 0.3 .. IT-BPO International Business Machines (United States) 38.2 190 NTT Data Corp. (Japan) 8.9 35 Hewlett-Packard (United States) 34.9 140 Computer Sciences Corporation (United States) 6.5 45 Fujitsu (Japan) 27.1 18 Cap Gemini (France) 6.1 109 Xerox (United States) 9.6 46 Dell (United States) 5.6 43 Accenture (Ireland) 9.2 204 Logica (United Kingdom) 5.5 39 Source: UNCTAD, based on annex tables IV.1, 2, 3, 5 and 7. Note: Data refers, where possible, to sales and employment associated with cross-border NEM activities. locations around the world which are important players in local value chains. These firms lack the global footprint of the top players and their close interaction with major lead TNCs in the electronics industry; instead many act as second- and third-tier suppliers to the large NEM players in the industry. The garment and footwear industries have a long history of contract manufacturing, especially by companies located in developing countries. Although there are large-scale developing country firms involved in contract manufacturing, such as Gama Tek (Turkey) or Alok Industries (India), generally speaking contract manufacturing is a highly competitive industry typified by vast numbers of small suppliers servicing a limited number of international brands and retailers. Examples of the larger brands include Adidas (Germany), Christian Dior (France), and Nike (United States) (annex table IV.4); retailers include mass merchandisers such as Walmart (United States) and Marks and Spencer’s (United Kingdom), and speciality retailers including Gap (United States) and HM (Sweden). Contracts are often managed through agents or intermediate players (mostly from East Asia),
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 137 formerly contract manufacturers, which have evolved into providers of “value chain management services”, taking on board more and more elements of the value chain (e.g. design and outsourcing), and sometimes shedding their original manufacturing operations. This happened in the case of Li Fung Ltd, which has 80 offices globally (many in developed countries, to work with and secure orders from major brand owners) and 12,000 suppliers under contract manufacturing arrangements in 40 developing economies. Some of the suppliers within such arrangements are themselves TNCs, for instance Hong Kong and Indonesian manufacturers with affiliates in (neighbouring) countries with lower labour costs such as Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic or Lesotho (Gereffi and Frederick, 2010; McNamara, 2008). The size of the market in contract manufacturing of garments, by sales, is some $200–205 billion (table IV.4), with production occurring in widely dispersed locations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The location of factories used by Gap Inc (United States) is a good reflection of this spread (figure IV.6). Beyond the manufacturing elements of TNCs’ value chains, increasing fine-slicing of business functions, including corporate and support activities (e.g. back-office functions or customer services), has fuelled a surge in the outsourcing of services. Figure IV.6. Location of factories used by Gap Inc, 2009 Source: UNCTAD, based on company report. Services outsourcing began as an “onshore” activity in information technology in the 1990s, but rapidly shifted to offshore markets, especially in developing and transition economies. The facility to separate location of production and related services arising from the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution hastened the extension of services outsourcing and offshoring to a range of business processes and other knowledge processes such as market research, business intelligence and RD (Gereffi and Fernadez-Starck, 2010). UNCTAD estimates that the global scale of services outsourcing exports, mostly IT-BPO, was around $90–100 billion in 2009 (table IV.4). This may be a considerable underestimate, with other valuations ranging up to $380 billion or more,11 although the higher figures often include elements such as services outsourcing by TNC affiliates. Because of its development out of ICT and knowledge activities, the industry is dominated by major developed country players such as Accenture (Ireland), Cap Gemini (France), Hewlett-Packard (United States), IBM (United States), and NTT Data (Japan) (table IV.6). The largest developing country firms providing services under contract to overseas clients are from India, including Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys Technologies and Wipro, with others dispersed from China to Chile (table IV.5). The top developing country locations for outsourcing services (managed both by major developed country players and by local firms) are still in Asia. Three countries, India, the Philippines and China, accounted for around 65 per cent12 of global export revenues related to IT-BPO services in 2009, partly because of locational advantages, such as specific language and IT skills, the low cost of labour, and ICT infrastructure. However, the industry is expanding to countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa (AT Kearney, 2011; annex table IV.5). Unlike contract manufacturing, services outsourcing is tied to cities as locations, because of the need for knowledge workers and ready connectivity. A number of new city locations for services outsourcing are coming to the fore (table IV.7). East Asia 33% South Asia 26% South-East Asia 25% Latin America and the Caribbean 7% Developed countries 5% Africa and West Asia 4%
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development138 b. Franchising Worldwide sales franchised enterprises reached nearly $2.5 trillion in 2010 (table IV.8), of which the value of cross-border franchising was around $330– 350 billion (table IV.4). The share of international franchising varies significantly by country. In most developed markets domestic franchising accounts for 80–90 per cent of the total, but franchising has reached maturity in some major emerging markets as well. In Brazil, for example, foreign franchise chains represent only around 10 per cent of the total, all of the top 10 chains being domestic Table IV.7. Locations for global services outsourcing: top 10 established and emerging cities, 2010 Top 10 established cities Top 10 emerging cities Bangalore (India) Krakow (Poland) Mumbai (India) Beijing (China) Delhi (India) Buenos Aires (Argentina) Manila (Philippines) Cairo (Egypt) Chennai (India) Sao Paolo (Brazil) Hyderabad (India) Ho Chi Minh City (Viet Nam) Dublin (Ireland) Dalian (China) Pune (India) Shenzhen (China) Cebu City (Philippines) Curitiba (Brazil) Shanghai (China) Colombo (Sri Lanka) Source: Global Services, Destination Compendium 2010. Available at www.globalservicesmedia.com. Note: The ranking of the cities is based on a range of quantitative and qualitative factors such as the number and quality of IT engineers and other skilled labour, the business environment, connectivity and infrastructure support, risk profiles and quality of life. Table IV.8. Franchise systemsa in the world, 2010 Region/economy Franchise systems Number of outlets (Thousands) Sales ($ billion) Employees (Thousands) Cross-border (Per cent) b World 30 000 2 640 2 480 19 940 15 Developed economies 12 200 1 310 2 210 12 400 10 Europe 7 700 370 340 2 830 20 Japan 1 200 230 250 2 500 5 United States 2 500 630 1 480 6 250 5 Developing/transition economies 17 400 1 330 270 7 540 30 Africa 1 600 40 30 550 70 Latin America and the Caribbean 3 800 190 70 1 810 20 Asia 11 200 1 070 170 4 810 25 South-East Europe and the CIS 800 30 5 370 50 Source: UNCTAD estimates, based on a joint UNCTAD/World Franchise Council survey of national franchise associations. a A franchise system consists of all the franchised units and units managed by the franchisor itself that operate under the same banner and business format, for example the McDonalds franchise system. b Refers to the share of cross-border outlets in the total number of outlets. franchises. However, initial growth of franchising in developing markets is often driven by international franchise operators. In most African markets, except for South Africa, international franchisors account for 80 per cent or more of the total, and in emerging markets such as Mexico, the Russian Federation and Turkey, the rate is still between 30 and 40 per cent. The franchising formula is found in different sectors, and takes different forms. The most important franchising sectors are retail (including high-street retailing as well as grocery), restaurants (often quick- service restaurants), hotels, business services, as well as a diverse range of other services sectors, from education to personal care services. In developed countries the share of higher value added services tends to be higher; in the United States, for example, business and personal services account for 37 per cent of the total franchising sector. By contrast, in developing countries, micro-franchising (mostly one-person businesses) and lower value added services are more common. For example, in South Africa the most important franchising sector is quick-service restaurants, with a share of almost 25 per cent of franchised systems, followed by retail (also a limited value added sector) with 22 per cent. Similarly, in India the leading sector is retail, with a share of 32 per cent, followed by quick-service restaurants with 16 per cent. Most large global franchising operators (franchisors) originate in developed countries, whether they are
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 139 international retailers expanding through franchise networks, luxury brands expanding internationally on the high street, in shopping malls and at airports, or restaurants transplanting their successful formulas to new markets as consumers develop an “international taste”. The top 15 global franchisors by number of outlets are all United States firms, apart from one company each from Japan, Canada and the United Kingdom (annex table IV.6). Most of these 15 firms are fast-food chains such as McDonald’s (United States) and Pizza Hut (United States). The remaining companies out of this group are essentially convenience stores or hotels, including 7-Eleven (Japan) and InterContinental (United Kingdom). Global franchise chains are frequently widely dispersed, with many franchisees in developing countries. For example, KFC (United States) has franchisees in about 110 countries globally, of which some 75 are developing economies; the equivalent numbers for Holiday Inn are over 100 and 80. The choice of location is driven by market size, which is reflected in the top franchising country locations. c. Licensing International licensing spans a wide range of industries and activities, touching on nearly every step of many industries’ global value chains. UNCTAD estimates that cross-border NEM-related licensing resulted in sales of $340–360 billion in 2010 (figure IV.7). NEM-related licensing has grown steadily since 1990, registering a steady 10 per cent average annual growth rate as measured by estimated sales up to 2008, although there was a decline in 2009 because of the financial and economic crisis. Balance of payments statistics suggest that licensing activity directed at developing markets increased markedly in the past decade, though developed economies continue to dominate. Global royalty payments are indicative of licences received (and hence the location of NEM partners to TNCs) and, on this basis, developing and transition economies now pay out roughly a quarter of global royalty fees (table IV.9). The geographical dispersal of licensees (based on royalty payments) is wide, although South, East, 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 1990 2000 2005 2008 2009 Figure IV.7. Estimated sales related to cross-border inter-firm licensing, various years (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: The dotted area depicts the range estimates for each year. Data from the United States was used to calculate the amount of cross-border inter-firm licensing associated with industrial processes and trade marks. This number was scaled-up to the world total by using the share of the United States in world licensing receipts. Table IV.9. Royalties and licence payments by selected developing and transition economies, 2005, 2008, 2009 (Billions of dollars) Region/economy 2005 2008 2009 World 143.4 204.2 197.4 Developed economies 113.1 153.5 149.2 Developing and transition economies 30.3 50.7 48.2 Africa 1.6 2.5 2.5 South Africa 1.1 1.7 1.6 Egypt 0.2 0.3 0.3 Nigeria 0.1 0.2 0.2 Latin America and the Caribbean 3.3 6.5 6.1 Brazil 1.4 2.7 2.5 Argentina 0.7 1.5 1.5 Mexico 0.1 0.6 0.5 Chile 0.3 0.5 0.5 Asia and Oceania 23.1 35.8 34.4 West Asia 0.5 1.1 1.0 Turkey 0.4 0.7 0.6 Iraq 0.0 0.4 0.3 South, East and South-East Asia 22.7 34.7 33.5 Singapore 9.3 12.5 11.6 China 5.3 10.3 11.1 Taiwan Province of China 1.8 3.0 3.4 Thailand 1.7 2.6 2.3 India 0.7 1.5 1.9 South-East Europe and the CIS 2.3 5.9 5.2 Russian Federation 1.6 4.6 4.1 Ukraine 0.4 0.8 0.6 Croatia 0.2 0.3 0.2 Source: UNCTAD, based on IMF’s balance-of-payment statistics.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development140 agreement. Although there is no available figure for the overall scale of cross-border contract farming, a key NEM in terms of development impact (section D), it is widespread. TNCs utilize contract farming in over 110 developing and transition economies, and this involves a large range of agricultural commodities. This NEM is a significant feature of many TNC GVCs, including food and beverages, biofuels and retail (supermarkets). Contract farming plays an important role in underpinning agricultural production and related activities (WIR09): • In Brazil about 75 per cent of poultry and 35 per cent of soya bean production are sourced through contract farming. • In Kenya, about 60 per cent of tea and sugar – and nearly all of cut flower exports – are pro- duced through contract farming arrangements. • In Mozambique a majority of the 400,000 con- tract farmers are smallholders. • In Viet Nam some 90 per cent of cotton and fresh milk, 50 per cent of tea and 40 per cent of rice are sourced through this mode. • In Zambia 100 per cent of cotton and paprika are produced through contract farming. and South-East Asia comprised nearly 70 per cent of the total from developing and transition economies in 2009, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean, South-East Europe and the CIS, Africa, and West Asia. Within each region there is a high concentration of licensing activity in a few countries, e.g. South Africa and Egypt in Africa; Brazil and Argentina in Latin America; and Turkey in West Asia. This is slightly less the case for East, South and South-East Asia, with Singapore, China and Taiwan Province of China most involved as licensing partners. d. Other modalities In addition to contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, franchising and licensing, discussed above, there are many other NEMs – such as management contracts and contract farming – for which overall scale is difficult to estimate (reliable data are often unavailable), but which are nevertheless large and important from a development perspective. In the case of cross- border management contracts, UNCTAD estimates sales of $100 billion (figure IV.3) in an eclectic range of industries from hotels (box IV.3) to infrastructure services, such as electricity and water distribution. The management contract element in infrastructure is often a sub-element of a more complex
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 141 Box IV.3. The use of management contracts in the hotel industry The international hotel industry is a good example of how TNCs vary their use of internationalization modes depending on circumstances. Historically, hotel chains have favoured franchising as a mode of expansion, both domestically and internationally. Hotel groups largely stick to franchising in more mature markets, while they have a stronger preference for management contracts (and ownership, i.e. FDI) in developing markets. They also exhibit a preference for management contract when it comes to luxury and upscale hotels – categories with a larger share in hotel group portfolios in developing markets, compared to mature markets. Globally, eight of the 10 largest hotel groups use management contracts. The average share of management contracts in the global branded market (by number of rooms) is around 28 per cent (24 per cent for the top 10 groups). Among the top 10 groups Hyatt makes the most use of this mode (53 per cent share in rooms), and Marriot accounts for the highest amount of sales associated with management contracts ($8.9 billion). These chains combined have 41 per cent of their operations abroad. The resulting share of management contracts in sales abroad by the top 10 groups provides an estimate of $16 billion; and by branded hotels of $19 billion. UNCTAD estimates that cross-border management contracts employ 233,000 people in the top 10 chains and 353,000 for the entire branded market. These figures most likely understate the employment impact in developing countries, as employment intensity in those markets is much higher due to low labour costs and more services provided in-house (box table IV.3.1; MKG Hospitality, 2011). Source: UNCTAD. Box table IV.3.1. Top 10 hotel groups, 2010 Group Home economy Number of rooms Estimated hotel system sales Estimated hotel system employment Internation- alization (Per cent) Franchising (Per cent) Management contracts (MC) (Per cent) Total sales MC International employment MC IHG InterContinental Hotels Group United Kingdom 647 161 18 700 335 000 90 74 25 4 701 75 786 Marriot International United States 618 104 19 691 300 000 20 53 45 8 860 27 00 Wyndham Hotel Group United States 612 735 7 169 315 970 25 96 1 47 519 Hilton Hotel Corp. United States 587 813 18 757 303 118 17 69 26 4 885 13 082 Accor France 507 306 10 083 261 603 75 24 22 2 208 42 728 Choice Hotel International, Inc. United States 495 145 6 538 145 000 15 100 - - - Starwood Hotel Resorts Worlwide United States 308 736 12 260 159 206 43 39 52 6 323 35 353 Best Western International United States 308 477 6 931 145 000 39 100 - - - Carlson Hotels Worldwide United States 159 756 4 844 160 000 55 65 21 1 017 18 541 Hyatt Hotels Corp. United States 127 507 5 124 130 000 30 16 53 2 716 20 376 Total top 10 hotel groups - 4 372 740 110 101 2 254 898 41 68 22 30 760 233 488 Source: UNCTAD estimates, based on company and consultancy reports. Note: Sales are the gross sales of the global hotel system, including sales generated by franchised and managed hotels. The share of management contracts is the proportion of rooms in hotels under management contracts in the total number of rooms.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development142 Table IV.10. NEMs: key advantages and drivers of growth Advantages of NEMs for TNCs Drivers of the continuing growth of NEMs Low upfront investment outlays and working capital • Increasing focus on return on capital employed (ROCE) and need to de-leverage • Ever greater levels of capital expenditure required for expansion of production and entering new markets Limited risk exposure • Increasing market and political risk-aversion • Limitation of legal liability Flexibility • Increasing awareness of the need to anticipate cyclical shocks Leveraging of core competencies • Increasing value-chain segmentation, combined with improving knowledge codification, prevalence of industry standards and improving IP regimes as enabling factors • Growing availability of sophisticated NEM partners in emerging markets capable of providing core (e.g. design facilities) and non-core activities efficiently and effectively Source: UNCTAD. 1. Driving forces behind the growing importance of NEMs The use of non-equity modes in international production by TNCs has increased rapidly over the last decade. The growth of NEMs has outpaced the growth of FDI, the traditional means of overseas expansion for TNCs. They have also expanded faster than the average in those sectors in which NEMs are most prevalent (section IV.B). The rapid growth of NEMs as a means of internationalization can be explained by both firms’ strategic choices and a number of enabling factors. The choice on the part of firms to expand overseas through the use of NEMs is based on a number of key advantages they possess (table IV.10). Overall, these advantages, without nuancing them by type of NEM, are: (1) the relatively lower upfront capital expenditure and working capital needed for operation; (2) related to this, the reduced risk exposure; (3) greater flexibility in adapting to changes in the business cycle and in demand; and (4) the externalization of non-core activities that can be carried out at lower cost or more effectively by other operators. These core advantages of NEMs for firms indicate that the growth of NEMs as a means of internationalization is likely to persist. The ever- present attention of shareholders on return on capital employed (ROCE),13 the need for firms to de-leverage in the post-crisis world, and greater risk-aversion all increase the relative attractiveness of NEMs, as these modes require less capital. The greater awareness of the need to anticipate shocks in the business cycle makes the flexibility that contract manufacturers provide in changing production levels, or the shifting of market risks to partners through licensing or franchising, more important. In industries such as hotels, franchising and management contracts allow for much faster expansion of the brand than would be feasible when owning all properties. Finally, across industries the trend to focus on core competencies, externalizing parts of the value chain not considered central to other operations, will if anything accelerate, given the drive to ensure maximum efficiency along the value chain to serve emerging markets demanding low-cost versions of mature-market products and services. There are also disadvantages and risks associated with NEMs. To start with, the externalization of any part of the value chain through the use of an NEM will cause a firm to capture less of the total value created in the chain. In addition, natural and structural market imperfections and resulting NEMs are driven by a number of factors, including their relatively lower upfront capi- tal requirements, reduced risk exposure and greater flex- ibility in adapting to change, allowing TNCs to leverage their core competencies. C. DRIVERS AND DETERMINANTS OF NEMs
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 143 transaction costs can make NEMs less attractive. This is balanced by the relative profitability of other segments of the value chain and by potential cost advantages that can be obtained through the externalization of activities (e.g. to low-cost providers and locations). Risks associated with NEMs stem from a lower degree of control over processes, with potential implications for quality and service levels (e.g. on-time delivery), and over technology, skills, or other forms of intellectual property transferred to a partner. The purpose of the contract establishing the NEM partnership is to address precisely these disadvantages and risks, from the TNC’s perpective, setting out the parameters for the sharing of value and profits, and including clauses to mitigate the risks for both parties. In addition to the trends pushing TNCs towards a greater use of NEMs, a number of enabling factors are facilitating their growth. The increasing fragmentation of production processes between locations, growing sophistication in codification of knowledge and prevalence of industry standards, improving intellectual property protection regimes worldwide, and growing capabilities and increasing availability of credible and technologically sophisticated partner firms in new markets are all contributing to NEM growth. Due to the inherent advantages of NEMs and the factors enabling their development, TNCs appear to be increasingly choosing NEMs rather than FDI as a means of internationalization. However, TNCs make a deliberate choice between the two options only in some cases; frequently the use of NEMs is either opportunistic or is determined by a firm’s business model, or by industry- and country- specific factors. Where the use of NEMs is optional for TNCs, the choice between ownership and partnership is analogous to a “make or buy” decision (as discussed in section IV.A). For example, a pharmaceutical firm can either build its own plant to serve an overseas market, or grant a licence to a local manufacturer to do so, as in the case of GlaxoSmithKline’s licensing of the drug Seretide to Hanmi in the Republic of Korea (Avafia, Berger and Hartzenberg, 2006; Berger et al., 2010). NEMs and FDI operations can also be developed in parallel. Many retailers operate both directly owned and franchised stores in the same markets. For example, Carrefour operates most of its hypermarkets and larger supermarkets as directly owned stores, and uses franchising for some of its convenience stores in both developed countries (e.g. France, Italy) and emerging markets (e.g. Brazil) In many cases a TNC’s business model or plan may predispose it to use a particular mode. In the case of franchising, while the choice of using FDI remains, a business model that is built around the exploitation of intellectual property or product development core competencies leads some brand owners, such as Benetton, to use exclusively franchising for distribution in both domestic and foreign markets (Reid, 2008). In pharmaceuticals, the trend to outsource production stages along the pharmaceutical value chain in their home markets is leading TNCs to adopt the same lean model globally. For example, as part of Pfizer’s outsourcing strategy, the company manages approximately 150 contract manufacturers around the world. A number of developing country companies, such as LaboratoriosPhoenix(Argentina)havebenefitedfrom this process.14 In contract manufacturing, in some industries such as automotives or electronics where the model is mature and contract manufacturers have themselves grown into large TNCs with strong competencies and cost advantages, it would be almost unthinkable for brand owners to invest in their own intermediate manufacturing facilities. For example, Denso (Japan), in automotive parts, and Foxconn (Taiwan Province of China), an electronics contract manufacturer, have huge operations in many locations, as well as considerable investment in research (section D.4; Cattaneo, Gereffi and Staritz, 2010). Industry and host economy factors can also necessitate the use of NEMs. The competitive advantages possessed by local businesses may make entry into a market through FDI unfeasible or a losing proposition. In a more extreme case, prohibitive restrictions on FDI as an entry mode into a host economy may foster greater use of NEMs by TNCs. For example, the cap on foreign ownership and restriction on retailing business in the Indian food retail sector has kept out or limited the nature of market entry by large international
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development144 retailers such as Walmart15 that exclusively operate fully owned stores; but the same policy has created an opportunity for Spar International (Germany), an international retail franchisor, to expand its network in the huge and expanding Indian consumer market (Ravichandran, Jayakumar and Samad, 2008). Restrictions on land ownership by foreign firms in India have also, in part, led to the use of contract farming by TNCs in order to secure supplies for the local or global value chains (Barrett et al., 2010). Clearly the opposite is also possible: firm-, industry- or host country-specific factors may preclude the use of NEMs and dictate the choice of FDI in entering foreign markets. A TNC may have a business model and cost structure based on maximizing internal value added, or be dependent on full control over marketing or retail mix (product and price), which cannot be achieved in external structures. At the industry level, in highly knowledge-intensive sectors, and in those industries where knowledge still tends to be tacit and difficult to transfer to third parties, developing NEMs may not be feasible. And at the country level, where countries lack credible and capable local partners, or where local partners do not have access to capital, FDI may be the only feasible entry option. Firms’ preferences, enabling factors, and factors that predetermine the use of a particular mode of internationalization will play out in different ways to drive the growth of different non-equity modes across industries. Table IV.11 summarizes the main drivers of growth for each mode. 2. Factors that make countries attractive NEM locations The factors that make countries attractive locations for NEM operations are in many respects the same as for FDI operations. These factors, or locational determinants, are usually analysed for FDI in a standard framework (WIR98; WIR10) that encompasses a country’s policies, business facilitation, and its general economic environment (table IV.12). A stable policy environment conducive to business, including well-developed competition policy, trade and fiscal rules, is equally relevant for NEM operations as for direct invested operations. A numberofFDI-specificlocationaldeterminants,such as rules regarding entry and operations, standards of treatment of foreign affiliates, and adherence to international agreements on FDI, are relevant only to the extent that TNCs aiming to enter a foreign market through the use of a non-equity mode may NEM locational determinants consist of the policy frame- work, economic conditions and business facilitation. Such determinants are con- text- and mode-specific. Table IV.11. Selected mode-specific drivers of international NEM growth Mode Drivers of growth Contract manufacturing Services outsourcing • Increasing fragmentation of production processes between locations • Easier codification and sharing of knowledge and increasing prevalence of industry standards • Improving intellectual property protection regimes • Growing presence of large and sophisticated potential partners Licensing • Strengthening intellectual property regimes • Increasing availability of sophisticated partners in emerging markets Franchising • Large emerging consumer markets moving from traditional to modern retail and services, leading to: - growth of demand exceeding the capacity of TNCs to expand through directly owned business networks - increasing “pull” of potential franchisors by willing entrepreneurs in rapidly growing emerging markets • Market saturation and high levels of competition in home countries Management contracts • Increasing number of passive property investors • Market saturation and high levels of competition in home countries Contract farming • Increasingly volatile commodity prices pushing TNCs to seek stable sources of supplies and predictability of costs • Rising concerns in many countries regarding foreign ownership of agricultural land Source: UNCTAD.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 145 Table IV.12. Locational determinants and relevance for FDI and NEMs Relevant for FDI and NEMs More relevant for FDI More relevant for NEMs Policy framework • Economic, political and social stability • Competition policy • Trade policy • Tax policy • Rules regarding entry and operations • Standards of treatment of foreign affiliates • International investment agreements • Privatization policy • Stable general commercial and contract law • Specific laws governing NEM contractual forms (e.g. recognizing licensing, franchising contracts) • Intellectual property protection Business facilitation • Reduction of hassle costs (e.g. cost of doing business) • Investment promotion • Investment incentives • Provision of after-care • Provision of social amenities (e.g. quality of life) • Facilitation efforts aimed at: - upgrading of technological, quality, productivity standards of local firms - enterprise development, increasing local entrepreneurial drive, business facilitation - subsidies, fiscal incentives for start-ups - information provision, awareness-building on NEM opportunities with local groups - supporting minimum standards of working conditions and CSR in local firms Economic determinants • Infrastructure • Market size and per capita income • Market growth • Access to regional and global markets • Country-specific consumer preferences • Access to raw materials • Access to low-cost labour • Access to skilled labour • Relative cost and productivitity of resources/assets • Other input costs (e.g. transport, communications, energy) • Access to strategic assets: - created assets (e.g. technology, intellectual property) - strategic infrastructure • Presence of credible local entrepreneurs and business partners • Access to local capital Source: UNCTAD. have to establish a “foothold” operation to support the NEM business. Such a foothold can range from a minimal commercial presence, for example a purchasing and quality control organization to support outsourced manufacturing, or a marketing and customer service presence to support a licensed consumer business, to significant logistical support operations as in the case of franchisors of retail or quick-service restaurant businesses which need to provide supplies to franchised outlets. FDI-specific policies are also relevant where TNCs operate a mixed model, developing for example franchised outlets next to directly owned outlets, as in the case of McDonald’s in China, or where the NEM is combined with a limited equity stake held by the TNC, as in the case of the Jordanian pharmaceuticals company, JPM, which licenses technology to five ventures in Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Mozambique and Tunisia in which it also holds equity stakes. JPM’s role in these ventures is primarily one of technical oversight, given the relatively low capacities of the local partners (UNCTAD, WHO and ICTSD, forthcoming). In addition to the policy-related locational determinants considered standard for FDI, there are a number of factors specifically favouring the development of NEMs in host countries. These include a stable commercial and contract law, as NEMs are essentially a contract-based form of TNC engagement in a host economy; the specific laws that may govern NEMs in the country, such as laws recognizing and setting parameters for NEM contractual forms (e.g. franchising, contract farming); and the IP regime (see also section E.2). Businessfacilitation,thesecondsetofdeterminants, is equally important for the attraction of NEMs as for FDI. Some FDI-specific business facilitation
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development146 efforts are clearly less relevant, unless promotion activities and incentives are applicable more widely, for example where investment promotion agencies engage in matchmaking between foreign franchisors and local aspiring franchisees (about a quarter of IPAs do so, according to this year’s IPA survey (section E.3). However, in addition to the business facilitation efforts considered standard for FDI, a number of measures are relevant for the development of NEMs. Initiatives to upgrade technological, quality, or productivity standards of local firms, or to support minimum standards of working conditions and CSR, can all increase the pool of potential local NEM partners capable of engaging with TNCs (section E.2). For example, the Government of Malaysia introduced franchising-specific legislation, and undertook other measures which facilitated entry into the local economy by TNCs. Through various agencies it offers financial support to those setting up franchising businesses.16 In the case of services outsourcing, the Government of the Philippines contributed to strengthening the development of the call centre industry.17 The Government of Brazil has also provided incentives and institutional support to develop this industry.18 The economic determinants of the attractiveness of a country for NEM and FDI operations, the third area of determinants, again are very similar. For example, the size and growth of the market and the access to regional markets are equally important for NEM forms such as franchising or out-licensing as for their directly invested equivalents. The provision of basic infrastructure and the costs of transport, energy and communications are important for all businesses, although an adverse local infrastructure environment may be less of a deterrent for local entrepreneurs setting up a business to engage in an NEM relationship than for a foreign investor. The only economic locational determinant that is likely to be less relevant for NEMs is access to local strategic assets, which TNCs will aim to own outright. The types of economic determinants that are especially relevant to NEMs include the presence of credible and capable local entrepreneurs and business partners and access to capital for local businesses (section E.2). Most NEMs, unlike FDI, generally require strong and sometimes sophisticated local partners that can shoulder risks transferred to them. For example, in the case of contract farming, farmer associations and Table IV.13. Main locational determinants by type of NEM Mode Most relevant locational determinants Contract manufacturing Services outsourcing • Open trade policy, access (or preferential access) to international markets • Access to cheap labour (both unskilled and skilled); favourable relative costs and productivity of local resources • Strong intellectual property regime • Facilitation initiatives aimed at upgrading local technological capabilities Licensing • Strong intellectual property regime • Availability of skilled local labour • Stable commercial law and contract enforcement regime • Facilitation initiatives aimed at upgrading local technological capabilities • Market size and growth Franchising • Stable commercial law and contract enforcement regime • Availability of capable local entrepreneurs and access to local finance • Market size and growth • Business facilitation aimed at local entrepreneurial development and start-up incentives Management contracts • Stable commercial law and contract enforcement regime • Underperforming locally owned assets Contract farming • Access to agricultural and related resources (i.e. land, water) • Stable political and economic environment • Open trade policy, access (or preferential access) to international markets • Transport and storage infrastructure • Market size and growth (for local value chains) Source: UNCTAD.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 147 cooperatives offer a degree of sophistication and certainty to TNCs which not prevail in contracts with individual farmers (WIR09; Barrett et al., 2010). Access to capital for local firms is crucial, insofar as NEMs imply the development of a locally financed business, even if the very contractual engagement of the local partner in the NEM relationship generally works as a facilitator of access to finance with local banks or other financiers. The relative importance of locational determinants varies by non-equity mode and industry. While all determinants contribute to the overall attractiveness of a country for any form of NEM, certain determinants are fundamental for the development of specific modes. The most relevant locational determinants for each mode are summarized in table IV.13. The choice between FDI and NEMs, insofar as it is a choice, is clearly one for firms to make. However, differences between the locational determinants of the two types of internationalization show that developing countries can influence that choice. Where host countries’ efforts to become more attractive for foreign investors can be politically difficult or economically costly, as in the case of adhering to international investment agreements or providing tax incentives, the cost of improving locational determinants for NEMs can be lower. D. DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF NEMs The development implications of NEMs vary according to the NEM type, the sector or industry and the value chain segments in which they take place. Individual contractual arrangements can also play a role, as do country-specific conditions and policy influences. NEMs bring to a host country a package of tangible and intangible assets. The analytical framework for the assessment of their development impact is similar to that for FDI – it looks at employment, value added, exports, technology dissemination and social and environmental impacts, among others (table IV.14). In each of these areas NEMs can bring a number of benefits to a developing host country which, combined, can make a positive contribution to its long-term industrial development by supporting the build-up of productive capacity and improving access to international markets (Narula and Dunning, 2010). Not all of the benefits that NEMs can bring are automatic; the extent to which they materialize will depend on the capabilities of local firms and on the balance of power between them and partner TNCs, as well as on the general policy framework in host countries. In addition, there are a number of concerns and risks associated with NEMs which need to be addressed, including substandard working conditions in some NEM facilities, a lack of employment stability, and prolonged reliance on low value added activities or technological dependence on foreign firms. 1. Employment and working conditions UNCTAD estimates that worldwide, some 18 to 21 million workers are directly employed in firms operating under NEM partnership arrangements in selected industries and value chain segments (section B). Most of the jobs created are in contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and franchising activities (figure IV.8). Around 80 per cent of NEM-generated employment is in developing and transition economies; especially in contract manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, services outsourcing. Beyond this, there is significant direct employment in other NEMs or industries, such as contract farming, as well as considerable indirect employment. The jobs created are both skilled and unskilled, depending on industry factors. Contract manufacturing comprises two types of industry: “hi-tech” or technology-intensive industries such as electronics, semiconductors, auto components, pharmaceuticals; and “low-tech” or labour-intensive ones like garments, footwear and NEMs can make a significant contribution to employment, but concerns remain about working conditions and stability of employment.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development148 toys. Among the first group of industries, activity is largely dominated by a relatively small group of major players with a worldwide employment footprint. In the electronics and semiconductor industries, the largest of these firms, mostly from developing economies, have a centre of gravity in East and South-East Asia, with a global web of factories in emerging economies in Latin America, Eastern Europe and elsewhere (table IV.6). Foxconn, a subsidiary of Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) and one of the largest electronics manufacturing services firms in the world, has nearly a million Table IV.14. Main development impacts of NEMs Impact category Highlights of findings Employment generation and working conditions • NEMs have significant job-creation potential: especially contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and franchising account for large shares of total employment in countries where they are prevalent • Working conditions have been a source of concern in the case of contract manufacturing based on low-cost labour in a number of countries with relatively weak regulatory environments • Stability of employment is a concern, principally in the case of contract manufacturing and outsourcing, as contract-based work is more susceptible to economic cycles Local value added and linkages • NEMs can generate significant direct value added, making an important contribution to GDP in developing countries where individual modes achieve scale • Concerns exist that contract manufacturing value added is often limited where contracted processes are only a small part of the overall value chain or end-product • NEMs can also generate additional value added through local sourcing, sometimes through “second-tier” non- equity relationships Export generation • NEMs imply access to TNCs’ international networks for local NEM partners; in the case of those modes relying on foreign markets (e.g. contract manufacturing, outsourcing, management contracts in tourism) this leads to significant export generation and to more stable export sales • In the case of contract manufacturing this is partly counterbalanced by increased imports of goods for processing • In the case of market-seeking NEMs (e.g. franchising, brand-licensing, management contracts) NEMs can lead to increased imports Technology and skills transfer • NEM relationships are in essence a form of intellectual property transfer to a local NEM partner, protected by the contract • NEM forms such as franchising, licensing, management contracts, involve transfer of technology, business model and/or skills and are often accompanied by training of local staff and management • In contract manufacturing, local partners engaging in NEM relationships have been shown to gain in productivity, particularly in the electronics industry • NEM partners can evolve into important technology developers in their own right (e.g. in contract manufacturing and services outsourcing) • They can also remain locked into low-technology activities • NEMs, by their nature, foster local entrepreneurship; positive effects on entrepreneurship skills development are especially marked in franchising Social and environmental impacts • NEMs can serve as a mechanism to transfer international best social-and-environmental practices • They equally raise concerns that they may serve as mechanisms for TNCs to circumvent such practices Long-term industrial capacity building • Through the sum of the above impacts, NEMs can support or accelerate the development of modern local productive capacities in developing countries • In particular, NEMs encourage domestic enterprise development and domestic investment in productive assets and integration of such domestic economic activity into global value chains • Concerns need to be addressed especially in issues such as long-term dependency on foreign sources of technology; over-reliance on TNC-governed GVCs for limited-value-added activities; and “footlooseness”. Source: UNCTAD. employees in China alone, making it one of the single largest employers in the country.19 Contract manufacturing in the second group of industries is characterized by wide geographical dispersion. In garments, footwear and toys, roughly 90 per cent of NEM-related employment is located in developing and transition economies, including LDCs. For some of these countries, NEM- related activities generate significant employment. Contract manufacturing for major brands such as Nike (United States) and Hugo Boss (Germany), in particular, is an important generator of employment
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 149 in terms of GDP, exports and employment. By 2009, in India the sector had created some 2.2 million direct jobs and indirectly impacted the lives of about 8 million people;20 in Chile, the outsourcing services industry in 2008 employed 20,000 people;21 and in the Philippines, another stronghold of the industry, total employment was some 525,000 people in 2010.22 Contract farming is linked to very large numbers of jobs for smallholder farmers; its employment and poverty reduction implications are generally viewed positively. The overall number of contract farmers is uncertain but individual projects can have several hundred thousand participant farmers at a time. For instance, the PTP Group, a joint venture between Asia Timber Products (Singapore) and the local government in Leshan, China, involves the participation of 400,000 forestry workers in fibreboard production (WIR09: 144). Similarly, Nestlé (Switzerland) is working with more than 550,000 farmers around the globe supplying it with commodities for its food and beverage businesses.23 In Mozambique, some 400,000 contract farmers are participating in GVCs.24 On a smaller scale, but nevertheless significant for the countries and GVC segment involved, the Coca-Cola/SABMiller value chain involved 3,741 workers in Zambia and 4,244 in El Salvador in 2008, mostly in contract farming Figure IV.8. Estimated global employment in contract manufacturing, selected industries, 2010 (Millions of employees) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: See box IV.2 for the methodology used. The dotted area depicts the range estimate for each item. Box IV.4. Employment impact in developing countries of NEMs in garment and footwear production The employment impact of contract manufacturing in low technology-intensive industries such as garments and footwear is significant in developing economies. Most major brand companies such as Nike, Adidas, HM, Gap, Puma, Collective Brands and Hugo Boss use extensive networks of contract manufacturers based in different developing economies to produce their brand products. For instance, all of Nike’s footwear is produced by contract suppliers outside of the United States – some 600 factories in 33 countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, China, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and Viet Nam – which involves over 800,000 workers. Similarly, Puma has contract manufacturing arrangements with some 350 factories, a majority of which are in developing economies, involving 300,000 workers. Thus, unlike electronics contract manufacturing, which is relatively concentrated in East Asia, contract manufacturing in garments and footwear is far more dispersed, especially in poor countries. In some developing economies foreign contract manufacturers constitute the bulk of the contract manufacturing activity. The rapid growth of the garment industry in countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, China and Viet Nam owes much to the participation of foreign contract manufacturing firms producing locally for international clients, at least initially (UNIDO, 2009; McNamara, 2008). In the case of Cambodia, 95 per cent of exports in the industry are by foreign firms, mostly developing economy TNCs from China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. These companies employed around 300,000 people in 2009, accounting for nearly 50 per cent of Cambodia’s manufacturing employment. Source: UNCTAD. across the developing world (box IV.4). For example, there are about 376,000 workers in the Cambodian garments sector, where the vast bulk of production is carried out under contract manufacturing arrangements. In Sri Lanka, the garments industry employs some 400,000 people, many working under similar contractual arrangements. In services outsourcing the employment impact is also large in India, the Philippines and a few other developing economies. For instance, IT-BPO is one of the largest contributors to a number of economies 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Garments Automotive components Electronics Footwear Toys NEM-related employmentemployment Global industry employmentemployment
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development150 arrangements (SABMiller, Coca-Cola and Oxfam, 2010). International franchising is also a significant contributor to employment in host countries, where theformulaiswidelyused.Thenumberoffranchising businesses, mostly micro- and small enterprises, in developing countries is growing rapidly and franchising in some countries is considered an important tool for unemployment reduction for its potential to create both formal entrepreneurial employment and dependent employment in small business outlets. For example, in Brazil around 780,000 people were employed in franchised businesses in 2010 (just under 1 per cent of the total workforce) (Rocha, Borini and Spers, 2010; UNCTAD–WFC survey), while in South Africa, franchised businesses employed 460,000 people in 2010, almost 2.5 per cent of the total labour force,25 and in Malaysia, franchising businesses employ more than 200,000 people, or some 1.7 per cent of the workforce. Management contracts in some industries can also have a sizeable employment impact in host countries. The potential of the hotel industry to create jobs is one of the reasons that many developing-country governments are aiming to grow the industry. The global branded hotel market has an estimated employment of 3.5 million people, of which roughly 400,000 jobs are attributable to operations run under management contracts abroad (box IV.3). International hotels often offer a higher service level (requiring more staff per room) than local hotels (Fontanier and van Wijk, 2010). Research in six developing countries has shown that foreign-owned accommodation has a staff-to- guest ratio of 8:1, compared to the 1:1 or 1:2 ratio reported for domestically owned accommodation (UNCTAD, 2007). International hotel groups are currently expanding their reach, particularly in Asia. In China, for instance, the InterContinental Hotel Group has an expansion plan to double its current complement of 150 hotels over the next five years. This expansion plan will be mostly carried out using management contracts, creating an additional 90,000 jobs – on top of the current 40,000 employees in China.26 International hotel chains operating through management contracts or franchising in host countries are a powerful pull factor in complementary activities employing low- skilled workers, such as laundry, cleaning and security (in addition to higher-skilled areas such as surveillance and IT services) in developing countries (Lamminmaki, 2005; UNCTAD, 2007: 81; MKG Hospitality, 2011). The employment impact of NEMs is even more significant when indirect employment is taken into account, through linkages with local firms, as in the case of IT-BPO in India above, or contract farming in Kenya (box IV.10). In terms of backward linkages, sources of indirect employment include workers employed by subsequent tiers of contractors (for instance in contract manufacturing), providing services or parts and components to NEM partner firms.Inaddition,employmentiscreatedbyproviders of ancillary services. For instance, in franchising in the retail sector, further employment is created by local service providers to the NEM operations, such as logistics companies, advertising firms, interior design companies, local suppliers of raw materials and local packaging companies. Similarly, licensing of host country firms in the pharmaceutical industry creates employment opportunities in other parts of the local value chain, such as in pharmaceutical RD or product distribution. The factors that influence working conditions in non-equity modes are the type of mode and the industry, the sourcing practices of lead firms, and the role of governments in defining, communicating and enforcing labour standards. NEMs such as franchising, licensing and management contracts are frequently perceived as enhancing employment conditions in host countries, often due to relatively strong management control or oversight from international partners, although franchising businesses are not immune to bad working conditions.27 In an UNCTAD-World Franchise Council survey of franchising associations, which represent the interests of franchisors and franchisees, 64 per cent of franchising associations around the world state that employees in foreign chains enjoy at least the same working conditions as prevailing in local host-country chains; while 30 per cent declare that franchisees and their employees have better working conditions in foreign chains compared to local competitors.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 151 NEMs that are focused on reducing production costs, such as contract manufacturing or services outsourcing, are more often criticised for weak employment conditions, including the violation of national and international labour rights. In order to keep costs down and remain competitive and attractive as partners for lead TNCs, NEM firms can take measures that impinge on workers’ rights and freedoms – low wages and benefits, excessive overtime, job instability28 and poor health and safety practices (Milberg and Amengual, 2008). In some extreme cases, heavy criticism in the media and by activists and consumer organizations has forced international firms to intervene and to work with their local NEM partners in order to improve working conditions (box IV.5). While contract manufacturing, contract farming and similar modes can employ large numbers of workers, the very nature of cost-sensitive production can be problematic because TNCs can shift to other locations with even lower operating costs. This “footloose” nature of some NEMs can have severe consequences for workers, NEM partners and industries in host economies. For instance, in 2000 the garment industry in Lesotho employed over 45,000 workers and accounted for 77 per cent of the country’s exports, chiefly produced by contract manufacturers from Taiwan Province of China under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which gave privileged access to the United States market. After 2003, however, as quotas on garment imports to the United States from large, low-cost locations such as China and India were removed ,the industry in Lesotho was devastated. Many factories were closed and thousands of jobs lost (McNamara, 2008). Jobs in labour-intensive NEMs are highly sensitive to the business cycle in GVCs, and can be shed quickly at times of economic downturn. One example is the electronics cluster in Guadalajara which, although an example of successful value chain upgrading, also illustrates the highly volatile nature of certain types of employment created through NEMs. Box IV.6 illustrates, however, that it is possible for NEMs to manage demanding customers, seasonality and other sources of volatility, for example through diversifying the customer base. Over the last two decades, however, the relationship between core firms and their NEM partners has started to change. Campaigns by civil society, NGOs and media have begun a process assigning social and environmental responsibilities in supply chains back to lead firms. In 2009 for example, one of Nike’s NEM partners in Honduras closed two of its factories, leaving 1,800 workers unemployed and without the legally mandated severance payments they were due. With the help Box IV.5. Labour conditions in Foxconn’s Chinese operations – concerns and corporate responses Foxconn, a subsidiary of Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd (Taiwan Province of China), is the world’s largest contract manufacturer in the electronics industry. In common with many other contract manufactures, Foxconn has been involved in several controversies concerning working conditions. Reports on Foxconn’s Chinese operations have in the past identified facility-specific issues on wages and benefits, work intensity, occupational health and safety, working hours, management quality, employee breaks, grievance mechanisms, treatment of student workers, and dining and living conditions. A number of Foxconn’s customers, including Apple, Dell and HP, have responded to these concerns by carrying out an independent investigation and subsequently by working with Foxconn senior management on corrective actions towards higher international labour standards. The action plan consists of several steps to improve working conditions in factories, including the introduction of new salary standards that reduce pressure for overtime as a personal necessity for employees, the relocation of some manufacturing operations closer to migrant workers’ hometowns (thereby maintaining social structures and support systems), and helping employees to integrate better into the community to promote a positive work-life balance and create a more extensive support network. Despite these positive actions, a recent report by a Hong Kong (China)-based NGO (SACOM) argues that labour rights abuses persist at some of Foxconn’s facilities in China.a Source: UNCTAD. a “Foxconn and Apple fail to fulfill promises: predicaments of workers after the suicides”, SACOM website at http:// sacom.hk.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development152 Box IV.6. Cyclical employment in contract manufacturing in Guadalajara Guadalajara, the capital of Jalisco State in south-west Mexico, is home to an electronics cluster deeply embedded in GVCs. Until 2001, when the technology bubble burst, Guadalajara’s factories competed directly with those in China in the production of high-volume, price-sensitive items such as mobile phone handsets and notebook computers. During 1994–2000, when large contract manufacturers such as Flextronics, Jabil Circuit and Solectron, all established facilities in Guadalajara, the value of electronics exports from Jalisco State increased at an average rate of 35 per cent per year. In contrast, during 2000–2005, the average annual export growth rate was reduced to near zero, with falling exports in two consecutive years (box figure IV.6.1). Box figure IV.6.1. Volatility in contract manufacturing employment in Guadalajara, 1996–2009 Source: Cadelec, 2010. With the downturn in the business cycle, the decline in output and employment after 2001 was precipitous. Total hi-tech employment peaked in Jalisco State at more than 76,000 in 2000, and after 2001 dropped by 40 per cent to less than 46,000; in some plants, employment fell by up to 60 per cent. Some contract manufacturers with facilities both in Guadalajara and in other locations shifted high-volume work to lower-cost plants in China. High variations in employment, as in the case of electronics in Guadalajara, are a general feature of the Mexican maquiladora industries. Employment volatility in such Mexican plants was found to be twice that of United States facilities in the same industry. The close economic ties between the two countries, resulting in a “synchronization” of business cycles, had some observers speaking of the United States exporting a portion of its employment fluctuations over the business cycle to Mexico (Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson, 2008; Blecker and Esquivel, 2010). However, to increase the utilization of facilities in Guadalajara, contract manufacturers found new partners in retail outlets in the United States, and started to produce lower-volume goods, often on a direct-ship, rapid replenishment basis. Examples of such electronics products include low- and mid-range computer servers, electronic fish finders for use in recreational boating and alarm systems for homes and businesses. Very few of the products made in Guadalajara in 2000 are still made there today. Contract manufacturers and workers have had to adapt to more complex production and supply processes. New logistics functions have been added to ship small lots directly to retailers for distribution, and materials management, testing, and quality assurance processes have been upgraded to accommodate the increased product variety. Over time, the industrial upgrading that took place has led to a gradual recovery to previous levels of employment and exports. Source: Sturgeon and Dussel-Peters, 2006; Cadelec, 2010. of “The Workers’ Rights Consortium” NGO, civil society groups initiated intense public campaigns until Nike agreed to take over the supplier’s full obligations (severance payment, nine months of medical care and job training for laid-off workers). This “public relations liability” has extended the social responsibility of TNCs beyond their actual legal boundaries and compelled them to increase their influence over the activities of their value chain partners. It is increasingly common for TNCs, in order to manage risks and protect their brand and image, to control their NEM partners through codes of conduct, to promote international labour standards and good management practices. Although most codes are developed individually by companies, 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2004 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Thousandsofemployees Exports($billion) Employment (left scale) Exports (right scale) 80 90 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 153 they are commonly based on international principles such as ILO labour standards, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (chapter III). In combination with individual company codes, many TNCs also adopt third party standards, such SA8000 (for labour practices) or ISO14001 (for environmental management). Currently there are over 2,600 facilities certified to SA8000 across 65 industries,29 and more than 200,000 ISO 14001 certificates have been issued in more than 150 countries.30 These certifiable third-party standards assure TNCs that their suppliers meet certain basic standards, and help developing country enterprises to differentiate themselves when seeking international business partners (Riisgard and Hammer, 2010). NEM firms in most industries need to commit to the terms set forth in a code before entering into business relationships with lead firms. Thus, for many NEM partners the adherence to internationally recognized labour standards is part of their contractual obligations. In this way, core firms themselves are emerging as a regulator of sorts, issuing process guidelines covering a range of social and environmental practices. To ensure that the code of conduct is implemented and followed by their partners, core firms engage in compliance monitoring, which often includes management audits and on-site factory inspections. For instance, HM has an inspectorate in South Asia which investigates the working conditions in the approximately 40 clothing factories in India and Sri Lanka with which the company works. In 2010 they carried out 251 visits, about half of which were unannounced.31 Although questions remain about TNCs’ motives vis-à-vis CSR in global value chains (Starmanns, 2010), it can be observed that lead firms that have worked with codes over a longer period of time have introduced a systematic approach to supplier monitoring and rating. Accordingly, they integrate the outcomes of the inspections into their purchasing decisions, rewarding those NEM partners that comply with the standards, or at least show strong commitment to meeting them. However, it has also become evident over the past decade, that many companies are reluctant to drop a supplier for failure to meet the conditions of the code. Instead, NEM partners typically have to implement corrective action plans to rectify critical issues identified during the audits. To support their NEM partners in their efforts to meet compliance with the code, lead firms offer special supplier development programmes for social and environmental issues. In this way, codes are being used as a basis for capacity-building programmes aimed at transferring specific management know- how to developing country enterprises. 2. Local value added The direct impact of NEMs on local value added can be significant; however, the scale of additional indirect value creation depends greatly on the nature of the particular NEM, the structure of the TNC’s GVC and the underlying capabilities of other local firms. UNCTAD estimates that the direct value added impact of cross-border NEMs is roughly $400–500 billion dollars a year (table IV.4). Of this amount, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing are the largest single contributor, accounting for more than $200 billion (figure IV.9). Among those industries with significant contract manufacturing activity, automotive OEM components and garments generate the largest share of value added. Electronics contract manufacturing, footwear, and toys are manifestly smaller, due in part to industry size – footwear and toys are smaller markets – and the nature of the manufacturing being contracted – much of the activity covered in electronics is related to final assembly of goods. Cross-border franchising, which includes a spectrum of discrete activities, accounts for roughly $150 billion of value added worldwide. The real significance of NEM-related value added stems from its importance within a particular country’s economic context. While global NEM value added accounts for less than 1 per cent of global GDP, in some developing countries it NEMs can generate signifi- cant value added in the host economy – including through second-tier linkages – even when their share of value created in the global value chain is limited.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development154 represents a significant share of economic activity. For example, in the Philippines, IT-BPO activities accounted for 4.8 per cent of GDP and generated $9 billion export revenues in 2010.32 India’s auto components industry, working mostly under contracting arrangements, contributes about 2.3 per cent to the country’s GDP and is expected to generate $30 billion in revenues in fiscal year 2010–11.33 This value added activity, however, is often only a small part of the value generated within the GVC of any particular product. For efficiency-seeking NEMs, such as contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and contract farming, value capture in the host economy can be small, depending crucially on the nature of a NEM’s integration into lead TNCs’ GVC and the balance of power between the two. If the NEM partner’s role is confined to processing inputs from one step in a TNCs’ value chain to be passed onto the next, the scope for local sourcing, and thus for additional indirect value generation, is relatively limited as goods are imported, processed, and subsequently exported. On the other hand, greater autonomy has the potential to generate substantial indirect local value added, as NEM partners can make greater use of local suppliers, retaining value in the host economy. 0 100 200 300 Franchising Toys Footwear Electronics Garments IT services and business process outsourcing Automotive components Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing Electronics contract manufacturing provides a clear example of the interplay of these forces. The explosive growth of this mode in the industry has stemmed largely from lead firms wanting to outsource the lowest value added activities of their internal processes. Combined with their significant bargaining power over their NEM partners, lead firms’ logic in using contract manufacturing often squeezes local capture of value added. This has led to a steady fall in the generation of value added by their NEM partners, who face ever-smaller margins (figure IV.10). For instance, in the case of the iPhone that Foxconn (Taiwan Province of China) assembles on behalf of Apple (United States), only a small share of the unit value added is captured by the company’s Chinese factories. Much of the remaining global value added is accounted for by Japanese, Korean and other international suppliers pre-selected by Apple, as part of the firm’s globally integrated value chain, as well as by Apple and its vendors (box IV.7). Importantly, the low value captured by the NEM partner in this example reflects the industry (and the balance of power within it), rather than the country location of production. For example, in a similar case – the Nokia N95 Smartphone – the value added in manufacturing was determined to be 2.1 per cent of the total, whether the phone is produced in Finland or China, though production methods and factor inputs might differ (Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2011). Local NEM partners are not, however, necessarily locked into a low local value added trap. Many electronics contract manufacturers are quickly evolving to provide additional services to their clients in higher value-generating activities in other segments of the value chain. In some cases, former contract manufacturers have created their own brands and are now competing with lead TNCs in the global consumer electronics market (Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2010). One argument in favour of developing countries undertaking low value added NEM activities is that the apparently unfavourable balance in value capture for local NEM firms is the initial price they pay for access to TNCs’ knowledge assets and long-term capability development (Moran, 2011). Figure IV.9. Estimated global value added in contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and franchising, selected industries, 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: See box IV.2 for the methodology used. The dotted area depicts the range estimate for each item.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 155 Beyond contract manufacturing, value added in predominantly market-seeking NEMs such as franchising, management contracts and licensing essentially remains in the host economy – apart from the fees and royalties involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, operations linked to a TNC were found to source no less locally than host country competitors (UNCTAD, 2007). The extent and nature of backward linkages by NEMs and their concomitant additional local value capture vary by mode, industry and host country, depending on the capabilities of local firms. The use of local inputs, and the overall impact on host country value added, increase if the emergence of contract manufacturing leads to a concentration of production and export activities in clusters (e.g. industrial parks). The greater the number of plants and the more numerous the linkages with TNC buyers, the greater are the spillover effects and local value added, as seen in the Republic of Korea in the 1980s and 1990s, Malaysia in the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, cluster policies can reduce the risk of TNCs shifting production to other locations because of the benefits they gain from cooperation with firms in such agglomerations. The extent of local sourcing is also governed by contractual agreements between NEM partners. For example, adherence to specified quality standards is a common feature in licensing, contract manufacturing and franchising agreements, which can limit sourcing in host economies if local suppliers do not meet the required quality levels. Nevertheless, franchise operations can create significant local linkages. McDonald’s (United States), for example, often builds up a domestic food value chain to supply its stores. Once a supplier and McDonald’s have agreed on standards and quality guarantees along the food chain, contracts and local value creation tend to be long-term.34 3. Export generation NEMs shape global patterns of trade in many industries. In toys, footwear, garments and electronics, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing represent more than 50 per cent of global trade (figure IV.11). Modes such as contract manufacturing, business- process outsourcing and contract farming, by their nature create substantial exports and foreign exchange earnings. As industries associated with these modes often show significant clustering effects, this can lead to high shares of individual industries in a country’s or region’s exports: for 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Value added/sales $ billion Per cent NEMs generate export gains – the extent of which is context and mode-specific. Figure IV.10. Total sales and value added as per cent of sales for top electronics contract manufacturers, 2003–2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD. Note: Value added is calculated as the sum of pre-tax income, personnel costs (wages), and amortization/ depreciation. Value added as per cent of sales based on data from six of the top 10 major companies in this segment (Hon Hai, Compal Electronics, Inventec, Quanta Computer, Wistron Corp, and TPV Technology). Figure IV.11. World and NEM-related exports, selected industries, 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: See box IV.2 for methodology used. The dotted area depicts the range estimate for each item. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Electronics Garments Automotive components Footwear Toys World exports NEM exports
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development156 Box IV.7. Value capture can be limited: iPhone production in China The relative value added captured by contract manufacturers in developing countries, compared to the total value created in the overall global value chain and expressed in currency units of the final destination market (or as a percentage of the final product sales price), can appear very limited. This is illustrated by the well-known case of the Apple iPhone, for which it is estimated that only $6.50 of the $179 production cost (retail price, $500 in the US market) is captured by Foxconn (Taiwan Province of China), the company’s NEM partner in China (box figure IV.7.1). The share captured by domestic Chinese companies is even less, limited to packaging and local services. This is, in part, because iPhone are assembled from components made mostly in other countries, such as the United States, Japan, Germany and the Republic of Korea. Box figure IV.7.1. Breakdown of the production costs of the iPhone, 2010 (Dollars per unit) Source: UNCTAD, based on Xing and Detert, 2010. Note: The remaining $321 of the $500 retail price is accounted for by Apple and other companies’ returns to RD, design, distribution and retailing etc. 124.46 48.00 6.50 Components Other materials Assembly instance, toys made up $12.9 billion, i.e. more than half, of Guangdong province’s (China) exports in 2010.35 In Bangladesh and Cambodia the garment industry accounted for some 70–80 per cent of total national exports in 2008–2009.36 In India, textiles and apparel exports were $22 billion, i.e. 12.5 per cent of total exports, in fiscal year 2009, and were expected to grow fast.37 Looking beyond individual industries, goods for processing trade, the shipping of intermediate goods for assembly or further processing (and thus a good proxy in international statistics for trends in contract manufacturing), has exploded during the past decade. In China, the gross value of such exported goods reached $655 billion in 2009, up from roughly $138 billion in 2000 (IMF, BoP database).38 IT-BPO and contract farming also underline the significant export generation of efficiency-seeking NEMs. During 2005–2009 average IT-BPO exports from India, amounting to two-thirds of the country’s total IT-BPO industry revenues, were equivalent to 14 per cent of India’s total exports. Similarly, exports of cut flowers (produced under contract) from Ethiopia, Kenya and Zimbabwe accounted for more than 8, 9 and 14 per cent of the respective countries’ total merchandise exports in 2009.39 In NEMs that are primarily oriented towards the host country market – such as franchising, licensing and management contracts – export gains are clearly more limited, but not absent. In the global hotel industry, with almost all international operations run either as a franchise or under a management contract, global chains give hotel-owners access to new customer groups, in particular international tourists and business travellers. In the upper segments of the hotel market in particular, the high proportion of international guests is an important feature.40 In licensing, constraints on exporting activity can be built into contractual agreement between the TNC and host country licensees, especially in terms of geographical delimitation of the sales activities of the NEM partner. For example, the South African pharmaceutical company Aspen Pharmacare is limited in its exports of patented anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs under the terms of its licensing agreements
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 157 with GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim (Berger, 2006; Amuasi, 2009: 14). Net export generation may differ appreciably by mode and industry. Franchising in retail goods, for instance, normally creates few exports, but imports can rise in the case of branded goods retailing. In the case of management contracts in hotels, the influx of international tourists constitutes a rise in services exports and normally the associated imports are low. Similarly, modes such as contract manufacturing and contract farming lead to net export gains, although these can be limited where the import of intermediate goods or services accounts for a significant part of the value, as in the case of the iPhone (box IV.7). The impact on export generation is higher in the case of other contracting modes, such as services outsourcing. As an alternative route to international market access, international franchising can be an avenue for brands from developing countries to grow internationally (including as master franchisees for lead TNCs) with little need for high up-front investments. In the case of Brazil, for example, 68 home-grown brands – about 5 per cent of the total national franchised networks – have internationalized and expanded to some 50 countries around the world through franchising as a mode of entry (Rocha, Borini and Spers, 2010). Similarly, franchised businesses based in South Africa have opened outlets in neighbouring countries across Southern Africa (figure IV.12) 4. Technology and skills acquisition by NEMs Technology encompasses a range of hard and soft elements, often in combination, e.g. intellectual property (including patents, blueprints, manuals etc.); machinery and other capital equipment; production and organisational knowledge and skills (including quality standards and norms); managerial, engineering and other skills (including tacit ones); business models; and even – potentially – corporate culture and values. The extent and combination of technology and skills received by NEM partners differs. Licensing involves a TNC granting an NEM partner access to intellectual property – usually with some contractual conditions – and with or without training or skills transfer. A good example is MAN BW Diesel (MBD), a Danish subsidiary of MAN AG (Germany), which has been licensing marine engine technology primarily – with some training – to shipbuilders in Asia (Japan, the Republic of Korea and China account for 92 per cent of production). Such narrow technology transfers, with limited interaction between the TNC and partners, imply that in licensing, the NEM company normally must already possess significant capabilities and absorptive capacities, in order to assimilate and utilize the knowledge received. Since the 1960s, companies in Asia and Latin America, especially in Argentina, Brazil and the Republic of Korea, have been active in pursuing such strategies (acquiring and absorbing narrow, specific technologies), primarily because of their existing industrial base, in sectors such as automobiles, electronics, pharmaceuticals and shipbuilding41 (Kim, 2003; Mudambi, Schrunder and Mongar, 2004; Pyndt and Pedersen, 2006; UNCTAD, WHO and ICTSD, forthcoming). In contrast, in the case of international franchising, which transfers a business model, extensive training and support are normally offered to local partners in order to properly set up the new franchise, with wide- ranging implications for technology dissemination. In addition to professional skills – which are industry- specific – the training and support given usually includes general managerial competencies, e.g. financial, marketing and management knowledge to let entrepreneurs manage the new business efficiently (i.e. elements in creating absorptive capacity). For example, the 7-Eleven franchise system provides not only structural support (store equipment), but also field consultants who regularly meet with franchisees in order to help them maximize store performance and profitability. Also, prior to the establishment of a 7-Eleven store, the TNC provides training to facilitate the start-up of the new business and provides ongoing in-store and computer-based assistance to help the franchisee in developing their business.42 Some TNC hotel groups, apart from providing internal training programmes, contribute to initiatives NEMs can diffuse technology and skills to local partners. The extent of technology uptake depends on local absorptive capacities.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development158 to build capacity in the sector. One example is the current expansion of the InterContinental Group in China. The company has launched the IHG Academy, a public partnership that provides hospitality job training in local communities. The Academy has 23 partners located in 10 cities, training 5,000 students per year. Other examples include Best Western’s establishment of a Centre for Hotel Management and Training in India and the creation of the Hospitality Training Campus in UAE, to address the needs of the international hospitality and tourism industry (Intercontinental Hotel Group, 2010). TNCs exist primarily because they possess intellectual property, or other forms of knowledge; it is therefore normally in their interest to create or seek barriers to make acquisition of this knowledge by other firms more difficult. Nevertheless, for host countries, NEMs can be an important interface for acquisition and diffusion of knowledge from lead TNCs – in a similar fashion to JVs and affiliate- supplier linkages. This is because NEMs are a part of TNCs’ global value chains; it is in TNCs’ interest to disseminate technology – including building local absorptive capacities – to their partners, at least to a degree (UNCTAD, 2010c).43 A good example of how a TNC may do this is provided by IKEA’s relationship with its developing country suppliers in the home furnishing industry. IKEA has a policy of working long-term with its suppliers, but without “lock-in” (i.e. NEM partners can continue to supply to other customers). The relationship with suppliers is managed by dedicated regional trade sales offices (TSOs) which ensure that necessary technology and skills are provided, either through the TSO, staff despatched from the parent office or external expertise (consultants, international manufacturers) (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2010a; 2010b). Technology acquisition and assimilation by NEM firms, whether in processes, products or along the value chain, are therefore not infrequent and are consistent with the role that these firms play in value chains (UNCTAD, 2010c; Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2008). Most relevant research on this issue has been conducted on contract manufacturing and services outsourcing. In some East and South-East Asian economies in particular, but also in Eastern Europe, Latin America and South Asia, technology and skills acquisition and assimilation by NEM companies in electronics, garments, pharmaceuticals and IT-BPO services – among others – has led to their evolution into TNCs and technology leaders in their own right (WIR06; section B).44 A good example of a company which has become a significant TNC and technology leader by being Figure IV.12. Regional spread of selected South African franchise chains, 2010 Source: UNCTAD, adapted from Beck, Deelder and Miller (2010). Woolworth's Debonair's Shoprite Protea Hotels Nando's Wimpy Numberofunits 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Namibia Zambia Botswana Swaziland Zimbabwe MozambiqueMalawi Madagascar Angola
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 159 (and continuing as) an NEM is Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) – holding company to Foxconn – which was the 13th largest recipient of patents45 granted in the United States in 2010.46 With 1,438 patents (up from about 500 in 2000), Hon Hai is one of only four developing country companies in the top 50 assignees of United States patents in 2010;47 and the number is not far off the 1,490 received by LG Electronics (Republic of Korea). Hon Hai is following in the footsteps of other Taiwanese companies such as Acer and AsusTek, in moving from a pure contract manufacturer to becoming a brand. All these companies made this transition on the basis of deep expertise established over time in product definition and design.48 Although technology acquisition and assimilation through NEMs is a widespread phenomenon, it is not a foregone conclusion, especially at the level of second- and third-tier suppliers, where linkages may be insufficient or of low quality, or the absorptive capacity of suppliers low. The Taiwan Province of China notebook computer production network in China, for instance has not yet resulted in significant upgrading by small local suppliers (Yang, 2010). Overall, a number of factors affect technology and knowledge acquisition and assimilation by NEMs. Among the most important of these are (1) the industry, (2) local absorptive capacities, and (3) NEM strategies. With respect to the industry, key determinants are the industry’s structure, GVC and learning opportunities. For example, in “low- tech” industries such as garments, footwear and furniture, most opportunities for technological/ skill upgrading are inherent in product design (controlled by brands) and production methods (capital goods and inputs, generally purchasable from manufacturers independent of the brands). As most technology is embodied in capital goods, this means that there are few barriers to technology upgrading, apart from the cost of the equipment.49 On the other hand, in industries such as automotives and components, technology assimilation requires mastery of complex products, processes or systems. This makes technology and assimilation more difficult for new players on the scene, and explains the dominance of developed country TNCs in such industries. How NEMs fare despite these constraints depends greatly on absorptive capacity (Giuliani, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2005). For example, although the Philippines is successful in various services outsourcing GVCs, the recent financial and economic crisis that created a competitive impulse for upgrading such industries also showed that local NEMs may lack the necessary capabilities to do so, including services requiring “creative” work, such as animation (Tschang and Goldstein, 2010). In the Philippine animation industry, the local NEMs’ combination of high wages, limited skills sets and fragile markets led TNCs such as Warner Brothers to move their contracts to other countries such as India and China. Even in the case of IKEA, mentioned earlier, only a small proportion of its suppliers improve their innovative capabilities (albeit all suppliers achieve better operational capacity and about half are able to absorb adaptive technologies) (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2010a). To benefit fully from technology and skills available through particular NEM arrangements, it is therefore important for local firms to develop their absorptive capacities. Strategies of NEM partners also matter. For example, it is possible for companies to engage in “deep niche” specialization, whereby they become technologically advanced in particular components on a mass scale and realize profits through cost reductions. For instance, Bharat Forge (India) is now the world’s second largest producer of forgings for car engines and chassis components. Its customers include most major automobile companies and it has affiliates in China, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Finally, NEM partners can adopt strategies in their dealings with TNCs to improve their bargaining power and technology acquisition and upgrading. A very common strategy which pays dividends is customer diversification leading to cross- chain learning (i.e. NEM companies benefit from knowledge gained from a number of TNCs). For example Acer and AsusTek (both Taiwan Province of China) achieved their success in notebooks through leveraging knowledge gained from supply chains of many TNC customers. They were able to innovate on the basis of the wider technological base thus gained, through an entrepreneurial pioneering of new niches. For instance this led to AsusTek –
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development160 followed by Acer and others – subverting Intel’s product roadmap by expanding its target market for netbooks to include customers in the developed world (Intel’s vision had only encompassed sales of the devices to developing countries, hence their lower cost) (Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2010; Shih et al., 2008). IKEA actually encourages such cross-chain learning, despite the risks, because it improves their supplier capabilities (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2010c). Another example, from a low-tech industry, is that of the Brazilian furniture and footwear industries. Research shows that companies which have serviced multiple value chains in NEM relationships in this industry (rather than operating as affiliates under a single TNC network), including creating brands for domestic and regional customers, are able to use the learning in design, marketing and branding to interact more effectively as they gradually gain the capacities to sell direct to final customers. Operating in multiple value chains appears to improve NEMs’ options for upgrading (Navas-Aleman, 2011). 5. Social and environmental impacts Many socio-cultural and political issues arise from TNC involvement in developing countries, including a range of externalities such as changing consumption patterns and cultural values. In the case of NEM operations, to the extent that the TNC is not directly involved, some of these issues are weaker in scope, but they remain in essence. For instance, franchising can influence local socio- cultural norms by contributing to the growth of consumerism, increasing the use of imported inputs, and the development and strengthening of commercial values and standards (Freund and Martin, 2008; Grünhagen, Witte and Pryor, 2010). In this context, although there are many economic benefits arising from modern retail franchise networks,50 there is often a tension between the elements of “modernization” – some brought about through NEM activities – and the essence of traditional identity.51 The entry of “fast food” restaurants offering accessible non-traditional fare has met with some resistance in countries such as China, India and Mexico (Alon, 2004). At the same time, some governments have become adept at using NEMs to address and overcome important social issues in their countries. Franchising, for example, is an effective system of localizing the operations of a foreign company, by integrating its business model into a population of entrepreneurs who will then have ownership interests in the business and who can cater to national development goals. With this in mind, the Government of South Africa has officially promoted franchising, for instance when issuing a mobile phone licence to Vodacom in the 1990s with specific requirements that involved providing services to the poor, who either had limited or no access to phone lines. Vodacom subsequently set up a system of franchised “Telecom Kiosks”, often consisting of renovated shipping containers with some installed phones linked to the mobile network.52 The use of micro-franchising as a distribution channel to the poor or low-income segments of a market is common in developing countries, with telecom services a widespread example, e.g. in Ghana, India, Indonesia, Senegal or Thailand; while in some countries like Bangladesh and Peru a similar franchising model is used to broaden internet access (Falch and Anyimadu, 2003; ITU, 2010: 22–23). In Malaysia, Bank Rakyat together with Perbadanan Nasional Bhd (PNS), an agency under the Ministry of Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development, has allocated $4 million to a loan scheme to back the Women Franchise Programme and the Graduate Franchise Programme. Other examples include the sale of household products to the poor, e.g. for Unilever in India through its Project Shakti.53 In a similar vein, the Government of Liberia uses TNCs and their supply chains to support job creation for young people, including in the agriculture and forestry sectors (Arai, Cissé and Sock, 2010). TNCs and NEMs can also take social-cultural initiatives, while at the same time addressing their needs. It is possible for NEMs, such as hotel chains entering markets through franchising and contract NEMs can serve as a means to transfer international best social and environ- mental practices, but they may also allow TNCs to circumvent such practices.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 161 management, to diversify their local capability programmes to support wider goals than their immediate skill needs (though the two can be interrelated). An example of such an approach in Thailand involves major international chains (InterContinental Hotels Group (United Kingdom), Marriott International (United States), Fairmont Hotels and Resorts (Canada), Four Seasons Hotels Resorts (Canada), Hyatt Hotel Corporation (United States), Hilton Worldwide (United States), Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide (United States), NH Hotels (Spain)) in establishing and sustaining “the international tourism partnership youth career service”.54 This has developed into a strong, private–public cooperation, focusing on poverty alleviation and youth employability. NEMs, like all industry, inevitably have environmental impacts – mostly similar in type to FDI. Contract farming can have serious impacts, among others through soil erosion and biodiversity loss (WIR09: 155–157). The specific environmental impacts of contract farming activities depend on contingent factors, including the specific crop or activity undertaken, production technologies, the scale of operations, and host-country and international rules and regulations on the environment. An important factor is the technical support or encouragement provided to the NEM by the TNC, which can be controversial, e.g. in terms of inputs and production methods to support the farming of genetically modified crops (box IV.8). There is a significant body of evidence to suggest that TNCs are likely to use more environmentally friendly practices than domestic companies in equivalent activities. Applying a uniform environmental standard across all global operations is normally less costly than taking advantage of laxer environmental regulations in some locations. The extent to which TNCs guide NEM operations to the same effect depends, first, on their perception of and exposure to legal liability risks (e.g. reparations in the case of environmental damages) and business risks (e.g. damage to their brand and lower sales). Second, it depends on the extent to which they can control NEMs. TNCs employ a number of mechanisms to influence NEM partners, including codes of conduct, factory inspections/audits, and third party certification schemes. Ultimately the level of influence a TNC has over its NEM partners is determined by a range of factors including how fragmented or concentrated the industry is at the level of the NEM partner, which determines how much choice the TNC has in selecting the partner. In the cases of franchising and management contracts, NEMs for which the TNC’s brand is a key driver, environmental reporting is of high importance. For example, seven of the 10 largest hotel groups worldwide (all extensively involved in franchising and/or management contracts) provide extensive information on their global policies to promote environmental responsibility, including reductions in waste, water use and electricity consumption, as well as their carbon footprint in their annual and CSR reports. In this respect, training of personnel and recycling facilities are two of the most commonly adopted measures to tackle environmental challenges and encourage an ecological conscience. Some, such as InterContinental Hotels Group PLC and Marriot International are pioneering the construction of sustainable hotels and buildings using renewable resources, thereby contributing to the diffusion of more environmentally friendly practices. 6. Long-term industrial capacity-building NEMactivityindeveloping host countries can make immediate contributions to employment, to GDP, to exports, to linkages and to the local technology base. In doing so, NEMs also help to provide the resources, skills and access to global value chains that are prerequisites for long-term industrial capacity building. The long-term industrial development impact of NEMs filters through each of the impact types discussed in previous sections: oo The employment generated by NEM activities contributes to the build-up of a formalized workforce, with the potential to obtain skills NEMs can enhance productive capacities in developing countries through their integration into global value chains, but there are also concerns related to long-term dependency, limited value added and “footlooseness”.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development162 that can be transferred to the wider economy, as workers change jobs. Skills include technical, managerial and professional skills, as well as values and experience of business culture. The extent to which the labour force is flexible and can afford to look for new opportunities (i.e. is not forced for subsistence reasons to stay in occupations where working conditions limit possibilities to seek improvement) is an important aspect of the potential of NEMs to contribute to longer-term development. oo The local value added generated by NEMs may be limited in the early stages of development of an economy, where NEM activities may be confined to low value added and low-tech segments of global value chains. In the longer term there are opportunities through NEMs to grow a country’s presence in such limited value chain segments to a “dominant” international position to maximize development potential, to extend its presence to adjacent segments of the value chain, or to enter other value chains that may depend on similar skills, resources and endowments. oo NEMs are a major “route-to-market” for countries aiming at export-led growth, and a major point of access to TNC global value chains. While initially NEMs in countries in the early stages of development may be the only point of access, local firms can grow into independent exporters and gain independent access to global value chains, often by gradually moving to serve more than one TNC network. oo Long-term industrial capacity building implies the gradual upgrading of local technological capabilities and the pursuit of a degree of technological independence. The path to such independence is, for example, often from third-party factories in the early stages of development, to contract manufacturing activities for multiple TNC value chains at a later stage, to design and own brand development (including for domestic or regional markets) (box IV.9). oo Even the impact of NEMs on social and environmental standards can have a bearing on long-term sustainable industrial development, insofar as industrial upgrading, moving up to higher value added segments of global value chains, is conditioned increasingly by extended corporate social responsibility demands placed on all actors in the chain by lead TNCs. A major part of the contribution of NEMs to the build-up of local productive capacity and long-term prospects for industrial development is through impact on enterprise development as, in contrast to Box IV.8. Managing the environmental impact of contract farming In the cut flower industry, operations by TNCs and their contract farming schemes have often been criticized for negative environmental impacts due to their high water consumption leading to water depletion, and due to the fact that many producers are far from their customers, thus creating significant impact from transport activities. In response, farms working with TNCs have introduced environmentally sustainable practices, such as geothermal steam and integrated pest management systems (Wee and Arnold, 2009). For similar reasons, since the late 1990s, the banana industry in Latin America (where contract farming is also common) has progressively seen the adoption of environment-friendly farming techniques in plantations. Organic planting technologies introduced through foreign firms’ networks have boosted value creation and led to higher incomes for farmers (Liu, 2009). Despite these recent efforts for sustainable farming, TNCs have been consistently criticized for their environmental impact through contract farming. One positive result of these criticisms seems to be the fact that TNCs are increasingly embracing environmental certification for produce in their GVCs, to protect their corporate image and to manage risks. (In some cases, environmentally friendly methods also contribute to reducing cost, through lower inputs and recycling.) Regular environmental and social inspections are performed to guarantee that contract farmers conform to good agricultural practices (GAPs), sustainable environmental standards and good working conditions for their employees. Compliance is implemented through codes of practice and certification by industry associations. Source: UNCTAD, based on WIR09: 155–157.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 163 FDI, local entrepreneurs and domestic investment are intrinsic to NEMs. Such domestic investment, and access to local or international financing, is often facilitated for NEMs, either through explicit measures by TNCs providing support to local NEM partners such as supplier capacity-building initiatives or financing guarantees, or through the implicit assurance stemming from the partnership with a major TNC itself or from the contract setting out terms and conditions obtained by the local partner. There can also be indirect impacts on capital formation.55 For example, in the case of franchising, access to a proven business model facilitates access to commercial credit for start-up capital requirements for local micro- and small entrepreneurs. The reduced risk associated with a “tried and tested” business model, and in some cases explicit guarantees offered by TNC franchisors, ease negotiations with banks. Contract farming also tends to increase local investment in agriculture by giving farmers a guaranteed fixed income against which they can borrow money from local financial institutions (WIR09). In the case of other NEM types, such as contract manufacturing, UNCTAD has included such practices into its roster of good practices in business linkages (WIR04). * * * The potential contributions of NEMs as catalysts for long-term development are clear and typified by economies such as India, Kenya and Taiwan Province of China (box IV.10). However, concerns are often raised (especially with regard to contract manufacturing and licensing) that countries relying to a significant extent on NEMs for industrial development risk remaining locked into low value added segments of TNC-governed global value chains and cannot reduce their technology dependency. In such cases, developing economies would run a further risk of becoming extremely vulnerable to TNCs shifting productive activity to other locations, as NEMs are more “footloose” than equivalent FDI operations. The related risks of “dependency” and “footlooseness” must be addressed through policies touching on each of the impact areas discussed above, but above all they must be addressed by embedding NEMs in the overall development strategies of countries. Box IV.9. From contract manufacturing to building brands – the Chinese white goods sector Chinese manufacturers are key players in the white-goods household appliance sector globally; over 50 per cent of Chinese production is destined for overseas markets. Few Chinese players are operating internationally with their own brands. Nevertheless, several contract manufacturers, active in international supply in mass product categories such as refrigerators, washing machines, microwaves, air-conditioners or domestic cooling fans, have progressively moved into design and secondary innovation. For example, Hisense develops multiple product variants each year that exhibit innovative design. Many of these manufacturers entered the market barely a decade ago, but have migrated from pure outsourced third- party factories to independent contract manufacturers. Internationally, the high levels of exports still largely compete on the basis of cost advantages in contract manufacturing arrangements, based on large consignment orders, for both manufacturers and large retail chains. For a particular product category, these operations are often heavily clustered in a particular town or city; microwave- oven production for example is dominated by the manufacturers Galanz and Midea, who between them represent some two-thirds of global production volumes, and are both based in Shunde. Their supplier base is located within a two-hour road transport network, facilitating rapid response and low cost. Price competition is fierce both in the domestic market and in consignment-based international contract production, where manufacturers have routinely accepted single-digit profit margins. A number of producing firms are now aiming to establish independent footholds in overseas markets to improve these margins. Manufacturers, including Hisense, Midea and Haier, are now producing designs that are increasingly producer-branded. This will also help them in the domestic market, as domestic consumers are becoming increasingly brand aware. Source: UNCTAD, based on case studies by the Institute for Manufacturing, University of Cambridge.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development164 Box IV.10. NEMs as catalysts for capacity-building and development Contract manufacturing in Taiwan Province of China Taiwan Province of China has successfully transformed into an industrial power through contract manufacturing, especially in electronics. This strategy was pursued after the Second World War because the economy possessed an educated labour force, a developed infrastructure and a large number of entrepreneurial SMEs in manufacturing and other industries. The Government built on this by providing a strong policy influence and institutional support aimed at fostering local capabilities, including establishing links with foreign TNCs. In the case of electronics, the State-owned Electronics Research and Services Organization, National Chiao Tung University and National Development Fund have played a significant role in the development of the industry. Local firms and the economy have upgraded their capacities over time, moving from the production of goods using simple technologies, through more capital and technology intensive processes, to – increasingly – innovation. Over a period, this strategy has produced many local world-class electronics companies such as Acer, BenQ, Asus, Quanta, Foxconn, many of which are now TNCs. The process has also led to a formidable industrial cluster, on which the economy continues to build, e.g. through a move to semiconductors. Both Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and United Mircoelectronics Corporation (UMC), two leading global semiconductor producers, owe much to the Government for their existence. Services outsourcing in India India is today a world-leading destination for IT-BPO and offshoring activities. The industry accounted for about 6.4 per cent of the country’s GDP, about 26 per cent of export revenues, and over two million jobs in 2011. The success of the industry in India owes much to the existence of significant IT companies, such as Tata Consultancy Services, most with existing links with TNCs in the United Kingdom and North America, when IT-BPO services offshoring began to accelerate in the 1990s. Indian NEMs were able to take advantage of a large low-cost labour force with English language and technology skills, as well as the strong policy and institutional support from the Government and the industry’s organization. Indian firms’ existing scale and links with local industrial groups meant that they had the absorptive capabilities to acquire, assimilate and develop technology and skills from their relationship with TNC partners. Many of them have become TNCs themselves. The rapid growth of the services outsourcing industry has improved India’s competitiveness and the overall investment environment. The IT-BPO industry has evolved over the past two decades and is a significant support or infrastructure industry for the Indian economy. It provides skilled, IT-savvy employees and entrepreneurs who are now playing a significant role in other industries (e.g. telecommunications) – all of which has fostered economic diversification. Contract farming in Kenya Contract farming has helped Kenya emerge as a major agriculture exporter and helped to modernize the processes utilized by its local farmers. This is exemplified by the country’s floriculture industry, which produces cut flowers for foreign auction centres and retailers. A combination of active government support, favourable agro-climatic condition, availability of low-cost farm workers and the role of foreign-owned farms have contributed to Kenya’s floriculture development. Through out-grower arrangements, small cut flower farms in Kenya produce and sell their flowers to larger local Kenyan or foreign companies, which control, grade, bunch and export the flowers to auction centres in the Netherlands. Local and foreign-owned farms also produce cut flowers under contract for customers, including major supermarkets, in other developed countries. Kenya’s cut flowers industry has grown rapidly at 18.6 per cent CAGR between 2000 and 2009, and employs a significant number of people with some 2 million or about 7 per cent of the population relying on the industry for their livelihood; the industry contributes to poverty alleviation and rural employment and development. Technology acquisition, quality control and improved infrastructure play a role in modernizing Kenya’s farming sector and furthering the competitiveness of the agriculture industry. In addition, the introduction of a business culture with a stress on quality and reliability develops capacities among workers and entrepreneurs beyond agriculture, and is a force for diversification of the economy. Source: UNCTAD.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 165 Appropriate policies are necessary if countries are to maximize the development benefits from the integration of domestic firms into NEM networks of TNCs. There are four key challenges for policymakers. First, how to integrate NEM policies into the overall context of national development strategy; second, how to support the building of domestic productive capacity to ensure the availability of attractive business partners that can qualify as actors in global value chains; third, how to promote and facilitate NEMs; and fourth, how to address negative consequences related to NEMs (table IV.15). 1. Embedding NEM policies in development strategies Many countries are increasingly opting for more proactive industrial development policies, in particular since the recent global economic crisis. These policies interact increasingly with the national and international policy frameworks for FDI (see chapter III) and trade. Given the importance of E. POLICIES RELATED TO NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION Maximizing the development benefits of NEMs requires embedding them into overall development strategies, building domestic NEM- related productive capacity, NEM-specific promotion, and policies to mitigate negative effects. NEMs in global value chains and in developing country economies, there is a case for industrial development policies to embrace NEMs as an additional means to achieving development objectives. Analogous to the common policy challenge in industrial policy of “picking winners”, successful government strategies towards using NEMs to galvanize capacity-building reflect the economy’s natural and created endowments, its industrial structure and the capabilities of local enterprises. These strategies should build on concrete opportunities to integrate local players into specific activities or segments of global value chains, such as existing linkages with international production networks and existing export markets. Because of the evolutionary nature of GVCs, initial success in one “GVC niche” can breed additional outsourcing and induce rapid growth (Whittaker et al., 2010). NEM policies within industrial development strategies that aim at industrial upgrading support firms in moving up to higher stages in the value Embedding NEM policies in overall development strategies requires their integration into industrial development strategies, ensuring co- herence with trade, in- vestment and technology policies, and mitigating dependency risks. Table IV.15. Maximizing development benefits from NEMs Policy areas Key actions Embedding NEM policies in overall development strategies • Integrating NEM policies into industrial development strategies • Ensuring coherence with trade, investment, and technology policies • Mitigating dependency risks and supporting upgrading efforts Building domestic productive capacity • Developing entrepreneurship • Improving education • Providing access to finance • Enhancing technological capacities Facilitating and promoting NEMs • Setting up an enabling legal framework • Promoting NEMs through IPAs • Securing home-country support measures • Making international policies conducive to NEMs Addressing negative effects • Strengthening the bargaining power of domestic firms • Safeguarding competition • Protecting labour rights and the environment Source: UNCTAD.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development166 chain, reducing their technology dependency, developing their own brands, or becoming NEM originators in their own right. Policies can support businesses to extend their operations into adjacent activities and segments of the value chain to maximize value added and job creation (see below). Most importantly, embedding NEMs into comprehensive industrial development strategies can help address the risks arising from dependency on a limited range of technologies, market segments or TNC partners. In the short term, the implications of “footlooseness” can be mitigated by improving the “stickiness” of NEMs, with a view to retaining existing TNC engagements with domestic NEM partners. Policymakers can maintain – and possibly even increase – domestic NEM partners’ attractiveness by building sufficient local mass and clusters of secondary suppliers, by nurturing existing NEM relationships or by improving the overall NEM climate (e.g. improving soft and hard infrastructure). As part of the longer-term strategy, countries can reduce dependency risks by balancing specialization and diversification. Policies that foster specialization can improve NEM partners’ competitive edge within a value chain, allowing them ultimately to move towards segments with greater value capture, or even to become “NEM originators” themselves. This is of particular importance in situations where countries’ development paths, and related structural changes, result in a reduction of their low labour cost competitiveness. Diversification, in turn, can help mitigate dependency risks by ensuring that domestic companies are engaged in many different activities, both within and across different value chains, and connected to a broad range of NEM partners. These strategies can be complemented by labour and social policies aimed at cushioning adjustment costs and smoothing adjustment processes. Bridging support, while local industry builds capacity in other activities to fill gaps or finds alternative international NEM partners, can help address social and other challenges arising. On a more permanent basis, periodic review by host countries of their international competitiveness as NEM destinations, involving close monitoring of key indicators concerning labour and other cost factors, is critical. Competitiveness based only on cheap labour can easily vanish as the economy develops. Continuous learning and skills upgrading of domestic entrepreneurs and employees are necessary preconditions for domestic firms to qualify as attractive business partners for higher value added activities, when foreign companies move relatively “low-end” economic activities and production processes to cheaper locations. People-embodied technology ultimately is the most effective anchor for TNCs. 2. Domestic productive capacity-building NEM-related development strategies can only be successful if enterprises in developing countries qualify as potential NEM partners of TNCs. Several policies related to productive capacity-building are important in this context: • Entrepreneurship policy, to develop local entrepreneurs capable of partnering international NEMs and taking advantage of them. • Education policy, to improve the entrepreneurial, technological and managerial skills of the local labour force, including vocational training, so as to be able to engage in NEMs. • Technology policy to support local technological uptake and upgrading so as to enable local firms to capture more value added in NEM relationships. • Policies geared towards easing access to finance. Effective policies to attract and benefit from NEMs require the promotion of local business partners with good entrepreneurial and technological capabili- ties, and sufficient access to finance.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 167 a. Entrepreneurship policy Proactive entrepreneurship policies consist of measures to raise awareness of entrepreneurship as a career option and to support individuals who are willing to assume the risks of engaging in business activities. Awareness is also necessary to promote an entrepreneurial culture among a country’s population. Building on this, support for start-ups and commercialization is fundamental at the early level of business development, including in the NEM context. Business “incubators” are a useful government tool to assist producers that engage, for instance, in contract manufacturing. Most incubators are linked to or sponsored by government institutions, universities or industry associations. Governments can also support the creation of business networks and linkages to assist new entrepreneurs in their interaction with established companies and facilitate access to resources and clients. Finally, supportive administrative regulations can help entrepreneurs to turn new ideas into business products and firms, including through simplification of administrative steps and the provision of specific information through government websites and portals. b. Education Education plays a fundamental role in developing entrepreneurial attitudes, technological and managerial skills and behaviours relevant for NEMs. Key in this respect is to embed entrepreneurship knowledge (including financial literacy and business strategy for start-ups) into the formal educational system at all levels, including schools, universities and private sector bodies. This can be supported by reaching out to the business community and integrating it into the learning process, e.g. Box IV.11. Educational reforms in Viet Nam promote entrepreneurship In Viet Nam, the Government has supported higher education vocational training schools through its Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). Recently, MOET has supported various initiatives to improve the knowledge base of the population. A new education law was passed in 2005 and a plan was formulated by MOET to implement a National Policy Framework for development of a profession-oriented education system, to convert most existing universities into professional higher education institutions. The system will make it possible to connect the curricula with the ever-changing educational and training needs of the industrial sector, the service sector and respective labour markets. Source: UNCTAD, based on Pham Truong Hoang, “Industrial Human Resource Development in Vietnam in the New Stage of Industrialization” Vietnam Development Forum, available at: www.vdf.org.vn. by offering practical training and internships in companies. Vocational training and the development of specialized skills can be a key policy to enhance the capacity of local companies to engage in NEMs (box IV.11). It prepares trainees for jobs involving manual or practical activities, which are non-academic and related to a specific trade or occupation. An example is education programmes for local farmers to increase their productivity and to enhance sustainable methods of agricultural production (WIR09). Depending on the educational systems of countries, vocational training can be set up at the secondary or post-secondary level, and can also interact with apprenticeship systems. To promote the development of specialized skills, entrepreneurship centres can be established that serve as hubs to coordinate activities across business and educational institutions. These centres can also focus on the coordination of after- school programmes or activities in community centres. c. Enhancing technological capacities National technology policies play a vital role in the development of local capacities for technology- related NEMs. This requires a combination of policies geared towards developing technology clusters, encouraging acquisition and dissemination of technology and skills through improved local absorptive capacity, and protecting intellectual property rights. In a broader sense, it also encompasses policies to disseminate information on international business standards expected from local NEM partners of TNCs, such as quality standards, automation processes and prevailing ITC systems.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development168 Generating and disseminating technologies are both vital activities for the development of local capacities in technology-related NEMs. Disseminating technology can foster technological upgrading and hence facilitate the involvement of domestic producers in global value chains. The promotion of partnerships between SMEs and organizations overseas, for the dissemination of key technology, products, processes or management practices, can be useful. The provision of technologies, for instance in the form of new seeds and pesticides, can support local farmers in contract farming (WIR09). Policies aimed at generating technology can strengthen the technological base and attractiveness of domestic NEM partners. For example, technology clusters that promote RD in a particular industry can help generate technology by bringing together technology firms, suppliers and research institutes. Recent years have witnessed some successful initiatives by governments to stimulate not only the involvement of national producers in global value chains, but also to foster their upgrading through technological innovation. For instance, through a combination of targeted incentives and the establishment of centers of excellence, both Egypt56 and the Philippines57 have promoted technological upgrading among local contractors with a focus on improving the competitiveness of call centers and business processing operations. Both countries built their strategies on existing capacities and comparative advantages and policies supported the creation of linkages with the wider business community. In the long run these kind of initiatives may also allow the domestic NEM contractor to become an NEM originator in its own right. Technology-related policies are also crucial to avoid local firms being limited to low value-added activities within NEM relationships; upgrading helps host countries to capture higher economic rents within the value chain. Specific policies include supporting training and capacity-building via skill development and business development service programmes, establishing logistic technology centres as demonstration and testing facilities, facilitating technological upgrading and promoting partnerships. Appropriate protection and enforcement of IP rights is a precondition for IP holders to disclose their technology to licensees in developing countries, especially in areas involving RD-intensive, but at the same time easily imitateable technologies, such as pharmaceuticals (UNCTAD, 2010b). Hence, IP protection plays an important role in the NEM context. It can also be a means of encouraging RD by local NEM partner firms. A new UNCTAD study of developing country cases in the automotive components, software and audiovisual industries emphasizes the relevance and mutual dependence of technological upgrading and the protection of intellectual property rights (UNCTAD, 2010b). SMEs are more likely to invest resources in RD and technological upgrading if their innovations are protected against piracy. d. Access to finance Access to finance is a key concern for SME entrepreneurs in general, and it can be a particular constraint when engaging in NEMs. Government policies aimed at promoting credit for SMEs can take the form of tax breaks, subsidies and government loan guarantees,58 or of alternatives to traditional bank credit, e.g. the formation of venture capital funds to assist start-ups. Policies can be instituted to address the circumstances of SMEs involved in NEMs with foreign companies. For example, in order to reduce the commercial risks faced by contract manufacturers, governments can create a legal framework for “factoring”, where a firm can sell its accounts receivable (i.e. invoices) to a third party in exchange for money with which to finance current expenditure.59 Also, governments can promote finance for licensing and franchising through official institutions that provide special windows for this type of activity, or encourage their formation within existing private institutions (box IV.12). The establishment of agricultural development banks can particularly focus on serving the financial needs of local farmers and small holders (WIR09).
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 169 3. Facilitation and promotion of NEMs a. Setting up an enabling legal framework NEMs are based on contractual relationships. The laws and regulations governing these contracts are therefore an important NEM determinant, and can constitute either an incentive or an obstacle for this kind of business cooperation.60 According to investment promotion agencies (IPAs) from developing countries and economies in transition, weak contract laws and cumbersome administrative rules on business start-ups are perceived as the main regulatory obstacles by TNCs. This is particularly the case for contract manufacturing and management contracts. NEMs would be facilitated by a clear and stable regulatory framework. NEM parties need to know what domestic rules govern their contract, the extent to which these regulations constrain their contractual discretion, whether and to what extent they have the right to chose the law of a third (neutral) country to apply to the contract, the consequences of a breach of contract, what procedures apply in the event of a dispute, in particular whether they can opt for international arbitration instead of domestic court proceedings, and how a judicial decision or arbitration award can be enforced. Identifying the applicable laws and regulations is Box IV.12. Providing access to finance for SMEs engaging in franchising activities In the Philippines, the Philippine Franchise Association (PFA), Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SBGFC), the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Export Industry Bank (EIB) launched franchise financing facility windows specifically for franchisors and franchisees. Additionally, SBGFC provides credit through the banking system to finance the requirements of small and medium enterprises, including franchises, in various productive sectors such as manufacturing, agribusiness and service. Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Philippine Franchise Association and Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation. complicated by the fact that most countries do not have specific rules for individual NEM types, such as contract manufacturing, contract farming or franchising, but apply general contract laws, together with other legislation that may be relevant in the specific context. Many law areas may come into play, such as regulations on intellectual property (e.g. for licensing or franchising), competition, consumer protection, employment and environmental protection. Under these circumstances, ensuring transparency and coherence of the legal framework becomes particularly important. An additional task to improve the legal framework for NEMs is to promote the simplification of administrative steps needed to set up new businesses. For example, “one-stop shop” initiatives that concentrate registration procedures in a single agency can reduce the time needed to set up a company, and also reduce costs. Communication campaigns that provide information on existing regulations through media and websites can also contribute to business facilitation. b. The role of investment promotion agencies UNCTAD’s latest survey of IPAs indicates that at present they are only modestly involved in attracting NEMs, with most of their attention to date devoted to contract manufacturing (table IV.16). This is the case for almost all regions; only agencies in Asia seem to give more attention to franchising. A review of existing NEM-specific promotion activities, implemented either by IPAs or by other government institutions, reveals variations between different NEM modes: (i) fiscal and financial subsidies Facilitating and promoting NEMs requires an enabling legal framework, strengthened promotion policies, securing home-country support and harnessing international policies.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development170 Table IV.16. Share of IPAs actively involved in the promotion of NEMs, 2011 (Percentage of respondents) Mode Current promotion Expected importance in the future Main industries Strategic Alliances, Contractual joint ventures 54 60 Across the board Contract manufacturing 40 49 Textiles and apparel, electrical and electronic equipment and business services Franchising 26 43 Hotels and restaurants and retail and wholesale trade Management contracts 24 36 Hotels and restaurants Contract farming 20 32 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing Licensing 19 31 Pharmaceuticals Source: UNCTAD, forthcoming c. are mainly used for contract manufacturing; (ii) promoting local entrepreneurship is, in particular, linked to franchising; (iii) technological upgrading is mostly mentioned in connection with contract manufacturing; while (iv) matchmaking plays an important role across the board. Beyond assisting domestic NEM partners, IPAs can play an important role in promoting the use of NEMs to TNCs. Figure IV.13 indicates that, in general, IPAs involve themselves mainly with information provision and project facilitation in this respect. For instance, investment fairs play an import role in the promotion of franchising opportunities. Involvement in project negotiations mainly occurs in the case of management contracts. Investor targeting, investment missions and the provision of incentives are more common in the case of contract manufacturing. Figure IV.13. Use of IPA policy tools for NEMs, 2011 (Percentage of respondents) Source: UNCTAD, forthcoming c. c. Home-country policies There are examples of TNC home countries promoting specific forms of NEM, in particular franchising. For example, the Australian Trade Commission (AUSTRADE) provides a number of services to Australian franchisors abroad, including coordinating missions around international events, undertaking market research, business partner searches and individual market visit programmes.61 The United States Exim Bank offers long-term financing in emerging markets to United States franchisors involved in international franchising (Richter, 2009). In Malaysia, export promotion activities for the franchise industry by the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE) include participation in international fairs and organizing special marketing missions in conjunction with franchise exhibitions.62 National export insurance schemes as well as political risk insurance for FDI can be extended to NEMs. For example, the United States Exim Bank can provide insurance for franchising related to export activities.63 Official development aid can be used to fund supplier development programmes in host countries (WIR01) and can include technical assistance aimed at domestic capacity-building for NEM. d. International policies While there is no comprehensive international legal and policy framework for fostering NEMs and their development implications, a number of different international treaties and policies merit attention. 0 10 20 30 40 50 Financial and fiscal incentives Advertisement and publicity Project negotiation Policy advocacy Missions Aftercare Company targeting Fairs and seminars Project facilitation Information provision
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 171 The role of IIAs in protecting – and hence promoting – NEMs and NEM-related investments is not straightforward. IIAs are not designed to cover NEM arrangements, which do not involve an (equity) investment and hence miss the element that typically triggers IIA application.64 Moreover, the type of protection offered by IIAs (i.e. protection against government interference or conduct) might not correspond to what is mostly required by NEM partners. However, certain NEM components can be considered part of an investment package, under the broad or asset-based definition of “investment” in IIAs (e.g. a trade mark or patents), particularly when TNCs have both FDI and NEMs in the same host country. In such cases, IIAs could have some application. However, there are other international treaties that may impact – directly or indirectly – on NEMs, including for example, the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (e.g. by reducing barriers to trade in services, and hence to a certain extent facilitating business process outsourcing or cross-border franchising in, for example, hotel, restaurant, or distribution services). NEMs relying on intellectual property may benefit from IP rules at national, regional and multilateral levels. Also relevant are other non-binding guidelines and recommendations in specific areas such as licensing, technology transfer and innovation. Regional integration agreements can foster NEMs by encouraging harmonization and institution- building and helping establish regionally integrated production networks and value chains. Of relevance also is the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which, from November 2010, may provide political risk insurance also for activities other than FDI, including management contracts, services, franchising and licensing agreements.65 Some international “soft law” instruments can promote NEMs by harmonizing the rules governing the contractual relationship between private NEM parties, or by guiding private NEM parties in the crafting of the NEM contract. For example, (i) the Model International Franchising Contract, issued by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) provides franchisors and franchisees with drafting suggestions; and (ii) the 1998 UNIDROIT Guide to International Master Franchising Arrangements (in its 2007 revision) comprehensively examines and explains master franchise arrangements. Some of these international initiatives also aim at addressing potential negative effects of NEMs. For example, in terms of strengthening the bargaining power of domestic NEM partners, the 2002 Model Franchise Disclosure Law developed by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) addresses pre-contractual disclosure on the part of the franchisor, and the ICC Model Contract explicitly aims at striking a balance between the interests of the franchisor and franchisee. As regards potential anti-competitive effects, international competition policies remain patchy.66 International environmental law, international labour standards, and soft law initiatives, including CSR, all play a part in ensuring that NEMs deliver tangible development benefits without detrimental side-effects. 4. Addressing potential negative effects of NEMs a. Strengthening the bargaining power of domestic firms Negotiating a NEM contract with a foreign TNC can be a challenge for firms in developing countries, where local entrepreneurs will often be in a weaker position, have little or no experience or knowledge of NEMs, and sometimes do not fully understand the implications of concluding a deal. The local firm’s negotiation position might further be weakened by the fact that TNCs often use standard contract forms with local foreign partners, leaving little room for individual bargaining. Strengthening the negotiating power of domestic firms can be an important means to achieving a fair sharing of risk between the contracting parties, and to preventing the contract from confining the local company to low value-added activities. Addressing negative effects of NEMs requires strengthening the bargaining power of local firms, safeguarding competition, and protect- ing labour rights and the environment.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development172 One means of backing domestic firms in their negotiations is through the imposition by the host country of mandatory requirements on NEM counterparts. The respective issue is then no longer a bargaining chip between the negotiators. Such mandatory rules exist particularly for franchising and contract farming. For instance, numerous countries have franchising regulations, establishing certain pre-contractual requirements for the franchisor vis- à-vis the franchisee (box IV.13). Specific laws on contract farming have been adopted in a few countries, including India, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The provisions address, inter alia, the establishment of a special register or a notification procedure for contract farming agreements, special regulations on leasing of land by enterprises and land property rights of farmers, compensation in case of contract breach, and rules relating to force majeure. Another key aspect relates to special dispute settlement mechanisms, e.g. facilitating access to justice for farmers and ensuring that decisions are final, binding and enforceable (WIR09). With such provisions in place, NEMs may be more appropriate than FDI in sensitive situations, since contract farming is more likely to address responsible investment issues – respect for local rights, livelihoods of farmers and sustainable use of resources – than large-scale land acquisition. Local entrepreneurs can also benefit greatly from advice on how to negotiate a NEM contract. This includes economic aspects (distribution of business risks), financial considerations (e.g. taxation) and legal elements (implications of the contract). In most cases it is not the lack of an adequate legal framework, but the lack of carefully drafted contracts, that lies at the root of subsequent problems and failures. Governments can play a role, for instance, by developing and publishing negotiating guidelines, checklists of issues to be considered in negotiations, codes of conduct, model contracts (including for contract farming) or benchmark prices for the respective product or service. Promoting a “contract culture”, i.e. a better understanding of the merits of entering into formal contracts, is also vital. Finally, supporting collective bargaining, including the formation of domestic producer associations, can help to create a better counterweight to TNCs’ negotiating power. b. Addressing competition concerns NEMs, like FDI, can have serious implications for competition in the host countries. Specific Box IV.13. Pre-contractual requirements in franchising The most common obligation on the franchisor is to provide pre-contractual disclosure of all relevant information, allowing the prospective franchisee to enter the contract with full knowledge of the facts. How much information needs to be disclosed, and how long in advance, depends on the country. Some countries have set a detailed list with required information (e.g. China, France, Japan, Mexico, United States) while for others this is based on general principles (e.g. United Kingdom) or is derived from case law (e.g. Germany). The most common requirements include information on the franchisor’s business experience, past or pending litigation, financial statements, franchise fees and the existing network of franchisees. Other information may include operational details, including the franchisor’s involvement in supervision or training of the franchisee. How long in advance these documents need to disclosed varies, e.g. from seven days in Singapore to 14 in Australia, Canada or the United States, or 30 days in China or Mexico. Franchising regulation may also include other obligations for the franchisor. For instance, the United States requires the franchise offering to be registered with the state. In China, the franchisor must fulfil the “2+1” requirement, that is the franchisor must have owned at least two stores that carry out the franchised business for more than one year, although these do not necessarily need to be in China. In France, the franchisor needs to have run a similar business in a manner and for a time necessary to be considered a success. In other countries similar requirements are not part of the legal framework itself, but are set out in a franchise code of ethics (e.g. in Germany and the United Kingdom). Source: UNCTAD, based on Getting the Deal Through – Franchise 2011, available at www.franchise.org.
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 173 contractual provisions in NEMs, such as exclusive dealing oblilcations, territorial constraints, and resale price maintenance, frequently raise competition concerns. They are considered as per se anti- competitive in many competition law regimes. If TNCs engaged in NEMs acquire dominant positions, they may be able to abuse their market power to the detriment of their competitors (domestic and foreign) and their own trading partners. Therefore, policies to promote NEMs need to go hand in hand with policies safeguard competition (WIR97). Competition-related considerations may go beyond the enforcement of the “rules of the game” to ensure that enterprises do not undertake restrictive business practices. Other public interest criteria may require attention as well. Protection of indigenous capacities and traditional activities that may be crowded out by a rapid increase in market shares of successful NEMs, may be relevant, particularly in market-seeking forms of NEMs, such as franchising. c. Labour issues and environmental protection Concerns about labour malpractices and environmental damage related to NEM require government and industry efforts to ensure that internationally recognized labour rights are respected, and environmental protection is in place. One crucial policy issue is to ensure respect for labour standards as embodied in ILO conventions. This not only requires translating these standards into domestic law, but also effective control by the host-country authorities that domestic NEM firms respect these standards. Another critical issue is the protection of domestic stakeholders in case of a termination of the NEM relationship by the TNC. Ensuring “responsible divestment” is not only an issue of contractual relationships and relevant host-country regulatory and legal farmeworks (including social adjustment policies) but also a social responsibility dimension on the part of the TNCs involved. The causing of environmental harm by NEM operations raises the issue of legal liability. While the domestic NEM firm bears direct responsibility as owner and operator of the plant, there is the issue of whether liability could be extended to the TNC, in case that the latter controls or strongly influences many of the processes within the NEM. These labour and environmental issues are also addressed in TNCs’ voluntary CSR standards. Governments can play an important role in creating a coherent policy and institutional framework to address the challenges and opportunities presented by the universe of CSR standards. As explained in chapter III, various approaches are already underway that increasingly mix regulatory and voluntary instruments to promote responsible business practices. There is also a role for policies to build the capacity of local NEM firms to meet the labour and environmental standards expected by TNCs. As TNC CSR codes and other CSR standards proliferate to include international value chains, domestic NEM partners are increasingly expected to meet international standards of labour practice and environmental protection. The potential for legal liability and brand damage discourages TNCs from engaging in NEMs with partners having poor labour or environmental records. Many TNCs will conduct audits and factory inspections of NEM partners, and will disengage from business with partners that consistently fail to meet the TNC’s code of conduct. Developing country governments can consider partnering with donor states, international organizations, civil society specialists and industry associations to deliver practical management training and technical assistance to domestic firms in these areas. * * * Maximizing the development contribution of NEMs requires an integrated policy approach, combining a wide range of different policy tools and instruments, with particular attention given to overall industrial policy objectives, investment, trade and technology policies. What kind of policies fit best is situation- and context-specific, depending among others on, (i) a country’s level of economic and technological development, (ii) its actual and latent NEM-potential, and (iii) its broader development and industrial policy
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development174 strategies. All of this is taking place in a dynamic context, where the rise and fall of competitive NEM-related industries around the globe requires a continuing reassessment and adjustment of a particular country’s overall development strategy and policy instruments. Enhanced coordination between different policymakers and institutions, as well as building on first-hand private sector experience, with a view to fostering synergies, is crucial in this context. Notes 1 Strictly speaking, alternative forms of TNC overseas operations are not new; some forms, such as licensing and management contracts, were commonly used in past eras (Jones, 2010; Wilkins and Schröter, 1998). 2 The OLI model explains why some firms choose to expand overseas and others do not (ownership advantages), why firms choose specific locations (location advantages), and why they choose to “make” rather than “buy” (internalization advantages). 3 NEMs can be both domestic and international/ cross-border in scope. In WIR11 all reference to NEMs will be to cross-border arrangements. 4 For example, in management contracts and concessions the TNCs are technically the NEMs because they offer technology and expertise to local partners, including governments in the case of infrastructure and extractive industries. However, this leads to control over a host country business entity without ownership. 5 These linkages between affiliates and local NEMs may also include second- and third-tier suppliers that are in some way dependent on or controlled by the TNC principal. 6 For instance, in contract manufacturing, the report focuses on the final stage of production. In electronics this is associated with the final assembly of a consumer electronic good, typified by large electronics manufacturing services firms like Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) and Flextronics (Singapore). Seen from this perspective, NEM firms dominate world trade associated with final consumer electronics goods. However, within the context of the entire electronics supply there are many other players. 7 Assigning a sales-equivalent value to some of these forms is conceptually difficult (e.g. concessions are generally measured as investment values). There is also a paucity of reliable data. 8 Much of this labour was trained by affiliates, especially in South-East Asia, thereby creating assets which were later taken up by contract manufacturers. 9 Such strategies remain very much a part of the dynamics of the industry. 10 See the company website at: www.lifunggroup. com/eng/businesses/sourcing.php (accessed 9 June 2011). The company’s business is largely in garments and footwear. 11 Based on information from Nasscom, XMG Global, IDC and Gartner. 12 Estimates of the global share of these countries in the industry range as high as 78 per cent. See XMG Global report cited in “World’s outsourcing revenue worth $373 billion”, by Eileen Yu, ZDNet Asia, 23 September 2009; available at: www.zdnetasia.com. 13 There remain doubts about how persistent higher returns might be. For example, in the case of franchising, Alon, Drtina and Gilbert (2007) found no sustainable profit advantage for franchise networks over non-franchise networks. 14 Pfizer decreased its own plants by almost 50 per cent (to 46 plants) from 2003 to 2008. Key considerations for outsourcing decisions include the ability to supply, capacity flexibility, cost competitiveness, and technology, while ensuring supply chain integrity/reliability, product quality, and regulatory compliance. Information from Pfizer website www.pfizer.com. 15 See “Why Wal-Mart’s First India Store Isn’t a Wal- Mart”, Time, 15 May 2009; available at: www.time. com and “Walmart: India Fact Sheet”, February 2011; available at: http://walmartstores.com. 16 See Franchise Malaysia, “Government to the fore”, available at www.ifranchisemalaysia.com. 17 This included an English skill enhancement programme for which funding was granted to support language training of individuals; and other initiatives such as tax incentives and concessions. See “Philippines call center industry enjoy the strong Government support”, available at: www.piton- global/resource16.html. 18 For instance, it has taken initiatives to improve human resources quality and has encouraged innovations to strengthen the development of the industry. Expenses on staff training and on development, including research and development can be deducted against income tax at 200 per cent and 160 per cent to 200 per cent, respectively. A 50 per cent excise tax deduction is provided for purchase of equipment for research and development. Companies established in technological parks will be exempted from property taxes and will receive discounts on service taxes. See Brasscom, “Brazil IT-BPO Book: 2008−2009”, (brazilexportati.files.wordpress.com) and Brasscom “Government Support”, (www.brasscom.org).
CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 175 19 See “Foxconn to hire more workers in China”, BBC News, 19 August 2010; available at: www.bbc. co.uk. 20 See NASSCOM, India (2010), “Impact of the IT-BPO industry in India: a decade in review”, available at: www.nasscom.in. 21 See “Chilean global services industry”, IDC Study for CORFO, 2009, available at: www.investchile.com. 22 See “IT-BPO Road Map 2011-2016” (www.bpap. org) and “IT-BPO road map 2011-2016: driving to global leadership”. 23 Information provided by Nestlé. 24 See “Contract farming offers fresh hope for Africa’s declining agriculture”, East Africa Policy Brief, No. 2, 2007 (www.worldagroforestry.org). 25 The Franchise Factor. Franchise directions, franchising consulting and trainings, by Bendeta Gordon (2008). Available at: www.franchize.co.za. 26 “IHG invests in China’s future hospitality talent with three new IHG academies”, 31 May 2011; IHG website at: www.ihgplc.com; and “IHG in Greater China - IHG Greater China Facts Sheet”, IHG website. 27 Fast food chains including McDonald’s, Taco Bell and Burger King have been criticized for underpayment to contracted tomato suppliers (contract farmers). In 2005 Florida tomato suppliers won their first wage rise since the 1970s after Taco Bell’s decision to end a consumer boycott by paying an extra cent per pound of tomatoes. Actions continue towards ensuring better conditions for contracted tomato suppliers (Schlosser, Eric (2007) “Penny foolish”, New York Times, 29 November. 28 For instance, in order to gain greater flexibility in responding to the sourcing requirements of TNCs’ contract manufacturers, services outsourcing firms and contract farmers increasingly hire short-term workers or outsource human resources to “temp agencies” (Barrientos, 2007; van Liemt, 2007). 29 Data as of 31 March 2011 www.saasaccreditation. org/certfacilitieslist.htm. 30 ISO (2010) ISO Survey for 2009. 31 Interview with Linda Johansson, head of inspections for HM India; http://somo.nl. The company applied a methodology for obtaining bona fide responses from workers. 32 See “Philippine IT-BPO road map 2016: driving to global leadership”, Everest Global and Outsource2Philippines; available at: www.ncc.gov. ph. 33 See “Auto parts cost strike JVs for technology, consolidation looms”, The Economic Times, 23 May 2011, available at: http://articles.economictimes. indiatimes.com. 34 Carl J. Kosnar, “Global economic development through the utilization of the franchising system”, www.kosnar.com. 35 Total exports from Guangdong province amounted to $22.2 billion, while total Chinese exports amounted to $1,577.9 billion (Ministry of commerce PRC). Toy exports from Guangdong province held a share of 58 per cent of total Chinese toy exports (Chinese Toy Association). 36 See “Bangladesh ranks fourth in global apparel exports”, The Daily Star, 25 July 2010. 37 This is expected to grow to $37 billion by 2011. Increasingly, companies such as Marks and Spencer, Haggar Clothing, Little Label, Boules Trading Company, Castle, Quest Apparel, Wal-Mart, JC Penny, Nautica, Docker and Target are sourcing textiles and apparels from India. See “Textiles and apparel”, IBEF, November 2010; www.ibef.org. 38 A share of goods for processing trade is due to intra-firm trade between affiliates or between parents and affiliates of the same TNC. 39 Calculated from UN Comtrade data. 40 “Segments”, IHG website at: www.ihgplc.com. This access is created by international chains’ brand reputation, international quality standards, centralized marketing and customer loyalty programmes, and in particular their global booking systems. In addition, they are able to negotiate directly with tour operators, large travel agencies and large companies and other organizations, thus generating preferred access to otherwise unreachable customer segments. 41 In fact, partly because licensees can possess significant absorptive capacity, there are risks for TNCs. In the case of MBD its largest customer, Hyundai Heavy Industries, with 26 per cent of MBD’s licensing deals, is now competing with it for market shares based on its own proprietary diesel engine (Pyndt and Pedersen, 2006). 42 7-Eleven, Inc. – Web Corporate Communication 2011. Available at: www.franchise.7-eleven.com. 43 For example, cooperatives and other associations in contract farming arrangements, albeit ostensibly tipping the balance of power against TNCs, are generally regarded favourably by the latter. 44 Examples of such companies include, Acer and HTC (both consumer electronics, Taiwan Province of China), Integrated Microelectronics Inc. (the Philippines), LG and DA Corporation (electronics, Republic of Korea), Piramal Health Care (India), Sonda (IT-BPO, Chile), Trinunggal Komara (garments, Indonesia), Varitronix (electronic displays, Hong Kong (China)) and Yue Yuen (footwear, Taiwan Province of China) (WIR06). 45 Other electronic contract manufacturers, especially Taiwanese, are also being granted an increasing number of patents – e.g. Inventec and Quanta – but the numbers they are assigned are a long way behind Hon Hai.
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development176 46 “IFI CLAIMS announces top global companies ranked by 2010 U.S. patents”; available at: www. ificlaims.com. 47 The other three are from the Republic of Korea. 48 Acer and AsusTek spun off their contract manufacturing arms as “Wistron” and “Pegatron” respectively. 49 However, there is also a significant market in renovated machinery (Rasiah, 2009). 50 Important local industries for wealth and job creation such as construction and real estate benefit from the growth of commercial and shopping centres based on the expansion of franchise networks. 51 In this framework, conflicts arise because of concern that foreign brands and products alter local consumers’ preferences or habits (i.e. losing touch with host-country culture and traditions) (Grünhagen, Witte and Pryor, 2010). 52 See, for instance, Magleby (2007). 53 Project Shakti was launched by Hindustan Lever (Unilever’s business in India) in 2000 to distribute its soaps and shampoos, by the end of 2009 employing some 45,000 “Shakti entrepreneurs”. See www.unilever.com. 54 Source: www.tourismpartnership.org. 55 This can occur through “crowding out” (where NEMs out-compete local firms which do not enjoy the advantages of transfers of knowledge and skills from TNCs), or its obverse, “crowding in”. 56 In Egypt, a new Ministry for Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) was established and assigned the mandate to upgrade the national telecommunication system to enhance Egypt’s insertion on global value chains. See the national strategy of Egypts’ Ministry for Communication and Information Technology (MCIT), available at: www. mcit.gov.eg. 57 In the Philippines, the government not only offered tax benefits for the relocation of business processing operations buy foreign companies, but it also established centers of excellence to support the training of its labor force. The industrial policy authorities also supported the creation of linkages through an “Industry Cluster” approach to enhance industrial competitiveness, promote investments in the countryside and develop micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. See the Philippines’ Department of Trade and Industry: www.dti.gov.ph/ dti. 58 The record of active credit support is mixed. While on the one hand subsidized finance does increase access to credit for SMEs, it does so at the risk of lower profitability and non-performance of borrowers (UNCTAD, 2001). 59 Because factoring relies less on collateral, it can assist access to finance for producers who are less creditworthy than their clients (often TNCs). It can also be particularly attractive in financial systems with weak commercial laws and enforcement (Klapper, 2006). 60 UNCTAD conducted a survey of 238 IPAs on their role in attracting NEMs. A total of 91 questionnaires were completed, representing an overall response rate of 38 per cent. Respondents included 27 IPAs from developed countries, 54 from developing countries and 10 from economies in transition (UNCTAD, forthcoming c). 61 See “Franchising overview” on the Austrade website available at: www.austrade.gov.au. 62 See a list of export promotion activities related to franchise at MATRADE’s website, available at: www. matrade.gov.my. 63 Richter, John (2009). “Ex-Im Bank: a valuable partner for ifa members seeking to export”, Franchising World, October; available at: www. franchise.org. 64 For a discussion of the criteria for determining a “covered investment” and the role of development considerations in this context, see UNCTAD (2011 d). 65 See MIGA’s website: www.miga.org. 66 While there is no international legally binding competition instrument, a series of non-binding instruments offer recommendations on the design of domestic competition laws (e.g. the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices or the UNCTAD Model Law on Competition). In terms of regional initiatives, European competition law stands out as supranational law directly applicably in EU Member States, but competition rules also exist in RTAs (UNCTAD, 2000).
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ANNEX TABLES 185 ANNEX TABLES I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005–2010.................................................................... 187 I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 ......................................................... 191 I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 ....... 195 I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 ...................................................................................................................... 199 I.5. Cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2005–May 2011 ................................................... 203 I.6. Number of cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2005–May 2011 ................................. 204 I.7. Cross-border MA deals worth over $3 billion completed in 2010 .................................... 205 I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 ......................... 206 I.9. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 ..................... 210 III.1. List of IIAs, as of end May 2011 ........................................................................................... 213 III.2. Selected MSI standards ........................................................................................................ 216 III.3. Selected industry association codes ................................................................................... 218 IV.1. Top 10 contract manufacturers in electronics, ranked by revenues, 2009 ......................... 219 IV.2. Top 10 auto parts contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009 .............................. 220 IV.3. Top 10 pharmaceutical contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009 ..................... 221 IV.4. Use of contract manufacturing by major garment and footwear brand owners, selected indicators, 2009 ...................................................................................................... 222 IV.5. Top 15 outsourcing IT-BPO service providers, ranked by revenues, 2009 ......................... 223 IV.6. Top 15 global franchise chains, ranked by revenues, 2009 ................................................ 224 IV.7. Top 10 global semiconductor foundry contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009 ...................................................................................................................... 225
186 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development List of annex tables available on the UNCTAD website, www.unctad.org/wir 1. FDI inflows, by region and economy, 1990–2010 2. FDI outflows, by region and economy, 1990–2010 3. FDI inward stock, by region and economy, 1990–2010 4. FDI outward stock, by region and economy, 1990–2010 5. FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 1990–2010 6. FDI outflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 1990–2010 7. FDI inward stock as percentage of gross domestic products, by region and economy, 1990–2010 8. FDI outward stock as percentage of gross domestic products, by region and economy, 1990–2010 9. Value of cross-border MA sales, by region/economy of seller, 1990–May 2011 10. Value of cross-border MA purchases, by region/economy of purchaser, 1990–May 2011 11. Number of cross-border MA sales, by region/economy of seller, 1990–May 2011 12. Number of cross-border MA purchases, by region/economy of purchaser, 1990–May 2011 13. Value of cross-border MA sales, by sector/industry, 1990–May 2011 14. Value of cross-border MA purchases, by sector/industry, 1990–May 2011 15. Number of cross-border MA sales, by sector/industry, 1990–May 2011 16. Number of cross-border MA purchases, by sector/industry, 1990–May 2011 17. Cross-border MA deals worth over $1 billion completed in 2010 18. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source, 2003–April 2011 19. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by destination, 2003–April 2011 20. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by sector/industry, 2003–April 2011 21. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source, 2003–April 2011 22. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by destination, 2003–April 2011 23. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by sector/industry, 2003–April 2011 24. Estimated world inward FDI stock, by sector and industry, 1990–2009 25. Estimated world outward FDI stock, by sector and industry, 1990–2009 26. Estimated world inward FDI flows, by sector and industry, 1990–1992 and 2007–2009 27. Estimated world outward FDI flows, by sector and industry, 1990–1992 and 2007–2009 28. Inward FDI Performance and Potential Index ranking, 1990–2010 29. The world’s top 100 non-financial TNCs, ranked by foreign assets, 2010 30. The top 100 non-financial TNCs from developing and transition economies, ranked by foreign assets, 2010 31. The top 50 financial TNCs, ranked by Geographical Spread Index (GSI), 2010 32. Outward FDI projects by State-owned TNCs, by home region/economy, 2003-2010 33. Outward FDI projects by State-owned TNCs, by sector and industry, 2003-2010 34. Number of parent corporations and foreign affiliates, by region and economy, latest available year
ANNEX TABLES 187 Annex table I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/economy FDI inflows FDI outflows 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 World 982 593 1 461 863 1 970 940 1 744 101 1 185 030 1 243 671 882 132 1 405 389 2 174 803 1 910 509 1 170 527 1 323 337 Developed economies 619 134 977 888 1 306 818 965 113 602 835 601 906 745 679 1 154 983 1 829 044 1 541 232 850 975 935 190 Europe 503 730 635 832 895 753 514 975 387 825 313 100 686 671 792 652 1 274 118 983 284 434 171 475 763 European Union 496 075 581 719 850 528 487 968 346 531 304 689 606 515 690 030 1 199 325 906 199 370 016 407 251 Austria 10 784 7 933 31 154 6 858 7 011 6 613 11 145 13 670 39 025 29 452 7 381 10 854 Belgium 34 370 58 893 93 429 142 041 23 595 61 714 32 658 50 685 80 127 164 314 - 21 667 37 735 Bulgaria 3 920 7 805 12 389 9 855 3 351 2 170 310 177 282 755 - 119 238 Cyprus 1 186 1 864 2 234 4 050 5 725 4 860 558 902 1 245 4 142 5 052 4 220 Czech Republic 11 653 5 463 10 444 6 451 2 927 6 781 - 19 1 468 1 620 4 323 949 1 702 Denmark 12 871 2 691 11 812 2 216 2 966 - 1 814 16 193 8 206 20 574 14 142 6 865 3 183 Estonia 2 869 1 797 2 725 1 731 1 838 1 539 691 1 107 1 746 1 114 1 549 133 Finland 4 750 7 652 12 451 - 1 035 - 4 4 314 4 223 4 805 7 203 9 297 3 831 8 385 France 84 949 71 848 96 221 64 184 34 027 33 905 114 978 110 673 164 310 155 047 102 949 84 112 Germany 47 439 55 626 80 208 4 218 37 627 46 134 75 893 118 701 170 617 77 142 78 200 104 857 Greece 623 5 355 2 111 4 499 2 436 2 188 1 468 4 045 5 246 2 418 2 055 1 269 Hungary 7 709 6 818 3 951 7 384 2 045 2 377 2 179 3 877 3 621 3 111 2 699 1 546 Ireland - 31 689 - 5 542 24 707 - 16 453 25 960 26 330 14 313 15 324 21 146 18 949 26 616 17 802 Italy 19 975 39 239 40 202 - 10 845 20 073 9 498 41 826 42 068 90 778 67 002 21 271 21 005 Latvia 707 1 663 2 322 1 261 94 349 128 170 369 243 - 62 16 Lithuania 1 028 1 817 2 015 2 045 172 629 346 291 597 336 217 128 Luxembourg 6 564 31 843 - 28 260 9 785 30 196 20 350 9 932 7 747 73 350 10 171 18 726 18 293 Malta 676 1 840 1 006 845 760 1 041 - 21 30 14 305 134 87 Netherlands 39 046 13 976 119 383 3 577 34 514 - 16 141 123 071 71 174 55 608 67 485 26 927 31 904 Poland 10 293 19 603 23 561 14 839 13 698 9 681 3 406 8 864 5 405 4 414 5 219 4 701 Portugal 3 930 10 902 3 055 4 665 2 706 1 452 2 111 7 139 5 490 2 741 816 - 8 608 Romania 6 483 11 367 9 921 13 910 4 847 3 573 - 31 423 279 277 - 86 193 Slovakia 2 429 4 693 3 581 4 687 - 50 526 150 511 600 530 432 328 Slovenia 588 644 1 514 1 947 - 582 834 641 862 1 802 1 390 167 151 Spain 25 020 30 802 64 264 76 993 9 135 24 547 41 829 104 248 137 052 74 717 9 737 21 598 Sweden 11 896 28 941 27 737 36 771 10 322 5 328 27 706 26 593 38 836 31 326 25 778 30 399 United Kingdom 176 006 156 186 196 390 91 489 71 140 45 908 80 833 86 271 272 384 161 056 44 381 11 020 Other developed Europe 7 655 54 113 45 225 27 006 41 294 8 411 80 156 102 622 74 793 77 085 64 155 68 512 Gibraltar 122 a 137 a 165 a 159 a 172 a 165 a - - - - - - Iceland 3 071 3 843 6 824 917 83 2 950 7 072 5 473 10 186 - 4 209 2 281 - 1 935 Norway 5 413 6 415 5 800 10 781 14 074 11 857 21 966 21 326 13 588 25 990 28 623 12 195 Switzerland - 951 43 718 32 435 15 149 26 964 - 6 561 51 118 75 824 51 020 55 305 33 251 58 253 North America 130 465 297 430 330 604 363 543 174 298 251 662 42 907 270 434 451 244 388 090 324 351 367 490 Canada 25 692 60 294 114 652 57 177 21 406 23 413 27 538 46 214 57 726 79 794 41 665 38 585 United States 104 773 237 136 215 952 306 366 152 892 228 249 15 369 224 220 393 518 308 296 282 686 328 905 Other developed countries - 15 060 44 626 80 460 86 595 40 712 37 144 16 101 91 897 103 682 169 858 92 454 91 937 Australia - 24 246 31 050 45 397 46 843 25 716 32 472 - 31 137 25 409 16 786 33 604 16 160 26 431 Bermuda 44 261 577 - 146 - 88 210 31 579 1 040 563 208 693 Israel 4 818 15 296 8 798 10 875 4 438 5 152 2 946 15 462 8 604 7 210 1 695 7 960 Japan 2 775 - 6 507 22 550 24 426 11 939 - 1 251 45 781 50 264 73 548 128 019 74 699 56 263 New Zealand 1 548 4 526 3 138 4 598 - 1 293 561 - 1 521 182 3 703 462 - 308 589 Developing economies 332 343 429 459 573 032 658 002 510 578 573 568 122 143 226 683 294 177 308 891 270 750 327 564 Africa 38 160 46 259 63 132 73 413 60 167 55 040 1 968 6 943 10 719 9 750 5 627 6 636 North Africa 12 236 23 143 24 775 24 045 18 468 16 926 287 134 5 545 8 751 2 543 3 384 Algeria 1 081 1 795 1 662 2 594 2 761 2 291 - 20 35 295 318 215 226 Egypt 5 376 10 043 11 578 9 495 6 712 6 386 92 148 665 1 920 571 1 176 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 1 038 2 013 4 689 4 111 2 674 3 833 a 128 - 534 3 933 5 888 1 165 1 282 a Morocco 1 654 2 449 2 805 2 487 1 952 1 304 a 75 445 622 485 470 576 a Sudan 2 305 3 534 2 426 2 601 2 682 a 1 600 a - 7 11 98 45 a 51 a Tunisia 783 3 308 1 616 2 758 1 688 1 513 13 33 20 42 77 74 Other Africa 25 924 23 116 38 357 49 367 41 699 38 114 1 681 6 809 5 173 999 3 084 3 252 West Africa 7 126 6 976 9 522 12 718 12 662 11 323 289 342 977 1 341 1 504 1 120 Benin 53 53 255 171 135 111 - 0 - 2 - 6 - 4 31 7 Burkina Faso 34 34 344 137 a 171 a 37 a - 0 1 0 0 a 1 a 0 a Cape Verde 82 131 190 209 119 111 - - 0 - 0 0 0 Côte d’ Ivoire 312 a 319 a 427 a 446 a 381 a 418 a 52 a - 27 a - 0 a 8 a - 7 a 0 a Gambia 45 71 76 70 47 37 a - - - - - - Ghana 145 636 855 1 220 1 685 2 527 - - - 9 7 8 Guinea 105 125 386 382 141 303 a - - - 126 a - a - a Guinea-Bissau 8 17 19 6 14 a 9 a 1 0 - 0 0 0 0 a Liberia 83 108 132 395 218 248 a 255 47 65 119 - 93 30 a Mali 225 82 65 180 a 109 a 148 a - 1 1 7 3 a 4 a 5 a Mauritania 814 106 138 338 - 38 14 a 2 5 4 4 4 4 a Niger 30 51 129 566 739 947 a - 4 - 1 8 a 24 a 10 a 14 a Nigeria 4 978 4 898 6 087 8 249 8 650 6 099 15 322 875 1 058 1 542 923 Saint Helena 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - - Senegal 52 210 273 a 272 a 208 a 237 a - 8 10 25 a 9 a 15 a 154 a Sierra Leone 83 59 97 53 a 33 a 36 a - 8 - - - - 5 a Togo 77 77 49 24 a 50 a 41 a - 15 - 14 - 1 - 16 a - 10 a - 31 a Central Africa 2 675 3 051 5 985 4 395 5 400 7 959 84 127 87 159 117 94 Burundi 1 0 1 a 14 a 10 a 14 a - - 0 - - - Cameroon 225 309 284 270 337 425 a - 9 - 1 - 2 2 a - 9 a 2 a Central African Republic 32 35 57 117 42 72 a - - - - - - Chad - 99 - 279 - 69 234 462 781 a - - - - - - /…
188 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005–2010 (continued) (Millions of dollars) FDI inflows FDI outflows Region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Congo 1 475 1 925 2 275 2 483a 2 083a 2 816a - - - - - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - 256 1 808 1 727 664 2 939 13 18 14 54 35 7 Equatorial Guinea 769 470 1 243 - 794 1 636 695a - - - - - - Gabon 242 268 269 209a 33a 170a 65a 106a 59a 96a 87a 81a Rwanda 14 31 82 103 119 42 - - 13 - - - São Tomé and Principe 16 38 35 33a 14a 3a 15 3 3 7a 4a 5a East Africa 1 424 2 588 4 085 3 667 3 638 3 728 91 42 112 109 89 153 Comoros 1 1 8a 8a 9a 9a - - - - - - Djibouti 22 108 195 229 100 27 - - - - - - Eritrea - 1 0 - 0 - 0 0 56a - - - - - - Ethiopia 265 545 222 109 221a 184a - - - - - - Kenya 21 51 729 96 141 133a 10 24 36 44 46 18a Madagascar 86 295 773 1 169 1 066 860 - - - - - - Mauritius 42 105 339 383 257 430 48 10 58 52 37 129 Mayotte 5 0 - - - - - - - - - - Seychelles 86 146 239 179 275 369a 33 8 18 13 5 6a Somalia 24a 96a 141a 87a 108a 112a - - - - - - Uganda 380 644 792 729 816 848 - - - - - - United Republic of Tanzania 494 597 647 679 645 700a - - - - - - Southern Africa 14 699 10 501 18 764 28 588 19 999 15 105 1 218 6 298 3 998 - 610 1 373 1 885 Angola 6 794 9 064 9 796 16 581 11 672 9 942 221 194 912 2 570 8 1 163a Botswana 279 486 495 528 579a 529a 56 50 51 - 91 - 65a - 38a Lesotho 57 89 97 56 48 55 - - - - - - Malawi 52 72 92 9 60a 140a 1 1 1 25 1a 1a Mozambique 108 154 427 592 893 789 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 3 1 Namibia 348 387 733 720 516 858 - 13 - 12 3 5 - 3 - 4 South Africa 6 647 - 527 5 695 9 006 5 365 1 553 930 6 063 2 966 - 3 134 1 151 450 Swaziland - 46 121 37 106 66 93a 21 1 - 23 8 - 7 8a Zambia 357 616 1 324 939 695 1 041 - - 86 - 270 289 Zimbabwe 103 40 69 52 105 105 1 0 3 8 20 15 Latin America and the Caribbean 78 082 98 459 169 514 206 733 140 997 159 171 33 999 68 129 61 731 80 580 45 544 76 273 South and Central America 72 198 69 833 108 701 126 163 75 772 111 103 19 645 43 603 23 412 37 374 13 471 47 062 South America 44 266 43 916 71 546 92 134 55 287 86 481 11 898 35 449 12 247 34 161 4 066 30 294 Argentina 5 265 5 537 6 473 9 726 4 017 6 337 1 311 2 439 1 504 1 391 712 964 Bolivia, Plurinational State of - 288 281 366 513 423 622 3 0 7 4 - 3 - 58 Brazil 15 066 18 822 34 585 45 058 25 949 48 438 2 517 28 202 7 067 20 457 - 10 084 11 519 Chile 6 984 7 298 12 534 15 150 12 874 15 095 2 183 2 172 2 573 8 041 8 061 8 744 Colombia 10 252 6 656 9 049 10 596 7 137 6 760 4 662 1 098 913 2 254 3 088 6 504 Ecuador 493 271 194 1 006 319 164 10 8 - 8 8 36 12 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - Guyana 77 102 152 178 144a 188a - - - - - - Paraguay 54 173 185 320 209 419 6 7 7 8 8 - 4 Peru 2 579 3 467 5 491 6 924 5 576 7 328 - - 66 736 398 215 Suriname 348 323 179 209 151 180a - - - - - - Uruguay 847 1 493 1 329 2 106 1 593 2 355 36 - 1 89 - 11 16 9 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 2 589 - 508 1 008 349 - 3 105 - 1 404 1 170 1 524 30 1 273 1 834 2 390 Central America 27 932 25 916 37 155 34 029 20 485 24 622 7 747 8 154 11 164 3 213 9 405 16 768 Belize 127 109 143 170 109 97 1 1 1 3 0 1 Costa Rica 861 1 469 1 896 2 078 1 347 1 413 - 43 98 263 6 7 9 El Salvador 511 241 1 551 903 366 78 - 113 26 - 95 - 80 - - Guatemala 508 592 745 754 600 687 38 40 25 16 26 24 Honduras 600 669 928 1 006 523 797 - 1 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 Mexico 24 122 20 052 29 734 26 295 15 334 18 679 6 474 5 758 8 256 1 157 7 019 14 345 Nicaragua 241 287 382 626 434 508 18 21 9 16 15 14 Panama 962 2 498 1 777 2 196 1 773 2 363 1 372 2 209 2 704 2 095 2 336 2 377 Caribbean 5 884 28 626 60 813 80 570 65 226 48 068 14 354 24 526 38 320 43 207 32 073 29 211 Anguilla 117 142 119 99 46 25 - - - - - - Antigua and Barbuda 221 359 338 174 118 105 0 - - - - - Aruba 101 565 - 127 200 73 161 - 9 - 13 30 3 1 4 Bahamas 912 1 159 1 164 1 103 657 977 - - - - - - Barbados 128 245 338 267 160 80a 9 44 82 3 - 80 2a British Virgin Islands - 9 090a 7 549a 31 443a 51 742a 42 100a 30 526a 6 380a 15 698a 29 339a 29 121a 25 742a 20 598a Cayman Islands 10 221a 14 963a 22 969a 18 749a 17 878a 12 894a 7 451a 8 333a 8 769a 13 333a 6 379a 8 539a Cuba 16a 26a 64a 24a 24a 86a - 2a - 2a - - - - Dominica 19 26 40 57 41 31 - - - - - - Dominican Republic 1 123 1 085 1 667 2 870 2 165 1 626 21 - 61 - 17 - 19 - 32 - 23 Grenada 70 90 152 142 103 89 - - - - - - Haiti 26 160 75 30 38 150 - - - - - - Jamaica 682 882 867 1 437 541 201a 101 85 115 76 61 67a Montserrat 1 4 7 13 3 2 - - - - - - Netherlands Antillesb 42 - 22 234 266 117 138 65 57 - 3 - 15 - 7 17 Puerto Rico 36 - - - - - - - - - - - /…
ANNEX TABLES 189 Annex table I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005–2010 (continued) (Millions of dollars) FDI inflows FDI outflows Region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Saint Kitts and Nevis 93 110 134 178 104 141 - - - - - - Saint Lucia 78 234 272 161 146 99 - - - - - - Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 40 109 131 159 106 92 - - - - - - Trinidad and Tobago 940 883 830 2 801 709 549 341 370 0 700 - - Turks and Caicos Islands 108a 58a 97a 99a 95a 97a - 3a 14a 5a 6a 9a 7a Asia and Oceania 216 101 284 741 340 387 377 857 309 414 359 357 86 176 151 611 221 727 218 560 219 579 244 656 Asia 215 834 283 463 339 252 375 665 307 527 357 846 86 051 151 566 221 688 218 436 219 500 244 585 West Asia 44 498 67 112 78 211 91 564 65 993 58 193 12 452 22 570 34 175 40 180 26 309 12 999 Bahrain 1 049 2 915 1 756 1 794 257 156 1 135 980 1 669 1 620 - 1 791 334 Iraq 515 383 972 1 856 1 452 1 426 89 305 8 34 116 52 Jordan 1 984 3 544 2 622 2 829 2 430 1 704 163 - 138 48 13 72 28 Kuwait 234 121 112 - 6 1 114 81 5 142 8 211 9 784 9 091 8 636 2 069 Lebanon 3 321 3 132 3 376 4 333 4 804 4 955 715 875 848 987 1 126 574 Oman 1 538 1 588 3 431 2 528 1 471 2 045 234 263 70 481 66 317 Palestinian Territory 47 19 28 52 265 115a 13 125 - 8 - 8 - 15 - 11a Qatar 2 500a 3 500a 4 700a 3 779 8 125 5 534a 352a 127a 5 160a 6 029a 11 584a 1 863a Saudi Arabia 12 097 17 140 22 821 38 151 32 100 28 105 - 350 - 39 - 135 3 498 2 177 3 907 Syrian Arab Republic 583 659 1 242 1 467 1 434 1 381a 80 - 11 2 2 - 3 0a Turkey 10 031 20 185 22 047 19 504 8 411 9 071 1 064 924 2 106 2 549 1 553 1 780 United Arab Emirates 10 900 12 806 14 187 13 724 4 003 3 948 3 750 10 892 14 568 15 820 2 723 2 015 Yemen - 302 1 121 917 1 555 129 - 329a 65a 56a 54a 66a 66a 70a South, East and South-East Asia 171 337 216 351 261 041 284 100 241 534 299 653 73 599 128 997 187 513 178 256 193 191 231 585 East Asia 116 189 131 829 151 004 185 253 161 096 188 291 51 907 85 402 114 391 133 173 142 941 174 283 China 72 406 72 715 83 521 108 312 95 000 105 735 12 261 21 160 22 469 52 150 56 530 68 000a Hong Kong, China 33 625 45 060 54 341 59 621 52 394 68 904 27 196 44 979 61 081 50 581 63 991 76 077 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 50a - 105a 67a 44a 2a 38a - - - - - - Korea, Republic of 7 055 4 881 2 628 8 409 7 501 6 873 6 359 11 175 19 720 20 251 17 197 19 230 Macao, China 1 240 1 608 2 305 2 591 2 770 2 558a 60 636 3 - 102 - 708 - 269a Mongolia 188 245 373 845 624 1 691 2 54 13 6 54 62 Taiwan Province of China 1 625 7 424 7 769 5 432 2 805 2 492 6 028 7 399 11 107 10 287 5 877 11 183 South Asia 14 411 27 821 34 297 51 901 42 458 31 954 3 524 14 812 17 709 19 897 16 405 15 079 Afghanistan 271 238 243 300 185 76 - - - - - - Bangladesh 845 792 666 1 086 700 913 3 4 21 9 29 15 Bhutan 9 6 78 28 15 12 - - - - - - India 7 622 20 328 25 350 42 546 35 649 24 640 2 985 14 285 17 234 19 397 15 929 14 626 Iran, Islamic Republic of 3 136 1 647 1 670 1 615 3 016 3 617 452 386 302 380 356 346 Maldives 53 64 91 135 112 164 - - - - - - Nepal 2 - 7 6 1 39 39a - - - - - - Pakistan 2 201 4 273 5 590 5 438 2 338 2 016 45 109 98 49 71 46 Sri Lanka 272 480 603 752 404 478 38 29 55 62 20 46 South-East Asia 40 737 56 701 75 740 46 947 37 981 79 408 18 169 28 782 55 413 25 185 33 845 42 223 Brunei Darussalam 289 434 260 239 370 496a 15 17 - 7a 16a 9a 6a Cambodia 381 483 867 815 539 783 11 12 5 24 18 17 Indonesia 8 336 4 914 6 928 9 318 4 877 13 304 3 065 2 726 4 675 5 900 2 249 2 664 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 28 187 324 228 319 350a - 0 39 1 - 75 1 6 Malaysia 4 065 6 060 8 595 7 172 1 430 9 103 3 076 6 021 11 314 14 965 7 930 13 329 Myanmar 236 428 715 976 579 756a - - - - - - Philippines 1 854 2 921 2 916 1 544 1 963 1 713 189 103 3 536 259 359 487 Singapore 15 460 29 348 37 033 8 588 15 279 38 638 11 218 18 809 32 702 - 256 18 464 19 739 Thailand 8 067 9 517 11 355 8 448 4 976 5 813 529 970 3 003 4 053 4 116 5 122 Timor-Leste 1a 8 9 40 50 280 - - - - - - Viet Nam 2 021 2 400 6 739 9 579 7 600 8 173a 65 85 184 300a 700a 853a Oceania 267 1 278 1 134 2 192 1 887 1 511 124 45 39 125 79 71 Cook Islands 1 3 - 0 1a 1a 1a 0 0 - - - - Fiji 160 370 376 354 114 129a 10 1 - 6 - 8 3 3a French Polynesia 8a 31a 58 14 10 26a 16a 10a 14a 30a 8a 16a Kiribati 5 1 1 3 3 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 Marshall Islands 7a 6a 12a 6a 8a 9a 54a - 8a - - - - Micronesia, Federated States of 0a 1a 17a 6a 8a 10a - - - - - - Nauru 1a - 0a 1a 1a 1a 1a - - - - - - New Caledonia - 7 749 417 1 673 1 146 1 003a 31 31 7 93 58a 49a Niue - 1 - - - - - 1a - 2a 4a 2a - 0a - Palau 1a 1a 3a 2a 2a 2a - 2 - - - - - Papua New Guinea 34 - 7 96 - 30 423 29 6 1 8 0 4 0 Samoa - 4 3 3 17 1 2 2 2 - 0 0 - 0 0 Solomon Islands 19 34 64 95 120 238 0 7 10 4 3 2 Tokelau 0 - - - - - - - - - - - Tonga 17 10 28 6 15 16a 5 2 2 2 2 - Tuvalu - 0a 5a 0a 2a 2a 2a - - - - - - Vanuatu 28 72 57 44 32 39 1 1 1 1 1 1 Wallis and Futuna Islands - 0a 1a 1a 1a 1a - - - - - - /…
190 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005-2010 (concluded) (Millions of dollars) FDI inflows FDI outflows Region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 South-East Europe and the CIS 31 116 54 516 91 090 120 986 71 618 68 197 14 310 23 723 51 581 60 386 48 802 60 584 South-East Europe 4 877 9 875 12 837 12 601 7 824 4 125 273 395 1 448 1 896 1 371 52 Albania 264 325 656 988 979 1 097 4 11 28 81 36 - 12 Bosnia and Herzegovina 613 766 2 080 932 246 63 0 4 28 13 - 9 47 Croatia 1 825 3 473 5 035 6 179 2 911 583 239 259 289 1 425 1 235 - 203 Montenegro 501 622 934 960 1 527 760 4 33 157 108 46 29 Serbia 1 577 4 256 3 439 2 955 1 959 1 329 22 88 947 283 52 189 The FYR of Macedonia 96 433 693 586 201 293 3 0 - 1 - 14 11 2 CIS 26 239 44 642 78 252 108 385 63 794 64 072 14 037 23 328 50 134 58 490 47 432 60 532 Armenia 239 453 699 935 778 577 7 3 - 2 10 53 8 Azerbaijan 1 680 - 584 - 4 749 14 473 563 1 221 705 286 556 326 232 Belarus 305 354 1 805 2 180 1 886 1 350 2 3 15 31 102 43 Georgia 453 1 170 1 750 1 564 658 549 - 89 - 16 76 70 - 1 6 Kazakhstan 1 971 6 278 11 119 14 322 13 771 9 961 - 146 - 385 3 153 1 204 3 118 7 806 Kyrgyzstan 43 182 209 377 190 234 0a 0a - 0a 0a - 0a 0a Moldova, Republic of 191 240 534 713 128 199 - 0 - 1 17 16 7 4 Russian Federation 12 886 29 701 55 073 75 002 36 500 41 194 12 767 23 151 45 916 55 594 43 665 51 697 Tajikistan 54 339 360 376 16 45a - - - - - - Turkmenistan 418 731 856 1 277 3 867a 2 083a - - - - - - Ukraine 7 808 5 604 9 891 10 913 4 816 6 495 275 - 133 673 1 010 162 736 Uzbekistan 192 174 705 711 711a 822a - - - - - - Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)c 14 831 20 888 26 083 33 030 26 538 26 390 555 393 1 234 3 049 441 1 819 Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)d 6 832 11 935 15 736 25 420 26 190 23 022 1 169 476 3 627 1 693 3 809 8 352 Small island developing states (SIDS)e 3 728 5 083 5 833 7 968 4 250 4 210 623 526 291 851 42 215 Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Estimates. b This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010. c Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. d Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. e Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
ANNEX TABLES 191 Annex table I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 (Millions of dollars) FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Region/economy 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 World 2 081 299 7 445 637 19 140 603 2 094 169 7 962 170 20 408 257 Developed economies 1 563 969 5 653 192 12 501 569 1 948 644 7 083 477 16 803 536 Europe 808 896 2 440 473 7 614 844 887 519 3 759 713 10 023 881 European Union 761 851 2 322 264 6 890 387 810 472 3 492 863 8 933 485 Austria 10 972 31 165 154 999 4 747 24 821 169 697 Belgium and Luxembourg 58 388 195 219 - 40 636 179 773 - Belgium .. .. 670 013 .. .. 736 725 Bulgaria 112 2 704 47 971 124 34 1 486 Cyprus ..a,b 2 846 29 530 8 557 20 600 Czech Republic 1 363 21 644 129 893 .. 738 15 523 Denmark 9 192 73 574 139 205a 7 342 73 100 194 948a Estonia .. 2 645 16 438 .. 259 5 779 Finland 5 132 24 273 82 706 11 227 52 109 130 617 France 97 814 390 953 1 008 378 112 441 925 925 1 523 046 Germany 111 231 271 613 674 217a 151 581 541 866 1 421 332a Greece 5 681 14 113 33 559 2 882 6 094 37 876 Hungary 570 22 870 91 933 159 1 280 20 685 Ireland 37 989 127 089 247 097 14 942 27 925 348 737 Italy 59 998 121 170 337 401 60 184 180 275 475 598 Latvia .. 2 084 10 838 .. 23 833 Lithuania .. 2 334 13 449 .. 29 2 092 Luxembourg .. .. 114 691a .. .. 137 575a Malta 465 2 385 9 866a .. 203 1 528a Netherlands 68 731 243 733 589 825 106 900 305 461 890 222 Poland 109 34 227 193 141 95 1 018 36 839 Portugal 10 571 32 043 110 241 900 19 794 64 253 Romania 0 6 953 70 012 66 136 1 486 Slovakia 282 4 762 50 678 .. 379 2 830 Slovenia 1 643 2 893 15 022 560 768 7 603 Spain 65 916 156 348 614 473 15 652 129 194 660 160 Sweden 12 636 93 995 348 667 50 720 123 256 336 086 United Kingdom 203 905 438 631 1 086 143 229 307 897 845 1 689 330 Other developed Europe 47 045 118 209 724 457 77 047 266 850 1 090 396 Gibraltar 263a 642a 1 903a - - - Iceland 147 497 11 771 75 663 10 504 Norway 12 391 30 265 171 833a 10 884 34 026 170 481a Switzerland 34 245 86 804 538 950 66 087 232 161 909 411 North America 652 444 2 995 951 4 012 516 816 569 2 931 653 5 459 459 Canada 112 843 212 716 561 111 84 807 237 639 616 134 United States 539 601 2 783 235 3 451 405 731 762 2 694 014 4 843 325 Other developed countries 102 629 216 769 874 209 244 556 392 111 1 320 196 Australia 80 364 118 858 508 123 37 505 95 979 402 249 Bermuda - 265a 3 266a - 108a 2 932a Israel 4 476 22 367 77 810 1 188 9 091 66 299 Japan 9 850 50 322 214 880 201 441 278 442 831 074 New Zealand 7 938 24 957 70 129 4 422 8 491 17 642 Developing economies 517 322 1 731 604 5 951 203 145 525 857 354 3 131 845 Africa 60 675 154 268 553 972 20 229 44 224 122 429 North Africa 23 962 45 728 206 067 1 836 3 281 23 562 Algeria 1 561 3 537 19 498 183 249 1 814 Egypt 11 043 19 955 73 095a 163 655 5 447a Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 678 451 19 342a 1 321 1 942 13 269a Morocco 3 011 8 842 42 023a 155 402 2 745a Sudan 55 1 398 20 743a - - - Tunisia 7 615 11 545 31 367 15 33 286 Other Africa 36 712 108 540 347 905 18 393 40 942 98 867 West Africa 14 013 33 401 95 396 2 202 6 699 6 793 Benin ..a,b 213 849 2 11 63a Burkina Faso 39a 28a 905a 4a 0a 11a Cape Verde 4a 192a 1 140 - - 1 Côte d’ Ivoire 975a 2 483 6 641a 6 9 23a Gambia 157a 216a 675a - - - Ghana 319a 1 605a 9 098a - - - Guinea 69a 263a 1 917a .. 7a 139a Guinea-Bissau 8a 38a 190a - - 3a Liberia 2 732a 3 247a 4 888a 846a 2 255a 960a Mali 229a 132a 1 234a 22a 22a 62a Mauritania 59a 146a 2 155a 3a 4a 27a Niger 286a 45a 2 310a 54a 117a 171a Nigeria 8 539a 23 786a 60 327a 1 219a 4 144a 5 041a Senegal 258a 295a 1 615a 47a 117a 364a Sierra Leone 243a 284a 495a - - - Togo 268a 427a 955a - 13a ..a,b /…
192 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 (continued) (Millions of dollars) FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Region/economy 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 Central Africa 3 808 5 733 38 835 372 648 1 039 Burundi 30a 47a 86a 0a 2a 2a Cameroon 1 044a 1 600a 4 828a 150a 254a 245a Central African Republic 95a 104a 369a 18a 43a 43a Chad 250a 576a 4 168a 37a 70a 70a Congo 575a 1 889a 15 983a - - - Congo, Democratic Republic of 546a 617 3 994 - - - Equatorial Guinea 25a 1 060a 7 374a 0a ..a,b 3a Gabon 1 208a ..a,b 1 438a 167a 280a 663a Rwanda 33a 55 435 - - 13 São Tomé and Principe 0a 11a 163a - - - East Africa 1 701 7 199 30 913 165 387 1 063 Comoros 17a 21a 58a - - - Djibouti 13a 40 878 - - - Eritrea ..a 337a 438a - - - Ethiopia 124a 941a 4 102a - - - Kenya 668a 931a 2 262a 99a 115a 306a Madagascar 107a 141 4 452 1a 10a 6a Mauritius 168a 683a 2 319a 1a 132a 504a Seychelles 213a 515 2 017 64a 130 247 Somalia ..a,b 4a 566a - - - Uganda 6a 807 5 853 - - - United Republic of Tanzania 388 2 778 7 966 - - - Southern Africa 17 191 62 208 182 762 15 653 33 208 89 971 Angola 1 024 7 978 25 028a 1 2 4 672a Botswana 1 309 1 827 1 299 447 517 448 Lesotho 83 330 1 129a 0 2 2a Malawi 228 358 961a - ..a,b 24a Mozambique 25 1 249 5 489 2 1 3 Namibia 2 047 1 276 5 290 80 45 57 South Africa 9 207 43 451 132 396a 15 004 32 325 81 127a Swaziland 336a 536a 902a 38a 87a 60a Zambia 2 655a 3 966a 8 515a - - 3 290a Zimbabwe 277a 1 238a 1 754a 80 234 288 Latin America and the Caribbean 111 377 502 012 1 722 278 57 645 204 515 732 781 South and Central America 103 311 424 209 1 307 203 56 014 115 170 406 071 South America 74 815 309 055 899 541 49 346 96 041 307 495 Argentina 9 085 67 601 86 685 6 057 21 141 29 841 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 1 026 5 188 6 869 7 29 21 Brazil 37 143 122 250 472 579 41 044 51 946 180 949 Chile 16 107 45 753 139 538 154 11 154 49 838 Colombia 3 500 11 157 82 420 402 2 989 22 772 Ecuador 1 626 6 337 11 815 18a 247a 324a Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 0a 58a 75a - - - Guyana 45a 756a 1 754a - 1a 2a Paraguay 418 1 325 3 105 134 214 238 Peru 1 330 11 062 41 849 122 505 3 319 Uruguay 671 2 088 14 830 186 138 304 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 3 865 35 480 38 022 1 221 7 676 19 889 Central America 28 496 115 154 407 662 6 668 19 129 98 576 Belize 89 301 1 243 20 43 51 Costa Rica 1 324 2 709 13 500 44 86 88 El Salvador 212 1 973 7 760 56 104 7 Guatemala 1 734 3 420 6 399 .. 93 382 Honduras 293 1 392 25 870 - - 168 Mexico 22 424 97 170 327 249a 2 672 8 273 66 152a Nicaragua 145 1 414 4 698 - 22a 169a Panama 2 275 6 775 20 945 3 876 10 507a 31 559a Caribbean 8 066 77 803 415 074 1 630 89 345 326 710 Anguilla 11a 231a 978a - - - Antigua and Barbuda 290a 619a 2 401a - - - Aruba 145 760 2 284 - 374 366 Bahamas 586a 2 988a 9 062a - - - Barbados 171a 308a 1 706a 23a 41a 98a British Virgin Islands 126a 32 093a 212 034a 875a 67 132a 239 252a Cayman Islands 1 749a 25 585a 133 967a 648a 20 788a 84 478a Cuba 2a 74a 317a - - - Dominica 66a 275a 590a - - - Dominican Republic 572a 1 673a 14 731a - - - Grenada 70a 348a 1 268a - - - Haiti 149a 95a 603a .. 2a 2a Jamaica 790a 3 317a 10 829a 42a 709a 288a Montserrat 40a 83a 118a - - - /…
ANNEX TABLES 193 Annex table I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 (continued) (Millions of dollars) FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Region/economy 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 Netherlands Antillesc 408a 277a 1 222a 21a 6a 106a Saint Kitts and Nevis 160a 487a 1 560a - - - Saint Lucia 316a 807a 2 110a - - - Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 48a 499a 1 312a - - - Trinidad and Tobago 2 365a 7 280a 17 424a 21a 293a 2 119a Turks and Caicos Islands 2a 4a 557a - - - Asia and Oceania 345 270 1 075 324 3 674 953 67 651 608 615 2 276 635 Asia 342 937 1 072 694 3 662 985 67 600 608 366 2 276 194 West Asia 31 194 60 465 575 214 8 674 16 564 161 029 Bahrain 552 5 906 15 154 719 1 752 7 883 Iraq ..a,b ..a,b 6 487a - - - Jordan 1 368 3 135 20 406 158 44 483 Kuwait 37 608 6 514 3 662 1 677 18 676 Lebanon 53 4 988 37 040 43 586 7 150 Oman 1 723a 2 577a 15 196 590a 611a 2 228 Palestinian Territory - 932a 1 551a - 809a 1 644a Qatar 63a 1 912a 31 428a .. 74a 25 712a Saudi Arabia 15 193 17 577 170 450 2 328 5 285 16 960 Syrian Arab Republic 154a 1 244a 8 715a 4a 107a 418a Turkey 11 150 19 209 181 901 1 150 3 668 23 802 United Arab Emirates 751a 1 069a 76 175a 14a 1 938a 55 560a Yemen 180a 1 336a 4 196a 5a 12a 513a South, East and South-East Asia 311 743 1 012 229 3 087 772 58 927 591 801 2 115 165 East Asia 240 645 716 103 1 888 390 49 032 504 301 1 586 468 China 20 691a 193 348 578 818a 4 455a 27 768a 297 600a Hong Kong, China 201 653a 455 469 1 097 620 11 920 388 380 948 494 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 572a 1 044a 1 475a - - - Korea, Republic of 5 186 43 738 127 047 2 301 21 497 138 984 Macao, China 2 809a 2 801 14 631a - - ..a,b Mongolia 0a 182a 4 512a - - 191a Taiwan Province of China 9 735a 19 521 64 288 30 356 66 655 201 228 South Asia 6 795 29 834 260 980 422 2 949 97 168 Afghanistan 12a 17a 1 625a - - - Bangladesh 477 2 162 6 072 45 69 100 Bhutan 2a 4a 160a - - - India 1 657 16 339 197 939 124 1 733 92 407 Iran, Islamic Republic of 2 039a 2 597a 27 600a .. 572a 2 555a Maldives 25a 128a 876a - - - Nepal 12a 72a 205a - - - Pakistan 1 892 6 919 21 494 245 489 1 727 Sri Lanka 679 1 596 5 008 8 86 380 South-East Asia 64 303 266 291 938 401 9 472 84 551 431 529 Brunei Darussalam 33a 3 867a 11 225a 0a 512a 681a Cambodia 38 1 580 5 958 .. 193 343 Indonesia 8 732a 25 060a 121 527a 86 6 940a 1 703a Lao People’s Democratic Republic 13a 588a 2 088a 1 26 ..a,b Malaysia 10 318 52 747 101 339 753 15 878 96 758 Myanmar 281a 3 211a 8 273a - - - Philippines 4 528a 18 156a 24 893a 406a 2 044a 6 582a Singapore 30 468 110 570 469 871a 7 808 56 755 300 010a Thailand 8 242 29 915 127 257a 418 2 203 25 454a Timor-Leste - - 342 - - - Viet Nam 1 650a 20 596a 65 628a - - - Oceania 2 333 2 630 11 967 51 249 441 Cook Islands 14a 34a 41a - - - Fiji 284a 356 2 256a 25a 39 41a French Polynesia 69a 139a 342a - - 122a Kiribati -a -a 20a - - 4a New Caledonia 70a 67a 5 354a - - - Niue -a 0a 7a - - - Palau -a 97a 129a - - - Papua New Guinea 1 582a 935a 1 745a 26a 210a 225a Samoa 9 53 51a - - 1a Solomon Islands -a 106a 654 - - 27 Tokelau -a 0a 1a - - - Tonga 1a 15a 115a - - - Tuvalu -a ..a,b 35a - - - Vanuatu -a 61a 450 - - 21 /…
194 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 (concluded) (Millions of dollars) FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Region/economy 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 South-East Europe and the CIS .. 60 841 687 832 .. 21 339 472 876 South-East Europe .. 5 682 76 414 .. 840 8 775 Albania .. 247 4 355a .. .. 145a Bosnia and Herzegovina .. 1 083 7 152a .. .. 82a Croatia .. 2 796 34 374 .. 824 4 154 Serbia .. 1 017 20 584 .. .. 3 928 Montenegro .. .. 5 456 .. .. 375 The FYR of Macedonia .. 540 4 493a .. 16 91a CIS .. 55 159 611 418 .. 20 499 464 101 Armenia 9a 513 4 206a .. 0 85a Azerbaijan .. 3 735 9 593 .. 1 5 790 Belarus .. 1 306 9 940 .. 24 205 Georgia .. 784 7 821 .. 92 155 Kazakhstan .. 10 078 81 352 .. 16 16 176 Kyrgyzstan .. 432 974 .. 33 1 Moldova, Republic of .. 449 2 837 .. 23 68 Russian Federation .. 32 204 423 150a .. 20 141 433 655a Tajikistan .. 136a 915a .. .. .. Turkmenistan .. 949a 8 186a .. .. .. Ukraine .. 3 875 57 985 .. 170 7 966 Uzbekistan .. 698 4 460a .. .. - Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)d 11 051 37 437 151 689 1 089 2 974 10 865 Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)e 7 471 35 896 169 599 844 1 448 27 144 Small island developing states (SIDS)f 7 166 20 102 60 634 202 1 555 3 576 Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Estimates. b Negative stock value. However, this value is included in the regional and global total. c This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010. d Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. e Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. f Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
ANNEX TABLES 195 Annex table I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) World 462 253 625 320 1 022 725 706 543 249 732 338 839 224 163 462 253 625 320 1 022 725 706 543 249 732 338 839 224 163 Developed economies 403 731 527 152 891 896 581 394 203 530 251 705 189 614 359 551 497 324 841 714 568 041 160 785 215 654 135 369 Europe 316 891 350 740 559 082 273 301 133 871 123 354 56 764 233 937 300 382 568 988 358 981 102 709 33 825 63 981 European Union 304 740 333 337 527 718 251 169 116 226 113 539 47 314 210 111 260 680 537 890 306 734 89 694 17 328 48 869 Austria 1 713 1 145 9 661 1 327 1 797 432 6 584 3 871 6 985 4 720 3 049 3 345 1 653 1 275 Belgium 4 277 1 794 961 2 491 12 089 9 406 799 4 067 3 640 8 258 30 146 - 9 638 - 238 - 176 Bulgaria 2 551 807 971 227 151 24 - 234 - - 5 7 2 9 - Cyprus 24 294 1 343 - 909 52 684 400 52 1 274 775 1 725 1 395 - 12 - 2 560 Czech Republic 6 196 1 154 107 5 169 2 669 - 457 468 579 812 846 34 1 608 - 17 - 552 Denmark 12 093 11 235 5 761 6 095 1 651 1 448 - 1 181 11 921 2 078 3 226 2 841 3 198 - 3 519 - 1 066 Estonia 82 3 - 57 110 28 3 92 16 179 - 4 - 0 4 - Finland 2 923 1 321 8 313 1 153 508 324 - 42 2 720 2 169 - 1 128 13 179 653 391 1 014 France 25 172 19 423 28 207 4 590 724 3 785 4 162 58 255 41 030 78 451 56 806 41 565 7 157 - 7 468 Germany 47 501 41 388 44 091 31 911 12 790 10 893 1 668 4 677 16 427 58 795 61 340 24 313 7 138 1 310 Greece 872 7 309 723 6 903 477 - 1 185 621 1 159 5 238 1 495 2 697 386 518 0 Hungary 2 470 2 337 721 1 559 1 853 213 1 707 415 1 522 1 41 0 465 17 Ireland 725 2 731 811 2 892 1 712 2 127 674 3 375 10 176 6 677 3 693 - 526 2 505 - 5 247 Italy 40 445 25 760 23 630 - 2 377 1 109 6 762 3 018 23 565 6 887 55 880 21 358 17 505 - 5 336 672 Latvia 9 11 47 195 109 72 - - - 4 3 - 30 40 - Lithuania 61 97 35 98 20 462 - 10 - - 30 31 - - - Luxembourg 7 989 35 005 7 339 - 3 570 444 2 083 - 6 847 15 539 22 631 8 109 3 382 2 998 - 21 147 Malta 12 517 - 86 - 13 315 - - 115 - - 25 - 235 - Netherlands 21 326 25 560 162 770 - 8 156 17 988 4 002 2 176 3 140 51 304 - 3 268 53 668 - 3 273 14 252 23 065 Poland 1 487 773 728 966 776 1 042 2 958 586 194 128 432 117 292 310 Portugal 1 648 537 1 715 - 1 279 504 2 208 984 - 1 612 644 4 023 1 164 1 236 - 8 885 2 426 Romania 1 851 5 324 1 926 993 314 148 11 - - - 4 7 24 - Slovakia 117 194 50 136 13 - - 493 - 142 - - - - - 18 Slovenia 148 15 57 418 - 332 - 47 29 74 320 251 - 50 - Spain 21 217 7 951 51 686 33 708 32 173 8 669 5 961 24 162 71 481 40 893 - 14 654 - 1 278 1 898 10 954 Sweden 7 892 15 228 4 563 18 770 1 098 1 439 2 711 11 606 3 199 32 390 6 108 9 024 - 128 - 4 668 United Kingdom 93 940 125 421 171 646 147 748 25 164 58 309 13 788 50 170 19 900 222 984 54 653 - 3 546 - 4 068 50 724 Other developed Europe 12 150 17 403 31 363 22 132 17 645 9 816 9 451 23 826 39 702 31 099 52 247 13 015 16 496 15 112 Andorra - 433 1 174 - - - - - - - - - - - 136 Faeroe Islands - - - 0 - 85 - - - - - - - - Gibraltar 4 - 50 212 - - - 13 404 116 1 253 - 1 757 Guernsey - - 31 17 260 427 - 667 1 424 1 144 556 4 001 8 425 2 333 Iceland 12 39 - 227 - - 14 - 3 714 2 171 4 664 737 - 317 - 221 - 881 Isle of Man 606 - 221 35 66 157 129 489 990 720 319 136 858 - 325 Jersey 32 254 816 251 414 52 - - 1 561 96 814 - 829 844 1 234 81 Liechtenstein - - - - - - - - 154 270 - 1 - - Monaco - - 437 - - - - - 455 - 13 - - 100 100 0 Norway 4 568 4 289 7 831 14 997 1 630 7 171 6 318 6 994 9 465 10 641 6 102 611 - 4 084 3 016 Switzerland 7 361 11 647 22 206 6 620 15 275 1 910 3 004 13 966 25 010 12 729 45 362 7 385 10 184 8 994 North America 79 865 165 591 265 866 262 698 51 475 94 737 136 322 94 088 138 576 226 646 114 314 40 477 118 670 57 873 Canada 12 464 37 841 100 888 35 253 11 389 14 470 19 516 8 000 20 848 46 751 44 141 16 718 32 328 14 313 United States 67 401 127 750 164 978 227 445 40 085 80 267 116 806 86 088 117 729 179 895 70 173 23 760 86 342 43 560 Other developed countries 6 975 10 821 66 948 45 395 18 185 33 613 - 3 472 31 525 58 366 46 080 94 747 17 598 63 159 13 515 Australia 2 070 10 508 44 222 33 530 22 206 26 530 - 5 871 26 602 31 949 43 439 18 454 - 2 981 15 323 3 987 Bermuda 1 613 1 083 1 424 850 820 - 405 - 400 503 - 40 691 4 507 3 248 5 330 - 2 045 Israel 1 223 8 061 684 1 363 803 1 024 406 403 9 747 8 408 11 316 167 6 453 835 Japan 662 - 11 683 16 538 9 251 - 5 771 6 675 1 469 5 012 16 966 30 346 56 379 17 440 31 016 9 506 New Zealand 1 407 2 853 4 081 401 126 - 211 524 - 892 - 799 4 578 4 092 - 275 5 037 1 232 Developing economies 63 801 89 163 100 381 104 812 39 077 82 813 25 473 68 680 114 922 144 830 105 849 73 975 96 947 25 395 Africa 8 685 11 181 8 076 21 193 5 140 7 608 454 14 494 15 913 9 891 8 216 2 702 3 184 3 316 North Africa 3 351 6 773 2 182 16 283 1 475 1 141 - 12 892 5 633 1 401 4 665 1 004 1 470 - Algeria - 18 - 82 - - - - - - 47 - - - - Egypt 1 478 2 976 1 713 15 895 993 195 - 12 892 5 633 1 448 4 613 76 1 091 - Libyan Arab Jamahiriya - 1 200 307 145 91 - - - - 51 601 377 - Morocco 1 438 133 269 - 125 333 846 - - - - - 324 - - Sudan 390 1 332 - - - - - - - - - - - - Tunisia 46 2 313 - 122 4 9 - - - - - 3 2 - Other Africa 5 334 4 408 5 894 4 910 3 665 6 467 454 1 603 10 279 8 490 3 551 1 697 1 714 3 316 Angola 175 1 - - 475 - 471 1 300 - - - - 60 - - - - Botswana - 57 1 - 50 - 14 88 - - 3 - - - Burkina Faso - 289 - 20 - - - - - - - - - - Cameroon - - - 1 - - 0.2 - - - - - - - Cape Verde - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - /…
196 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (continued) (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Congo 13 20 - 435 - - - - - - - - - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - - - - 5 175 - - - - 45 - - - - Equatorial Guinea - - - - 2 200 - - - - - - - - - - Eritrea - - - - - 12 - - - - - - - - Ethiopia - - - - - - - 18 - - - - - - - Gabon - - 82 - - - - - - - 16 - - - - Ghana - 3 122 900 - - - - - - - - 1 - Guinea 0.1 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - Kenya 32 2 396 - - - 18 12 - - 18 - - - Liberia - - - - - 587 - - - - - - - - Madagascar - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - Malawi - - 5 - 0.5 0.1 - - - - - - - - Mali - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - Mauritania - - 375 - - - - - - - - - - - Mauritius - 25 268 - 26 27 203 1 - 265 232 89 206 191 - 50 - Mozambique - 34 2 - - 35 21 - - - - - - - Namibia 7 181 2 15 59 8 40 - - - - - - - Nigeria 25 4 883 490 - 597 - 241 296 119 - - - 418 - - - Rwanda - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - Senegal - - - - - - 457 - 22 - - - - - - Seychelles - - 89 49 - 19 - 115 - 0 66 - 11 0 Sierra Leone - - 31 40 - 13 - - - - - - - - South Africa 5 092 - 1 336 4 301 6 676 4 215 3 943 232 1 604 10 046 8 541 2 817 1 491 1 488 3 316 Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 - Togo - - - - - - - - - - 20 - - - Uganda - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 257 - United Republic of Tanzania - - - - 2 60 - - - - - - - - Zambia 8 4 - 1 11 272 - 29 - 25 - 16 2 - Zimbabwe 7 - - 7 6 - 27 - 0 1 - 44 1 - - - Latin America and the Caribbean 14 563 12 768 20 648 15 452 - 4 358 29 481 9 024 10 013 28 064 40 195 2 466 3 740 15 710 5 979 South America 8 427 4 503 13 697 8 121 - 5 342 18 026 8 240 2 513 19 923 13 152 4 765 3 104 11 686 2 592 Argentina 358 344 877 - 3 283 111 3 457 - 1 079 - 173 160 569 274 - 77 92 200 Bolivia, Plurinational State of - - 39 - 77 24 - 0 - - - - - - - - Brazil 2 993 2 637 6 539 7 568 - 1 369 8 874 11 006 2 505 18 629 10 785 5 243 2 501 7 757 3 384 Chile - 779 447 1 480 3 234 829 1 642 - 131 - 80 431 466 - 88 55 544 244 Colombia 5 775 1 319 4 303 - 57 - 1 633 - 1 594 - 2 029 258 697 1 384 16 211 3 210 315 Ecuador - 21 29 0 6 356 72 - - - 0 - - 2 Guyana - - 3 1 1 - 3 - - - - - - - Paraguay - - 10 4 - 60 - 1 - - - - - - - - Peru 55 53 1 135 293 38 684 329 3 6 195 679 416 77 34 Uruguay 0 164 157 8 3 448 70 - - - - - 7 13 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 26 - 443 - 760 329 - 3 268 4 158 - - - - 248 - 1 358 - 2 - - 1 600 Central America 3 903 2 898 4 889 2 899 153 8 854 166 3 140 3 699 17 452 - 1 053 3 434 3 324 3 899 Belize - - - 0.4 - 1 - - 4 - 43 - 2 - - Costa Rica 59 294 - 34 405 - 5 - - 97 642 - - - - El Salvador 441 173 835 - 30 43 103 15 370 - - - - - Guatemala 10 - 2 5 145 - 650 - 1 317 140 - - - - Honduras - - 140 - - 1 - - - - - - - - Mexico 2 899 874 3 717 2 304 104 7 990 9 3 036 2 750 18 226 - 463 3 247 3 306 3 453 Nicaragua - 2 - - - 1 - 4 - - - - - - - Panama 493 1 557 226 44 20 164 50 88 160 - 1 512 - 591 185 17 446 Caribbean 2 232 5 367 2 061 4 432 832 2 601 619 4 359 4 442 9 592 - 1 245 - 2 799 701 - 512 Anguilla - - - - - - - 71 - 1 - 30 - - 10 - Antigua and Barbuda 160 85 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Aruba 1 468 - - - - - - - - - - - - Bahamas - 3 027 - 41 - 82 212 - 146 - 411 2 693 537 11 112 - Barbados - 999 1 207 - 413 - 166 - 3 3 - - - British Virgin Islands 524 19 559 980 242 432 275 2 086 2 900 5 017 - 1 635 - 1 579 - 700 2 264 Cayman Islands 449 49 - 969 - 84 92 1 800 1 563 2 047 2 079 - 1 237 759 - 3 929 Dominican Republic - 427 42 - 0.4 1 39 - - 93 - 25 - 31 - Haiti - - - - 1 59 - - - - - - - - Jamaica - 0.2 67 595 - - - - 1 158 3 13 28 1 - Netherlands Antillesc 43 10 - - 2 19 - - 20 350 - - - 30 - 156 3 Puerto Rico 1 085 216 862 - 587 1 037 1 512 - 216 - 261 - 2 454 13 665 - Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.3 - /…
ANNEX TABLES 197 Annex table I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (continued) (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Trinidad and Tobago - 30 - - 2 236 - - - - 129 97 - 2 207 - 10 - - US Virgin Islands - - - - - 473 - 21 - - - 4 - 1 150 Asia 40 537 65 250 71 423 68 909 38 291 36 706 15 991 44 023 70 792 94 469 94 398 67 310 77 962 16 100 West Asia 13 358 22 431 22 602 16 287 3 543 4 617 3 969 19 983 35 350 40 103 22 099 26 843 - 15 560 - 2 487 Bahrain 85 - 410 190 178 - 452 - 4 514 4 275 1 002 4 497 323 - 3 319 - 1 810 Iraq - - - 34 - - - - - 33 - - - - Jordan 89 750 440 773 108 - 103 - - 4 45 322 - - 34 - Kuwait - 13 3 963 496 - 55 473 3 725 1 345 1 416 2 147 124 - 10 810 1 097 Lebanon 236 5 948 - 153 108 - 642 - 103 716 210 - 233 283 0.3 142 Oman 116 1 621 10 - 386 - 6 5 79 601 893 - 529 172 Qatar - - - 124 298 13 - 352 127 5 160 6 029 10 266 865 - 1 200 Saudi Arabia - 21 125 102 42 264 216 6 603 5 405 15 780 1 442 121 422 - 129 Syrian Arab Republic - - - - - 41 - - - - - - - - Turkey 12 771 15 340 16 415 13 238 2 849 2 053 3 574 199 356 767 1 313 - 2 538 United Arab Emirates 61 53 856 1 225 300 376 176 7 481 23 117 15 611 5 983 14 831 - 2 157 - 1 297 Yemen - 716 144 - - 20 - - - - - - - - South, East and South- East Asia 27 179 42 819 48 822 52 622 34 748 32 089 12 022 24 041 35 441 54 365 72 298 40 467 93 521 18 587 East Asia 20 998 25 456 23 390 17 226 15 741 16 144 3 097 12 597 21 163 - 667 39 888 35 851 53 089 - 7 070 China 7 207 11 298 9 332 5 375 10 898 5 965 2 825 3 653 12 090 - 2 282 37 941 21 490 29 201 13 476 Hong Kong, China 5 449 9 106 7 102 8 707 3 028 12 024 264 8 195 8 003 - 7 980 - 1 048 7 461 14 455 - 1 325 Korea, Republic of 5 165 - 161 46 1 194 1 956 - 2 169 - 64 194 1 057 8 646 3 882 6 951 9 915 1 863 Macao, China 67 413 133 593 - 57 33 34 0 - - 0 - 580 52 - Mongolia - 2 7 - 344 65 55 - - - 106 - 24 - - Taiwan Province of China 3 110 4 798 6 770 1 356 - 429 227 - 17 554 14 949 - 993 552 - 533 316 South Asia 738 7 883 5 371 12 654 6 094 5 556 1 170 1 877 6 745 29 096 13 488 291 26 434 - 2 005 Bangladesh - 330 4 - 9 10 - - - - - - 1 - Iran, Islamic Republic of - - - 695 - - - - - - - - - - India 526 4 424 4 405 10 427 6 049 5 537 886 1 877 6 715 29 083 13 482 291 26 421 74 Maldives - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - 3 - Nepal - - 15 - 13 - - - - - - - - - - Pakistan 207 3 139 956 1 147 - - 0 247 - 30 - - - 15 - Sri Lanka 5 4 6 370 36 9 36 - - 12 6 - - - South-East Asia 5 443 9 480 20 061 22 743 12 913 10 389 7 755 9 567 7 533 25 936 18 922 4 325 13 998 - 1 167 Brunei Darussalam - 0 0 - 3 - - - 112 - - 10 - - Cambodia - 9 6 30 - 336 5 - - - - - - - 0 Indonesia 6 171 388 1 706 2 070 1 332 1 667 4 496 290 - 85 826 913 - 2 590 893 74 Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - - - - 110 5 - - - - - - - Malaysia 1 141 2 509 6 976 2 781 354 3 441 734 1 946 2 664 3 654 9 751 3 277 2 306 858 Myanmar - - - 1 - - 0 - - - - 1 010 - - - - - Philippines - 5 180 - 134 1 165 2 621 1 291 30 661 1 829 190 - 2 514 - 174 - 7 25 30 Singapore 3 933 2 908 7 426 14 240 9 693 4 578 1 162 5 706 5 566 23 916 6 992 2 762 7 851 2 139 Thailand - 632 3 771 2 372 142 346 457 388 - 203 88 54 1 416 872 2 864 1 083 Viet Nam 10 29 412 859 230 101 308 - 8 - 25 - 59 - Oceania 16 - 36 234 - 742 4 9 019 4 150 154 275 770 224 91 - Cook Islands - - - - - - - - - - - 50 - - Fiji 1 - 12 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - French Polynesia - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - Guam - 72 - - - - - 150 - - - - - - Marshall Islands - - 45 - - - - - - - - 0.3 - - Nauru - - - - - - - - 3 - - - 172 - - New Caledonia - - 100 - - - - - 3 - - - - - - Niue 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - Papua New Guinea 9 7 160 - 758 0 9 018 4 - - 275 1 051 - - 4 - Samoa - - 18 3 13 - - - - 64 - - 324 - 95 - Solomon Islands - - 14 - - - - - - - - - - - Tuvalu - - - - - - - - - - 43 - - - Vanuatu - 3 - - 4 - - - - - - - - - South-East Europe and the CIS - 5 279 9 005 30 448 20 337 7 125 4 321 9 076 6 188 2 940 21 729 20 167 7 432 9 698 2 352 South-East Europe 955 3 942 2 192 767 529 266 97 - 654 - 2 092 1 039 - 4 - 167 325 - Albania 7 41 164 3 146 - - - - - - - - - Bosnia and Herzegovina 21 79 1 022 2 8 - - - - - - - - - Croatia 360 2 530 674 204 - 201 84 - 125 3 - 2 8 325 - /…
198 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (concluded) (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Montenegro - 7 0.1 - 362 - - - - 4 - - - - Serbia - 582 280 501 10 19 13 - - 1 898 860 - 7 - 174 - - Serbia and Montenegro 549 419 - - 3 - - - - - - - - - The FYR of Macedonia 0 280 53 57 - 46 - - - - - - - - Yugoslavia (former) 17 5 - - - - - - 529 - 198 175 - - - - CIS - 6 234 5 064 28 256 19 570 6 596 4 056 8 979 6 842 5 032 20 691 20 171 7 599 9 373 2 352 Armenia 4 - 423 204 30 - 26 - - - - - - - Azerbaijan - - - 2 - 0.2 - - - - 519 - - - Belarus 4 - 2 500 16 - 649 - - - - - - - - Georgia 232 115 53 104 14 30 - - - - - - - 0 - 10 Kazakhstan 1 474 - 1 751 727 - 242 1 322 101 137 430 1 503 1 833 2 047 - 254 - Kyrgyzstan 155 - 179 - - 44 - - - - - - - - Moldova, Republic of - 10 24 4 - - - 9 - - - - - - - Russian Federation - 14 547 6 319 22 529 13 507 5 079 2 907 7 502 6 029 3 507 18 598 16 634 7 599 9 082 2 346 Tajikistan 12 - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - Turkmenistan 47 - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ukraine 6 386 261 1 816 5 933 147 322 1 324 383 23 260 972 - 37 16 Uzbekistan - 110 - 42 4 1 - - - - - - - - Unspecified - - - - - - - 24 613 10 134 11 981 12 486 7 528 16 192 61 046 Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)d 573 2 688 584 - 2 552 - 774 2 201 8 51 - 946 - 80 - 261 16 354 - Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)e 1 707 - 1 052 1 357 144 1 708 639 237 546 1 504 1 814 2 676 - 8 518 - Small island developing states (SIDS)f 115 4 438 920 1 824 31 9 735 217 - 263 141 3 061 1 803 393 161 - Source: UNCTAD cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Net sales by the region/economy of the immediate acquired company. b Net purchases by region/economy of the ultimate acquiring company. c This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010. d Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. e Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. f Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net cross-border MA sales in a host economy = Sales of companies in the host economy to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the host economy; net cross-border MA purchases by a home economy = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.
ANNEX TABLES 199 Annex table I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) World 5 004 5 747 7 018 6 425 4 239 5 405 2 036 5 004 5 747 7 018 6 425 4 239 5 405 2 036 Developed economies 3 805 4 326 5 187 4 603 2 920 3 638 1 420 3 741 4 446 5 443 4 732 2 666 3 644 1 484 Europe 2 271 2 531 2 955 2 619 1 476 1 944 804 2 109 2 519 3 117 2 853 1 522 1 989 737 European Union 2 108 2 354 2 717 2 419 1 344 1 780 718 1 828 2 216 2 782 2 548 1 328 1 723 662 Austria 57 44 48 30 19 31 11 62 77 104 75 42 36 13 Belgium 64 87 81 86 50 77 22 49 63 77 61 15 21 13 Bulgaria 29 29 30 28 14 4 - 1 2 2 6 3 1 2 Cyprus - 5 17 32 22 23 13 3 23 21 46 160 273 53 Czech Republic 31 53 54 72 29 26 13 7 14 12 10 6 9 3 Denmark 90 90 89 75 39 85 22 112 85 82 102 43 43 9 Estonia 13 10 13 19 5 8 6 3 8 10 4 - 3 4 Finland 53 68 91 52 25 37 18 56 66 66 109 32 58 26 France 222 224 232 178 101 155 56 253 265 404 381 191 219 87 Germany 374 426 434 337 169 185 108 226 229 264 286 196 147 82 Greece 9 11 9 13 15 - 1 1 13 20 17 27 7 1 2 Hungary 20 46 27 26 8 20 4 8 13 14 10 5 2 - Ireland 42 49 76 62 41 36 13 48 94 128 82 32 33 17 Italy 118 111 140 150 85 113 55 52 59 121 119 45 55 15 Latvia 14 10 17 14 4 15 4 1 1 4 - 1 - 4 - Lithuania 14 18 17 18 4 7 - 1 3 2 2 7 2 4 1 Luxembourg 11 12 20 10 10 12 4 26 39 42 53 34 33 17 Malta 3 3 2 - 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 Netherlands 126 88 163 116 74 107 54 91 146 173 221 104 165 53 Poland 44 49 55 43 48 62 20 15 8 30 28 3 21 5 Portugal 37 29 32 11 15 8 7 10 16 25 36 20 18 2 Romania 41 44 48 38 18 17 8 - 1 - 1 7 3 6 - Slovakia 13 12 15 14 6 7 1 2 2 1 7 2 5 - Slovenia 5 7 8 6 2 3 - 6 7 6 4 4 5 - 1 Spain 81 148 162 193 147 150 54 82 109 156 106 50 54 13 Sweden 115 144 148 164 73 117 42 154 185 207 161 94 167 69 United Kingdom 482 537 689 632 317 474 181 544 681 814 600 231 336 176 Other developed Europe 163 177 238 200 132 164 86 281 303 335 305 194 266 75 Andorra - 1 1 - - - - - - 1 - 1 1 2 2 Faeroe Islands 1 - - 1 - 1 - - - 1 - - 1 - Gibraltar 2 1 2 1 - 1 - - 1 3 3 1 3 - 3 Guernsey - 2 6 3 6 6 - 5 14 21 20 11 32 - Iceland 5 3 1 - - 3 - 47 50 38 4 - 11 - 15 - 2 Isle of Man 7 4 3 4 3 4 1 11 14 25 5 3 14 - 1 Jersey 3 3 7 6 4 5 - 4 18 28 13 8 17 5 Liechtenstein - 2 1 - - 1 - - 1 1 1 3 - - Monaco 1 - 4 1 - 2 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 2 2 1 Norway 78 81 93 86 53 87 40 82 84 93 84 41 53 14 Switzerland 67 80 121 98 66 55 44 131 119 125 174 133 160 53 North America 1 200 1 380 1 717 1 491 1 013 1 228 487 1 234 1 458 1 667 1 436 888 1 301 578 Canada 252 324 420 374 303 344 130 337 395 426 351 306 422 196 United States 948 1 056 1 297 1 117 710 884 357 897 1 063 1 241 1 085 582 879 382 Other developed countries 334 415 515 493 431 466 129 398 469 659 443 256 354 169 Australia 180 229 252 306 283 305 87 209 246 363 153 58 107 52 Bermuda 6 8 7 8 5 8 - 11 8 28 31 9 2 8 Israel 25 35 31 30 16 22 6 38 49 59 42 22 34 11 Japan 44 57 106 99 85 98 16 126 137 161 185 160 192 90 New Zealand 79 86 119 50 42 33 20 14 28 48 32 7 19 8 Developing economies 1 062 1 219 1 552 1 501 975 1 290 501 765 839 1 047 1 011 746 1 061 360 Africa 72 107 116 106 58 75 44 54 53 60 47 56 60 13 North Africa 21 25 20 23 15 14 4 6 16 11 8 14 13 1 Algeria 2 5 2 4 1 - - - 1 - 1 - - 1 - Egypt 11 14 9 11 3 9 3 4 14 8 6 5 8 1 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 2 1 1 1 2 2 - 1 - 2 1 3 3 - Morocco - 1 1 4 2 7 - 1 1 1 2 1 3 - - Sudan 3 2 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - Tunisia 4 2 3 4 2 3 - - - - - 3 1 - Other Africa 51 82 96 83 43 61 40 48 37 49 39 42 47 12 Angola 1 2 1 - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - Benin - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - Botswana 1 1 4 1 1 1 2 1 - 1 - 3 1 1 - /…
200 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (continued) (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Burkina Faso - 1 - 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - Burundi - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Cameroon 1 1 - 2 - - 1 1 - - - - - - - Cape Verde 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Congo 1 4 - 1 1 1 - - - - - - - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - - 2 - 2 1 - - - - 2 - - - - Equatorial Guinea - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Gabon - 1 3 2 - - - - - - 1 - - - - Ghana 1 2 5 3 2 - - - - - - - 1 - Guinea 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - Kenya 3 2 2 5 - 1 3 2 4 4 3 1 2 1 Liberia - 1 - - - 3 - - - - - - - - Madagascar - 3 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Malawi - - 2 - 1 1 - - - - - - - - Mali - 2 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Mauritania - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Mauritius 3 4 2 5 5 9 3 14 12 6 6 10 5 1 Mozambique - 5 2 - - 4 2 - - - - - - 1 - Namibia 2 2 7 2 3 1 1 - - - - 1 - - Nigeria 2 5 1 - - 2 2 4 2 - 1 1 4 1 - - Reunion - - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - Rwanda - 1 3 2 - - - - - - - - - - Senegal 1 - 1 1 - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - Seychelles - - 2 1 - 1 - 3 - 2 - 1 - 1 3 2 Sierra Leone - - 1 3 - 1 - - - - - - - - South Africa 24 34 41 37 22 27 23 26 22 38 22 29 33 7 Swaziland 1 - 2 - - - - - - - - - 1 - Togo - - - - - - - - 1 - - 2 - - - Uganda 2 2 5 3 1 1 1 - - 1 - - 1 - United Republic of Tanzania - 4 2 2 3 1 - - - - - - - - Zambia 3 3 - 5 2 4 - 1 1 1 - 1 1 - Zimbabwe 2 - 5 2 2 - - - 1 2 - - - - - Latin America and the Caribbean 147 250 425 378 221 400 161 80 132 174 146 116 192 68 South America 77 135 265 266 130 250 116 24 39 67 63 37 92 39 Argentina 5 40 43 44 11 41 20 - 3 - 1 3 - 5 6 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 1 - 2 2 - - 1 - - - 1 - 1 - - Brazil 37 54 126 116 44 112 43 15 20 35 50 19 36 15 Chile 9 14 20 31 29 21 11 3 7 13 1 3 23 5 Colombia 13 13 26 30 22 36 19 3 4 16 2 8 14 6 Ecuador 1 6 9 2 7 8 3 - 1 - 1 - - 1 Guyana - 1 1 1 1 1 4 - - - - - - - Paraguay - - 2 5 - 1 2 1 - - - - 1 - - Peru 3 8 30 28 24 28 9 - 2 1 6 4 13 5 Suriname - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - Uruguay 2 - 6 4 3 6 3 2 - - - - 1 2 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 5 - 1 - 1 3 - 10 - 4 2 - 2 2 - 1 - - 1 Central America 37 79 97 64 39 86 27 27 42 38 19 34 37 18 Belize - - - 1 1 1 - - 2 1 - 1 1 5 11 - 1 Costa Rica 3 2 2 7 3 4 1 2 3 3 2 - 1 - 2 El Salvador 4 4 5 - 3 5 1 1 13 - - - - - Guatemala 2 - 3 4 2 2 - 5 9 3 1 3 - - Honduras 1 1 2 - - 1 - - - - - - - - Mexico 23 67 75 46 26 59 18 17 14 28 16 22 20 17 Nicaragua 1 2 1 - - 1 4 3 - - - - - - - Panama 3 3 9 6 5 10 4 4 2 5 - 1 5 6 - Caribbean 33 36 63 48 52 64 18 29 51 69 64 45 63 11 Anguilla - - - - - - - 2 - - 1 - - 1 - Antigua and Barbuda 6 1 1 - - - - 1 2 - 2 - 1 - - Aruba 1 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - Bahamas 1 - 2 4 1 4 2 1 1 1 4 2 - - Barbados - 1 2 - - 2 - 6 3 9 4 1 - 1 - 1 British Virgin Islands 10 8 20 25 39 42 11 3 9 19 20 21 39 10 Cayman Islands 4 4 5 12 3 3 3 5 19 35 37 17 14 - 2 Cuba - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - Dominican Republic - 2 6 1 3 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 - 5 - /…
ANNEX TABLES 201 Annex table I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (continued) (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Haiti - 2 - - 1 2 - - - - - - - - Jamaica 1 3 13 1 - - - 3 6 4 - 6 1 - Netherlands Antillesc 5 5 1 - 3 2 - - 3 - - - 1 2 4 Puerto Rico 4 6 9 1 - 5 1 7 5 - - 4 - 6 - 1 Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - Saint Lucia 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Trinidad and Tobago 1 1 1 2 2 - - 1 - - 1 1 - 3 - 2 - 1 US Virgin Islands - 1 - 1 - - 2 - 1 1 - - 2 - 2 Asia 832 854 999 1 011 693 808 295 630 649 809 813 565 808 278 West Asia 57 86 116 138 77 101 37 66 91 129 166 73 60 30 Bahrain 3 2 6 9 3 3 - 8 14 15 28 3 9 2 Iraq 4 - - 2 2 - 1 - - 1 - - - - Jordan 4 9 4 8 12 4 3 3 4 3 2 1 - 1 - Kuwait - 1 4 14 2 13 2 11 6 19 23 7 6 7 Lebanon 3 2 - 1 2 - 3 - 2 2 3 1 5 6 3 Oman 1 2 9 2 2 2 1 1 4 2 7 5 7 1 Qatar - - 2 2 2 - - 4 1 8 19 9 6 - 1 Saudi Arabia 1 5 10 12 8 11 5 8 14 10 13 3 8 2 Syrian Arab Republic - - - - 2 2 - - - - - - - - Turkey 29 51 63 60 31 44 12 7 4 12 5 4 3 5 United Arab Emirates 12 13 18 27 13 18 13 22 42 56 68 36 15 11 Yemen - 1 1 - - 1 - - - - - - 1 - South, East and South-East Asia 775 768 883 873 616 707 258 564 558 680 647 492 748 248 East Asia 408 396 430 403 279 325 98 190 190 226 252 266 345 - 49 China 217 224 232 236 142 146 52 45 38 61 69 97 148 47 Hong Kong, China 138 119 144 93 67 105 22 117 118 116 110 88 117 45 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - Korea, Republic of 25 17 19 37 59 45 12 17 30 39 50 57 55 25 Macao, China 7 6 5 - - 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 2 - Mongolia 1 1 3 2 5 8 6 - - - 1 - - - Taiwan Province of China 20 28 27 35 6 20 5 10 3 10 21 25 23 11 South Asia 101 139 159 158 112 122 46 99 137 176 166 57 142 - 15 Bangladesh 1 1 1 1 1 2 - - - - - - 3 - Iran, Islamic Republic of - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - India 94 130 147 136 104 115 39 98 134 175 163 56 139 44 Maldives 1 - - 2 - 1 - - - - - - - 1 - Nepal - - 1 - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - Pakistan 5 7 7 10 - 1 - 1 3 - 1 - 1 1 - - Sri Lanka - 2 4 5 8 5 3 - 2 2 2 - 1 - South-East Asia 266 233 294 312 225 260 114 275 231 278 229 169 261 - 49 Brunei Darussalam - 5 2 - 2 2 - - 1 - - 2 1 - Cambodia 2 3 3 1 2 1 1 - - - - - - 1 Indonesia 30 24 40 54 35 60 29 5 1 5 11 9 13 7 Malaysia 92 67 91 80 75 59 19 120 117 123 113 63 86 16 Myanmar - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - - Philippines 13 5 11 18 3 12 7 8 2 10 9 4 4 2 Singapore 96 91 103 89 62 76 36 134 100 129 78 74 134 40 Thailand 29 36 31 41 12 18 7 10 9 11 17 16 21 10 Viet Nam 2 2 14 30 35 31 14 - 2 2 - 1 1 3 - Oceania 11 8 12 6 3 7 1 1 5 4 5 9 1 1 American Samoa - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - Cook Islands - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - Fiji 3 1 1 3 - 1 - - - - 1 1 - - - French Polynesia - 1 1 - - 1 - - - 2 1 - 2 - - Guam - 2 - - - - - 1 - - - - - - Marshall Islands - - 1 - 1 1 - - - 1 - 3 - - New Caledonia 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 1 - - - 1 - Northern Mariana Islands 1 - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - Papua New Guinea 4 3 3 1 1 3 1 - - 2 2 1 - 1 - Samoa - 1 3 1 1 - - - 1 - 1 - 1 1 Solomon Islands - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Tonga - - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - Tuvalu - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - Vanuatu - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - /…
202 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (concluded) (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) South-East Europe and the CIS 137 202 279 321 343 477 115 51 62 102 123 70 83 31 South-East Europe 30 39 73 46 17 18 10 - 9 - 2 9 4 - 3 - Albania 1 1 4 6 2 - - - - - - - - - Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 9 8 4 2 1 - - - - 1 - 1 - Croatia 7 8 18 12 2 11 5 1 2 6 3 1 1 1 Montenegro - 1 2 - 3 1 - - - 1 - - - - Serbia - 4 21 20 7 4 4 - 4 2 - - 1 1 - 1 Serbia and Montenegro 14 10 - 2 1 - - - - - - - - - The FYR of Macedonia 1 5 20 2 - 1 1 - - - - - - - Yugoslavia (former) 1 1 - - - - - - 10 - 8 - - - - - CIS 107 163 206 275 326 459 105 60 64 93 119 70 80 31 Armenia 3 2 5 4 3 - 3 - - - - - - - Azerbaijan - - 1 3 2 3 - - - - - 1 - - Belarus 1 1 7 4 - 10 3 - 1 1 - - 1 - Georgia 5 7 9 4 - 1 3 - - - 1 - - - 1 - Kazakhstan 6 2 9 6 12 12 2 9 4 11 6 - 1 1 - Kyrgyzstan 3 2 5 - 1 3 2 - - - - - - - Moldova, Republic of 1 5 2 6 - - 2 - - - 1 - - - Russian Federation 66 101 118 181 185 343 73 45 54 70 108 65 75 27 Tajikistan 1 - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - Turkmenistan 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Ukraine 19 37 43 63 122 84 20 6 4 10 4 5 4 4 Uzbekistan - 6 3 4 2 1 - - 1 - - - - - Unspecified - - - - 1 - - 444 399 425 554 752 608 160 Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)d 17 36 31 23 14 25 6 2 - - 2 4 - 5 - Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)e 30 33 79 50 31 38 21 11 7 13 11 3 4 - Small island developing states (SIDS)f 22 16 34 22 12 22 6 27 25 23 21 19 4 - 2 Source: UNCTAD cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Net sales by the region/economy of the immediate acquired company. b Net purchases by region/economy of the ultimate acquiring company. c This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010. d Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. e Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. f Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net cross-border MA sales in a host economy = Sales of companies in the host economy to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the host economy; net cross-border MA purchases by a home economy = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.
ANNEX TABLES 203 Annex table I.5. Cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2005–May 2011 (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Sector/industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Total 462 253 625 320 1 022 725 706 543 249 732 338 839 224 163 462 253 625 320 1 022 725 706 543 249 732 338 839 224 163 Primary 17 145 43 093 74 013 90 201 48 092 73 461 45 096 2 816 32 650 95 021 53 131 29 097 52 971 38 525 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries 7 499 - 152 2 422 2 898 1 033 5 441 1 813 85 2 856 887 4 240 1 476 675 183 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 9 647 43 245 71 591 87 303 47 059 68 019 43 283 2 731 29 794 94 134 48 891 27 622 52 296 38 342 Manufacturing 147 527 212 998 336 584 326 114 76 080 129 183 62 688 118 804 163 847 218 661 244 667 37 632 119 862 79 220 Food, beverages and tobacco 37 047 6 736 49 950 131 855 9 636 39 125 5 393 17 763 3 124 36 280 54 667 - 804 35 011 7 710 Textiles, clothing and leather 1 818 1 799 8 494 2 112 410 962 356 3 266 809 - 1 220 - 189 537 4 320 458 Wood and wood products 333 1 922 5 568 3 166 821 - 462 291 - 524 1 660 4 728 - 251 536 8 112 220 Publishing and printing 4 933 24 386 5 543 4 658 66 4 977 87 3 882 7 783 843 8 228 - 130 570 769 Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel - 77 2 005 2 663 3 086 2 214 2 584 - 605 820 5 429 7 691 - 3 244 - 1 096 - 5 477 255 Chemicals and chemical products 31 709 48 035 116 736 73 563 32 559 32 243 35 781 29 069 35 192 89 397 71 293 28 861 43 080 37 869 Rubber and plastic products 2 639 6 577 7 281 1 200 15 5 987 322 684 5 409 658 - 235 - 197 183 388 Non-metallic mineral products 11 281 6 166 37 800 28 944 118 3 151 - 115 17 534 6 370 16 613 23 053 - 260 4 352 161 Metals and metal products 20 371 46 312 69 740 14 215 - 2 953 1 938 3 302 15 255 47 613 44 241 20 695 1 433 2 773 2 604 Machinery and equipment 1 467 17 664 20 108 15 060 2 431 7 922 3 360 6 421 14 890 - 37 504 7 868 2 635 5 800 2 994 Electrical and electronic equipment 11 938 35 305 24 483 14 151 17 763 13 237 9 439 8 305 27 908 33 644 32 401 1 880 6 404 11 748 Precision instruments 11 339 7 064 - 17 184 23 059 4 105 9 465 1 665 9 102 9 118 19 339 19 176 4 428 7 397 4 923 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 8 524 7 475 3 099 11 608 8 753 7 484 2 621 5 827 - 2 031 3 795 10 254 - 480 6 638 6 783 Other manufacturing 4 205 1 552 2 305 - 565 141 570 792 1 400 574 158 951 290 701 2 337 Services 297 581 369 228 612 128 290 228 125 561 136 196 116 379 340 634 428 822 709 043 408 746 183 003 166 007 106 418 Electricity, gas and water 40 158 1 402 103 005 48 969 61 627 - 1 881 2 856 25 274 - 18 197 50 150 25 270 47 613 - 18 656 1 561 Construction 4 319 9 955 12 994 2 452 10 391 7 035 - 714 3 683 3 372 10 222 - 5 220 - 1 704 - 2 113 - 3 088 Trade 15 946 11 512 41 307 17 458 3 658 14 468 8 472 406 4 241 7 422 19 766 3 360 9 526 - 185 Hotels and restaurants 3 273 14 476 9 438 3 499 1 422 5 411 489 - 779 - 164 - 8 357 3 702 673 1 045 527 Transport, storage and communications 75 783 113 915 66 328 34 325 15 912 15 762 15 715 49 802 87 466 45 574 48 088 12 187 15 386 33 943 Finance 53 912 107 951 249 314 73 630 9 535 31 929 67 434 224 103 316 920 548 901 311 409 110 555 125 669 65 811 Business services 84 366 80 978 102 231 100 701 17 167 45 634 15 107 42 487 47 087 50 893 57 088 17 652 27 025 10 050 Public administration and defense 324 - 111 29 30 110 63 14 - 9 201 - 15 477 - 17 058 - 46 337 - 8 202 - 4 422 - 1 663 Education 1 474 - 429 860 1 048 559 1 931 27 1 112 122 42 155 51 111 5 Health and social services 2 293 10 624 8 140 2 222 1 123 9 056 - 4 198 - 2 247 506 9 493 - 176 40 3 799 225 Community, social and personal service activities 15 627 17 060 15 625 1 002 3 434 4 739 4 827 5 524 1 798 9 263 - 5 270 87 6 604 - 1 714 Other services 105 1 896 2 856 4 893 624 2 050 6 349 471 1 148 2 497 270 692 2 033 945 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Net sales in the industry of the acquired company. b Net purchases by the industry of the acquiring company. Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net Cross-border MAs sales by sector/industry = Sales of companies in the industry of the acquired company to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the industry of the acquired company; net cross-border MA purchases by sector/industry = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.
204 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.6. Number of cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2005–May 2011 (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Sector/industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Total 5 004 5 747 7 018 6 425 4 239 5 405 2 036 5 004 5 747 7 018 6 425 4 239 5 405 2 036 Primary 265 413 485 486 433 600 264 199 288 350 296 221 344 174 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries 38 39 64 59 63 70 25 24 34 35 40 28 42 14 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 227 374 421 427 370 530 239 175 254 315 256 193 302 160 Manufacturing 1 522 1 688 1 993 1 976 1 153 1 485 544 1 367 1 523 1 872 1 850 909 1 286 524 Food, beverages and tobacco 158 130 213 220 109 167 71 147 110 237 180 71 119 45 Textiles, clothing and leather 41 62 56 64 39 49 15 20 39 36 22 26 42 17 Wood and wood products 40 75 78 49 26 46 21 25 37 58 52 10 33 14 Publishing and printing 96 97 90 60 37 34 21 105 110 100 72 20 38 28 Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel 9 21 14 20 16 17 4 9 10 16 11 4 9 - Chemicals and chemical products 321 275 325 316 225 307 110 252 231 266 323 191 269 102 Rubber and plastic products 38 55 66 63 35 53 7 51 49 60 41 25 33 12 Non-metallic mineral products 76 91 130 91 22 42 10 79 102 110 92 16 24 6 Metals and metal products 146 155 218 199 95 123 51 133 162 205 224 87 139 54 Machinery and equipment 160 187 228 265 134 175 63 124 166 195 247 127 160 63 Electrical and electronic equipment 167 257 266 309 203 199 74 162 254 255 259 144 179 92 Precision instruments 148 152 155 184 109 140 45 140 159 164 203 91 120 55 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 78 84 86 95 74 86 31 77 49 122 88 60 78 23 Other manufacturing 44 47 68 41 29 47 21 43 45 48 36 37 43 13 Services 3 217 3 646 4 539 3 962 2 653 3 320 1 228 3 438 3 936 4 796 4 279 3 109 3 775 1 338 Electricity, gas and water 97 110 135 159 130 166 57 61 75 92 155 98 70 47 Construction 99 118 149 114 96 129 34 44 55 83 73 48 56 16 Trade 441 425 588 590 324 445 180 276 354 374 352 198 264 124 Hotels and restaurants 49 101 134 123 77 115 28 14 24 56 60 26 40 17 Transport, storage and communications 351 352 436 343 211 288 98 285 304 346 260 169 214 84 Finance 484 531 712 563 458 557 187 1 492 1 661 2 121 1 887 1 728 1 923 553 Business services 1 402 1 651 1 972 1 681 1 109 1 320 533 1 188 1 331 1 545 1 305 816 1 006 425 Public administration and defense 10 7 10 8 13 2 4 - 81 - 84 - 77 - 72 - 86 1 - 7 Education 22 22 19 43 30 26 12 22 12 12 22 15 18 7 Health and social services 85 85 124 95 59 110 34 35 39 69 52 22 68 26 Community, social and personal service activities 149 178 197 177 116 110 45 75 111 123 127 50 76 41 Other services 28 66 63 66 30 52 16 27 54 52 58 25 39 5 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Net sales in the industry of the acquired company. b Net purchases by the industry of the acquiring company. Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net Cross-border MAs sales by sector/industry = Sales of companies in the industry of the acquired company to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the industry of the acquired company; net cross-border MA purchases by sector/industry = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.
ANNEX TABLES 205 AnnextableI.7.Cross-borderMAdealsworthover$3billioncompletedin2010 Rank Value ($billion) AcquiredcompanyHosteconomya IndustryoftheacquiredcompanyAcquiringcompanyHomeeconomya Industryoftheacquiringcompany Shares acquired 118.8CadburyPLCUnitedKingdomCandyandotherconfectioneryproductsKraftFoodsIncUnitedStatesFoodpreparations,nec100 210.7ZainAfricaBVNigeriaRadiotelephonecommunicationsBhartiAirtelLtdIndia Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 100 39.7BrasilcelNVBrazilRadiotelephonecommunicationsTelefỏnicaSASpain Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 50 49.1EDFEnergyPLCUnitedKingdomElectricservicesInvestorGroupHongKong,ChinaInvestors,nec100 59.0LihirGoldLtdPapuaNewGuineaGoldoresNewcrestMiningLtdAustraliaGoldores100 68.5T-Mobile(UK)LtdUnitedKingdomRadiotelephonecommunicationsOrangePLCUnitedKingdomRadiotelephonecommunications100 77.6E.ONUSLLCUnitedStatesNaturalgasdistributionPPLCorpUnitedStatesElectricservices100 87.6SolvayPharmaceuticalsSABelgiumPharmaceuticalpreparationsAbbottLaboratoriesUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparations100 97.3FomentoEconomicoMexicanoSABdeCVMexicoMaltbeveragesInvestorGroupNetherlandsInvestors,nec100 107.1RepsolYPFBrasilSABrazilCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasChinaPetrochemicalCorporation{SinopecGroup}ChinaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas40 116.1MilliporeCorpUnitedStatesLaboratoryanalyticalinstrumentsMerckKGaAGermanyPharmaceuticalpreparations100 126.0SybaseIncUnitedStatesPrepackagedSoftwareSheffieldAcquisitionCorpUnitedStatesPrepackagedSoftware100 135.5ZAO“KyivstarGSM”UkraineRadiotelephonecommunicationsOAO“Vympel-Kommunikatsii”{Vimpelkom}RussianFederationRadiotelephonecommunications100 145.2UnitymediaGmbHGermanyCableandotherpaytelevisionservicesLibertyMediaCorpUnitedStatesCableandotherpaytelevisionservices100 154.9RatiopharmInternationalGmbHGermanyPharmaceuticalpreparationsTevaPharmaceuticalIndustriesLtdIsraelPharmaceuticalpreparations100 164.8RepublicofVenezuela-CaraboboBlock Venezuela,Bolivarian Rep.of CrudepetroleumandnaturalgasInvestorGroupIndiaInvestors,nec40 174.7EastResourcesIncUnitedStatesCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasRoyalDutchShellPLCNetherlandsCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas100 184.5PactivCorpUnitedStatesPlasticsfoamproductsReynoldsGroupHoldingsLtdNewZealandConvertedpaperandpaperboardproducts,nec100 194.5EgyptianCoforMobileServicesEgyptRadiotelephonecommunicationsOrangeParticipationsSAFrance Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 51 204.4TomkinsPLCUnitedKingdom Mechanicalpowertransmission equipment,nec PinaforeAcquisitionsLtdCanadaInvestmentoffices,nec100 214.1DenwayMotorsLtdHongKong,ChinaMotorvehiclepartsandaccessoriesChinaLoungeInvestmentsLtdHongKong,ChinaInvestors,nec62 224.1AXASA-LifeAssuranceBusiness,UKUnitedKingdomLifeinsuranceFriendsProvidentHoldings(UK)Ltd{FPH}UnitedKingdomLifeinsurance100 234.0OSIPharmaceuticalsIncUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparationsRubyAcquisitionIncUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparations100 244.0LibertyGlobalIncUnitedStatesCableandotherpaytelevisionservicesKDDICorpJapan Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 100 253.8BungeParticipacoeseInvestimentosSABrazilSoybeanoilmillsValeSABrazilIronores100 263.7PiramalHealthcareLtdIndiaPharmaceuticalpreparationsAbbottLaboratoriesUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparations100 273.7KraftFoodsIncUnitedStatesFrozenspecialties,necNestléSASwitzerlandChocolateandcocoaproducts100 283.7AbertisInfraestructurasSASpainHighwayandstreetconstructionTrebolHoldingsSarlSpainInvestmentoffices,nec26 293.4TandbergASANorway RadioTVbroadcastingcommunications equipment CiscoSystemsIncUnitedStatesComputerperipheralequipment,nec100 303.4HS1LtdUnitedKingdomRailroads,line-hauloperatingInvestorgroupCanadaInvestors,nec100 313.4AndeanResourcesLtdUnitedStatesGoldoresGoldcorpIncCanadaGoldores100 323.4 SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDeutschland GmbH GermanyBooks:publishing,orpublishingprintingInvestorgroupGuernseyInvestors,nec100 333.3InteractiveDataCorpUnitedStatesInformationretrievalservicesInteractiveDataCorpSPVUnitedStatesInvestmentoffices,nec100 343.3GeneralGrowthPropertiesIncUnitedStatesRealestateinvestmenttrustsBrookfieldAssetManagementIncCanadaManagementinvestmentoffices,open-end36 353.3SunriseCommunicationsAGSwitzerlandRadiotelephonecommunicationsCVCCapitalPartnersLtdLuxembourgInvestors,nec100 363.3BPPLCCanadaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasApacheCorpUnitedStatesCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas100 373.2ArrowEnergyLtdAustraliaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasCSCSG(Australia)PtyLtdAustraliaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas100 383.2TommyHilfigerCorpNetherlandsMen’sshirtsandnightwearPhillips-VanHeusenCorpUnitedStatesMen’sshirtsandnightwear100 393.1DimensionDataHoldingsPLCSouthAfricaComputerintegratedsystemsdesignNipponTelegraphTelephoneCorpJapan Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 100 403.1BridasCorpArgentinaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasCNOOCLtdChinaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas50 413.1BPPLC-PermianBasinAssetsUnitedStatesCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasApacheCorpUnitedStatesCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas100 423.1IntollGroupAustraliaInvestmentoffices,necCanadaPensionPlanInvestmentBoardCanadaInvestmentadvice100 433.0RBSWorldPayUnitedKingdomFunctionsrelatedtodepositorybanking,necInvestorgroupUnitedStatesInvestors,nec80 Source:UNCTAD,cross-borderMAdatabase(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Immediatecountry. Note:Aslongastheultimatehosteconomyisdifferentfromtheultimatehomeeconomy,MAdealsthatwereundertakenwithinthesameeconomyarestillconsideredcross-borderMAs.
206 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (Millions of dollars) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination World 709 764 884 087 940 100 1 461 783 952 200 806 969 295 867 709 764 884 087 940 100 1 461 783 952 200 806 969 295 867 Developed countries 530 218 598 448 650 301 1 027 741 685 086 569 081 203 876 225 107 286 272 298 350 462 450 305 231 263 509 74 017 Europe 269 658 352 000 413 499 586 118 411 360 343 026 125 589 148 751 213 079 212 965 314 699 191 644 148 924 49 018 European Union 252 532 325 512 375 229 537 991 383 270 317 370 119 723 145 730 210 078 208 204 307 195 186 381 143 123 47 329 Austria 8 407 21 207 14 112 22 632 10 106 7 443 1 909 3 681 1 861 2 861 2 864 1 547 1 889 697 Belgium 2 766 3 048 5 951 13 731 8 407 4 890 1 177 4 101 3 879 9 568 10 634 3 540 4 554 557 Bulgaria 98 55 74 161 9 77 3 3 703 16 995 6 857 9 495 4 257 4 515 2 154 Cyprus 282 356 396 242 725 239 4 207 89 220 180 428 185 440 43 Czech Republic 784 1 356 4 926 4 110 1 487 2 001 329 4 815 6 887 6 799 4 516 3 805 5 473 1 759 Denmark 8 795 4 621 6 561 13 249 8 840 4 013 2 751 1 751 1 641 2 004 1 975 2 206 341 173 Estonia 632 959 2 448 403 94 1 245 1 062 1 898 698 764 1 371 1 144 996 297 Finland 8 674 9 555 13 159 9 294 3 385 4 292 2 938 1 274 1 455 1 083 2 252 956 1 475 699 France 31 432 46 102 53 171 83 660 64 849 46 893 12 311 10 321 16 104 17 572 22 201 11 201 8 516 2 585 Germany 58 853 69 942 73 012 92 741 67 727 66 161 22 565 13 188 17 884 18 514 35 163 19 750 13 748 5 854 Greece 1 006 2 107 1 600 5 406 1 670 1 332 392 680 1 669 4 195 4 704 1 748 1 035 888 Hungary 2 396 563 2 691 4 997 3 304 508 649 7 702 8 321 9 384 7 661 4 095 7 349 1 176 Ireland 4 267 8 937 8 321 17 252 14 871 5 055 823 9 397 6 687 3 903 8 176 4 776 4 436 2 492 Italy 15 549 15 372 24 187 41 024 28 440 21 469 7 164 7 536 9 939 9 790 14 112 12 121 10 084 1 815 Latvia 176 768 155 418 575 725 5 1 470 3 066 616 2 409 594 974 884 Lithuania 960 3 071 305 669 292 267 - 1 129 967 1 164 1 225 1 104 1 558 513 Luxembourg 2 016 11 046 10 959 11 565 8 366 4 772 3 426 30 204 654 182 619 356 152 Malta 67 4 36 164 622 14 9 89 870 287 383 197 261 29 Netherlands 27 928 35 230 25 148 32 483 29 299 18 488 6 677 4 105 4 879 5 288 9 131 8 721 9 826 1 156 Poland 644 864 2 809 2 459 1 042 2 334 512 13 771 15 014 21 530 32 766 13 557 9 999 3 131 Portugal 1 065 1 015 4 161 10 506 6 641 4 785 336 791 4 065 10 649 7 164 4 958 2 582 740 Romania 80 54 90 3 991 62 713 - 10 704 19 038 21 519 33 613 15 379 7 958 5 204 Slovakia - 346 486 297 400 1 571 130 9 021 11 258 5 732 3 331 5 416 3 760 2 808 Slovenia 749 3 039 600 1 638 661 545 90 380 616 927 822 193 776 49 Spain 10 586 24 941 35 838 41 876 38 928 36 335 16 132 9 974 17 516 19 397 27 726 13 729 14 833 3 255 Sweden 9 624 10 777 10 920 20 974 14 007 13 354 4 496 7 244 6 797 4 068 2 498 2 714 1 836 1 009 United Kingdom 54 697 50 176 73 112 102 049 68 461 67 849 29 630 16 888 31 548 22 898 60 395 47 869 23 556 7 212 Other developed Europe 17 125 26 488 38 270 48 128 28 090 25 656 5 866 3 021 3 001 4 762 7 505 5 263 5 800 1 689 Iceland 358 4 118 1 291 786 518 584 169 2 180 52 84 - 706 - Liechtenstein 79 40 24 88 74 35 27 15 - 94 2 - 16 - Norway 6 585 3 847 13 930 12 521 8 722 3 707 1 563 1 756 628 594 3 125 2 260 2 169 433 Switzerland 10 103 18 482 23 024 34 733 18 776 21 330 4 107 1 248 2 194 4 022 4 294 3 003 2 909 1 256 North America 192 441 167 743 142 970 306 426 182 289 148 127 50 793 58 059 52 959 55 733 107 896 87 961 71 524 19 347 Canada 40 661 13 772 13 745 76 871 29 039 16 135 6 740 21 501 14 623 7 767 17 594 16 043 14 397 3 626 United States 151 779 153 971 129 225 229 556 153 250 131 992 44 053 36 558 38 337 47 966 90 302 71 919 57 127 15 720 Other developed countries 68 120 78 706 93 832 135 197 91 438 77 929 27 494 18 297 20 233 29 652 39 855 25 626 43 061 5 652 Australia 14 322 18 988 17 597 29 919 16 156 9 049 4 111 6 847 3 815 20 937 27 362 15 200 37 107 3 774 Bermuda 928 807 763 3 521 5 156 1 424 378 - 4 17 - 1 13 7 Greenland 24 - 183 37 - - - 365 - - - - 475 - Israel 2 961 10 825 4 262 15 598 2 575 6 720 1 837 4 798 833 439 860 3 268 813 200 Japan 49 789 47 509 70 548 85 561 66 652 60 033 21 058 5 338 13 741 6 318 9 804 6 692 4 523 562 New Zealand 96 577 480 560 899 703 111 949 1 840 1 941 1 829 464 130 1 109 Developing economies 152 844 267 768 268 353 404 054 248 451 218 697 87 154 421 460 540 760 559 778 883 917 593 041 491 622 200 740 Africa 4 588 6 684 8 039 15 587 14 866 14 602 7 131 90 290 101 510 93 210 212 811 96 933 84 078 27 417 North Africa 2 257 4 047 4 150 7 019 2 216 3 211 5 42 208 67 453 53 452 100 174 37 708 25 407 4 414 Algeria - 15 10 2 504 34 - - 15 226 9 708 13 281 21 418 1 597 1 806 621 Egypt 2 109 3 844 3 651 3 541 1 810 3 138 5 13 689 27 349 13 003 13 363 18 213 13 827 704 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 21 - - - 18 - - 5 696 20 920 4 170 22 872 1 677 1 762 3 Morocco 96 60 26 560 237 27 - 4 300 5 201 4 842 17 855 5 760 3 516 2 300 Sudan - 9 7 - - - - 1 715 1 154 18 2 709 1 978 2 430 61 Tunisia 32 120 455 414 117 46 - 1 582 3 122 18 138 21 957 8 483 2 066 726 Other Africa 2 330 2 637 3 889 8 569 12 650 11 392 7 125 48 082 34 057 39 757 112 637 59 224 58 671 23 002 Angola - - 24 48 - 493 - 583 2 549 7 585 11 170 13 691 1 101 116 Benin - - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - Botswana - 108 - - 10 9 26 217 866 310 2 089 308 728 497 Burkina Faso - - - - - - - 488 - 9 252 234 447 25 Cameroon 9 - - - 18 - - 900 728 2 460 344 1 054 5 275 1 296 Cape Verde - - - - - - - - - 9 128 - 37 - Congo - - - - - - - - - 223 - 1 226 - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - - - 169 - - - 2 158 1 427 1 042 3 316 41 695 869 Côte d’ Ivoire 28 9 - 12 18 18 - 764 405 59 309 94 213 - Djibouti - - - - - - - 300 528 5 1 723 1 295 1 387 - Equatorial Guinea - - - - - - - - 85 - 6 2 887 1 1 600 /…
ANNEX TABLES 207 Annex table I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (continued) (Millions of dollars) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Eritrea - - - 3 - - - 969 5 - - - - - Ethiopia - - - 24 3 - - 20 1 507 2 499 703 310 276 269 Gabon - - - - - - - 2 088 1 727 333 4 232 913 1 062 151 Gambia - - - - - - - 400 83 9 21 21 537 - Ghana - - - - 8 15 7 5 431 1 030 124 4 808 6 570 2 658 5 193 Guinea - - - - - - - 96 249 - - 56 1 400 234 Guinea-Bissau - - - - - - - - - 409 - 18 - - Kenya 24 42 18 590 216 3 517 121 546 81 354 437 3 708 1 549 1 766 Lesotho - - - - - - - - - 46 17 22 41 509 Liberia - - - - - - - 909 - - 2 600 820 4 319 3 Madagascar - 27 - - - - - 336 246 3 331 1 273 474 - - Mali - - - - - - - 598 372 - 174 47 5 0 Mauritania - - - - - - - 1 107 542 37 242 - 211 237 Mauritius 2 - 36 314 2 392 1 028 2 357 80 3 538 294 58 54 503 Mozambique - - - - - - - - 595 2 103 11 607 1 557 3 192 1 208 Namibia - 2 - 2 - - - 868 65 443 1 791 1 448 393 513 Niger - - - - - - - - 1 - 3 087 - 100 234 Nigeria 16 524 184 2 168 177 1 254 775 21 051 11 053 4 172 35 722 6 722 12 492 750 Reunion - - - - - - - - 13 - - - - - Rwanda - - - - 1 - - 11 - 273 253 313 1 717 83 São Tomé and Principe - - - - - - - 9 - 2 - - - - Senegal - - - - - - - 13 1 243 2 979 1 296 328 927 5 Seychelles - - - - - - - 57 - 1 421 137 1 128 - Sierra Leone - - - - - - - 727 247 - 68 - 230 - Somalia - - - - - - - - 400 - 409 - 52 - South Africa 2 212 1 926 3 589 4 452 9 608 4 953 3 830 3 467 4 947 5 148 11 873 7 509 5 891 1 042 Swaziland - - - - - - - 94 - - 14 3 - 468 United Republic of Tanzania - - - 9 32 49 - 1 520 263 315 2 090 726 994 990 Togo 9 - 29 64 104 36 9 - 421 400 - 1 - - Uganda 30 - 9 37 28 9 - 67 325 289 2 941 2 306 8 339 2 024 Zambia - - - - 9 - - 2 148 1 926 410 4 613 2 358 1 228 947 Zimbabwe - - - 667 15 10 - 60 127 2 022 965 903 682 1 449 Latin America and the Caribbean 5 358 7 961 12 074 20 023 16 164 19 946 9 838 65 433 64 461 63 847 125 406 109 094 118 195 58 257 South America 4 198 5 834 8 823 17 675 12 991 16 791 4 412 50 505 42 621 38 235 82 557 74 696 91 932 46 893 Argentina 33 811 447 370 573 1 434 781 3 537 10 389 5 489 6 700 7 593 7 100 3 494 Bolivia, Plurinational State of - - - - - - - 343 2 588 1 448 637 1 780 668 191 Brazil 3 224 3 523 5 383 14 803 9 693 8 755 1 029 20 487 10 578 16 720 35 952 36 866 43 184 28 714 Chile 723 318 1 928 371 1 453 2 207 362 4 919 4 244 2 891 8 951 11 325 8 077 8 421 Colombia - 35 84 541 54 3 362 33 1 719 2 043 3 080 8 836 2 280 8 835 2 903 Ecuador 10 9 31 24 213 75 - 2 822 1 058 515 313 325 64 269 Guyana - - - - - - - 422 311 10 1 000 12 7 - Paraguay - - - - - - - 5 - 607 175 38 6 304 12 Peru 20 33 267 16 88 135 34 4 852 6 593 2 540 10 693 13 324 11 599 2 016 Suriname - - - - - - - - - - 95 - - - Uruguay - - 25 2 48 2 3 490 1 756 2 648 4 299 352 308 474 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 189 1 105 659 1 549 870 821 2 172 10 908 3 060 2 288 4 906 801 5 787 400 Central America 443 1 711 2 625 919 2 369 2 988 5 273 9 737 17 825 23 172 37 716 31 036 19 052 9 646 Costa Rica 2 - 81 3 48 62 11 467 358 1 274 339 2 354 1 767 606 El Salvador - - 103 - 308 150 - 86 630 249 375 727 304 131 Guatemala 9 - 40 21 46 62 - 278 14 880 469 1 170 877 95 Honduras 11 54 61 - - - - 227 34 897 934 83 172 437 Mexico 421 1 656 2 296 842 1 919 2 578 5 250 7 651 16 199 17 767 32 517 23 761 14 462 7 478 Nicaragua - - 29 19 - 66 - 64 114 96 154 849 272 10 Panama - - 16 35 49 71 12 964 476 2 010 2 928 2 089 1 197 889 Caribbean 717 416 626 1 429 804 167 152 5 192 4 016 2 439 5 134 3 362 7 210 1 718 Aruba - - - - - - - 285 - - 64 - 7 22 Bahamas 390 5 1 11 7 - - 55 - 16 48 3 - 21 Barbados - - 2 - - 4 22 - - - - 27 130 - Cayman Islands 290 205 74 495 744 72 119 42 11 3 30 32 124 9 Cuba - - - 32 - - - 847 450 127 1 180 842 6 048 377 Dominican Republic 10 - 498 - 30 22 - 1 122 807 709 2 098 1 255 145 690 Guadeloupe - - - - - - - - 25 - 267 - - 22 Haiti - - - - - 2 - 9 139 - 1 136 59 241 /…
208 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (continued) (Millions of dollars) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Jamaica - 205 7 887 19 30 - 260 368 32 281 17 23 186 Martinique - - - - - 12 - - 25 17 - 6 - - Puerto Rico - - 17 4 3 22 11 425 672 857 715 746 496 86 Saint Lucia 17 - - - - - - - - 12 - 1 144 64 Trinidad and Tobago 9 1 28 - - 3 - 2 140 1 518 666 320 299 23 - Asia 142 898 252 513 248 239 368 400 217 413 184 143 70 135 265 726 374 346 398 579 540 948 385 457 288 227 111 962 West Asia 58 434 134 275 77 928 176 092 73 776 35 705 10 688 77 075 79 088 67 236 159 371 92 944 51 978 19 553 Bahrain 8 522 20 416 8 937 20 877 14 526 1 085 129 2 410 5 700 742 8 670 1 932 1 739 1 870 Iraq 82 - 48 - 20 - 33 1 489 5 249 456 20 110 3 447 2 766 1 024 Jordan 136 194 258 2 618 860 535 4 2 034 4 478 1 223 12 346 2 426 2 074 887 Kuwait 9 407 17 426 4 567 16 181 4 554 2 837 2 188 595 1 799 384 2 216 1 500 688 65 Lebanon 891 5 406 549 2 393 54 199 20 1 118 2 056 431 1 441 2 116 1 779 406 Oman - - 95 91 3 177 39 - 2 958 3 216 2 349 13 792 6 266 4 226 1 105 Palestinian Territory - 300 - - - - - - 88 6 1 050 4 18 - Qatar 293 1 440 1 883 9 763 13 302 2 925 1 757 11 694 3 977 1 109 19 009 21 848 6 030 2 573 Saudi Arabia 6 378 5 922 2 191 13 863 5 951 1 315 1 015 6 234 19 537 26 821 21 187 14 776 9 741 3 755 Syrian Arab Republic - - - 364 48 - - 18 370 2 628 3 434 6 236 3 207 1 919 676 Turkey 3 830 1 876 2 038 4 367 3 671 3 551 2 629 4 316 12 996 13 330 15 063 21 311 9 114 2 155 United Arab Emirates 28 897 81 296 57 365 105 523 27 613 23 217 2 913 23 715 17 057 16 762 34 241 13 160 10 835 5 016 Yemen - - - 54 - 1 - 2 144 308 190 4 010 952 1 049 22 South, East and South- East Asia 84 463 118 237 170 311 192 308 143 637 148 438 59 447 188 651 295 258 331 343 381 576 292 512 236 249 92 409 East Asia 52 273 60 206 94 376 105 888 81 460 96 524 39 749 99 422 128 068 140 398 130 813 108 662 99 781 34 759 China 9 689 15 433 29 923 49 029 28 202 29 178 9 834 83 691 114 024 95 115 111 582 94 555 84 579 31 561 Hong Kong, China 6 680 12 048 18 972 15 313 15 274 7 837 8 194 2 831 3 147 2 442 3 899 6 327 4 999 1 106 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of - - - - - - - - 175 338 509 173 - 56 Korea, Republic of 24 205 23 093 27 082 31 143 26 764 35 178 19 177 8 175 7 625 8 525 10 252 3 829 2 674 1 228 Macao, China - - - 1 - - - 324 70 4 719 556 354 108 3 Mongolia - - - - - 150 - 1 225 176 350 243 288 1 033 1 Taiwan Province of China 11 700 9 632 18 400 10 403 11 220 24 181 2 544 3 178 2 852 28 909 3 770 3 137 6 388 805 South Asia 12 667 33 914 30 034 38 442 25 953 17 961 7 045 43 986 110 957 64 396 90 380 67 492 54 404 30 248 Afghanistan 135 - - - - - 25 128 31 6 180 2 957 537 2 Bangladesh 208 20 - 14 24 50 - 1 942 511 169 510 574 2 447 93 Bhutan - - - - - - - - 32 - - 100 15 - India 11 232 28 192 23 928 35 666 20 651 17 314 6 400 27 224 86 738 51 564 74 335 50 022 45 358 28 538 Iran, Islamic Republic of 264 860 6 076 1 643 5 197 503 518 1 205 977 8 284 7 798 8 807 2 532 6 Maldives - - - - - - - - 847 170 179 347 1 441 177 Nepal - - - 6 - 4 31 - 3 3 392 259 303 48 Pakistan 351 83 22 1 087 16 54 20 13 237 21 270 3 600 5 901 2 744 1 055 852 Sri Lanka 477 4 760 7 26 65 36 52 249 547 602 1 085 1 682 716 531 South-East Asia 19 523 24 117 45 901 47 978 36 224 33 953 12 652 45 243 56 233 126 549 160 384 116 358 82 065 27 402 Brunei Darussalam 4 - - 66 - - 1 25 - 706 393 578 148 - Cambodia - - - 41 37 - - 206 1 103 139 2 701 2 978 865 523 Indonesia 4 554 633 1 659 390 1 039 400 4 927 12 747 12 467 18 266 36 731 27 317 11 659 8 863 Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - - 157 - - - 527 563 1 359 1 169 1 965 235 78 Malaysia 6 481 4 996 25 314 18 121 13 544 20 566 521 4 091 4 497 9 912 20 168 12 088 12 750 4 403 Myanmar - - 20 - - - - - 227 1 403 1 241 1 890 372 15 Philippines 238 242 1 310 344 1 111 1 538 11 4 368 4 954 19 755 16 057 10 400 4 380 1 528 Singapore 6 861 11 105 14 141 18 127 11 216 7 683 3 840 5 825 11 767 22 939 10 478 9 596 13 603 6 533 Thailand 975 2 366 2 881 7 951 7 898 3 193 2 230 6 048 4 291 7 173 12 369 7 036 7 696 1 157 Timor-Leste - - - - - - - 10 - - - - 1 000 - Viet Nam 410 4 774 576 2 782 1 379 573 1 122 11 395 16 365 44 897 59 075 42 510 29 358 4 301 Oceania - 611 - 43 9 6 51 11 443 4 142 4 751 1 558 1 122 3 104 Fiji - - - - 1 3 - - 173 169 77 372 - 53 Micronesia, Federated States of - 11 - - - - - - 66 - - - - - New Caledonia - - - - - - - 7 - 3 800 3 200 16 - - Papua New Guinea - - - 41 - 3 51 3 204 173 967 1 144 904 3 000 South-East Europe and the CIS 26 702 17 871 21 446 29 988 18 663 19 190 4 837 63 197 57 056 81 972 115 416 53 928 51 838 21 111 South-East Europe 464 306 2 734 1 961 545 1 432 53 5 506 9 327 13 553 19 160 6 852 7 043 3 521 Albania - - - - - 105 - 559 2 254 4 398 3 268 85 38 115 Bosnia and Herzegovina 48 - - - - 15 3 2 212 289 2 507 1 836 1 238 222 648 /…
ANNEX TABLES 209 Annex table I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (concluded) (Millions of dollars) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Croatia 416 224 2 703 1 269 130 981 3 1 034 514 1 712 3 836 1 325 2 263 164 Montenegro - - - - - 7 - - 407 1 769 732 120 267 3 Serbia - 83 31 692 405 322 43 912 2 996 2 668 6 975 3 274 3 794 2 447 The FYR of Macedonia - - - - 10 1 5 788 2 867 499 2 514 809 458 144 CIS 26 238 17 565 18 712 28 026 18 118 17 758 4 784 57 691 47 729 68 419 96 256 47 077 44 796 17 590 Armenia 34 2 - 9 - 9 - 334 194 2 440 258 726 188 20 Azerbaijan 260 14 4 230 988 3 584 512 77 1 282 817 1 762 2 348 1 452 373 364 Belarus 33 35 53 1 715 525 1 991 62 828 753 376 2 255 1 781 1 724 403 Georgia - - - 47 30 35 18 886 455 998 1 905 4 105 718 23 Kazakhstan 237 70 13 97 523 429 - 3 705 3 437 4 196 19 489 1 504 2 034 3 464 Kyrgyzstan 2 - - 7 15 - - 538 63 3 440 534 10 - 101 Moldova, Republic of - - - 522 - - - 430 76 50 138 425 320 38 Russian Federation 25 404 14 812 13 221 22 211 11 951 13 617 4 563 40 819 37 031 46 459 58 453 30 198 33 355 9 224 Tajikistan - - - 31 5 - - 952 9 269 185 483 1 1 042 Turkmenistan - - - - - - - 2 - 834 3 463 1 370 348 407 Ukraine 267 2 632 1 195 2 400 1 487 1 166 64 7 015 4 306 6 751 6 740 4 123 3 320 819 Uzbekistan - - - - - - - 900 590 843 488 900 2 415 1 685 Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)a 383 656 90 638 255 645 65 19 141 17 083 25 427 62 915 42 524 37 037 10 510 Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)b 699 194 4 252 2 553 4 212 1 132 164 14 862 16 569 24 363 48 933 23 071 29 103 14 126 Small island developing states (SIDS)c 419 822 73 1 255 2 426 1 070 2 431 2 622 3 178 3 207 3 013 2 297 4 104 4 055 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. b Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. c Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Note: Data refer to estimated amount of capital investment.
210 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.9. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination World 10 560 12 277 12 245 16 422 14 192 14 142 4 874 10 560 12 277 12 245 16 422 14 192 14 142 4 874 Developed countries 9 057 10 291 10 356 13 474 11 651 11 574 4 022 5 145 6 163 6 355 7 526 6 618 6 766 2 216 Europe 4 920 5 860 6 344 8 027 7 147 6 872 2 295 4 074 4 888 4 912 5 802 4 633 4 418 1 400 European Union 4 586 5 426 5 896 7 331 6 583 6 316 2 127 3 975 4 756 4 725 5 578 4 466 4 265 1 344 Austria 220 263 252 281 201 214 51 104 90 109 111 74 82 30 Belgium 125 142 191 209 141 141 39 163 126 210 183 104 96 35 Bulgaria 6 6 7 12 4 11 2 134 286 150 146 101 122 28 Cyprus 5 22 8 10 18 23 11 5 15 7 18 10 17 2 Czech Republic 22 41 32 53 12 34 11 151 179 149 145 113 183 67 Denmark 152 142 136 179 208 138 36 78 68 67 66 36 31 12 Estonia 25 44 39 26 13 11 6 63 55 32 44 25 27 8 Finland 185 190 183 203 133 130 49 35 44 38 38 24 33 16 France 649 688 912 1 060 984 812 254 492 588 570 697 414 373 93 Germany 1 026 1 262 1 278 1 464 1 320 1 362 444 285 372 456 727 692 454 143 Greece 39 54 61 74 28 27 9 28 29 38 48 40 29 12 Hungary 12 19 30 30 21 15 13 205 243 218 154 110 150 55 Ireland 76 94 98 132 146 136 39 192 146 116 184 175 187 71 Italy 322 288 335 519 444 399 135 138 149 178 232 172 186 55 Latvia 11 24 15 18 9 17 2 84 110 33 52 28 23 9 Lithuania 54 66 13 18 12 15 - 75 59 45 47 35 42 4 Luxembourg 26 29 94 83 64 64 36 2 14 26 17 15 28 6 Malta 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 9 12 9 9 15 15 7 Netherlands 238 351 309 453 406 376 134 112 138 131 174 160 144 54 Poland 28 38 40 45 39 38 9 272 336 343 376 225 307 89 Portugal 21 26 37 88 47 57 12 30 56 82 82 57 51 11 Romania 13 13 13 26 13 13 - 260 375 371 360 204 218 73 Slovakia - 4 2 9 2 10 2 118 117 101 85 57 93 35 Slovenia 41 49 27 31 20 23 5 20 25 23 23 12 24 4 Spain 183 232 461 622 623 609 214 171 304 452 577 391 384 115 Sweden 272 285 294 334 326 335 117 106 122 86 87 98 67 20 United Kingdom 832 1 051 1 026 1 349 1 346 1 303 496 643 698 685 896 1 079 899 290 Other developed Europe 334 434 448 696 564 556 168 99 132 187 224 167 153 56 Iceland 17 30 27 25 9 11 8 1 5 1 2 - 4 - Liechtenstein 4 3 3 7 3 6 3 1 - 2 1 - 2 - Norway 90 102 71 113 109 93 38 20 22 25 45 31 29 8 Switzerland 223 299 347 551 443 446 119 77 105 159 176 136 118 48 North America 3 126 3 278 3 037 3 894 3 340 3 439 1 309 790 927 1 036 1 206 1 516 1 788 649 Canada 419 243 259 331 326 299 137 207 179 168 218 260 318 108 United States 2 707 3 035 2 778 3 563 3 014 3 140 1 172 583 748 868 988 1 256 1 470 541 Other developed countries 1 011 1 153 975 1 553 1 164 1 263 418 281 348 407 518 469 560 167 Australia 145 159 154 208 164 172 70 115 135 178 240 254 322 100 Bermuda 22 52 33 64 62 57 9 - 2 4 - 1 2 1 Greenland 1 - 1 1 - - - 2 - - - - 2 - Israel 55 108 66 120 74 84 30 23 34 21 42 21 29 18 Japan 775 808 702 1 131 827 915 296 122 149 179 203 163 179 34 New Zealand 13 26 19 29 37 35 13 19 28 25 33 30 26 14 Developing economies 1 321 1 779 1 700 2 650 2 297 2 302 781 4 509 5 337 5 110 7 728 6 731 6 470 2 379 Africa 70 87 64 199 173 151 60 463 448 388 852 692 630 232 North Africa 24 28 18 45 40 34 1 209 200 195 364 262 219 69 Algeria - 1 2 3 2 - - 45 50 33 73 32 20 7 Egypt 13 17 9 23 14 25 1 47 51 54 85 103 73 10 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 1 - - - 2 - - 15 11 20 40 17 17 1 Morocco 4 5 3 5 14 4 - 59 46 58 93 48 52 30 Sudan - 1 1 - - - - 10 15 2 13 12 9 6 Tunisia 6 4 3 14 8 5 - 33 27 28 60 50 48 15 Other Africa 46 59 46 154 133 117 59 254 248 193 488 430 411 163 Angola - - 2 4 - 4 - 18 15 10 35 33 34 7 Benin - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - Botswana - 4 - - 2 1 2 6 4 6 17 13 7 6 Burkina Faso - - - - - - - 3 - 1 2 1 3 1 Cameroon 1 - - - 2 - - 1 1 1 3 8 2 4 Cape Verde - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - 4 - Congo - - - - - - - - - 1 - 3 - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - - - 2 - - - 10 8 5 15 5 8 7 Côte d’ Ivoire 3 1 - 2 2 2 - 2 2 2 5 8 9 - Djibouti - - - - - - - 1 2 1 3 2 3 - Equatorial Guinea - - - - - - - - 3 - 1 2 1 1 Eritrea - - - 1 - - - 4 1 - - - - - Ethiopia - - - 2 1 - - 1 3 10 10 8 8 5 Gabon - - - - - - - 4 3 3 5 3 4 1 Gambia - - - - - - - 1 2 1 3 3 3 - Ghana - - - - 1 2 2 17 16 4 20 22 23 11 Guinea - - - - - - - 3 3 - - 2 3 1 Guinea-Bissau - - - - - - - - - 2 - 2 - - /…
ANNEX TABLES 211 Annex table I.9. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (continued) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Kenya 4 3 2 26 26 17 10 13 12 8 19 29 35 19 Lesotho - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 2 Liberia - - - - - - - 2 - - 1 5 6 1 Madagascar - 2 - - - - - 4 3 3 4 3 - - Mali - - - - - - - 3 3 - 2 1 3 1 Mauritania - - - - - - - 3 4 2 1 - 5 2 Mauritius 1 - 2 5 8 8 8 5 1 4 14 5 5 2 Mozambique - - - - - - - - 5 5 23 10 16 5 Namibia - 1 - 1 - - - 7 6 5 14 8 6 3 Niger - - - - - - - - 1 - 2 - 1 1 Nigeria 3 7 6 27 21 13 7 38 25 20 47 40 33 13 Reunion - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - Rwanda - - - - 1 - - 2 - 8 13 26 6 3 São Tomé and Principe - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - - Senegal - - - - - - - 3 5 4 9 10 8 2 Seychelles - - - - - - - 3 - 3 2 1 1 - Sierra Leone - - - - - - - 2 2 - 5 - 2 - Somalia - - - - - - - - 1 - 2 - 1 - South Africa 32 41 29 65 50 61 29 62 76 59 120 109 95 41 Swaziland - - - - - - - 2 - - 3 1 - 1 United Republic of Tanzania - - - 1 2 3 - 11 7 6 17 11 23 7 Togo 1 - 4 7 9 3 1 - 1 1 - 1 - - Uganda 1 - 1 3 3 1 - 6 15 7 41 16 21 2 Zambia - - - - 1 - - 14 14 5 17 15 13 10 Zimbabwe - - - 7 3 2 - 2 3 2 5 13 13 3 Latin America and the Caribbean 86 128 226 219 230 273 92 568 588 820 1 169 1 229 1 180 524 South America 66 91 146 168 156 173 61 368 339 457 648 687 753 350 Argentina 2 16 27 15 21 22 7 42 52 112 123 114 116 56 Bolivia, Plurinational State of - - - - - - - 2 9 4 3 14 6 2 Brazil 34 40 66 102 63 72 35 169 152 154 254 276 348 163 Chile 15 15 26 24 37 50 11 39 39 30 70 112 58 34 Colombia - 2 9 13 6 12 2 46 32 77 78 61 106 51 Ecuador 1 1 3 2 12 5 - 4 5 8 10 6 7 5 Guyana - - - - - - - 3 3 1 1 1 2 - Paraguay - - - - - - - 2 - 2 4 3 8 1 Peru 3 2 6 3 5 5 1 29 23 37 64 76 59 22 Suriname - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - Uruguay - - 1 1 2 1 1 7 8 21 16 8 21 10 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 11 15 8 8 10 6 4 25 16 11 23 16 22 6 Central America 13 21 61 38 59 81 24 165 213 323 453 487 365 150 Costa Rica 1 - 7 2 5 5 2 12 20 39 19 68 43 14 El Salvador - - 2 - 5 2 - 4 5 7 11 19 13 8 Guatemala 1 - 2 4 7 5 - 1 2 16 17 18 11 3 Honduras 1 2 2 - - - - 3 2 11 10 7 9 5 Mexico 10 19 43 26 35 52 19 136 177 217 355 320 238 100 Nicaragua - - 2 2 - 7 - 1 3 6 7 7 10 2 Panama - - 3 4 7 10 3 8 4 27 34 47 40 18 Caribbean 7 16 19 13 15 19 7 35 36 40 68 55 62 24 Aruba - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - 1 2 Bahamas 1 1 2 1 1 - - 2 - 1 3 2 - 2 Barbados - - 1 - - 1 2 - - - - 1 2 - Cayman Islands 3 10 6 5 8 7 4 1 2 2 6 4 6 1 Cuba - - - 1 - - - 5 1 2 7 12 8 3 Dominican Republic 1 - 3 - 2 2 - 8 9 8 16 13 10 5 Guadeloupe - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - 2 Haiti - - - - - 1 - 1 2 - 1 2 1 2 Jamaica - 4 1 5 2 4 - 2 2 2 5 3 2 2 Martinique - - - - - 1 - - 1 2 - 1 - - Puerto Rico - - 4 1 2 2 1 8 13 18 20 15 26 4 Saint Lucia 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 2 1 Trinidad and Tobago 1 1 2 - - 1 - 6 5 4 5 1 2 - Asia 1 165 1 562 1 410 2 229 1 890 1 876 628 3 476 4 297 3 899 5 695 4 801 4 653 1 619 West Asia 232 423 297 582 437 414 118 498 699 588 1 106 1 016 914 339 Bahrain 3 9 11 34 32 13 4 27 49 34 68 70 56 26 Iraq 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 8 4 2 18 16 46 10 Jordan 6 12 6 14 13 9 2 24 32 20 34 26 47 9 Kuwait 15 46 28 77 39 29 14 10 21 9 30 28 32 7 Lebanon 11 16 6 11 4 14 2 11 18 11 9 27 32 11 Oman - - 4 6 3 4 - 13 37 16 55 42 38 25 Palestinian Territory - 1 - - - - - - 5 1 2 1 1 - Qatar 9 20 10 50 22 18 18 23 44 31 82 85 64 28 /…
212 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.9. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (concluded) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Saudi Arabia 20 58 54 56 32 28 8 58 94 54 108 140 116 38 Syrian Arab Republic - - - 2 1 - - 24 16 16 29 19 21 8 Turkey 65 51 32 62 61 87 21 68 86 97 171 156 146 47 United Arab Emirates 102 210 145 266 229 211 47 229 290 293 490 401 309 128 Yemen - - - 4 - 1 - 3 3 4 10 5 6 2 South, East and South-East Asia 933 1 139 1 113 1 647 1 453 1 462 510 2 978 3 598 3 311 4 589 3 785 3 739 1 280 East Asia 514 586 643 844 820 806 267 1 589 1 734 1 526 1 972 1 638 1 721 563 China 141 129 207 261 330 267 85 1 257 1 407 1 218 1 548 1 167 1 301 424 Hong Kong, China 99 119 116 170 134 121 52 126 160 150 224 275 209 70 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of - - - - - - - - 2 4 4 1 - 1 Korea, Republic of 186 217 198 256 222 241 80 119 88 72 88 97 112 32 Macao, China - - - 1 - - - 9 6 13 14 9 7 1 Mongolia - - - - - 1 - 8 3 6 7 3 8 1 Taiwan Province of China 88 121 122 156 134 176 50 70 68 63 87 86 84 34 South Asia 214 315 226 380 294 372 157 691 1 056 764 1 072 850 857 357 Afghanistan 1 - - - - - 2 5 3 1 2 6 9 1 Bangladesh 4 3 - 3 2 6 - 7 12 5 13 17 30 6 Bhutan - - - - - - - - 2 - - 2 2 - India 191 297 215 358 267 339 148 591 984 695 972 745 747 329 Iran, Islamic Republic of 7 7 7 9 16 13 2 10 9 17 20 15 11 1 Maldives - - - - - - - - 5 2 4 3 8 2 Nepal - - - 1 - 3 2 - 2 1 11 4 4 2 Pakistan 6 4 3 6 5 8 2 66 28 28 28 35 20 6 Sri Lanka 5 4 1 3 4 3 1 12 11 15 22 23 26 10 South-East Asia 205 238 244 423 339 284 86 698 808 1 021 1 545 1 297 1 161 360 Brunei Darussalam 2 - - 1 - - 1 4 - 6 4 8 4 - Cambodia - - - 1 7 - - 6 5 8 35 31 34 13 Indonesia 9 5 9 5 10 14 2 76 98 82 136 118 124 46 Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - - 2 - - - 8 8 11 21 15 12 3 Malaysia 73 71 73 135 114 75 18 92 125 172 214 158 187 51 Myanmar - - 1 - - - - - 2 3 6 5 5 2 Philippines 6 9 25 19 14 23 2 66 62 97 143 119 96 24 Singapore 84 100 92 177 119 106 28 156 197 254 304 311 321 121 Thailand 19 36 29 47 51 38 25 120 112 123 331 276 209 40 Timor-Leste - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - Viet Nam 12 17 15 36 24 28 10 169 199 265 351 256 168 60 Oceania - 2 - 3 4 2 1 2 4 3 12 9 7 4 Fiji - - - - 1 1 - - 1 1 3 2 - 2 Micronesia, Federated States of - 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - New Caledonia - - - - - - - 1 - 1 1 1 - - Papua New Guinea - - - 2 - 1 1 1 2 1 6 5 5 1 South-East Europe and the CIS 182 207 189 298 244 266 71 906 777 780 1 168 843 906 279 South-East Europe 8 14 9 31 21 32 5 148 140 156 231 136 175 61 Albania - - - - - 1 - 13 11 8 16 7 6 3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 - - - - 2 2 26 17 23 25 20 20 9 Croatia 6 7 7 16 8 13 1 45 39 32 40 30 42 11 The FYR of Macedonia - - - - 4 2 1 11 27 9 22 18 14 3 Montenegro - - - - - 1 - - 3 5 14 1 11 1 Serbia - 7 2 15 9 13 1 53 43 79 114 60 82 34 CIS 174 193 180 267 223 234 66 758 637 624 937 707 731 218 Armenia 2 1 - 3 - 2 - 12 8 8 20 20 9 2 Azerbaijan 4 2 10 21 20 15 6 20 14 17 43 44 24 6 Belarus 2 7 14 8 9 19 6 11 19 19 28 26 39 9 Georgia - - - 2 3 3 1 11 19 20 40 29 30 4 Kazakhstan 12 5 2 7 10 9 - 29 25 33 62 46 32 21 Kyrgyzstan 1 - - 1 1 - - 3 3 4 7 2 - 2 Moldova, Republic of - - - 1 - - - 13 6 12 6 9 11 4 Russian Federation 139 154 133 192 151 160 46 512 396 383 573 403 451 135 Tajikistan - - - 3 2 - - 6 2 4 4 6 1 3 Turkmenistan - - - - - - - 1 - 5 11 10 7 2 Ukraine 14 24 21 29 27 26 7 126 128 108 125 92 113 22 Uzbekistan - - - - - - - 14 17 11 18 20 14 8 Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)a 7 7 9 33 29 22 5 133 152 109 327 267 288 97 Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)b 21 12 13 52 49 36 13 173 172 169 358 327 242 97 Small island developing states (SIDS)c 4 8 8 14 14 16 11 22 17 21 48 25 34 13 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. b Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. c Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
ANNEX TABLES 213 Annex table III.1. List of IIAs, as of end-May 2011a Economies and territories BITs DTTs Other IIAs b Total 1 Afghanistan 3 1 2 6 2 Albania 40 30 5 75 3 Algeria 46 31 6 83 4 Angola 8 - 7 15 5 Anguilla 0 4 1 5 6 Antigua and Barbuda 2 6 7 15 7 Argentina 58 41 16 115 8 Armenia 36 39 2 77 9 Aruba - 6 - 6 10 Australia 23 66 16 105 11 Austria 64 94 63 221 12 Azerbaijan 40 37 2 79 13 Bahamas - 1 - 1 14 Bahrain 30 26 12 68 15 Bangladesh 29 27 3 59 16 Barbados 10 22 3 35 17 Belarus 58 43 2 103 18 Belgium c 93 106 63 262 19 Belize 8 6 9 23 20 Benin 14 2 5 21 21 Bermuda - 6 1 7 22 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 22 8 14 44 23 Bosnia and Herzegovina 38 12 4 54 24 Botswana 9 7 6 22 25 Brazil 14 38 17 69 26 British Virgin Islands - 11 1 12 27 Brunei Darussalam 8 8 17 33 28 Bulgaria 68 68 61 197 29 Burkina Faso 14 2 6 22 30 Burundi 7 - 8 15 31 Cambodia 21 - 16 37 32 Cameroon 14 4 4 22 33 Canada 28 108 22 158 34 Cape Verde 9 1 2 12 35 Cayman Islands - 5 1 6 36 Central African Republic 4 1 5 10 37 Chad 14 - 5 19 38 Chile 51 26 25 102 39 China 127 107 15 249 40 Colombia 6 7 17 30 41 Comoros 6 1 8 15 42 Congo 12 3 5 20 43 Congo, Democratic Republic of 14 3 8 25 44 Cook Islands - 1 2 3 45 Costa Rica 20 4 15 39 46 Côte d’ Ivoire 10 20 6 36 47 Croatia 58 55 5 118 48 Cuba 58 12 3 73 49 Cyprus 27 43 60 129 50 Czech Republic 78 77 63 218 51 Denmark 55 116 63 234 52 Djibouti 7 - 9 16 53 Dominica 2 7 10 19 54 Dominican Republic 15 1 6 22 55 Ecuador 18 9 11 38 56 Egypt 100 49 15 164 57 El Salvador 22 2 10 34 58 Equatorial Guinea 7 - 4 11 59 Eritrea 4 - 4 8 60 Estonia 27 50 63 140 61 Ethiopia 29 9 5 43 62 Fiji - 8 3 11 63 Finland 71 94 63 228 64 France 101 133 63 297 65 Gabon 12 5 6 23 66 Gambia 13 6 5 24 67 Georgia 29 35 5 69 68 Germany 136 105 63 304 69 Ghana 26 8 5 39
214 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table III.1. List of IIAs, as of end-May 2011a (continued) Economies and territories BITs DTTs Other IIAs b Total 70 Greece 43 52 63 158 71 Grenada 2 3 9 14 72 Guatemala 17 - 11 28 73 Guinea 19 1 9 29 74 Guinea-Bissau 2 - 6 8 75 Guyana 8 4 10 22 76 Haiti 5 - 4 9 77 Honduras 11 1 10 22 78 Hong Kong, China 15 29 3 47 79 Hungary 58 69 63 190 80 Iceland 9 35 28 72 81 India 81 80 14 175 82 Indonesia 62 60 17 139 83 Iran, Islamic Republic of 60 37 1 98 84 Iraq 4 1 6 11 85 Ireland 1 71 63 135 86 Israel 37 52 4 93 87 Italy 94 96 63 253 88 Jamaica 16 12 10 38 89 Japan 16 75 20 111 90 Jordan 52 22 10 84 91 Kazakhstan 42 40 4 86 92 Kenya 11 13 8 32 93 Kiribati - 5 2 7 94 Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of 24 10 - 34 95 Korea, Republic of 90 85 15 190 96 Kuwait 58 49 13 120 97 Kyrgyzstan 28 16 1 45 98 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 23 5 14 42 99 Latvia 45 51 61 157 100 Lebanon 50 33 8 91 101 Lesotho 3 3 7 13 102 Liberia 4 4 5 13 103 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 32 12 10 54 104 Liechtenstein - 6 23 29 105 Lithuania 52 48 63 163 106 Luxembourg c - 70 63 133 107 Macao, China 2 7 2 11 108 Madagascar 9 2 8 19 109 Malawi 6 9 8 23 110 Malaysia 67 82 22 171 111 Mali 17 2 9 28 112 Malta 22 60 60 142 113 Mauritania 19 2 7 28 114 Mauritius 36 43 7 86 115 Mexico 28 49 17 94 116 Moldova, Republic of 39 46 3 88 117 Monaco 1 6 - 7 118 Mongolia 43 31 3 77 119 Montenegro 16 3 2 21 120 Montserrat - 6 5 11 121 Morocco 61 49 7 117 122 Mozambique 24 4 6 34 123 Myanmar 6 7 12 25 124 Namibia 13 8 4 25 125 Nepal 5 7 3 15 126 Netherlands 98 131 63 292 127 New Caledonia - 1 1 2 128 New Zealand 5 50 14 69 129 Nicaragua 17 - 11 28 130 Niger 5 1 6 12 131 Nigeria 22 15 5 42 132 Norway 15 110 27 152 133 Oman 33 28 9 70 134 Pakistan 47 59 6 112 135 Palestinian Territory 2 - 5 7 136 Panama 22 14 9 45 137 Papua New Guinea 6 7 4 17 138 Paraguay 24 5 15 44
ANNEX TABLES 215 Annex table III.1. List of IIAs, as of end-May 2011a (concluded) Economies and territories BITs DTTs Other IIAs b Total 139 Peru 32 8 22 62 140 Philippines 35 40 16 91 141 Poland 62 90 63 215 142 Portugal 53 66 63 182 143 Qatar 45 37 11 93 144 Romania 82 74 61 217 145 Russian Federation 69 68 4 141 146 Rwanda 6 2 9 17 147 Saint Kitts and Nevis - 8 10 18 148 Saint Lucia 2 4 5 11 149 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2 5 10 17 150 Samoa - 3 2 5 151 San Marino 6 13 - 19 152 São Tomé and Principe 1 - - 1 153 Saudi Arabia 22 23 12 57 154 Senegal 24 14 6 44 155 Serbia 46 53 2 101 156 Seychelles 7 14 8 29 157 Sierra Leone 3 4 5 12 158 Singapore 41 81 29 151 159 Slovakia 53 63 63 179 160 Slovenia 37 42 63 142 161 Solomon Islands - 3 2 5 162 Somalia 2 - 6 8 163 South Africa 46 67 9 122 164 Spain 76 96 63 235 165 Sri Lanka 27 38 5 70 166 Sudan 28 11 11 50 167 Suriname 3 1 7 11 168 Swaziland 5 6 9 20 169 Sweden 70 109 63 242 170 Switzerland 118 118 26 262 171 Syrian Arab Republic 41 33 6 80 172 Taiwan, Province of China 23 19 5 47 173 Tajikistan 31 16 3 50 174 Thailand 39 62 23 124 175 The FYR of Macedonia 36 37 5 76 176 Timor-Leste 2 - 1 3 177 Togo 4 2 5 11 178 Tonga 1 - 2 3 179 Trinidad and Tobago 12 17 10 39 180 Tunisia 54 47 9 110 181 Turkey 82 82 19 183 182 Turkmenistan 23 12 3 38 183 Tuvalu - 4 2 6 184 Uganda 15 12 9 36 185 Ukraine 66 46 5 117 186 United Arab Emirates 38 48 11 97 187 United Kingdom 104 153 63 320 188 United Republic of Tanzania 15 10 7 32 189 United States 47 155 65 267 190 Uruguay 30 11 17 58 191 Uzbekistan 49 35 3 87 192 Vanuatu 2 - 2 4 193 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 28 28 6 62 194 Viet Nam 58 52 19 129 195 Yemen 37 9 7 53 196 Zambia 12 21 9 42 197 Zimbabwe 31 14 9 54 Source: UNCTAD, based on IIA database. a This includes not only agreements that are signed and entered into force, but also agreements where negotiations are only concluded. Note that the numbers of BITs and DTTs in this table do not add up to the total number of BITs and DTTs as stated in the text, since some economies/territories have concluded agreements with entities that are not listed in this table. Note also that because of ongoing reporting by member States and the resulting retroactive adjustments to the UNCTAD database the data differ from those reported in the WIR10. b These numbers include agreements concluded by economies as members of a regional integration organization. c BITs concluded by the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.
216 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table III.2. Selected MSI standards (Standards referenced and subjects covered in code) Multi-stakeholder initiatives Standard Universal principles referenced in the standards Topics addressed 4C Association 4C code of conduct • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Human rights Labour practices Environment Bonsucro Bonsucro Standard • UN Declaration on Rights of Indigenous People • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment CERES CERES Principles • None specifically Environment Clean Clothes Campaign Code of Labour Practices for the Apparel Industry Including Sportswear • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) ETI Base Code • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Fair Labour Association Fair Labor Association Workplace Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Fair Wear Foundation Fair Wear Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards • Universal Declaration of Human Rights Human rights Labour practices Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) FSC Principles and Criteria • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Labour wwpractices Environment GoodWeave GoodWeave code of conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Framework Convention on Climate Change • UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Green-e Energy Greene Climate Standard • UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Environment International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOSM) IFOAM Standard (Currently under development) • UN Charter of Rights for Children ILO Conventions relating to Labour Welfare Human rights Labour practices Environment ISO ISO14000 • None specifically Environment ISO 26000 • The major international standards relevant for CSR are referenced in ISO 26000 Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) MSC environmental standard for sustainable fishing • The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (UN FAO) Environment Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) RSB Principles Criteria • None specifically Human rights Labour practices Environment Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) RSPO Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production (RSPO P C) • UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples • UN Convention on Biological Diversity • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards • ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Human rights Labour practices Environment Social Accountability International SA8000 • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women • UN Convention on the Rights of the Child • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices
ANNEX TABLES 217 Multi-stakeholder initiatives Standard Universal principles referenced in the standards Topics addressed Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) /Rainforest Alliance SAN Standards • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Children´s Rights Convention • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment Transparency International Transparency International Business Principles for Countering Bribery • None specifically Bribery UTZ CERTIFIED UTZ CERTIFIED Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Official • UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law enforcement Officials Human rights Workers Rights Consortium Workers Rights Consortium Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards • Other ILO Conventions Human rights Labour practices Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) WRAP Code of conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Source: UNCTAD. Annex table III.2. Selected MSI standards (concluded) (Standards referenced and subjects covered in code)
218 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table III.3. Selected industry association codes (Subjects covered and intergovernmental organization standards referenced) Industry association Standard [code] Intergovernmental organization standards referenced Topics addressed Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) BSCI Code of conduct • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Global Compact • ILO Fundamental Human Rights Conventions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Caux Round Table Caux Round Table Principles for Business • None specifically Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) CEPI Code of Conduct • None specifically Environment Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition Electronic Industry Code of Conduct • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Global Compact • UN Convention Against Corruption • ILO Fundamental Human Rights Conventions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Equator Principles Equator Principles • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment Forética Norma SGE 21 • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Global Compact • Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Businesses and Social Policy • Other ILO Conventions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery International Chamber of Commerce ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development • None specifically Environment ICC Rules of Conduct to Compact Extortion and Bribery • UN Convention Against Corruption • UN Global Compact • OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials Bribery International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI) International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI) CARE Code of conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices International Hydropower Association (IHA) IHA sustainability Guidelines • None specifically Environment International Mining and Metals Council (IMMC) Principles for Sustainable Development Performance • UN Global Compact • Rio Declaration • Other ILO Conventions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises • OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Petroleum Industry (IPIECA) Guidelines for Reporting Greenhouse Gas Emissions • None specifically Environment Responsible Care (Chemical industry) The Responsible Global Charter • UN Global Compact Labour practices Environment World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) The PACI Principles for Countering Bribery • UN Global Compact • OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Bribery World Cocoa Foundation Sustainability Principles • None specifically Human rights Labour practices Environment World Federation Sporting Foods Industry (WFSFI) WFSFI Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Source: UNCTAD, based on data from individual initiatives.
ANNEX TABLES 219 Annex table IV.1. Top 10 contract manufacturers in electronics, ranked by revenues, 2009a Company Home economy Revenues ($ billion) Selected major clients Global employment Major overseas production bases Other relevant information Foxconn/ Hon Hai Taiwan Province of China 59.3 Apple Inc, Hewlett-Packard, Dell, Nokia, Sony Ericsson, Samsung, Microsoft, Acer, Intel, Samsung, Cisco, Nintendo, Amazon 611 000 China, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Czech Republic Manufacturing operations in many countries. About 20 factories in China. Flextronics Singapore 30.9 Alcatel-Lucent, Cisco, Dell, Sony Ericsson, Hewlett-Packard, Huawei, Lenovo, Microsoft, Eastman Kodak, Western Digital, Research in Motion, Motorola 160 000 Brazil, China, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Ukraine, India Manufacturing facilities in 30 countries covering the Americas, Europe and Asia. Quanta Taiwan Province of China 25.4 Apple Inc, Compaq, Dell, Hewlett- Packard, Fujitsu, LG, Siemens AG, Sony, Gateway, Cisco, Lenovo, Siemens AG, Sharp Corporation, Panasonic, Research in Motion, Gericom, Toshiba 64 719 China, United States, Germany Manufactuirng operations in the Americas, Asia and Europe. A number of factories are in China. Compal Taiwan Province of China 20.4 Acer Inc, Dell, Toshiba, Hewlett- Packard, Fujitsu-Siemens, Lenovo 58 025 China, Viet Nam, Poland, Brazil, United States Have a number of factories in China. Wistron Taiwan Province of China 13.9 Acer, Sony, Dell, Microsoft, Lenovo, FSC, Hewlett-Packard 39 239 China, Philippines, Czech Republic, Mexico Wistron has RD centres in China and the Netherlands. Inventec Taiwan Province of China 13.5 Apple Inc, Acer, Hewlett-Packard, Toshiba, Fujitsu-Siemens, Lenovo 29 646 China, Republic of Korea, United States, Mexico, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Malaysia RD facilities in the United States, United Kingdom and Japan. Software and service outsourcing centres in China. Jabil United States 13.4 Apple Inc, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, IBM, Echostar, NetApp, Pace, Research in Motion, General Electric 61 000 Brazil, Mexico, Austria, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Hungary, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Viet Nam 59 manufacturing and design facilities in over 20 countries covering the Americas, Europe and Asia. TPV Technology Hong Kong, China 8.0 Dell, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Mitsubishi Electric 24 479 Mainly in China. Also in Poland, Brazil and Mexico Also sell PC monitors under its various own brands such as AOC and Topview. 2009 revenues of PC monitors was made up of 31% own brand manufacturing (OBM) and 69% original design manufacturing (ODM), while LDC TV was 12% OBM and 88% ODM. Celestica Canada 6.5 Cisco, Hitachi, IBM, Research in Motion 35 000 China, Malaysia, Singa- pore, Thailand, Mexico, United States, Czech Republic, Ireland, Romania, United Kingdom 20 manufacturing and design facilities world wide. Celestica has a regional technology centre in Thailand and a global design services facility based in Taiwan Province of China. Sanmina-SCI United States 5.2 IBM, Lenovo, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, Dell, Nokia, Caterpillar 31 698 Mexico, Brazil, Hun- gary, Malaysia, Singapore, China, Indonesia, Thailand Manufactures products in 18 countries. Total of the top 10 .. 196.5 .. .. .. .. Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Bloomberg and company annual reports. a These companies are commonly referred to as “electronic manufacturing services”(EMS) providers.
220 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development AnnextableIV.2.Top10autopartscontractmanufacturers,rankedbyrevenues,2009 Company Home economy Totalglobalauto- motivepartssales ($billion) SelectedmajorclientsEmployeesc Otherrelevantinformationc DensoCorpJapan32a GeneralMotors,Chrysler,BMW, MercedesBenz,Toyota,Honda,Isuzu, Subaru,Mazda,Hino,Mitsubishi,Hyun- dai,Kia,DeerCo,Caterpillar,Suzuki, Cummins,CNH.In2008,Toyota accountedfor30%ofDenso'ssales. 120000Operatesin33countrieswith34overseassubsidiariesintheAmericas,Europe(34)andAsia-Oceania(48). About42%ofsalesinfiscalyear2009-2010weregeneratedoutsideJapan,with15%intheAmericas,Europe (12%)andAsia-Pacific(15%).About76%ofthesalesinJapanwerewiththirdpartycustomers,intheAmericas (99%),Europe(98%)andAsia-Pacific(93%). RobertBoschGermany25.6About76%ofthesalesrevenueswere generatedoutsideGermany. 270687with41%inGermany, Europe(26%),Americas (12%),Asia-Pacificandother countries(21%). Thecompanyhas300subsidiariesandregionalcompaniesin60countries. AisinSeikiJapan22.1InadditiontoToyota,othermajor customersincludeVolkswagen,Suzuki, Ford,Mitsubishi,GeneralMotors, Mazda,Daewoo,NissanandHyundai. 74447Has154subsidiaries,ofwhich71domesticand83overseas.MajorproductionbasesincludeThailand,China andtheUnitedStates(withmanyfactories).Othermajormanufacturingcentres:UnitedKingdom,Belgium, CzechRepublic,Turkey,Indonesia,India,Brazil,MexicoandCanada.About25%ofsalesin2009-2010were outsideofJapan. ContinentalGermany18.7Volkswagen,Daimler,Ford,Volvo, Iveco,BMW,Toyota,Honda,Renault, GeneralMotors,Koegel,Freightliner Trucks. 148228with33%inGermany, Europe(33%),NAFTA(14%) andAsia(15%). Operatesin46countriesandconsistsofautomotiveandrubbergroups.About99%ofthesalesaretoexternal customers.Thisincludesforthechassisandsafetydivision,powertrain,interior,andpassengerandlighttruck tires.Salesin2009wereconcentratedinEurope(34%ofglobalsales),29%inGermany,17%inNAFTAand 14%inAsia.Ithas18factoriesinChinaalone. Magna International Canada17.4GeneralMotors,Ford,BMW,Fiat/ Chrysler,VW,Daimler. 96000mainlyinEurope, UnitedStates,Mexicoand Canadainthatorder. Has256manufacturingoperationsin26countriescoveringfivecontinentswiththefollowingmanufacturing/ assemblingfacilitiesin:UnitedStates(49),Mexico(29),China(15),India(5),Brazil(5),Argentina(4),Republic ofKorea(4),SouthAfrica(2),Thailand(1). LGChemRepublic ofKorea 13.1b GeneralMotors,HyundaiMotor,Volvo, FordandRenault. 13000Thecompanyhasaglobalnetworkof25businesslocationsin15countries.About81%ofthecompany'stotal revenuesin2008werefromthepetrochemicalsectorand19%frominformation,electronicmaterialsandbatte- ries.Chinaisthelargesthostcountryintermsofrevenues.In2008,Chinaaccountedfor64.4%oftheoverseas sales.MostofitsoverseasmanufacturingfacilitiesareconcentratedinChina(9locations).Ithasmanufacturing facilitiesinIndia,VietNam,TaiwanProvinceofChinaandPoland.Ithas2RDcentresintheUnitedStates. FaureciaFrance13PSAPeugeot-Citroëncontributed20% ofthe2009sales.Othermajorcusto- mersincludeVWGroup,Ford,Renault/ Nissan,BMW,GM,Daimler,Toyota, Chrysler-Fiat. 58414PartofthePeugeotgroup.Ithasanetworkof200productionsitesin32countries.Mostoftheoverseas productionplantsareintheUnitedStates,Spain,Germany,China.FaureciahasplantsinMexico,Brazil, Argentina,UnitedKingdom,Portugal,Sweden,Poland,CzechRepublicandIndia.Ithas33RDcentersacross theworldwithsignificantpresenceinEuropeandtheUnitedStates.OtheroverseasRDfacilitiesareinChina, IndiaandBrazil. Johnson Controls United States 12.8a InFY2010,thecompany'slargest customerswereFordMotorCompany, GeneralMotors(GM),Daimler,Chrys- ler.ForFY2009,thegeographical salesdistributionwereUnitedStates (39%),Germany(10%),Mexico(3%), otherEuropeancountries(26%),and therestoftheworld(22%). 130000Thecompanyhas175manufacturing/assemblyplantsin27countries. Delphi Holding United States 11.8GeneralMotors,Fordandother automotivemanufacturers.Customers aremainlythetier1autosuppliers. About21%oftherevenueswerefrom GMandaffiliates,and79%withother customers. 146600Thecompanyhasoperationsin32countries. ZFFriedrichs- hafen Germany11.7Amongthemajorcustomersinclude: AlfaRomeo,BMW,DKW,Fahr,Ford, KruppTitan,Lotus,MercedesBenz, Peugeot,Porsche. 59771ZFGrouphas117productioncompaniesin26countriesandeightmaindevelopmentlocations.ZFoperations cover5continents:Europe,NorthAmerica,SouthAmerica,Asia-PacificandMiddleEastAfica. Ofthe117productioncompanies,31wereinGermany,China(19),UnitedStates(10),France(7),Brazil(5), India(5),SouthAfrica(5),Mexico(4),Slovakia(3),UnitedKingdom(3)andItaly(3). Totalofthe top10 ..178.2...... Source:UNCTAD,basedonBloomberg,annualreportsofcompanies,andAutomotiveNews:“Top100GlobalSuppliers”,14June2010. a Fiscalyear.b Estimate.c 2010. Note:Thesefiguresdonotincludeafter-marketsalesandunrelatedsalesoftherespectivecompanies.
ANNEX TABLES 221 Annex table IV.3. Top 10 pharmaceutical contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009a Companyb Home economy Contract mfg revenue ($ million) Selected major clients Global employment Major overseas production bases Catalent Pharma Solutions, Inc. United States 1 640 Most of the top 50 pharmaceutical com- panies, including Pfizer, Merck, Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, Bayer, Amgen, Roche and AstraZeneca. Top 20 customers account for 55% of revenues. 9 200 The company has 20 facilities worldwide covering 5 continents. Lonza Group AG Switzerland 1 310 KaloBios Pharmaceuticals Inc, Genentech, Enobia, Athera. 8 386 United States, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, China, and Singapore. Has RD facili- ties in India, Japan and France. Boehringer Ingelheim Verwaltungs GmbH Germany 1 096 MorphoSys, Elan, Amgen Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Bayer Schering Pharma Ag, Genentech, Genzyme Corp, GlaxoS- mithKline, InterMune, MedImmune, Merck, Nycomed Danmark. 6 200 Production sites in North and South America, Europe and Asia. Production facilities for contract manufacturing are in Austria, United States, Italy, Spain, Indonesia, Brazil and Greece. Royal DSM Netherlands 1 006 Novacta Biosystems Ltd, APT Pharmaceu- ticals Inc, GlycoMimetics Inc, Genzyme Pharmaceuticals, MorphoSys, NicOx. 4 374 Has faclities in United States, China, India, Austria and other European countries. Piramal Healthcare Ltd India 735 Major customers from 50 top pharma companies. Asia revenues are mainly gene- rated in India. However, share of revenues from outside India is growing. About 28% of the total revenues are from contract manufacturing. 7 311 Production facilities in Canada and the United Kingdom include also process pharma deve- lopment. In China operation limited to material sourcing. Jubilant Life Sciences (formerly known as Jubilant Orga- nosys Limited) India 710 Clients include Amgen, AstraZeneca, Duke Medicine, Endo Pharmaceuticals, GlaxoSmithKline, Guerbet. 5 950 The company has production facilities in the United States and Canada. NIPRO Corporation Japan 625 .. 9 939 In the area of pharmaceutical, has facilities in Brazil, United States, Thailand, China and India. About 33% of the company's revenues is from contract pharmaceutical operations. Patheon Inc. Canada 530 Has about 300 customers worldwide. Of which: 19 of the world’s 20 largest pharmaceutical companies, 6 of the world’s 10 largest biotechnology companies and 5 of the world’s 10 largest speciality pharma- ceutical companies. 4 000 Also operates in 14 locations with development and manufacturing facilities in the United States, United Kingdom, France and Italy. Fareva Holding France 418 Has many pharmaceutical company cus- tomers including some of the largest ones and Omega Pharma. 5 000 Has facilities in a number of countries, including Germany, Italy, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ita- ly and Turkey. It has a RD facility in Germany. Haupt Pharma AG Germany 348 Has over 200 international pharmaceutical companies including some of the major global ones. 2 000 Italy, France and Japan. Total of the top 10 .. 8 418 .. .. .. Source: UNCTAD, based on Bloomberg, company’s annual reports and information. a Only includes revenues from contract manufacturing activities. b Evonik (Degussa) is a significant contract manufacturer and specific information on the company is not available.
222 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development AnnextableIV.4.Useofcontractmanufacturingbymajorgarmentandfootwearbrandowners,selectedindicators,2009 BrandfirmHomeeconomyTotalsales Numberof supplier countries Number ofsuppliers Numberof supplierfactoriesNumberofsupplierworkersMajorproductionbases/otherinformation ChristianDior (includesLVMH) France25459........ Theuseofsubcontractorsforfashionandleathergoodsoperationsrepresentedabout43%ofthecostofsalesofChristian Diorin2010.About70%ofChristianDior'sproductionaresuppliedfromEurope(France,ItalyandSpain),Asia~20%,North America~5%,andOthers~5%. NikeUnitedStates1908346.... 600823026(490670in NorthAsia,256385inSouth Asia,51604intheAmericas and24367inEMEAa ). AllfootwearisproducedbycontractsuppliersoutsideoftheUnitedStates.InFY2010,contractfactoriesinVietNam,China, Indonesia,ThailandandIndiamanufacturedapproximately37%,34%,23%,2%and1%oftotalNIKEBrandfootwear,res- pectively.NIKEalsohascontractmanufacturingagreementswithindependentfactoriesinArgentina,Brazil,IndiaandMexico toproducefootwearforsaleprimarilywithinthosecountries.AlmostallofNIKEBrandapparelismanufacturedoutsideofthe UnitedStatesbyindependentcontractmanufacturerslocatedin33countriessuchasinChina,Thailand,Indonesia,Malaysia, VietNam,SriLanka,Turkey,Cambodia,ElSalvador,MexicoandTaiwanProvinceofChina. AdidasGroupGermany1489469..1230.. Adidasisservicedbymultiplesuppliersinmanylocations.MostofthesuppliersareinAsiaincountriessuchasChina,India, Indonesia,ThailandandVietNam. HMHennes MauritzAB Sweden14507306751693.. HMisservicedbymultiplesuppliersinmanydifferentlocations.Thebrandfirmworkswithsome675contractsuppliersin about30countries,mainlyinAsiaandEurope.About660factoriesinEastandSoutheastAsia,580intheEMEAregionand over400inSouthAsiaproducedforHM. TheGapIncUnitedStates14197....728.. Likeotherbrandfirms,Gapusescontractmanufacturingextensively.Ithasmultiplecontractsuppliersbasedindifferentlow costproducingcountries.Gap'scontractfactoriesincludeSouthAsia(188factories),China(186),SoutheastAsia(180),North Asia(57),Mexico,CentralAmericatheCaribbean(39),NorthAfricaMiddleEast(20),Europe(20),UnitedStatesand Canada(18),SouthAmerica(14)andSub-SaharanAfrica(5). InditexSASpain13336..1237.. 308508(forfactoriespartofthe cluster):161080Bangladesh, 43275Turkey,14264Portugal, 36804Morocco,53085India. Some599suppliersinEurope,480inAsia,94inAfricaand51inAmericasproducedforInditex. VFUnitedStates714360..1500+.. In2010,about66%ofgoodsofVFweremanufacturedbyoutsourcingwith51%ofsuppliersfromAsia,NorthAmerica(18%), CentralandSouthAmerica(16%),Europe(12%)andAfrica(3%). PoloRalphLaurenUnitedStates5019..400+.... InFY2010,lessthan2%,bydollarvolume,ofthebrandfirm'sproductswereproducedintheUnitedStates,andover98%,by dollarvolume,wereproducedoutsidetheUnitedStates,primarilyinAsia,EuropeandSouthAmerica. PumaRudolfDassler Sport Germany353045.. 351(292indeveloping andtransitioneconomies, 100inChina,30inTurkey, and22inVietNam). 300000inauditedfacilities (includingtier2and3suppliers). AmajorityofPuma'scontractsuppliersareinAsia.ChinaandVietNamarethemainprocurementsourcesinadditionto Indonesia,CambodiaandBangladesh.Regionalprocurementcontinuestoplayanimportantrole,inparticularforSouth America.Asaconsequence,theprocurementvolumeincreasedconsiderablyinBrazilandArgentina. TheJonesGroupUnitedStates3327........ ApparelsoldbyJonesGroupisproducedinaccordancewiththefirm'sdesign,specificationandproductionschedulesthrough anextensivenetworkofindependentfactorieslocatedthroughouttheworld,primarilyinAsia,withadditionalproduction locatedintheMiddleEastandAfrica.NearlyalltheapparelproductsweremanufacturedoutsideNorth Americaduring2010.JonesGrouphaslong-termmutuallysatisfactorybusinessrelationshipswithmanyofitscontractorsand agentsbutdonothavelong-termwrittenagreementswithanyofthem. CollectiveBrandsIncUnitedStates3308....101.. Nearly85%ofthecostoffootwearofCollectiveBrandsin2009weresuppliedbycontractfactoriesinChina.Thefirmis diversifyingitsmanufacturingbasenotonlybetweencountriesbutalsowithinChinainordertoreducecosts.In2010,thefirm sourced13%offootwearfromVietNamandtheremaining3%fromdifferentcountriesincludingBrazil,India,Indonesiaand Thailand.Productsaremanufacturedtomeetthefirm'sspecificationsandstandards. AmericanEagle OutfittersInc UnitedStates299120+..450+.. Thebrandfirmdoesnotownoroperateanymanufacturingfacilities.Itsbrandedproductsareproducedbythird-partycontract manufacturerslocatedinmorethan20countries. AbercrombieFitch Company UnitedStates292928191.... DuringFY2010,thisbrandfirmpurchasedmerchandisefromapproximately191vendorsindifferentpartsoftheworld;primar- ilyinAsiaandCentralandSouthAmerica.Thefirmdidnotsourcemorethan5%ofitsmerchandisefromanysinglefactoryor supplierduringFY2010. BenettonItaly2925........ Benettonhasanetworkofcontractsuppliersindifferentcountries.Itoutsourceproductiontosuppliersinvariouscountries, includingChina,India,ThailandandTurkey.ThreemainareasofsourcingforBenettonare:ChinacoordinatedfromHong Kong(China);SouthEastAsia(Thailand,Cambodia,LaoPDR,VietNam,Indonesia)coordinatedfrom Bangkok;India(coordinatedfromBangalore).AsofDecember2010,thesourcedproductsofBenettonincludingthoseunder contractmanufacturingrepresentedapproximately50%ofitstotalproduction. OnwardHoldingsJapan2668........ Onwarddoesnotownanyfactories.Itskeysuppliersareoverseaspartners(90%ofmanufacturingisdoneoutsideJapan,of which70-80%isdoneinChina). PhillipsVanHeusenUnitedStates239955..1014.. Mostofthebrandfirm'sdressshirtsandallofitssportsweararesourcedandmanufacturedintheFarEast,theIndiansub- continent,theMiddleEast,theCaribbeanandCentralAmerica.Itsfootwearissourcedandmanufacturedthroughthirdparty suppliersprincipallyintheFarEast,Europe,SouthAmericaandtheCaribbean. HugoBossGermany2241..~300.... HugoBosshasitsownproductionfacilitiesandoutsourcedasignificantportionofitsproductionrequirementtothird-party suppliers.About76%ofthefullproductlineisproducedbyindependentsuppliersforHugoBoss.About51%ofitsproduction areproducedinEasternEurope,27%inAsia,11%WesternEurope,9%NorthAfricaand2%Americas. Totaloftheselected majorbrandowners ..139956.......... Source:UNCTAD,basedonFairLabourAssociation,“2009AnnualReport”,June2010(www.FairLabor.org)andcompany’sreports. a Europe,theMiddleEastandAfrica(EMEA).
ANNEX TABLES 223 Annex table IV.5. Top 15 outsourcing IT-BPO service providers, ranked by revenues, 2009 Company Home economy IT-BPO Revenue ($ Million) Global employment Major service centres International Business Machines Corporationa United States 38 201 426,751, of which 190,000 in global business services. About 100,000 staff work in IBM’s delivery centres in India where most are involved in BPO services. IBM has over 50 IT-BPO related service centres in more than 40 countries, with most of them located in developing economies. Hewlett-Packard Companya United States 34 935 324,600 of which 139,500 in IT-BPO in over 50 countries. In 2007, about 30% of HP Services’ global work force was based in India. Key service centres are in the United States, India and the United Kingdom. HP has services locations in more than 50 countries. It has 7 global business centres located in India, China, Singapore, Mexico, Costa Rica and Spain. Fujitsu Ltd Japan 27 071 172,438 of which 18,000 are in Fujitsu Services. It’s subsidiary, TDS, has about 1,200 employees in IT-BPO services. Fujitsu has a network of 91 data centers and outsourcing services in 16 countries worldwide, including United Kingdom, Finland, Australia, China, Singapore, the Philippines and India. Xerox Corporationa United States 9 637 136,500, of which 46,000 are in services. The global service centres are located in various parts of the world, including India, Mexico, the Philippines, Jamaica, Ghana, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, Spain, Poland and Ireland. Accenturea Ireland 9 179 204,000, majority in technology services and outsourcing activities. Accenture has a global delivery network of more than 50 centres located in different parts of the world. It operates in the Americas, Europe, Middle East and Africa. NTT Data Corporation Japan 8 925 231,315, of which 34,543 is in System Integration and IT services. Emerio, a subsidiary, employs 1,400 people in 14 global bases. NTT locations include the United States, the United Kingdom and also many developing countries such as China, India, Singapore and the Phlippines. Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) United States 6 451 94,000, of which 45,000 in managed services sector. CSC has services centres globally including in India, China, South Asia, Eastern Europe, Australia, Singapore and Viet Nam. Capgeminia France 6 071 108,698. It has more than 20,000 outsourcing service workforce in India alone. Capgemini has presence in over 36 countries. It has outsourcing centres in India, Romania, Viet Nam, Australia and other locations. Dell United States 5 622 96,000, of which 43, 000 in services. Dell Services Applications and BPO activities include more than 15,000 employees globally.b Dell International Services has a number of operations in India, Europe, Latin America, Canada and the Philippines. Logicaa United Kingdom 5 459 38,963 (5,750 in offshore sites). Logica has service operations in more than 35 countries with outsourced service delivery in India, Philippines, Morocco, Malaysia and Eastern European countries. Tata Consultancy Services India 5 164 396,517, of which 143,000 Tata Consultancy Services. TCS has achieved scale in Latin American markets, as well as Eastern Europe, Middle-East, Africa and the Asia Pacific region. Atos Origina France 5 011 49,036, of which 41,324 in Managed Services, Medical BPO, Systems Integration. Four key offshore locations for Managed Services: India, Malaysia, Morocco and Poland. Wipro India 4 189 108,071, out of which 22,000 in BPO activities. Wipro has service facilities in the United States, France, Germany, Australia, Netherlands, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It has presence also in Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Philippines, Poland, Brazil and China. EMC Corporation United States 3 875 48,500 It has presence in many countries, including China and Singapore. Unisys Corporation United States 2 754 22,900, of which 17,000 experienced services professionals. It has significant operations in different parts of the world including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. In developing countries, its presence in India and China is notable. Total .. 172 554 .. .. Sources: UNCTAD, based on data from International Association of Outsourcing Professionals, “Global Outsourcing 100: 2010” for ranking of top 15 IT-BPO service providers; Bloomberg; respective companies’ annual reports and information; Outsourcing Alert (http://www.outsourcing-alert.com/2010/); and research papers by consultancy firms. a 2010 data. b See “Vaswani to lead Dell Services” applications and BPO arm”, Business Standard, 6 April 2011.
224 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table IV.6. Top 15 global franchise chains, ranked by revenues, 2009 Franchise Brand Parent company Home economy World- wide sales in 2009 ($ million) Total units Domestic units International units Internationali- zation degree (Per cent) Number of countries covered (world- wide) Number of developing and transition economies covered McDonald's McDonald's Corporation United States 70 693 31 967 13 918 18 049 56 117 77 7-Eleven Seven and i Hol- dings Co. Ltd. Japan 53 700 35 603 6 378 29 225 82 15 9 KFC Yum! Brands, Inc United States 17 800 12 459 5 166 7 293 59 109 75 Subway Doctor's Associates, Inc. United States 12 900 30 257 21 881 8 376 28 98 60 Burger King Burger King Holdings, Inc. United States 12 789 11 925 7 534 4 391 37 76 60 Ace Hardware Ace Hardware Corp. United States 12 500 4 630 4 410 220 5 70 34 Pizza Hut Yum! Brands, Inc United States 10 400 11 068 6 119 4 949 45 95 90 Circle K Stores Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. Canada 9 148 7 077 3 324 3 753 53 8 6 Wendy's Wendy's/Arby's Group United States 9 000 6 630 5 905 725 11 47 35 Marriott Hotels, Resorts Suites Marriott International United States 8 539 531 348 183 34 72 57 Hilton Hotels Resorts Hilton Worldwide United States 7 700 526 253 273 52 76 40 RE/MAX RE/MAX, LLC United States 7 500 6 552 3 745 2 807 43 98 75 Taco Bell Yum! Brands, Inc United States 7 000 5 345 5 142 203 4 21 10 Blockbuster Blockbuster, Inc United States 6 200 7 405 4 585 2 820 38 21 12 Holiday Inn Hotels Resorts InterContinental Hotels Group United Kingdom 5 840 1 353 920 433 32 100 (all brands) 80 Total of the top 15 .. .. 251 709 .. .. .. .. .. .. Source: UNCTAD, based on Franchise Times, “Top 200 Franchise Systems”, October 2010; Franchise Direct, “Top 100 Global Franchises 2010” (http:www. franchisedirect.com/top100globalfranchises/rankings/?year=2010) and company’s annual reports.
ANNEX TABLES 225 Annex table IV.7. Top 10 global semiconductor foundry contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009 Company Home economy Revenue ($ Million) Selected clients Global employ- ment Major production bases Market share (Per cent) Other relevant information Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) Taiwan Province of China 9 246 TSMC serves more than 400 cus- tomers worldwide, which include Applied Micro Circuits Corporation, Qualcomm, Altera, Broadcom, Conexant, Marvell, Nvidia, LSI Logic, Intel, Xilinx, AMD, Apple and Texas Instruments. 26 390 Taiwan Province of China, United States, China, Singapore 46 TSMC is a significant outsource manufacturer for advanced IC producers. It is the world's largest pure play semiconductor foundry. Like many other foundries, TSMC does not design, manufacture or market semiconductor products under its own brand name. United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) Taiwan Province of China 2857 The major customers of UMC include Qualcomm, Texas Instruments, Infineon, STMi- croelectronics, Sony, Agilent Technologies and leading fabless design companies, such as Xilinx, Broadcom, MediaTek, Realtek and Novatek. 13 051 Taiwan Province of China, Singapore, Japan 14 UMC purchased a majority of silicon wafers from a few suppliers. In 2010, four suppliers; Shin-Etsu Handotai Corporation, Siltronic AG, MEMC Corporation and Sumco Group (including Sumco Corpo- ration and Formosa Sumco Technology Corporation) were the major suppliers. In 2010, the top 10 customers accounted for 63.2% of the net operating revenues. More than 62% of revenues in 2008–2010 came from overseas customers outside of the economy. Chartered Semiconductora Singa- pore 1 542 Motorola, National Semiconductor, Qualcomm, Texas Instruments. 3 500 Singapore 8 Although all its production/fabrication facilities are in Singapore, the company has a business presence in 11 countries in 2009. GlobalFoun- driesb United States 1 101 With Chartered Semiconductor, GlobalFoundries has more than 150 customers, which include many of the world's largest semi- conductor companies. Some of its customers include ST Microelec- tronics, ARM, AMD, Broadcom and Qualcomm. 10 000 Fabrication facilities are located in the United States, Germany and Singapore. 5 GlobalFoundries was formerly part of AMD and has only started operations in March 2009. With the acquisition of Chartered Semiconductor in late 2009, GlobalFoundries' revenues and market share are expected to surge in 2010. It is also engaged in collaborative RD with Freescale, IBM, Infineon, NEC, Samsung and Toshiba. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) China 1 071 About 69% of the revenues are outside China (with 56% from North America and 13% from Taiwan Province of China). 10 307 All its production facilities are based in China. 5 The company has marketing offices in the United States, Europe and Japan, and a representative office in Hong Kong (China). Dongbu HiTek Republic of Korea 440 Analog Devices, Sanken, Silicon Mitus 3 360 It has two fabs in the Republic of Korea 2 The company has two fabrication facilities and both are in Republic of Korea. It has a sales and RD networks in Taiwan Province of China, Japan, United States, France and Italy. Vanguard International Semiconductor (VIS) Taiwan Province of China 394 TSMC account for nearly 30% of its revenues. Another major customer is Winbond Electronics Corporation. 3 236 Taiwan Province of China 2 VIS started as a subcontractor to TSMC. The top 10 of its major customers accounted for more than 80% of the company's revenues. TowerJazz Israel 309 Include semiconductor companies such as Atheros Communications, Conexant, Fairchild Semiconduc- tor, International Rectifier, Ikanos, Intersil, Marvell Technology Group, National Semiconductor, Freescale Semiconductor, On Semiconductor, Panavision, Toshiba, Vishay - Siliconix, Texas Instruments, VIA Technologies and Zoran Corporation. 1 600 Israel, United States 2 Jazz Semiconductor was acquired by Tower Semiconductor in 2008. The new company's name is TowerJazz. Through manufacturing partnerhsip with strategic alliances TowerJazz has accessed to production facilities in China. IBM Microelectronics United States 285 .. .. United States 1 .. Samsung Electronics Republic of Korea 290 Customers include Dell, Ixys, Qualcomm, Xilinx and Apple. 39 900 Republic of Korea and the United States 1 It has 15 fabrication facilities, 10 test and assembly facilities, 5 RD pilot lines. Semiconductor fabs are located mainly in Republic of Korea and United States. IC assembly plants are located in Republic of Korea and China. Semiconductor RD facilities in United States, China, Japan, Russia, India and Israel. Total of the top 10 .. 14 678 .. - .. 73 .. Source: UNCTAD, based on Gartner, “Market Share: Semiconductor Foundry, Worldwide, 2009”, April 2010, Bloomberg and company’s information and reports. a In 2009, the company was acquired by Advanced Technology Investment Company (Abu Dhabi). b Globalfoundries was formerly part of AMD. Sales are from AMD annual report “foundry services”.
226 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development SELECTED UNCTAD PUBLICATION SERIES ON TNCs AND FDI World Investment Report www.unctad.org/wir World Investment Prospects Survey www.unctad.org/diae Global Investment Trends Monitor www.unctad.org/iia Investment Policy Monitor www.unctad.org/iia Issues in International Investment Agreements www.unctad.org/iia International Investment Policies for Development www.unctad.org/iia Investment Advisory Series A and B www.unctad.org/diae Investment Policy Reviews www.unctad.org/ipr Current Series on FDI and Development www.unctad.org/diae Transnational Corporations Journal www.unctad.org/tnc The sales publications may be purchased from distributors of United Nations publications throughout the world. They may also be obtained by contacting: United Nations Publications Customer Service c/o National Book Network 15200 NBN Way PO Box 190 Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214 email: unpublications@nbnbooks.com https://unp.un.org/ For further information on the work on foreign direct investment and transnational corporations, please address inquiries to: Division on Investment and Enterprise United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Palais des Nations, Room E-10052 CH-1211 Geneva 10 Switzerland Telephone: +41 22 917 4533 Fax: +41 22 917 0498 web: www.unctad.org/diae HOW TO OBTAIN THE PUBLICATIONS

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Wir2011 en

  • 1. U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 2011 NewYorkandGeneva,2011
  • 2. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentii UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.11.II.D.2 ISBN 978-92-1-112828-4 Copyright © United Nations, 2011 All rights reserved Printed in Switzerland NOTE The Division on Investment and Enterprise of UNCTAD is a global centre of excellence, dealing with issues related to investment and enterprise development in the United Nations System. It builds on three and a half decades of experience and international expertise in research and policy analysis, intergovernmental consensus-building, and provides technical assistance to developing countries. The terms country/economy as used in this Report also refer, as appropriate, to territories or areas; the designations employed and the presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. In addition, the designations of country groups are intended solely for statistical or analytical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage of development reached by a particular country or area in the development process. The major country groupings used in this Report follow the classification of the United Nations Statistical Office. These are: Developed countries: the member countries of the OECD (other than Chile, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Turkey), plus the new European Union member countries which are not OECD members (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania), plus Andorra, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. Transition economies: South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Developing economies: in general all economies not specified above. For statistical purposes, the data for China do not include those for Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR), Macao Special Administrative Region (Macao SAR) and Taiwan Province of China. Reference to companies and their activities should not be construed as an endorsement by UNCTAD of those companies or their activities. The boundaries and names shown and designations used on the maps presented in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The following symbols have been used in the tables: • Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. Rows in tables have been omitted in those cases where no data are available for any of the elements in the row. • A dash (–) indicates that the item is equal to zero or its value is negligible. • A blank in a table indicates that the item is not applicable, unless otherwise indicated. • A slash (/) between dates representing years, e.g., 1994/95, indicates a financial year. • Use of a dash (–) between dates representing years, e.g. 1994–1995, signifies the full period involved, including the beginning and end years. • Reference to “dollars” ($) means United States dollars, unless otherwise indicated. • Annual rates of growth or change, unless otherwise stated, refer to annual compound rates. Details and percentages in tables do not necessarily add to totals because of rounding. The material contained in this study may be freely quoted with appropriate acknowledgement.
  • 3. iii PREFACE Global foreign direct investment (FDI) has not yet bounced back to pre-crisis levels, though some regions show better recovery than others. The reason is not financing constraints, but perceived risks and regulatory uncertainty in a fragile world economy. The World Investment Report 2011 forecasts that, barring any economic shocks, FDI flows will recover to pre-crisis levels over the next two years. The challenge for the development community is to make this anticipated investment have greater impact on our efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In 2010 – for the first time – developing economies absorbed close to half of global FDI inflows. They also generated record levels of FDI outflows, much of it directed to other countries in the South. This further demonstrates the growing importance of developing economies to the world economy, and of South-South cooperation and investment for sustainable development. Increasingly, transnational corporations are engaging with developing and transition economies through a broadening array of production and investment models, such as contract manufacturing and farming, service outsourcing, franchising and licensing. These relatively new phenomena present opportunities for developing and transition economies to deepen their integration into the rapidly evolving global economy, to strengthen the potential of their home-grown productive capacity, and to improve their international competitiveness. Unlocking the full potential of these new developments will depend on wise policymaking and institution building by governments and international organizations. Entrepreneurs and businesses in developing and transition economies need frameworks in which they can benefit fully from integrated international production and trade. I commend this report, with its wealth of research and analysis, to policymakers and businesses pursuing development success in a fast-changing world. BAN Ki-moon Secretary-General of the United Nations
  • 4. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The World Investment Report 2011(WIR11) was prepared by a team led by James Zhan. The team members include Richard Bolwijn, Quentin Dupriez, Masataka Fujita, Thomas van Giffen, Michael Hanni, Kalman Kalotay, Joachim Karl, Ralf Krüger, Guoyong Liang, Anthony Miller, Hafiz Mirza, Nicole Moussa, Shin Ohinata, Astrit Sulstarova, Elisabeth Tuerk, Jörg Weber and Kee Hwee Wee. Wolfgang Alschner, Amare Bekele, Federico Di Biasio, Hamed El Kady, Ariel Ivanier, Lizzie Medrano, Cai Mengqi, Abraham Negash, Sergey Ripinski, Claudia Salgado, Christoph Spennemann, Katharina Wortmann and Youngjun Yoo also contributed to the Report. Peter Buckley served as principal consultant. WIR11 also benefited from the advice of Ilan Alon, Mark Casson, Lorraine Eden, Pierre Guislain, Justin Lin, Sarianna Lundan, Ted Moran, Rajneesh Narula, Pierre Sauvé and Timothy Sturgeon. Research and statistical assistance was provided by Bradley Boicourt, Lizanne Martinez and Tadelle Taye as well as interns Hasso Anwer, Hector Dip, Riham Ahmed Marii, Eleni Piteli, John Sasuya and Ninel Seniuk. Production and dissemination of WIR11 was supported by Tserenpuntsag Batbold, Elisabeth Anodeau- Mareschal, Séverine Excoffier, Rosalina Goyena, Natalia Meramo-Bachayani, Chantal Rakotondrainibe and Katia Vieu. The manuscript was edited by Christopher Long and typeset by Laurence Duchemin and Teresita Ventura. Sophie Combette designed the cover. At various stages of preparation, in particular during the four seminars organized to discuss earlier drafts of the Report, the team benefited from comments and inputs received from Rolf Adlung, Marie-Claude Allard, Yukiko Arai, Rashmi Banga, Diana Barrowclough, Francis Bartels, Sven Behrendt, Jem Bendell, Nathalie Bernasconi, Nils Bhinda, Francesco Ciabuschi, Simon Collier, Denise Dunlap-Hinkler, Kevin Gallagher, Patrick Genin, Simona Gentile-Lüdecke, David Hallam, Geoffrey Hamilton, Fabrice Hatem, Xiaoming He, Toh Mun Heng, Paul Hohnen, Anna Joubin-Bret, Christopher Kip, Pascal Liu, Celso Manangan, Arvind Mayaram, Ronaldo Mota, Jean-François Outreville, Peter Muchlinski, Ram Mudambi, Sam Muradzikwa, Peter Nunnenkamp, Offah Obale, Joost Pauwelyn, Carlo Pietrobelli, Jaya Prakash Pradhan, Hassan Qaqaya, Githa Roelans, Ulla Schwager, Emily Sims, Brian Smart, Jagjit Singh Srai, Brad Stillwell, Roger Strange, Dennis Tachiki, Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann, Silke Trumm, Frederico Araujo Turolla, Peter Utting, Kernaghan Webb, Jacques de Werra, Lulu Zhang and Zbigniew Zimny. Numerous officials of central banks, government agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations also contributed to WIR11. The financial support of the Governments of Finland and Sweden is gratefully acknowledged.
  • 5. vCONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE ..................................................................................................iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................iv ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ix KEY MESSAGES .........................................................................................x OVERVIEW ............................................................................................... xii CHAPTER I. GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS ............................................... 1 A. GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS: RECOVERY OVER THE HORIZON....................2 1. Overall trends ...............................................................................................................................2 a. Current trends ...........................................................................................................................................3 b. FDI by sector and industry .......................................................................................................................8 c. FDI by modes of entry ............................................................................................................................10 d. FDI by components ................................................................................................................................11 e. FDI by special funds: private equity and sovereign wealth funds ..........................................................13 2. Prospects ...................................................................................................................................16 B. FDI AS EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FINANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES..............21 C. FURTHER EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION ..................................24 1. Accelerating internationalization of firms .................................................................................24 2. State-owned TNCs .....................................................................................................................28 a. The universe of State-owned TNCs .......................................................................................................28 b. Trends in State-owned TNCs’ FDI ..........................................................................................................32 c. Issues related to corporate governance .................................................................................................34 CHAPTER II. REGIONAL INVESTMENT TRENDS ......................................... 39 A. REGIONAL TRENDS ........................................................................................40 1. Africa ...........................................................................................................................................40 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................40 b. Intraregional FDI for development ..........................................................................................................42 2. South, East and South-East Asia ..............................................................................................45 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................45 b. Rising FDI from developing Asia: emerging diversified industrial patterns ................................................47 3. West Asia ....................................................................................................................................52 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................52 b. Outward FDI strategies of West Asian TNCs ..........................................................................................53 4. Latin America and the Caribbean ..............................................................................................58 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................58 b. Developing country TNCs’ inroads into Latin America ...........................................................................60 5. South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States ......................................63 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................63 b East–South interregional FDI: trends and prospects ..............................................................................65 6. Developed countries ..................................................................................................................69 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................69 b. Bailing out of the banking industry and FDI ...........................................................................................71
  • 6. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentvi B. TRENDS IN STRUCTURALLY WEAK, VULNERABLE AND SMALL ECONOMIES..................................................................... 74 1. Least developed countries ........................................................................................................74 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................74 b. Enhancing productive capacities through FDI .......................................................................................76 2. Landlocked developing countries .............................................................................................79 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................79 b. Leveraging TNC participation in infrastructure development..................................................................82 3. Small island developing States .................................................................................................85 a. Recent trends .........................................................................................................................................85 b. Roles of TNCs in climate change adaptation .........................................................................................87 CHAPTER III. RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ........................................ 93 A. NATIONAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS.................................................................94 1. Investment liberalization and promotion ...................................................................................95 2. Investment regulations and restrictions ....................................................................................96 3. Economic stimulus packages and State aid .............................................................................98 B. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME...................................................100 1. Developments in 2010 .............................................................................................................100 2. IIA coverage of investment ......................................................................................................102 C. OTHER INVESTMENT-RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS .................................103 1. Investment in agriculture .........................................................................................................103 2. G-20 Development Agenda .....................................................................................................104 3. Political risk insurance .............................................................................................................104 D. INTERACTION BETWEEN FDI POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY .......................105 1. Interaction at the national level ...............................................................................................105 2. Interaction at the international level ........................................................................................107 3. Challenges for policymakers ...................................................................................................109 a. “Picking the winner” .............................................................................................................................109 b. Nurturing the selected industries .........................................................................................................109 c. Safeguarding policy space ...................................................................................................................110 d. Avoiding investment protectionism ......................................................................................................110 e. Improving international coordination ....................................................................................................110 E. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ............................................................111 1. Taking stock of existing CSR standards .................................................................................111 a. Intergovernmental organization standards ...........................................................................................111 b. Multi-stakeholder initiative standards ...................................................................................................112 c. Industry association codes and individual company codes .................................................................112 2. Challenges with existing standards: key issues .....................................................................113 a. Gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies .....................................................................................................113 b. Inclusiveness in standard-setting .........................................................................................................114 c. Relationship between voluntary CSR standards and national legislation ............................................114 d. Reporting and transparency .................................................................................................................114 e. Compliance and market impact ...........................................................................................................114 f. Concerns about possible trade and investment barriers .....................................................................115 3. Policy options ...........................................................................................................................117 a. Supporting CSR standards development..............................................................................................117 b. Applying CSR to public procurement policy ........................................................................................117 c. Building capacity ..................................................................................................................................117 d. Promoting CSR disclosure and responsible investment ......................................................................118 e. Moving from soft law to hard law .........................................................................................................118
  • 7. viiCONTENTS f. Strengthening compliance promotion mechanisms among intergovernmental organization standards ...........................................................................................118 g. Applying CSR to investment and trade promotion and enterprise development .................................119 h. Introducing CSR into the international investment regime ...................................................................119 CHAPTER IV. NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................ 123 A. THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND TNC GOVERNANCE.................................................................... 124 1. TNC value chains and governance choices ............................................................................124 2. Defining features of NEMs .......................................................................................................127 B. THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF CROSS-BORDER NEMs..........................................130 1. The overall size and growth of cross-border NEMs................................................................132 2. Trends and indicators by type of NEM.....................................................................................133 a. Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing ................................................................................133 b. Franchising..............................................................................................................................................138 c. Licensing.................................................................................................................................................139 d. Other modalities......................................................................................................................................140 C. DRIVERS AND DETERMINANTS OF NEMs.......................................................142 1. Driving forces behind the growing importance of NEMs .......................................................142 2. Factors that make countries attractive NEM locations ..........................................................144 D. DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF NEMs........................................................147 1. Employment and working conditions ......................................................................................147 2. Local value added ....................................................................................................................153 3. Export generation .....................................................................................................................155 4. Technology and skills acquisition by NEMs ............................................................................157 5. Social and environmental impacts ..........................................................................................160 6. Long-term industrial capacity-building....................................................................................161 E. POLICIES RELATED TO NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION.............................................................................................................165 1. Embedding NEM policies in development strategies ............................................................165 2. Domestic productive capacity-building ..................................................................................166 a. Entrepreneurship policy ........................................................................................................................167 b. Education ..............................................................................................................................................167 c. Enhancing technological capacities .....................................................................................................167 d. Access to finance .................................................................................................................................168 3. Facilitation and promotion of NEMs ........................................................................................169 a. Setting up an enabling legal framework ...............................................................................................169 b. The role of investment promotion agencies .........................................................................................169 c. Home-country policies .........................................................................................................................170 d. International policies .............................................................................................................................170 4. Addressing potential negative effects of NEMs .....................................................................171 a. Strengthening the bargaining power of domestic firms .......................................................................171 b. Addressing competition concerns.........................................................................................................172 c. Labour issues and environmental protection .......................................................................................173 REFERENCES ........................................................................................ 177 ANNEX TABLES ..................................................................................... 185 SELECTED UNCTAD PUBLICATIONS ON TNCS AND FDI ............................ 226
  • 8. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentviii Boxes I.1. Why are data on global FDI inflows and outflows different?.....................................................6 I.2. FDI flows and the use of funds for investment.........................................................................12 I.3. Forecasting global and regional flows of FDI ..........................................................................17 I.4 Effects of the natural disaster on Japanese TNCs and outward FDI.......................................19 I.5. FDI and capital controls ............................................................................................................23 I.6. Recent trends in internationalization of the largest financial TNCs in the world ...................26 I.7. What is a State-owned enterprise: the case of France ...........................................................29 II.1. The Arab Spring and prospects for FDI in North Africa ..........................................................43 II.2. China’s rising investment in Central Asia .................................................................................66 II.3. Russian TNCs expand into Africa .............................................................................................67 II.4. Overcoming the disadvantages of being landlocked: experience of Uzbekistan in attracting FDI in manufacturing .................................................................................................................81 II.5. Natural resource-seeking FDI in Papua New Guinea: old and new investors.........................88 II.6. TNCs and climate change adaptation in the tourism industry in SIDS ..................................89 III.1. Examples of investment liberalization measures in 2010–2011 ..............................................96 III.2. Examples of investment promotion measures in 2010–2011 ..................................................97 III.3. Examples of new regulatory measures affecting established foreign investors in 2010–2011 ..............................................................................................................................98 III.4. Examples of entry restrictions for foreign investors in 2010–2011 .........................................99 III.5. EU FDI Policymaking ..............................................................................................................101 III.6. WTO TRIMS Agreement ..........................................................................................................108 III.7. The 10 principles of the UN Global Compact ........................................................................112 III.8. Impact investing: achieving competitive financial returns while maximizing social and environmental impact ............................................................................................119 IV.1. The evolution of retail franchising in transition economies ...................................................127 IV.2. Methodological note ...............................................................................................................131 IV.3. The use of management contracts in the hotel industry .......................................................141 IV.4 Employment impact in developing countries of NEMs in garment and footwear production ................................................................................................................149 IV.5. Labour conditions in Foxconn’s Chinese operations – concerns and corporate responses ................................................................................................................................151 IV.6. Cyclical employment in contract manufacturing in Guadalajara ..........................................152 IV.7. Value capture can be limited: iPhone production in China....................................................156 IV.8. Managing the environmental impact of contract farming......................................................162 IV.9. From contract manufacturing to building brands – the Chinese white goods sector..........163 IV.10. NEMs as catalysts for capacity-building and development..................................................164 IV.11. Educational reforms in Viet Nam promote entrepreneurship.................................................167 IV.12. Providing access to finance for SMEs engaging in franchising activities.............................169 IV.13. Pre-contractual requirements in franchising...........................................................................172
  • 9. ixABBREVIATIONS ABBREVIATIONS ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations BIT bilateral investment treaty BOO build-own-operate BOT build-operate-transfer CIS Commonwealth of Independent States COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CSR corporate social responsibility EAC East African Community EMS electronics manufacturing services FDI foreign direct investment GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GFCF gross fixed capital formation GHG green house gas IIA international investment agreement IP intellectual property IPA investment promotion agency IPO initial public offering ISDS investor–state dispute settlement IT-BPO information technology and business process outsourcing LDC least developed country LLDC landlocked developing country LNG liquefied natural gas M&As mergers and acquisitions MFN most favoured nation MSI multi-stakeholder initiative NEM non-equity mode NIE newly industrializing economies ODA official development assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PPM process and production method PPP public-private partnership QIA Qatar Investment Authority R&D research and development ROCE return on capital employed RTAs regional trade agreements SADC Southern African Development Community SEZ special economic zone SIDS small island developing States SME small and medium-sized enterprise SOE State-owned enterprise SWF sovereign wealth fund TBT technical barriers to trade TNC transnational corporation TRIMs trade-related investment measures TRIPs trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights WIPS World Investment Prospects Survey
  • 10. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentx KEY MESSAGES FDI TRENDS AND PROSPECTS Global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows rose moderately to $1.24 trillion in 2010, but were still 15 per cent below their pre-crisis average. This is in contrast to global industrial output and trade, which were back to pre-crisis levels. UNCTAD estimates that global FDI will recover to its pre-crisis level in 2011, increasing to $1.4–1.6 trillion, and approach its 2007 peak in 2013. This positive scenario holds, barring any unexpected global economic shocks that may arise from a number of risk factors still in play. For the first time, developing and transition economies together attracted more than half of global FDI flows. Outward FDI from those economies also reached record highs, with most of their investment directed towards other countries in the South. In contrast, FDI inflows to developed countries continued to decline. Some of the poorest regions continued to see declines in FDI flows. Flows to Africa, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States all fell, as did flows to South Asia. At the same time, major emerging regions, such as East and South-East Asia and Latin America experienced strong growth in FDI inflows. International production is expanding, with foreign sales, employment and assets of transnational corporations (TNCs) all increasing. TNCs’ production worldwide generated value-added of approximately $16 trillion in 2010, about a quarter of global GDP. Foreign affiliates of TNCs accounted for more than 10 per cent of global GDP and one-third of world exports. State-owned TNCs are an important emerging source of FDI. There are at least 650 State-owned TNCs, with 8,500 foreign affiliates across the globe. While they represent less than 1 per cent of TNCs, their outward investment accounted for 11 per cent of global FDI in 2010. The ownership and governance of State-owned TNCs have raised concerns in some host countries regarding, among others, the level playing field and national security, with regulatory implications for the international expansion of these companies. INVESTMENT POLICY TRENDS Investment liberalization and promotion remained the dominant element of recent investment policies. Nevertheless, the risk of investment protectionism has increased as restrictive investment measures and administrative procedures have accumulated over the past years. The regime of international investment agreements (IIAs) is at the crossroads. With close to 6,100 treaties, many ongoing negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, it has come close to a point where it is too big and complex to handle for governments and investors alike, yet remains inadequate to cover all possible bilateral investment relationships (which would require a further 14,100 bilateral treaties). The policy discourse about the future orientation of the IIA regime and its development impact is intensifying. FDI policies interact increasingly with industrial policies, nationally and internationally. The challenge is to manage this interaction so that the two policies work together for development. Striking a balance between building stronger domestic productive capacity on the one hand and avoiding investment and trade protectionism on the other is key, as is enhancing international coordination and cooperation. The investment policy landscape is influenced more and more by a myriad of voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards. Governments can maximize development benefits deriving from these standards through appropriate policies, such as harmonizing corporate reporting regulations, providing capacity-building programmes, and integrating CSR standards into international investment regimes.
  • 11. xiKEY MESSAGES NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT In today’s world, policies aimed at improving the integration of developing economies into global value chains must look beyond FDI and trade. Policymakers need to consider non-equity modes (NEMs) of international production, such as contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, franchising, licensing, management contracts, and other types of contractual relationship through which TNCs coordinate the activities of host country firms, without owning a stake in those firms. Cross-border NEM activity worldwide is significant and particularly important in developing countries. It is estimated to have generated over $2 trillion of sales in 2009. Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing accounted for $1.1–1.3 trillion, franchising $330–350 billion, licensing $340–360 billion, and management contracts around $100 billion. In most cases, NEMs are growing more rapidly than the industries in which they operate. NEMs can yield significant development benefits. They employ an estimated 14–16 million workers in developing countries. Their value added represents up to 15 per cent of GDP in some economies. Their exports account for 70–80 per cent of global exports in several industries. Overall, NEMs can support long- term industrial development by building productive capacity, including through technology dissemination and domestic enterprise development, and by helping developing countries gain access to global value chains. NEMs also pose risks for developing countries. Employment in contract manufacturing can be highly cyclical and easily displaced. The value added contribution of NEMs can appear low if assessed in terms of the value captured out of the total global value chain. Concerns exist that TNCs may use NEMs to circumvent social and environmental standards. And to ensure success in long-term industrial development, developing countries need to mitigate the risk of remaining locked into low-value-added activities and becoming overly dependent on TNC-owned technologies and TNC-governed global value chains. Policy matters. Maximizing development benefits from NEMs requires action in four areas. First, NEM policies need to be embedded in overall national development strategies, aligned with trade, investment and technology policies and addressing dependency risks. Second, governments need to support efforts to build domestic productive capacity to ensure the availability of attractive business partners that can qualify as actors in global value chains. Third, promotion and facilitation of NEMs requires a strong enabling legal and institutional framework, as well as the involvement of investment promotion agencies in attracting TNC partners. Finally, policies need to address the negative consequences and risks posed by NEMs by strengthening the bargaining power of local NEM partners, safeguarding competition, protecting labour rights and the environment.
  • 12. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxii OVERVIEW FDI TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FDI recovery to gain momentum in 2011 Global foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows rose modestly by 5 per cent, to reach $1.24 trillion in 2010. While global industrial output and world trade are already back to their pre-crisis levels, FDI flows in 2010 remained some 15 per cent below their pre-crisis average, and nearly 37 per cent below their 2007 peak. UNCTAD predicts FDI flows will continue their recovery to reach $1.4–1.6 trillion, or the pre-crisis level, in 2011. They are expected to rise further to $1.7 trillion in 2012 and reach $1.9 trillion in 2013, the peak achieved in 2007. The record cash holdings of TNCs, ongoing corporate and industrial restructuring, rising stock market valuations and gradual exits by States from financial and non-financial firms’ shareholdings, built up as supporting measures during the crisis, are creating new investment opportunities for companies across the globe. However, the post-crisis business environment is still beset by uncertainties. Risk factors such as the unpredictability of global economic governance, a possible widespread sovereign debt crisis and fiscal and financial sector imbalances in some developed countries, as well as rising inflation and signs of overheating in major emerging market economies, may yet derail the FDI recovery. Emerging economies are the new FDI powerhouses Developing economies increased further in importance in 2010, both as recipients of FDI and as outward investors. As international production and, recently, international consumption shift to developing and transition economies, TNCs are increasingly investing in both efficiency- and market-seeking projects in those countries. For the first time, they absorbed more than half of global FDI inflows in 2010. Half of the top-20 host economies for FDI in 2010 were developing or transition economies. FDI outflows from developing and transition economies also increased strongly, by 21 per cent. They now account for 29 per cent of global FDI outflows. In 2010, six developing and transition economies were among the top-20 investors. The dynamism of emerging-market TNCs contrasts with the subdued pace of investment from developed-country TNCs, especially those from Europe. Their outward investment was still only about half of their 2007 peak. Services FDI subdued, cross-border M&As rebound Sectoral patterns. The moderate recovery of FDI inflows in 2010 masks major sectoral differences. FDI in services, which accounted for the bulk of the decline in FDI flows due to the crisis, continued on its downward path in 2010. All the main service industries (business services, finance, transport and communications and utilities) fell, although at different speeds. FDI flows in the financial industry experienced one of the sharpest declines. The share of manufacturing rose to almost half of all FDI projects. Within manufacturing, however, investments fell in business-cycle-sensitive industries such as metal and electronics. The chemical industry (including pharmaceuticals) remained resilient through the crisis, while industries such as food, beverages and tobacco, textiles and garments, and automobiles, recovered in 2010. FDI in extractive industries (which did not suffer during the crisis) declined in 2010. Modes of entry. The value of cross-border M&A deals increased by 36 per cent in 2010, but was still only around one third of the previous peak in 2007. The value of cross-border M&As into developing economies
  • 13. xiiiOVERVIEW doubled. Greenfield investments declined in 2010, but registered a significant rise in both value and number during the first five months of 2011. Components of FDI. Improved economic performance in many parts of the world and increased profits of foreign affiliates lifted reinvested earnings to nearly double their 2009 level. The other two FDI components – equity investment flows and intra-company loans – fell in 2010. Special funds. Private equity-sponsored FDI started to recover in 2010 and was directed increasingly towards developing and transition economies. However, it was still more than 70 per cent below the peak year of 2007. FDI by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) dropped to $10 billion in 2010, down from $26.5 billion in 2009. A more benign global economic environment may lead to increased FDI from these special funds in 2011. International production picks up Indicators of international production, including foreign sales, employment and assets of TNCs, showed gains in 2010 as economic conditions improved. UNCTAD estimates that sales and value added of foreign affiliates in the world reached $33 trillion and $7 trillion, respectively. They also exported more than $6 trillion, about one-third of global exports. TNCs worldwide, in their operations both at home and abroad, generated value added of approximately $16 trillion in 2010 – about a quarter of total world GDP. State-owned TNCs in the spotlight State-owned TNCs are causing concerns in a number of host countries regarding national security, the level playing field for competing firms, and governance and transparency. From the perspective of home countries, there are concerns regarding the openness to investment from their State-owned TNCs. Discussions are underway in some international forums with a view to addressing these issues. Today there are at least 650 State-owned TNCs, constituting an important emerging source of FDI. Their more than 8,500 foreign affiliates are spread across the globe, bringing them in contact with a large number of host economies. While relatively small in number (less than 1 per cent of all TNCs), their FDI is substantial, reaching roughly 11 per cent of global FDI flows in 2010. Reflecting this, State-owned TNCs made up 19 of the world’s 100 largest TNCs. State-owned TNCs constitute a varied group. Developing and transition economies are home to more than half of these firms (56 per cent), though developed countries continue to maintain a significant number of State-owned TNCs. In contrast to the general view of State-owned TNCs as largely concentrated in the primary sector, they are diversified and have a strong presence in the services sector. Uneven performance across regions The rise of FDI to developing countries masks significant regional differences. Some of the poorest regions continued to see declines in FDI flows. Flows to Africa, least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS) continued to fall, as did those to South Asia. At the same time, major emerging regions, such as East and South-East Asia and Latin America, experienced strong growth in FDI inflows. FDI flows to Africa fell by 9 per cent in 2010. At $55 billon, the share of Africa in total global FDI inflows was 4.4 per cent in 2010, down from 5.1 per cent in 2009. FDI to the primary sector, especially in the oil industry, continued to dominate FDI flows to the continent. It accounted for the rise of Ghana as a major host country, as well as for the declines of inflows to Angola and Nigeria. Although the continuing pursuit of natural resources, in particular by Asian TNCs, is likely to sustain FDI flows to sub-Saharan Africa, political uncertainty in North Africa is likely to make 2011 another challenging year for the continent as a whole.
  • 14. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxiv Although there is some evidence that intraregional FDI is beginning to emerge in non-natural resource related industries, intraregional FDI flows in Africa are still limited in terms of volume and industry diversity. Harmonization of Africa’s regional trade agreements and inclusion of FDI regimes could help Africa achieve more of its intraregional FDI potential. Inflows to East Asia, South-East Asia and South Asia as a whole rose by 24 per cent in 2010, reaching $300 billion. However, the three subregions experienced very different trends: inflows to ASEAN more than doubled; those to East Asia saw a 17 per cent rise; FDI to South Asia declined by one-fourth. Inflows to China, the largest recipient of FDI in the developing world, climbed by 11 per cent, to $106 billion. With continuously rising wages and production costs, however, offshoring of labour-intensive manufacturing to the country has slowed down, and FDI inflows continue to shift towards high-tech industries and services. In contrast, some ASEAN member States, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam, have gained ground as low- cost production locations, especially for low-end manufacturing. The decline of FDI to South Asia reflects a 31 per cent slide in inflows to India and a 14 per cent drop in Pakistan. In India, the setback in attracting FDI was partly due to macroeconomic concerns. At the same time, inflows to Bangladesh, an increasingly important low-cost production location in South Asia, jumped by 30 per cent to $913 million. FDI outflows from South, East and South-East Asia grew by 20 per cent to about $232 billion in 2010. In recent years, rising FDI outflows from developing Asia demonstrate new and diversified industrial patterns. In extractive industries, new investors have emerged, including conglomerates such as CITIC (China) and Reliance Group (India), and sovereign wealth funds, such as China Investment Corporation and Temasek Holdings (Singapore). Metal companies in the region have been particularly active in ensuring access to overseas mineral assets, such as iron ore and copper. In manufacturing, Asian companies have been actively taking over large companies in the developed world, but face increasing political obstacles. FDI outflows in the services sector have declined, but M&As in such industries as telecommunications have been increasing. FDI flows to West Asia in 2010 continued to be affected by the global economic crisis, falling by 12 per cent, but they are expected to bottom out in 2011. However, concerns about political instability in the region are likely to dampen the recovery. FDI outflows from West Asia dropped by 51 per cent in 2010. Outward investment from West Asia is mainly driven by government-controlled entities, which have been redirecting some of their national oil surpluses to support their home economies. The economic diversification policies of these countries has been pursued through a dual strategy: investing in other Arab countries to bolster their small domestic economies; and also investing in developed countries to seek strategic assets for the development and diversification of the industrial capabilities back at home. Increasingly this policy has been pursued with a view to creating productive capabilities that are missing at home, such as motor vehicles, alternative energies, electronics and aerospace. This approach differs from that of other countries, which have generally sought to develop a certain level of capacity at home, before engaging in outward direct investment. FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 13 per cent in 2010. The strongest increase was registered in South America, where the growth rate was 56 per cent, with Brazil particularly buoyant. FDI outflows from Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 67 per cent in 2010, mostly due to large cross-border M&A purchases by Brazilian and Mexican TNCs. Latin America and the Caribbean also witnessed a surge of investments by developing Asian TNCs particularly in resource-seeking projects. In 2010, acquisitions by Asian TNCs jumped to $20 billion, accounting for more than 60 per cent of total FDI to the region. This has raised concerns in some countries in the region about the trade patterns, with South America exporting mostly commodities and importing manufactured goods.
  • 15. xvOVERVIEW FDI flows to transition economies declined slightly in 2010. Flows to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) rose marginally by 0.4 per cent. Foreign investors continue to be attracted to the fast-growing local consumer market, especially in the Russian Federation where flows rose by 13 per cent to $41 billion. In contrast, FDI flows to South-East Europe dropped sharply for the third consecutive year, due partly to sluggish investment from EU countries. South–East interregional FDI is growing rapidly. TNCs based in transition economies and in developing economies have increasingly ventured into each other’s markets. For example, the share of developing host countries in greenfield investment projects by TNCs from transition economies rose to 60 per cent in 2010 (up from only 28 per cent in 2004), while developing-country outward FDI in transition economies increased more than five times over the past decade. Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation are the most important targets of developing-country investors, whereas China and Turkey are the most popular destinations for FDI from transition economies. Such South–East interregional FDI has benefited from outward FDI support from governments through, among others, regional cooperation (e.g. the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and bilateral partnerships. FDI flows to the poorest regions continue to fall In contrast to the FDI boom in developing countries as a whole, FDI inflows to the 48 LDCs declined overall by a further 0.6 per cent in 2010 – a matter of grave concern. The distribution of FDI flows among LDCs also remains highly uneven, with over 80 per cent of LDC FDI flows going to resource-rich economies in Africa. However, this picture is distorted by the highly capital-intensive nature of resource projects. Some 40 per cent of investments, by number, were in the form of greenfield projects in the manufacturing sector and 16 per cent in services. On the occasion of the 2011 Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, UNCTAD proposed a plan of action for investment in LDCs. The emphasis is on an integrated policy approach to investment, technical capacity-building and enterprise development, with five areas of action: public-private infrastructure development; aid for productive capacity; building on LDC investment opportunities; local business development and access to finance; and regulatory and institutional reform. Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) saw their FDI inflows fall by 12 per cent to $23 billion in 2010. These countries are traditionally marginal FDI destinations, and they accounted for only 4 per cent of total FDI flows to the developing world. With intensified South–South economic cooperation and increasing capital flows from emerging markets, prospects for FDI flows to the group may improve. FDI inflows to small island developing States (SIDS) as a whole declined slightly by 1 per cent in 2010, to $4.2 billion. As these countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, SIDS are looking to attract investment from TNCs that can make a contribution to climate change adaptation, by mobilizing financial and technological resources, implementing adaptation initiatives, and enhancing local adaptive capacities. FDI to developed countries remains well below pre-crisis levels In 2010, FDI inflows in developed countries declined marginally. The pattern of FDI inflows was uneven among subregions. Europe suffered a sharp fall. Declining FDI flows were also registered in Japan. A gloomier economic outlook, austerity measures and possible sovereign debt crisis, as well as regulatory concerns, were among the factors hampering the recovery of FDI flows. Inflows to the United States, however, showed a strong turnaround, with an increase of more than 40 per cent. In developed countries, the restructuring of the banking industry, driven by regulatory authorities, has resulted in a series of significant divestments of foreign assets. At the same time, it has also generated new FDI as assets changed hands among major players. The global efforts towards the reform of the financial
  • 16. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxvi system and the exit strategy of governments are likely to have a large bearing on FDI flows in the financial industry in coming years. The downward trend in outward FDI from developed countries reversed, with a 10 per cent increase over 2009. However, this took it to only half the level of its 2007 peak. The reversal was largely due to higher M&A values, facilitated by stronger balance sheets of TNCs and historic low rates of debt financing. INVESTMENT POLICY TRENDS National policies: mixed messages More than two-thirds of reported investment policy measures in 2010 were in the area of FDI liberalization and promotion. This was the case for Asia in particular, where a relatively high number of measures eased entry and establishment conditions for foreign investment. Most promotion and facilitation measures were adopted by governments in Africa and Asia. These measures included the streamlining of admission procedures and the opening of new, or the expansion of existing, special economic zones. On the other hand, almost one-third of all new measures in 2010 fell into the category of investment- related regulation and restrictions, continuing its upward trend since 2003. The recent restrictive measures were mainly in a few industries, in particular natural resource-based industries and financial services. The accumulation of restrictive measures over the past years and their continued upward trend, as well as stricter review procedures for FDI entry, has increased the risk of investment protectionism. Although numerous countries continue to implement emergency measures or hold considerable assets following bail-out operations, the unwinding of support schemes and liabilities resulting from emergency measures has started. The process advances relatively slowly. As of April 2011, governments are estimated to hold legacy assets and liabilities in financial and non-financial firms valued at over $2 trillion. By far the largest share relates to several hundred firms in the financial sector. All this indicates a potential wave of privatizations in the years to come. The international investment regime: too much and too little With a total of 178 new IIAs in 2010 – more than three new treaties per week – the IIA universe reached 6,092 agreements at the end of the year. This trend of treaty expansion is expected to continue in 2011, the first five months of which saw 48 new IIAs, with more than 100 IIAs currently under negotiation. How the FDI-related competence shift from EU member States to the European level will affect the overall IIA regime is still unclear (EU member States currently have more than 1,300 BITs with non-EU countries). At least 25 new treaty-based investor–State dispute settlement cases were initiated in 2010 and 47 decisions rendered, bringing the total of known cases to 390, and those closed to 197. The overwhelming majority of these cases were initiated by investors from developed countries, with developing countries most often on the receiving end. The 2010 awards further tilted the overall balance in favour of the State, with 78 cases won against 59 lost. As countries continue concluding IIAs, sometimes with novel provisions aimed at rebalancing the rights and obligations between States and firms, and ensuring coherence between IIAs and other public policies, the policy discourse about the future orientation of the IIA regime and how to make IIAs better contribute to sustainable development is intensifying. Nationally, this manifests itself in a growing dialogue among a broad set of investment stakeholders, including civil society, business and parliamentarians. Internationally, inter- governmental debates in UNCTAD’s 2010 World Investment Forum, UNCTAD’s Investment Commission and the joint OECD-UNCTAD investment meetings serve as examples.
  • 17. xviiOVERVIEW With thousands of treaties, many ongoing negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, today’s IIA regime has come close to a point where it is too big and complex to handle for governments and investors alike. Yet it offers protection to only two-thirds of global FDI stock and covers only one-fifth of possible bilateral investment relationships. To provide full coverage a further 14,100 bilateral treaties would be required. This raises questions not only about the efforts needed to complete the global IIA network, but also about the impact of the IIA regime and its effectiveness for promoting and protecting investment, and about how to ensure that IIAs deliver on their development potential. Intensifying interaction between FDI policies and industrial policies FDI policies increasingly interact with industrial policies, nationally and internationally. At the national level, this interface manifests itself in specific national investment guidelines; the targeting of types of investment or specific categories of foreign investors for industrial development purposes; investment incentives related to certain industries, activities or regions; and investment facilitation in line with industrial development strategies. Countries also use selective FDI restrictions for industrial policy purposes connected to the protection of infant industries, national champions, strategic enterprises or ailing domestic industries in times of crisis. At the international level, industrial policies are supported by FDI promotion through IIAs, in particular when the respective IIA has sector-specific elements. At the same time, IIA provisions can limit regulatory space for industrial policies. To avoid undue policy constraints, a number of flexibility mechanism have been developed in IIAs, such as exclusions and reservations for certain industries, general exceptions or national security exceptions. According to UNCTAD case studies of reservations in IIAs, countries are more inclined to preserve policy space for the services sector, compared to the primary and manufacturing sectors. Within the services sector, most reservations exist in transportation, finance and communication. The overall challenge is to manage the interaction between FDI policies and industrial policies, so as to make the two policies work for development. There is a need to strike a balance between building stronger domestic productive capacity on the one hand and preventing investment and trade protectionism on the other. Better international coordination can contribute to avoiding “beggar thy neighbour” policies and creating synergies for global cooperation. CSR standards increasingly influence investment policies Over the past years, corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards have emerged as a unique dimension of “soft law”. These CSR standards typically focus on the operations of TNCs and, as such, are increasingly significant for international investment as efforts to rebalance the rights and obligations of the State and the investor intensify. TNCs in turn, through their foreign investments and global value chains, can influence the social and environmental practices of business worldwide. The current landscape of CSR standards is multilayered, multifaceted, and interconnected. The standards of the United Nations, the ILO and the OECD serve to define and provide guidance on fundamental CSR. In addition there are dozens of international multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), hundreds of industry association initiatives and thousands of individual company codes providing standards for the social and environmental practices of firms at home and abroad. CSR standards pose a number of systemic challenges. A fundamental challenge affecting most CSR standards is ensuring that companies actually comply with their content. Moreover, there are gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies between standards in terms of global reach, subjects covered, industry focus and uptake among companies. Voluntary CSR standards can complement government regulatory efforts, but they can also undermine, substitute or distract from these. Finally, corporate reporting on performance relative to CSR standards continues to lack standardization and comparability.
  • 18. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxviii Governments can play an important role in creating a coherent policy and institutional framework to address the challenges and opportunities presented by the universe of CSR standards. Policy options for promoting CSR standards include supporting the development of new CSR standards; applying CSR standards to government procurement; building capacity in developing countries to adopt CSR standards; promoting the uptake of CSR reporting and responsible investment; adopting CSR standards as part of regulatory initiatives; strengthening the compliance promotion mechanisms of existing international standards; and factoring CSR standards into IIAs. The various approaches already underway increasingly mix regulatory and voluntary instruments to promote responsible business practices. While CSR standards generally aim to promote sustainable development goals, in the context of international production care needs to be taken to avoid them becoming barriers to trade and investment. The objective of promoting investment can be rhymed with CSR standards. Discussions on responsible investment are ongoing in the international community; for example, in 2010, G-20 leaders encouraged countries and companies to uphold the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) that were developed by UNCTAD, the World Bank, IFAD and FAO, requesting these organizations to develop options for promoting responsible investment in agriculture. NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT International production, today, is no longer exclusively about FDI on the one hand and trade on the other. Non-equity modes (NEMs) of international production are of growing importance, generating over $2 trillion in sales in 2010, much of it in developing countries. NEMs include contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, franchising, licensing, management contracts and other types of contractual relationships through which TNCs coordinate activities in their global value chains (GVCs) and influence the management of host-country firms without owning an equity stake in those firms. From a development perspective, both NEM partnerships and foreign affiliates (i.e. FDI) can enable host countries to integrate into GVCs. A key advantage of NEMs is that they are flexible arrangements with local firms, with a built-in motive for TNCs to invest in the viability of their partners through dissemination of knowledge, technology and skills. This offers host economies considerable potential for long-term industrial capacity building through a number of key channels of development impact such as employment, value added, export generation and technology acquisition. On the other hand, by establishing a local affiliate through FDI, a TNC signals its long-term commitment to a host economy. Attracting FDI is also the better option for economies with limited existing productive capacity. NEMs may be more appropriate than FDI in sensitive situations. In agriculture, for example, contract farming is more likely to address responsible investment issues – respect for local rights, livelihoods of farmers and sustainable use of resources – than large-scale land acquisition. For developing country policymakers, the rise of NEMs not only creates new opportunities for productive capacity building and integration into GVCs, there are also new challenges, as each NEM mode comes with its own set of development impacts and policy implications. The TNC “make or buy” decision and NEMs as the “middle-ground” option Foremost among the core competencies of a TNC is its ability to coordinate activities within a global value chain. TNCs can decide to conduct such activities in-house (internalization) or they can entrust them to other firms (externalization) – a choice analogous to a “make or buy” decision. Internalization, where it has a cross-border dimension, results in FDI, whereby the international flows of goods, services, information and other assets are intra-firm and under full control of the TNC. Externalization results in either arm’s-length trade, where the TNC exercises no control over other firms or, as an intermediate “middle-ground” option,
  • 19. xixOVERVIEW in non-equity inter-firm arrangements in which contractual agreements and relative bargaining power condition the operations and behaviour of host-country firms. Such “conditioning” can have a material impact on the conduct of the business, requiring the host-country firm to, for example, invest in equipment, change processes, adopt new procedures, improve working conditions, or use specified suppliers. The ultimate ownership and control configuration of a GVC is the outcome of a set of strategic choices by the TNC. In a typical value chain, a TNC oversees a sequence of activities from procurement of inputs, through manufacturing operations to distribution, sales and aftersales services. In addition, firms undertake activities – such as IT functions or R&D – which support all parts of the value chain. In a fully integrated company, activities in all these segments of the value chain are carried out in-house (internalized), resulting in FDI if the activity takes place overseas. However, in all segments of the value chain TNCs can opt to externalize activities through various NEM types. For example, instead of establishing a manufacturing affiliate (FDI) in a host country, a TNC can outsource production to a contract manufacturer or permit a local firm to produce under licence. The TNC’s ultimate choice between FDI and NEMs (or trade) in any segment of the value chain is based on its strategy, the relative costs and benefits, the associated risks, and the feasibility of available options. In some parts of the value chain NEMs can be substitutes for FDI, in others the two may be complementary. NEMs are worth more than $2 trillion, mostly in developing countries Cross-border NEM activity worldwide is estimated to have generated over $2 trillion of sales in 2010. Of this amount, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing accounted for $1.1–1.3 trillion, franchising for $330–350 billion, licensing for $340–360 billion, and management contracts for around $100 billion. These estimates are incomplete, including only the most important industries in which each NEM type is prevalent. The total also excludes other non-equity modes such as contract farming and concessions, which are significant in developing countries. For example, contract farming activities by TNCs are spread worldwide, covering over 110 developing and transition economies, spanning a wide range of agricultural commodities and accounting for a high share of output. There are large variations in relative size. In the automotive industry, contract manufacturing accounts for 30 per cent of global exports of automotive components and a quarter of employment. In contrast, in electronics, contract manufacturing represents a significant share of trade and some three-quarters of employment. In labour-intensive industries such as garments, footwear and toys, contract manufacturing is even more important. Putting different modes of international production in perspective, cross-border activity related to selected NEMs of $2 trillion compares with exports of foreign affiliates of TNCs of some $6 trillion in 2010. However, NEMs are particularly important in developing countries. In many industries, developing countries account for almost all NEM-related employment and exports, compared with their share in global FDI stocks of 30 per cent and in world trade of less than 40 per cent. NEMs are also growing rapidly. In most cases, the growth of NEMs outpaces that of the industries in which they operate. This growth is driven by a number of key advantages of NEMs for TNCs: (1) the relatively low upfront capital expenditures required and the limited working capital needed for operation; (2) reduced risk exposure; (3) flexibility in adapting to changes in the business cycle and in demand; and (4) as a basis for externalizing non-core activities that can often be carried out at lower cost by other operators. NEMs generate significant formal employment in developing countries UNCTAD estimates that worldwide some 18–21 million workers are directly employed in firms operating under NEM arrangements, most of whom are in contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and franchising
  • 20. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxx activities. Around 80 per cent of NEM-generated employment is in developing and transition economies. Employment in contract manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, services outsourcing, is predominantly based in developing countries. The same applies in other NEMs, although global figures are not available; in Mozambique, for instance, contract farming has led to some 400,000 smallholders participating in global value chains. Working conditions in NEMs based on low-cost labour are often a concern, and vary considerably depending on the mode and the legal, social and economic structures of the countries in which NEM firms are operating. The factors that influence working conditions in non-equity modes are the role of governments in defining, communicating and enforcing labour standards and the sourcing practices of TNCs. The social responsibility of TNCs has extended beyond their own legal boundaries and has pushed many to increase their influence over the activities of value chain partners. It is increasingly common for TNCs, in order to manage risks and protect their brand and image, to influence their NEM partners through codes of conduct, to promote international labour standards and good management practices. An additional concern relates to the relative “footlooseness” of NEMs. The seasonality of industries, fluctuating demand patterns of TNCs, and the ease with which they can shift NEM production to other locations can have a strong impact on working conditions in NEM firms and on stability of employment. NEMs often make an important contribution to GDP The impact of NEMs on local value added can be significant. It depends on how NEM arrangements fit into TNC-governed GVCs and, therefore, on how much value is retained in the host economy. It also depends on the potential for linkages with other firms and on their underlying capabilities. In efficiency seeking NEMs, such as contract manufacturing or services outsourcing, it is possible for value capture in the host economy to be relatively small compared to the overall value creation in a GVC, when the scope for local sourcing is limited and goods are imported, processed and subsequently exported, as is often the case in the electronics industry, for example. Although value captured as a share of final-product sales price may be limited, it can nevertheless represent a significant contribution to the local economy, adding up to 10–15 per cent of GDP in some countries. Local sourcing and the overall impact on host-country value added increases if the emergence of contract manufacturing leads to a concentration of production and export activities (e.g. in clusters or industrial parks). The greater the number of plants and the more numerous the linkages with TNCs, the greater will be the spillover effects and local value added. In addition, clustering can reduce the risk of TNCs shifting production to other locations by increasing switching costs. NEMs can generate export gains NEMs are inextricably linked with international trade, shaping global patterns of trade in many industries. In toys, footwear, garments, and electronics, contract manufacturing represents more than 50 per cent of global trade. NEMs can thus be an important “route-to-market” for countries aiming at export-led growth, and an important initial point of access to TNC governed global value chains, before gradually building independent exporting capabilities. Export gains can be partially offset by higher imports, reducing net export gains, where local value added is limited, especially in early stages of NEM development. NEMs are an important avenue for technology and skills building NEMs are in essence a transfer of intellectual property to a host-country firm under the protection of a contract. Licensing involves a TNC granting an NEM partner access to intellectual property, usually with contractual conditions attached, but often with some training or skills transfer. International franchising
  • 21. xxiOVERVIEW transfers a business model, and extensive training and support are normally offered to local partners in order to properly set up the new franchise with wide-ranging implications for technology dissemination. In some East and South-East Asian economies in particular, but also in Eastern Europe, Latin America and South Asia, technology and skills acquisition and assimilation by NEM companies in electronics, garments, pharmaceuticals, IT-services and business process outsourcing (BPO) have led to their transformation into TNCs and technology leaders in their own right. Although technology acquisition and assimilation through NEMs is a widespread phenomenon, this is not a foregone conclusion, especially at the level of second and third tier suppliers, where linkages may be insufficient or of low quality. A key factor is the absorptive capacity of local NEM partners, in the form of their existing skills base, the availability of workers that can be trained to learn new skills, and the basic prerequisites to turn acquired skills into new business ventures, including the regulatory framework, the business environment and access to finance. Another important factor is the relative bargaining power of TNCs and local NEM partners. Both factors can be influenced by appropriate policies. Social and environmental pros and cons of NEMs Concerns exist that cross-border NEMs in some industries may be a mechanism for TNCs to circumvent high social and environmental standards in their production network. Pressure from the international community has pushed TNCs to take greater responsibility for such standards throughout their global value chains. There is now a significant body of evidence to suggest that TNCs are likely to use more environmentally friendly practices than domestic companies in equivalent activities. The extent to which TNCs guide NEM operations on social and environmental practices depends, first, on their perception of and exposure to legal liability risks (e.g. reparations in the case of environmental damages) and business risks (e.g damage to their brand and lower sales); and, secondly, on the extent to which they can control NEMs. TNCs employ a number of mechanisms to influence NEM partners, including codes of conduct, factory inspections and audits, and third-party certification schemes. NEMs can help countries integrate in GVCs and build productive capacity The immediate contributions to employment, to GDP, to exports and to the local technology base that NEMs can bring help to provide the resources, skills and access to global value chains that are prerequisites for long-term industrial capacity building. A major part of the contribution of NEMs to the build-up of local productive capacity and long-term prospects for industrial development is through the impact on enterprise development, as NEMs require local entrepreneurs and domestic investment. Such domestic investment, and access to local or international financing, is often facilitated by NEMs, either through explicit measures by TNCs providing support to local NEM partners, or through the implicit guarantees stemming from the partnership with a major TNC itself. While the potential contributions of NEMs to long-term development are clear, concerns are often raised (especially with regard to contract manufacturing and licensing), that countries relying to a significant extent on NEMs for industrial development risk remaining locked-in to low-value-added segments of TNC-governed global value chains and remaining technology dependent. In such cases, developing economies would run a further risk of becoming vulnerable to TNCs shifting productive activity to other locations, as NEMs are more “footloose” than equivalent FDI operations. The related risks of “dependency” and “footlooseness” must be addressed by embedding NEMs in the overall development strategies of countries. The right policies can help maximize NEM development benefits Policies are instrumental for countries to maximize development benefits and minimize the risks associated with the integration of domestic firms into NEM networks of TNCs. There are four key challenges for
  • 22. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Developmentxxii policymakers: first, how to integrate NEM policies into the overall context of national development strategies; second, how to support the building of domestic productive capacity to ensure the availability of attractive business partners that can qualify as actors in global value chains; third, how to promote and facilitate NEMs; and fourth, how to address negative effects of NEMs. NEM policies appropriately embedded in industrial development strategies will: • ensure that efforts to attract NEMs through building domestic productive capacity and through facilitation and promotion initiatives are directed at the right industries, value chains and specific activities or segments within value chains; • support industrial upgrading in line with a country’s development stage, ensuring that firms move to higher value-added stages in the value chain, helping local NEM partners reduce their technology dependency, develop their own brands, or become NEM originators in their own right. An important element of industrial development strategies that incorporate NEMs are measures to prevent and mitigate impacts deriving from the “footlooseness” of some NEM types, balancing diversification and specialization. Diversification ensures that domestic companies are engaged in multiple NEM activities, both within and across different value chains, and are connected to a broad range of NEM partners. Specialization in particular value chains improves the competitive edge of local NEM partners within those chains and can facilitate, in the longer term, upgrading to segments with greater value capture. In general, measures should aim at maintaining and increasing the attractiveness of the host country for TNCs and improve the “stickiness” of NEMs by building up local mass, clusters of suppliers, and the local technology base. Continuous learning and skills upgrading of domestic entrepreneurs and employees are also important to ensure domestic firms can move to higher value-added activities should foreign companies move “low end” production processes to cheaper locations. Improving the capacity of locals to engage in NEMs has several policy aspects. Pro-active entrepreneurship policies can strengthen the competitiveness of domestic NEM partners and range from fostering start-ups to promoting business networks. Embedding entrepreneurship knowledge into formal education systems, combined with vocational training and the development of specialized NEM-related skills is also important. A mix of national technology policies can improve local absorptive capacity and create technology clusters and partnerships. Access to finance for domestic NEM partners can be improved through policies reducing borrowing costs and the risks associated with lending to SMEs, or by offering alternatives to traditional bank credits. Facilitation efforts can also include initiatives to support respect for core labour standards and CSR. Promoting and facilitating NEM arrangements depends, first, on clear and stable rules governing the contractual relationships between NEM partners, including transparency and coherence. This is important, as NEM arrangements are often governed by multiple laws and regulations. Conducive NEM-specific laws (e.g. franchising laws, rules on contract farming) and appropriate intellectual property (IP) protection (particularly relevant for IP-intensive NEMs such as licensing, franchising and often contract manufacturing) can also help. While the current involvement of investment promotion agencies in NEM-specific promotion is still limited, they could expand their remit beyond FDI to promote awareness of NEM opportunities, engage in matchmaking services, and provide incentives to start-ups. To address any negative impacts of NEMs, it is important to strengthen the bargaining power of local NEM partners vis-à-vis TNCs to ensure that contracts are based on a fair sharing of risks and benefits. The development of industry-specific NEM model contracts or negotiation guidelines can contribute to achieving this objective. If TNCs engaged in NEMs acquire dominant positions, they may be able to abuse their market power to the detriment of their competitors (domestic and foreign) and their own trading partners. Therefore, policies to promote NEMs need to go hand in hand with policies to safeguard competition. Other public interest criteria may require attention as well. Protection of indigenous capacities and traditional
  • 23. xxiiiOVERVIEW activities, that may be crowded out by a rapid increase in market shares of successful NEMs, is essential. In the case of contract farming for instance, policies such as these would result in model contracts or guidelines supporting smallholders in negotiations with TNCs; training on sustainable farming methods; provision of appropriate technologies and government-led extension services to improve capacities of contract farmers; and infrastructure development for improving business opportunities for contract farmers in remote areas. If contract farming was given more pride of place in government policies, direct investment in large-scale land acquisitions by TNCs would be less of an issue. Finally, home-country initiatives and the international community can also play a positive role. Home-country policies that specifically promote overseas NEMs include the expansion of national export insurance schemes and political risk insurance to also cover some types of NEMs. Internationally, while there is no comprehensive legal and policy framework for fostering NEMs and their development contribution, supportive international policies range from relevant WTO agreements and, to a limited extent, IIAs, to soft law initiatives contributing to harmonizing the rules governing the relationship between private NEM parties or guiding them in the crafting of NEM contracts. * * * Foreign direct investment is a key component of the world’s growth engine. However, the post-crisis recovery in FDI has been slow to take off and is unevenly spread, with especially the poorest countries still in “FDI recession”. Many uncertainties still haunt investors in the global economy. National and international policy developments are sending mixed messages to the investment community. And investment policymaking is becoming more complex, with international production evolving and with blurring boundaries between FDI, non-equity modes and trade. The growth of NEMs poses new challenges but also creates new opportunities for the further integration of developing economies into the global economy. The World Investment Report 2011 aims to help developing-country policymakers and the international development community navigate those challenges and capitalize on the opportunities for their development gains. Geneva, June 2011 Supachai Panitchpakdi Secretary-General of the UNCTAD
  • 25. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows rose moderately to $1.24 trillion in 2010, but were still 15 per cent below their pre-crisis average. This is in contrast to global industrial output and trade, which were back to pre-crisis levels. UNCTAD estimates that global FDI will recover to its pre- crisis level in 2011, increasing to $1.4–1.6 trillion, approaching its 2007 peak in 2013. This positive scenario holds, barring any unexpected global economic shocks that may arise from a number of risk factors still in play. For the first time, developing and transition economies together attracted more than half of global FDI flows. Outward FDI from those economies also reached record highs, with most of their investment directed towards other countries in the South. Furthermore, interregional FDI between developing countries and transition economies has been growing rapidly. In contrast, FDI inflows to developed countries continued to decline. Some of the poorest regions continued to see declines in FDI flows. Flows to Africa, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States all fell, as did flows to South Asia. At the same time, major emerging regions, such as East and South-East Asia and Latin America, experienced strong growth in FDI inflows. International production is expanding, with foreign sales, employment and assets of transnational corporations (TNCs) all increasing. TNCs’ production worldwide generated value added of approximately $16 trillion in 2010 – about a quarter of global GDP. Foreign affiliates of TNCs accounted for more than one-tenth of global GDP and one-third of world exports. State-owned TNCs are an important emerging source of FDI. There are some 650 State-owned TNCs, with 8,500 foreign affiliates across the globe. While they represent less than 1 per cent of TNCs worldwide, their outward investment accounted for 11 per cent of global FDI in 2010. The ownership and governance of State-owned TNCs have raised concerns in some host countries regarding, among others, the level playing field and national security, with regulatory implications for the international expansion of these companies. CHAPTER I GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
  • 26. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development2 A. GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS: RECOVERY OVER THE HORIZON 1. Overall trends As stimulus packages and other public fiscal policies fade, sustained economic recovery becomes more dependent on private investment. At present, transnational corporations (TNCs) have not yet taken up fully their customary lead role as private investors. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows rose modestly in 2010, following the large declines of 2008 and 2009. At $1.24 trillion in 2010, they were 5 per cent higher than a year before (figure I.1). This moderate growth was mainly the result of higher flows to developing countries, which together with transition economies – for the first time – absorbed more than half of FDI flows. While world industrial production and trade are back to their pre-crisis levels, FDI flows in 2010 remained some 15 per cent below their pre-crisis average, and 37 per cent below their 2007 peak (figure I.1). The moderate recovery of FDI flows in 2010 revealed an uneven pattern among components and modes of FDI. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) rebounded gradually, yet greenfield projects – which still account for the majority of FDI – fell in number and value. Increased profits of foreign affiliates, especially in developing countries, boosted reinvested earnings – one of the three components of FDI flows – while uncertainties surrounding global currency markets and European sovereign debt resulted in negative intra-company loans and lower levels of equity investment – the other two components of FDI flows. While FDI by private equity firms regained momentum, that from sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) fell considerably in 2010. FDI inward stock rose by 7 per cent in 2010, reaching $19 trillion, on the back of improved performance of global capital markets, higher profitability, and healthy economic growth in developing countries. UNCTAD predicts FDI flows will continue their recov- ery to reach $1.4 –1.6 trillion, or the pre-crisis level, in 2011. In the first quarter of 2011, FDI inflows rose compared to the same period of 2010, although this level was lower than the last quarter of 2010 (figure I.2). They are expected to rise further to $1.7 trillion in 2012 and reach $1.9 trillion in 2013, the peak achieved in 2007. The record cash holdings of TNCs, ongoing corporate and industrial restructur- ing, rising stock market valuations and gradual ex- its by States from financial and non-financial firms’ shareholdings built up as supporting measures during the crisis, are creating new investment opportunities for companies across the globe. However, the volatility of the business environment, particularly in developed countries, means that TNCs have remained relatively cautious regarding their investment plans. In addition, risk factors such as unpredictability of global economic governance, a possible widespread sovereign debt crisis and fis- cal and financial sector imbalances in some devel- oped countries, rising inflation and apparent signs of overheating in major emerging market economies, among others, might derail FDI recovery. 1 472 1 971 1 744 1 185 1 244 2005-2007 average 2007 2008 2009 2010 ~15% ~37% Figure I.1. Global FDI inflows, average 2005–2007 and 2007 to 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on annex table I.1 and the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Global FDI flows rose modestly in 2010, but the share of developing and transition economies in both global inflows and outflows reached record highs.
  • 27. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 3 Figure I.2. UNCTAD’s Global FDI Quarterly Index,a 2007 Q1–2011 Q1 (Base 100: quarterly average of 2005) Figure I.3. FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1980–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on annex table I.1 and the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/ fdistatistics). Developing economies Developed economies Transition economies 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 World total 52% 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 a. Current trends Global FDI inflows in 2010 reached an estimated $1,244 billion (figure I.1) – a small increase from 2009’s level of $1,185 billion. How- ever, there was an uneven pattern between regions and also between subregions. FDI inflows to devel- oped countries and transition economies contract- ed further in 2010. In contrast, those to developing economies recovered strongly, and together with transition economies – for the first time – surpassed the 50 per cent mark of global FDI flows (figure I.3). FDI flows to developing economies rose by 12 per cent (to $574 billion) in 2010, thanks to their relatively fast economic recovery, the strength of domestic demand, and burgeoning South– South flows. The value of cross-border M&As into developing economies doubled due to attractive valuations of company assets, strong earnings growth and robust economic fundamentals (such as market growth). As more international production moves to developing and transition economies, TNCs are increasingly investing in those countries to maintain cost-effectiveness and to remain competitive in the global production networks. This is now mirrored The shift of FDI inflows to developing and transition economies accelerated in 2010: for the first time, they absorbed more than half of global FDI flows. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: UNCTAD. a The Global FDI Quarterly Index is based on quarterly data of FDI inflows for 87 countries, which together account for roughly 90 per cent of global flows. The index has been calibrated such that the average of quarterly flows in 2005 is equivalent to 100.
  • 28. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development4 by a shift in international consumption, in the wake of which market-seeking FDI is also gaining ground. This changing pattern of FDI inflows is confirmed also in the global ranking of the largest FDI recipients: in 2010, half of the top 20 host economies were from developing and transition economies, compared to seven in 2009 (figure I.4). In addition, three developing economies ranked among the five largest FDI recipients in the world. While the United States and China maintained their top position, some European countries moved down in the ranking. Indonesia entered the top 20 for the first time. The shift towards developing and transition economies in total FDI inflows was also reflected in a change in the ranking of host countries by UNCTAD’s Inward FDI Performance Index, which measures the amount of FDI that countries receive relative to the size of their economy (GDP). The index for developed countries as a group is below unity (the point where the country’s share in global FDI flows and the country’s share in global GDP are equal), and their ranking has fallen in the after-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period of 2005– 2007. In contrast, developing countries increased their performance index in the period 2005–2010, and they all have indices above unity (figure I.5). The rise of FDI to devel- oping countries hides significant regional dif- ferences. Some of the poorest regions con- tinued to see declines in FDI flows. In addition to least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island de- veloping States (SIDS) (chapter II), flows to Africa continued to fall, as did those to South Asia. In contrast, major emerging regions, such as East and South-East Asia and Latin America experienced strong growth in FDI inflows (figure I.6). FDI flows to South, East and South-East Asia picked Figure I.4. Global FDI inflows, top 20 host economies, 2009 and 2010 a (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on annex table I.1 and the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Ranked on the basis of the magnitude of 2010 FDI inflows. Note: The number in bracket after the name of the country refers to the ranking in 2009. British Virgin Islands, which ranked 12th in 2010, is excluded from the list. 153 5 13 15 30 21 9 36 26 32 26 34 15 36 71 38 26 24 52 95 13 15 19 20 23 25 25 26 28 32 34 39 41 46 46 48 62 69 106 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Indonesia (43) Chile (26) Mexico (21) Luxembourg (12) Canada (18) Spain (30) India (8) Ireland (14) Saudi Arabia (11) Australia (16) France (10) Singapore (22) Russian Federation (7) United Kingdom (3) Germany (6) Brazil (15) Belgium (17) Hong Kong, China (4) China (2) United States (1) 228 2010 2009 Slow growth of FDI flows globally masks diverging trends between and within regions. Some of the poor- est regions continued to see declines.
  • 29. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 5 Developing economies Developed economies 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 2005-2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure I.5. Inward FDI Performance Index,a developed and developing economies, average of 2005–2007 and 2008–2010 Source: UNCTAD, based on data from FDI/TNC database (www/unctad.org/fdistatistics). a The Inward FDI Performance Index is the ratio of a country/ region’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP. A value greater than 1 indicates that the country/ region receives more FDI than its relative economic size, a value below 1 that it receives less. Note: A full list of countries ranked by the index is available at www.unctad.org/wir. up markedly, outperforming other developing regions. Inflows to the region rose by about 24 per cent in 2010, reaching $300 billion, rising especially in South-East Asia and East Asia. Similarly, strong economic growth, spurred by robust domestic and external demand, good macroeconomic fundamentals and higher commodity prices, drove FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean to $159 billion. Cross-border M&As in the region rose to $29 billion in 2010, after negative values in 2009. Nearly all the big recipient countries saw inward flows increase, with Brazil the largest destination. In contrast, inflows to Africa, which peaked in 2008 driven by the resource boom, continued the downward trend which started in 2009. Inflows to South Africa declined to little more than a quarter of those for 2009. North Africa saw its FDI flows fall slightly (by 8 per cent) in 2010; the uprisings which broke out in early 2011 impeded FDI flows in the first quarter of 2011 (see box II.1). FDI flows to West Asia, at $58 billion decreased, despite the steady economic recovery registered by the economies of the region. Sizeable increases in government spending by oil-rich countries helped bolster their economies, but business conditions in the private sector remained fragile in certain countries. The transition economies of South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) registered a marginal decrease in FDI inflows in 2010, of roughly 5 per cent, to $68 billion, having fallen by 41 per cent in 2009. FDI flows to South- East Europe continued to decline sharply due to sluggish investment from EU countries – traditionally the dominant source of FDI in the subregion. The CIS economies saw their flows increase by less than 1 per cent despite stronger commodity prices, a faster economic recovery and improving stock markets. FDI inflows to developed countries contracted moderately in 2010, falling by less than 1 per cent to $602 billion. Europe stood out as the subregion where flows fell most sharply, reflecting uncertainties about the worsening sovereign debt crisis. However, Figure I.6. FDI inflows to developing and transition economies, by region, average of 2005–2007 and 2008 to 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). 0 100 200 300 Africa Latin America and the Caribbean South, East and South- East Asia West Asia Transition economies average 2005-2007 2008 2009 2010
  • 30. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development6 Box I.1. Why are data on global FDI inflows and outflows different? The discrepancy between reported global inward and outward FDI flows has been significant (box figure I.1.1). This is a major problem for policymakers worldwide, as sound policy analysis and informed policymaking on this issue require reliable, accurate, timely and comparable data (Fujita, 2008). The discrepancy is due to several reasons. First, there are inconsistencies in the data collection and reporting methods of different countries. Examples include different methods used by host and home countries recording the same transactions, uneven coverage of FDI flows between countries (e.g. treatment of reinvested earnings), and different exchange rates used for recording FDI transactions. Second, the changing nature (e.g. investment through exchange of shares between investors and acquired firms, investment from indirect sources) and the increasing sophistication of FDI-related transactions (that involve not only funds from parent firms, but also government loans and development assistance in the same package) often make it difficult to attribute exact values to FDI. Third, the distinction between FDI transactions with “portfolio-like behaviour” and portfolio investment, including hot money, is blurred. Finally, the accuracy of FDI reporting may itself be a victim of the global crisis, which caused increasing volatility in exchange rates, making an exact correspondence between home- and host-country reporting more uncertain (as differences in the timing of records may coincide with major exchange-rate differences). This situation calls for a continuous improvement of both FDI-related definitions and data collection, especially in developing countries. As considerable efforts by UNCTAD and other international organizations are underway to harmonize definitions and data collection, it can be expected that the discrepancy between reports on inflows and outflows will narrow over time. Source: UNCTAD. while Italy and the United Kingdom suffered, FDI in some of the region’s other major economies fell only slightly (e.g. France) or increased (e.g. Germany). Declining FDI flows were also registered in Japan, where there were a number of large divestments. In contrast, FDI flows to the United States surged by almost 50 per cent largely thanks to a significant recovery in the reinvested earnings of foreign affiliates. However, FDI flows were still at about 75 per of their peak level of 2008. At $1,323 billion, global FDI outflows in 2010, while increasing over the previous year, are still some 11 per cent below the pre- crisis average, and 39 per cent below the 2007 peak (see box I.1 for differences between FDI inflows and outflows). As in the case of inflows, there was an uneven pattern among regions. FDI flows from developing and transition economies picked up strongly, reflecting the strength of their economies, the dynamism of their TNCs and their growing aspiration to compete in new markets. The downward trend in FDI from developed countries reversed, with an 10 per cent increase over 2009. However, it remained at half the level of its 2007 peak. Outward FDI from developing and transition economies reached $388 billion in 2010, a 21 per cent increase over 2009 (figure I.7; annex table I.1). Their share in global outflows of 29 per cent was up from 16 per cent in 2007, the year prior to the financial crisis. Behind this general increase there lie significant differences between countries. Investors from South, East and South-East Asia and Latin America were the major drivers for the 1 171 74 90 -1 -188 100 56 -204 -166 15 -80 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Box figure I.1.1. The difference between global FDI inflows and outflows, 1999–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD. Note: Positive value means inflows are higher than outflows, and vice versa. Outward FDI from develop- ing and transition economies reached a record high, with most of their investment directed towards other econo- mies within these regions.
  • 31. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 7 strong growth in FDI outflows. Outflows from the largest FDI sources – Hong Kong (China) and China – increased by more than $10 billion each, reaching historical highs of $76 billion and $68 billion, respectively. Chinese companies continued their buying spree, actively acquiring overseas assets in a wide range of industries and countries, and overtaking Japanese companies in total outward FDI. All of the big outward investor countries from Latin America – Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico – bolstered by strong economic growth at home, increased their acquisitions abroad, particularly in developedcountrieswhereinvestmentopportunities have arisen in the aftermath of the crisis. In contrast, outflows from major investors in West Asia fell significantly, due to large-scale divestments and redirection of outward FDI from government- controlled entities to support their home economies weakened by the global financial crisis. FDI outflows from transition economies grew by 24 per cent, reaching a record $61 billion. Most of the outward FDI projects, as in previous years, were carried out by Russian TNCs, followed by TNCs from Kazakhstan. The quick recovery of natural resource-based companies in transition economies was boosted by strong support by the State,1 and by recovering commodity prices and higher stock market valuations, easing the cash flow problems these firms had faced in 2009. Developed countries as a group saw only a limited recovery of their outward FDI. Reflecting their diverging economic situations, trends in FDI outflows differed markedly between countries and regions: outflows from Europe and the United States were up (9.6 and 16 per cent, respectively), while Japanese outward FDI flows dropped further in 2010 (down 25 per cent). The lingering effects of the crisis and subdued prospects in developed countries forced many of their TNCs to invest in emerging markets in an effort to keep their markets and profits: in 2010 almost half of total investment (cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI projects) from developed countries took place in developing and transition economies, compared to only 32 per cent in 2007 (figure I.8).2 In 2010, six developing and transition economies were among the top 20 investors (figure I.9). UNCTAD’s World Investment Prospects Survey 2011–2013 (WIPS) confirms that developing and transition economies are becoming important investors, and that this trend is likely to continue in the near future (UNCTAD, forthcoming a). Many TNCs in developing and transition economies are investing in other emerging markets, where recovery is strong and the economic outlook better. Indeed, in 2010, 70 per cent of FDI projects (cross- border M&A and greenfield FDI projects) from these economies were invested within the same regions (figure I.8). TNCs, especially large State-owned enterprises, from the BRIC countries – Brazil, the Figure I.7. FDI outflows from developing and transition economies, by region, average of 2005–2007 and 2008 to 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). 0 100 200 300 average 2005-2007 2009 2010 Africa Latin America and the Caribbean South, East and South-East Asia West Asia Transition economies 2008
  • 32. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development8 Russian Federation, India and China – have gained ground as important investors in recent years as the result of rapid economic growth in their home countries, abundant financial resources and strong motivations to acquire resources and strategic assets abroad (section C). In 2010 there were seven mega-deals (over $3 billion) involving developing and transition economies (or 12 per cent of the total) (annex table I.7), compared to only two (or 3 per cent of the total) in 2009. Firms from developing Asia expanded their acquisitions in 2010 beyond their own regions. For example China’s outward FDI showed substantial increases in Latin America (chapter II; ECLAC, 2011). Transition-economy firms also increased their purchases in other transition economies in 2010. b. FDI by sector and industry The unchanged level of overall FDI in 2010 also obscures some major sectoral differences. Data on FDI projects (both cross- border M&As and greenfield investment) indicate that the value and share of manufacturing rose, accounting for almost half of the total. The value and share of the primary and services sector declined (figure I.10). Compared with the pre-crisis level (2005–2007), the picture In the aftermath of the crisis, FDI in manufactur- ing bounced back while services sector FDI is still in decline. is quite different. While the primary sector has recovered, services are still less than half, and manufacturing is 10 per cent below their pre-crisis levels (annex table I.5). The value of FDI projects in manufacturing rose by 23 per cent in 2010 compared to 2009, reaching $554 billion. The financial crisis hit a range of manufacturing industries hard, but the shock could eventually prove to be a boon to the sector, as many companies were forced to restructure into more productive and profitable activities – with attendant effects on FDI. In the United States, for example, FDI in manufacturing rose by 62 per cent in 2010, accompanied by a substantial rise in productivity (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). Within manufacturing, business-cycle sensitive industries such as metal and metal products, electrical and electronics equipment and wood and wood products were hit by the crisis, in terms of sales and profits (annex table I.5). As a result, investment fell in these industries, which suffered from serious overcapacity and wished to use cash to restore their balance sheet. In addition, their prospects for higher demand and market growth remained gloomy, especially in developed countries. Some manufacturing industries such as chemicals (including pharmaceuticals) remained more resilient to the crisis; while other industries, such as food, beverages and tobacco, textile and garments, and Figure I.8. Distribution of FDI projects,a by host region, 2007 and 2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border M&A database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Including both cross-border M&As and greenfield FDI projects. To transition economies To developing economies To developed economies 2007 2010 2007 2010 68 51 38 30 58 63 5 7 26 45 6 4 (b) by developing and transition country TNCs(a) by developed country TNCs
  • 33. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 9 Figure I.9. Global FDI outflows, top 20 home economies, 2009 and 2010a (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on annex table I.1 and the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Ranked on the basis of the magnitude of 2010 FDI outflows. Note: The number in bracket after the name of the country refers to the ranking in 2009. British Virgin Islands, which ranked 16th in 2010, is excluded from the list. 16 27 19 17 18 21 10 16 26 27 42 44 75 33 57 64 103 78 15 18 18 19 20 21 22 26 30 32 38 39 52 56 58 68 76 84 105 0 50 100 150 200 India (21) Ireland (13) Luxembourg (17) Korea, Republic of (19) Singapore (18) Italy (16) Spain (23) Australia (20) Sweden (14) Netherlands (12) Belgium (156) Canada (9) Russian Federation (8) Japan (4) Switzerland (10) China (6) Hong Kong, China (5) France (2) Germany (3) United States (1) 329 283 2010 2009 Figure I.10. Sectoral distribution of FDI projects,a 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD. a Comprises cross-border M&As and greenfield investments. The latter refers to the estimated amounts of capital investment. 554 361 449 392 254 338 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Primary Manufacturing Services 2009 2010 37% 48%30% 22% 33% 30% automobiles,recoveredin2010.Thepharmaceutical industry, for example, remained attractive to foreign investment, thanks to the dynamism of its final markets – especially in emerging economies. This rests, first, on the necessity of setting up or acquiring production facilities, as the patent protection for a number of major drugs marketed by global pharmaceutical firms is about to expire, and secondly on the ageing demography of most developed countries. Restructuring continued in 2010, as witnessed by two large deals that took place in the industry.3 Opportunities for business deals exist due to rapid growth in the number of scientists and pharmaceutical firms in emerging economies, most notably in China and India. In food, beverages and tobacco the recovery was due to the sustained demand for basic items, especially in developing countries. For many large TNCs in this industry, profits soared in 2010, and a number of large acquisitions were made.4 In the case of textiles and clothing, the recovery is prompted by a growth in consumer spending, particularly in some emerging countries. Garment production is fairly cost-sensitive, which may prompt accelerated
  • 34. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development10 relocation to countries where there is cheap labour. FDI in the primary sector decreased in 2010 despite growing demand for raw materials and energy resources, and high commodity prices. FDI projects (including cross-border M&A and greenfield investments) amounted to $254 billion in 2010, raising the share of the primary sector to 22 per cent, up from 14 per cent in the pre-crisis period. Natural resource-based companies with sound financial positions, mainly from developing and transition economies, made some large acquisitions in the primary sector. Examples include the purchase of Repsol (Brazil) by China’s Sinopec Group for $7 billion, and the purchase of the Carabobo block in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by a group of investors from India for $4.8 billion (annex table I.7). The value of FDI projects in the services sector continued to decline sharply in 2010, with respect to both 2009 and the pre-crisis level of activity. All main service industries (business services, finance, transport and communications and utilities) fell, although at different speeds. Business services declined by 8 per cent compared to the pre- crisis level, as TNCs are outsourcing a growing share of their business support functions to external providers, seeking to cut internal costs by externalizing non-core business activities (chapter IV). Transportation and telecommunication services suffered equally in 2010 as the industry’s restructuring is more or less completed after the round of large M&A deals before the crisis, particularly in developed countries. FDI in the financial industry – the epicentre of the current crisis – experienced the sharpest decline, and is expected to remain sluggish in the medium term. Over the past decade, its expansion was instrumental in integrating emerging economies into the global financial system, and it has brought substantial benefits to host countries’ financial systems in terms of efficiency and stability. However, it also produced a bubble of unsustainable lending, which had to burst. In the period of post-bubble correction, issues relating to the management of country risk and the assessment of conditions in host-country financial systems play a major role in supporting expansion abroad. Utilities were also strongly affected by the crisis, as some investors were forced to reduce investment or even divest due to lower demand and accumulated losses. c. FDI by modes of entry There are diverging trends between the two main modes of FDI entry: M&As and greenfield (new) investment. The value of cross-border M&A deals increased by 36 per cent in 2010, to $339 billion, though it was still roughly one-third of the previous peak in 2007 (figure I.11). Higher stock prices increased the purchasing power of investors to invest abroad, as higher values of corporate assets in 2010 raised the leverage of investors in undertaking M&As by using shares in part- payment. At the same time, the ongoing corporate and industrial restructuring is creating new acquisition opportunities, in particular for cash-rich TNCs, including those from emerging markets. On the other hand, greenfield investment – the other mode of FDI – declined in 2010. Differing trends between cross-border M&As and greenfield FDI are not surprising, as to some extent companies tend to consider the two modes of market entry as alternative options. However, the total project value of greenfield investments has been much higher than that of cross-border M&As since the crisis. Developing and transition economies tend to host greenfield investment rather than cross- border M&As. More than two-thirds of the total value of greenfield investment is directed to these economies, while only 25 per cent of cross-border M&As are undertaken there. At the same time, investors from these economies are becoming increasingly important players in cross-border M&A markets, which previously were dominated by developed country players. During the first five months of 2011, both greenfield investments and cross-border M&As registered a significant rise in value (figure I.11; annex tables I.3–6 and I.8). Cross-border M&As rose by 58 per cent, though from a low level, compared with the corresponding period of 2010. Greenfield investment has become much larger than cross-border M&As. Recovery of FDI flows in 2011 relies on the rise of both greenfield investments and cross-border M&As.
  • 35. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 11 Figure I.11. Value and number of cross-border M&As and greenfield FDI projects, 2007–May 2011 Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border M&A database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: Data for value of greenfield FDI projects refer to estimated amounts of capital investment. M&A value Greenfield FDI value M&As number Greenfield FDI number $ billion 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 1 800 2007 2008 2009 2010 Thousands 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 2010 (Jan-May) 2011 (Jan-May) d. FDI by components Stagnant global flows in 2010 were accompanied by diverging trends in the components of FDI inflows (figure I.12). Improved economic performance in many parts of the world, and increased profits of foreign affiliates, lifted reinvested earnings to nearly double their 2009 level (figure I.13). This reflects the general increase in profits globally. For example, the profits to sales ratio of the United States’ S&P 500 firms in 2010 improved further, while profits of Japanese firms also rose in 2010. Also in developing countries, operating profits of companies from China and the Republic of Korea rose significantly in 2010. However, not all reinvested earnings are actually reinvested in productive capacity. They may be put aside to await better investment opportunities in the future, or to finance other activities (box I.2), including those that are speculative (box I.5). About 40 per cent of FDI income was retained as reinvested earnings in host countries in 2010 ( figure I.13). The increase in reinvested earnings compensated for the decline in equity capital flows, which were down slightly despite an up-tick in cross-border M&As. The continuing depressed level of equity investments was still the key factor keeping FDI In 2010, reinvested earnings grew fast, while equity capital investment and intra-company loans declined. Cash reserves of foreign affiliates grew substantially. Figure I.12. FDI inflows by component, 2007–2010a (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, based on data from FDI/TNC database (www/unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Based on 106 countries that account for 85 per cent of total FDI inflows during the period 2007-2010. 0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 1 800 2007 2008 2009 2010 Other capital Reinvested earnings Equity Figure I.13. FDI income, 2005–2010a (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD. a Based on 104 countries that account for 81 per cent of total FDI inflows during the period 2005-2010. $ billion Per cent 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Reinvested earnings Repatriated earnings on Inward FDI Reinvested earnings as a % share of income
  • 36. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development12 Box I.2. FDI flows and the use of funds for investment FDI is traditionally broken down into three components: equity capital, intra-company loans, and reinvested earnings of foreign affiliates. These component parts can be considered as sources of funds for investment, additional to funds raised on local and international capital markets. However, the decision by a TNC to finance an investment in productive assets in a host country through an increase in equity capital, a loan, or by using income earned in the host country is driven by a wide range of factors, most of which are beyond the reach of host-country policymakers to influence. From a policymaker’s perspective, it may be more relevant to see how FDI flows are used (use of funds). TNCs can employ FDI (1) for the creation, expansion or improvement of productive assets, generating additional productive capacity, (2) to finance changes in ownership of assets (MAs), or (3) to add to the financial reserves of foreign affiliates. The latter may be motivated by decisions on the level of financial leverage of the firm, by the need to retain cash for planned future investments, by fiscal considerations (e.g. to defer tax liabilities upon repatriation of profits), or by other factors, including opportunistic behaviour on the part of TNCs to profit from changes in exchange rates or local asset-price rises. The traditional method of analysing FDI by sources of funds tends to overlook the significance of such “parked funds” held in foreign affiliates of TNCs. “Reinvested earnings” consist of income earned by foreign affiliates that is not repatriated to the home country of the parent firm; firms do not necessarily reinvest this income in additional productive capacity. The difference between FDI flows and actual capital expenditures by foreign affiliates represents FDI not immediately employed for the creation of additional productive capacity and, as such, it is a good proxy for the increase in cash reserves in foreign affiliates. Box figure I.2.1. Estimated value of the “non-used” part of FDI by United States TNCs, 2001–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD based on FDI database and Bureau of Economic Analysis. This proxy indicator for overseas cash reserves of United States firms over the last 10 years shows a peak in 2004, a steep drop in 2005 and an ascent to new heights in 2008 – with estimates for 2009 and 2010 equally high (box figure I.2.1). The 2004 peak and the 2005 trough can be explained by the Homeland Investment Act which provided a tax break on repatriated profits in 2005. Anticipating the tax break, firms hoarded cash in their overseas affiliates in 2004 and brought back several years’ worth of retained earnings in 2005 (some $360 billion). For the last three years, levels have been similar to the anomalous 2004 peak, leading to the conclusion that cash reserve levels in foreign affiliates may well exceed what is required for normal operations. The sensitivity of overseas cash reserves to the tax rate on fund repatriation can also be observed in Japan. A 2009 tax change on the repatriation of foreign earnings is estimated to bring back an additional $40 billion in overseas funds annually (chapter II; WIR10). The implications are significant. Under-employed cash reserves of TNCs represent untapped funds that could be gainfully employed to stimulate the global economy, create jobs and finance development. Source: UNCTAD. -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
  • 37. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 13 flows relatively low. It is a source of concern, as among the components of FDI, equity investment compared with reinvested earnings and intra- company loans is the one that is related most directly to TNCs’ long-term international investment strategies. Intra-company loans declined also, as parent firms withdrew or were paid back loans from their affiliates, in particular those in developed host countries, in order to strengthen their balance sheets. This was especially true of European TNCs which, facing fears of a sovereign debt crisis spreading in many parts of the euro zone, significantly reduced loans to their affiliates in the United Kingdom and the United States. Given the fact that foreign affiliates hold a significant amount of retained earnings on their balance sheets (box I.2), unless they are repatriated to their parent firms in home countries, reinvested earnings continue to play an important role in determining the level of investment flows. e. FDI by special funds: private equity and sovereign wealth funds Private equity funds In 2010, the value of private equity-sponsored cross- border MAs increased by 14 per cent to $122 billion, compared to $107 billion in 2009 after two years of consecutive decline (table I.1).5 At the same time, the corresponding number of cross-border MAs reached a record high, with 2,050 deals completed. The factors behind the increase in FDI by private equity funds are largely related to the stabilization of macroeconomic conditions. Also, investors were looking for yields, in a declining interest rate environment. Positive trends were supported by stronger private equity activity in emerging markets (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association, 2011). Thus 31 per cent of FDI by private equity firms, amounting to $38 billion, was directed to developing and transition economies in 2010 (figure I.14), up from 26 per cent in 2009. This rise reflects the increasing interest of private equity Private equity-sponsored FDI has regained momentum, although it fell short of its pre-crisis level. It is directed more towards developing and transition economies, secondary buyouts and smaller acquisitions. firms in developing country firms and venture capital business, which provide better business opportunities than before. Despite stronger private equity-sponsored cross- border MAs in 2010, their value is still more than 70 per cent lower than the peak level in 2007. The relative contribution of private equity to global FDI continues to decline. The volume share of private equity in total cross-border MAs fell from 19 per cent in 2009 to 17 per cent in 2010 (table I.1). The relative contribution of private equity funds to total FDI contracted by nearly 40 per cent from 2004, its peak year, to 2010. A more benign global economic environment should see fundraising and investment picking up in 2011, also bolstering a more positive outlook for private equity-sponsored FDI. Private equity investors were estimated to have held nearly a trillion dollars of uninvested capital at the beginning of 2010, including reserves for future use, that could result Table I.1. Cross-border MAs by private equity firms, 1996–May 2011 (Number of deals and value) Number of deals Value Year Number Share in total (%) $ billion Share in total (%) 1996 932 16 42 16 1997 925 14 54 15 1998 1 089 14 79 11 1999 1 285 14 89 10 2000 1 340 13 92 7 2001 1 248 15 88 12 2002 1 248 19 85 18 2003 1 488 22 109 27 2004 1 622 22 157 28 2005 1 736 20 207 22 2006 1 698 18 271 24 2007 1 917 18 457 27 2008 1 785 18 322 25 2009 1 993 25 107 19 2010 2 050 22 122 17 2011 591 17 91 20 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad. org/fdistatistics). Note: Value is on a gross basis, which is different from other MA tables based on a net value. The table includes MAs by hedge funds. Private equity firms and hedge funds refer to acquirers as “investors not elsewhere classified”. This classification is based on the Thomson Finance database on MAs.
  • 38. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development14 in a surge in volume of cross-border MAs in 2011 (Bain Co., 2011). Onthesupplyside,therearenowmoreopportunities. There are two factors. First, companies owned by private equity firms are becoming targets for other private equity firms. The relative performance of these secondary buyouts (i.e. buyouts of private equity invested firms) is only slightly lower than that of primary buyouts: this is because the former can be executed faster than the latter in issuing IPOs (initial public offerings), and because secondary buyouts entail a lower risk profile.6 Second, private equity firms are now seeking smaller firms, and are engaged in smaller-scale buyouts. This is an area to which private equity firms have not paid much attention in the past, yet one where many attractive firms are to be found. However, private equity funds continue to face regulations in response to the global financial crisis, partly due to the G-20’s commitment to subject all significant financial market actors to appropriate regulation and supervision. For example, the EU Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive7 and the United States' Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act8 will affect directly and indirectly the operations of private equity funds and their fund-raising ability, and in consequence their contribution to FDI. Figure I.14. Cross-border MAs by private equity funds directed to developing and transition economies, 2005–2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad. org/fdistatistics). Note: Figures in parenthesis refer to the percentage share in total private equity. Data for 2005–2007 and 2008–2010 are annual averages. 0 10 20 30 40 50 2005–2007 2008–2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 (13%) (20%) (10%) (14%) (26%) (31%) Average Sovereign wealth funds Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are s p e c i a l - p u r p o s e investment funds or arrangements that are owned by gov- ernment.9 At the end of 2009, more than 80 SWFs, with an estimated total of $5.9 trillion in assets, could be identified.10 In 2010 alone, nearly 20 governments, mostly from emerging econo- mies, considered or decided to establish an SWF. While funds that invest mainly in debt instruments (e.g. government bonds) were largely unaffected by the global financial crisis, SWFs with considerable equity exposure suffered a dramatic erosion of the value of their investments. By the end of 2009, however, with the recovery of stock markets worldwide, almost all SWFs had been able to recoup their losses from 2008. In 2010 the positive outlook for most SWFs held firm, supported by the overall recovery in equity markets. However, total SWF-sponsored FDI in 2010 amounted to only $10.0 billion, a significant drop from 2009’s $26.5 billion (figure I.15). The largest SWF-sponsored deals included investments in infrastructure, retail, transportation, natural resources and utilities in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (table I.2). The fall in SWF-sponsored FDI in 2010 is a considerable deviation from the trend of SWFs becoming more active foreign direct investors, that started in 2005. There are two reasons for this slump. First, unlike in earlier years, in 2010 FDI by SWFs based in the Gulf region (e.g. United Arab Emirates) was almost absent (table I.2). Asian and Canadian SWFs were the main investors in 2010. Second, while SWF-sponsored FDI is not necessarily pro-cyclical, the low appetite for direct investments in 2010 can be traced back to the exceptionally uncertain global financial environment of previous years. Because of that uncertainly, in 2010 SWFs directed about one-third of their FDI to acquire shares of, or inject capital into, private equity funds and other funds,11 rather than investing in acquiring shares issued by industry SWF-sponsored FDI declined substantially because of severely reduced investment from the Gulf region. However, its long-term potential as a source of investment remains.
  • 39. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 15 Figure I.15. Cross-border MAs by SWFs, 2001–2010 (Million dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Per cent$ billion Value Share in global outflows Table I.2. Selected large FDI deals by SWFs in 2010 Value ($ million) Acquiring company Acquiring nation Target company Target nation Industry of the acquired company 3 090 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Canada Intoll Group Australia Finance 2 227 Qatar Holding LLC Qatar Harrods United Kingdom Retail 1 581 China Investment Corp China AES Corp United States Electricity, gas and water 881 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Canada 407 ETR Concession Co Canada Transport, storage and communications 800 China Investment Corp China Penn West Energy Trust Canada Mining, quarrying and petroleum 576 Ontario Teachers Pension Plan Canada Camelot Group PLC United Kingdom Community, social and personal service activities 400 Temasek Holdings(Pte)Ltd Singapore Odebrecht Oleo Gas SA Brazil Mining, quarrying and petroleum 259 Caisse de Depot Placement du Quebec Canada HDF(UK)Holdings Ltd United Kingdom Finance 194 GIC Real Estate Pte Ltd Singapore Salta Properties-Industrial Property Portfolio Australia Business services 100 Temasek Holdings(Pte)Ltd Singapore Platmin Ltd South Africa Mining, quarrying and petroleum 91 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Canada Vornado Realty Trust United States Business services 43 Oman Investment Fund Oman Petrovietnam Insurance Joint Stock Corp Viet Nam Finance Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). (e.g. the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board’s investment in Intoll Group, an infrastructure fund, for $3 billion – table I.2). While expenditure on FDI has declined, the fundamental drivers for stronger SWF-sponsored FDI activity remain robust. Strong commodity prices in 2010 in particular have created a positive funding environment for SWFs, including those that have been actively involved in FDI in previous years. The foreign assets of the Qatar Investment Authority, an active strategic investor, were estimated to grow from $65 billion in 2009 to $90 billion in 2010, and $120 billion in 2011.12 It has been suggested that the China Investment Corporation, established in 2007 with a mandate to diversify China’s foreign exchange holdings, and an active investor in energy, natural resources, and infrastructure-related assets, received $100–200 billion in new funds in 2010.13 Other SWFs have seen strong returns in 2010, supporting policy decisions to become more
  • 40. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development16 proactive sponsors of FDI. Since 2009, for example, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, with more than $400 billion under management and owning roughly 1 per cent of the world’s equity, is now allowed to own up to 10 per cent of a listed company – the threshold to be considered FDI – making the fund a considerable potential source of FDI.14 Greater availability of funds, as well as policies that give SWFs more leeway to acquire larger stakes in attractive assets, together with improved in-house fund management capacity, will result in SWFs becoming more visible sources of FDI. 2. Prospects Judging from the data on FDI flows, cross-border MAs and greenfield investment for the first few months of 2011, the recovery of FDI is relatively strong. This trend may well continue into the remaining period of 2011. New investment opportunities await for cash-rich companies in developed and developing countries. Emerging economies, particularly Brazil, China, India and the Russian Federation, have gained ground as sources of FDI in recent years. A recovery in FDI is on the horizon. However, the business environment remains volatile, and TNCs are likely to remain relatively cautious regarding their investment plans. Consequently, medium-term prospects for FDI flows – which have not really picked up yet after the sharp slump in 2008 and 2009, and which had only a moderate recovery in 2010 – may vary substantially, depending on whether or not the potential risks in the global economy materialize or not. To illustrate these uncertainties, UNCTAD proposes baseline and pessimistic scenarios for future FDI growth (figure I.16). The former scenario is based on the results of various leading indicators, including UNCTAD’s World Investment Prospects Survey 2011—2013 (WIPS) (UNCTAD, forth­ coming a), an econometric model of forecasting FDI inflows (box I.3), and data for the first four to five months of 2011 for cross-border MAs and greenfield investment values. Taking these various indicators together, FDI flows could range from $1.4–1.6 trillion in 2011 (with a baseline scenario of $1.52 trillion) — the pre-crisis average of Recovery is underway, but risks and uncertainties remain. 2005–2007. They are expected to rise further to $1.7 trillion in 2012 and reach $1.9 trillion in 2013, the peak achieved in 2007. However, there is also a possibility of stagnant FDI flows (pessimistic scenario) if the above–mentioned risks such as the unpredictability of global economic governance, worsening sovereign debt crisis, and fiscal and financial imbalances were to materialize. After the sharp recession at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, the economic environment has improved significantly over the past two years. The recovery in world output growth rests on a number of factors, including stabilization of the financial system, the resilient growth of emerging markets, the stimulus package programmes implemented in various major economies in the world, and the pick- up in final demand in developed countries, following a return to confidence for both households and companies. Recent forecasts suggest that global GDP will grow by 3 per cent in 2011. Moreover, domestic investment, is expected to pick up strongly not only in developing countries but also in advanced economies (table I.3). Take for example the Republic of Korea, where investment expenditure in 2011 is expected to rise by nearly 10 per cent, to a record high.15 The improvement in the global macroeconomic outlook has had a direct positive effect on the capacity of TNCs to invest. After two years of slump, profits of TNCs picked up significantly in 2010 (figure I.17), and have continued to rise in 2011: in the first quarter the SP 500 United States Figure I.16. Global FDI flows, 2002–2010, and projection for 2011–2013 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD. 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Pessimistic scenario Baseline
  • 41. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 17 Box I.3. Forecasting global and regional flows of FDI Part of UNCTAD’s forecast for FDI flows is based on an econometric model, by which not only global but also regional estimations are made possible for 2011–2013. As FDI decisions are a strategic choice by firms choosing among alternative locations, the single country/region model cannot demonstrate how a TNC chooses a particular location over others. Existing studies typically portray FDI as reacting to individual host country/region factors, but fail to capture the impact of factors elsewhere on the other regions that may attract investment to, or divert investment from, the country in question. Consequently, in order to explain and forecast global and regional FDI, factors in all regions must be taken into consideration simultaneously. UNCTAD’s econometric model for FDI uses panel data for the period 1995–2010 from 93 countries, which account for more than 90 per cent of FDI in their own respective regions (Africa, West Asia, South, East and South-East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, EU and other developed countries).a The variables employed in the model include: market growth of G-20 countries as main home and host countries of global FDI (G-20 growth rate), market size (one year lagged GDP of each individual country), the one-year lagged price of oil to capture natural-resource FDI projects, trade openness (the share of exports plus imports over GDP), and the lagged dependent variable of FDI to capture the effects of FDI in the previous periods (autocorrelation). The regression results are summarized in box table I.3.1. Based on this model, FDI flows are projected to pick up in 2011 reaching the pre-crisis level mainly due to dynamism in the economic growth of G-20 countries. FDI inflows are expected to reach the peak level of 2007 in 2013 (box table I.3.2). However, the results of the model are based mainly on economic fundamentals and do not take into account the various risk factors mentioned in the Report. This is due to difficulties in quantifying them. Source: UNCTAD. a The only exception is Latin America and the Caribbean, where the countries included represent around 70 per cent of FDI inflows. Lower coverage is due to the absence of macroeconomic data for the Caribbean. firms increased their profits by 12 per cent over the corresponding period of 2010. For Japan, despite a negative economic growth rate due to the natural disaster, listed firms still achieved profits,16 and even in the aftermath of the disaster, Japanese firms are vigorously investing abroad (box I.4). Firms now Box table I.3.1. Regression results of FDI forecasting model, fixed effects panel regressiona Explanatory variable Coefficients G20 growth 0.37 (3.87)*** GDP (-1) 0.01 (3.32)*** Openness 0.01 (3.48)*** Oil price (-1) 0.02 (3.9)*** FDI(-1) 0.50 (7.2)*** Constant -0.63 (-0.58) R2 0.81 Observations 1395 Source: UNCTAD estimates, based on UNCTAD (for FDI inflows), IMF (G20 growth, GDP and openness), United Nations (oil price) from the Link project. a The following model FDIjt =αo +α1 *G20t +α2 *GDPjt-1 +α3 *Openessjt +α4 *Oil_pricejt-1 +α5 *FDIjt-1 +ejt is estimated with fixed effect panel regression using estimated generalized least squares with cross-sections weights. Coefficients computed by using white heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Statistical significance at the 1 per cent (***) and 5 per cent (**) levels. Box table I.3.2. Summary of econometric medium-term baseline scenarios of FDI flows, by groupings (Billions of dollars) Averages Projections 2005-2007 2008-2010 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Global FDI flows 1 471 799 1 390 934 1 185 030 1 243 671 1 523 598 1 685 792 1 874 620 Developed countries 967 947 723 284 602 835 601 906 790 183 887 729 1 026 109 Developing countries 444 945 580 716 510 578 573 568 655 800 713 946 749 531 Transition economies 58 907 86 934 71 618 68 197 77 615 84 117 98 980 Source: UNCTAD.
  • 42. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development18 Table I.3. Real growth rates of GDP and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), 2010–2012 (Per cent) Variable Region 2010 2011 2012 World 3.6 3.1 3.5 GDP growth rate Developed economies 1.6 1.3 1.7 Developing economies 7.1 6.0 6.1 Transition economies 3.8 4.0 4.2 World 5.9 6.5 7.2 GFCF growth rate Advanced economiesa 2.5 4.2 6.2 Emerging and developing economiesa 9.6 8.9 8.2 Source: UNCTAD, based on United Nations, 2011 for GDP and IMF, 2011a for GFCF. a IMF’s classifications of advanced, emerging and developing economies are not the same as the United Nations’ classifications of developed and developing economies. have record levels of cash holdings. TNCs’ sales have also increased significantly as compared to 2009, both globally and for their foreign affiliates (section C). These improvements at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels are reflected in TNCs’ opinions about the global investment climate. According to 2011’s World Investment Prospects Survey (WIPS),17 TNCs exhibit a growing optimism going towards 2013 (figure I.18). Some 34 per cent of respondents expressed “optimistic” or “very optimistic” views for the global investment environment in 2011, compared to more than half Figure I.17. Profitability a and profit levels of TNCs, 1997–2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Thomson One Banker. a Profitability is calculated as the ratio of net income to total sales. Note: The number of TNCs covered in this calculation is 2,498. -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 - 200 0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Per cent$ billion Profits Profitability (53 per cent) in 2013. Perhaps more strikingly, the share of TNCs responding that they were “pessimistic” or “very pessimistic” for 2013 fell to 1 per cent. Responses to the WIPS also suggest strongly the continuing importance of developing and transition economies as destinations for FDI (figure I.19). While the composition of the top five destinations has not changed much in recent years – for example, in 2005 the top five were China, India, United States, Russian Federation, and Brazil – the mix of the second tier of host economies has shifted over time. Reflecting the spread of FDI in developing Asia beyond the top destinations, the rankings of economies such as Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Taiwan Province of China have risen markedly compared to previous surveys. Peru and Chile have likewise improved their position as Latin American destinations, thanks largely to their stable investment climates and strong macroeconomic factors. African countries are conspicuous by their absence from the list of top potential host economies for TNCs. While improving macro- and microeconomic fundamentals, coupled with rising investor optimism and the strong pull of booming emerging markets, should signal a strong rebound in global FDI flows, risks and uncertainties continue to hamper the realization of new investment opportunities. Such factors include the unpredictability of global governance (financial system, investment regimes, Figure I.18. Level of optimism of TNCs regarding the investment environment, 2011–2013 (Percentage of responses by TNCs surveyed) Source: UNCTAD, forthcoming a. 34% 49% 53% 2011 2012 2013
  • 43. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 19 Box I.4 Effects of the natural disaster on Japanese TNCs and outward FDI On 11 March 2011, the northern part of Japan experienced a devastating earthquake and tsunami. The region that was most badly affected is home to a number of niche hi-tech companies, all major producers of specialized components (e.g. Renasas Electronics, which controls a 30 per cent share of the global market for microcontrollers). The earthquake itself and the subsequent interruption of power supplies resulted in a severe disruption of supply chains, not only in Japan but internationally. Despite the severity of the damage, by June most of the supply chains had been restored: for example, production at Toyota had recovered to 90 per cent of its pre-earthquake level. While Japanese firms have shown remarkable resilience, the chain of events has prompted Japanese manufacturers to reconsider their procurement strategies. In a recent survey of Japanese firms by the Nikkei,a one-quarter of the respondents said that they would increase procurement from abroad, while a further fifth intended to diversify their procurement sources within Japan. The survey indicated that about two-thirds of the firms intended to maintain or increase their level of total investment in the aftermath of this natural disaster. In the short term, the supply disruption will have reduced the revenues of those foreign affiliates of Japanese TNCs that were affected by supply disruption, and thus their reinvested earning. On the other hand, the temporary loss of revenues might have induced the parent companies of these affiliates to extend intra-company loans. In the medium term, the strategy of diversifying procurement sources could strengthen outward FDI. However, the overall impact of the earthquake on outward FDI from Japan is likely to be limited, especially against the backdrop of buoyant outward FDI through MA by Japanese firms. Over the long run, Japan will again be a leading investor for outward FDI. Source: UNCTAD. a Based on a survey of 100 CEOs by the Nikkei (29 May 2011). etc.); the worsening sovereign debt crisis in some developed countries and the resultant fiscal austerity; regional instability; energy price hikes and risks of inflation; volatility of exchange rates; and fears of investment protectionism. Although each can serve as a disincentive to investment in its own right, the prominence of all of these risks at the same time could seriously obstruct FDI globally. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 China UnitedStates India Brazil RussianFederation Poland Indonesia Australia Germany Mexico VietNam Thailand UnitedKingdom Singapore TaiwanProvinceofChina Peru CzechRepublic Chile France Colombia Malaysia Figure I.19. Top host economies for FDI in 2011–2013 (Number of times the country is mentioned as a top FDI priority by respondent TNCs) Source: UNCTAD, forthcoming a.
  • 44. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development20 * * * UNCTAD’s WIPS and econometric model projections for FDI flows in the coming years paint a picture of cautious but increasing optimism, with global FDI flows set to increase to between $1.4 and $1.6 trillion in 2011, building upon the modest recovery experienced in 2010. At the high end of that range, FDI flows would be slightly more than the average pre-crisis level, yet would still be below the 2007 peak of $2 trillion. World trade, by contrast, is already back at pre-crisis levels (table I.5). While the FDI recovery resumes, the worldwide demand for private productive investment is increasing as public investment, which rescued the global economy from a prolonged depression, declines in one country after another. With unsustainably high levels of public debt at both national and sub-national levels in many countries, and with nervous capital markets, governments must now rein in their deficits and let private investment take over the lead role in generating and supporting a sustained recovery. The FDI recovery in 2010 was slow not because of a lack of funds to invest, or because of a lack of investment opportunities. Responses by TNCs to UNCTAD's WIPS (UNCTAD, forthcoming a) indicate increasing willingness to invest, and clear priority opportunity areas. However, the perception among TNC managers of a number of risks in the global investment climate, including financial instability and the possibility of a rise in investment protectionism, is acting as a brake on renewed capital expenditures. A number of developed countries, where the need for private investment to take over from dwindling public investment is greatest, are ranked far lower on the investment priority list of TNCs than either the size of their economies or their past FDI performance would seem to warrant. Policymakers from those countries would be well advised to take a lead role among their international peers in continuing to ensure a favourable and stable global investment climate.
  • 45. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 21 Domestic investment still accounts for the majority of the total investment in developing and transition economies.18 Foreign investment can only complement this. However, each form of foreign investment plays a distinct and important role in promoting growth and sustainable development, boosting countries’ competitiveness, generating employment, and reducing social and income disparities. Non-FDI flows may work either in association with FDI, or separately from it. As no single type of flow alone can meet investment needs, it is vital to leverage their combinations to maximize their development impact. This section will discuss the development implications of various forms of investment, and the benefits of combining FDI with other sources of external finance, be they private or public. Foreign investors may finance their activities using a range of instruments in addition to FDI. These have different motivations, behave differently, and consequently have different impacts on development. This makes it necessary to review each instrument and the synergies between them. Differing motivations, characteristics and responses also drive different groups of investors in an enterprise – for instance, private investors (individuals, enterprises, funds etc.) and public investors (e.g. via ODA and other official finance). There is a sign of continued recovery in capital flows, but caution is needed. Since the first half of 2009, private capital flows to emerging and developing economies have been rebounding, led by FDI, but these remain below their peak of 2007 (table I.4). However, is the recovery in development finance to developing and transition economies sustainable? The recovery is due to a combination of structural (long-term) and cyclical (short-term) pull and push factors. High expected GDP growth in developing B. FDI AS EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FINANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES The recovery of external capital flows to developing countries is under way, led by FDI. However, caution is needed as to its sustainabil- ity, as FDI may be volatile. Table I.4. Capital flows to developing countries, 2005–2010 (Billions of dollars) Type of flows 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 579 930 1 650 447 656 1 095 FDI 332 435 571 652 507 561 Portfolio investment 154 268 394 -244 93 186 Other investmenta 94 228 686 39 56 348 Memorandum Official grants, excluding technical cooperation 56.9 106.9 76.1 86.4 95 .. Change in reserves 539 647 1 063 774 673 927 Workers' remittances 173 204 245 288 281 297 Source: UNCTAD, based on data from IMF, 2011a (on portfolio, other investment and reserve assets), from UNCTAD (on FDI inflows and workers’ remittances) and from the World Bank (on official grants excluding technical cooperation). a Other investments include loans from commercial banks, official loans and trade credits. countries is heralding profitable investment opportunities (cyclical pull), while policy frameworks are perceived to be more resilient to future shocks, especially in Asia (structural pull). Developed countries with excess liquidity, thanks to quantitative easing and low interest rates, are motivated to invest in developing countries with relatively higher rates and returns (cyclical push) (Akyuz, 2011; IMF, 2011b).19 However, there remain concerns about volatility. First, the capital surge is exposing developing and transition economies to greater instability, putting direct upward pressure on their exchange rates. And the low interest rate environment in developed economies cannot be sustained indefinitely.20 As a positive sign for emerging and developing economies, FDI has been the main source of inflows during 2009–2010, implying greater stability and a return to confidence for longer-term, productive investment. Less positively, the global recovery may be more fragile, because FDI is relatively less significant this time in developed economies, which are now highly exposed to volatile portfolio and especially other capital elements such as bank loans.
  • 46. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development22 Second, FDI in recent years is gradually becoming morevolatileindevelopingandtransitioneconomies, although it remains much less volatile than portfolio and other investments (such as commercial loans and trade credits) (figure I.20). It is argued that this might reflect its changing composition, for example a shift from equity to debt components, which would also make it more sensitive to the changes in United States monetary policy that have triggered previous crises. As a consequence, assumptions about FDI’s stability relative to other types of capital should be treated with caution especially for emerging economies (IMF, 2011a), bearing in mind the dramatic rise and fall in FDI inflows to such countries as Brazil ($45 billion in 2008, $26 billion in 2009 and $48 billion in 2010), the Republic of Korea ($8.4 billion in 2008, $7.5 billion in 2009 and $6.9 billion in 2010) and South Africa ($9 billion in 2008, $5.4 billion in 2009 and $1.6 billion in 2010). FDI is also likely to contain some short-term and volatile flows, or “hot money”. Stabilization of capital flows now represents an important challenge to many developing countries (box I.5). Each of the three components of FDI flows (equity investment, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans) has reasons for fluctuation. Intra-company debt generally comes with more flexible terms and conditions than commercial loans, being related more to the decisions of the parent company in order to help its foreign affiliates to expand or cover the running costs during start-up, restructurings, or upswings.21 Reinvested earnings fluctuate quite significantly, depending on profitability and the level of repatriation from abroad in the form of dividend payments. Although equity investment continues to be the most stable component of FDI, global production chains have changed considerably and it has become much easier for equity to relocate. Despite the instability of FDI flows in recent years, the fact that net private flows to developing countries remain positive is largely due to FDI: the recovery has not extended yet to all private flows in all regions, and non-FDI flows were negative in many years and regions even during the FDI boom (figure I.21). FDI would therefore appear to be much less volatile than these other private flows (namely private portfolio and private other capital). All private foreign capital flows – portfolio investment, bank loans and FDI – contribute to development. Thus, the recent crisis, and the nature and inherent fragility of the current upswing, are both matters of concern to developing countries. This makes the role of official development assistance (ODA) very important. ODA is less prone to fluctuations; however, failure by developed countries to meet stipulated objectives has led to deep scepticism about its effectiveness in addressing core development needs of beneficiary countries. Figure I.20. The volatility of private capital flows, by type, 2003–2010 Source: UNCTAD. a In 2003 and 2004, the value of standard deviation exceeded 3. Note: The volatility of each type of capital flow is calculated as relative standard deviation for the immediately preceding 10 years. The relative standard deviation of 2010 is based on flows between 2001 and 2010. 0 1 2 3 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 1 2 3 2003a 2004a 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Other investment FDI Portfolio investment Other investment FDI Portfolio investment Developed countries Developing and transition economies
  • 47. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 23 Some developing countries are concerned that a surge in capital inflows could exacerbate imbalanc- es and complicate their macroeconomic policies. Against this backdrop, capital controls are back on their policy agenda. The IMF also has now softened its customary stance against capital controls (Ostry et al., 2011), making it easier for some Asian and Latin American countries to introduce measures to restrict short-term, volatile flows, while maintaining the more preferential treatment of long-term capital. In principle, these measures should not affect FDI, as the latter should contain only long-term flows. Reality is more complex, as flows recorded statistically under FDI could encompass some short-term flows. In 2010, FDI flows rose significantly to some develop- ing countries. In certain cases, the increase of FDI was not necessarily accompanied by investment in fixed assets or cross-border acquisitions. A part of this money might have entered developing host countries for the purpose of short-term capital gains. In coun- tries where FDI inflows exceed considerably the capi- tal expenditures of foreign affiliates, the latter may hold part of the funds received from their parent firms in assets other than immediate investment, for example speculative funds. Moreover, short-term speculative flows may be misre- ported under FDI outflows when they leave the home country, but are not recorded as FDI inflows in host countries as the money transferred is spent instanta- neously for speculative purposes, and does not stay long enough in the accounts of foreign affiliates. This kind of money is either reserved for special-purpose entities and financial holding companies, or is invest- ed in real estate and property which may easily be liquidated. Indeed FDI in real estate is rising in many countries, in particular in China (chapter II) and in Latin America – as it at one time was in pre-crisis West Asia. Such misreporting happens because the distinction between long-term capital flows (FDI) and short-term capital flows is increasingly blurred. As a result of the growth of this short-term capital, recently FDI flows have become more volatile than before (figure I.20). While some speculative short-term private capital flows may have become part of FDI statistics, most continue to be recorded under errors and omissions, as they usually escape being captured in the estab- lished items of the balance of payments. In 2009 (the most recent year for which data are available), the val- ue of errors and omissions was equivalent to almost half that of all FDI inflows globally, up from only about 10 per cent in previous years. As the markets for different types of capital flows are interrelated, the establishment of measures targeting exclusively short-term capital flows is increasingly diffi- cult. Take for example the capital controls introduced in 2009–2010 in the real estate markets of various Asian economies: direct controls to limit the size of flows affected both short- and long-term capital flows (IMF, 2011a). Source: UNCTAD Box I.5. FDI and capital controls Figure I.21. Composition of private capital flows to developing and transition economies, 2004–2010 (Billions of dollars) - 40 - 20 - 20 40 60 80 100 - 300 - 200 - 100 - 100 200 300 400 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 - - 150 - 100 - 50 - 50 100 150 200 250 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Africa South, East, and South-East Asia Latin America and the Caribbean FDI Portfolio Other Capital Source: UNCTAD, based on data from IMF, 2011a.
  • 48. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development24 1. Accelerating internationalization of firms International production is expanding, with sales, employment and assets of foreign affiliates all increasing (table I.5). UNCTAD estimates that TNCs worldwide, in their operations both at home and abroad, generated value added of approximately $16 trillion in 2010 (figure I.22), accounting for more than a quarter of global GDP. In 2010, foreign affiliates accounted for more than one-tenth of global GDP and one-third of world exports. International production by TNCs (i.e. value added by foreign affiliates) accounts for around 40 per cent of TNCs’ total value added (figure I.22), up from around 35 per cent in 2005. International production networks thus continue to expand, although the rate of growth was slower during the crisis, due to the drop in FDI flows. This continuing expansion reflects the consistently high rates of return obtained by TNCs on FDI – back up to 7.3 per cent in 2010, after a one-year dip during the crisis (table I.5). Returns are thus back to pre-crisis levels, despite a steady decrease in leverage, as proxied by outward FDI stock over foreign assets. Leverage peaked during the FDI boom years from 2005 to 2007, with the stock (equity) over assets ratio declining from nearly 40 per cent to 25 per cent, but it has since decreased, with the equity/asset ratio climbing up to 36 per cent in 2009 and 2010. Other indicators of international production also showed positive gains in 2010. Sales of foreign affiliates rose 9.1 per cent, reflecting strong revenues in developing and transition economies. Employment continued to expand, as efficiency- seeking investments expanded during the crisis. C. FURTHER EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION Table I.5. Selected indicators of FDI and international production, 1990–2010 Item Value at current prices Annual growth rate or change on return (Billions of dollars) (Per cent) 1990 2005–2007 average 2008 2009 2010 1991– 1995 1996– 2000 2001– 2005 2009 2010 FDI inflows 207 1 472 1 744 1 185 1 244 22.5 40.1 5.3 -32.1 4.9 FDI outflows 241 1 487 1 911 1 171 1 323 16.9 36.3 9.1 -38.7 13.1 FDI inward stock 2 081 14 407 15 295 17 950 19 141 9.4 18.8 13.4 17.4 6.6 FDI outward stock 2 094 15 705 15 988 19 197 20 408 11.9 18.3 14.7 20.1 6.3 Income on inward FDI 75 990 1 066 945 1 137 35.1 13.1 32.0 -11.3 20.3 Rate of return on inward FDI a 6.6 5.9 7.3 7.0 7.3 -0.5 - 0.1 -0.3 0.3 Income on outward FDI a 122 1 083 1 113 1 037 1 251 19.9 10.1 31.3 -6.8 20.6 Rate of return on outward FDI a 7.3 6.2 7.0 6.9 7.2 -0.4 - - -0.2 0.3 Cross-border MAs 99 703 707 250 339 49.1 64.0 0.6 -64.7 35.7 Sales of foreign affiliates 5 105 21 293 33 300 30 213b 32 960b 8.2 7.1 14.9 -9.3 9.1 Value-added (product) of foreign affiliates 1 019 3 570 6 216 6 129b 6 636b 3.6 7.9 10.9 -1.4 8.3 Total assets of foreign affiliates 4 602 43 324 64 423 53 601b 56 998b 13.1 19.6 15.5 -16.8 6.3 Exports of foreign affiliates 1 498 5 003 6 599 5 262c 6 239c 8.6 3.6 14.7 -20.3 18.6 Employment by foreign affiliates (thousands) 21 470 55 001 64 484 66 688b 68 218b 2.9 11.8 4.1 3.4 2.3 GDP 22 206 50 338 61 147 57 920d 62 909d 6.0 1.4 9.9 -5.3 8.6 Gross fixed capital formation 5 109 11 208 13 999 12 735 13 940 5.1 1.3 10.7 -9.0 9.5 Royalties and licence fee receipts 29 155 191 187 191 14.6 10.0 13.6 -1.9 1.7 Exports of goods and non-factor services 4 382 15 008 19 794 15 783d 18 713d 8.1 3.7 14.7 -20.3 18.6 Source: UNCTAD. a Calculated with FDI income for the countries that have the data for both this and FDI stock. b Data for 2009 and 2010 are estimated based on a fixed effects panel regression of each variable against outward stock and a lagged dependent variable for the period 1980-2008. c Data for 1995–1997 are based on a linear regression of exports of foreign affiliates against inward FDI stock for the period 1982–1994. For 1998–2010, the share of exports of foreign affiliates in world export in 1998 (33.3%) was applied to obtain values. d Based on data from IMF, 2011a. Note: Not included in this table are the value of worldwide sales by foreign affiliates associated with their parent firms through non-equity relationships and of the sales of the parent firms themselves. Worldwide sales, gross product, total assets, exports and employment of foreign affiliates are estimated by extrapolating the worldwide data of foreign affiliates of TNCs from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for sales; those from the Czech Republic, France, Israel, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for value-added (product); those from Austria, Germany, Japan and the United States for assets; those from Czech Republic, Japan, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for exports; and those from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao (China), Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States for employment, on the basis of the shares of those countries in worldwide outward FDI stock.
  • 49. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 25 Underlying this improvement in international production has been an acceleration of the internationalization of TNCs – and, indeed, of the initial internationalization of previously non-TNC firms. Three of the major factors driving this “new” burst of internationalization are: first, the crisis caused firms to rationalize their corporate structure and increase efficiencies wherever possible (including the options to close down or to sell to others), often by relocating business functions to cost-advantageous locations; second, the rapid recovery in emerging market economies, compared to the relatively weak response in developed economies, forced many TNCs to embrace these markets, in an effort to protect profits and generate growth; and the rise of emerging market TNCs including State-owned TNCs. During the economic and financial crisis, many companies embarked on sig- nificant layoffs and organizational restructuring in order to remain prof- itable. For TNCs in developed economies, which make up nearly 80 per cent of the TNCs in the world, and account for some 70 per cent of global FDI outflows, this often meant making cuts in their In 2010, foreign activity of the largest non-financial TNCs rebounded, and its share in total activity remained high. home economy operations, while moving or open- ing new facilities abroad to take advantage of spe- cific comparative advantages in those locations. In 2010, foreign activity of the largest non-financial TNCs’ rebounded, and its share in total activity re- mained high. However not all of the largest TNCs increased their internationalization. Financial TNCs, for example, experienced significant difficulties in 2010 (box I.6). These trends are plainly manifest in the findings of UNCTAD’s annual survey of the largest TNCs in the world (table I.6). These firms, predominantly from developed economies, expanded their footprint outside their home countries, registering a continued increase in their foreign assets in 2010. Rising cross-border MA activity by the largest TNCs, especially targeting strategic firms, has given further momentum to the expansion of foreign assets.22 Employment and sales also rose both at home and abroad. The largest TNCs from developing and transition economies experienced subtly differing pressures. Given the tremendous growth registered in many of their home economies, in some cases stoked by significant public stimulus packages, these TNCs struggled to balance responding to growth at home Figure I.22. TNCs account for one-quarter of world GDP, 2010 (Per cent and trillions of dollarsa ) Source: UNCTAD. a Current prices, current exchange rates. b ISIC L, M, N, Q, X, 92, P (Public administration, Defence, Social security, Health, Sanitation, Community services, Private household employment). c As estimated by the weighted average size of home economies. d Table I.5 in this report. 100% 24% 76% 50% 25% 14% 10% World GDP Public sectorb Private sector Domestic businesses TNCs Home countryc Foreign affiliatesd (6.6) (62.9) (47.8) ( )15.6 (9.0)
  • 50. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development26 with long-term internationalization goals and the desire to acquire international brands, technologies, and access to natural resources. Therefore, the share of foreign operations in total activity (i.e. sales and employment) continued to rise (table I.6). These firms continued to expand their balance sheets abroad at a rapid pace, with foreign assets rising 11 per cent in 2009 (the latest year for which data are available) to almost $1 trillion (table I.6). The rising importance of developing and transition economies The crisis drew attention to the importance of developing and transition economies, especially the emerging markets of Brazil, India, China and the Russian Federation (BRICs), as key destinations for both efficiency- and market-seeking investors. Not only are these economies attractive for their lower labour costs, they are also seen increasingly as important markets in their own right. This trend is apparent Box I.6. Recent trends in internationalization of the largest financial TNCs in the world Financial TNCs, which accounted for more than 20 per cent of FDI outflows during 2006–2008, have seen their fortunes fluctuate dramatically over recent years. Since the crisis, during which a number were forced into government receivership, they have been stabilizing their situations – as witnessed by the strong rebound in their profits.a Nevertheless, the crisis has played havoc with the internationalization programmes of many of the largest financial TNCs. In some cases, firms were forced to consolidate by regulators, or by their new State owners, shifting their focus to domestic markets at the expense of foreign businesses. For example, RBS (United Kingdom), which was saved only by significant government intervention, has sold a number of its foreign assets. Icelandic and Irish banks suffered the same fate. In other cases the crisis hastened previously laid plans, for example Citigroup’s (United States) sale of non-retail banking assets in Japan (chapter II).b Given the pressures facing the largest financial TNCs, a slowdown in their internationalization in 2010 was almost inevitable. UNCTAD’s measure of the average geographical spreadc of the 50 largest financial TNCs rose only 1.4 points to 44.9 for the year, compared to 43.5 in 2009. Individual firm performance was mixed, with sharp drops registered by a number of European financial institutions. A number of financial TNCs in the United States also posted declines. Japanese financial TNCs, in contrast, increased their internationalization, making strategic international acquisitions during the crisis.d A new wave of financial industry MAs may materialize in the coming years, but financial TNCs in developed markets may find that their entry into fast-growing developing markets encounters various capital control measures (box I.5). During the crisis, policymakers in many of the largest developing countries, in particular Brazil and China, viewed State-owned financial institutions as important agents of healthy financial markets. Without easy access to the largest and fastest-growing markets, financial TNCs will find it difficult to uphold the long-term rationale for internationalization: balancing the earnings of developed, relatively stable, markets with those of quick-growing, and volatile, developing markets (Schildbach, 2009). Source: UNCTAD. a “Banking industry posts best quarter of profits since early 2007”, Washington Post, 25 May 2011. b “Citigroup to sell shares in Japanese brokerage monex”, Bloomberg, 21 September 2010. c Geographical spread is calculated as the square root of the share of foreign affiliates in total affiliates (the Internationalization Index), multiplied by the number of host economies. d “The big boys are back”, Economist, 25 September 2008. Strong profits of TNCs in emerging markets incentivizes further investments in both the share of operating profits generated in these economies, and the number of investments targeting them. Corporate profits, which were slashed by the crisis, have rebounded sharply for many of the largest TNCs in the world (section A). The swift economic recovery of the largest developing economies played an important role in restoring these firms to income growth. In some cases, income from developing and transition economies has grown to account for a significant share of TNCs’ operating income. This trend spans industries, with TNCs as varied as Coca-Cola (United States), Holcim (Switzerland), and Toyota Motors (Japan) deriving more than one-third of their operating income from developing economies (figure I.23). Investment activity by the 100 largest TNCs in the world has now shifted decidedly towards develop- ing and transition economies. Comparing interna- tional greenfield projects between 2007–2008 and 2009–2010, the number of projects targeting these economies increased by 23 per cent, compared
  • 51. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 27 Table I.6. Internationalization statistics of the 100 largest non-financial TNCs worldwide and from developing and transition economies (Billions of dollars, thousands of employees and per cent) 100 largest TNCs worldwide 100 largest TNCs from developing and transition economies Variable 2008 2009 2008–2009 % change 2010b 2009–2010 % change 2008 2009 % change Assets Foreign 6 161 7 147 16.0 7 512 5.1 899 997 10.9 Total 10 790 11 543 7.0 12 075 4.6 2 673 3 152 17.9 Foreign as % of total 57 62 4.8 a 62 0.3 a 34 32 -2.0 a Sales Foreign 5 168 4 602 -10.9 5 005 8.8 989 911 -7.9 Total 8 406 6 979 -17.0 7 847 12.4 2 234 1 914 -14.3 Foreign as % of total 61 66 4.5 a 64 -2.2 a 44 48 3.3 a Employment Foreign 9 008 8 568 -4.9 8 726 1.8 2 651 3 399 28.2 Total 15 729 15 144 -3.7 15 489 2.3 6 778 8 259 21.9 Foreign as % of total 57 57 -0.7 a 56 -0.2 a 39 41 2.0 Source: UNCTAD. a In percentage points. b Preliminary results. Note: From 2009 onwards, data refer to fiscal year results reported between 1 April of the base year to 31 March of the following year. 2010 data are unavailable for the 100 largest TNCs from developing and transition economies due to lengthier reporting deadlines in these economies. to only a 4 per cent rise in developed economies. While investments in developing Asia have domi- nated, growing poles of investment are now dis- cernible in Latin America and in Africa (figure I.24). Metro AG (Germany) is pursuing growth in both developing and transition economies, opening new stores in the Russian Federation (17), China (7), Kazakhstan (4), and Viet Nam (4) during 2010, while Figure I.23. Operating profits derived from operations in developing and transition economies, selected top 100 TNCs, 2010 (Billions of dollars and share of total operating profits) Source: UNCTAD. Note: Regional reporting by TNCs differs, in this case segments that were either completely or mainly located in developing or transition economies were included. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Bayer Honda Motor BASF Nissan Motor British American Tobacco Holcim Barrick Gold Nestlé SABMiller Unilever Toyota Motor Coca-Cola GlaxoSmithKline Anheuser-Busch InBev Anglo American 91 44 25 45 68 36 76 19 52 41 83 27 32 19 26 % of operating income
  • 52. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development28 closing stores in developed markets in Europe.23 General Electric (United States), the world’s largest TNC in terms of foreign assets, is also emblematic of this shift, having announced recently that it in- tends to intensify its focus on emerging markets – which account for 40 per cent of the firm’s industrial revenues – in order to reduce costs and increase revenue growth.24 Figure I.24. Greenfield investments by the largest 100 TNCs in the world, by host region, 2007–2008 and 2009–2010 (Number of projects and percent change between periods) Source: UNCTAD. 0 500 1 000 1 500 Transition economies West Asia South, East and South- East Asia and Oceania Latin America and the Caribbean Africa Developing economies Developed economies 2009–2010 2007–2008 4 5 41 9 61 23 23 2. State-owned TNCs The internationalization of large State-owned enterprises (SOEs) from developing and transition economies constitutes an impor- tant component of FDI. State-owned TNCs from developed countries are also extant internationally, albeit not widely recog- nized. The ownership difference from traditionally private or shareholder-owned TNCs – putatively impacting on their objectives, motives and strate- gies – has become an issue of intense interest and debate, if not yet of extensive research. State-owned TNCs are defined as enterprises comprising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates in which the government has a controlling interest (full, majority, or significant minority), whether The emergence of State-owned TNCs, especially those from developing economies, as important outward investors, has implications for both home and host economies. or not listed on a stock exchange. Definitions of what constitutes a controlling stake differ, but in this Report, control is defined as a stake of 10 per cent or more of the voting power, or where the government is the largest single shareholder. State- owned refers to both national and sub-national governments, such as regions, provinces and cities. Importantly, this definition excludes international investments by SWFs, which have become more visible investors in recent years25 (see section A.1.e for a review of recent trends in SWF-sponsored FDI), because they are not enterprises and are not necessarily governed by the usual corporate mechanisms. Some illustrative examples of factors determining what constitutes a State-owned TNC – for example, France Telecom, in which the State has a roughly 26 per cent-stake – are included in box I.7. a. The universe of State-owned TNCs In 2010 there were at least 650 State-owned TNCs, with more than 8,500 foreign affiliates, operating around the globe.26 While this makes them a minority in the universe of all TNCs (see section C.1 for more details), they nevertheless constituted a significant number (19 companies) of the world’s 100 largest TNCs of 2010 (also in 2009), and, more especially, of the top 100 TNCs from developing and transition economies of 2009 (28 companies). The largest 15 of these State- owned TNCs, from both developed and developing economies, are a relatively well-known group with recognizable names (table I.7). It is important to note that this enumeration of State-owned TNCs refers only to parent firms, which has the effect of reducing some widespread conglomerates to a single entry. Additionally, a number of the State-owned TNCs are identified such only due to a recent crisis- induced intervention, thus their membership on this list should be considered temporary (General Motors, for example). Government control of State-owned TNCs spans a spectrum from full control to substantive influence. Roughly 44 per cent of State-owned TNCs are majority-owned by their respective governments (figure I.25). These include companies that are fully Relatively small as a group, State-owned TNCs nev- ertheless rank among the largest TNCs in the world.
  • 53. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 29 integrated into the State, usually as an extension of a particular ministry, as well as those firms which are publically listed, but in which the State owns more than 50 per cent of the voting shares. For 42 per cent of identified State-owned TNCs, the government had a stake of less than 50 per cent. Of these, 10 per cent had a stake of less than 10 per cent. For these firms the government is often the largest of the minority stakeholders, or holds so-called “golden shares” and therefore exerts a significant or preponderant influence on the composition of the board of directors and the management of the enterprise. Geographically, 56 per cent of State-owned TNCs worldwide are from developing and transition economies (table I.8). Among these economies, South Africa (54), China (50), Malaysia (45), United Arab Emirates (21) and India (20) are the top five source countries. In developed economies, the majority of State-owned TNCs are located in Europe, especially in Denmark (36), France (32), Finland (21) and Sweden (18). These overall figures, however, belie very different government ownership strategies: for example, South Africa owes its relatively large number of SOEs to investment of public pension funds (through the Public Investment Box I.7. What is a State-owned enterprise: the case of France In France there is no specific law defining “State-owned” or “State-controlled” enterprises. The economic definition, as given by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), is as follows: “[a] State-owned enterprise is a company in which the State holds, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence, due to the owning of the property or of a financial participation, by owning either the majority of the capital or the majority of votes attached to the emitted shares.” This very broad definition encompasses a large variety of situations and types of company, and should be analysed in terms of “control” rather than mere “ownership”. Basically, it is possible to identify four main categories of “State-owned” enterprises falling under the INSEE definition: 1. Non-listed companies totally owned by the State, the so-called public establishments (Etablissements pub- lics). These firms fill a specific function and may not diversify. Examples include RATP, SNCF, Réseau Ferré de France, Banque de France, etc. 2. Listed companies totally owned by the State.a These firms, falling within the legal framework of the “free mar- ket”, may diversify their activities. The French State’s stake may be reduced or eliminated at any time, unless this is prohibited by law in a particular case. Examples include La Poste. 3. Listed companies in which the French State has a stake of more than 50 per cent, allowing it full control of the company’s management. Examples include EDF (a former “public establishment”), Aéroport de Paris, and vari- ous other large airports and ports in the country. 4. Listed companies in which the French State has a direct or indirect stake of less than 50 per cent. Examples include France Telecom (a former “public establishment”, 26 per cent stake) and GDF-Suez (formed through the merger of GDF, a former “public establishment”, and Suez, a private firm). Source: UNCTAD. a This situation is possible when the SOE has to be privatized or become publicly-owned. The State owns 100 per cent of shares before they are sold publicly. Figure I.25. Ownership structure of State-owned TNCs, 2011 (Per cent of State-owned TNCs by size of government stake) Source: UNCTAD, based on 653 TNCs. a The State is the largest shareholder or owns golden shares. b Includes those State-owned TNCs where the government stake is unknown, but is assumed to be majority-owned. 10% 32% 44% 14% 10%a 10-50% 51-100%b 100% Corporation) in various businesses throughout the domestic economy, resulting in the State taking a stake in a number of firms, though normally a small (less than 15 per cent) stake. State-owned TNCs from China, on the other hand, tend to be more firmly controlled directly by the State, through majority or full-ownership stakes. These numbers
  • 54. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development30 TableI.7.Thetop30non-financialState-ownedTNCs,rankedbyforeignassets,2009a (Millionsofdollarsandnumberofemployees) CorporationHomeeconomy Government stakeb Industryc AssetsSalesEmployment TNIe (percent)ForeignTotalForeignTotalForeignd Total EnelSpAItaly34.7Electricity,gasandwater1572314486438157.2 VolkswagenGroupGermany20.0Motorvehicles15625510514619636961.9 GDFSuezFrance36.4Utilities(Electricity,gasandwater)146247681119619756.5 EDFSAFrance84.7Utilities(Electricity,gasandwater)13434840925816939.0 DeutscheTelekomAGGermany31.7Telecommunications113184539010825854.1 EniSpAItaly30.3Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.10216978117407859.2 GeneralMotorsCoUnitedStates32.0Motorvehicles761365510511421753.7 FranceTelecomSAFrance26.7Telecommunications7313331646416747.0 EADSNVFrance22.4Aircraft7211654607512071.9 VattenfallABSweden100Electricity,gasandwater72832227344084.9 VeoliaEnvironnementSAFrance10.7Utilities(Electricity,gasandwater)5272294821231366.9 CITICGroupChina100Diversified4431511312512523.2 StatoilASANorway67.0Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.43971774112934.4 DeutschePostAGGermany30.5Transportandstorage3950446725842568.3 ValeSABrazil 5.5 (12goldenshares) Miningquarrying391022024136048.2 Petronas-PetroliamNasionalBhdMalaysia100Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.34126286384130.7 TeliaSoneraABSweden37.3Telecommunications32371014202973.3 RenaultSAFrance18.3Motorvehicles309229476612150.2 JapanTobaccoIncJapan50.0Food,beveragesandtobacco30422966255055.4 FinmeccanicaSpaItaly30.2Machineryandequipment29442025327362.7 ChinaOceanShipping(Group)CompanyChina100Transportandstorage2836182847249.7 LukoilOAORussianFederation13.4Petroleumandnaturalgas247938682214334.0 SingaporeTelecommunicationsLtdSingapore54.4Telecommunications2327812102364.3 ZainKuwait49.2Telecommunications192078121392.1 QatarTelecomQatar55.0Telecommunications1823571278.0 TataSteelLtdIndia12.9Metalandmetalproducts16241622478165.2 PetroleoBrasileiroSABrazil39.8Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.152002911687714.2 AbuDhabiNationalEnergyCoPJSCUnitedArabEmirates100Utilities(Electricity,gasandwater)1425353467.2 PetróleosdeVenezuelaSAVenezuela,BolivarianRep.of100Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.12150337559219.0 ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationChina100Petroleumexpl./ref./distr.1232551783015852.7 Source: UNCTAD. a Alldataarebasedonthecompanies’annualreportsunlessotherwisestated. b BasedonmostrecentdataavailablefromThomsonWorldscope(retrieved31May2011). c IndustryclassificationforcompaniesfollowstheUnitedStatesStandardIndustrialClassificationasusedbytheUnitedStatesSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC). d Inanumberofcasesforeignemploymentdatawerecalculatedbyapplyingtheshareofforeignemploymentintotalemploymentofthepreviousyeartototalemploymentof 2009. e TNI,theTransnationalityIndex,iscalculatedastheaverageofthefollowingthreeratios:foreignassetstototalassets,foreignsalestototalsalesandforeignemploymenttototal employment.
  • 55. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 31 also are dwarfed, in most cases, by the total number of SOEs in each respective economy. For example, there are some 900 SOEs in France, while in China, State sole-funded enterprises and enterprises with the State as the largest shareholder numbered roughly 154,000 in 2008. This suggests that the number and proportion of SOEs that have become transnational is relatively small. State-owned TNCs tend to be most active in financial services and industries that are capital- intensive, require monopolistic positions to gain the necessary economies of scale, or are deemed to be of strong strategic interest to the country. Roughly 70 per cent of State-owned TNCs operate Table I.8. Distribution of State-owned TNCs by home region/economy, 2010 Region/economy Number Share World 653 100 Developed countries 285 43.6 European Union 223 34.2 Denmark 36 5.5 Finland 21 3.2 France 32 4.9 Germany 18 2.8 Poland 17 2.6 Sweden 18 2.8 Others 81 12.4 Other European countries 41 6.3 Norway 27 4.1 Switzerland 11 1.7 Others 3 0.5 United States 3 0.5 Other developed countries 18 2.8 Japan 4 0.6 Others 14 2.1 Developing economies 345 52.8 Africa 82 12.6 South Africa 54 8.3 Others 28 4.3 Latin America and the Caribbean 28 4.3 Brazil 9 1.4 Others 19 2.9 Asia 235 36.0 West Asia 70 10.7 Kuwait 19 2.9 United Arab Emirates 21 3.2 Others 30 4.6 South, East and South-East Asia 165 25.3 China 50 7.7 India 20 3.1 Iran, Islamic Republic of 10 1.5 Malaysia 45 6.9 Singapore 9 1.4 Others 31 4.7 South-East Europe and the CIS 23 3.5 Russian Federation 14 2.1 Others 9 1.4 Source: UNCTAD. Note: While the number is not exhaustive, major SOE investors are covered. in the services sector, led by financial services, which accounts for 19 per cent of all State-owned TNCs, transport, storage and communications (16 per cent) and electricity, gas, and water (10 per cent). Some 22 per cent of State-owned TNCs are in manufacturing industries, mainly automotive and transport equipment (4 per cent of all State- owned TNCs), chemicals and chemical products (3 per cent) and metals and metal products (3 per cent) (table I.9). The remaining 9 per cent are located in the primary sector and are mainly active in extractive industries. Table I.9. Distribution of State-owned TNCs by sector/industry, 2010 Sector/industry Number Share Total 653 100 Primary 56 8.6 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 48 7.4 Others 8 1.2 Manufacturing 142 21.7 Food, beverages and tobacco 19 2.9 Wood and wood products 12 1.8 Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel 11 1.7 Chemicals and chemical products 20 3.1 Metals and metal products 20 3.1 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 27 4.1 Others 33 5.1 Services 455 69.7 Electricity, gas and water 63 9.6 Construction 20 3.1 Trade 42 6.4 Transport, storage and communications 105 16.1 Finance 126 19.3 Holding 27 4.1 Insurance 17 2.6 Rental activities 14 2.1 Business services 18 2.8 Others 23 3.5 Source: UNCTAD. Note: While the number is not exhaustive, major SOE investors are covered. The transnationality index (table I.7), and the share of their affiliates located abroad (figure I.26), are each indicative of the internationalization of State- owned TNCs. State-owned TNCs from West Asia show the highest levels of internationalization by the latter measure (the former measure is not available for many developing country State-owned TNCs), with on average 47 per cent of their affiliates being located abroad. Those based in the other major developing regions – Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South, East, and South-East Asia – are less internationalized, with less than half of
  • 56. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development32 their affiliates located in foreign countries. These numbers are, however, very small compared with the internationalization of the world’s top 100 TNCs, which on average have roughly 70 per cent of their affiliates abroad, or compared with the largest 100 TNCs from developing countries, which on average have 51 per cent of their affiliates abroad (WIR08). The geographical spread of State-owned TNCs’ operations appears to be relatively limited: in terms of the number of host economies in which they operate, State-owned TNCs from Europe have a wider footprint (operating in 8.2 foreign economies, on average) compared to their counterparts from developing and transition economies (between 2.7 and 6.3 foreign economies, on average) (figure I.26). b. Trends in State-owned TNCs’ FDI An analysis of FDI proj- ects (including both cross-border MA pur- chases and greenfield in- vestments) indicates that State-owned TNCs are ac- tive investors around the world.27 In 2010, their FDI, as measured by the value of these proj- ects, totalled some $146 billion, or roughly 11 per cent of global FDI flows (figure I.27), a higher share than represented by their number in the uni- verse of TNCs (less than one per cent of all TNCs). During 2003–2010, FDI projects by State-owned TNCs made up an average of 32 per cent of total outflows from developing countries. Emblematic of this surge is the number of developing coun- try State-owned TNCs responsible for the largest mega-deals in the past five years (table I.10). Four of the six FDI projects with a value of more than $10 billion (one MA deal and three greenfield in- vestment projects) were undertaken by developing country State-owned TNCs. While official statistics of the FDI stock controlled by State-owned TNCs do not exist, a rough estimate suggests that in 2010 their share of global outward stock was no less than 6 per cent.28 State-owned TNCs as major international investors are a relatively new phenomenon, judging by their cross-border MA purchases from the early 1980s to 2010. During that period there appear to have been two key phases of activity: first, the period from the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s, when State-owned TNCs from developed countries were more important in FDI flows; and secondly, from the beginning of 2000 onwards, when surging outward FDI by State-owned TNCs from developing economies made up the majority of State-owned TNC FDI flows (figure I.28). During 2003–2010, a period for which data on both MAs and greenfield investments are available, outward FDI of all State-owned TNCs was tilted towards developing and transition economies (56 per cent of the total) (table I.11). State-owned TNCs from developing and transition economies are significant players in South–South investment flows, investing $458 billion in FDI projects in other developing and transition economies over the period, or slightly more than two-thirds of all FDI projects from those economies ($663 billion). The direction of FDI also differs by mode of investment: in the case of cross-border MAs, two-thirds of such deals conducted by State-owned TNCs worldwide were directed to developed countries; in contrast, developing and transition economies received 68 per cent of total greenfield investment. Differences by mode of investment and by source also appear in sectoral/industry activity. While Surging FDI by State-owned TNCs, especially those from developing economies, has raised their profile on the global investment scene. 28% 32% 34% 35% 35% 40% 44% 47% Other developed economies Latin America and the Caribbean Commonwealth of Independent States Africa South, East, and South-East Asia World Europe West Asia 3.8 3.1 2.7 6.3 4.1 3.7 8.2 5.6 Figure I.26. West Asian State-owned TNCs are more internationalized than others, 2011 (Average internationalization indexa and average number of host economies) Source: UNCTAD. a Calculated as the number of foreign affiliates divided by the number of all affiliates.
  • 57. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 33 about 40 per cent of State-owned TNCs’ FDI projects, in terms of value, are in the primary sector, the shares of manufacturing and services sectors differ somewhat between cross-border MAs and greenfield investments. State-owned TNCs’ cross-border MAs between 1981 and 2010 largely targeted extractive industries, utilities, and telecommunications (figure I.29). However, FDI from State-owned TNCs based in developed economies largely focused on utilities (33 per cent of the total), such as electricity, gas and water, and telecommunications (19 per cent); whereas State-owned TNCs from developing and transition economies, in contrast, targeted extractive industries (37 per cent) and telecommunications (20 per cent). The difference between the patterns of investment by State-owned TNCs from developed as opposed to developing countries reflects, to some extent, the principal actors involved and their differing strategic aims. The most active State-owned TNCs from developed economies are large national utilities, which engage in FDI in order to capitalize on their firm-specific advantages and to generate 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 50 100 150 200 250 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Cross-border MAs Greenfield investments Share in global FDI outflows $billion % Figure I.27. The value of FDI projectsa by State-owned TNCs,b and its share in total FDI outflows, 2003–2010 Source: UNCTAD. a Comprises cross-border MAs and greenfield investments. The latter refers to the estimated amounts of capital investment. b Cross-border MA data refers only to TNCs in which the State has a stake of 50 per cent or more. Note: The values may be overestimated, as the value of greenfield FDI refers to estimated amount of capital investment of the entire project. Figure I.28. Cross-border MA purchases by State-owned TNCs,a by home region, 1981–2010 (Millions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD. a Refers only to TNCs in which the State has a stake of 50 per cent or more. Developed economies Developing economies Transition economies 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
  • 58. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development34 growth in markets outside their own. In contrast, State-owned TNCs active in extractive industries are more commonly from developing economies. This is largely in keeping with many emerging economies’ national goals to secure access to necessary natural resources. c. Issues related to corporate governance There is a significant di- versity in the behaviour of SOEs around the world, as State-owners differ in their interest and politi- cal systems. Even SOEs owned by the same State differ, for instance in their mission, technologies, industry and market context. SOEs may have multiple objectives – for instance, political, social, or cultural, or income re- distribution. Many of them were created originally to pursue public policy objectives. These aspects complicate the understanding (in comparison with private companies) of how SOEs operate, the way they are governed and how their relationship with the State plays out.29 At a general level, the development of SOEs as TNCs is influenced by the political and economic underpinnings of the country of origin. First, it is important to distinguish between countries where free market policies or interventionism are preponderant. Second, State-owned TNCs’ internationalization process may be influenced by the level of development of the country. The less developed a country, it can be argued, the more the State will tend to intervene in SOE management as SOEs become an important tool for the country’s development. In some cases the government might hinder FDI by SOEs, as this could reduce their contribution and role (e.g. social, industrial) in the domestic economy; however, in other cases, the State might be willing to support FDI by SOEs as this may help to build economies of scale and/or further develop the competitive position of the firm and that of the home country (e.g. Deng, 2004; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Third, influencing the possibilities and modalities of SOEs’ internationalization are specific government industrial, technological, fi­ nancial, social and foreign policies. Thus, it is important to distinguish between cases where the link to the State might either hinder or support SOEs’ FDI and performance: • Government as hindrance to international- ization (e.g. in Italy, where there has been re- peated concern about the potential effects of SOEs’ internationalization on local unemploy- ment rates). Figure I.29. Cumulative cross-border MA purchases by State-owned TNCs,a by economic grouping of ultimate acquirer and industry of target, 1981–2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD. a Refers to the TNCs in which the State has a 50 per cent or more stake only. b) Developing and transition economiesa) Developed countries 33% 19% 11% 8% 5% 4% 20% Electricity, gas and water Transport, storage and communications Food, beverages and tobacco Mining, quarrying and petroleum Finance All other Business services 37% 20% 7% 6% 5% 4% 21% Mining, quarrying and petroleum Transport, storage and communications Chemicals and chemical products Finance Electricity, gas and water Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel All other Corporate governance struc- tures play an important role in determining FDI decisions of State-owned TNCs – raising concerns in host economies.
  • 59. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 35 Table I.10. The 10 largest cross-border MA purchases and 10 largest greenfield investments by State-owned TNCs, 2006–2010 (Millions of dollars and per cent) (a) Cross-border MAs Year Value ($ million) Host economy Acquired company Industry of acquired company Ultimate acquiring company Ultimate home economy Shares acquired (%) 2009 16 938 United Kingdom British Energy Group PLC Electric services EDF France 73 2007 14 684 United Kingdom Gallaher Group PLC Cigarettes Japan Tobacco Inc Japan 100 2007 11 600 United States GE Plastics Plastics materials and synthetic resins SABIC Saudi Arabia 100 2009 7 157 Switzerland Addax Petroleum Corp Crude petroleum and natural gas Sinopec Group China 100 2010 7 111 Brazil Repsol YPF Brasil SA Crude petroleum and natural gas Sinopec Group China 40 2006 6 899 United Kingdom Peninsular Oriental Steam Navigation Co Deep sea foreign transportation of freight Dubai World United Arab Emirates 100 2008 6 086 United Kingdom British Energy Group PLC Electric services EDF France 26 2007 5 483 Italy FASTWEB SpA Information retrieval services Swisscom AG (Swiss Confederation) Switzerland 82 2009 4 500 United States Constellation Energy Nuclear Group LLC Electric services EDF France 50 2006 4 388 Hong Kong, China Hutchison Port Holdings Ltd Marine cargo handling PSA Corp Ltd (Ministry of Finance) Singapore 20 (b) Greenfield investments Year Value ($ million) Host economy Investing company Industry of investing company Home economy 2006 18 725 Pakistan Emaar Properties PJSC Real estate United Arab Emirates 2010 16 000 Australia Petroliam Nasional Berhad Coal, oil and natural gas Malaysia 2007 14 000 Tunisia Dubai Holding LLC Real estate United Arab Emirates 2006 9 000 China Kuwait Petroleum Corporation Coal, oil and natural gas Kuwait 2006 6 000 Turkey Indian Oil Corporation Ltd Coal, oil and natural gas India 2010 5 800 Cuba China National Petroleum Corporation Coal, oil and natural gas China 2010 5 740 Nigeria China State Construction Engineering Corporation Coal, oil and natural gas China 2008 5 000 Morocco International Petroleum Investment Company PJSC Coal, oil and natural gas United Arab Emirates 2010 5 000 Cameroon GDF Suez SA Coal, oil and natural gas France 2008 4 700 United States AREVA Group Alternative/renewable energy France Source: UNCTAD. • Government as supporter of internationaliza- tion (e.g. China’s “Go Global” policy, GCC countries’ economic diversification policy (see chapter II.A.3), the Republic of Korea’s Over- seas Investment Policy Package, and South Africa’s outward FDI policies – WIR06). • Government as indifferent to SOE internation- alization, but with general support and with greater regard to developmental impact (e.g. Vattenfall (Sweden) in Africa). In general terms it is argued that the extent to which SOEs are free of, or subject to, government involvement in operational and management matters (including FDI) is critical. Active government participation in SOEs is often regarded as a limit to good economic performance. However, if the degree of autonomy is very high, the SOE could behave just like a private firm, and this may impact on its original mission and public policy role. This situation suggests that although a certain level
  • 60. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development36 Table I.11. Cumulative value of FDI projectsa by State-owned TNCsb , by source and target economy, 2003–2010 (Millions of dollars and per cent) Source economy Host economy (a) By value (millions of dollars) Developed economies Developing economies Transition economies Total Developed economies 292 109 180 641 45 748 518 498 Developing economies 176 314 394 935 18 826 590 076 Transition economies 28 556 16 916 26 987 72 460 Total 496 979 592 493 91 562 1 181 034 (b) By destination of source economy (per cent) Developed economies Developing economies Transition economies Total Developed economies 56 35 9 100 Developing economies 30 67 3 100 Transition economies 39 23 37 100 Total 42 50 8 100 Source: UNCTAD. a Comprises cross-border MAs and greenfield investments. The latter refers to the estimated amounts of capital investment. b Cross-border MA data refers only to TNCs in which the State has a stake of 50 per cent or more. Note: The value may be overestimated as the value of greenfield FDI refers to estimated amount of capital investment of the entire project. of State intervention can be good for SOEs’ performance, including international diversification, too much State intervention might be detrimental. The level and mode of FDI by SOEs is also influenced by host country policies that regulate inward FDI. State-owned TNCs might be perceived either favourably or unfavourably, depending on conditions and the attitude of the host country. For example, there are persistent claims of “unfair” competition by State-owned TNCs, as well as concerns about State-owned TNCs as instruments of foreign policy (e.g. Mazzolini, 1980; Mascarenhas, 1989; Anusha and Nandini, 2008; Athreye and Kapur, 2009). Partly in response, host countries – particularly in the developed world – have over the past few years focused attention on developing legal frameworks and processes to provide the necessary instruments for identifying and preventing deemed adverse consequences arising from State-owned TNC investments (e.g. Australia, Canada). However, there are also countries with more favourableattitudesconcerningFDIbyforeignSOEs. For instance there are cases in which two States, because they do not yet have established political ties, perceive FDI by their SOEs as a step – among others – towards establishing a closer relationship between them. Examples include the case of Malaysian State-owned TNCs such as Petronas and some African countries, in which investments were often fostered by the Government of Malaysia (WIR06). There are also cases in which, because of the already existing strong ties between States, FDI by SOEs is perceived as further strengthening these ties. Their international business operations became part of ODA packages. Typical potential corporate governance concerns regarding State-owned TNCs are related to their objectives arising from State ownership (which may diverge from the commercial norms), a perceived lower level of transparency, potentially inexperienced boards of directors, and poor relationships with other shareholders and stakeholders.30 As many SOEs may have no public reporting requirements, and relevant information may only be available to the State, this hinders monitoring, limits accountability and, under some conditions, may create opportunities for corruption. In light of this situation, the future policy agenda that host governments may wish to deal with revolves around the core differences between State-owned and private TNCs, and focuses on alleviating these concerns: • National security concerns were particularly prominent when State-owned TNC activity in- creased in the mid-2000s. It was argued that sometimes their investments would endanger the national security position of any host coun- try. For instance, an acquisition of port man- agement businesses in six major United States seaports in the United States by DP World (UAE) in 2006 came under close scrutiny, be- cause of fears of compromising port security. Political resistance ultimately forced DP World to divest these assets. Explicitly defining and reaching an agreement (between the State and SOE governance) on SOE objectives can help reduce concerns in both host and home coun- tries, clarify management goals, improve per- formance monitoring, and reduce opportunism. • Competition concerns may be voiced where foreign investment is deemed a threat to na- tional core industries and “national champi-
  • 61. CHAPTER I Global Investment Trends 37 ons”, but they may also be raised in the con- text of knowledge and technology transfer issues. A recent controversial case that failed for these reasons concerned a proposed sec- ond deal in 2009, in the mining industry, which otherwise would have led to the Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco), China’s State- owned metals group, purchasing more stake in Rio Tinto (Australia/United Kingdom), a leading global mining company. • Concerns over governance and social and en- vironmental standards might become more prominent in the future for host countries as investments from State-owned TNCs increase, although such concerns are already being voiced with regard to extractive industries and agriculture. To improve transparency, SOEs are also expected to comply with high standards of accounting and auditing. In reality, less than one-fifth, or 119 firms, of 653 State-owned TNCs in UNCTAD’s database subscribe to the United Nations’ Global Compact, and only 3 per cent (or 17 firms) use the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards, compared to 60 per cent in both initiatives for the world’s top 100 TNCs (UNCTAD, 2011e).31 The OECD has pre- pared guidelines regarding provision of an ef- fective legal and regulatory framework (OECD, 2005). Also, from the perspective of home countries, there are concerns regarding the openness to investment from their State-owned TNCs. Given the current absence of any broader consensus on the future rules of engagement of State-owned TNCs as sources of FDI, it is critical that home and host economies determine and define more clearly the rules and regulations under which State-owned TNCs pursue their investment activities. This policy agenda determines part of future work in this area. Research should look at how specific government industrial and technological, financial, social and foreign policies influence the possibilities and modalities of SOEs’ internationalization. In particular, SOEs’ internationalization drivers should be identified and examined, as should be SOEs’ FDI impact on key aspects such as employment conditions, technology transfer, market access and environmental issues. Notes 1 In October–December 2008 the Russian Gov- ernment provided financial help amounting to $9.78 trillion to the largest Russian companies through the State corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Filippov, 2011). 2 Due to unavailability of data on FDI flows (on a balance-of-payments basis) by sector or by country, data on FDI projects (cross-border MAs and greenfield investments) are used in this Report. 3 The acquisition of Solvay Pharmaceuticals (Belgium) by Abbott Laboratories (United States) for $7.6 billion and the takeover of Millipore (United States) by the drug and chemical group Merck (Germany) for $6 billion (annex table I.7). 4 Nestlé, for example, registered a net profit of $34 billion in 2010, while the acquisition of Cadbury (United Kingdom) by Kraft Foods (United States) for $19 billion was the largest deal recorded in 2010 (annex table I.7). 5 Private equity firms are engaged in buying out or acquiring a majority of the existing firms, rather than establishing new companies (greenfield investment). 6 Bain Company, Global Private Equity Report 2011, Boston. 7 Commission of the European Communities, 2009. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, COM(2009) 207 final, Brussels: European Commission. 8 Public Law 111-202-July 21, 2010, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 9 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices, the Santiago Principles, 8 October 2008. 10 Truman (2011: 11). Note that the size of the SWF universe depends on the qualifying criteria used in the underlying SWF definition. The Monitor Group, for example, includes 33 funds in its Monitor-FEEM SWF Transaction Database. The membership base of the International Working Group for Sovereign Wealth Funds comprises 26 SWFs from 23 countries, managing assets of around $2.3 trillion. The analysis in this report is based on a consolidated universe drawn from these two samples. 11 Some SWFs have acquired large stakes in leading private equity firms, such as the Carlyle Group, Blackstone Group and Apax Partners. A good example for a private equity-SWF investment syndication is the co-ownership of Gatwick Airport by the California Public Employees Retirement System, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Republic of Korea’s National Pension Service, the Australian Future Fund and the private equity firm
  • 62. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development38 Global Infrastructure Partners (“Future fund gets Gatwick go-ahead”, Financial Times, 20 December 2010). 12 Institute of International Finance, GCC Regional Overview, 29 October 2010. 13 “CIC set for up to $200bn in fresh funds”, Financial Times, 25 April 2011. 14 Government Pension Fund Global, Annual Report 2009, Oslo: Norges Bank Investment Management, p.22. 15 Based on 600 major companies. Nikkei, 12 April 2011. 16 For United States firms, data from Thomson Reuter (Nikkei, 10 April 2011) and for Japanese firms, compiled by the Nikkei (14 May 2011). 17 This year’s survey provides an outlook on future trends in FDI as seen by 205 largest TNCs and 91 IPAs. 18 For detailed discussion on FDI and domestic investment, see UNCTAD, 2010a and 2011a. 19 This is because in home economies, banks are reluctant to lend, as there are concerns about the recovery, heavily indebted consumers have little appetite to borrow or spend, and enterprises facing weak market prospects are discouraged from investing. 20 For example, sudden increases in United States interest rates especially have in the past triggered crises in developing countries, including the debt crisis of the 1980s, and various emerging markets crises of the 1990s. 21 Intra-company loans often have flexible terms and conditions. including low or zero interest rates, and variable grace and maturity periods (Bhinda and Martin, 2009). 22 Examples include a $18.8 billion acquisition of Cadbury (United Kingdom) by Kraft Foods (United States) – the largest MA deal of the year (annex table I.7). 23 Annual Report 2010, Metro AG. 24 Annual Report 2009, General Electric. 25 TNCs where the State’s stake is held by an SWF (e.g. Singapore Telecom − which is majority owned by Temasek, an SWF) are included in the universe of State-owned TNCs. 26 In those cases where it was not possible to fully apply the restriction related to government stakes of less than 10 per cent, the State-owned TNC in question was retained in the count. 27 Due to data limitations, the analysis presented in this section refers to the State-owned TNCs where the State has a 50 per cent or greater stake. This data also excludes FDI projects of SWFs, which are reviewed in section A.1.e. 28 Comparing the cumulative sum of their gross cross-border MA purchases and greenfield capital expenditures from 2003–2010. 29 A more extensive study on the issue of State-owned TNCs’ governance and FDI is ongoing and will be published soon by UNCTAD. 30 At SOE firm-level discussions on governance typically revolve around specific governance decisions, such as who should be appointed as board members and CEO, compensation and incentives for management, amount of reporting and new investments. 31 This 100 TNC list, which is used for the study on CSR (UNCTAD 2011e), includes 14 State-owned TNCs, all of which are signatories to the Global Compact and two use the GRI reporting standard.
  • 63. The slow recovery of FDI flows in 2010 masked starkly divergent trends among regions: while East and South-East Asia and Latin America experienced strong growth in FDI inflows, those to Africa, South Asia, West Asia, transition and developed countries continued to decline. Inward FDI flows to Africa varied between subregions. In developing Asia, ASEAN and East Asia attracted record amounts of FDI, while in West Asia the impact of the global economic crisis continued to hold back FDI. Latin America and the Caribbean witnessed a surge in cross-border MAs, mainly from developing Asia. In transition economies, the marginal rise of flows to the CIS did not compensate for the sharp drop in South-East Europe. Among developed countries, flows to Europe and Japan declined, overshadowing the increased flows to the United States. All three groups in the structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies – LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS – saw their FDI inflows fall. Some major developments feature in regional FDI: • Intraregional FDI in Africa is increasing but has yet to realize its potential. • FDI outflows from South, East and South-East Asia have been rising rapidly, demonstrating new and diverse industrial patterns. • State-owned enterprises lead outward FDI from West Asia with a strategy of improving the competitiveness of the home economies. • Latin America and the Caribbean are witnessing a surge in resource-seeking FDI from developing Asia. • The investment link between developing and transition economies is gaining momentum, fuelled by the commodity boom and government support within both group of economies. • The restructuring of the banking industry in developed countries resulted in both significant divestments of foreign assets and the generation of new FDI. • A new plan of action for LDCs is proposed within an integrated policy framework on investment, technical capacity-building and enterprise development. • TNC participation has led to significant infrastructure build-up in LLDCs. • TNCs are contributing to the economic challenges of climate change adaptation in SIDS. CHAPTER II REGIONAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
  • 64. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development40 1. Africa a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $3.0 billion Angola, Egypt, Nigeria and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya .. $2.0 to $2.9 billion Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Ghana, and Algeria .. $1.0 to $1.9 billion Sudan, South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco and Zambia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Egypt and Angola $0.5 to $0.9 billion Niger, Madagascar, Namibia, Uganda, Mozambique, Chad, United Republic of Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea and Botswana Nigeria and Morocco $0.1 to $0.4 billion Mauritius, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Seychelles, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, Malawi, Kenya, Somalia, Cape Verde, Benin and Zimbabwe South Africa, Zambia, Algeria, Senegal and Mauritius Below $0.1 billion Swaziland, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Lesotho, Rwanda, Togo, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Burundi, Mauritania, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Principe. Gabon, Tunisia, Sudan, Liberia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Niger, Ghana, Swaziland, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Benin, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Principe, Mali, Mauritania, Cameroon, Malawi, Mozambique, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Guinea- Bissau, Namibia, Togo and Botswana a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Africa 60.2 55.0 5.6 6.6 5.1 7.6 2.7 3.2 North Africa 18.5 16.9 2.5 3.4 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.5 East Africa 3.6 3.7 0.1 0.2 - 0.3 0.2 0.2 West Africa 12.7 11.3 1.5 1.1 - 0.2 0.4 - - Southern Africa 20.0 15.1 1.4 1.9 3.9 5.6 1.5 1.5 Central Africa 5.4 8.0 0.1 0.1 - 0.2 - - Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Africa 488.8 554.0 106.0 122.4 39.2 50.1 2.2 2.7 North Africa 190.7 206.1 20.2 23.6 8.7 12.7 0.5 0.7 East Africa 27.5 30.9 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.2 West Africa 84.1 95.4 5.7 6.8 12.2 15.3 0.3 0.4 Southern Africa 153.6 182.8 78.2 90.0 14.0 17.2 1.1 1.2 Central Africa 32.9 38.8 1.0 1.0 3.5 4.3 0.1 0.2 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 5 140 7 608 2 702 3 184 Primary 2 579 2 149 621 - 81 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 2 579 2 149 621 - 81 Manufacturing - 110 303 138 381 Food, beverages and tobacco - 263 39 2 Wood and wood products 11 - 1 - 1 Chemicals and chemical products - 620 5 - - 38 Non-metallic mineral products 250 - - 4 416 Metals and metal products 248 32 102 - Machinery and equipment - 2 - - Electrical and electronic equipment - - 9 - - Precision instruments - 10 - - Services 2 672 5 157 1 942 2 885 Construction - - - 103 - Trade - 84 - 1 - 26 Hotels and restaurants - 117 136 3 - Transport, storage and communications 3 058 1 912 - - Finance - 295 38 1 643 2 572 Business services 21 3 003 32 340 Health and social services 5 - - - Community, social and personal service activities 0 - 23 369 - 1 Other services - 6 - - Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 5 140 7 608 2 702 3 184 Developed economies 4 328 6 355 1 378 1 336 European Union 3 159 1 459 782 1 224 United States 1 125 1 927 - 45 Japan - 3 199 - - Developing economies 797 952 1 124 1 460 Africa 927 268 927 268 North Africa 324 - - 54 Sub-Saharan Africa 603 268 927 214 South Africa 597 100 500 - 88 Uganda - 257 - - Zambia - - 11 257 Zimbabwe - - 62 51 Latin America and the Caribbean - 70 - 84 395 - 75 South America - 383 - 75 Caribbean - 84 12 - Asia - 60 768 102 1 267 West Asia -10 653 - 965 South, East and South-East Asia 11 421 102 302 Oceania - - - 300 - South-East Europe and the CIS - 51 200 388 Russian Federation - 16 200 388 A. REGIONAL TRENDS - 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 $billion Southern Africa North Africa East Africa West Africa Central Africa 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 30Central Africa Southern Africa West Africa East Africa North Africa FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation $billion % Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
  • 65. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 41 Inflows to Africa, which peaked in 2008 amidst the resource boom, continued their downward trend in 2010, although there were significant subregional variations. For the region as a whole, FDI in 2010 stood at $55 billon, 9 per cent down from 2009 (figure A). Other developing regions performed considerably better, leading Africa’s share of FDI inflows among developing countries to fall from 12 per cent in 2009 to 10 per cent in 2010. Inflows to North Africa account for roughly one- third of the total in Africa. These fell for the second year running, although the rate of decline was much reduced and the picture uneven. Indeed, inflows to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya rose over 40 per cent in 2010, though this rebound seems certain to be short-lived, given the current political situation in the country. In West Africa, the two largest recipients had contrasting fortunes: inflows increased significantly in Ghana, but not enough to compensate for the large fall in Nigeria to reverse the downward trend of this subregion. In both countries, the major factor was the oil industry. In Nigeria, uncertainty over the Petroleum Industry Bill,1 which is perceived as unfavourable for TNCs, and the unresolved political problem in the Niger Delta, discouraged foreign investors and, for instance, allegedly led Shell to sell a number of its onshore licences. As for Ghana, the start of major oil production has attracted the interest of TNCs, some of which are seeking an alternative subregional source of oil to Nigeria. In Southern Africa, inflows fell by 24 per cent. One of the two major recipients in the subregion, South Africa, saw its inflows fall by over 70 per cent to $1.6 billion, a level amounting to one-sixth of the peak recorded in 2008. Inflows to Angola, the region’s largest recipient, fell by 15 per cent. Although the decline was large, the inflow levels achieved in 2008 ($16.6 billion) and 2009 ($11.7 billion), when there had been major investments in oil and agriculture, were perhaps not sustainable, considering that inflows to Angola had been just over $5 billion in 2003 when the civil war in the country ended. One of the problems of Angola’s oil industry is that its production has exceeded Angola’s OPEC quota. Elsewhere in West and Southern Africa, oil and gas TNCs are divesting their downstream businesses. In April 2010, Shell announced its plan to withdraw from the downstream markets – considered “low- margin” – in 21 African countries. Similarly, BP announced plans to divest from five Southern African countries. In Central Africa and East Africa, inflows of FDI increased in 2010 to reach $8.0 billion and $3.7 billion, respectively. The inflows to the larger recipients in Central Africa (Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) were mostly due to oil- related investments. The only significant instance of FDI in non-primary sectors was investment in telecommunications in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. East Africa’s increase was modest (2.5 per cent), as inflows to the subregion’s largest recipient, Madagascar, fell substantially (19 per cent). FDI to the subregion’s two other large recipients, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, have tended to be stable in recent years and held broadly steady in 2010. The source countries and industry distribution of FDI to Africa can be gauged from the expansion of TNCs’ affiliate networks in Africa through cross- border MAs (tables D and E) and greenfield projects. As in previous years, TNCs investing in Africa in 2010 were mostly from developed countries. Among developing countries, China, India and the United Arab Emirates were the main source countries in 2010. In terms of industry distribution, the primary sector (mainly coal, oil and gas) accounted for 43 per cent, manufacturing for 29 per cent (of which almost half was in the metal industry) and services (mainly communications and real estate) for 28 per cent. One of the largest MA deals worldwide in 2010 was the acquisition of the telecoms operations of Zain (Kuwait) in 15 African countries (not including those in North Africa) by the Indian mobile operator Bharti Airtel, for $10.7 billion. Although the deal itself did not bring in any net external finance to Africa, the new owner announced that it would invest $1 billion to expand its operations in 2011.2 As for the future, inflows to North Africa seem likely to fall significantly, due to the military conflict in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the general political uncertainty hanging over the subregion (box II.1).
  • 66. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development42 It would require a major upturn in sub-Saharan Africa to reverse the downward trend of FDI inflows to the continent. Data on FDI projects (greenfield investments and cross-border MA deals) for the first few months of 2011 show a 9 per cent rise over the same period of 2010 in Africa as a whole, but this rise was mainly driven by a large investment in Ghana.3 FDI projects in North Africa fell by half in this period (annex tables I.3 and I.8). The continuing pursuit of natural resources by Chinese TNCs, and the increasing interest in Africa of Indian TNCs, which also have a significant presence in other sectors, could provide a boost. The nascent oil industry in Ghana perhaps represents the single most important positive prospect. Overall, however, 2011 is likely to be another challenging year for FDI inflows to Africa. b. Intraregional FDI for development The extent of intraregional FDI in Africa is limited. Judging from data on FDI projects, intra-regional FDI accounts for only 5 per cent of the total in terms of value and 12 per cent in terms of number (table II.1). The large share accounted for by FDI projects within sub-Saharan Africa suggests that South African investors are playing a large role. The pattern indicates that aside from South Africa, which has an exceptional propensity to invest regionally, intraregional FDI is particularly underdeveloped in Africa. Table II.1. Intraregional FDI projectsa in Africa: the value and number of projects and their shares in Africa’s totals, cumulative 2003−2010 Total and intraregional FDI Value Projects $ billion % share Number % share All intraregional FDI projects 46 5 570 12 North Africa to North Africa 8 1 65 1 Sub-Saharan Africa to sub-Saharan Africa 35 4 461 10 North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa 2 0.2 43 1 Sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa 0.2 0 1 0 Memorandum Total FDI projects in Africa 848 100 4 702 100 Source: UNCTAD. a Including cross-border MA and greenfield FDI projects. Intra-African FDI offers a huge potential; subregional organizations can do more to boost these flows. From a development perspective, the lack of intra­ regional FDI is suggestive of a missed opportu- nity. Geographical proximity and cultural affinity are thought to give regional TNCs an advantage in terms of familiarity with the operational envi- ronment and business needs in the host country. From the host country’s point of view, developing country TNCs are likely to be in possession of more appropriate technologies – with a greater potential for technology transfer – and better able to address the needs of local consumers, especially the poor (UNCTAD, 2011b). Indeed, there is some anecdotal evidence of regional FDI bringing positive development impacts to host countries in Africa. For example, investments from foreign farmers have played a role in revitalizing agriculture in Zambia. Mozambique has offered generous incentives to foreign farmers to invest, and other countries have considered similar packages (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda).4 The scope for joint ventures between domestic and foreign partners in the African context is often constrained by the absence of domestic partners with the required technical and financial capacity. In manufacturing, Coleus Crowns (Uganda) provides a successful example of a joint venture at the intraregional level. It is a joint venture between the Madhvani Group (Uganda) and Coleus Packaging (South Africa), which began production of bottle crowns in 2007. Since then, it has succeeded in establishing itself as a supplier to major TNCs
  • 67. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 43 such as Nile Breweries (an affiliate of SABMiller), Pepsi Uganda and Coke Uganda. It also serves the regional markets in Burundi, Rwanda and the Sudan.5 In services, some African TNCs in telecommuni- cations and banking have actively engaged in re- gional expansion. Leading players in the region's telecommunications industry include MTN (South Africa), Orascom (Egypt) and Seacom (Mauritius). In the financial industry, a number of banks based in Nigeria and South Africa have established a re- gional/subregional presence. Nigerian banks have a reputation of bringing in innovative services to neighbouring countries in West Africa, and many of the leading banks have an extensive presence throughout the region. In spite of these successful instances, the extent of intraregional FDI is limited. There is a paucity of disaggregate data on the source countries of FDI in Africa, but such data as are available reveal intraregional FDI in Africa to have a skewed and underdeveloped nature. Most of the intraregional flows are attributable to investment from South Africa in neighbouring countries in East and Southern Africa. Countries with high shares of intraregional FDI flows/stock (i.e. Botswana, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia and the United Republic of Tanzania) are those in which investors from South Africa are active, primarily in natural resource-related industry. For South Africa, the importance of Africa in its outward investment has increased over time. The share of Africa in its outward FDI stock rose from 8 per cent in 2005 to 22 per cent in 2009 (table II.2). The dominant role of South Africa is also confirmed by data on the expansion of TNCs’ affiliate networks through greenfield projects and MAs. Given the geographical proximity and cultural affinity, there ought to be potential for diverse intraregional FDI in terms of industry and source country. However, available country-level evidence indicates that the actual picture in this regard is very mixed. For instance, Senegalese FDI in the Gambia is relatively diverse, covering finance, manufacturing, real estate, wholesale and retail. In contrast, outward FDI from Nigeria is concentrated in finance. In the United Republic of Tanzania, FDI from Kenya is diversified into various manufacturing, finance and service activities, while FDI from South Africa has mainly been in mining, although Box II.1. The Arab Spring and prospects for FDI in North Africa The Arab Spring led to a blossoming of democratic expression in the subregion, but it has dampened investor confidence in the short term. The available data for the first few months of 2011 indicate that FDI inflows, as shown by greenfield investments and cross-border MAs (annex tables I.3 and I.8) to the subregion declined substantially. For example, there was no record of cross-border MAs in North Africa for the first five months (annex table I.3). It could take months before confidence among investors in those countries is restored. In Egypt, where greenfield investments fell by 80 per cent in the first four months of 2011 compared to the corresponding period of 2010 (annex table I.8), the most important investor country is the United States, which reportedly accounted for about $9 billion out of $11.1 billion of foreign investment (both FDI and portfolio) in the country. In May 2011, the United States offered loan guarantees of up to $1 billion through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to finance infrastructure development and boost job creation in Egypt. It was also reported that some Gulf States had agreed to contribute to a fund worth about $170 million set up by the Government of Egypt to encourage investment. In addition to international support, the Government has approved measures to simplify the procedure for approving new industrial projects and to ease the restrictions on setting up franchises. However, the impact of investment incentives might be limited in the current climate of political transition, and the return of investor confidence is likely to depend on the overall political settlement and the geopolitical situation surrounding the country. In the long term, democratization should result in better governance and thus lead to a more sustainable growth of economic activities, including FDI. Source: UNCTAD.
  • 68. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development44 the greater value of investment projects in mining obscures the significant number of investment projects in other sectors (Bhinda and Martin, 2009). The current situation calls for more efforts to encourage FDI at the regional and subregional levels. Various subregional initiatives have been introduced to this end. The Free Trade Area of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)6 was established with the objective of promoting, among other activities, FDI and domestic investment, by creatingalargersinglemarket(RwelamiraandKaino, 2008). SADC has concluded a Protocol on Finance and Investment, which sets out the legal basis for regional cooperation and harmonization in the area of finance, investment and macro-economic policy. SADC also has a services protocol, though not yet in force, which would also have implications for FDI. The East African Community (EAC)7 has discussed the need to promote FDI into the subregion, but there seems to be no well-developed structure in place to promote intra-subregional FDI. There are also initiatives to promote FDI between the regional groupings, most notably by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Fujita, 2009; UNCTAD, 2008a). Its Common Investment Area is aimed at promoting intra-COMESA and international FDI into infra­ structure, information technology, telecoms, energy, agriculture, manufacturing and finance.8 One major problem with regional groupings in Africa is their great proliferation, resulting in overlaps and inconsistencies. There are around 30 regional trade agreements (RTAs) in Africa, each country typically belonging to several such groupings. Recognizing this, COMESA, EAC, and SADC started a process to enhance integration among their members in 2008 (Brenton et al., 2011). The harmonization of Africa’s RTAs, and accelerated and closely coordinated planning with respect to FDI, would help Africa to achieve its full intraregional FDI potential. Table II.2. Intraregional FDI in Africa, various years Country Period average / year Source region ($ million) Share of Africa in world (%)From Africa From the World FDI inflows Egypt 2007-2009 162.6 13 882.1 1.2 Ethiopia 1997-1999 0.8 206.4 0.4 2002-2004 37.3 421.7 8.8 Mauritius 1990-1992 1.8 24.9 7.3 2007-2009 45.6 348.1 13.1 Morocco 1996-1998 20.3 664.7 3.1 2006-2008 41.0 3 735.2 1.1 Mozambique 2007-2009 229.1 636.3 36.0 Namibia 1991-1993 78.4 98.0 80.0 2006-2008 522.7 653.4 80.0 Tunisia 1990-1992 8.4 261.7 3.2 2007-2009 70.6 2 020.7 3.5 Inward FDI stock Botswana 1997 769.7 1 280.2 60.1 2007 310.0 968.9 32.0 Malawi 2000 103.6 357.7 29.0 2004 151.5 562.3 26.9 Morocco 2004 236.1 19 883.1 1.2 2008 303.1 39 388.3 0.8 South Africa 2000 301.1 43 451.0 0.7 2009 802.4 117 434.1 0.7 United Rep. of Tanzania 1998 924.3 3 352.5 27.6 2005 2 224.9 5 141.6 43.3 Outward FDI stock To Africa To the World South Africa 2005 3 017.0 36 826.0 8.2 2009 15 676.0 72 583.0 21.6 Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
  • 69. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 45 2. South, East and South-East Asia a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $50 billion China and Hong Kong (China) Hong Kong (China) and China $10 to $49 billion Singapore, India and Indonesia Singapore, Republic of Korea, India, Malaysia and Taiwan Province of China $1.0 to $9.9 billion Malaysia, Viet Nam, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Islamic Republic of Iran, Macao (China), Taiwan Province of China, Pakistan, Philippines and Mongolia Thailand and Indonesia $0.1 to $0.9 billion Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, Sri Lanka, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Timor- Leste and Maldives Viet Nam, Philippines and Islamic Republic of Iran Below $0.1 billion Afghanistan, Nepal, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Bhutan Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Macao (China) a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 34 748 32 089 40 467 93 521 Primary 1 597 - 428 12 962 23 948 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 4 180 - 54 72 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 1 593 - 608 13 016 23 875 Manufacturing 17 084 17 806 2 798 8 812 Food, beverages and tobacco 3 298 2 896 - 142 4 152 Textiles, clothing and leather 86 367 235 981 Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2 212 265 - 1 299 Chemicals and chemical products 1 038 5 950 154 1 361 Rubber and plastic products 14 460 35 35 Metals and metal products - 351 1 557 958 - 557 Machinery and equipment 1 119 300 531 - 127 Electrical and electronic equipment 9 441 918 787 - 499 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 88 4 201 206 2 000 Services 16 067 14 711 24 707 60 761 Electricity, gas and water 2 241 408 7 973 1 048 Trade 2 609 239 2 273 1 765 Hotels and restaurants - 3 138 262 1 144 Transport, storage and communications 5 758 2 165 -3 639 13 768 Finance 2 839 1 650 17 876 39 271 Business services 2 532 4 837 947 138 Health and social services - 236 3 330 41 3 101 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 34 748 32 089 40 467 93 521 Developed economies 11 320 14 936 19 966 42 661 European Union 1 031 1 446 2 875 18 594 United States 3 985 5 780 1 014 8 329 Australia 206 910 3 529 9 383 Japan 5 473 4 840 350 625 Developing economies 23 195 16 223 18 796 50 816 Africa 102 302 105 11 421 Latin America and the Caribbean 374 - 618 1 018 19 935 South America - 39 981 19 353 Central America 246 9 - 25 Asia 22 497 16 539 17 649 19 284 West Asia 5 005 -2 143 158 602 South, East and South-East Asia 17 491 18 682 17 491 18 682 China 4 519 7 024 9 333 2 536 Hong Kong, China 7 746 1 790 2 403 8 924 Korea, Republic of 276 3 536 243 - 318 Malaysia 2 637 1 061 323 2 119 Singapore 2 482 3 192 4 940 4 448 South-East Europe and the CIS 13 - 1 706 44 Kazakhstan - - 1 359 24 Russian Federation 13 - 347 16 Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 South, East and South-East Asia 241.5 299.7 193.2 231.6 34.7 32.1 40.5 93.5 East Asia 161.1 188.3 142.9 174.3 15.7 16.1 35.9 53.1 South Asia 42.5 32.0 16.4 15.1 6.1 5.6 0.3 26.4 South-East Asia 38.0 79.4 33.8 42.2 12.9 10.4 4.3 14.0 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 South, East and South-East Asia 2 565.6 3 087.8 1 766.1 2 115.2 190.6 232.4 99.1 116.8 East Asia 1 599.4 1 888.4 1 365.5 1 586.5 145.6 177.9 90.9 107.6 South Asia 220.0 261.0 83.7 97.2 16.2 17.0 1.5 1.4 South-East Asia 746.3 938.4 317.0 431.5 28.8 37.4 6.7 7.7 $billion 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 East Asia South Asia South-East Asia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 $billion 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 % South-East Asia South Asia East Asia FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
  • 70. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development46 In 2010, FDI inflows to South, East and South- East Asia rose 24 per cent, to $300 billion (figure A). However, the performance of major economies within the region varied significantly: inflows to the 10 ASEAN countries more than doubled; those to China and Hong Kong (China) enjoyed double-digit growth; while those to India, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China declined (table B). FDI to ASEAN surged to $79 billion in 2010, surpassing 2007’s previous record of $76 billion. The increase was driven by sharp rises in inflows to Malaysia (537 per cent), Indonesia (173 per cent) and Singapore (153 per cent) (table A; annex table I.1). Proactive policy efforts at the country level contributed to the good performance of the region, and seem likely to continue to do so: in 2010, Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines liberalized more industries; Indonesia improved its FDI-related administrative procedures; and the Philippines strengthened the supportive services for public- private partnerships (PPPs) (chapter III). In Singapore, which accounted for half of ASEAN’s FDI, inflows amounted to a historic level of $39 billion in 2010. As a global financial centre and a regional hub of TNC headquarters, the island State has benefited considerably from increasing investment in developing Asia, against a background of rising capital flows to the emerging economies in general in the post-crisis era. Due to rising production costs in China, some ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam, have gained ground as low-cost production locations, especially for low- end manufacturing.9 ASEAN LDCs also received increasing inflows, particularly from neighbouring countries like China and Thailand. For instance, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic has been successful in attracting foreign investment in infrastructure in recent years; as a result of Chinese investment in an international high-speed rail network, FDI to the country is likely to boom in the coming years (section II.B.2). FDI to East Asia rose to $188 billion, thanks to growing inflows to Hong Kong (China) (32 per cent) and China (11 per cent) (table A). Benefiting greatly from its close economic relationship with mainland China, Hong Kong (China) quickly recovered from the shock of the global financial crisis, and FDI inflows recorded a historic high of $69 billion in 2010. However, inflows to the other two newly industrializing economies, namely the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, declined by 8 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. China continues to experience rising wages and production costs, so the widespread offshoring of low-cost manufacturing to that country has been slowing down and divestments are occuring from the coastal areas. Meanwhile, structural transformation is shifting FDI inflows towards high- technology sectors and services. For instance, FDI in real estate alone accounted for more than 20 per cent of total inflows to China in 2010, and the share was almost 50 per cent in early 2011. Mirroring similar arrangements in some developed countries, China established a joint ministerial committee in 2011 to review the national security implications of certain foreign acquisitions. FDI to South Asia declined to $32 billion, reflecting a 31 per cent slide in inflows to India and a 14 per cent drop in Pakistan, the two largest recipients of FDI in the subcontinent. In India, the setback in attracting FDI was partly due to macroeconomic concerns, such as a high current account deficit and inflation, as well as to delays in the approval of large FDI projects;10 these factors are hindering the Indian Government’s efforts to boost investment, including the planned $1.5 trillion investment in infrastructure between 2007 and 2017. In contrast, inflows to Bangladesh increased by nearly 30 per cent to $913 million; the country is becoming a major low-cost production location in South Asia. Cross-border MAs in the region declined by about 8 per cent to $32 billion in 2010. MAs in manufacturing rose slightly while they declined by 8 per cent in services. Within manufacturing, the value of deals surged in industries such as chemical products ($6.0 billion), motor vehicles ($4.2 billion) and metal products ($1.6 billion), but dropped in industries such as food and beverages ($2.9 billion) and electronics ($920 million) (table D). Greenfield investment remained stable in 2010, after a significant slowdown due to widespread divestments and project cancellations in 2009 (annex table I.8). FDI inflows to East Asia should continue to grow in the near future, and those to South Asia are likely to
  • 71. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 47 regain momentum. The competitiveness of South- East Asian countries in low-cost production will be strengthened, and further FDI increases can be expected. Prospects for inflows to the LDCs in the region are promising, thanks to intensified South- South economic cooperation, fortified by surging intraregional FDI. Indeed, countries in the region have made significant progress in their regional economic integration efforts (within Greater China, and between China and ASEAN, for example), which will translate into a more favourable investment climate for intraregional FDI flows. b. Rising FDI from developing Asia: emerging diversified industrial patterns FDI outflows from South, East and South- East Asia rose by 20 per cent to about $230 billion in 2010 (figure B), driven by increased outflows from China, Hong Kong (China), Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. Outflows from the region’s two largest FDI sources – Hong Kong (China) and China – increased by more than $10 billion each and reached historic highs of $76 billion and $68 billion, respectively. In 2010, China exceeded Japan for the first time in outward FDI, as well as in GDP. Asian companies actively acquired overseas assets through large deals covering a wide range of industries and countries (annex table I.7). As a result, cross-border MA purchases surged to nearly $94 billion in 2010, a record level, with China alone accounting for over 30 per cent of the total. MA purchases by India boomed, while FDI outflows were down by 8 per cent,11 perhaps reflecting the fact that a few large deals, such as the Bharti Airtel–Zain acquisition, discussed later, were not included in the official statistics. FDI outflows from the region have been rising rapidly since 2005, with only a modest setback in 2008 due to the global financial crisis (figure B). The region’s share in global FDI outflows jumped from below 10 per cent before 2008 to around 17 per cent in the past two years. The rise in FDI outflows has been driven by various corporate motives and strategies, and is a manifestation of new and diversified industrial patterns in recent years. FDI outflows in extractive industries. FDI in extractive industries (including oil and gas, metal mining, as well as other extractive activities) accounts for a significant part of total FDI from South, East and South-East Asia, with China, India, the Republic of Korea and Malaysia being the major investor countries. In terms of FDI stock, the share of extractive industries might seem unimpressive, but their share in FDI outflows from the region has been rising.12 For example, although Chinese companies have been actively acquiring mineral assets abroad and extractive industries has accounted for well above 20 per cent of FDI outflows from China in recent years, the share of these industries in China’s total FDI stock was nevertheless at a modest level of 16 per cent at the end of 2009. The number and value of recorded greenfield projects show a certain degree of fluctuation, while the number and value of cross-border MAs have kept rising (figure II.1). Due to the capital-intensive nature of projects in extractive industries, although the number of deals is small, the amount of total investment is very large. Indeed, during the period 2003-2010, about 560 cross-border MAs and 500 greenfield projects were recorded in extractive industries, but the total investment was $65 billion and $258 billion (19 per cent and 25 per cent of the total), respectively. The growth in FDI outflows in extractive industries has been driven by the rising demand for oil and gas and minerals in economies such as China and India, to support their rapid economic growth, industrialization and urbanization, as well as by the need of both governments and companies to guarantee a long-term, stable supply of natural resources against a background of rising commodity prices. Beyond that, a national energy security strategy has further reinforced the motivation of State-owned companies to acquire mineral assets abroad. The major oil and gas companies and mining companies from the region are traditional natural- resource acquirers (table II.3), but new investors have been emerging, including metal companies, conglomerates, such as CITIC (China) and Rising FDI outflows from developing Asia display new and diverse patterns in the primary sector, manufacturing and services.
  • 72. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development48 Reliance Group (India), and sovereign wealth funds, such as China Investment Corporation and Temasek Holdings (Singapore). In particular, metal companies have been increasingly involved in a vertical relationship along the value chain in order to gain access to upstream mineral assets, such as iron ore and copper. For instance, a number of steel companies in the region have invested in overseas iron ore production bases (table II.3); facing rising iron ore prices, they have been actively acquiring mines around the world in order to secure stable supplies. China’s position as a leading investor in extractive industries has been strengthened. The country overtook the United States to become the world’s largest energy user in 2010,13 and Chinese oil companies have continued their buying spree, spending $25 billion on overseas assets, accounting for around one-fifth of all global deal activities.14 Mining companies from the country spent much less – $4.5 billion – but are catching up, as highlighted by the $6.5 billion bid for Equinox Minerals (Australia and Canada) by Minmetals Corporation. As a result of such investments, China has become the leading foreign investor in Australia. FDI in extractive industries from developing Asia has targeted resource-rich countries all around the world (table II.3). Major investment locations include mineral-rich Australia and Canada in the developed world, and oil-abundant developing and transition economies, such as Iraq, Sudan and Uzbekistan. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be a major target, 15 but Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania (section B.3) have also appeared on the radar screens of Asian resource acquirers.16 FDI outflows in manufacturing. Outflows in manu­ facturing from South, East and South-East Asia have been mainly via greenfield investment. For the region as a whole, manufacturing accounts for about half of accumulated outward FDI through greenfield investment, but less than 15 per cent of the total amount of cross-border MA purchases. In 2010, the total value of deals in manufacturing was $9 billion, equivalent to about 9 per cent of all MA purchases. Major industrial targets of FDI outflows from East and South-East Asia are electronics, metal and metal products, motor vehicles, and chemicals and chemical products (figure II.2). As the global centre of electronics production, the region is also the major source of FDI in the electronics industry. Indeed, this industry accounts for more than one- quarter of both greenfield projects and cross-border MAs in the region, in value terms. The significance of electronics in outward FDI from the region is in line with the international competitiveness of Asian 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Value of MAs Value of greenfield projects Number of MAs Number of greenfield projects $billion Number Figure II.1. Number and value of extractive industry projects undertaken by firms based in South, East and South-East Asia, 2003–2010 Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
  • 73. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 49 companies in the industry, particularly the contract manufacturers, which have become a dominant forceattheproductionstageoftheglobalelectronics value chain (chapter IV). For instance, Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) has become the world’s largest contract manufacturer, with about $60 billion sales and 1,000,000 employees in 2010.17 So far its production activities are concentrated in East Asia, most notably China. However, the company is establishing new production locations both within and outside the region, such as in South-East Asia (Malaysia and Viet Nam) and the Czech Republic; it is also considering a multi-billion investment in Brazil. Within China, Hon Hai is aggressively investing in large-scale production bases in inner land areas such as Chongqing, Henan, Sichuan and Shanxi. As illustrated by the case of electronics, greenfield investment in manufacturing from South, East and South-East Asia is concentrated within the region. Driven by market- and efficiency- seeking motivations, manufacturers from a wide range of industries have been investing mainly in neighbouring countries. However, as the industrial landscape in the world evolves, with rising production costs in some economies in the region and shifting corporate strategies, the pattern of outward FDI from the region has started to change. New production locations outside of the region have emerged. Although the scale of Asian FDI in manufacturing in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean remains small so far, the potential seems to be large. A new round of industrial restructuring and upgrading is taking place in China, and some Table II.3. Major foreign production locations of selected oil and gas, mining and steel companies based in South, East and South-East Asia, 2010 Major foreign production location Oil and gas companies Mining companies Steel companies CNPC (China) ONGC (India) KNOC (Republic of Korea) PETRONAS (Malaysia) Minmetal (China) MSC Group (Malaysia) Sinosteel (China) Tata Steel (India) Algeria X X Australia X X X X X Azerbaijan X X Cameroon X X Canada X X X X Chad X X Guinea X Indonesia X X X X X Iran, Islamic Rep. of X X Iraq X X X X Kazakhstan X X X Libyan Arab Jamahiriya X X X Mauritania X X Myanmar X X X Niger X Nigeria X X X Oman X X Peru X X X Philippines X X Russian Federation X X X Sudan X X Syrian Arab Republic X X United States X X X Thailand X X Uzbekistan X X Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of X X X Viet Nam X X X X Source: UNCTAD, based on company annual reports and UNCTAD’s database on cross-border MAs.
  • 74. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development50 low-end, export-oriented manufacturing activities have been shifting from coastal China to low income countries in South-East Asia and also Africa. In recent years, companies from major economies in the region, including China, India, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, have actively been taking over companies in developed countries, as highlighted by a number of mega-deals (table II.4). For Asian companies eager to tackle global markets, accumulate ownership advantages and enhance international competitiveness, strategic assets-seeking investment through cross-border MA is a particularly attractive choice. For example, Chinese companies are often attracted by various intangible assets, such as advanced, proprietary technologies, brand names and distribution channels (Buckley et al., 2007). MA opportunities in developed countries, triggered by industrial restructuring during and after the global financial crisis, and high profitability and abundant bank lending at home, also help boost outward FDI in manufacturing. Asian companies have been facing political obstacles in undertaking strategic assets-seeking FDI as they become important players in MA markets in developed countries. This is illustrated by the failed attempts by Huawei Technologies (China) to take over 3Com and 3Leaf in the United States in 2008 and 2010.18 How to clear such hurdles for Chinese investors became an important issue discussed at the third China-United States Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2011. FDI outflows in services. As the major target of international investment by Asian firms, services account for about 70 per cent of accumulated outward FDI through cross-border MA purchases. In contrast, the share is below 30 per cent for greenfield investment. The main target services for FDI outflows from South, East and South- East Asia are real estate, hotels and tourism, telecommunications, transportation, and financial services (figure II.3). During the past few years, although FDI outflows from the region in the services sector have declined, market-seeking MAs in specific service industries, such as hotels, health services and telecommunications, have been increasing, targeting economies both in and outside the region. In the meantime, FDI outflows in financial services have also rebounded since the global financial crisis. In 2010, the value of deals in finance more than doubled to $39 billion. Figure II.2. Outward FDI from South, East and South-East Asia in manufacturing, top 5 industries, cumulative 2003−2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: Figures in parenthesis show the share of the industry in the region’s total amount of investment. 0 60 120 180 Food, beverages and tobacco Chemicals and chemical products Motor vehicles others Electronics Metal and metal products Greenfield projects 0 9 18 27 Metal and metal products Food, beverages and tobacco Chemicals and chemical products Machinery and equipment Electronics Cross-border MAs (28%) (26%) (15%) (11%) (4%) (27%) (13%) (12%) (12%) (10%)
  • 75. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 51 In telecommunications, the total value of deals surged to about $14 billion in 2010. Bharti Airtel (India) alone spent $10.7 billion to buy Zain’s (Kuwait) mobile operations in Africa (annex table I.7). Through this aggressive market-seeking deal, Bharti Airtel gained access to mobile markets in 15 African countries and became the world’s fifth largest mobile telecom operator, by number of subscribers. The Indian company aims to have 100 million subscribers and $5 billion annual revenue in Africa by 2013, growing from the baseline of 42 million subscribers and $3.6 billion revenue in 2010. However, it faces challenges to streamline its operations across the 15 different countries, and turn around loss-making assets.19 In the hotel industry, HNA (China) paid $620 million for a 20 per cent stake in NH Hotels (Spain) in May 2011, aiming at market expansion in Europe.20 Figure II.3. Outward FDI from South, East and South-East Asia in the services sector, top 5 industries, cumulative 2003−2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: Figures in parenthesis show the share of the industry in the region’s total amount of investment. Greenfield projects Cross-border MAs 0 60 120 180 Finance Communications Transportation Hotels and tourism Real estate (43%) (15%) (14%) (10%) (5%) 0 100 200 300 Wholesale and retail trade Business activities Utilities Transport, storage and communications Finance (52%) (28%) (7%) (4%) (3%) Table II.4. Selected MA mega-deals in manufacturing undertaken by firms from South, East and South-East Asia in developed countries, 2007−2011 Acquiring company Target company Industry Value ($ million) Year Tata Steel (India) Corus Group (United Kingdom) Steel 11 791 2007 Hindalco Industries (India) Novelis Inc. (United States) Aluminium 5 789 2007 Doosan (Republic of Korea) Ingersoll-Rand Co. (United States) Construction equipment 4 900 2007 Flextronics (Singapore) Solectron Corp. (United States) Electronics 3 675 2007 Tata Motors Ltd. (India) Jaguar Cars Ltd. (United Kingdom) Motor vehicles 2 300 2008 China National Agrochemical Elkem AS (Norway) Aluminium 2 179 2011 Wanhua Polyurethanes (China) BorsodChem Zrt (Hungary) Chemical products 1 701 2011 Essar Steel Holdings (India) Algoma Steel Inc. (Canada) Steel 1 603 2007 United Spirits (India) Whyte Mackay (United Kingdom) Food and beverages 1 176 2007 Geely Holding Group (China) Volvo (Sweden) Motor vehicles 1 500 2010 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
  • 76. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development52 Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $10 billion Saudi Arabia .. $5.0 to $9.9 billion Turkey and Qatar .. $1.0 to $4.9 billion Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan, Iraq and Syrian Arab Republic Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Turkey Below $1.0 billion Bahrain, Palestinian Territory, Kuwait and Yemen Lebanon, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic and Palestinian Territory a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 West Asia 66.0 58.2 26.3 13.0 3.5 4.6 26.8 - 15.6 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 47.1 39.9 23.4 10.5 0.6 2.0 26.6 - 15.5 Turkey 8.4 9.1 1.6 1.8 2.8 2.1 - - Other West Asia 10.5 9.3 1.4 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.3 - 0.0 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 West Asia 487.6 575.2 151.1 161.0 19.8 21.0 6.7 6.9 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 274.9 314.9 119.2 127.0 14.2 14.6 5.7 5.7 Turkey 143.6 181.9 22.3 23.8 2.9 3.0 0.2 0.2 Other West Asia 69.1 78.4 9.5 10.2 2.7 3.3 0.9 1.0 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 3 543 4 617 26 843 -15 560 Primary 8 170 52 1 484 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 8 170 52 1 484 Manufacturing 199 2 126 142 8 Food, beverages and tobacco 91 32 113 - Textiles, clothing and leather - 32 - - Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel - 1 525 - - Chemicals and chemical products - 56 19 - 4 - 19 Non-metallic mineral products - 44 - - 20 Metals and metal products 110 410 33 - Electrical and electronic equipment 97 107 - - Services 3 336 2 321 26 648 -17 052 Electricity, gas and water 2 361 - 59 724 400 Construction 78 14 - - Trade 85 74 85 12 Hotels and restaurants - 331 - - 15 Transport, storage and communications 41 100 1 645 -10 736 Finance 550 1 637 24 510 -1 897 Business services 120 146 297 556 Public administration and defence - - - 612 -5 372 Health and social services 100 112 - - Community, social and personal service activities - - 38 - - Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 3 543 4 617 26 843 -15 560 Developed economies 3 174 2 357 21 451 -2 909 European Union 2 457 1 472 16 387 -1 037 United States 349 112 3 012 -2 333 Australia - 3 1 143 322 Japan - 343 146 - Developing economies 358 1 673 5 362 -12 691 Africa - 965 - 164 -10 653 North Africa - 965 - 164 47 Sub-Saharan Africa - - - -10 700 Latin America and the Caribbean - - 320 - Asia 358 708 5 206 -2 038 West Asia 201 105 201 105 Jordan - - 15 101 - Saudi Arabia 114 27 12 66 Turkey - - 118 49 South, East and South-East Asia 158 602 5 005 -2 143 Korea, Republic of - 122 49 -2 234 Singapore - 2 3 923 - 92 South-East Europe and the CIS - 21 30 40 Armenia - - 30 - Russian Federation - 21 - 40 3. West Asia a. Recent trends $billion 0 10 20 30 40 50 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Turkey Other West Asia Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 20 40 60 80 100 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 $billion % Other West Asia Turkey Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
  • 77. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 53 FDI flows to West Asia in 2010 continued to be affected by the global economic crisis. They decreased by 12 per cent to $58 billion (table B and figure A), despite the steady economic recovery registered in 2010 in most of the economies of the region, underpinned by sizeable increases in government spending in oil-rich countries. Private investors however remained cautious. The estimated value of greenfield FDI projects fell in both 2009 (by 42 per cent) and 2010 (by 44 per cent). Cross-border MA sales – traditionally concentrated mainly in Turkey – whilst increasing by 30 per cent in 2010, remained at a very low level ($4.6 billion), due to the ending of the privatization process in this country. The fall in FDI inflows in 2010 varied by country. For example, they dropped by 12 per cent in Saudi Arabia, where a number of flagship mega- projects in the petrochemical industry involving joint ventures between the State-owned Saudi Aramco and foreign TNCs saw the withdrawal of foreign partners (ConocoPhillips from the Yanbu project), or were temporarily frozen (such as the Ras Tanura integrated project with Dow Chemical), or failed to attract enough foreign investment, and became domestic operations fully funded by Saudi Aramco (as for example the Jazan refinery). In Qatar, FDI inflows fell by 32 per cent as the last of four LNG Qatargas plants, that had bolstered FDI in 2009, was completed in 2010. In the United Arab Emirates FDI stayed at the same low level as in 2009, when it had plummeted to $4 billion due to the economic crisis. The 8 per cent rise in Turkey mainly resulted from a 40 per cent increase in real estate investment. FDI inflows are now expected to bottom out, as cross-border MAs have risen fivefold during the first five months of 2011 from the low value reg- istered during the corresponding period of 2010, due to a large acquisition in Turkey,21 and greenfield investments increased by 9 per cent in the first four months of 2011 over the corresponding period of 2010. However, concerns about the political stabil- ity of the region are likely to remain, holding back its recovery, as foreign companies will be reluctant to sink large sums of money into projects until the political outlook becomes clearer. This uncertainty is likely to affect both inflows and outflows, given the importance of both intra- regional investments and West Asia’s invest- ment in North Africa. For example in March 2011, AES (United States) withdrew from bidding for a power plant project in Saudi Arabia. Qatar Elec- tricity Company is evaluating the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic before proceeding with plans to build a plant there. In addition, the tel- ephone company Etisalat (United Arab Emirates) recently cancelled its $12 billion bid for Zain, a Kuwaiti rival, citing unrest as one of the reasons.22 Unrest is also affecting outward investment by putting pressure on governments and government-control- led entities to direct more investment into their own economies and to finance higher social spending to pre-empt or respond to popular discontent. Long- term prospects for outward investments are never- theless positive on the whole, as oil prices prospects suggest that funds available for investment abroad will continue to rise. b. Outward FDI strategies of West Asian TNCs FDI outflows from West Asia declined significantly for the second consecutive year (table B and figure B). They fell by 51 per cent in 2010 due to divestments by West Asian firms. The largest ones included the $10.7 billion sale by Zain Group (Kuwait) of its African operations to Bharti Airtel (India), and the $2.2 billion sale by International Petroleum Investment Company of a 70 per cent stake in Hyundai Oilbank in the Republic of Korea to Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. At the same time, the estimated value of West Asian greenfield projects abroad dropped by 52 per cent. Outward investment from West Asia is driven mainly by government-controlled entities that have been redirecting part of their investment to support their home economies, weakened by the global financial crisis. In addition, outward investment by the private sector has been affected by the tightening of lending by local banks to the private sector amid the financial crisis. State-owned entities from oil-rich countries have led West Asia’s outward FDI boom since the early 2000s. Their strategy is driven not only by financial returns, but also by economic and political objectives.
  • 78. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development54 The decline of outward FDI from West Asia since 2009 came after a period of notable increase that began in 2004, raising outward FDI stock from $25 billion in 2003 to $161 billion in 2010. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries accounted for 79 per cent of the total, led by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia which together accounted for 45 per cent of the region’s total outward FDI stock (annex table I.2). A number of factors explain this surge of outward FDI from rich Arab countries. These include the accumulation of considerable surpluses, thanks to the surge in oil prices; low interest rates and high volatility of equity markets, which diverted part of these surpluses from purely financial investment; and the adoption of a policy of economic diversification that includes investing abroad in industries perceived as strategic for the development and diversification of their national economies. The outward FDI boom was largely driven by State- owned enterprises. These companies accounted for 73 per cent of the amount of cross-border acquisitions by West Asian firms and for 47 per cent of the region’s greenfield outward FDI projects during the period 2004–2010. Companies from the United Arab Emirates have been by far the most active investors abroad. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait have been other significant outward investors (table II.5). Targeted regions and sectors. In terms of geographical distribution, developed countries have been the preferred destination of cross-border MA purchases by West Asian firms, attracting 68 per cent of net purchases during 2004-2010 (table II.6). In contrast, developing and transition economies are by far the main destination of West Asian greenfield FDI abroad: between 2003 and 2010, they attracted 93 per cent of the total, the main destinations being West Asia (31 per cent) and North Africa (29 per cent) (table II.7). In sectoral terms, 59 per cent of the estimated value of greenfield projects during 2003 and 2010 concerned real estate, located mainly in developing and transition economies (98 per cent), particularly in North Africa and West Asia. Other significant industries in West Asian outward greenfield projects are oil and gas (10 per cent) and hotels and tourism Table II.5. West Asia: cross-border MA purchases and greenfield outward FDI projects by ownership type and by home economy, cumulative 2004−2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Home economy Net cross-border MA purchases Greenfield FDI projectsa State ownedb Private owned Total State ownedb Private owned Total Value Per cent Value Per cent Bahrain 0.3 4.0 4.3 3 41.1 35.9 76.9 13 Iraq - - - - - 0.1 0.1 - Jordan - 0.3 0.3 - 0.2 4.4 4.6 1 Kuwait -6.5 6.6 0.1 - 18.0 38.0 56.0 10 Lebanon - 1.1 1.1 1 - 9.7 9.7 2 Oman 0.3 0.8 1.1 1 2.4 1.0 3.4 1 Palestinian territory - - - - - 0.3 0.3 - Qatar 21.8 1.5 23.2 18 24.5 5.2 29.7 5 Saudi Arabia 20.8 9.1 29.9 23 13.2 28.0 41.2 7 Syria - - - - - 0.4 0.4 - Turkey - 2.7 2.7 2 - 21.8 21.8 4 United Arab Emirates 56.5 8.7 65.2 51 169.6 157.5 327.1 57 Yemen - - - - - 0.1 0.1 - Total 93.1 34.7 127.8 100 268.9 302.4 571.3 100 Total, per cent 73 27 100 - 47 53 100 - Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a The value refers to the estimated amounts of capital investment. b Refers to TNCs in which the State has a controlling stake.
  • 79. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 55 (6 per cent). In the case of cross-border MAs, purchases in developed countries have targeted companies that operate mainly in the chemicals, motor vehicle, extractive, transport and hotel industries, in that order (table II.6). In developing countries, the preferred purchase targets have been telecommunications, and electrical and electronic equipment in South, East and South-East Asia. Table II.6. West Asia: cross-border MA purchases by region/industry of destination, cumulative 2004−2010 (Millions of dollars and per cent) Sector / industry Developed economies Developing and transition economies World Total North America Europe Total West Asia South, East and South-East Asia Value Per cent Primary, of which 15 253 7 932 5 616 - 991 228 -1 922 14 261 11 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 14 910 7 932 5 616 - 991 228 -1 922 13 918 11 Secondary, of which 38 343 20 517 17 040 11 136 315 9 632 49 479 39 Chemicals and chemical products 18 005 13 826 4 178 3 887 - 44 3 128 21 892 17 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 14 954 1 800 13 154 2 136 82 2 054 17 090 13 Electrical and electronic equipment 3 220 3 216 3 4 070 97 3 972 7 289 6 Tertiary, of which 32 929 10 731 21 914 31 229 19 420 13 795 64 158 50 Post and communications 3 947 - 13 3 900 16 735 13 380 9 736 20 683 16 Transport 9 479 1 249 8 299 1 092 161 - 40 10 571 8 Business activities 7 209 1 677 5 459 2 377 947 1 515 9 586 7 Hotels and restaurants 8 928 7 349 1 550 580 0 352 9 508 7 Total 86 525 39 180 44 571 41 374 19 963 21 505 127 899 100 Total, per cent 68 31 35 32 16 17 100 - Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Table II.7. West Asia: greenfield outward FDI projects by region/industry of destination, cumulative 2004−2010 (Millions of dollars and per cent) Sector / industry Developed economies Developing and transition economies World Total North America Europe Total West Asia North Africa South, East and South- East Asia Value Per cent Primary, of which 3 016 38 2 177 59 698 11 018 11 948 23 073 62 713 10.7 Coal, oil and natural gas 2 478 22 1 657 56 773 10 769 11 345 21 497 59 251 10.1 Secondary, of which 15 921 3 158 12 314 66 308 19 819 10 922 26 349 82 229 14.0 Metals 103 10 93 22 112 6 603 6 563 7 551 22 216 3.8 Chemicals 1 342 5 971 14 317 828 292 11 711 15 658 2.7 Non-metallic minerals 1 545 2 1 543 10 162 4 213 505 3 434 11 707 2.0 Food, beverages and tobacco 448 18 430 9 206 5 026 2 054 981 9 655 1.6 Plastics 6 712 88 6 621 633 185 37 288 7 345 1.3 Tertiary, of which 20 327 3 408 16 397 421 253 149 237 148 309 60 130 441 580 75.3 Real estate 6 297 2 272 4 025 338 395 118 449 132 424 40 581 344 692 58.8 Hotels and tourism 6 757 - 6 687 26 219 16 071 3 487 3 582 32 976 5.6 Communications 1 013 105 908 18 934 3 170 3 346 3 938 19 947 3.4 Transportation 3 964 370 3 493 13 942 509 2 311 7 238 17 906 3.1 Leisure and entertainment 580 324 256 11 480 5 444 5 746 223 12 060 2.1 Total 39 264 6 604 30 888 547 258 180 074 171 179 109 552 586 522 100 Total, per cent 7 1 5 93 31 29 19 100 - Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: The value refers to the estimated amounts of capital investments.
  • 80. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development56 The most important investors and their strategy. Investors from West Asia have traditionally played a passive role, focusing on liquidity and safety rather than return on investments. However, with access to increasing funding derived from high commodity prices, and with higher levels of managerial skill, they have become increasingly active in direct acquisitions and greenfield FDI projects that entail a long-term relationship and involvement in management. West Asia’s outward investment flows are concentrated in a small number of companies – 10 companies accounted for 83 per cent of cross- border MA purchases between 2004 and 2010. Of these, only three undertake specific activities (such as petrochemicals, telecom, construction), the others are holding groups or investment companies. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates is home to half of them. All but two of these companies are owned by or strongly related to the State. Most of them were created in the 2000s (table II.8). The FDI strategies of these State-owned investors are generally linked to the economic and political objectives of their respective governments. They aim not only at achieving revenue maximization and diversification, but also at building international partnerships and strategic alliances that generally support economic and political objectives. It is also common that the State-owned entities use foreign alliances and partnerships built through outward FDI as a tool to attract FDI and enhance its impact on the host economy. The example of two State- owned entities or SWFs established during the 2000s - the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and Mubadala - illustrates this new trend. Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) has been making a number of high-profile international direct investments in the financial services, automotive, aerospace and construction industries, and in real estate.23 These include the acquisition of 17 per cent of the voting rights in Volkswagen, which was accompanied by a memorandum of understanding seeking to establish RD collaboration, testing and training facilities in Doha; the acquisition of the German construction firm Hochtief in 2010, aimed at facilitating the transfer of advanced technology and know-how to Qatar;24 and the acquisition of an 8 per cent share in the French public works company Vinci in 2009 (becoming the top shareholder after its employees), which reinforced its partnership with this company, and widened the scope of Vinci’s activities in Qatar.25 Mubadala aims to develop world-leading clusters of expertise in strategically important sectors, and ac- cordingly has created nine business units. Amongst them, Mubadala Aerospace aims at turning Abu Dhabi into a global aerospace hub. Mubadala In- dustry is pursuing investment and development opportunities in capital, energy and intellectual property-intensive sectors, and Mubadala Informa- tion Communications Technology is creating a portfolio of global ICT assets to develop industry- leading facilities at home and in the region. Other projects include the energy, healthcare, real estate, infrastructure and services sectors. For example, in recent years, Mubadala has acquired stakes in the aircraft manufacturing company Piaggio Aero (Italy), the semiconductor company Advanced Micro De- vices (United States) , the provider of technical so- lutions to airlines SR Technics (United States), the oil and gas company Pearl Energy (Singapore), the car manufacturer Ferrari (Italy), and the global in- vestment firm Carlyle Group (United States). It has also developed joint ventures and funds with nota- ble investors and industry leaders such as Credit Suisse and General Electric. 26 Given the high levels of their foreign exchange reserves and the relatively small sizes of their respective economies, GCC countries can afford to spend large amounts of foreign currency on overseas investments. It is important, however, that they assess the performance and effectiveness of their strategy of using outward FDI as an instrument for economic development. The economic diversification policies of GCC coun- tries has been pursued by a dual strategy. In sec- tors such as construction and real estate, finance, telecommunications, and transport, Gulf countries have developed a certain level of expertise at home that has allowed them to engage in outward direct investment in these fields. This outward FDI has aimed mainly at building a presence in other Arab countries in West Asia and North Africa to compen- sate for the small size of their domestic economies. Lacking strong proprietary assets, West Asian firms have expanded to neighbouring countries where
  • 81. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 57 Table II.8. The top 10 West Asian companies, ranked by the total value of cross-border MA purchases, cumulative 2004–2010 (Millions of dollars) Company name Home country Cross- border MA purchasesa Activity Creation date Ownership Information about the company Dubai World United Arab Emirates 18 282 Holding company 2006 State-owned Owned by the Government of Dubai. Its mandate is to manage and supervise a portfolio of businesses and projects for the Dubai Government across a wide range of industries. Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) Qatar 14 293 SWF 2005 State-owned Its mandate is to diversify the Qatari national economy. SABIC Saudi Arabia 12 411 Petrochemical company 1976 State-owned Created in 1976, it is 70% State-owned. It produces chemicals, fertilizers, plastics and metals. International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) United Arab Emirates 12 255 Energy investment fund 1984 State-owned Owned by the Government of Abu Dhabi with a mandate to invest in the energy sector across the globe. Dubai Holding United Arab Emirates 10 754 Holding company 2004 State-owned 99.67% owned by the ruler of Dubai. Its mandate is to consolidate the various large scale infrastructure and investment projects in Dubai that were created over the past five years as well as to identify and execute future major projects. Arcapita Bahrain 10 163 Islamic Investment Bank 2005 Private It acquires controlling interests in foreign companies with the aim of providing investments with strategic and financial support when necessary, and to exit at the right time and price. TAQA United Arab Emirates 9 848 Energy investment company 2005 State-owned 51% owned by ADWEA, wholly owned by the Abu Dhabi Government. Its mandate is to own, invest in and/or operate companies engaged in the oil and gas, power generation, water, energy and infrastructure sectors, in addition to making other investments as considered appropriate to meet its objectives. Mubadala United Arab Emirates 7 808 Investment Company 2002 State-owned Owned by the Government of Abu Dhabi. Its mandate is to facilitate the diversification of Abu Dhabi’s economy. STC Saudi Arabia 5 900 Telecom company 1998 State-owned 70% State-owned. It is Saudi Arabia’s largest telecom service provider and the only integrated service provider. Saudi Oger Saudi Arabia 4 215 Construction and infrastructure 1978 Private Founded as a construction company, it covers several activities including telecommunication, real estate development, printing, utilities and IT services. Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Estimated value. Includes only deals involving the acquisition of at least 10 per cent of the shares. they took advantage of their financial capacities and cultural proximity, which contributed to increasing their expertise and improving their competitiveness. In investing in developed countries and Asian emerging economies, consisting mainly in using MAs, the region has a different strategy to aim at enhancing capabilities in industries existing at home - such as finance, hotels and petrochemicals - but also and increasingly to develop capabilities in industries not actually present at home, such as motor vehicles, aerospace, alternative energies and electronics. This approach differs from that of other countries, which have generally first developed a certain level of capacity at home, before engaging in outward direct investment. It is generally through the medium of exchanges between parent companies and foreign affiliates - such as transfer of technological knowledge, movement of employees and intra-firm trade - that outward FDI can become a source of improved competitiveness at home. In the absence of a parent company that performs related activities at home, a question is raised about the nature of the channels through which cross-border purchases of enterprises can contribute to the development and diversification of the region's economies.
  • 82. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development58 Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $10 billion Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Mexico, Chile and Cayman Islands British Virgin Islands, Mexico and Brazil $5.0 to $9.9 billion Peru, Colombia and Argentina Chile, Cayman Islands and Colombia $1.0 to $4.9 billion Panama, Uruguay, Dominican Republic and Costa Rica Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Panama $0.1 to $0.9 billion Bahamas, Honduras, Guatemala, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Jamaica, Guyana, Suriname, Ecuador, Aruba, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Netherlands Antilles and Antigua and Barbuda Argentina and Peru Less than $0.1 billion Saint Lucia, Belize, Turks and Caicos Islands, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, Cuba, Barbados, El Salvador, Dominica, Anguilla, Montserrat and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Jamaica, Guatemala, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Turks and Caicos Islands, Aruba, Barbados, Belize, Honduras, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Plurinational State of Bolivia a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Latin America and the Caribbean 141.0 159.2 45.5 76.3 - 4.4 29.5 3.7 15.7 South America 55.3 86.5 4.1 30.3 - 5.3 18.0 3.1 11.7 Central America 20.5 24.6 9.4 16.8 0.2 8.9 3.4 3.3 Caribbean 65.2 48.1 32.1 29.2 0.8 2.6 - 2.8 0.7 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Latin America and the Caribbean 1 507.7 1 722.3 664.4 732.8 77.7 91.4 7.7 8.8 South America 787.8 899.5 272.4 307.5 63.0 77.7 7.2 7.4 Central America 352.6 407.7 94.5 98.6 12.1 10.9 0.1 0.9 Caribbean 367.3 415.1 297.5 326.7 2.6 2.8 0.5 0.5 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total -4 358 29 481 3 740 15 710 Primary -2 327 11 692 4 689 2 112 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 43 423 - 1 96 Mining, quarrying and petroleum -2 370 11 269 4 690 2 016 Manufacturing -2 768 8 092 859 4 962 Food, beverages and tobacco 404 6 771 3 224 2 834 Wood and wood products 61 - 115 - - 130 Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel - 57 - 947 - Chemicals and chemical products 61 -1 221 63 373 Non-metallic mineral products 125 695 -1 337 990 Metals and metal products -3 219 82 5 672 Electrical and electronic equipment - 90 1 742 - 188 - Motor vehicles and other transport equipment - 134 72 - 150 Services 737 9 697 -1 808 8 637 Electricity, gas and water -2 642 409 - 103 1 227 Construction - 12 18 - 12 49 Trade 1 575 1 410 - 14 762 Transport, storage and communications 3 421 2 962 120 164 Finance -2 353 1 565 -2 113 4 105 Business services 735 2 437 379 1 070 Education 18 503 - - Community, social and personal service activities 1 217 - 1 200 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World -4 358 29 481 3 740 15 710 Developed economies -6 815 3 581 3 475 11 544 European Union -3 023 946 -1 233 2 534 United States - 797 - 512 5 603 5 225 Japan - 89 4 508 561 125 Developing economies 1 850 24 970 420 4 313 Africa 395 - 75 - 70 - 84 Latin America and the Caribbean 116 5 015 116 5 015 South America 2 288 4 086 - 62 2 062 Brazil 1 659 386 - 90 257 Colombia 211 3 116 796 182 Central America 16 747 177 2 839 Mexico 16 761 10 193 Caribbean -2 188 182 2 115 Asia 1 338 19 935 374 - 618 West Asia 320 - - - South, East and South-East Asia 1 018 19 935 374 - 618 China 133 12 915 374 281 Korea, Republic of 893 720 161 - India - 5 460 64 - 735 South-East Europe and the CIS - - 3 - 156 - 147 Russian Federation - - 3 - 159 - 156 4. Latin America and the Caribbean a. Recent trends $billion 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 South AmericaCentral AmericaCaribbean 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Caribbean Central America South America FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation $billion % 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
  • 83. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 59 FDI inflows to Latin America and the Caribbean rose 13 per cent to $159 billion in 2010 (table B), following a 32 per cent decline in 2009. However, they remained below their 2008 level (figure A). The strongest increase was in South America, where FDI rose by 56 per cent to $86 billion, with Brazil alone accounting for 56 per cent of this amount. Inflows to Central America increased by 20 per cent to $25 billion, of which Mexico attracted $19 billion. Those to the Caribbean decreased by 26 per cent, to $48 billion, of which offshore financial centres accounted for 95 per cent. The FDI rebound in 2010 was due mainly to the strong rise in cross-border MAs. These rose from negative values (because of divestment) in 2009 to $29 billion in 2010 (tables D and E), the highest level since 2000. This shows a renewed interest by foreign firms in the acquisition of Latin American enterprises, after a decade of sluggish cross- border MA activities in the region. On the other hand, the estimated value of greenfield projects in 2010 increased by 8 per cent - after a 13 per cent decrease in 2009 - sustaining the recovery of FDI inflows from the impact of the global financial crisis. Inanunprecedentedsurgeofinvestment,developing Asian countries (mostly China and India) became the main acquirers of Latin American and Caribbean firms in 2010 (see section 4.b). Their acquisitions totalled $20 billion or 68 per cent of the total. The share of developed countries was only 12 per cent, and that of Latin America and the Caribbean 17 per cent. In the case of greenfield investment, however, developed countries were responsible for 79 per cent of the total amount of projects in 2010, while Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 10 per cent and developing Asia for 9 per cent. The sectoral breakdown in 2010 differs by entry mode. Cross-border MA predominantly concerned the primary sector (40 per cent of total amount), while greenfield projects were mostly in the manufacturing sector (58 per cent of total estimated amounts), especially the metal industry. All the main recipient countries, except for Colombia, registered significant increases in FDI inflows in 2010. The highest growth (87 per cent) occurred in Brazil and resulted from the doubling of equity capital, mainly in the primary sector, but also in manufacturing (16 per cent). In Mexico (22 per cent) and Chile (17 per cent), the increases were due to the growth of cross-border MA sales, while the 58 per cent growth in Argentina stemmed from intra-company loans. The decrease of FDI to Colombia (down 5 per cent) was due mainly to a 32 per cent decrease in FDI into metal mining . FDI inflows are expected to increase in 2011, due to a jump of FDI inflows to Brazil, the main recipient country, which absorbed 30 per cent of the region’s total FDI inflows in 2010. Preliminary data show that in the first four months of 2011, FDI into Brazil amounted to $23 billion, a threefold increase over the corresponding period of 2010. This resulted from a strong increase in both equity capital (an increase of 147 per cent to $18 billion) and intra-company loans (15-fold increase to $5 billion). Greenfield FDI projects into the region also registered a significant increase in the four first months of 2011: their estimated value was 94 per cent above the corresponding period of the previous year. After plummeting in 2009, FDI outflows from Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 67 per cent to $76 billion in 2010 (table B). Strong increases were registered in the region’s two main outward investor countries: Mexico and Brazil. In the latter, outflows jumped from a large negative value in 2009 (−$10 billion) to $11.5 billion in 2010, and they increased by 104 per cent in Mexico. This rise in outward FDI − the strongest among the world’s economic regions − is mainly due to the surge in cross-border MA purchases, which increased more than fourfold to $15.7 billion (tables D and E). Greenfield projects abroad also increased (23 per cent) in 2010, after declining by 19 per cent in 2009. The region’s TNCs, bolstered by strong economic growth at home, have increased their investments abroad, in particular in developed countries (table E), where investment opportunities have arisen in the aftermath of the crisis. Brazilian companies such as Vale, Gerdau, Camargo Correa, Votorantim, Petrobras and Braskem have made acquisitions in the iron ore, steel, food, cement, chemical, and petroleum-refining industries in developed
  • 84. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development60 countries. Mexican firms such as Grupo Televisa, Sigma Alimentos, Metalsa and Inmobiliaria Carso purchased firms in the United States in industries such as media, food, motor vehicles and services. There have been also some important intraregional acquisitions (table E), the most significant being the $1.9 billion purchase by Grupo Aval (Colombia) of BAC Credomatic, a Panamanian affiliate of General Electric. While 73 per cent of the region’s cross-border MA purchases were concentrated in developed countries in 2010 (table E), an estimated 75 per cent of outward greenfield projects were located in developing countries. Of these, 78 per cent targeted Latin America and the Caribbean, 13 per cent South, East and South-East Asia, and 5 per cent Africa. FDI from the region is expected to decrease in 2011, as preliminary data for the first four months of 2011 show high negative values for FDI outflows from Brazil (minus $9 billion). This is the result of a more than sevenfold increase (to $14 billion) in repayment of loans (intra-company loans) from foreign affiliates to their parent company in Brazil. Outflows from Mexico also decreased in 2011, accounting in the first quarter of 2011 for only one-fifth of their value in the same period of 2010. b. Developing country TNCs' inroads into Latin America Direct investment by TNCs from developing countries has been on the rise in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 2000s. This follows decades during which TNCs based in developed countries were the most dynamic foreign source of direct investment into the region. This trend is obvious in the region’s cross-border MA market, where the average amount of annual purchases by developing economy-based TNCs increased from $1.3 billion in 1991–2000 to $5.6 billion in 2001–2010, which brought their share in the total from 8 to 43 per cent. TNCs based in Latin America and Asia are the main investors from developing regions.27 At the intraregional level, both cross-border MAs and greenfield FDI projects followed a rising trend during the 2000s, reflecting the growing strength of Latin American firms, bolstered by the region’s strong economic recovery. Greenfield FDI projects reached an estimated $11.6 billion in 2010 (up from $4.5 billion in 2003), and their share in the total grew from 5 per cent in 2003 to 10 per cent in 2010. In the case of cross-border MAs, the share of intraregional deals in the total increased considerably from the early 2000s: during the period 1995–2002, Latin American companies were the origin of only 5 per cent of the total amount of cross-border MA sales in the region; this share rose to 36 per cent during the period 2003–2010 (table II.9). This increase was favoured by a relative retrenchment of developed country-based TNCs (see figure II.4), that resulted from a number of factors, among which were the region’s economic stagnation between 1998 and 2003, the rise of regulatory problems with the privatized companies involving investment from developed country TNCs, and the dot com crisis in the 2000s that affected developed country TNCs’ financial capacities. The recent global financial crisis had a strong impact on the region’s cross-border MA market, including on intraregional acquisitions that fell to zero in value in 2008 and 2009, though they resumed growth in 2010 (figure II.4). The surge of developing Asian TNCs in the Latin American and the Caribbean cross-border MA market in 2010. Firms based in developing Asia had been only marginal investors in the region’s cross-border MA market until 2010, their FDI activity being undertaken mainly through greenfield FDI projects, where their share represented 10 per cent of the region’s total during 2003–2010.28 In 2010, however, the region’s cross-border MA market witnessed a notable and unprecedented surge of investment by developing Asian TNCs, following their near-inactivity of previous years. Acquisitions by these companies jumped to $20 billion in 2010, accounting for 68 per cent of the total, and more than three times their total accumulated acquisitions in the region over the previous two decades. Most of these acquisitions were undertaken by Chinese enterprises (44 per cent), and took Intraregional FDI gained strength during the 2000s, and investments in resource- seeking activities from developing Asia surged in 2010.
  • 85. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 61 place in South America in oil and gas and energy activities. Two Chinese oil and gas companies – China Petrochemical Corp. (Sinopec) and CNOOC – made big upstream acquisitions in Argentina and Brazil in 2010 and 2011 that totalled $12.6 billion (annex table I.7). In addition, China’s State Grid Corporation acquired seven Brazilian power transmission companies for $1.7 billion. India was also the source of significant resource-seeking acquisitions in the region, especially in the oil and Table II.9. Latin America and the Caribbean: cross-border MAs by main acquiring regions and countries and main targeted industries, 2003−2010 (Per cent) Sector/industry - Investing country World Developed economies Developing economies Latin America and the Caribbean Developing Asia Total Mexico Brazil Total China Hong Kong (China) India Total sectors 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Primary 18.7 -11.4 44.4 11.1 - 33.1 81.0 81.3 95.1 Mining of metal ores 15.4 29.0 4.7 4.7 - 10.4 6.6 5.9 - Petroleum 1.3 -43.3 37.6 3.7 - 16.0 72.5 74.6 89.3 Manufacturing 24.3 32.6 18.0 24.7 13.4 48.3 9.2 12.4 3.8 Food, beverages and tobacco 14.3 26.8 4.6 7.5 7.0 10.8 1.4 0.8 3.6 Metal and metal products 3.0 3.4 2.8 5.5 -0.3 15.3 0.1 0.1 - Services 57.0 79.8 37.6 64.1 86.6 18.6 9.9 6.3 1.0 Finance 20.0 37.5 6.3 9.1 - 12.8 2.9 5.1 - Post and communications 13.4 10.1 16.1 30.8 80.1 - 1.8 - - Business activities 10.5 22.0 1.2 0.7 0.1 - 0.5 0.7 0.3 Total sectors, in $billion 99.6 43.9 54.0 26.8 10.1 7.6 26.6 15.9 6.8 Share in total world 100 44 54 27 10 8 27 16 7 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Note: Africa and South-East Europe and the CIS are not shown in this table because of the small amounts. Figure II.4. Latin America and the Caribbean: cross-border MA sales by main acquiring regions, 1993–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MAs database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Note: Africa and South-East Europe and the CIS are not represented in this figure because of the small amounts involved. -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Developed countries Latin America and the Caribbean South, East and South-East Asia
  • 86. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development62 gas industry in Venezuela and in the sugar cane industry in Brazil.29 TNCs from developing Asia accounted for one- tenth of the total estimated value of greenfield FDI projects in the region during 2003–2010, with China and Hong Kong (China) alone the source of 47 per cent of the projects from developing Asian countries. As with their MA activities, resources were the main attraction, with metals and oil and gas the underlying reason for most of the projects (table II.10). The strong increase in resource-seeking FDI from developing Asia into South America in 2010–2011 raises concerns by some countries in the region about the trade patterns, with South America exporting mostly commodities and importing manufactured goods.30 Table II.10. Greenfield FDI projects by main investing regions and countries and main targeted industries, 2003–2010 (Per cent) Sector/industry Investing country World Developed economies Developing economies Latin America and the Caribbean Developing Asia Total Brazil Chile Mexico Total China Hong Kong (China) India Korea, Rep. of Total sectors 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Primary 25 24 28 24 29 12 4 26 23 41 6 Coal, oil and natural gas 19 17 24 19 18 10 4 25 23 35 6 Manufacturing 58 58 56 54 68 63 29 60 65 53 91 Metals 27 27 27 14 25 - 10 36 50 33 37 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 9 10 8 1 1 - - 12 11 14 18 Automotive OEM 7 7 7 1 - - - 11 11 14 17 Food, beverages and tobacco 5 6 3 6 1 23 6 1 2 - - Chemicals and chemical products 4 4 3 4 - 17 3 2 - 5 2 Services 18 18 16 22 4 25 67 14 12 7 3 Communications 5 6 4 10 - 1 56 1 1 - 1 Business activities 4 4 3 4 - 17 3 2 - 5 2 Transportation 3 3 4 1 2 - - 7 8 - - Total sectors, in $ billion 708 566 142 55 25 8 6 74 35 13 12 Share in total world 100 80 20 8 4 1 1 10 5 2 2 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Note: The values refer to estimated amounts of capital investments.
  • 87. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 63 5. South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $5.0 billion Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine Russian Federation and Kazakhstan $1.0 to $4.9 billion Turkmenistan, Belarus, Serbia and Albania .. $0.5 to $0.9 billion Uzbekistan, Montenegro, Croatia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Ukraine Below $0.5 billion The FYR of Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Tajikistan Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Montenegro, Armenia, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, the FYR of Macedonia, Albania and Croatia a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 South-East Europe and the CIS 71.6 68.2 48.8 60.6 7.1 4.3 7.4 9.7 South-East Europe 7.8 4.1 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 - 0.2 0.3 CIS 63.8 64.1 47.4 60.5 6.6 4.1 7.6 9.4 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 South-East Europe and the CIS 626.6 687.8 337.7 472.9 58.7 72.3 10.8 17.4 South-East Europe 77.3 76.4 11.2 8.8 2.6 2.8 0.1 0.3 CIS 549.4 611.4 326.5 464.1 56.1 69.5 10.7 17.2 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 7 125 4 321 7 432 9 698 Primary 5 037 - 85 7 897 1 965 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 5 033 - 85 7 897 1 965 Manufacturing 522 1 857 1 032 270 Food, beverages and tobacco 175 1 366 - 325 Wood and wood products - 51 - 126 Publishing and printing 12 20 - - Chemicals and chemical products 52 - 7 - - 7 Non-metallic mineral products - 50 - - Metals and metal products 7 12 1 015 - 174 Machinery and equipment 7 - 17 - Electrical and electronic equipment - 350 - - Precision instruments - 14 - - Services 1 565 2 549 -1 497 7 463 Electricity, gas and water 259 625 4 - Construction 3 6 - 519 Trade 716 330 - 13 Hotels and restaurants - 15 8 - Transport, storage and communications 111 1 020 - 5 077 Finance 356 543 590 1 248 Business services 120 185 2 7 Public administration and defence - - -2 101 599 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 7 125 4 321 7 432 9 698 Developed economies 5 336 -3 076 7 616 3 464 European Union 4 320 2 202 6 536 1 888 United States 265 119 1 072 205 Japan 174 - - - Developing economies 1 779 325 13 69 Africa 200 388 - 51 Latin America and the Caribbean - 156 - 147 - - 3 South America - 78 - - - 3 Caribbean - 82 - 156 - - Asia 1 736 84 13 21 West Asia 30 40 - 21 South, East and South-East Asia 1 706 44 13 - China 3 843 - 5 - Korea, Republic of 426 20 - - India - 24 8 - Indonesia -2 604 - - - South-East Europe and the CIS - 197 6 166 - 197 6 166 South-East Europe - 167 - - 157 4 CIS - 30 6 166 - 40 6 163 Russian Federation - 30 6 152 - - Ukraine - 15 158 5 519 Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 $billion Commonwealth of Independent States South-East Europe 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 $billion % Commonwealth of Independent States South-East Europe FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
  • 88. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development64 In 2010, FDI inflows to South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)31 declined by 5 per cent (to $68 billion), after falling more than 40 per cent in 2009 (figure A and table B). FDI flows to the CIS rose marginally by less than 1 per cent, thanks to favourable commodity prices, economic recovery and improving stock markets. In the Russian Federation, FDI flows rose by 13 per cent (to $41 billion) (table A). Foreign investors continue to be attracted to the fast-growing local consumer market. The acquisition of the Russian soft drinks brand Wimm-Bill-Dann by PepsiCo for $3.8 billion was seen as a sign of investor confidence in the country. However, some foreign banks, such as Morgan Stanley and Spain’s Santander, divested or downsized their operations.32 FDI flows to Ukraine increased by 35 per cent, due to better macroeconomic conditions and the revival of cross-border acquisitions by Russian companies. FDI inflows declined in Kazakhstan in 2010, even though it remained the second largest recipient in the subregion. In contrast to the CIS, FDI flows to South-East Europe fell, for the third consecutive year (by 47 per cent in 2010), partly as a result of the sluggishness of investment from EU countries (traditionally the dominant source of FDI in this subregion). In particular, Greece, which used to be a gateway or conduit for foreign investors into South-East Europe, ceased to be an entry point as its domestic economic crisis worsened. Another reason for the sluggishness of FDI is structural: investors rarely set up export-oriented projects in the subregion, which has been excluded from international production networks – the engine of recovery in 2010. FDI flows to Croatia and Serbia declined sharply in 2010, while Albania saw its FDI rise to more than $1 billion for the first time ever, making it the second- largest FDI recipient country in the subregion after Serbia (table A). Cross-border MA sales in the region declined by 39 per cent in 2010 (tables D and E), whereas the value of greenfield projects declined by 4 per cent. A large increase in intraregional MA purchases – mainly from the Russian Federation – could not compensate for the slump in MA activity by developed country firms, whose net value (new MAs less divested projects) became negative for the first time ever, due to the divestment by Telenor (Norway) of ZAO Kyivstar GSM (Ukraine) to the Russian firm VimpelCom ($5.5 billion, annex table I.7). Developed countries remained the largest source of greenfield projects in the transition economies (more than two-thirds), despite a continued rise in the share of developing countries. In both greenfield and MA projects, the share of manufacturing continued to rise in 2010 at the expense of the primary and services sectors, especially in “non-strategic” industries, which are open to foreign investors (e.g. food and beverages, motors vehicles and chemicals). Outward FDI flows rose by 24 per cent in 2010 to a record $61 billion (table B), thanks to better cash flows of TNCs located in the region, higher commodity prices, economic recovery and strong support by the State.33 Most of the outward FDI projects, as in past years, were carried out by Russian TNCs, followed by those from Kazakhstan. Both cross-border MA purchases and greenfield projects rose in 2010. Transition-economy firms increased their purchases within the region and in developing countries in 2010 (section 5.b). More than 60 per cent - a record share - of greenfield investment projects by transition-economy firms took place in developing countries. Prospects for inward FDI are positive. FDI inflows are expected to increase in 2011 on the back of a more investor-friendly environment, the anticipated WTO accession of the Russian Federation, and a new round of privatizations in the major host countries of the region (the Russian Federation and Ukraine).34 Outward FDI is expected to pick up in 2011–2013, due to stronger commodity prices and economic recovery in countries with large natural resources. In the first five months of 2011, the cross-border MA purchases of the region increased by more than seven times compared with the same period in 2010.
  • 89. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 65 b. East−South interregional FDI: trends and prospects The landscape of in- ternational investment has gained an impor- tant new dimension in recent years with the expansion of FDI from developing and transi- tion economies. Rapid economic growth, high commodity prices and liberalization have been feeding a boom in outward investment from these economies. This reached a record level of $388 billion in 2010, representing almost 30 per cent of world outflows (chapter I). Ten years ago, that share was only 11 per cent. Although the bulk of South–South FDI (including the flows to and from transition economies) is intra- regional, TNCs based in developing and transitions economies have increasingly ventured into each other’s markets. Trends Bilateral FDI flows between developing and transition economies are relatively small. However, they have grown rapidly during the past decade and this process is expected to continue to gain momentum. Increasingly, transition-economy TNCs are finding their way to Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, in 2010, the share of developing countries in greenfield investment projects from transition economies rose to 60 per cent, up from only 30 per cent in 2004 (figure II.5). Similarly, South to East FDI has been on the rise: developing countries' share in transition economies' greenfield investment projects rose from 9 per cent in 2004 to 21 per cent in 2010. Central Asian countries have been increasingly targeted by neighbouring Chinese TNCs (box II.2). The growing demand for energy in developing countries, especially China and India, has prompted TNCs from these countries to actively pursue joint ventures and other forms of collaboration in resource-rich transition economies. For example, CNPC (China) formed a joint-venture with Rosneft (Russian Federation) to develop oil extraction projects in the Russian Federation and downstream operations in China. In another large project, India’s State-owned ONGC Videsh participated in the development of the Sakhalin I oil and gas exploration project. In contrast to TNCs from developing countries, the main aim of transition-economy TNCs is not simply to ensure the supply of raw materials to their home countries, but rather to expand their control over Bilateral FDI between transition and developing economies is gaining momentum, reflecting the priorities and strategies of their governments. Figure II.5. Cross-border MAs and greenfield FDI projects undertaken in developing countries by transition economy TNCs, 2004–2010 (Billions of dollars and as a per cent of total) Source: UNCTAD. Note: Data for value of greenfield FDI projects refer to estimated amounts of capital investment. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % MA value Greenfield value Share in total total cross-border MAs by transition economy TNCs Share in total greenfield investment projects by transition economy TNCs $billion
  • 90. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development66 the value chain of their natural resources, to build sustainable competitive advantages vis-à-vis other firms, and to strengthen their market positions in key developing countries. East–South investment links are concentrated in a handful of countries. While Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation are the most important targets of developing-country investors, China and Turkey are the most popular destinations for FDI from transition economies (figure II.6). Africa also has attracted important investment flows from the Russian Federation (box II.3). As for the host country pattern, there is a limited number of home countries in South to East bilateral investments. While the Russian Federation is the dominant transition-economy investor in developing countries, Turkey, China, India and the Republic of Korea are major investors in transition economies. In 2009, more than one- third of Turkey’s outward FDI stock was located in Box II.2. China’s rising investment in Central Asia China initiated its investment in Central Asia through the signing in April 1996 of general economic and security agreements with the Central Asian economies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Since then, Chinese investment in the subregion has increased dramatically. Chinese firms built two oil and gas pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China (inaugurated in 2006 and 2009, respectively), laying the ground for large- scale exploration and development of oil and gas fields. In Turkmenistan, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the only foreign company possessing an onshore contract for oil and gas exploration. In Kazakhstan, the China Investment Corporation bought a 14.5 per cent stake in KazMunaiGas, and CNPC bought a 49 per cent share of Mangistaumunaigaz for $2.6 billion, both in 2009. In the electricity industry, China’s Tebian Electric Apparatus is building power transmission lines and substations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In an offsetting deal, this company has acquired the right to extract gold, silver, copper and tungsten in the Pamir Mountains of Tajikistan. Another company, XD Group, is modernizing the electricity system in the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.a In nuclear energy, CNPC formed a joint venture with Kazakhstan’s State-owned Kazatomprom to invest in uranium production in Kazakhstan, and an affiliate of the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation is in a joint venture to develop black-shale uranium in the Navoi Province of Uzbekistan. Source: UNCTAD. a “Chinese-Central Asian Relationship Requires Delicate Balancing Act”, Radio Free Europe, 4 April 2010. Figure II.6. Top 5 destinations of FDI projects,a cumulative 2003–2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Including both cross-border MAs and greenfield FDI projects. 4 4 6 17 68 Georgia Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Russian Federation 6 7 9 14 19 Viet Nam Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Syrian Arab Republic Turkey China 4 4 6 17 68 Georgia Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Russian Federation 6 7 9 14 19 Viet Nam Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Syrian Arab Republic Turkey China a) From developing to transition economies b) From transition to developing economies
  • 91. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 67 transition economies; in the cases of China and the Republic of Korea, that share was only 2–3 per cent (figure II.7). South to East FDI benefited from outward FDI support (e.g. from the Governments of China and India) and from geographical proximity, cultural affinity and historical relationships. TNCs often invest in countries with common cultural and ethnic ties and heritage (e.g. Turkish investment in South- East Europe and Central Asia, Chinese investment in Central Asia), or with which their countries have historical links (e.g. in the case of the Russian– Vietnamese cooperation in coal mining, electricity and natural gas). As developing-country investors are interested in the fast-growing consumer markets of large transition economies such as Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, most of the acquisitions took place in the services sector (figure II.8). Examples of market-seeking projects include investments of Chinese companies and companies from West Asia in real estate construction projects in the Russian Federation, and the expansion of the Turkish retail group Migros (part of Koc Group) in this country and Kazakhstan. Investments by Korean firms (e.g. Ssangyong Motor’s $480 million production agreement and Hyundai’s $400 million new car assembly plant, both in the Russian Federation) are also of this type. The primary sector accounts for almost one-third of FDI projects, and the largest acquisitions took place in this sector.35 A greater proportion of acquisitions by transition- economy TNCs were made in the primary sector, followed by manufacturing and services, mainly in telecommunications. Policy response. FDI between developing countries and transition economies often involves large State-owned TNCs, following national strategic objectives. For this reason, integration schemes and regional cooperation encompassing these groups, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),36 play an important role. Other important measures are bilateral partnerships which can underpin cooperation conducive to East–South investment links.37 The Silk Road Initiative seeks to enhance regional cooperation between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The initiative is an important step in establishing networks, encouraging dialogue, bridging cultural divides Box II.3. Russian TNCs expand into Africa The expansion of Russian TNCs in Africa is fairly recent. The arrival of these TNCs has been motivated by a desire to enhance raw-material supplies and to expand to new segments of strategic commodities, as well as a desire to access local markets. For example RusAl, the world’s largest aluminium producer, has operations in Angola, Guinea, Nigeria and South Africa. Russian TNCs have acquired certain assets directly, such as South Africa’s Highveld Steel and Vanadium (by Evraz group) or Burkina Faso’s High River Gold (by Severstal); in other cases they acquired the parent firms of African assets in developed countries. Other forms of investment include joint ventures, such as in the case of Severstal’s $2.5 billion iron mining project in Liberia, in collaboration with African Aura Mining (United Kingdom). Russian banks are also moving into Africa. Vneshtorgbank for instance opened the first foreign majority-owned bank in Angola, and then moved into Namibia and Côte d’Ivoire, while Renaissance Capital owns 25 per cent of the shares in Ecobank, one of the largest Nigerian banks, with branches in 11 other African countries. In Southern Africa, Russian mining companies are currently involved in developing manganese deposits in the Kalahari Desert (Renova Group, a leading Russian asset management company, has invested up to $1 billion). The largest Russian diamond producer, Alrosa, is building electric power plants in Namibia and a hydroelectric dam in Angola. In the latter case, the project is coupled with a licence to explore for oil and gas. In North Africa, Gazprom has signed three exploration and production-sharing agreements with the National Oil Corporation (NOC) of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In Egypt, the Government of Russia has signed an agreement on civilian nuclear development, allowing Russian companies to bid for nuclear power plant construction contracts. Source: UNCTAD.
  • 92. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development68 and promoting awareness of the potential for cooperation in the investment area between countries of the region. A growing number of bilateral agreements such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DTTs) have been concluded between developing countries and transition economies. As of the end of 2010, 233 BITs had been concluded. Transition economies have signed the largest number of BITs with Asia, followed by Africa and then Latin America. The Russian Figure II.7. Major developing country investors in transition economies, outward FDI stock in 2009 (Millions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Note: Figures in parenthesis show the share of transition economies in the country’s total outward FDI stock in 2009. Data for India refer to 2005 and are on an approval basis. (20%) (3%) (2%) (34%) 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 3 000 3 500 4 000 4 500 5 000 5 500 6 000 India Korea, Rep. of China Turkey Federation is the transition country with the largest number of BITs concluded with developing countries (31); among developing countries China has signed BITs with all transition economies (17). By the end of 2010, the number of East-South DTTs had grown to 175. Prospects. Despite the recent financial crisis, and stricter regulations and conditions governing natural resources projects in the Russian Federation and other transition economies, developing country TNCs have continued to access the natural resources of these economies. In addition, the fast growing consumer market of transition economies and the rise of commodity prices will induce further investment by developing country TNCs in the East. Governments could also consider nurturing long- lasting relationships by focusing on businesses based on comparative advantages and by providing specific mesures to promote investment. For the former, FDI based on technology and other firm-specific advantages is crucial for firms from developing countries and transition economies to increase their investment links.38 For the latter, for example, in the Russian Federation, the launch of a $10 billion FDI fund to attract foreign investors in the country can be expected to further increase FDI, including from developing countries. Outward FDI from transition economies, mainly the Russian Federation, is expected in particular to grow fast in the near future. It will include Africa. Some large resource-based firms are seeking to become regional and global players, while some banks are expanding into other countries in the region. State-owned TNCs such as Gazprom can play a major role in that expansion. Figure II.8. Sectoral distribution of FDI projects,a cumulative, 2004–2010 (Per cent of total value) Source: UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Including both cross-border MAs and greenfield FDI projects. 23% 42% 28% 30% 49% 28% Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary a) From South to East b) From East to South
  • 93. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 69 6. Developed countries a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $100 billion United States United States and Germany $50 to $99 billion Belgium France, Switzerland and Japan $10 to $49 billion Germany, United Kingdom, France, Australia, Ireland, Spain, Canada, Luxembourg and Norway Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom and Austria $1 to $9 billion Poland, Italy, Czech Republic, Austria, Sweden, Israel, Cyprus, Finland, Romania, Iceland, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Estonia, Portugal and Malta Finland, Israel, Poland, Cyprus, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary and Greece Below $1 billion Slovenia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Slovakia, Latvia, Bermuda, Gibraltar, Japan, Denmark, Switzerland and Netherlands Bermuda, New Zealand, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, Latvia, Iceland and Portugal a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Developed economies 602.8 601.9 851.0 935.2 203.5 251.7 160.8 215.7 European Union 346.5 304.7 370.0 407.3 116.2 113.5 89.7 17.3 Other developed countries 40.7 37.1 92.5 91.9 18.2 33.6 17.6 63.2 Other developed Europe 41.3 8.4 64.2 68.5 17.6 9.8 13.0 16.5 North America 174.3 251.7 324.4 367.5 51.5 94.7 40.5 118.7 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Developed economies 12 263.7 12 501.6 16 171.4 16 803.5 558.5 669.2 910.5 1 098.2 European Union 7 296.1 6 890.4 9 080.9 8 933.5 353.8 387.1 439.4 524.9 Other developed countries 762.6 874.2 1 153.1 1 320.2 41.6 55.2 59.6 57.3 Other developed Europe 655.1 724.5 1 012.9 1 090.4 47.9 44.9 61.5 73.4 North America 3 550.0 4 012.5 4 924.4 5 459.5 115.3 182.0 350.0 442.6 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 203 530 251 705 160 785 215 654 Primary 41 198 50 945 2 875 23 548 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 40 216 46 107 1 344 23 041 Manufacturing 61 153 98 998 32 663 105 333 Food, beverages and tobacco 5 669 27 797 -4 038 27 603 Chemicals and chemical products 32 084 27 496 28 648 41 409 Non-metallic mineral products - 139 2 436 728 3 050 Metals and metal products 252 - 155 - 680 2 832 Machinery and equipment 1 305 7 619 2 086 5 870 Electrical and electronic equipment 8 315 10 129 1 281 6 902 Precision instruments 3 841 9 303 4 798 7 331 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 8 546 3 210 - 686 4 488 Services 101 179 101 762 125 247 86 773 Electricity, gas and water 59 408 -3 265 39 015 -21 331 Construction 10 254 6 301 -1 641 -2 700 Trade -1 327 12 331 1 017 7 001 Hotels and restaurants 1 535 4 712 400 - 43 Transport, storage and communications 3 523 7 603 14 062 7 112 Finance 8 434 26 496 60 286 63 832 Business services 13 638 35 025 15 995 24 914 Health and social services 1 254 5 613 - 1 698 Community, social and personal service activities 3 175 4 080 - 291 5 195 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 203 530 251 705 160 785 215 654 Developed economies 143 163 182 657 143 163 182 657 European Union 81 751 9 804 88 575 84 910 France 38 372 2 451 - 342 3 496 Germany 20 372 6 293 1 561 9 665 United Kingdom -6 307 -7 516 21 678 42 782 United States 18 834 79 091 26 640 66 819 Japan 11 882 18 126 -6 945 3 051 Developing economies 46 272 52 629 12 286 36 073 Africa 1 378 1 336 4 328 6 355 Latin America and the Caribbean 3 475 11 544 -6 815 3 581 South America 959 7 561 -6 681 -4 129 Central America 3 169 2 559 16 5 787 Asia 41 417 39 752 14 494 17 294 West Asia 21 451 -2 909 3 174 2 357 South, East and South-East Asia 19 966 42 661 11 320 14 936 China 12 994 9 047 1 418 2 976 India 40 7 949 5 573 7 465 Oceania 2 - 4 280 8 843 South-East Europe and the CIS 7 616 3 464 5 336 -3 076 Russian Federation 7 616 2 896 4 487 1 719 Ukraine - - 12 - 14 -5 206 $billion 0 400 800 1 200 1 600 2 000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 European Union Other developed countries Other developed Europe North America Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 $billion % 0 300 600 900 1 200 1 500 0 5 10 15 20 25 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Other developed countries European Union North America Other developed Europe Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
  • 94. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development70 In 2010, FDI inflows to developed countries declined marginally. At $602 billion, FDI inflows to the region were only 46 per cent of the peak level in 2007 (figure A). From a global perspective, the developed countries’ share of FDI inflows in the world total fell below 50 per cent for the first time in 2010. A gloomier economic outlook prompted by government austerity measures, looming sovereign debt crises and regulatory concerns were among the factors hampering the recovery of FDI flows in developed countries. The overall figures, however, mask wide subregion- al variations among developed countries. In North America, inflows of FDI showed a strong turna- round with a 44 per cent increase over the previous year to $252 billion (table A). In contrast, inflows to Europe were down by 19 per cent. In addition to a 36 per cent fall in the United Kingdom, which has been one of the largest recipients in Europe, large divestments from two of the subregion’s small open economies, namely the Netherlands and Switzerland, dragged down the total. Significant divestments also occurred in Japan where growth prospects were perceived to be poor, especially in comparison with emerging economies. The divergent pace of economic recovery is reflect- ed, to an extent, in the components of inward FDI. In the two large economies leading the recovery of FDI in the grouping, namely Germany and the United States, there was a more robust economic recovery, resulting in strong growth of reinvested earnings, which increased more than threefold compared with the 2009 level in both economies. In contrast to the declining inflows, FDI outflows from developed countries reversed their downward trend, with a 10 per cent increase over the previ- ous year. FDI from developed countries amounted to $935 billion, still accounting for 71 per cent of the world total (figure B). TNCs in developed countries accumulated an unprecedented amount of cash on their balance sheets and the rates of debt financing were at a historic low, facilitating their overseas expansion. Furthermore, MA remained an attractive strategy for firms seeking growth as well as for those seeking cost-cutting through synergy. Although these factors appear to have generated a sizeable recovery of outward FDI from developed countries, the total for the region as a whole was half of its peak in 2007. By subregion, the recovery of FDI outflows in developed countries was, like inflows, driven by North America. Cross-border MA deals by United States firms more than tripled, resulting in a 16 per cent increase in total outflows from the United States. Furthermore, the value of reinvested earnings increased by 35 per cent. In addition to the increase in profits, a greater share of profits was reinvested rather than repatriated.39 In Europe, despite a 67 per cent fall in cross-border MA deals by European TNCs, outflows of FDI overall increased by 10 per cent, due largely to the upswing of intra-company loans. For Germany, for example, intra-company loans from its TNCs turned from a negative $25 billion in 2009 to nearly $18 billion in 2010. Similarly, intra-company loans from Swiss TNCs increased from a negative $7 billion in 2009 to $11 billion in 2010. Cross-border MA deals by Japanese firms almost doubled, but this was still not enough to compensate for the fall in intra-company loans and reinvested earnings at Japanese affiliates abroad. Japanese TNCs continued to repatriate much of the profits from their affiliates to take advantage of the tax break on dividends introduced in 2009 (WIR10). At the industry level, MA activities in the natural resource-relatedindustriesdrewmuchattention,not least because of the political sensitivity associated with them. For instance, the takeover of Dana Petroleum (United Kingdom) by Korea National Oil Corporation in 2010 was thought to have been the first hostile bid for a developed country-based firm by a State-owned company from an emerging economy.40 Some proposed mega-deals in the sector, namely the separate bids by BHP Billiton and Sinochem for PotashCorp (Canada), as well as the plan to merge the Australian iron ore operations of BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, did not materialize, as they failed to address regulatory concerns. Another active industry in terms of MAs was the pharmaceutical industry. The populations in many developed countries are ageing, and consequently,
  • 95. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 71 the long-term prospects for the healthcare-related industries are regarded as favourable. Furthermore, the patents of a number of top-selling drugs will shortly expire, prompting takeovers of smaller pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms with products and technologies by large international pharmaceutical companies. One of the largest MA deals in 2010 was the takeover of Millipore (United States) by the drug and chemical group Merck (Germany) (annex table I.7). Other reported deals included the acquisition of Talecris Biotherapeutics (United States) by Grifols (Spain) and of OSI Pharmaceuticals (United States) by Astellas Pharma (Japan). This trend has continued into 2011. As for the prospect, the comparison of the first several months of 2011 and those of 2010 suggests a more solid recovery of FDI flows in 2011. The value of greenfield projects indicates that outflows will continue their recovery – at a faster rate. The values of greenfield projects from all the subregions in the first four months of 2011 are showing a 20– 25 per cent increase over the same period of 2010. Despite suffering from a serious natural disaster, Japan’s outward FDI flows are buoyant, in particular through cross-border MAs in 2011. For inflows, the picture is more mixed. Data on greenfield projects show a small overall decline for the region. In contrast, MA data show a similar pattern to 2010: a robust increase in North America but declines in Europe and Japan. As growth prospects for major economies in the region, including the United States, are uncertain, the return of confidence and a recovery of inward FDI may take longer than was the case after previous FDI downturns. b. Bailing out of the banking industry and FDI The financial crisis and the banking industry. Amid the turmoil in the financial markets which followed the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, some of the largest banks in the world sought injections of capital from SWFs, rival banks or governments to shore up their balance sheets. In some cases, the bail-outs by foreign banks and SWFs were large enough to qualify as FDI.41 The bail-outs by national governments were followed by a restructuring process of those banks, which in some cases resulted in divestments of foreign assets but in others generated new FDI (table II.11). Over the period from September 2008 to December 2010, divestment of foreign assets by the rescued banks resulted in a net decrease of FDI (i.e. assets abroad sold to a domestic bank in the host country) by about $45 billion. In the same period, the sell-offs of nationalized banks and their assets generated FDI worth about $35 billion.42 Therestructuringofthebanksthatwerebeneficiaries of government rescue – a process which is still ongoing in 2011 – has been driven by concerns over competition in the banking industry and efforts towards the reform of the financial system. The future policy discourse over these issues is likely to have implications for the FDI flows of the financial industry for years to come. Restructuring and divestment. The bail-outs of the banks left governments holding substantial amounts of equity in the rescued banks. As financial markets around the world recovered some stability in the course of 2009 and 2010, governments began to seek exit from holding major stakes in the banks. In some cases, governments simply sold off their equity holdings through public offerings.43 In others, banks were required to restructure and to sell off assets while under government control. This process has generated FDI, resulting in further transnationalization of the banking industry, especially in Europe, where the competition policy of the European Commission was the major driving force behind the restructuring. The concerns of the European Commission were twofold. First, injection of public funds should not give the recipient banks an unfair competitive advantage. Second, consolidation of the industry resulting from acquiring weaker banks should not reduce competition in the industry. In the United Kingdom, for instance, in 2008 the Government injected £37 billion into its two largest banks, Lloyds Banking Group and the Royal Bank of Scotland, followed by additional support measures in the following year.44 As the price for the State bail-out, the European Commission required Lloyds to sell at least 600 branches and reduce its The restructuring of the banking industry following government bail-outs in Europe and the United States has resulted in both divestment of foreign assets and generation of new FDI.
  • 96. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development72 market share by an agreed percentage by selling some of its operations.45 Similarly, the Royal Bank of Scotland was told to sell 318 branches, which were subsequently purchased by Santander (Spain) for £1.65 billion. The Spanish bank announced that it would inject £4.46 billion of equity capital to its affiliates in the United Kingdom, although the deal is not expected to be completed until 2012.46 Furthermore, the Royal Bank of Scotland announced in 2010 an agreement to sell an 80 per cent share in its payment processing business to a consortium of United States private equity funds, Advent International and Bain Capital, for £2 billion.47 Table II.11. Selected cases of government bail-out of international banks, 2008−2010 Bank Government Bail-out, 2008–2010 Implications for FDI flows Hypo Group Alpe Adria Austria €450 million 67% stake worth €3 billion held by Bayerische Landesbank (Germany) written off when nationalized in 2009. Dexia Belgium €3 billion 20% stake in Credit du Nord (France) sold for €645 million in 2009. 70% stake in Dexia Crediop (Italy) and 85.5% stake in Dexia Banka Slovensko (Slovakia) to be divested by October 2012; 60% stake in Dexia Sabadell (Spain) by December 2013. France €3 billion Luxembourg €376 million Fortis Belgium/Luxembourg €9.4 billion/€2.5 billion Sold to BNP Paribas (France) in 2009 Netherlands €16.8 billion Amlin (United Kingdom) acquiring Fortis Corporate Insurance from the Government of the Netherlands for €350 million in 2009. KBC Group Belgium €7 billion Investment banking unit, KBC Peel Hunt (United Kingdom), global convertible bonds and Asian equity derivatives businesses, and its reverse mortgage activities in the United States all divested. Commerzbank Germany €18.2 billion Its Swiss affiliates Dresdner Bank (Switzerland) and Commerzbank (Switzerland) divested in 2009. The following assets divested in 2010: Privatinvest Bank (Austria), Dresdner VPV (Netherlands), Dresdner Van Moer Courtens (Netherlands), and the Belgian affiliate of Commerzbank International (Luxembourg), Commerzbank International Trust Singapore, its United Kingdom affiliates, Channel Islands Holdings and Kleinwort Benson Private Bank, Allianz Dresdner Bauspar AG (ADB) (Austria), Dresdner Bank Monaco. Its affiliate in Germany Montrada GmbH, a card payments processing company, sold to a Dutch firm in 2010. IKB Deutsche Industriebank Germany $3.1 billion Bailed out through State-owned development bank, KFW. Its 90.8% stake sold to the United States private equity fund Lone Star for $150 million in 2008. Allied Irish Bank Ireland €9.2 billion 22.4% stake in MT Bank (United States) sold though public offering (agreed in October 2010). Bank Zachodni WBK (Poland) sold to Banco Santander (Spain) for €4 billion (purchase completed in March 2011). Bank of Ireland Ireland €5.5 billion 50% stake in Paul Capital Investments (United States), a private equity fund, and its United States-based foreign currency business sold in 2011. ING Netherlands €10 billion Swiss private banking unit sold to Julius Baer (Switzerland) for $505 million; 51% equity stakes in ING Australia and ING New Zealand sold to the ANZ Bank (Australia) for €1.1 billion; and Asian Private Banking business sold for $1 billion in 2010. Most of its real estate investment management business around the world sold for $1.1 billion in 2011. Lloyds TSB/HBOS United Kingdom £17 billion 632 branches in the United Kingdom put up for sale in 2011 as agreed with the European Commission. Bank of Western Australia sold for $1.4 billion in 2008. RBS United Kingdom £20 billion 318 branches sold to Santander (Spain) in 2010. RBS WorldPay sold for £2 billion. Bank of America United States $45 billion Its stake in a Chinese affiliate reduced in 2009 and stake in Mexican affiliate disposed in 2010. Citigroup United States $25 billion Nikko Cordial Securities (Japan) sold for $5.8 billion and Nikko Asset Management (Japan) for $1.2 billion in 2009. Citi Cards Canada sold for $1 billion in 2009. Source: UNCTAD, based on media reports, corporate press releases and annual reports.
  • 97. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 73 In the case of the banks in the United Kingdom, some of the required sell-offs took the form of the sale of domestic assets to foreign investors, thus generating inward FDI. For other European banks, it often resulted in divestment of foreign assets, i.e. negative outward FDI. For instance, in return for receiving State support amounting to €18.2 billion over the period 2008–2010, Commerzbank was required by the European Commission to reduce its assets by 45 per cent, including its private bank operations in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The sell-off of foreign assets has not been limited to European Banks. To address regulatory concerns, Bank of America sold part of its equity holdings in China Construction Bank for $7.3 billion in 2009 and its entire 24.9 per cent stake in Grupo Financiero Santander (Mexico) for $2.5 billion in 2010. A much more complex process of restructuring took place in the aftermath of the bail-out of Fortis (Belgium). In September 2008, the Governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg took the decision to buy 49 per cent stakes in Fortis’s respective national arms, jointly injecting €11.2 billion. Subsequently, the Government of the Netherlands renegotiated the bail-out package, to buy all of Fortis’s Dutch operation as well as the Dutch operation of ABN Amro, also previously owned by Fortis, for €16.8 billion. The Belgian part of Fortis, Fortis Bank, was fully nationalized in October 2008. In the following year, an agreement was reached between the Government of Belgium and BNP Paribas (France), whereby France’s largest bank took over a 75 per cent stake of Fortis Bank in an all-share exchange transaction. This deal left the Government of Belgium as the largest shareholder of BNP Paribas, with a stake of around 11.7 per cent in the French bank, which became the biggest bank in Europe in terms of deposits. For the Dutch part of the assets, it was reported in June 2009 that Lloyds of London insurer Amlin had agreed to buy Fortis Corporate Insurance for €350 million. Nationalization of Icelandic banks. One of the most spectacular banking failures during the financial crisis was the collapse of the Icelandic banks. The three largest banks in Iceland, Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir had to be nationalized in October 2008, and the fourth largest, Straumur, followed suit in March 2009. In the process of subsequent restructuring, unsecured creditors (mostly foreign) agreed to a deal involving a debt- equity swap, as a result of which the foreign creditors took control of the remnants of three of those banks. The Government of Iceland reached an agreement in November 2008 to hand over 95 per cent of Glitnir, renamed Islandsbanki, to creditors, which included RBS and Mitsui-Sumitomo Bank. Similarly, in December 2009, creditors of Kaupthing agreed to take an 87 per cent stake in Arion Bank, the successor to Kaupthing, that took over its healthy assets, as compensation and to inject further capital worth more than $500 million. Finally, an agreement was reached in September 2010 whereby holders of unsecured debt issued by Straumur, including hedge funds Davison Kempner and Varde Partners, assumed 100 per cent ownership of the bank’s remaining businesses. The exact equity shares taken over by foreign creditors in those deals are not known, but some of them are likely to have been over 10 per cent, in effect, turning their portfolio investment into FDI. At the same time, the restructuring of Icelandic banks has resulted in divestment of their foreign assets (e.g. retailers based in the United Kingdom), resulting in negative outward FDI from Iceland, but which, in turn, have generated FDI by private equity groups from a third country (mostly the United States). Prospects. The process of restructuring is still ongoing. In developed countries, the nationalization of banks is only a temporary measure and the equity held by governments will be sold off. Thus, FDI flows in the banking industry in the coming years are likely to be influenced by the policies of the competition authorities as well as the exit strategies of governments. In the longer term, the global efforts towards reforming the financial system could have important implications. For instance, Basel III, the revised international bank capital and liquidity framework, imposes tougher bank capital requirement rules. Although the implementation of these rules is to be gradually phased in, starting in 2013 up to January 2019, there is some evidence that banks have been reconfiguring their assets, including divestment of their foreign assets, in an effort to strengthen their capital base.
  • 98. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development74 1. Least developed countries a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $10.0 billion .. .. $2.0 to $9.9 billion Angola and Democratic Republic of the Congo .. $1.0 to $1.9 billion Sudan and Zambia Angola $0.5 to $0.9 billion Niger, Bangladesh, Madagascar, Uganda, Mozambique, Cambodia, Chad, Myanmar, United Republic of Tanzania and Equatorial Guinea .. $0.1 to $0.4 billion Lao People's Democratic Republic, Guinea, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Solomon Islands, Senegal, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, Malawi, Somalia and Benin Zambia and Senegal Below $0.1 billion Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Lesotho, Rwanda, Togo, Nepal, Vanuatu, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Burundi, Mauritania, Bhutan, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, São Tomé and Principe, Samoa, Tuvalu and Yemen Yemen, Sudan, Liberia, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Niger, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Benin, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Principe, Mali, Mauritania, Solomon Islands, Malawi, Vanuatu, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Kiribati, Guinea-Bissau, Samoa and Togo a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. B. Trends in structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Least developed countries (LDCs) 26.5 26.4 0.4 1.8 - 0.8 2.2 - 0.4 LDCs: Africa 23.8 23.1 0.3 1.7 - 0.5 2.0 - 0.3 LDCs: Latin America and the Caribbean - 0.2 - - - 0.1 - - LDCs: Asia 2.6 2.9 0.1 0.1 - 0.3 0.1 - - LDCs: Oceania 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 0.1 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Least developed countries (LDCs) 127.8 151.7 7.4 10.9 16.3 19.6 0.3 0.4 LDCs: Africa 100.2 121.0 6.5 9.9 10.7 13.0 0.3 0.4 LDCs: Latin America and the Caribbean 0.5 0.6 - - - - - - LDCs: Asia 26.2 28.9 0.9 1.0 5.4 6.4 - - LDCs: Oceania 0.9 1.2 - 0.1 0.2 0.2 - - Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total - 774 2 201 16 354 Primary 8 1 094 16 2 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 8 1 094 16 2 Manufacturing 11 94 - 96 Food, beverages and tobacco - 65 - 95 Textiles, clothing and leather - 10 - - Wood and wood products 11 - - - Chemicals and chemical products - 20 - - Metals and metal products - - - 1 Machinery and equipment - - - - Electrical and electronic equipment - - - - Precision instruments - - - - Services - 793 1 013 - 257 Electricity, gas and water - 110 - - Trade - - - - Transport, storage and communications - 346 903 - - Finance - 354 - - 257 Business services - 94 - - - Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World - 774 2 201 16 354 Developed economies -1 156 1 655 - 2 European Union -1 160 786 - 1 United States - 15 1 300 - - Australia - - 427 - - Developing economies 372 511 16 352 Africa 354 252 - 257 North Africa 324 - - - Sub-Saharan Africa 30 252 - 257 Uganda - 257 - - Zambia - - - 257 Latin America and the Caribbean - 5 - 16 95 Panama - - - 95 Asia 23 259 - - West Asia - - 280 - - South, East and South-East Asia 23 539 - - South-East Europe and the CIS - 35 - - Ukraine - 35 - - $billion 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Africa Latin America and the Caribbean Asia Oceania Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 $billion 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 % Oceania Asia Latin America and the CaribbeanAfrica FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
  • 99. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 75 FDI inflows to the 48 LDCs declined by a further 0.6 per cent in 2010 to $26 billion, following the 20 per cent fall a year earlier that had interrupted the upwards trend of the previous decade (table B and figure A). Almost two-fifths of the LDCs – in particular Yemen, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Rwanda, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan – saw their FDI inflows reduced. This unprecedented two-year retreat in FDI inflows to LDCs has taken place against a backdrop of rising commodity prices, a modest recovery in global FDI flows, and a 10 per cent increase in inflows to developing and transition economies. The delay in recovery of FDI flows to LDCs is a mat- ter of grave concern, as FDI is a major contributor to their capital formation (figure A). This is especially so in African LDCs, where FDI flows were equiva- lent to as high as 25 per cent of gross fixed capital formation over most of the past decade. In addition, FDI is a key source of technology and management know-how, which are of particular importance for LDCs. Most investments in 2010 were in the form of greenfield projects, which totalled $37.1 billion in their combined (foreign and domestic) capital expenditures (annex table I.8). There were 288 such projects of a significant size (annex table I.9), which generated a total of 67,400 jobs (UNCTAD, 2011b). The projects were concentrated in the primary and manufacturing sectors, accounting for 44 and 39 per cent of the total, respectively, compared with 17 per cent in services. Many large FDI projects were in base metals and oil prospecting and exploitation. In Africa, extraction activities account for the majority of inflows, while in Asian LDCs services industries such as telecommunications and electricity have attracted more foreign investment. In terms of the number of deals, service industries such as financial services, transportation and communications represented the majority of investments, accounting for 48 per cent of the total, followed by manufacturing (36 per cent). The primary sector accounted for just 11 per cent of the deals. FDI in telecommunications is on the rise in African LDCs, while FDI to Asian LDCs is primarily in manufacturing or services such as electricity. Fifty- six per cent of the deals originated from developing and transition economies, rather than developed economies. FDI via MAs is still limited in LDCs, but their number has nearly doubled over the last decade. In particular, some of the large investments, such as in telecommunications, were through mergers and acquisitions. Cross-border MA sales turned positive in 2010, amounting to $2.2 billion in 2010 (tables D and E), in contrast to 2008 and 2009, when they were negative. The distribution of FDI flows among LDCs remains highly uneven. The accumulated stock of inward FDI in LDCs now stands at $152 billion. However the 10 countries (Angola, Sudan, Zambia, Myanmar, the United Republic of Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Uganda and Mozambique, in that order) with FDI stocks of more than $5 billion as of 2010, account for two-thirds of the total inward stock. Four mostly natural resources exporting countries – Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Zambia – received over half of total FDI into LDCs. This concentration of FDI in a limited number of resource-rich countries continues to increase. The FDI pattern in LDCs is also evident from the expanding presence of the largest TNCs, whose presence in LDCs doubled over the past decade. There was a particularly impressive expansion of global TNCs investing in Mozambique, Malawi, Bangladesh and Uganda. However, some 75 TNCs have pulled out from LDCs during the past decade (UNCTAD, 2011b). As of 2010, judging by FDI project data (cross- border MA and greenfield investment projects), European companies accounted for the largest share of FDI flows from developed countries to LDCs, with over 36 per cent of the world total (UNCTAD, 2011b). Substantial shifts are taking place in world FDI patterns, due to the emergence of FDI from developing economies, which have become major players with respect to international investment, exports and technology flows into LDCs. Currently, the shares of developing and transition economies in LDCs’ FDI stock vary from 30 per cent in Malawi to more than 70 per cent in Cambodia, and most countries have seen a considerable increase in their
  • 100. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development76 proportion in recent years. Although starting from a low base, FDI from Brazil, China, India and South Africa, in particular, has become sizeable in many African LDCs. While such investments focused principally on extractive industries at first, they have become more diversified in recent years in a number of host countries, ranging from manufacturing, to commerce and finance, to agriculture. In addition, investments from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in African LDCs have recently increased in industries such as telecoms, tourism, finance, infrastructure, mining, oil and gas and agriculture. South-South FDI is likely to play an increasing role for LDCs in the future, and holds the potential to boost productivity and significantly affect development patterns in LDCs. It has been less volatile than that from developed countries, and has been more resilient during the recent global economic crisis, partly because it is less dependent on debt financing. FDI prospects for LDCs remain challenging. Data for the first four months of 2011 on greenfield investment, which is the main mode of investment in LDCs, rather than cross-border MA, show further decline of 25 per cent (annex table I.8). The regulatory conditions established in many LDCs are on a par with those in other developing countries, and recent regulatory reforms have made several LDC economies more attractive to FDI. Increased attention has been paid by many LDCs to policy initiatives at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels in order to enhance international cooperation and/or integration in matters relating to FDI. By the end of 2010, LDCs had concluded a total of 455 BITs and 188 DTTs. On average, LDCs concluded nine BITs and four DTTs per country, compared with 14 BITS and 12 DTTs for all developing countries. On the partners' side, Germany is the country that has signed most BITs with LDCs (33), followed by Switzerland (26) and China (19). However, there are serious challenges that require renewed policy efforts at the national and international levels if FDI is to effectively contribute to sustainable development in LDCs (see the following section). An ambitious new plan of action for FDI in LDCs to enhance productive capacities is urgently needed. b. Enhancing productive capacities through FDI In preparation for the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Devel- oped Countries, held in Istanbul, Turkey, in May 2011, UNCTAD carried out a broad review of FDI trends in LDCs over the past decade since the Brussels Declaration and the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries (BPoA), examining the impact of FDI on their economies with a view to proposing a plan of action to enhance its effectiveness (UNCTAD, 2011b). The report focuses on the challenges LDCs face in attracting and benefiting from FDI, and on what can be done to improve the situation in the light of UNCTAD´s long-standing work on FDI in LDCs. The study found that despite the recent setback, FDI flows to LDCs had grown at an annual rate of 15 per cent during the last decade, raising their share in global FDI flows from less than 1 per cent to over 2 per cent by 2010. Some LDCs have succeeded in diversifying the type of FDI they attract, but over 80 per cent of total FDI flows went to resource-rich economies in Africa, with a weak impact on employment generation, and inflows have stagnated or declined in some countries. In addition, LDCs as a whole still remain at the margin of global value chains, accounting for only 1 per cent of world trade flows (exports plus imports) in industrial goods. Also, the predominance of FDI in natural-resource extraction has reinforced the commodity dependence of LDCs, exacerbating their unbalanced economic structures and vulnerability to external shocks. The geographic concentration of FDI flows has increased over the past decade, contributing to further divergence in economic performance among LDCs, and regional disparities inside countries remain acute. Most LDCs are still characterized by a dual economy in which a relatively small formal private sector coexists with a large informal segment, which includes subsistence agriculture. FDI linkages with the domestic economy have been hard to establish, and transfers of skills and know- how have been limited.48
  • 101. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 77 Technological advances and organizational changes in the global economy and within TNCs are fundamentally altering the way goods and services are produced. Global value chains with a high degree of specialization have become the norm. TNCs are increasingly outsourcing parts of their value chains, in order to increase their efficiency and competitiveness and avail of the lowest worldwide cost options. This in turn requires new approaches and development policies for LDCs. The relevant new paradigm implies a more proactive approach to developing productive capacities, with a better balance between markets and the State, and places production and employment at the heart of policies. UNCTAD’s plan of action for LDCs builds on the reforms and efforts that have been undertaken in recent times, but strives to present new ways of addressing old problems, taking into account the changed circumstances and the lessons of the past decade. The emphasis is on an integrated policy approach to investment, capacity-building and enterprise development. The plan calls for steps to be taken by all key stakeholders involved – governments in LDCs, development partners and home countries of TNCs – and envisages a clear role for the private sector itself. There are five key areas: • Public–private initiatives in infrastructure. Poor physical infrastructure constrains not just FDI, but more generally the development of productive ca- pacities and LDCs’ ability to reap the benefits of economic globalization. Successfully addressing the problem calls for strengthened PPP initiatives for infrastructure development and a strong role for private investment. • Aid for productive capacity. Shortfalls in terms of skills and human capital are at least as big a constraint on development in LDCs as poor physical infrastructure. An aid-for-productive- capacity programme focusing on education, training and transfer of skills is called for. • Building on investment opportunities. Efforts need to be redoubled to enable firms of all sizes to capture opportunities in LDCs. Large TNCs frequently bypass investment opportunities in LDCs, where markets are typically small and operating conditions are more challenging. However, LDCs offer significant untapped business opportunities for nimble and innovative investors of a more modest size, as well as potential for high returns on investment. • Local business development and access to finance. The presence of efficient and dynamic local businesses is particularly important for efficiency- seeking foreign investors, which LDCs need to attract on a much larger scale and sustainable basisiftheyaretointegrateintoglobalvaluechains. New initiatives to support SME development and linkages with TNCs are essential. • Regulatory and institutional reform. LDCs need to launch the next wave of regulatory and institutional reforms to further strengthen the relevant State institutions and their implementation capacities within a partnership-based approach. While significant reforms have been carried out in LDCs in this area in the past 10 years, much remains to be done. In these five areas of action, there are specific measures to be taken by each stakeholder. These are summarized in table II.12.
  • 102. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development78 Table II.12. Plan of action for investment in LDCs Actions Selected measures on the part of… LDC governments Development partners Strengthen public-private infrastructure development efforts • Pursuing a liberalization of infrastructure sectors and stable regulatory frameworks to ensure competitive outcomes and protect the national interest. • Legal and regulatory framework for PPPs, with pipeline of projects and regional coordination. • LDC infrastructure development fund focused on infrastructure PPPs: risk coverage, direct participation and lending on soft terms. • Technical assistance for regulation and implementation of infrastructure PPPs. Boost aid for productive capacity • Increased public investment in technical and vocational training. • Reform of immigration and work permitting procedures. • Aid-for-productive capacity funds, including support for technical and vocational training and entrepreneurship. Enable firms of all sizes to capture LDC opportunities • Proactive targeting of SME FDI and “impact investors”. • Proactively promoting of the primary sector with opportunities for fast technological catching-up, e.g. telecom services, renewable energy. • Risk coverage institutions at the national level to service SME FDI. • Home-country measures to help firms tap into business opportunities in LDCs: IPA–EPA coordination mechanisms, “impact investment” regulatory framework. Foster local business and ease access to finance • Credit guarantee schemes for micro, small and medium-sized firms, and strengthened development banks. • Regulatory reform to enable SME access to bank lending and strengthen financial infrastructure. • Simplification of procedures for formal business development. • Technical support for the development of financial infrastructure and regulatory and institutional environment. • Support for increased lending and credit guarantee schemes for SMEs. Start the next wave of regulatory and institutional reform • New reform to put increasing emphasis on aspects of regulations that shape FDI impact and strengthen State institutions, including taxation and competition. • Building on mutually reinforcing interests: avoid command and control regulatory bias, establish systematic consultation mechanisms with investors on draft laws. • Build client-oriented investment institutions. • Strengthened efforts to combat corruption under top to bottom zero-tolerance policy. • Strengthened technical assistance on key regulatory issues, including taxation and competition. • Systematic institution twinning. • Adoption of home-country measures to support LDCs: tax engineering avoidance, oversight of business practices by TNCs. Source: UNCTAD, 2011b.
  • 103. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 79 2. Landlocked developing countries a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $1 billion Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia and Zambia Kazakhstan $500 to $999 million Niger, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Chad, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Botswana .. $100 to $499 million Paraguay, Lao People's Democratic Republic, the FYR of Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi and Zimbabwe Zambia and Azerbaijan $10 to $99 million Swaziland, Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Tajikistan, Rwanda, Nepal, Burkina Faso, Burundi and Bhutan Mongolia, Zimbabwe and Niger Below $10 million .. Armenia, Swaziland, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mali, Republic of Moldova, the FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Botswana and Plurinational State of Bolivia a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Landlocked countries (LLCs) 26.2 23.0 3.8 8.4 1.7 0.6 - 0.5 Africa 4.2 5.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 - 0.3 Latin America and the Caribbean 0.6 1.0 - - 0.1 - 0.1 - - - Asia and Oceania 1.2 2.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 - - Transition economies 20.1 14.8 3.5 8.1 1.4 0.2 - 0.3 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Landlocked countries (LLCs) 149.1 169.6 15.6 27.1 19.6 25.2 - 0.2 - 0.1 Africa 29.6 34.0 2.4 4.5 2.9 3.4 0.2 0.2 Latin America and the Caribbean 9.1 10.0 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.5 - - Asia and Oceania 6.4 8.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.7 - - Transition economies 104.0 117.0 12.8 22.2 15.1 19.6 - 0.5 - 0.4 Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 1 708 639 - 8 518 Primary 1 614 45 1 216 123 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 1 614 45 1 216 123 Manufacturing 25 44 - - Food, beverages and tobacco - 0 - - Wood and wood products 11 - - - Chemicals and chemical products 10 42 - - Non-metallic mineral products - - - - Metals and metal products - - - - Machinery and equipment 4 - - - Electrical and electronic equipment - 1 - - Services 70 551 -1 224 395 Electricity, gas and water - 247 110 - - Trade 335 0 - - Transport, storage and communications 0 371 - - Finance - 24 69 - 396 Public administration and defence - - -1 224 - 1 Other services 5 - - - Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 1 708 639 - 8 518 Developed economies 75 88 - 261 European Union - 418 89 - 260 United States - 53 - 17 - - Japan 52 - 3 - - Developing economies 1 831 550 - 8 257 Africa 74 303 - 257 Latin America and the Caribbean - - 16 - British Virgin Islands - - 16 - Asia 1 757 246 - 24 - West Asia 30 0 - - South, East and South-East Asia 1 727 246 - 24 - China 3 558 46 - 24 - India - 80 - - Indonesia -2 604 - - - Thailand - 110 - - South-East Europe and the CIS - 198 - - - Russian Federation - 198 - - - $billion 0 2 4 6 8 10 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 AfricaLatin America and the Caribbean Asia and OceaniaTransition economies Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 $billion 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 % FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation Transition economies Asia and Oceania Latin America and the Caribbean Africa Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
  • 104. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development80 In 2010, FDI inflows to the 31 landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)49 declined by 12 per cent to $23 billion (table B and figure A). LLDCs accounted for 3.6 per cent of FDI flows to all developing and transition economies, down from 4.5 per cent in 2009. Inherent geographical disadvantages and structural macroeconomic weaknesses have hampered the overall economic performance of these countries. They also face severe constraints in attracting FDI inflows, including the small size of their economies, weak infrastructure and high transportation costs. However, some of them have made significant progress in attracting FDI inflows over the past decade, as the result of economic reforms, investment liberalization and favourable external economic conditions (WIR10). The five largest recipients of FDI in this special grouping of structurally weak economies were Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan (both in the CIS), Mongolia (East Asia), Zambia (Southern Africa) and Niger (West Africa), with inflows of $10 billion, $2.1 billion, $1.7 billion, $1 billion and $950 million, respectively (table A). Large cross-border MA deals in LLDCs have been increasingly targeting services (table II.13), while in Zambia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, privatization in telecommunications led to significant foreign investment through MAs, including from other developing countries. Large cross-border MAs also took place in financial services. In the LLDCs, greenfield investments are more significant than cross-border MAs, covering a wider range of industries and business functions. While the largest projects were concen­trated in extractive industries (table II.14), a significant amount of investment also took place in manufac- turing, including in automotives, chemicals, elec- tronics, food and beverages, and textiles. Some large greenfield projects highlight the success of a number of LLDCs in attracting FDI, thereby en- hancing their productive capabilities and generating employment. For instance, Xinxiang Kuroda (China) invested $67 million in a project in the textiles indus- try in Ethiopia, creating about 1,100 jobs.50 Similarly, an Indian-funded project in the food industry, also in Ethiopia, is expected to create about 340 jobs. Though not yet reflected in FDI statistics, some projects announced in 2010 will be implemented in the years to come and drive up FDI inflows to countries such as Uganda. The performance of LLDCs in attracting FDI inflows varies widely (table A). For instance, Mongolia has demonstrated high performance in attracting FDI (up by 171 per cent to $1.7 billion in 2010), but inflows to the country have concentrated in mining industries. In contrast, a number of countries in different regions, such as Ethiopia (Africa), Paraguay (Latin America) and Uzbekistan (Central Asia), have received more diversified FDI inflows. For instance, Uzbekistan attracted greenfield FDI projects in a number of manufacturing industries in 2010, including the automotive industry, building materials, chemicals and consumer electronics (box II.4). Table II.13. The 10 largest cross-border MAs in LLDCs, 2010 Target company Country Acquiring company Home country Industry Value ($ million) Share (%) Zambia Telecommunications Co Ltd Zambia Libya Africa Investment Portfolio Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Telecommunications 257 75 Nam Theun 2 Power Co Ltd Lao PDR Investor Group Thailand Energy 110 15 TOO Mobile Telecom Service Kazakhstan Tele2 AB Sweden Telecommunications 77 51 Zimbabwe Alloys Chrome(Pvt)Ltd Zimbabwe Metmar Ltd South Africa Electrometallurgical products 51 40 Stopanska Banka AD Macedonia, TFYR National Bank of Greece SA Greece Banks 46 22 OAO Kyrgyztelekom Kyrgyzstan Investor Group Cyprus Telecommunications 40 78 Rwenzori Tea Investments Ltd Uganda McLeod Russel India Ltd India Food preparations, nec 30 100 Maamba Collieries Ltd Zambia Nava Bharat Ventures Ltd India Mining 26 65 AO Danabank Kazakhstan Punjab National Bank India Banks 24 64 Ovoot Coking Coal Project Mongolia Windy Knob Resources Ltd Australia Coal mining 8 100 Source: UNCTAD, cross border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
  • 105. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 81 Table II.14. The 10 largest greenfield projects in LLDCs, 2010 Investor or project Industry Host country Home country Investment ($ million) Rio Tinto Group Metals Paraguay United Kingdom 6 000 Tullow Oil Coal, oil and natural gas Uganda United Kingdom 5 000 Kenol-Kobil Group (KenolKobil) Coal, oil and natural gas Uganda Kenya 1 701 International Petroleum Investment Company Chemicals Uzbekistan United Arab Emirates 1 340 Albatros Energy Coal, oil and natural gas Uganda Mauritius 749 Lukoil Coal, oil and natural gas Kazakhstan Russian Federation 500 Move One Transportation Afghanistan United Arab Emirates 497 Globalstar Communications Botswana United States 470 Dimension Data Holdings (DiData) Communications Uganda South Africa 468 Vale (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce) Metals Zambia Brazil 400 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). Box II.4. Overcoming the disadvantages of being landlocked: experience of Uzbekistan in attracting FDI in manufacturing Uzbekistan is an LLDC with a GDP of $39 billion and GDP per capita of $1,400 in 2010. FDI to the country has increased since the mid-2000s as a result of a privatization programme.a In recent years, the country has attracted some large greenfield projects in manufacturing, with a number of them announced or implemented in 2010 (box table II.4.1). In the automotive components industry, for instance, Erae Cs Ltd (Republic of Korea) and Uztosanoat, a local company, established an international joint venture with a total investment of $13 million. The facility will supply 150,000 km of car cables per year to General Motors’ new plant in Uzbekistan, starting production in the second half of 2011.b In the petrochemicals industry, a $1.34 billion project is being funded from the United Arab Emirates, and a company from Singapore has signed a deal for a joint venture project for polyethylene production. These large projects illustrate the success of government policies in attracting FDI in manufacturing to Uzbekistan. A favourable investment climate and a sound framework of FDI legislation, which includes guarantees for foreign investors and certain preferences for them, have contributed to this success. It seems that institutional advantages can help LLDCs overcome their geographical disadvantages, and Uzbekistan provides an example in this regard. Source: UNCTAD. a For instance, the Government privatized more than 600 enterprises each year in 2006 and 2007, and foreign investors purchased 28 companies for $115 million in 2007 alone. b Currently, GM Uzbekistan produces seven models of automotive vehicles in the country. With a total investment of $136 million, the new plant will produce a compact sedan in late 2011. Box table II.4.1. Selected FDI projects in manufacturing in Uzbekistan, 2010 Investor or project Industry Home country Investment ($ million) International Petroleum Investment Company Chemicals United Arab Emirates 1 340 Omnivest Pharmaceuticals Hungary 100 Knauf Building materials Germany 50 EMG Ceramics and glass Iran, Islamic Republic of 24 CLAAS Industrial machinery Germany 20 Erae Cs Ltd Automotive components Korea, Republic of 13 LG Consumer electronics Korea, Republic of 9 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
  • 106. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development82 With intensified South–South economic cooperation and increasing capital flows from emerging markets, prospects for FDI inflows to the grouping of LLDCs are promising, for 2011 and beyond. Indeed, the total amount of investment of recorded greenfield projects jumped by over 40 per cent in the first four months of 2011, compared with the same period of 2010. b. Leveraging TNC participation in infrastructure development Infrastructure devel- opment is crucial for LLDCs to reduce high transaction (communi- cation and transporta- tion) costs, overcome geographic disadvan- tages and move onto a path of sustainable development and pov- erty reduction. To realize the objective of rapid infra- structure build-up, governments need to introduce specific infrastructure development strategies, making use of the private sector and leveraging the potential contribution of TNCs (WIR08). In a number of LLDCs, greenfield investment and other forms of TNC participation have contributed to infrastructure development, in particular in electricity, transport and telecommunications. During 2005-2010, 12 large infrastructure development projects of at least $100 million each with TNC participation were undertaken in seven LLDCs, namely Uganda (three projects), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (two projects), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (two projects) and Afghanistan (two projects), as well as Azerbaijan, Bhutan and Rwanda (one project each) (table II.15). TNCs have been involved in these infrastructure projects through different modalities, including various forms of PPPs, such as build-operate- transfer (BOT), build-own-operate (BOO), and concession (table II.15). TNCs are often attracted by the growth potential in host developing countries and regions, as well as by business opportunities triggered by new liberalization and deregulation initiatives. Furthermore, PPP arrangements have helped infrastructure TNCs mitigate risks and overcome difficulties in their operations abroad. In some cases, TNCs from different home countries have set up joint ventures for a project. In other cases, TNCs form joint ventures with local partners, such as in the TE–TO Skopje electricity generation project in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Aktau airport terminal project in Kazakhstan. TNC participation has helped mobilize significant amounts of capital for the development of infrastructure in LLDCs. The projects listed in table II.15 were associated with a total investment of $5.3 billion, and, sometimes, multilateral support was involved, as in the two largest electricity projects in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Uganda, respectively.51 A few LLDCs have been particularly successful in leveraging TNC participation to improve their infrastructure, which is badly needed to bring them on a track of fast and sustainable development. For instance, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Uganda have successfully implemented a number of large electricity generation and transmission projects with the involvement of TNCs from both developed and developing countries. The impact on financing and investment varies by industry. Table II.15 shows that TNCs’ contributions have been high in electricity generation and mobile telecommunications. Few projects were recorded in water and sanitation, which is in line with the general situation of TNC participation in infrastructure in the developing world (WIR08), but a number of large projects for extending transport networks and building transport utilities in LLDCs have brought in substantial financial resources. For example, in 2005, Rift Valley Railways, a consortium led by Sheltam (South Africa), won a 25-year concession to operate the combined Kenya and Uganda railway system. The company underwent several rounds of restructuring, but has devoted a significant amount of investment to upgrade the century-old transport system and increase the traffic volume. A systematic turnaround strategy was implemented to improve the services and a considerable reduction in rail- related accidents bolstered customers’ confidence. Under appropriate regulatory frameworks and proactive policies, TNCs can help develop badly needed infrastructure in LLDCs, including through various forms of public-private partnerships.
  • 107. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 83 At present the railway system handles less than 6 per cent of cargo passing through the Northern Corridor,52 and the Governments of Kenya and Uganda plan to build a new railway from the port of Mombasa.53 The example of the Maputo Corridor, in which TNCs are involved in the development of a transport network for facilitating trade and regional integration, provides useful lessons.54 In Asia, proactive national policies and regional integration efforts have brought benefits of infrastructure improvement and associated socio- economic development to LLDCs. For instance, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic has introduced a “land-linked” strategy in parallel with regional and subregional infrastructure development schemes, within the frameworks of ASEAN and the Greater Mekong Subregion.55 The ASEAN Highway Network Project has helped improve road transport in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.56 Construction of a high-speed railway system linking China and Singapore and passing through the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Malaysia will start in 2011. The project will bring a significant amount of foreign investment and advanced technology to related countries, and will play a particularly significant role in infrastructure Table II.15. Infrastructure development projects with TNC participation in LLDCs, with investment above $100 million, 2005−2010 Project Country Industry Segment Investment ($ million) TNCs involved Modality Year Nam Theun II Hydropower Project Lao PDR Energy Electricity generation 1250 Italian-Thai Development Public Company (Thailand), Electricite de France (France) BOT 2005 Bujagali Hydro Project Uganda Energy Electricity generation 799 Sithe Global Power (United States), Aga Khan Fund (Switzerland) BOT 2007 Nam Ngum 2 Hydro Power Plant Lao PDR Energy Electricity generation 760 Ch Karnchang Company Limited (Thailand), Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding Plc (Thailand) BOT 2006 Warid Telecom Uganda Limited Uganda Telecom- munications Various services 481 Abu Dhabi Group (United Arab Emirates), Essar Group (India) Greenfield 2007 Kenya-Uganda Railways Uganda Transport Railroads 404 Sheltam Rail Company (Pty) Ltd (South Africa), Trans Century Ltd. (Kenya) Concession 2006 Etisalat Afghanistan Afghanistan Telecom- munications Mobile access 340 Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat) (United Arab Emirates) Greenfield 2006 Azerfon Azerbaijan Telecom- munications Mobile access 300 Extel (United Kingdom), Siemens AG (Germany), Celex Communications (United Kingdom) Greenfield 2006 Skopje and Ohrid Airports Concession Macedonia, FYR Transport Airports 295 TAV Airports Holding Co. (Turkey) Concession 2008 TE-TO Skopje Macedonia, FYR Energy Electricity generation 233 Itera Holding Ltd. (Russian Federation), Toplifikacija (Macedonia, FYR), Sintez Group (Russian Federation) BOO 2007 Dagachhu Hydro Power Project Bhutan Energy Electricity generation 201 Tata Enterprises (India) BOO 2009 Areeba Afghanistan Afghanistan Telecom- munications Mobile access 133 MTN Group (South Africa) Greenfield 2005 Millicom Rwanda Rwanda Telecom- munications Mobile access 117 Millicom International (Luxembourg) Greenfield 2009 Source: UNCTAD, based on World Bank PPI database.
  • 108. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development84 development in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. The cases discussed above show that, in an enabling institutional environment (including a high-quality regulatory framework, an effective risk- mitigation system and proper investment promotion activities), TNCs can be engaged in various types of infrastructure development projects, and their involvement can help mobilize financial resources and increase investment levels in infrastructure industries in LLDCs. In particular, the development of region-wide transport infrastructure is a vital way for those countries to access regional markets and sea ports; and TNCs, particularly those from the South, can play an important role in this regard. Governments in LLDCs need to develop the capacity to assess the feasibility and suitability of different forms of infrastructure provision – whether public, private or through some forms of PPPs – as well as to identify the potential role of TNCs and to design the framework of specific projects. Capacity-building needs to be strengthened in this regard, and regional collaboration among developing countries should be encouraged.
  • 109. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 85 3. Small island developing States a. Recent trends Table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, by range,a 2010 Range Inflows Outflows Above $1 billion .. .. $500 to $999 million Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago .. $100 to $499 million Mauritius, Seychelles, Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Jamaica, Maldives, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Fiji, Cape Verde and Antigua and Barbuda Mauritius $50 to $99 million Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada and Barbados Jamaica $1 to $49 million Vanuatu, Dominica, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia, Comoros, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, São Tomé and Principe, Palau, Samoa and Tuvalu Seychelles, São Tomé and Principe, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Barbados and Vanuatu Below $1 million .. Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Cape Verde and Samoa a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows. Table B. FDI inflows and outflows, and cross-border MA sales and purchases, 2009–2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inflows FDI outflows Cross-border MA sales Cross-border MA purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Small island devel- oping states (SIDS) 4.3 4.2 - 0.2 - 9.7 0.4 0.2 Africa 0.7 0.9 - 0.1 - 0.2 0.2 - Latin America and the Caribbean 2.7 2.4 - 0.1 - 0.5 - 0.1 Asia 0.2 0.4 - - - - - - Oceania 0.7 0.5 - - - 9.0 0.2 0.1 Table C. FDI inward and outward stock, and income on inward and outward FDI, 2009-2010 (Billions of dollars) Region FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Income on inward FDI Income on outward FDI 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 Small island devel- oping states (SIDS) 56.6 60.6 3.4 3.6 2.0 2.0 0.5 0.5 Africa 4.8 5.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 - - Latin America and the Caribbean 46.2 48.3 2.4 2.5 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.5 Asia 0.8 1.2 - - - - - - Oceania 4.8 5.5 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.9 - - Table D. Cross-border MAs by industry, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Sector/industry Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 Total 31 9 735 393 161 Primary - 9 037 - - 11 Mining, quarrying and petroleum - 9 037 - - 11 Manufacturing - - - 95 Food, beverages and tobacco - - - 95 Chemicals and chemical products - - - - Metals and metal products - - - - Machinery and equipment - - - - Services 31 699 393 77 Electricity, gas and water - 82 6 - Trade - - - - Hotels and restaurants - 136 - - Transport, storage and communications - - - - 3 Finance 25 480 385 - 23 Business services - 1 2 3 Health and social services 5 - - - Other services - - - 100 Table E. Cross-border MAs by region/country, 2009–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/country Sales Purchases 2009 2010 2009 2010 World 31 9 735 393 161 Developed economies - 207 9 038 31 113 European Union 22 28 - 10 18 United States - 188 - 175 - 100 Australia 220 8 987 - - 4 Japan - 320 - 28 1 Developing economies 237 698 361 48 Africa - 300 - 6 - 88 Latin America and the Caribbean - 94 - 90 Asia 537 603 355 47 West Asia 320 - - - South, East and South-East Asia 217 603 355 47 China - 328 - 10 Hong Kong, China - - 63 172 - India 5 163 181 38 Malaysia 192 176 - - 1 South-East Europe and the CIS - - - - $billion 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Africa Latin America and the Caribbean Asia Oceania Figure B. FDI outflows, 2000–2010 Oceania Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Africa FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation $billion % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 Figure A. FDI inflows, 2000–2010
  • 110. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development86 FDI inflows to small island developing States (SIDS) dropped marginally by less than 1 per cent, to $4.2 billion in 2010 (table B and figure A), following a 47 per cent decline in 2009. The largest five recipients of FDI in this special grouping of structurally weak economies were Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago (both in the Caribbean), Mauritius, Seychelles (both in East Africa) and Timor-Leste (South-East Asia), with inflows ranging between $977 million and $280 million (table A). Geographically and culturally diverse, the 29 SIDS57 nevertheless share similar development challenges: small but rapidly growing populations, low availability of resources, remoteness, susceptibility to natural disasters, and a lack of economies of scale. They also face a number of difficulties in attracting FDI, such as the small size of their economies, a lack of human resources, and high transportation and communication costs. As a result, total inflows to these economies remain at a very low level, accounting for less than 1 per cent of total FDI inflows to the developing world in recent years. Despite a number of large cross-border MA deals in industries such as mining and hotels (table II.16), FDI flows to SIDS stagnated in 2010. The $9 billion acquisition of Lihir Gold by Newcrest Mining (Australia) was not reflected in FDI inflows to Papua New Guinea in 2010, as this transaction was between foreign investors, involving a change in foreign ownership only. However, other deals by firms from developing counties may drive inflows to the country to new highs in 2011. FDI inflows in SIDS have traditionally been concentrated in extractive industries and services, including hotels and tourism, financial services and real estate. In 2010, there were a number of greenfield investments in these industries (table II.17). The Maldives accounted for most of the large projects in hotels and tourism, as well as in other services, while Papua New Guinea hosted a major share of large mining projects. Noteworthy were two investments in manufacturing in Mauritius: one Table II.16. Selected large cross-border MAs in SIDS, 2010 Target company Country Acquiring company Home country Industry Value ($ million) Shares (%) Lihir Gold Ltd Papua New Guinea Newcrest Mining Ltd Australia Gold ore 9 018 100 Garden Plaza Capital SRL Barbados Fosun Intl Hldgs Ltd China Holding companies 328 100 CTP(PNG)Ltd Papua New Guinea Kulim(Malaysia)Bhd Malaysia Vegetable oil mills 175 80 Darius Holdings Ltd Mauritius Asian Hotels (North) Ltd India Hotels 136 53 Digicel Pacific Ltd Fiji Digicel Group Ltd Jamaica Telecommunications 132 100 Light Power Holdings Ltd Barbados Emera Inc Canada Investors 85 38 Source: UNCTAD, cross border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). Table II.17. The 10 largest greenfield projects in SIDS, 2010 Investor or project Industry Host country Home country Investment ($ million) Eni SpA (Eni) Coal, oil and natural gas Timor-Leste Italy 1 000 InterOil Coal, oil and natural gas Papua New Guinea Australia 550 Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering Coal, oil and natural gas Papua New Guinea Korea, Republic of 406 Pruksa Real Estate Real estate Maldives Thailand 373 Allied Gold Metals Solomon Islands Australia 217 Mubadala Development Hotels and tourism Maldives United Arab Emirates 170 Fairmont Raffles Hotels International Hotels and tourism Maldives Canada 170 Shangri-La Hotels and Resorts Hotels and tourism Maldives Hong Kong, China 165 Dubai Holding Hotels and tourism Maldives United Arab Emirates 160 Fairmont Raffles Hotels International Hotels and tourism Seychelles Canada 128 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
  • 111. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 87 undertaken by Pick n Pay (South Africa) in the food industry, and the other by Mango (Spain) in textiles. FDI inflows were still biased towards relatively large economies and tax havens. In 2010, 62 per cent of the grouping’s total FDI inflows targeted the top five recipients noted above (table A), and 38 per cent went into the tax havens;58 however the latter share might drop as TNCs move less funds to these economies in the future. In relative terms, a number of SIDS performed well in attracting FDI inflows, and resource-rich Papua New Guinea stands out as one of the winners, resulting from booming investment in its extractive industries (box II.5). Rising greenfield investments and cross-border MAs will drive up FDI inflows to SIDS in 2011. Total investment of recorded greenfield projects had jumped by 90 per cent in the first four months of 2011, compared with the same period of 2010. In the meantime, the value of cross-border MA purchases rose to over $200 million. Considering the high potential of capital flows from emerging economies, FDI inflows to SIDS seem likely to increase in the years to come. b. Roles of TNCs in climate change adaptation SIDS are perhaps the countries that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. A warming of the ocean surface and a rise in sea level around these island economies have been detected, and this is expected to continue (UNFCCC, 2007). The associated adverse impacts pose a serious danger to many aspects of economic development in SIDS.59 For instance, the tourist industry, which the economies of SIDS particularly depend on, will be strongly affected - the shift of tourism to higher altitudes and latitudes is expected to result in a significant drop in the tourist industry in such SIDS as the Maldives (Morin, 2006). To avoid the grave danger posed by climate change, aggressive mitigation action by the major green house gas (GHG) emitters is crucial, while SIDS themselves have an urgent need for adaptation activities.60 For this grouping of structurally vulnerable economies, the cost of inaction would be tremendous.61 The governments of SIDS are taking various initiatives to incorporate adaptation practices into their economic planning and investment activities. Key industries identified in this process are agriculture, tourism, public health and water infrastructure, while the actors involved range from individuals, governments, local communities and international organizations to the private sector and civil society (AOSIS and UNF, 2008). The SIDS have dedicated their own resources to this critical area, and are calling for action among the international community. The private sector is a crucial actor in the fight against the negative impacts of global warming in SIDS. In particular, TNCs can play an important role. First, the participation of and optimal use of TNCs’ resources is useful in filling the financial and technological gaps for climate change adaptation in SIDS. Considerable funds are needed to implement climate change adaptation activities (including improving land and water management and introducing new agricultural production technologies) and to enhance the countries’ adaptive capacities (including improving education, information and infrastructure). Various multilateral and bilateral sources of funding are available,62 but they are not of the magnitude needed (AOSIS and UNF, 2008). Evidence shows that TNCs can make a significant contribution through mobilizing resources and undertaking necessary investments, but lack of data prevents a systematic assessment of the extent of the financial and technological contributions of TNCs. Secondly, foreign affiliates have strengthened host countries’ adaptation efforts by undertaking their own adaptation activities as private sector participants, as well as indirectly through demonstration effects. In important industries such as tourism, which accounts for a large share of the economy of many SIDS,63 TNCs’ contribution in dealing with the economic challenges of climate change is considerable (box II.6). Thirdly, TNC involvement can enhance the adaptive capacities of host countries by improving infrastructure. To respond successfully to the risks of economic disruption, SIDS need infrastructure Highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, SIDS are looking to attract TNCs and FDI projects that can contribute to adaptation efforts.
  • 112. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development88 systems that are modern and resilient to climate change. There are many interdependencies between the infrastructure industries, all of which are important for adaptive capacities (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2011),64 but for most SIDS a resilient water industry (including water storage facilities, potable and waste water treatment plants, transmission lines, local distribution systems etc.) is a priority. A number of projects with TNC participation have contributed to infrastructure development in SIDS, helping to reduce the vulnerability of SIDS to natural disasters and the anticipated rise in sea level. For instance, Berlinwasser (Germany) invested in a water and sewerage project in Mauritius in 2008, raising standards and improving the efficiency and resilience of the water industry in the country.65 In the Maldives, Hitachi Plant Technologies Group (Japan) acquired a 20 per cent stake in a major water and sewage treatment company in 2010, and helped streamline and update operations by leveraging the company’s strengths and know-how.66 Some TNCs involved in infrastructure industries are also from developing countries, and sometimes they have cooperated with international organizations which provide multilateral support on climate change adaptation as well as related infrastructure development to SIDS.67 Effective climate change adaptation in SIDS is beyond the scope and capability of any single organization; it should involve partnerships among all relevant entities and stakeholders to achieve scale-up (AOSIS and UNF, 2008). With a proper institutional framework in place, TNCs can participate and play an important role. However, a number of barriers still exist to the private financing of adaptation practices in SIDS, including the lack of local capacities and resources, weak domestic markets and institutions, as well as the lack of interest by international investors. PPPs are needed to overcome these barriers and for a creative leveraging of foreign private resources; capacity-building of host country governments is the crucial first step. In this context, the importance of data collection cannot be overstated, which is fundamental to any further research in the area. Box II.5. Natural resource-seeking FDI in Papua New Guinea: old and new investors Papua New Guinea is a SIDS with substantial mineral reserves, including gold, copper and nickel, as well as oil and gas. Those natural resources have traditionally attracted significant investment from big companies based in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States; but in recent years, these companies have been joined by investors from emerging economies. Companies from developed countries are still the major investors in extractive industries in Papua New Guinea and have been trying to strengthen their positions. In the oil and gas industry, for instance, ExxonMobil and its joint venture partners have invested $14 billion in a liquefied natural gas project, starting from early 2010.a In metal mining, the “majors” from the developed world, such as BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Xstrata, are the main players in the country. Xstrata, the world’s largest copper producer, has invested over $2 billion in Frieda River, a copper mine in Sandaun and East Sepik Provinces in Papua New Guinea in recent years. Now, mining companies from developing countries, mainly large emerging economies, such as China and India, are investing in a big way. For example, following an agreement signed with the Government of Papua New Guinea in 2005, Metallurgical Construction Group (China) has made significant investments in the country’s mining industries, including through the Ramu nickel-cobalt project, in which the Chinese corporation holds 85 per cent of equity. The total investment in the project in 2009 was $1.4 billion.b Source: UNCTAD. a Elizabeth Fry, “Exxon LNG project arranges $14bn in financing”, Financial Times, 16 December 2009. b EMJ’s Annual Survey of Global Mining Investment, project survey 2010.
  • 113. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 89 Box II.6. TNCs and climate change adaptation in the tourism industry in SIDS The tourism industry is a key economic sector for SIDS in terms of income, employment and exports (box figure II.6.1), and is the major target of FDI inflows to these countries. The far-reaching consequences of climate change will affect the industry through increased infrastructure damage,a additional emergency preparedness requirements, higher operating expenses (e.g., insurance, back-up water and power systems, and evacuations), and business interruptions. Awareness of the need for climate-change mitigation measures is also changing the way that consumers think about tourism, all of which has significant implications for patterns of consumption and for the kinds of services that are desired or valued most. How to deal with these consequences has become a critical concern for SIDS such as Barbados and Dominica in the Caribbean, and Fiji and Vanuatu in Oceania. Foreign and domestic service providers (including hotel chains, tour operators, etc.) are active participants in sector- specific adaption plans for tourism in some SIDS. For example, a project of adaptation to “extreme temperatures and risk of tropical storms” was undertaken by the Caribbean Tourism Organization, the governments of several Carib- bean islands, as well as companies in the accommodation industry. Another project of “water impact and adapta- tion” was conducted by individual accommodation providers and tour operators in Fiji (Becken, 2005). The country receives the highest number of tourists in Oceania, and its major hotels are managed by global TNCs such as Accor, Intercontinental, Radisson, Sheraton, Warwick etc.b In this and other cases, a range of technological, managerial and behavioural adaptation measures have been utilized by foreign affiliates to deal with climate change impacts. Foreign affiliates can also play an indirect role in this regard. UNCTAD research in a number of developing countries found that foreign hotels were typically relatively early adopters of “green” technologies and approaches compared to local hotels and appeared to be able to recover from natural disasters more rapidly (UNCTAD, 2007). For instance, all four of Accor’s hotels in Fiji have reached benchmark status for achieving the Green Global certification. c A wide range of methodologies and decision tools exist to guide adaptation practices,d but none have been specifically applied to the tourism industry (UNWTO, UNEP and WMO, 2008). Therefore, in addition to raising the awareness of adaptation among domestic tourism operators, the adaptation activities conducted by foreign affiliates become important sources of possible “best practice” examples for local firms to learn from and imitate. Source: UNCTAD. a For instance, in Barbados: 70 per cent of the island’s hotels are located within 250 metres of the high water mark and are at a high risk of major structural damage. b Lengefeld, Klaus, “Sustainable tourism and climate change in the Pacific island region”, GTZ Sector Project, 2011. c Green Globe is an international environmental accreditation organization for travel and tourism operators. d These include the UNFCCC’s Compendium of Decision Tools to Evaluate Strategies for Adaptation to Climate Change, as well as those developed by organizations such as UNDP Adaptation Policy Framework, United States Country Studies Program and United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Antigua Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Dominicaa Fijia Jamaica Maldives Mauritius Seychellesa Vanuatua Exports GDP Employment Source: UNTCAD. a Share in total employment is estimated. Box figure II.6.1. Share of the hotel and tourism industry in total exports, GDP and employment, selected SIDS, 2007 or latest available year (Per cent)
  • 114. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development90 Notes 1 Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) is aimed at reforming the legal and fiscal arrangements governing the oil industry. It has yet to be passed. Operating companies are concerned about maintaining their tax exemptions. The proposed bill would also require existing joint ventures to become incorporated with the restructured State-owned oil company, impose separate licences for oil and gas, preferential tax treatment for gas, relinquishment of licences for inactive fields and further reallocation of marginal fields to indigenous operators, enhanced environmental reporting, and higher local content mandates especially for professional and managerial staff. “Nigeria: Petroleum Industry Bill – of Senate warning and public agitation”, AllAfrica.com, 14 March 2011; Revenue Watch Institute (no date), “The Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill: key upstream questions for the National Assembly”, www.revenuewatch.org. 2 “Bharti sets USD1bn African budget in 2011”, TeleGeography, 25 May 2011. www.telegeography. com. 3 Hasan International (Hong Kong, China) invested an estimated $4 billion in metals in Ghana in 2011. 4 Is Zambia Africa's next breadbasket?, Mail and Guardian Online, 1 October 2010 (www.mg.co.za); The great trek north, BNet, July 2004 (www.findarticles. com). 5 “Coleus Crowns: past, present and future”, Madhvani Group Magazine, 18(1): 25, June 2010. 6 Members include Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 7 EAC member countries are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. 8 The Daily News Egypt, Member States push for infrastructure investment at COMESA, 13 April 2010 (www.trademarksa.org). 9 In 2010, for example, Viet Nam surpassed China to become the largest production face for Nike (United States). In 2011, Coach (United States) is planning to shift half of its production activities out of China to neighbouring Asian countries, due to rising labour costs. 10 Harsh Joshi, “Foreign capital shuns India”, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2011. 11 The decline in FDI outflows from India was due to the depressed level of equity investment by Indian companies. By component, of FDI outflows from India: reinvested earnings remained at the same level of 2009 ($1.1 billion); other capital flows (mainly intra-company loans) increased by 99 per cent in 2010, while equity investments dropped by 40 per cent. 12 It is difficult to estimate the share of extractive industries in the region’s total FDI stock due to lack of data at the country level, but it might be around 15 per cent, which is well above the global average of less than 10 per cent (Web table 24 – www.unctad.org/wir). 13 Source: International Energy Agency. 14 Sylvia Pfeifer, “Chinese demand for energy pumps up MA share”, Financial Times, 7 November 2010. 15 See e.g. “The Chinese are coming … to Africa”, The Economist, 22 April 2011. 16 Attractive mineral resources are, for instance, copper (in Chile and Peru), iron ore (in Brazil) and oil and gas (in Ecuador and Venezuela). 17 Source: company website (www.foxconn.com.cn). 18 Adam Goldberg and Joshua Galper, “Where Huawei went wrong in America”, Wall Street Journal, 3 March 2011. 19 Source: International Business Times (www.ibtimes. com). 20 As the target company runs 400 hotels in 25 countries, mainly in Europe, the deal has helped HNA realize its plan of European market expansion. 21 There was a $3.8 billion acquisition of Turkiye Garanti Bankasi by the Spanish Bank BBVA in March 2011. 22 “Arab unrest takes toll on foreign investment”, Financial Times, 30 March 2011. 23 QIA’s cross-border purchases have included investments in the London Stock Exchange, Credit Suisse, Barclays Bank, Volkswagen, the French electrical engineering group Cegelec, the French media and aerospace group Lagardère, Singapore’s Raffles Medical Group, the grocery stores Sainsbury (United Kingdom), the Industrial Commercial Bank of China, the German construction firm Hochtief, and the Brazilian affiliate of Banco Santander. 24 “Qatar Holding acquires 9.1 per cent stake in German industrial giant Hochtief”, Gulfnews.com, 7 December 2010, http://gulfnews.com. 25 The acquisition was through the swap of a 100 per cent share of the French electrical engineering group Cegelec (wholly owned by QIA) for an 8 per cent share of Vinci (Vinci Press release, 31 August 2009, www.vinci.com). 26 Mubadala, Annual Report 2009, Abu Dhabi, Mubadala website http://mubadala.ae. 27 They were the source of 99 per cent of the value of the region's cross-border MA sales to developing countries in 2001–2010, and 99 per cent of greenfield FDI projects by TNCs from developing countries in 2003–2010. Source: UNCTAD, based on UNCTAD cross-border MA database and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDI markets (www.fDImarkets. com). 28 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDI Markets (www.fDImarkets. com).
  • 115. CHAPTER II Regional Investment Trends 91 29 Shree Renuka Sugars (India) bought out stakes in two Brazilian sugar and ethanol production companies for a total amount of $492 million: 50.34 per cent of Equipav AA, and 100 per cent of Vale Do Ivai. 30 For example, in 2010, three commodities – iron ore, soya and crude oil – made up 84 per cent of Brazilian exports to China in 2010, while its imports from China were dominated almost entirely by manufactured goods (98 per cent). Source: Latin American Economy and Business, April 2011. See also the Economist Intelligence Unit, “Brazil/China economy: rebalancing the relationship”, Viewswire, 13 April 2011, and “Chinese investment in Brazil soars”, Financial Times, 31 January 2011. 31 Georgia is listed under CIS, although it formally ceased to be a member in 2009. 32 “Foreign banks are fleeing Russia”, Bloomberg Business Week, 3 March 2011. 33 See endnote 1 in Chapter I for this State support. 34 A government fund is to be set up in the Russian Federation to attract foreign investment and help modernize the economy, sharing risks with foreign investors in projects designed to help modernize the country. “Russia plans $10 billion investment in fund”, Wall Street Journal, 22 March 2011. 35 Examples include the acqusitions of OAO Udmurneft (Russia Federation) and OAO MangistauMunaiGaz (Kazakhstan) by two Chinese TNCs for $3.6 trillion and $2.6 trillion, respectively. 36 Its members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan are observer States, and Belarus and Sri Lanka dialogue partners. 37 Examples include the “Sino-Russian Beijing declaration”, guiding the two countries’ strategic partnership, and “Russian Federation-India declaration on strategic partnership”, signed in 2000. 38 For example, Tencent, the Chinese company that runs the country’s largest social networking and instant messaging service, is seeking to extend its business model overseas, initially through a 10 per cent stake in one of Russia’s leading internet companies, Digital Sky Technologies. Yin et al., 2011. 39 Repatriated earnings by United States TNCs rose from $99 billion in 2009 to $104 billion in 2010, whereas reinvested earnings rose from $219 billion to $296 billion. 40 This hostile bid received wide media coverage, e.g. “Smooth sailing in rough seas for merger arbitrageurs”, FT.com, 6 December 2010. 41 Examples of bail-outs by rival banks include the $9 billion investment in Morgan Stanley by Mitsubishi UFJ Financial, for 21 per cent of the equity. Though not in the period under study, the most well-known bail-out was that of Merrill Lynch in December 2007, which with additional investments in 2008 amounted to about $6 billion in total. 42 The calculations are based on the Thomson Reuters MA data base and media reports. 43 Examples include the sale of equity in UBS by the Government of Switzerland in 2009 and the sale of equity in Citigroup by the Government of the United States over the course of 2010. 44 The State bail-out left the Government owning 84 per cent of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group and 43 per cent of the Lloyds Banking Group. 45 “Too late for an ‘unbundling’ of Lloyds-HBSO”, Financial Times, 7 April 2011. 46 “Santander buys RBS branches, UK spin-off seen”, Reuters, 4 August 2010. 47 “RBS agrees to sell 80.01 per cent interest in Global Merchant Services to a consortium of Advent International and Bain Capital”, Press Release of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, 6 August 2010. 48 Some efforts, such as UNCTAD’s Business Linkages programme, have proved useful, as exemplified by the projects undertaken in four LDCs: Mozambique, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia, in 2008–2010. 49 The countries of this grouping include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Sixteen of the 31 LLDCs are classified as LDCs, and 9 are economies in transition. 50 China’s Xinxiang Kuroda Mingliang Leather Co. opened a $67 million leather factory in Ethiopia on 24 November 2010. The company financed 55 per cent of the project, with the remainder coming from the China- Africa Development Fund (Source: Bloomberg). 51 In the Nam Theun II Hydropower Project in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, multilateral supports were from IDA (Guarantee/$42 million/2005), IDA (Loan/$20 million/2005), MIGA (Guarantee/$91 million/2005), ADB (Guarantee/$50 million/2005), EIB (Loan/$55 million/2005), ADB (Loan/$70 million/2005), and others (Loan/$131 million/2005). In the Bujagali Hydro Project in Uganda, multilateral supports were from IFC (Loan/$130 million/2007), IDA (Guarantee/$115 million/2007), ADB (Loan/$110 million/2007), EIB (Loan/$130 million/2007), and MIGA (Guarantee/$115 million/2007) (Source: World Bank). 52 The Northern Corridor links Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan Uganda, and United Republic of Tanzania. 53 Source: Reuters.
  • 116. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development92 54 South Africa, Mozambique and other countries in Southern Africa have promoted the establishment of the Maputo Corridor with substantial public and private (including foreign) investment. The corridor is intended to stimulate sustainable growth and development in the area. 55 The Greater Mekong Subregion comprises Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Yunnan Province in China. 56 Launched in 1999, the ASEAN Highway Network Project aims to upgrade all designated national routes to Class I standards by 2020. The network consists of 23 designated routes totalling 38,400 km. 57 The countries of this group include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 58 According to the OECD, the following SIDS are tax havens: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, and Vanuatu. 59 The advserse impacts of global warming on SIDS include: increases in extreme weather events, rises in sea level, reductions in water resources, diminished marine resources, displacement of local species, and increased hazards to human health (Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and United Nations Foundation (UNF), 2008; Kelman and West, 2009). 60 In the context of climate change, mitigation refers to human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels more efficiently for industrial processes and electricity generation, switching to solar energy or wind power, improving the insulation of buildings, and expanding forests and other “sinks” to remove greater amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Adaptation refers to the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities (Source: UNFCCC). 61 In the absence of adaptation efforts, the annual costs of climate change impacts in exposed developing countries in general and SIDS in particular are expected to range from several per cent to tens of per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2006). 62 These sources of funding for adaptation available for SIDS include, for instance, the GEF Trust Fund, the Special Climate Change Trust Fund and the Least Developed Countries Trust Fund (administrated by the UN Global Environment Facility), the Adaptation Fund (administrated by the AF Board under the authority and guidance of CMP), and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 63 In the Caribbean, the industry accounts for 15 per cent of GDP, 13 per cent of employment, and 15 per cent of total exports; in Oceania the shares are 12 per cent, 12 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively (Nurse, 2009). 64 The interdependencies in many cases are quite straightforward: energy directly affects all other industries which require power to function; workers in all industries rely on transport to get to work, and can only work if water supplies are maintained; all other industries are reliant on a supply of electricity for energy and on the ICT for communication (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2011). 65 Source: World Bank PPI database. 66 The company operates water supply and sewerage systems on seven islands, including the island of Malé, where the capital is. Its services are used by 40 per cent of the population of the Maldives (source: hitachi- pt.com). 67 For example, Digicel (incorporated in Bermuda) has been actively investing in telecommunications in countries such as the Maldives (together with IFC) and Papua New Guinea (together with the Asian Development Bank). An energy and water project with the involvement of the Asian Development Bank has contributed to infrastructure in the Maldives, improving the country’s adaptive capability.
  • 117. Investment liberalization and promotion remained the dominant element of recent investment policies. Nevertheless, the risk of investment protectionism has increased as restrictive investment measures and administrative procedures have accumulated over recent years. The regime of international investment agreements (IIAs) is at a crossroads. With close to 6,100 treaties, many ongoing negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, it has come close to a point where it is too big and complex to handle for governments and investors alike, yet remains inadequate to cover all possible bilateral investment relationships (which would require a further 14,000 bilateral treaties). The policy discourse about the future orientation of the IIA regime and its development impact is intensifying. FDI policies interact increasingly with industrial policies, nationally and internationally. The challenge is to manage this interaction so that the two policies work together for development. Striking a balance between building stronger domestic productive capacity on the one hand and avoiding investment and trade protectionism on the other is key, as is enhancing international coordination and cooperation. The investment policy landscape is influenced more and more by a myriad of voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards. Governments can maximize development benefits deriving from these standards through appropriate policies, such as harmonizing corporate reporting regulations, providing capacity-building programmes, and integrating CSR standards into international investment regimes. CHAPTER III RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
  • 118. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development94 A. NATIONAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS In 2010, at least 74 countries around the globe adopted upwards of 149 policy measures affecting foreign investment (table III.1). Of these measures, 101 related to investment liberalization, promotion and facilitation, while 48 introduced new restrictions or regulations relevant to FDI. Compared to 2009, the percentage of more restrictive policy measures increased only slightly, from approximately 30 per cent to 32 per cent. Table III.1. National regulatory changes, 2000–2010 (Number of measures) Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Number of countries that introduced changes 70 71 72 82 103 92 91 58 54 50 74 Number of regulatory changes 150 207 246 242 270 203 177 98 106 102 149 Liberalization/promotion 147 193 234 218 234 162 142 74 83 71 101 Regulations/restrictions  3 14 12 24 36 41 35 24 23 31 48 Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database. Figure III.1. National Regulatory Changes, 2000–2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database. 0 20 40 60 80 100 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Liberalization/promotion Regulations/restrictions 98% 2% 68% 32% This maintains the long-term trend of investment policy becoming increasingly restrictive, rather than liberalizing (figure III.1). Overall, the percentage of investment liberalization and promotion measures was slightly higher in developing countries and transition economies than in developed countries. A closer look at the type of policy measures adopted reveals that most related to operational conditions for TNCs, followed by measures affecting the entry and establishment phase, and promotion and facilitation measures (table III.2). Overall, measures aimed at improving investment conditions continued to outnumber measures introducing new restrictions or regulations, but the margin is diminishing. The numerical difference was particularly large with regard to the entry and establishment category. As regards the geographical distribution (table III.2), developing countries were especially active in revising investment policy. Asian countries (including West Asia) were the most active (56 Investment liberalization and promotion have continued to figure prominently on the policy agendas of many countries. At the same time, the trend of recent years to- wards increased investment regulation has persisted. measures), followed by Africa (29) and Latin America (25). Asia stands out, with a total of 46 out of 56 measures being more favourable to FDI. Measures from West Asia, for instance, were mainly in the area of liberalization of entry conditions, whereas for South, East and South-East Asia, promotion and facilitation also played an important role. In Africa, governments focused particularly on new promotion and facilitation measures to foster a more favourable investment climate. Due principally to developments in a small number of Latin American countries, this region stands out for the number of policy measures that were less favourable to FDI. These measures involved the strengthening of State control (up to and including nationalization) over natural resources- based industries, including both agribusiness and extractive industries. For developed countries the number of more favourable and less favourable entry measures was equal, while in transition economies these measures mainly related to the introduction of new privatization schemes.
  • 119. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 95 Table III.2. National regulatory changes in 2010, by type of measure and regiona (Number of measures) Entry and establishmentb Operationc Promotion and facilitationdMore favourable to FDI Less favourable to FDI More favourable to FDI Less favourable to FDI Total 40 16 34 33 35 Developed countries 6 6 10 6 4 Developing economies 30 10 19 24 27 Africa 4 2 8 4 11 South, East and South-East Asia 12 5 5 5 12 West Asia 10 0 4 0 3 Latin America and the Caribbean 4 3 2 15 1 South-East Europe and the CIS 4 0 5 3 4 Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database. a Since some of the measures can be classified under more than one type, overall totals differ from table III.1. b Entry measures and establishment: measures related to ownership and control or approval and admission conditions for (both inward and outward) FDI and other measures affecting the entry or establishment of TNCs. c Operation: measures related to non-discrimination, nationalization or expropriation, capital transfer, dispute settlement, performance requirements, corporate tax rates and other measures affecting the operating conditions for TNCs. d Promotion and facilitation: measures related to fiscal and financial incentives, procedural measures related to approval and admission, or investment facilitation and other institutional support. Approximately half of the investment policy measures taken in 2010 related to one or more specific industries. Many different industries were involved, some more than others (in particular, extractive industries and financial services). For most industries, measures in the area of liberalization or promotion of FDI dominated those of a restrictive nature (table III.3). The main exceptions to this were the extractive industries and to a lesser extent agribusiness. These industries were responsible for a large share of the restrictive measures in 2010, including measures such as the introduction of performance requirements and new tax regimes, and the renegotiation of contracts. 1. Investment liberalization and promotion Of the 40 new investment liberalization measures implemented in 2010, 25 were specifically taken to liberalize foreign investment, and 15 were of a more general nature improving the overall policy framework for FDI. These measures were most pronounced in Asia and related to a broad range of industries (table III.2 and box III.1). Of the 34 measures improving operational conditions for At least 56 countries adopted new investment liberalization or promotion measures in various indus- tries. The number of these measures increased from 71 in 2009 to 101 in 2010. TNCs, most relate to the lowering of corporate tax rates. Most of the measures to promote or facilitate foreign investment were taken by countries in Africa and Asia (table III.2). A few categories of facilitation and promotion measures stand out as having been frequently used. These include the streamlining of admission procedures and the opening of new – or the expansion of existing – special economic zones (box III.2). From a practical point of view, facilitation measures can often be more important for investors than a formal easing of investment restrictions. Informal Table III.3. National regulatory changes in 2010, by industry (Per cent) Liberalization/ promotion Regulations/ restrictions Total 67 33 No specific industry 84 16 Agribusiness 38 62 Extractive industries 7 93 Manufacturing 50 50 Electricity, gas and water 75 25 Financial services 59 41 Other services 61 39 Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database.
  • 120. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development96 Box III.1. Examples of investment liberalization measures in 2010/2011 • Bhutan released its “FDI policy 2010”, according to which all activities not included in a “negative list” shall be open to FDI. It allowed 100 per cent foreign ownership in certain activities such as education, specialized health services, luxury hotels and resorts, and infrastructure facilities within the services sector.a • Canada removed foreign ownership restrictions regarding international submarine cables, earth stations that provide telecommunications services by means of satellites, and satellites.b • Guatemala passed a new insurance law that allows foreign insurance companies to establish branches.c • India issued a new consolidated FDI policy, which facilitates the expansion of established foreign owned enter- prises, allows the conversion of non-cash items into equity (with approval from the government) and permits FDI in certain agricultural activities.d • Indonesia has partially liberalized construction services, film and health services, as well as parts of electricity generation. e • Syrian Arab Republic issued a legislation that permits the private sector (both foreign and domestic) to invest in the generation and distribution of electricity.f • Taiwan Province of China partially liberalized outward investment to China with regard to a number of activities related to agriculture, manufacturing, services, and infrastructure.g It also announced the opening of a large part of its core hi-tech business, including semiconductor manufacturing, to investors from mainland China.h • Turkey adopted a law permitting foreign investors to hold up to 50 per cent of the shares in up to two broad- casting companies. i Source: UNCTAD. a Ministry of Economic Affairs, 21 May 2010. b Canada Telecommunications Act amended 12 July 2010, Art. 16 (5). c Decree No. 25-2010, published in the Official Gazette No. 3, 13 August 2010. d Consolidated FDI Policy Circular No.1, 1 April 2011. e Presidential Regulation No. 36, 2010. f Law No. 32, 14 November 2010. g Council for Economic Planning and Development, “Restrictions loosened on investment in China”, 9 April 2010. h Investment Commission, “The second phase of opening up the mainland investment in Taiwan Industry Project”, 2 March 2011. i Law No. 6112, 3 March 2011. barriers are regularly cited as major investment hurdles in developing countries. Removing such bottlenecks is also politically less sensitive than investment liberalization. Moreover, the smaller the differences between countries in their formal openness to FDI, the greater the importance of “soft” investment conditions, like a welcoming, competent and efficient administration. Investment promotion measures have also been taken in the context of industrial policy (section D). Several countries have taken steps to encourage FDI in specific economic activities, such as hi- tech industries or car manufacturing. Promotion measures included fiscal and financial incentives, and the establishment of special economic zones. 2. Investment regulations and restrictions Notwithstanding the continuing predominance of investment liberalization and promotion, numerous countries have adopted measures to strengthen the regulatory framework for investment, both domestic and foreign. The number of measures restricting or regulating FDI increased from 31 in 2009 to 48 in 2010. This has been the case The rebalancing of investor rights and obliga- tions continued, with a particular focus on the financial sector. Several countries increased the role of the State in natural resources based industries, such as agribusiness and extractive industries.
  • 121. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 97 Box III.2. Examples of investment promotion measures in 2010/2011 • Bosnia and Herzegovina amended its Law on Foreign Direct Investment Policy, simplifying the registration pro- cess for foreign investment.a • Fiji adopted a one-stop shop policy to enhance processes relating to foreign and local investment applications in the country.b • In the Republic of Korea, the Government is offering an improved package of incentives to attract foreign inves- tors into special economic zones. The Government also extended FDI zones for the services sector.c • Myanmar passed a “Special Economic Zone Law”, which provides incentives for foreign investors in banking and insurance.d • The Philippines launched its Public–Private Partnership Centre to facilitate the coordination and monitoring of the PPP programmes and projects.e • The Russian Federation created a new special economic zone in the Samar Region with a view to attracting investors particularly in the car-making and related industries.f The country also introduced simplified rules for employing highly qualified foreign specialists.g Source: UNCTAD. a Law on the Policy on Foreign Direct Investment, Official Gazette No. 48/10. b Fiji Government Online Portal, “Cabinet approves one stop shop”, 18 January 2011. c Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “Free Economic Zone Promotion Plan”, 1 September 2010; Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “Modification of the Enforcement Decree on the FDI Act”, 5 October 2010. d Special Economic Zone Law No. 8/2011, Official Gazette of the Government of Myanmar, 27 January 2011. e Official Gazette, “PPP center launches 5 PPP projects”, 4 March 2011. f Government Resolution No. 621, 12 August 2010. g Federal Law No. 86-FZ, 19 May 2010. particularly in the financial sector, where several countries tightened existing rules in order to prevent future financial crises. Most of these measures have been taken by G-20 countries, and other members of the Basel Accord. In general, these new financial regulations focus on an increase in bank capital and liquidity requirements, reducing the existing risks in connection with financial institutions that are “too big to fail”, and reinforcing oversight.1 Different opinions exist as to the impact of the new regulations on FDI in the financial sector. Concerns have been expressed about the potential negative impact of the new regulations on existing investments, but regulators argue that the beneficial impact on the macro economy should more than offset the transitional adjustment costs.2 More State intervention also became apparent in the natural resources based industry. A number of countries, in particular in Latin America, pursued nationalization policies, with foreign investors being one target. Some nationalizations occurred also in other industries, including financial services. Likewise, a move towards stricter regulations manifested itself in new operational conditions for foreign investors, such as local content requirements. Once again, the extractive industry was particularly affected (box III.3). Compared to the quantity of nationalizations and new operating conditions for investment, new FDI entry and establishment restrictions have been less common (table III.2). In large part, these measures have related to screening and approval regulations (box III.4). No clear pattern emerged according to which certain industries would be specifically liable to new entry restrictions. The latter vary between countries due to individual political sensitivities. A few foreign investments have been rejected on national interest grounds. The reported nationalizations and sector-specific entry restrictions are part of broader developments in industrial policy, characterized by an extension of protective measures to national champions and strategic industries and by the intrusion of national security concepts into industrial policy
  • 122. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development98 Box III.3. Examples of new regulatory measures affecting established foreign investors in 2010/2011 • In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Government nationalized, among others, the country’s pension system.a • Ecuador passed a new hydrocarbons law. It requires private oil companies to renegotiate their contracts from a production-sharing to a service arrangement.b The Government started to take over the oil fields of the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras after renegotiation of its licence failed.c • Kazakhstan adopted a Law on State-Owned Property, which regulates the nationalization of private property in cases of threats to national security.d • The Kyrgyz Republic nationalized one of the country’s largest banks, the foreign-controlled AsiaUniversalBank.e • The Russian Federation tightened the rules for foreign automobile producers with assembly plants in Russia. In order for such producers to continue to enjoy duty-free importation of components, they will have to signifi- cantly increase the overall volume of production in Russia and achieve a higher level of locally produced parts.f • In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, nationalizations affected various industries, including in the area of agriculture and power generation.g • Zimbabwe set out the requirements for the implementation of the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act and its supporting regulations as they pertain to the mining sector. This 2007 Act made provision for the indigenization of up to 51 per cent of all foreign-owned businesses operating in Zimbabwe.h Source: UNCTAD. a Law No.65, 10 December 2010. b Ley Reformatoria a la Ley de Hidrocarburos y a la Ley de Regimen Tributario Interno, 24 June 2010. c Government press release, 23 November 2010. d Law on State Property, No. 413-IV, of 1 March 2011. e Decree No.56, 7 June 2010. f Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Finance, Joint Order No.678/1289/184H, 24 December 2010. g Decree No. 7.394, 27 April 2010; Decree No. 7.700, 4 October 2010; Decree No. 7.713, 10 October 2010; Decree No. 7.751, 26 October 2010. h General Notice 114, 25 March 2011. considerations. Together, this raises important questions on how to safeguard adequate policy space for countries to adopt FDI restrictions that they consider necessary, while at the same time avoiding such policies degenerating into investment protectionism (section D). Although still a minority, overall the number of restrictive investment regulations and administrative practices has accumulated to a significant degree over the past few years. Together with their continued upward trend, as well as stricter review procedures for FDI entry, this poses the risk of potential investment protectionism. 3. Economic stimulus packages and State aid More than two and a half years after the outbreak of the financial crisis, some countries continue to hold considerable assets following bail-out operations, have substantial outstanding loans to individual firms, or continue emergency support schemes for the financial and non-financial sectors.3 However, in the financial sector, many countries have ceased to accept applications from financial firms to public assistance schemes. The phasing out of some of these schemes had already started in late 2009, and continued in 2010. Part of this process is due to the expiry of support schemes in the European Union, which included sunset clauses set by the European Commission. The closure of aid schemes also reflects an uneven but often low demand by businesses for this aid, which has been further weakened by the gradual tightening of the conditions of State support by governments (EC, 2011). With the closure of support schemes to new entrants, the main outstanding issue relates to the unwinding of assets and liabilities that remain on government books as a legacy of the emergency The unwinding of support schemes and liabilities resulting from emergency measures has started. So far this process has not overtly discriminated against foreign investors.
  • 123. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 99 measures. So far, this process has advanced relatively slowly, and less than a fifth of the financial firms that received crisis-related support have repaid loans fully, repurchased equity or relinquished public guarantees. In the non-financial sectors, legacy assets and liabilities are much lower, but the number of companies that benefited from crisis-related government support is much greater. The unwinding of emergency aid to the non-financial sector has also started. For instance, in the automotive industry – one of the main industries at which aid was targeted – companies in Canada, France and the United States have partly repaid loans, and some of the government equity holdings in the companies have been acquired by private investors. In all, in April 2011, governments are estimated to hold legacy assets and liabilities in financial and non-financial firms valued at over $2 trillion. By far the largest share relates to several hundred firms in the financial sector. This indicates a potential wave of privatizations in years to come. Box III.4. Examples of entry restrictions for foreign investors in 2010/2011 • Australia rejected Singapore Exchange’s US$8.3 billion offer to take over Australian Securities Exchange, which it concluded was not in Australia’s national interest.a • Brazil reinstated restrictions on rural land-ownership for foreigners by modifying the way a law dating back to 1971 is to be interpreted. The reinterpreted law establishes that, on rural land-ownership, Brazilian companies which are majority owned by foreigners are subject to the legal regime applicable to foreign companies.b • The Minister of Industry of Canada announced the blocking of the Australian mining company “BHP Billiton’s” US$39 billion takeover of Potash Corp. (a Canadian fertilizer and mining company).c Source: UNCTAD. a Australian Treasury, Foreign Investment Decision, 8 April 2011. b New Interpretation of Law No. 5.709/71, Parecer CGU/AGU No. 01/2008, 23 August 2010. c Ministry of Industry Press Release , 3 November 2010.Catas dolor sint facia niatur rerendi dit intur sinventendae vel eostis Since 2009, following a request by G-20 leaders, UNCTAD, the WTO and OECD have monitored trade- and investment-related policy responses to the financial crisis. One of the main objectives is to scrutinize whether and to what extent countries resorted to trade or investment protectionism, as they grappled with the crisis. The five reports published so far by the three international organizations conclude that for the most part, emergency measures as well as unwinding of assets and liabilities did not overtly discriminate against foreign investors (WIR10; OECD-UNCTAD, 2010a, b and 2011; WTO-OECD-UNCTAD, 2009 and 2010). For instance, the United States has sold its holdings in financial institutions and an automotive company through auctions executed by private banks and parts of the assets were sold to foreign competitors.4 Furthermore, a study by the European Commission shows that several EU member States, including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, considered that emergency schemes for the non-financial sectors implemented in other countries did not harm their companies.5
  • 124. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development100 B. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 1. Developments in 2010 In 2010, a total of 178 new IIAs were concluded (54 bilateral investment treaties (BITs),6 113 double taxation treaties (DTTs)7 and 11 IIAs other than BITs and DTTs (“other IIAs”).8 As a result, at the end of 2010 the IIA universe contained 6,092 agreements, including 2,807 BITs, 2,976 DTTs and 309 “other IIAs” (figure III.2). The trend seen in 2010 of rapid treaty expansion – with more than three treaties concluded every week – is expected to continue in 2011, the first five months of which saw the conclusion of 48 new IIAs (23 BITs, 20 DTTs and five “other IIAs”) and more than 100 free trade agreements (FTAs) and other economic agreements with investment provisions currently under negotiation. At the same time, it remains to be seen how the shift of responsibility for FDI from EU member States to the European level will affect the IIA regime (with EU member States being parties to more than 1,300 BITs with third countries) (box III.5). In terms of total numbers of IIAs, as of May 2011, the United Kingdom is party to 320 IIAs, followed by Germany (304) and France (297). Amongst the developing countries, China tops the list, with 249 IIAs, followed by the Republic of Korea (190) and Turkey (183). The Russian Federation (141) and Croatia (118) rank first among the transition economies. Twenty of the 54 BITs signed in 2010 were between developing countries and/or transition economies, as were four of the 11 other IIAs, a trend possibly related to developing countries’ growing role as outward investors. With respect to “other IIAs”, treaties concluded in 2010 continue to fall into the three categories: IIAs including obligations commonly found in BITs (three treaties in 2010);9 agreements with limited investment-related provisions (five treaties);10 and IIAs focusing on investment cooperation (three treaties).11 Countries continue to conclude IIAs, sometimes with novel provisions aimed at rebalancing the rights and obligations between States and investors and ensuring coherence between IIAs and other public policies. At the same time, the policy discourse about international investment policymaking intensifies at both domestic and international levels, amounting to a period of reflection on the future orientation of the IIA regime to make it work better for sustainable development. Nationally, different investment stakeholders have started to voice their concerns about the costs and As the IIA universe continues to expand, the policy discourse about how to enhance IIAs’ con- tribution to sustainable development is intensify- ing, at both the national and international levels. Figure III.2. Trends of BITs, DTTs and “other IIAs”, 2000–2010 Source: UNCTAD, based on IIA database. 0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 5 000 6 000 7 000 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 DTTs BITs Other IIAs All IIAs cumulative AnnualnumberofIIAs CumulativenumberofIIAs
  • 125. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 101 Box III.5. EU FDI Policymaking The entry into force in December 2009 of the Lisbon Treaty shifted responsibility in the field of FDI from the member States to the EU (WIR10).While European member States continue concluding BITsa the shift of responsibility has given rise to a number of substantive and procedural questions about future EU investment policymaking at the international level. In that context, the relevant European institutions and non-governmental investment stakeholders have expressed their views. While there seems to be agreement among EU institutions on the general orientation of future EU IIAs (i.e. that they should contribute to sustainable and inclusive growth and be guided by the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action, notably human rights and sustainable development), differences of opinion have emerged regarding the details (e.g. provisions on scope and definition, the content and formulation of key substantive and procedural protection provisions, and the extent to which IIAs should refer to corporate social responsibility (CSR)). Opinions differ even more when considering non-governmental investment stakeholders. A number of civil society groups consider IIAs a threat to the public interest, and suggest that it is time for a radically new approach to foreign in­vestment. In contrast, some European industry groups highlight the positive role BITs play in increasing the competitiveness of European industry. The disagreement is compounded by questions about future development of the EU IIA regime, including how to deal with the selection of future negotiating partners, with ongoing negotiations and with existing EU BITs (both intra- and extra-EU BITs). The outcome of this debate is likely to have a major impact on the global IIA regime. EU member States are among the countries with the largest numbers of BITs (annex table III.1). Moreover, over the last three years, Europe as a whole accounted for approximately 30 per cent of global FDI flows. The EU debate offers great potential in so far as it allows the putting into practice of lessons learned regarding the design and substance of IIAs and their impact on sustainable development. However, open questions, attendant uncertainties, lack of predictability and stability will all serve to complicate the situation for EU negotiating partners and the IIA regime generally. Source: UNCTAD. a Thirty of the 54 BITs concluded in 2010 involved an EU member State. Seventeen of the 30 European BITs were renegotiated ones. benefits and the future orientation of IIAs, including civil society, business and parliamentarians. While IIAs have traditionally been negotiated by the relevant government ministry, there is now an emerging trend of inter-ministerial or inter-agency coordination. This process is particularly prominent at the European level (box III.5), but is also evident in EU member States and other countries around the globe. To the extent that countries are reviewing their model BITs (WIR10), or that IIAs need to undergo domestic ratification processes, the call for increasing transparency and inclusiveness of IIA-related decision-making is gaining additional traction. Internationally, the discourse was carried forward in forums such as the UNCTAD Investment Commission, the OECD Investment Committee, joint meetings of OECD and UNCTAD, regional conversations co-organized by UNCTAD to improve the investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) system, and particularly in the UNCTAD World Investment Forum 2010, which involved a broad range of investment stakeholders in the Ministerial Round Table and the IIA Conference 2010. With respect to ISDS, at least 25 new treaty-based cases were initiated in 2010 – the lowest number filed annually since 2001. This brought the total of known cases filed to 390 by the end of the year (figure III.3).12 These cases were mainly submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (including its Additional Facility), which continued to be the most frequently used international arbitration forum (with 18 new cases). This follows the long-term trend, with the majority of cases accruing under ICSID (245 cases in total). In 2010, the total number of countries involved in investment treaty arbitrations grew to 83, with Uruguay and Grenada each contesting the first claims directed against them. Fifty-one developing countries, 17 developed countries and 15 economies in transition have been on the responding side of ISDS cases. The overwhelming
  • 126. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development102 majority of the claims were initiated by investors from developed countries. Forty-seven decisions were rendered in 2010, bringing the total number of cases concluded to 197 (UNCTAD, 2011c).13 Twenty of these decisions were awards, 14 of which were decided in favour of the State, five in favour of the investor, and one award embodied the parties’ settlement agreement. This has tilted the overall balance of awards further in favour of the State (with 78 won cases against 59 lost). 2. IIA coverage of investment The intended purpose of IIAs is to protect and to promote foreign investment. Today, about two-thirds of global FDI stock benefits from post- establishment protection with comprehensive sectoral coverage granted by BITs or “other IIAs”.14 However, this represents only one-fifth of possible bilateral relationships. To provide full coverage another 14,100 bilateral investment treaties would be required (figure III.4). These 14,100 treaties would include, on the one hand, many bilateral relationships with little propensity to invest (i.e. where FDI flows are negligible) or with little propensity to protect (e.g. between OECD member countries). On the other hand, they would also include a few bilateral relationships where substantial FDI stocks exist that are not covered by any existing investment protection agreement (e.g. China and the United States, Brazil and China). Thesefindingsbeganumberofquestionswithregard to the effectiveness of IIAs in terms of generating investment flows and promoting development gains (UNCTAD, 2009b). For example, the existence of considerable FDI stocks in the absence of post- establishment treaty coverage suggests that for some investment relationships, IIAs fall short of being a determining factor for investment. Furthermore, some of the FDI stock is subject to protection offered by two or more IIAs. In fact, 570 BITs at least partially duplicate the post-establishment protection offered by other agreements. The extent of overlap and risk of contradictory provisions depends on the precise formulation used in BITs and/or “other IIAs” in terms of protection granted and flexibilities offered (WIR10). This raises questions about the efficiency of the IIA regime – an issue that is already discussed with regard to the future of EU member States’ IIAs (box III.5). A further 630 BITs overlap with “other IIAs” that contain investment liberalization provisions only Today’s IIA regime offers protection to more than two-thirds of global FDI stock, but covers only one- fifth of possible bilateral investment relationships. Figure III.3. Known investment treaty arbitrations, 1987–2010 (Cumulative and newly instituted cases) Source: UNCTAD, ISDS database. 100 0 50 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 ICSID Non-ICSID All cases cumulative Annualnumberofcases Cumulativenumberofcases
  • 127. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 103 (e.g. EU partnership, association and cooperation agreements), resulting in a situation where post-establishment protection (offered by BITs) complements pre-establishment protection/ liberalization (offered by “other IIAs”). Whether such comprehensive coverage is desirable is an important question, the answer to which is highly context- and situation-specific, and needs to be Figure III.4. IIA coverage of bilateral relationships and FDI stocks (Per cent and number) Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) and UNCTAD database on IIAs. a Includes EU, OIC, UCIAC, LAS, COMESA, SADC, ASEAN, CEFTA, CAFTA, APTA, UMA, Eurasian Economic Community, MERCOSUR,TEP,NAFTA, EFTA, the FTA between GCC-EFTA, as well as FTAs CARICOM, ASEAN, EFTA and GCC with third countries. Note: FDI stocks are estimated on the basis of treaty-partner shares of world FDI inflows and outflows. 192 UN member countries only. assessed against the overall objective of ensuring that IIAs promote investment for sustainable development.Furthermore,investmentrelationships have to be seen from a dynamic perspective, as the propensities to invest, and hence to protect through IIAs, may change over time (as witnessed by the growing interest of some emerging outward investing countries in IIAs). Bilateral relationships 10 10012 78 FDI stocks covered by regional economic groupings and FTAsa Total global FDI stocks FDI stocks covered by BITs only FDI stocks not covered by BITs or equivalent IIA 34 34 32 100 1 800 18 1002 200 14 100Number Per cent C. OTHER INVESTMENT-RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 1. Investment in agriculture Since the publication of the World Investment Report 2010, work has continued on the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) that were developed jointly by UNCTAD, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Bank (WIR10). The agricultural Supported by the G-20 Development Agenda, various international initiatives are being developed to promote positive development impacts through private investment. sector in low-income countries has been suffering from serious underinvestment for decades. Private investment can contribute to long-term solutions to food security and development, provided that such investment is socially responsible and environmentally sustainable (WIR09). The seven principles, once implemented, could contribute to enhancing the positive and reducing the potential negative effects of foreign investment in agricultural production. The coverage of food security and responsible investment in agriculture by the G-20 Multi-Year Action Plan on Development reflects growing concerns among policymakers regarding access to
  • 128. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development104 food and food prices, the potential negative impacts of speculation and profiteering in commodities and land, and the social and environmental impacts of international investments in agriculture. At the Seoul Summit on 11–12 November 2010, the G-20 leaders encouraged countries and companies to uphold the PRAI and requested UNCTAD, the World Bank, IFAD, FAO and other appropriate international organizations to develop options for promoting responsible investment in agriculture. 2. G-20 Development Agenda At the Seoul Summit, the G-20 leaders considered the disproportionate effect of the financial crisis on the most vulnerable in the poorest countries, and the slow progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).15 The G-20 leaders committed to work in partnership with other developing countries, low-income countries (LICs) in particular, to help build the capacity to achieve and maintain their economic growth potential in line with the mandate from the G-20’s Toronto Summit.16 The Seoul Consensus consists of a set of principles and guidelines to achieve the MDGs. The six core principles focus on economic growth, global development partnership, global or regional systemic issues, private sector participation, complementarity, and outcome orientation. In addition, the G-20 leaders identified nine areas, or “key pillars”, where action is necessary to resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth in developing countries. These areas are: infrastructure, private investment and job creation, human resource development, trade, financial inclusion, growth with resilience, food security, domestic resource mobilization, and knowledge-sharing. The G-20 leaders also endorsed the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development, with deadlines running from 2012 to late 2014. This Plan includes 16 specific and detailed actions on the nine key pillars identified in the Seoul Consensus. Three pillars in the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development are closely related to investment. Under the “Private Investment and Job Creation” pillar, the G-20 leaders emphasized the importance of domestic and foreign private investment as a key source of employment, wealth creation and innovation, which in turn contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction in developing countries. The leaders committed to support and assist investors, developing countries and key development partners in their work to maximize the economic value-added of private investment. At the G-20’s request, UNCTAD, UNDP, ILO, OECD and the World Bank reviewed and developed key quantifiable economic and financial indicators for measuring and maximizing economic value-added and job creation arising from private sector investment in value chains, and developed policy approaches for promoting standards for responsible investment in value chains. G-20 leaders are expected to take further actions based on this work at their future summits in 2011 and 2012. Under the “Infrastructure” pillar the G-20 leaders looked at gaps in infrastructure, in particular with respect to energy, transport, communications, water and regional infrastructure, that are significant bottlenecks to increasing and maintaining growth in many developing countries. They committed to overcoming obstacles to infrastructure investment, developing project pipelines, improving capacity and facilitating increased finance for infrastructure investment in developing countries, in particular LICs. They requested regional development banks and the World Bank Group to work jointly to prepare action plans to increase public, semi-public and private finance and improve implementation of national and regional infrastructure projects, including in energy, transport, communications and water, in developing countries. Under the “Food Security” pillar, the G-20 leaders emphasized the need for increased investment and financial support for agricultural development, and encouraged additional contributions by the private sector, the G-20 and other countries to support country-led plans and ensure predictable financing. 3. Political risk insurance In the past few years, the investment community has been mainly concerned with the financial crisis and its impacts on FDI and the global economy. However, political risk considerations are expected to return to the fore of investors’ concerns, both
  • 129. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 105 per cent in 12 months (MIGA, 2011). The slight pick-up in 2010 results from the modest recovery in FDI during the year. Political risk insurance evolved in 2010. For example, the Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy (NCBP) was updated to avoid the re-accumulation of external debt in low-income countries that have benefited from the “multilateral” debt relief initiative of 2006. Since April 2010, the NCBP has been successful in attracting an increased number of creditors to adhere to NCBP for promotion of financing of low-income countries (MIGA, 2011). Finally, political risk insurance has linkages with other areas of investment policymaking. For example, some entities condition the granting of political risk insurance on the existence of an IIA with the host country in question. in the developed and in the developing world. According to the 2010 MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey, political risk was perceived to be the single most important constraint on investment into developing countries over the medium term. This reflects numerous developments, including a trend towards greater regulation of FDI (section A) and recent political unrest in some parts of the world. So far, however, these concerns have not yet resulted in greater reliance on political risk insurance. As a consequence of the global economic crisis, the volume of liability underwritten by Berne Union (BU) investment insurers fell by 6 per cent to $137.1 billion from 2008 to 2009. Reflecting the recovery in new business, the volume of liability totalled over $142 billion as of June 2010, an increase of 7.7 D. INTERACTION BETWEEN FDI POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY Many governments have opted for more proactive industrial policy in recent years. The reasons for this are manifold and include, for instance, structural change and economic diversification, pressure from international competition, disappointment with the results of laissez- faire policy, the wish to “guide” development, a desire to strengthen and protect national champions, and State intervention in response to various crises. The success of industrial policy in countries such as Brazil, China, India or the Republic of Korea has given further impetus to this development. FDI policy interacts closely with industrial development strategies. In general, countries promote or restrict foreign investment within this context, depending on the industry in question and on the role they want to assign to FDI in domestic development. Investment promotion policy can be an important means to build productive capacity FDI policy increasingly interacts with industrial policy, both at the national and international levels. The challenge is to make the two work together for development, to avoid investment protectionism and to enhance interna- tional coordination. in developing countries, as TNCs bring capital, technology and know-how into the host country that can be crucial for the development of individual industries. Conversely, countries may choose to restrict FDI because they see a need to protect certain domestic industries − in particular infant or strategic industries – from foreign takeovers or competition. The interaction between FDI policy and industrial policy has both national and international dimensions. 1. Interaction at the national level The interface between FDI policies and industrial policies is most pronounced in specific national investment guidelines that define the role of FDI in domestic industrial development strategies and identify the policy tools to apply in this context. A number of countries have created such documents that specify to various degrees the extent to which FDI is prohibited, restricted, allowed or encouraged, and what FDI-related policy instruments to apply (e.g. China’s “Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue” and “Catalogue of Foreign Investment Advantageous Industries in Central
  • 130. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development106 and Western China”, India’s “Consolidated FDI Policy”).17 Some guidelines specifically address the use of investment promotion instruments (e.g. the Republic of Korea’s “FDI Promotion Policy in 2011”, the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority’s “Invest in Malaysia” policy, and the Thailand Board of Investment’s “Investment Promotion Policy for Sustainable Development”).18 These guidelines may also relate to the interpretation of national laws and policies at the sub-national level. Many countries have policies to target individual companies or specific categories of foreign investors considered capable of making a particularly significant contribution to industrial development, such as hi-tech investments, environmentally friendly projects or labour intensive technologies. Investment promotion agencies (IPAs) have an important supporting role in this context, namely through their matchmaking and aftercare services. These “targeting” policies may be reinforced through linkage programmes, the promotion of industrial clusters, and incubation programmes to maximize spillover effects and other benefits. Industrial policy strategies often emerge with more general fiscal or financial incentive programmes. Investment incentives are subject to requirements related to development in certain industries, or regions, or with regard to specific development goals, such as export promotion, job creation, technology transfer and upgrading. Investment incentives are also used to help developing industries where as yet there is no sufficiently large market (e.g. renewables). Industrial policy can further be supported by specific investment promotion and facilitation measures for FDI in particular industries, in line with their development strategies. The establishment of special economic zones and incubators, such as “hi-tech zones” (e.g. the “Electronic City” in Bangalore, India),19 “IT corridors” (e.g. The Taipei Technology Corridor”)20 or “renewables zones” (e.g. “Masdar City” in Abu Dhabi),21 which aim at improving the “hard” and “soft” infrastructure of the host country, are cases in point.22 Industrial policy may also be pursued through selective FDI restrictions. In the past, restrictive FDI policy has been applied particularly with a 0 20 40 60 80 Construction, tourism retail Agriculture forestry Health care waste management Light manufacturing Mining, oil gas Finance Telecom Electricity Media Transport view to promoting infant industries, or for socio- cultural reasons (e.g. land ownership restrictions). Nowadays, this relatively narrow policy scope has given way to a broader approach, under which numerous countries have strengthened their FDI- related policy instruments, in particular with regard to approval and screening procedures, and where the beneficiaries of government protection also include national champions, strategic enterprises and critical infrastructure. Moreover, governments may see a need to protect ailing domestic industries and companies at times of financial crisis or to discourage or restrict outward foreign investment in order to keep employment “at home”. Increasingly, industrial policy considerations to justify FDI restrictions have become blurred with other policies to protect national security, thus further enlarging the scope of State intervention vis-à-vis foreign investors. The economic importance of such policies is huge. For instance, policies to protect national champions and strategic enterprises usually cover core industries such as natural resources, energy, telecommunications, financial services and the transport sector (OECD, 2009). Figure III.5 provides an indication of which industries are most often affected by certain foreign ownership limitations. Restrictions mainly apply to transport and media, with more than half of the countries limiting foreign investment in these industries, often allowing only minority ownership.23 Figure III.5. Share of countries with industry-specific restrictions on foreign ownership, by industry, 2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD, based on World Bank, 2010.
  • 131. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 107 2. Interaction at the international level The interaction between international investment policy and industrial policy is characterized by the dual nature of IIAs, potentially both supporting and constraining industrial policy. With respect to their potential to support industrial policy, IIAs are expected to encourage foreign investment through their functions of (i) protecting and liberalizing investment (e.g. by easing entry or by offering national treatment); (ii) improving the overall investment policy framework; and/or (iii) enlarging markets to serve (UNCTAD, 2009c). In addition, some IIAs include specific promotion-oriented provisions (UNCTAD, 2008b).24 However, as most IIAs apply on a cross-cutting basis, potential foreign investment enhancing effects would occur for all industries. On the other hand, IIAs also have the potential to constrain investment-related industrial policy. Provisions that deserve most attention in this context include, among others, IIA rules regarding (i) the entry of foreign investors (e.g. potentially precluding countries from restricting foreign investment at the entry level); (ii) national treatment (e.g. potentially precluding countries from granting subsidies exclusively to domestically owned enterprises);25 and/or (iii) performance requirements (e.g. potentially constraining policies aimed at generating certain local linkages or ensuring positive spill-overs from foreign investment). A potentially constraining impact may also arise from investment- related provisions in international trade agreements, such as the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures26 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (box III.6).27 The actual extent of constraints posed by IIA obligations is hard to anticipate in the abstract, and will depend on the industry, policy and IIA clause at issue. To avoid creating undue policy constraints, a number of flexibility mechanisms have been developed in some IIAs (WIR10), taking, amongst others, the form of exceptions/exclusions to the treaty or of country-specific lists of reservations. Those particularly relevant for industrial policy include: • Excluding certain industries, such as aviation, fisheries, maritime matters, financial services or cultural industries; • Excluding certain policies, such as taxation, subsidies, government procurement, or agri- cultural policies;28 and/or • Including general or national security excep- tions, which increasingly become relevant in the context of industrial policy (UNCTAD, 2009b). Certain sectors and industries stand out as ones to which policymakers give particular attention when seeking to preserve space for industrial policy. For example, as revealed by UNCTAD case studies on investment reservations (figure III.6), countries are generally reluctant to accept far-reaching international commitments in the services sector, a trend that has remained broadly unchanged over recent decades.29 Beyond specific industrial policy considerations a number of other aspects might also come within this context, notably: (i) the generally higher level of regulation (e.g. as a result of the greater scope for market failure in network services); (ii) greater political sensitivities (e.g. regarding the role of private – and foreign – providers in essential services sectors such as education, health and environmental services, including water distribution); (iii) national security concerns (e.g. with respect to strategic services); and (iv) the high level of State ownership (chapter I, section C.2) or governmental scrutiny (e.g. in sectors where monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures prevail) (UNCTAD, 2005, 2006). Within the services sector, policymakers are inclined to preserve policy space particularly with regard to transportation, finance (e.g. banking and insurance), business/professional services and communication (e.g. postal, courier, telecom and audiovisual services) (figure III.7).30 While the rationale for doing so may be different in each of the industries (e.g. (i) issues related to cabotage in the case of transport; (ii) issues regarding the integrity and stability of the sector in the case of financial services; and (iii) issues regarding the need to guarantee the supply of public services in the telecommunications sector), the quest for State ownership may also be relevant.
  • 132. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development108 Sometimes, policy space is preserved for specific aspects of investment policy that are closely related to industrial policy. Issues related to subsidies, the nationality of ships, public utilities, State-owned enterprises or land ownership serve as examples. The salient features characterizing the interaction between FDI policies and industrial policy at the international level correspond to what can be observed at the national level. At both levels, the services sector is much more affected by foreign ownership limitations, compared to manufacturing or primary (e.g. agriculture and forestry) sectors. Moreover, as indicated by figures III.5 (national policies) and III.7 (international policies), the services industries where countries are comparatively more Figure III.6. Investment-related reservations in IIAs, across sectors (Number of reservations) Source: UNCTAD, based on IIA database and UNCTAD (2005, 2006). Based on a survey of 16 IIAs. 0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 Horizontal Primary Manufacturing Services Box III.6. WTO TRIMS Agreement The WTO Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement) precludes WTO members from adopting certain goods-related performance requirements, such as requirements to use predetermined amounts of locally produced inputs.a The TRIMS Agreement therefore directly touches upon measures that traditionally fall within the realm of industrial policy. Moreover, the fact that the TRIMs Agreement applies to both foreign and domestic producers of goods, including agriculture-related goods, and that its list of prohibited measures is indicative rather than exhaustive, may suggest that the Agreement’s actual reach may be considerable. However, it has to be noted that the TRIMs Agreement acknowledges that all exceptions under GATT 1994 shall apply, as appropriate, to its provisions.b The Agreement also provides for a temporary exception for developing countries to maintain flexibility in their tariff structure enabling them to grant the tariff protection required for the establishment of a particular industry.c Furthermore, TRIMS applies to goods-related policies only and hence does not apply to WTO Members’ services-related policies (e.g. local services requirements). The TRIMS Agreement establishes transparency requirementsd and an institutional setting, the TRIMs Committee, for discussion and consultation. Several debates in the TRIMs Committee have touched on industrial policies, including China’s policies in the automobile and steel sectorse or Indonesia’s policies in the telecommunications, the mineral/coal and mining sectors.f Prohibitions on performance requirements can also be found in IIAs. A crucial difference, between these IIAs and TRIMs lies in the scope of application: IIAs are typically narrower than TRIMs, in so far as they do not restrain governments from regulating domestic investors; they may be deeper than TRIMs in so far as they sometimes add additional requirements (“TRIMs +”) (e.g. performance requirements for services or intellectual property rights) or do not have TRIMs-type exceptions. Source: UNCTAD. a TRIMS prohibits trade-related investment measures that are inconsistent with the GATT’s provisions on national treatment (Article III of GATT 1994) and quantitative restrictions (Article XI of GATT 1994). b Article 3 of the TRIMs Agreement. “General Exceptions” are contained in Article XX of GATT 1994. c Article 4 of the TRIMS Agreement, and Article XVIII of GATT 1994. d Article 6.2 of the TRIMS Agreement requires each Member to notify the publications in which TRIMs may be found, including those applied by regional and local governments and authorities within their territories. e E.g. the so-called “2+2” regulation, which stipulates that foreign investors cannot set up more than two Sino-foreign joint ventures for the production of passenger cars, and two for commercial vehicles. See G/TRIMS/M/27 and 29, and G/ TRIMS/W/55. f E.g. requirements to “prioritize” the utilization of local manpower and domestic goods and services in the mineral and coal mining sectors and to carry out processing and refining of the mining product inside the country. See G/TRIMS/W/70, G/ TRIMS/W/71 and G/TRIMS/W/74.
  • 133. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 109 inclined to preserve regulatory space are similar at the national and international levels. On balance, this suggests that countries aim to consciously manage the interaction between investment and industrial policy, with a view to ensuring coherence at both the national and international levels. Figure III.7. Investment-related reservations in IIAs, across services industries (Share of reservations) Source: UNCTAD, based on IIA database and UNCTAD (2005, 2006). Based on a survey of 16 IIAs. 3. Challenges for policymakers These different kinds of interaction between FDI policy and industrial policy raise a number of important challenges for policymakers to make the two policies work together for development. a. “Picking the winner” One of the strongest criticisms of industrial policy relates to the difficulty in identifying the “right” industries for promotion (“picking the winner”). This difficulty relates not only to picking “winning industries”, but also to picking “winning firms”; the risk of wasting valuable and scarce resources if support is provided to “losers”; the risk of distorting market mechanisms to the long-term detriment of the economy; and the risk of succumbing to the pressure of lobbying . Industrial policy can be successful if governments are able to identify those industries or activities which possess existing or latent comparative advantages, and which will thereby benefit from new opportunities arising in a multi-polar growth world (Lin, 2011). Export-generating choices do not always have the greatest impact on employment and value added; domestic industries, including services, even in developing economies, often account for more than half of value added. Policy tools are needed (a checklist of indicators against which to assess domestic potential), together with institutional mechanisms reducing the risk of governments making the “wrong” choice. Some first suggestions have already been made in this regard (Rodrik, 2004; Lin and Monga, 2010; Lin, 2011). Successful strategies to pick winners also include a readiness to let losers go. Sometimes even the most obvious choices for industrial priorities, seemingly sure winners, will not work out in today’s uncertain economic environment. b. Nurturing the selected industries The interaction between FDI policies and industrial policy also implies designing the “right” investment promotion instruments. Horizontal policies are the basis, aiming at improving the hard and soft infrastructure of the host country. What is actually needed depends on the type of business activity to be developed, the technology and skills required for it, and the form of TNC involvement (FDI vs. non- equity modes).31 In countries with poor infrastructure and business environments that are perceived as unfriendly, special investment incentives may be needed to help overcoming barriers to entry. Such incentives may also be required with regard to emerging industries for which a market does not yet exist (e.g renewable energy) or where there is a “first mover” problem, because innovation is a risky process (Lin, 2011). By focusing on increasing industrial productivity, industrial policy can contribute to strengthening international competiveness. This underlines the need for close coordination between industrial policy, FDI policy and technology-related policy, so that they are coherent and mutually reinforcing. The dynamic nature of industrial development calls for regular review and adaptation of existing policy instruments. A case in point is recent changes in the international production networks of TNCs, resulting in a stronger emphasis on non-equity modes of international production (chapter IV). 0 10 20 30 40 Education Distribution Construction Environmental Tourism Recreational (incl. culture) Health related social Other Communication Business and professional Financial Transport
  • 134. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development110 c. Safeguarding policy space Managing the interaction between international investment policy and industrial policy implies striking a balance between liberalizing and protecting FDI, while preserving space for the dynamics of industrial policy. This challenge extends to identifying industries and existing/potential future domestic policies, for which flexibilities are most needed; identifying IIA provisions that are particularly likely to impact on industrial policy; and recognising that industrial policy is likely to change over time. The latter is important in light of the so-called “lock-in” effect, implying that once a commitment is made to open an industry to foreign investment, host countries are bound by it as long as the IIA remains in force.32 The problem is further exacerbated if pre-establishment treaties contain “rollback” commitments with regard to remaining FDI restrictions, or so-called “ratchet clauses” according to which regulatory changes towards further liberalization are automatically reflected in a country’s commitments under the IIA (UNCTAD, 2006). In response, some selected IIAs establish a procedure for IIA signatories to modify or withdraw commitments in their schedules.33 In sum, carefully crafting IIA obligations in conjunction with exceptions and reservations can go a long way to concluding IIAs that are conducive to countries’ industrial policy objectives. d. Avoiding investment protectionism The inclusion of elements of investment restrictions within industrial policy has given rise to concerns about investment protectionism. These concerns have grown in the light of the recent financial crisis, as countries may be tempted to protect their domestic industries, to the detriment of foreign competitors.34 Achieving a balance between the sovereign right to regulate an industry, and the need to avoid investment protectionism, remains a major policy challenge.Itiscomplicatedbythefactthatthereisno internationally recognized definition of “investment protectionism”. Clarifying the term would require distinguishing between justified and unjustified reasons to restrict FDI. The motivations for FDI restrictions are manifold and include, for instance, sovereignty or national security concerns, strategic considerations, socio-cultural reasons, prudential policies in financial industries, competition policy, infant industry protection or reciprocity policies. In each case, countries may have very different perceptions of whether and under what conditions such reasons are legitimate. One initiative to monitor investment protectionism has been taken by the G-20 (section A.3). Since September 2009, following a request from the G-20 London and Pittsburgh Summits, UNCTAD and the OECD have regularly published joint reports on G-20 Investment Measures.35 Efforts to establish criteria for assessing whether investment restrictions are justified have been undertaken in the context of policy measures relating to national security reasons (OECD, 2009). e. Improving international coordination As more and more countries adopt forms of industrial policy, competition and conflict are bound to intensify and to become more complex. To avoid a global race to the bottom in regulatory standards, or a race to the top in incentives, and to avoid the return of protectionist tendencies, better international coordination is called for (Zhan, 2011). At the global level, such “coordination” is presently essentially limited to the control of certain forms of subsidies in the framework of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Better international coordination of industrial policy can also create important synergies through economies of scale, avoiding “beggar thy neighbour” policies, and strengthening the position of participating countries. Cross-border industrial cooperation can also present solutions in cases where the size, costs and risks of an industrial project are too big for one country alone to implement it. Efforts in this regard have materialized at the regional level, in particular the EU, where the example of the creation of the Airbus industry in the 1970s comes to mind. Other regions, such as ASEAN,36 ECOWAS37 and the Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council,38 also have developed
  • 135. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 111 joint industrial development strategies. Regional industrial policy is further reinforced when there is a common FDI regime among the participants. * * * In conclusion, interaction between FDI policies and industrial policies is increasing, nationally and internationally. Development stages and related strategies differ between countries, and there can be no “one size fits all” solution in dealing with this interaction. The policy challenges are numerous, with some of them being relevant only at the domestic level, while others call for international attention. E. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY A further important investment policy development in recent years has been the emergence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards.39 Such standards can be contained in binding “hard law” instruments, such as national laws and regulations, or in voluntary non-binding “soft law” instruments. At present, international CSR standards are almost uniformly voluntary in nature and so exist as a unique dimension of “soft law”. This emergence of CSR has been further reinforced in the post-crisis era, as efforts to rebalance the rights and obligations of the State and the investor have intensified (WIR10). CSR standards, though applicable to all types of enterprises, are increasingly significant for international investment, as they typically focus on the operations of TNCs which, through their foreign investments and global value chains, can influence the social and environmental practices of businesses worldwide. Governments can consider a number of practical measures to apply these standards to their investment and enterprise governance mechanisms, with a view to maximizing the development impact of corporate activities. 1. Taking stock of existing CSR standards Over recent years, CSR standards have expanded in both number and form.40 While it would be difficult to provide an exhaustive account of every such standard and initiative, the universe of CSR The investment policy land- scape increasingly includes a combination of voluntary and regulatory initiatives to promote corporate social responsibility standards. standards can be categorized according to the organization that created them: i) intergovernmental organization standards, derived from universal principles as recognized in international declarations and agreements (three major sets of standards exist); ii) multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI) standards (dozens); iii) industry association codes (hundreds); and iv) individual company codes (thousands). This has resulted in a complex, multi- layered, multifaceted and interconnected universe of standards. a. Intergovernmental organization standards Universal principles as recognized by international declarations and agreements are the source of the most prominent and authoritative CSR standards. The three main sources of these international instruments are the United Nations, the ILO and the OECD. Three of the leading standards in this category are: • United Nations declarations and instruments: one of the most prominent examples is the UN Global Compact: launched in 2000, this is an initiative of the UN Secretary General’s office to translate the most relevant UN declarations into 10 guiding principles for enterprises (box III.7). • ILO conventions and declarations:41 there are 188 ILO conventions, the most relevant for TNC operations being the Tripartite Declara- tion of Principles concerning Multinational En- terprises and Social Policy (“MNE Declaration”) (first adopted in 1977, latest revision in 2006)
  • 136. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development112 Box III.7. The 10 principles of the UN Global Compact Human Rights Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. Labour Standards Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  Environment Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.  Anti-Corruption Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery. Source: www.unglobalcompact.org. and the Declaration on Fundamental Princi- ples and Rights at Work (1998) (also known as “Fundamental Labour Standards”). • The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enter- prises (“OECD Guidelines”) (first edition 1976; latest revision 2011). The 42 adhering govern- ments are fewer in number than the signatories of UN and ILO conventions, but they include large developed economies whose corpora- tions accounted for 70 per cent of FDI in 2010 (chapter I, section A.1). The standards of the UN and its specialized agencies, including the ILO, along with the Guidelines of the OECD, cover the fundamental issues of CSR. In each of the categories of standards reviewed below, it is common to find references to these major intergovernmental organization standards. In addition to the three most commonly noted standards above, there is a large number of relevant intergovernmental organization standards and conventions emanating from the UN (and its specialized agencies, including the ILO) and the OECD. b. Multi-stakeholder initiative standards Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) are “cross- sectoral partnerships created with a rule-setting purpose, to design and steward standards for the regulation of market and non-market actors” (Litovsky et al., 2007). These partnerships contain a mix of civil society, business, labour, consumers and other stakeholders. MSI standards most often address non-product-related process and productionmethods(PPM),i.e.issuesrelatedtohow a product is produced, such as the environmental or social aspects of certain production methods. Although MSI standards are mostly developed by civil society and business actors, they often make reference to the normative frameworks of international soft law instruments (annex table III.2). A unique MSI is the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a non-governmental organization whose members are national standard-setting bodies. ISO standards are widely recognized by international institutions (e.g. the WTO) and national governments. In 2010, ISO launched the ISO 26000 standard “Guidance on Social Responsibility”, which serves as a significant reference point for defining the terms of “social responsibility”.42 c. Industry association codes and individual company codes An industry-specific code typically involves the adoption of a code jointly developed by the leading companies within an industry, to address social and/or environmental aspects of supply chains
  • 137. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 113 and international operations (annex table III.3). There are thousands of individual company codes in existence, and they are especially common among large TNCs: more than three-quarters of large TNCs from both developed and developing countries have policies on social and environmental issues (UNCTAD, 2011e, UNCTAD, 2008c). About half of TNC codes that apply to value chains make reference to one or more intergovernmental organization standards (UNCTAD, forthcoming b). * * * The universe of voluntary CSR standards consists of a multitude of standards, each differing in terms of source, functions, addressees, and interrelationships, and each yielding influence and impacting on development in different ways. The proliferation of these standards has resulted in a number of systemic challenges related to standard- setting and standard implementation. 2. Challenges with existing standards: key issues a. Gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies Gaps between standards exist in terms of subjects covered and industry focus. The OECD Guidelines coverabroadrangeofresponsiblebusinesspractice, from human rights to taxation. However, they are negotiated by a more limited number of member States, compared to UN and ILO instruments. The ILO MNE Declaration focuses more specifically on employment practices and human rights, but applies to a larger group of member States that are directly addressed, alongside employers, workers and TNCs, to observe the MNE Declaration (OECD- ILO, 2008). Subject matter gaps exist among MSIs, as many standards focus either on the environment or on social issues, but not often to the same extent on both. An emerging trend among MSIs is the inclusion of social issues within environmental standards.43 Subject matter gaps can also include standards that focus on specific outcomes (e.g. minimum wage compliance) versus standards that focus on “process rights” (e.g. labour rights). Gaps also exist in industry focus, with not all industries (or parts of the value chain) being the subject of a standard. While the absence of a standard may reflect a gap that has yet to be filled,44 it can also represent either an area that does not necessarily require a standard, or where a standard is not considered the most appropriate way to address existing problems. Gaps also exist in uptake among companies: as uptake is driven by the concerns of consumers, media, and investors, CSR standards are primarily adopted by those companies that are most exposed to such concerns (Utting, 2002). While the adoption of standards by large TNCs can create a cascade effect that pushes sustainability across the value chain, this does not necessarily have a uniform impact on all members. Indeed there may be a tendency for some standards to favour concentration at different levels and to crowd out small enterprises and producers (Reed, Utting and Mukherjee-Reed, 2011). Nevertheless, as leading firms adopt and implement CSR standards, they set a benchmark for best practice against which other firms are measured. Among individual company standards, there can be both a high degree of overlap in the issues covered (e.g. labour practices, environment, human rights, bribery), and a high degree of inconsistency in detailed operational guidelines. As most companies refer to major intergovernmental organization standards for key issues, this reduces inconsistencies in the general subjects covered, but since many intergovernmental organization standards lack detailed micro-level operational guidance, companies are left to innovate these details themselves. The resulting inconsistencies mean that suppliers can be faced with differing requirements, adding complexity and higher compliance costs. The rise of industry-specific standards can help to alleviate this situation. In some industries, more than one MSI or industry association standard exists. This can cause confusion among companies, often leading them to opt for multiple certifications to ensure that all relevant issues have been addressed. MSIs are increasingly working together towards alignment between standards that address the same subject or the same industry.45
  • 138. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development114 b. Inclusiveness in standard- setting The credibility of a standard is linked to the inclusion of a sufficiently broad range of stakeholders in the standard-setting process. Company codes and industry association codes are often challenged as being less credible because of the limited involvement of outside stakeholders. The intergovernmental organizations are perceived as authoritative standard-setters because they reflect international consensus. The popularity of MSI standards is due largely to their inclusive cross-sectoral process. Addressing the challenge of inclusiveness also means addressing the often limited participation of developing country stakeholders in CSR standard-setting processes, which arises out of resource constraints. c. Relationship between voluntary CSR standards and national legislation Voluntary CSR standards can complement government regulatory efforts; however, where they are promoted as a substitute for labour, social and environmental protection legislation, or where CSR standards are not based on national or international rules, then these voluntary standards can potentially undermine, substitute or distract from governmental regulatory efforts. Critics of voluntary standards have pointed out, for example, the contrast in the United States between legally required safety inspections of the Trans- Alaska Pipeline, and voluntary commitments from companies to ensure the safety of feeder pipelines; they note that the oil company BP only discovered severe problems with its feeder pipelines after it was required by the United States Government to undertake inspections, following a spill of over a quarter of a million barrels of oil (Reich, 2007). d. Reporting and transparency Despite tremendous growth in CSR reporting in recent years among TNCs of developed and developing countries, such reporting continues to lack uniformity, standardization and comparability. A number of initiatives promote a standardized CSR reporting framework, including UNCTAD’s Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR)46 and several MSIs (e.g. the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Carbon Disclosure Standards Board, and the International Integrated Reporting Committee). While uptake of such frameworks among companies is growing rapidly, it nevertheless remains relatively low47 and even among companies adopting a voluntary CSR reporting framework, implementation of the framework can be selective and incomplete. The reporting of MSIs and industry associations also raises transparency issues that make it difficult for stakeholders to evaluate and compare the performance of different initiatives. Some initiatives, however, have started to implement reporting programmes: the Fair Labour Association publishes an annual report and discloses information about the progress made by the companies that have adopted its standard. Some MSIs (e.g. Fair Wear Association) have created a reporting framework for companies adopting their standards. e. Compliance and market impact A critical challenge is to ensure that companies voluntarily adopting a standard actually comply with the standard. Failure to demonstrate compliance can lower the standard’s credibility and market impact.48 The compliance promotion mechanisms embodied in existing CSR standards range from none, to reporting requirements and redress mechanisms, to proactive mechanisms such as audits, factory inspections, etc. (table III.4). The major intergovernmental organization standards contain compliance mechanisms, including the UN Global Compact (the “integrity measures” and the “communication on progress”), the ILO MNE Declaration (the “interpretation procedure”), and the OECD Guidelines (“the specific instance procedures” and the system of “National Contact Points”). MSI standards and industry association standards often have certification or accreditation programmes which typically include inspections/ audits, corrective action programmes, reporting and consumer labelling schemes. To enhance credibility, many MSIs have separated their standards-setting process from the certification process, relying increasingly on professionalized third parties for the
  • 139. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 115 Table III.4. Compliance mechanisms of selected international CSR standards Source of standard Proactive mechanisms (audits, inspections) Reporting requirements/ redress mechanisms No formal compliance mechanisms Inter- governmental Organization - • UN Global Compact • OECD Guidelines • ILO Tripartite Declaration - Multi- stakeholder/ NGO • ISO14000 • MSC • FSC • FLA RSPO • SA8000 • 4C Assoc. - • ISO 26000 • GRI Company/ Industry association • C.A.F.E. Practices • Leather Working Group • BSCI • International Council of Toy Industries - • EICC • Pharmaceutical Industry Principles for Responsible Supply Chain Management Source: UNCTAD. monitoring and auditing processes.49 The dynamic nature of the field of CSR standards also includes significant practices of “ratcheting-up” compliance mechanisms over time, e.g. adding new standards, tightening up inspection procedures, adding complaints procedures. While compliance promotion mechanisms can be an integral part of a standard, they can also be associated to a standard by third parties. As noted above, many intergovernmental organization standards are key references for some of the certifiablestandardsoftheMSI.Inthisway,company compliance with “soft law” intergovernmental organization standards can be driven by other CSR standards with proactive compliance mechanisms. A challenge associated with certification schemes and audits is that they may impose a higher burden on companies, and thus lead to lower rates of adoption of the standard, and reduced market impact. Conversely, a lack of compliance mechanisms can lead to high rates of voluntary adoption of the standard, but low, unclear and/or immeasurable rates of implementation. However, a number of MSI and industry association codes employ proactive compliance mechanisms and are nonetheless having a significant impact, with some influencing more than half of the global market for the industry in question (table III.5). With global market shares ranging between 5 and 10 per cent for some standards (such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)), the “proof of concept” phase has been passed; the challenge now is how to achieve widespread uptake of these standards. This is particularly so in highly fragmented industries, where adoption by many companies would be required to cover a large market share. In less fragmented industries, even individual company codes can have a significant impact (table III.5). f. Concerns about possible trade and investment barriers There are unresolved questions about whether social and environmental standards, especially non- product-related PPM standards, could potentially become barriers to trade and investment. It is not clear under WTO rules whether non-product PPM standards are covered by the WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement or other WTO agreements (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary measures; Agreement on Government Procurement). Outside of the TBT agreement, there was the “shrimp-turtle” case from the late 1990s, where environmental regulations in the United States led to an import ban for shrimp-exporting countries that did not use turtle-safe harvesting practices (which had already been introduced by the United States fishing industry on the basis of consumer demands).50 Similarly, it is possible for CSR standards to create barriers to (inward and outward) investment for companies that are unable to meet the requirements of the standards. In Guatemala, for example, forestry companies without FSC certification are prohibited from operating within the Mayan Biosphere reserve (FSC, 2009), and in Denmark, only companies meeting the Government’s CSR standard qualify for outward investment assistance. In both cases, the challenge is to distinguish where the use of a standard constitutes a legitimate application, and where it constitutes an abuse of protectionist intent. For example, the use of CSR standards can become a form of protectionism if they are applied in a discriminatory way, differentiating between companiesbynationalorigin.Itisimportanttherefore to monitor the application of CSR standards and to
  • 140. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development116 Table III.5. Impact of selected MSI and industry association CSR standards and individual company codes Standard Compliance mechanisms Market impactCertification/ Audits Public reporting Multi-stakeholder initiative standards Forest Stewardship Council (1993) Yes Annual Report, Audit Results Covers 11% of global forests used for productive activities ISO14001 (1996) Yes Annual Report As of December 2009, 223,149 organizations in 159 countries are certified to ISO 14000 SA8000 (1997) Yes Annual Report Over 1.4 million workers are employed in over 2,400 SA8000 certified facilities in 65 countries, across 66 industrial sectors Marine Stewardship Council (1997) Yes Annual Report, Audit Results Covers 6% of global landed fish Fair Labor Association (1998) Yes Annual Report, Audit Results Covers 75% of the athletic footwear industry Fair Wear Foundation (1999) Yes Annual Report Audit Results FWF affiliates in 2009 sourced from a total of 1,153 factories,  with an estimated total of 300,000 workers (growth rate of 60% in the last 3 years) UTZ CERTIFIED (1999) Yes Annual Report Covers 5% of global coffee production 4C Association (2004) Yes Annual Report with performance data of member companies Covers 30% of global coffee production Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (2004) Yes Audit Results Covers 8% of global palm oil production Industry association codes Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) Code of Conduct (2002) Yes Annual Report 11,200 suppliers audited according to the BSCI code of conduct and 4,000 suppliers trained in 9 different countries International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI) Code of Conduct (2004) Yes Biennial Report 75% of the global toy business is committed to only source from suppliers certified by ICTI in the future Leather Working Group Principles (2005) Yes No The working group covers 10% of the global leather production Individual company codes Nike Supplier code of conduct Yes Yes 31% of the global market for athletic footwear; through its supplier code of conduct Nike influences the conditions of more than 800,000 employees in 700 factories in 45 countries Adidas Supplier code of conduct Yes Yes 22% of the global market for athletic footwear; through its supplier code of conduct Adidas influences the conditions of more than 775,000 employees in 1,200 factories in 65 countries Source: UNCTAD, based on data from MSI, industry associations, companies and FAO. identify discriminatory practices where they arise. Voluntary CSR standards may be less susceptible to challenge through WTO trade agreements, and less prone to questions of investment protectionism, since there is no requirement that firms must follow them. For example, a voluntary standard pertaining to organic foods gives firms the option of using the approach adopted in the standard, but does not require that firms use this standard as a condition of market entry. In this way, voluntary CSR standards may be less problematic than mandatory requirements, in terms of achieving public policy objectives (Webb and Morrison, 2004). That said, voluntary standards alone can create a risk of neglect and indifference on the part of firms. The balance between mandatory
  • 141. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 117 and voluntary standards is delicate, but legitimate restrictions based on objective criteria of necessity and proportionality are permitted under trade and investment agreements.51 Equally, the State’s right to regulate may create legitimate restrictions on investors and their investments in the interests of public policy and economic development.52 Thus the challenge is to maintain an appropriate balance between mandatory and voluntary standards. 3. Policy options Governments can play an important role in creating a coherent policy and institutional framework to address the challenges and opportunities presented by the universe of CSR standards. In this regard, some governments are beginning to apply CSR standards to the architecture of corporate governance and international trade and investment. This approach aims to promote best practice in corporate compliance with national laws and international agreements in order to maximize the sustainable development impact of TNCs. A number of policy options follow. a. Supporting CSR standards development Governments can encourage and support the development of CSR standards, including through the provision of material support, technical expertise, and mobilizing the participation of relevant stakeholders (Vermeulen et al., 2010). For example, the 4C Association is a sustainability standard for the coffee industry, initiated by the Government of Germany and implemented by the German development agency. With support from the Government of Switzerland and other public and private sector representatives, the 4C Association has become an influential industry standard. Governments can support the development of national certifiable management system standards (MSSs). This approach provides enterprises with a certifiable standard to distinguish themselves in the area of CSR. Recent years have seen the creation of a number of national CSR MSSs, including standards in Brazil and Mexico in 2004, Portugal in 2008, Spain in 2009, and the Netherlands and Denmark in 2010. In some cases these national MSSs are based on or aligned with ISO standards. As national CSR MSSs proliferate, there may be increased interest in an international CSR MSS.53 b. Applying CSR to public procurement policy Governments can consider applying CSR standards to their purchasing policies, to promote good business practices on more environmentally friendly products, while being careful to avoid discriminatory practices that would be a form of protectionism. The Government of China, for instance, maintains a “green list” of environmentally friendly products which should be given preferential treatment in public procurement.54 The Government of Germany has made a commitment to purchase only wood and wood products that are verified as coming from legal and sustainable sources, and accepts the FSC certification as verification of this. The Netherlands also has a sustainable procurement policy; the Government of Switzerland is in the process of developing such a scheme; and the Government of the United Kingdom has laid out a strategy (“Government Sustainable Procurement Action Plan”) and has already committed to source fish for its public institutions (e.g. schools) exclusively from MSC-certified suppliers. While applying CSR standards to procurement policies can help promote the uptake of such standards by companies, it can also negatively effect the competitive position, and hence operations, of companies – especially those from poorer countries – that have limited capacity to adhere to such standards. c. Building capacity One factor that can lead to low uptake of standards is a lack of knowledge, skills and capabilities at various stages of a value chain. Thus, implementation of standards often requires a capacity-building component. This is part of creating “shared responsibility” within a value chain (which involves TNCs providing assistance to suppliers), as opposed to what critics call “off- loading responsibility” (wherein the compliance burden falls solely on developing country suppliers that may have little capacity for meeting CSR standards).
  • 142. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development118 Developing country governments wishing to promote standards in their countries can partner with donor States to deliver capacity-building initiatives and technical assistance to local industry and regulatory bodies. A project between the Government of Bolivia and USAID, for example, promotes FSC certification in the Bolivian forestry industry. This has included capacity-building for companies that are willing to be certified, and assistance linking certified companies with export markets. As a result of this programme, Bolivia now has the largest area of FSC-certified tropical forest in the world (FSC, 2009). In Gambia, the Ministry of Fisheries works in partnership with USAID to obtain MSC certification for the country’s fisheries (USAID, 2010). Governments can further strengthen CSR capacity-building by engaging in the exchange of best practice at international forums, such as UNCTAD. d. Promoting CSR disclosure and responsible investment To enhance transparency and comparability of CSR practices, a number of stock exchanges – especially in emerging markets − have employed stock exchange listing rules to promote the uptake of CSR reporting to facilitate responsible investment practices (Responsible Research, 2010). In close cooperation with national policymakers, the Malaysian stock exchange, for example, has made CSR reporting mandatory for all listed companies, and the Shanghai Stock Exchange in China has published the Shanghai Environmental Disclosure Guidelines, with which listed companies are urged to comply.55 An alternative to developing a national CSR reporting framework is to adopt an existing framework developed by an international initiative. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa, for example, requires companies to use the GRI guidelines in preparing sustainability reports. Using a common framework like this can promote international comparability between reports. Policymakers interested in promoting an internationally harmonized approach to CSR reporting and encouraging responsible investment, including in the area of “impact investing” (box III.8), can work together through forums such as UNCTAD’s ISAR working group56 and/or the Sustainable Stock Exchanges initiative.57 e. Moving from soft law to hard law Governments can consider adopting some of the existing CSR standards as part of regulatory initiatives, turning hitherto voluntary standards (soft law) into mandatory requirements (hard law). For example, organic food standards originated in most countries as voluntary standards from civil society or industry associations, but today are usually regulated under national legislation.58 This model allows governments to use the dynamic space of voluntary standards as a laboratory for future government regulations. Another option is a mixed “public–private regulatory regime”, wherein regulatory initiatives ensure compliancewithstandardsdevelopedbycivilsociety and/or the private sector. In Sweden, for example, State-owned enterprises are required to prepare reports using the GRI standard. In Guatemala, the Government has made FSC certification mandatory for forestry firms operating in the Mayan Biosphere reserve. This approach can be useful for preserving the dynamism and aspirational nature of many multi-stakeholder standard-setting processes, while adding uniformity of implementation through regulation. f. Strengthening compliance promotion mechanisms among intergovernmental organization standards Governments could consider further strengthening the compliance promotion mechanisms of existing intergovernmental organization standards. As noted above, many intergovernmental organization standards already have some compliance promotion mechanisms in place. These organizations periodically review the efficacy of such instruments, including their redress mechanisms. In the case of the UN Global Compact, for example, the UN Joint Inspections Unit recently recommended that the UN “reinforce the implementation of the Integrity Measures and accountability in implementing the ten principles” (UN JIU, 2010).
  • 143. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 119 Box III.8. Impact investing: achieving competitive financial returns while maximizing social and environmental impact Over time, responsible investment has become a multitrillion dollar industry. Responsible investing has various themes. It can be focused on negative screens that prohibit investment in firms that manufacture or promote certain products and services. It can also be focused on shareholder advocacy and positive environmental, social and governance (ESG) screens, to target investment in particular companies. “Impact investing” takes this a step further. It is the explicit incorporation of social, environmental and developmental objectives into the fabric of business and financial models. It is based on the fundamental belief that it is possible for investors to achieve competitive financial returns and social change simultaneously. The potential range of impact investment opportunities remains largely unknown. Analysts estimate that impact investments could reach between $500 billion and several trillions over the next decade. To illustrate the magnitude of opportunities in impact investing, a few examples are given below. To address climate change, the International Energy Agency estimates that $1.3 trillion in investment will be required to halve greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector by 2050. Another $41 trillion is needed by 2030 to modernize infrastructure systems worldwide. Water infrastructure, at $23 trillion, is the largest portion of this investment. McGraw Hill Construction estimates that the green building market will more than double worldwide to between $96 and $140 billion by 2013. Further, according to the World Resources Institute, the 4 billion people with annual incomes below $3,000 constitute a $5 trillion global consumer market. Moreover, the 1.4 billion people with per capita incomes between $3,000 and $20,000 represent an even larger $12.5 trillion market globally. Despite the enormous potential of impact investing, there are critical gaps in understanding the market conditions necessary for success, together with inadequate policy and regulatory frameworks, and limited knowledge of financial models that sufficiently incorporate environmental, social and developmental factors into valuations and alpha forecasts. Through its “20ii − Investing with Impact” initiative, the United States Department of State will work with UNCTAD, the OECD, and other institutions to address these gaps and galvanize sources of private capital to tackle high priority social and environmental challenges. Source: Contributed by the United States Department of State, in collaboration with Harvard University’s Initiative for Responsible Investment. g. Applying CSR to investment and trade promotion and enterprise development Governments could play an active role in promoting socially and environmentally sustainable inward and outward investment, while avoiding discriminatory practices that would be a form of protectionism. Governments can consider offering incentives for investments in sustainable industries (e.g. renewable energy) or for compliance with CSR standards. For example, the Brazilian National Economic Development Bank has introduced a code of ethics, based on intergovernmental organization standards, to which all of its clients must adhere. Similarly, the Government of Denmark requires companies receiving financial support from the Danish Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) to comply with IFU’s CSR policy. Some governments are also providing incentives through preferential trade agreements. For instance, the European Union has complemented its General System of Preferences (GSP) with the “GSP Plus” scheme, which offers additional tariff reductions for developing countries that have ratified and implemented 27 key international conventions related to CSR practices (e.g. the ILO Core Conventions).59 Care has to be taken, however, to ensure that those countries that do not a priori fulfil the criteria receive the required technical assistance in order to do so, and hence may benefit from such initiatives, in line with their overall development priorities and strategies. h. Introducing CSR into the international investment regime Governments can also consider introducing CSR into the international investment regime. While CSR- specific clauses do not currently feature prominently in IIAs, a small but growing number of agreements,
  • 144. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development120 especially recent FTAs with investment chapters, include such provisions. While this process has its origins in the mid-1990s,60 specific references to CSR started appearing more recently. Today, three Canadian FTAs with investment provisions61 refer to CSR in the preamble and contain substantive provisions. For example, Article 816 of the Canada- Colombia FTA, the earliest of these references, states that: “each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of corporate social responsibility in their internal policies, such as statements of principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the Parties. These principles address issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, community relations and anti-corruption. The Parties remind those enterprises of the importance of incorporating such corporate social responsibility standards in their internal policies.” In addition, the preambles of the European Free Trade Association’s 2009 FTA with Albania and 2010 FTA with Peru refer to CSR-related issues.62 While BITs by EU member States do not include CSR clauses, the European Parliament has called for the inclusion of a CSR clause in every future FTA investment chapter concluded by the EU.63 Finally, a few countries have included innovative CSR provisions in their model agreements, referring to specific corporate contributions, such as human capital formation, local capacity-building, employment creation, training and transfer of technology).64 However, the implementation of CSR provisions in “real” IIAs remains to be seen. Whileitisdifficulttoassesstheirimpactonconditions “on the ground”, such clauses nevertheless serve to flag the importance of CSR in investor–State relations, which may also influence the interpretation of IIA clauses by tribunals in investor–State dispute settlement cases, and create linkages between IIAs and international CSR standards. Again, care has to be taken to ensure that increasing consideration of CSR does not open the door to justifying policy interventions with undue protectionist purposes. * * * Governments have a range of policy options for promoting CSR. Pioneering examples in both developing and developed countries suggest that it is time to mainstream CSR into national policies and international trade and investment regimes, while devising mechanisms for addressing unintended consequences and preventing possible protectionist abuses. While there are a number of policy implications, the various approaches already underway are increasingly taking the form of a combination of regulatory and voluntary instruments that work together to promote responsible business practices. Two critical components of this mix will be improved CSR reporting by companies (to better inform future policy development), and strengthened capacity-building programmes (to assist developing country enterprises to meet international best practice in this area). Notes 1 The Basel III rules were issued by the Basel Committee on 16 December 2010. A gradual schedule for the implementation of these rules will start in 2013 and should be fully phased in by January 2019. At the Seoul Summit in November 2010, G-20 leaders endorsed these and other recommendations to strengthen financial stability. 2 Bank for International Settlements (2010) “Basel III rules text and results of the quantitative impact study issued by the Basel Committee”. Available at: www.bis.org. 3 For further information see the UNCTAD-OECD Fifth Report on G-20 Investment Measures (2011). 4 E.g. British bank Bradford Bingley was sold to a Spanish bank, United States automaker GM, then majority-controlled by the United States Government, sold its Swedish subsidiary Saab to a Dutch/Austrian company, and United States Government co-owned Chrysler was partly sold to Italian automaker Fiat. 5 The European Commission conducted consultation using “Questionnaire on the application of the Temporary Framework”, from 18  March 2010 to 26 April 2010. 6 Twenty of the 2010 BITs were renegotiated, including seven by the Czech Republic, in an effort to bring its IIAs into conformity with EU law. 7 This includes DTTs on “income” and “income and capital”. 8 This includes, e.g., free trade agreements (FTAs), economic partnership agreements (EPAs) or framework agreements.
  • 145. CHAPTER III Recent Policy Developments 121 9 The first category of “other IIAs” is those that contain substantive investment provisions, such as national treatment, most favoured nation (MFN) treatment, fair and equitable treatment (FET), protection in case of expropriation, transfer of funds and investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) (WIR10). 10 The second category focuses more on granting market access to foreign investors than on protecting investments once they are made (WIR10). 11 The third category of IIAs are agreements dealing with investment cooperation (WIR10). 12 Since most arbitration forums do not maintain a public registry of claims, the total number of actual treaty-based cases could be higher. UNCTAD, 2011c and UNCTAD’s database on investor–State dispute settlement cases (available at www.unctad. org/iia). 13 This includes 20 awards, five decisions on liability, 11 decisions on jurisdiction, and 11 other decisions. 14 This includes all post-establishment IIAs, including those that are only signed but not yet ratified. Treaties that offer post-establishment national treatment only, but no other typical protection provisions such as those on expropriation or ISDS (e.g. some of the EU treaties), are excluded. If individual treaty exclusions and reservations are taken into consideration a more nuanced picture would emerge. Multilateral investment-protection related agreements such as the TRIMs, and sector- specific agreements such as the Energy Charter Treaty are excluded, as well as DTTs. 15 See “The G-20 Seoul Summit Declaration” and “Annexes”, 11−12 November 2010. 16 At the Toronto summit on 26−27 June 2010, the G-20 leaders had agreed that “Narrowing the development gap and reducing poverty are integral to our broader objective of achieving strong, sustainable and balanced growth and ensuring a more robust and resilient global economy for all.” 17 For China, see http://works.bepress.com and www. chinalawinsight.com; for India see business. http:// mapsofindia.com, http://business.mapsofindia.com and www.indianground.com. 18 For the Republic of Korea, see Foreign Investment Committee, “FDI Promotion Policy in 2011”, endorsed and published on 31 January 2011. For Malaysia see www.mida.gov.my; for Thailand, see www.boi.go.th. 19 Other examples are the University of the Philippines Science Technology Park – joint venture between the university and private sector to establish an incubation centre for hi-tech projects, the “Technology Park Malaysia” − centre for research and development for knowledge-based industries, and Shenzhen Economic Zone. 20 Other examples include the “Ontario Technology Corridor” and the “Illinois Research Development Corridor”. 21 Examples are the “Aurora Pacific Economic Zone” in the Philippines to utilize wind power and solar cells for energy and fresh water springs for potable water, and the “Saemangeum Gunsan Free Economic Zone” in the Republic of Korea. 22 Examples of “hard” infrastructure are power, transport, telecommunication systems, health facilities and test bed facilities for RD. “Soft” infrastructure includes the financial system and regulation, the education system, the legal framework, social networks, values and other intangible structures in an economy. 23 The World Bank IAB 2010 report surveyed sectors with restricted entry for foreign investors for 87 countries, including 14 developed countries, 57 developing countries and 16 transition economies. The number of countries with data for specific sectors is: health care 86, telecoms 84, electricity 83, transport 80 and for all other industries 85 countries. Finance is a combination of banking and insurance from the original WB report and the share represents those countries that allow only less than full ownership for at least one of these sectors. 24 E.g. institutional mechanisms, financial or fiscal incentives. 25 The actual impact of the national treatment clause depends on its specific formulation, notably whether it contains the qualification of only applying to investments/investors “in like circumstances”. 26 For example, by requiring the use of local services or mandating technology transfer. 27 For example, the SCM Agreement disciplines the use of certain subsidies (e.g. by prohibiting subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export targets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods). 28 Some of the provisions refer explicitly to the industrial-policy related objectives of the subsidy in question, such as training or employing workers, or providing a service, locating production, constructing/expanding particular facilities, or carrying out research and development in a particular territory. 29 Case studies were conducted for 16 IIAs, including the OECD National Treatment Instrument (1991), NAFTA (1992), G3 (1994), Mercosur (1994), Canada-Chile FTA (1996), draft OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1998, but never concluded), Andean Community (2001) and the Chile-United States FTA (2003), CAFTA (2004), Panama-Singapore FTA (2005), United States- Uruguay BIT (2005), Canada-Peru BIT (2006), Rwanda-United States BIT (2007), Japan-Peru BIT (2009), Japan-Uzbekistan BIT (2009) and Japan- India FTA (2011). For further details on the eight earlier IIAs see UNCTAD, 2006. 30 Of interest is also the social services sector, where reservations have, over time, become
  • 146. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development122 more frequent. An increasing consciousness of the pros and cons of submitting social services to international obligations, and experiences with ISDS touching upon essential services or social considerations, might have contributed to this development. 31 See also chapter IV. 32 The risks of the lock-in effect are particularly pronounced with regard to liberalization commitments based on a “top-down/negative list” approach. See UNCTAD, 2006. 33 For example, the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the draft Norwegian model BIT (2007). 34 See the WTO-OECD-UNCTAD Reports on G-20 Investment Measures (WTO-OECD-UNCTAD, 2009 and 2010; OECD-UNCTAD 2010a, 2010b and 2011). 35 Ibid. 36 ASEAN Secretariat (2003), “What is AlCo?”, available at www.asean.org/6402.htm. 37 ECOWAS (2010) “West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP)”. 38 Gulf Cooperation Council (2000) “Unified Industrial Developments Strategy for the Arab States of the Gulf Cooperation Council”. 39 The text in this section is based partially on UNCTAD’s contribution to a recent G-20 document on “Promoting standards for responsible investment in value chains”, which also benefited from comments by UNDP, ILO, OECD and the World Bank, and the Governments of Germany and Saudi Arabia. See report to the G-20 High-Level Development Working Group, June 2011. 40 Among others, the governments of the G-8 and the G-20 have taken a strong interest in CSR standards in recent years, focusing on promoting dissemination, adoption and compliance. See G-8 Leaders Declaration: Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, 2009 (para. 53) and G-20 Multi- Year Action Plan on Development, 2010 (page 5). 41 The ILO is a specialized agency of the UN. It is unique among UN agencies in that it has a “tripartite” governance structure, involving representatives of governments, employers and employees. 42 See www.iso.org/iso/social_responsibility. 43 For example the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 44 There are a number of standards still emerging in new areas, e.g. sustainable meat production and conflict minerals. 45 The 4C Association and the Rainforest Alliance for example have created a translation mechanism between each other’s standards, such that Rainforest Alliance certificate-holders can now apply for the 4C Licence without having to go through the entire 4C Verification Process. 46 See www.unctad.org/isar for more information. 47 The most popular and comprehensive CSR reporting framework is that of the GRI, which in 2010 was used by approximately 1,800 corporations. 48 Impact assessment of CSR standards is critically important. While various efforts are underway (e.g.  the Committee on Sustainability Assessment), there is no consensus approach. UNCTAD currently uses an industry-level analysis examining factors such as the market share of the companies using the standard or the number of enterprises or workers influenced by the standard. 49 For example ISO, MSC, FSC and UTZ, among others, use third party certification. 50 WTO cases No. 58 and 61. 51 See GATT 1994, e.g. GATS 1994 Art.XIV, Canada model BIT Art.10. 52 See further WIR03. 53 Note that ISO 2600 is not an MSS, rather it is a guidance standard, and not intended for certification. 54 See Ministry of Finance and State Environmental Protection Agency: Implementation Guidance on Public Procurement Based on Environmentally Labeled Products. www.ccgp.gov.cn (Chinese language). 55 See www.world-exchanges.org. 56 For more information, see www.unctad.org/isar. 57 For more information, see www.unpri.org. 58 EU policy on organic farming: http://ec.europa.eu/ agriculture. 59 See www.europa-eu-un.org. 60 See references to environmental and labour considerations (e.g. NAFTA preamble) and a recognition that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures (e.g. NAFTA investment chapter). 61 These are Canada’s FTAs with Colombia (2008), Peru (2009), and Panama (2010). 62 There are references to responsible corporate conduct and ILO Conventions in the former, and references to good corporate governance, corporate governance standards of the United Nations Global Compact and relevant ILO Conventions in the latter. 63 On 6 April 2011, the European Parliament adopted its Resolution on the future European international investment policy, INI/2010/2203. 64 For example, in Art. 12, Ghana’s model BIT (2008) states that foreign investors “shall to the extent possible, encourage human capital formation, local capacity building through close cooperation with the local community, create employment opportunities and facilitate training opportunities for employees, and the transfer of technology”. See also Art. 11, Botswana’s model BIT (2008).
  • 147. CHAPTER IV NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT In today’s world, policies aimed at improving the integration of developing economies into global value chains must look beyond FDI and trade. Policymakers need to consider non-equity modes (NEMs) of international production, such as contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, franchising, licensing and management contracts. Cross-border NEM activity worldwide is significant and particularly important in developing economies. It is estimated to have generated over $2 trillion of sales in 2010. Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing accounted for $1.1–1.3 trillion, franchising $330–350 billion, licensing $340–360 billion, and management contracts around $100 billion. In most cases, NEMs are growing more rapidly than the industries in which they operate. NEMs can yield significant development benefits. They employ an estimated 14–16 million workers in developing countries. Their value added represents up to 15 per cent of GDP in some economies. Their exports account for 70–80 per cent of global exports in several industries. Overall, NEMs can enhance productive capacities in developing economies through their integration into global value chains. NEMs also pose risks for developing countries. Employment in contract manufacturing can be highly cyclical and easily displaced. The value added contribution of NEMs can appear low in terms of the value captured out of the total global value chain. Concerns exist that TNCs may use NEMs to circumvent social and environmental standards. Developing countries need to mitigate the risk of remaining locked into low-value-added activities. Policy matters. Maximizing development benefits from NEMs requires action in four areas. First, NEM policies need to be embedded in overall national development strategies. Second, governments need to support efforts to build domestic productive capacity. Third, promotion and facilitation of NEMs requires a strong enabling legal and institutional framework, as well as the involvement of investment promotion agencies in attracting TNC partners. Finally, policies need to address the negative consequences and risks posed by NEMs by strengthening the bargaining power of local NEM partners, ensuring fair competition, protecting labour rights and the environment.
  • 148. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development124 A. THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND TNC GOVERNANCE In the past, TNCs primarily built their international production networks through FDI (equity holdings), creating an internalized system of affiliates in host countries owned and managed by the parent firm. Over time, TNCs have also externalized activities throughout their global value chains. They have built interdependent networks of operations involving both their affiliates and partner firms in home and host countries. Depending on their overall objectives and strategy, the industry in which they operate, and the specific circumstances of individual markets, TNCs increasingly control and coordinate the operations of independent or, rather, loosely dependent partner firms, through various mechanisms. These mechanisms or levers of control range from partial ownership or joint ventures, through various contractual forms, to control based on bargaining power arising from TNCs’ strategic assets such as technology, market access and standards. Such mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and they can be as much complements as substitutes to FDI. In this chapter, we refer to these TNC networks as global value chains (GVCs). WIR11 focuses on “non-equity modes” of TNC international production (NEMs) as alternative forms of governance of TNC-controlled global value chains. NEMs include, for example, contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, franchising and licensing, as well as other types of contractual relationship through which TNCs coordinate and control the activities of partner firms in host countries. From a policy perspective, to pursue the integration of developing economies into global value chains it is no longer enough to focus on attracting FDI and TNC affiliates on the one hand, or to promote arm’s-length trade on the other. Policymakers need to consider a myriad of alternative networked forms of TNC operations, each of which comes with its own set of development impacts and policy implications. 1. TNC value chains and governance choices Foremost among the core competencies of a TNC is its ability to control and coordinate activities within a global value chain. TNCs, like all firms, can decide to conduct such activities in-house (internalization) or they can entrust them to other firms (externalization) – a choice analogous to a “make or buy” decision. Internalization, where there is a cross-border dimension, results in FDI, whereby the international flows of goods, services, information and other assets are intra-firm and under the full control of the TNC. Externalization results either in trade, where the TNC exercises no control over other firms, or in non-equity inter-firm arrangements in which contractual agreements condition the operations and behaviour of host- country partner firms. The choice between internalization and externalization is typically based on the relative costs and benefits, the associated risks, and the feasibility of each option (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 2001). Internalization of cross-border activities brings with it the costs of running complex, multi-plant, multi- currency operations, which tend to increase the greater the social, cultural and political differences between locations. It also implies internalizing the full extent of risk associated with the activity, including capital exposure and business uncertainty. Finally, it assumes that the technical capability, skills and know-how required to perform the activity are either present in the firm, or not prohibitively expensive or time-consuming to acquire. Balanced against the costs of internalization are the obvious advantages of retaining full control of value-chain activities. To start with, TNCs will want to maximize “value capture” – externalization clearly TNCs manage global value chains through internaliza- tion (ownership) and exter- nalization (including NEMs). NEMs and FDI can be sub- stitutes or complements, with the choice based on relative costs, benefits and associated risks.
  • 149. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 125 implies giving up part of the profits generated along the chain. Secondly, internalization avoids the transaction costs associated with finding suitable third parties and then stipulating contractual arrangements that tend to become more complex the greater the perceived risks associated with loss of control over parts of the value chain and over assets and valuable intellectual property (IP). Finally, internalization also eliminates the costs of managing relationships with NEM partners on a continuous basis, including flows of knowledge, goods and services; communication and information flows; and monitoring and control of compliance with contractual obligations. Externalization has a number of intrinsic advantages. These include shifting of certain costs and risks to third parties, as well as gaining rapid access to the assets and resources third parties may bring to the partnership. These can be “hard” assets such as plants and equipment, access to low-cost resources, technological capability and know- how, or often equally important “soft” assets, such as networks and relationships in host countries. Externalization allows the TNC to establish a more effective internal division of labour, freeing scarce resources to be used in other segments of its value chain – in other words, it allows a focus on “core business”. Externalization is clearly more feasible if the knowledge and intellectual property required to conduct the activity are transferable, i.e. not tacit and to some extent standardized or codified. From the TNC’s perspective, the terms of contracts underpinning non-equity relationships are aimed at minimizing the cost of externalization and at protectingtheassets,technologyandIPexchanged. Non-contractual levers of control can also play a role in minimizing costs and risks to the TNC – the superior bargaining power of the TNC will alleviate concerns related to giving up a measure of control over part of its value chain. The degree of control given up by the TNC, the costs and associated risks of externalization, and the type of contractual and non-contractual levers which come into play, vary by mode, context and relative bargaining power of TNCs and NEM partners (see below in section A.2). In building their international production networks, TNCs therefore have to decide not only on a location, but also on the mode of control and coordination Foreign direct investment Trade Non-equity modes of international production of international operations. In the classic economic model describing this decision-making process, the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) model (Dunning, 1980),2 the choice of mode in host countries is between ownership (FDI) and arm’s- length trade or licensing. Non-equity modes of international production represent an evolution of this model; they allow TNCs to enter a “middle ground” (figure IV.1) in their GVC governance by externalizing activities while still maintaining a level of control, i.e. improving the trade-off between the advantages and the costs of externalization (Hennart, 2009). The choice is thus no longer between control through ownership (FDI) or no control (trade), but between a range of modes in which control exercised in various configurations and to various degrees. Thus, in the case of wholly owned host country affiliates, control is defined purely by ownership; in the case of NEMs, control is exercised through contracts and bargaining power (table IV.1). Equity joint ventures are a special case in which TNCs control flows from a mix of equity and non-equity governance. Figure IV.1. Non-equity modalities: A middle ground between FDI and trade Source: UNCTAD. The ultimate ownership and control configuration of a GVC is thus the outcome of a set of strategic choices by the TNC. The type of non-equity modes that are available or appropriate along GVCs varies by value chain segment. Figure IV.2 shows that NEMs are not specific to any particular part of the value chain or type of activity – TNCs are generally prepared to externalize any activity that is not fundamental to its competitive advantage in its market or industry and that can be carried out at lower cost or more effectively by third parties (including overseas), when the risks associated with externalization are limited or can be contained. Activities that are knowledge-intensive or high value added are not precluded. While certain patterns of
  • 150. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development126 NEM activity have emerged in different industries, it is useful to view the propensity of any given segment of a value chain to be externalized is entirely specific to the industry or the individual TNC. In some parts of the value chain NEMs and FDI may be substitutes, while in others the two may be complementary. Substitution occurs where a TNC has a choice between different modes and makes a cost-benefit trade-off, for example where a firm has the option of either building a plant to produce and supply products to an overseas market, or alternatively licensing the required technology and IP to a local manufacturer. It may also occur where the industry structure predetermines the outcome of the trade-off. For example in the electronics industry, in most cases construction of a fully owned new components or assembly plant by a design- or brand-owner no longer makes economic sense in the presence of large and sophisticated global contract manufacturing firms. Complementarity is a characteristic of TNC coordinated international production systems, which encompass a web of owned affiliates and third-party NEM relationships; both modes of operation are an integral part of the chain of global value creation. Moreover, complementarity may exist at the same stage in the value chain, where for example directly owned retail outlets coexist with franchise outlets, or where foreign affiliates are established to manage and facilitate NEM relationships (e.g. a commercial, procurement or logistics entity to support multiple contract manufacturing relationships in the same overseas market). The composition of a TNC-governed GVC, and its ownership and control configuration, are dynamic. The partners in NEM relationships evolve over time. In some industries, NEM partner firms have grown into TNCs in their own right, not unusually expanding their NEM operations to new production bases or Table IV.1. Different modes of TNC governance in global value chains Types of governance Translation to modes of international operation OLI-model Ownership advantages Locational advantages Internalization advantages Control through ownership FDI, direct participation in host-country firms √ √ √ Contractual levers of control Contractual agreement conditions the behaviour of a host- country firm √ √ - Control based on bargaining power Host-country firm dependence on access to TNC strategic assets and the TNC network conditions its behaviour √ √ - No control Arm’s-length market transactions, trade √ - - Source: UNCTAD, adapted from Dunning (1980). Figure IV.2. Selected NEM-types along the value chain Source: UNCTAD, based on Porter’s classic value chain representation (Porter, 1985). • Contract manufacturing (assembly/final product) • Out-licensing • Contract logistics • Franchising • Management contracts • Concessions • Brand-licensing • After sales services outsourcing • Call centres • Business process outsourcing Corporate services and support processes Technology/Intelectual property development • Contract RD, Contract design, In-licensing Operations/ manufacturing Out-bound logistics/ distribution - Sales, service provision, marketing Aftersales and services • Contract farming • Procurement hubs • Contract manufacturing (intermediates) Procurement/ in-bound logistics
  • 151. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 127 Box IV.1. The evolution of retail franchising in transition economies One of the main economic challenges of transition economies in the early transition period was the reconstruction of the services sector. Retail services in particular needed modernization, as the distribution networks created for the centrally planned system had become unsustainable. Transition economies relied heavily on foreign investors for capital, technology and know-how in logistics, network development and marketing. International retailers entered the market almost exclusively through equity investments (FDI). The share of retail in the inward FDI stock of transition economies was between 5 and 7 per cent in the late 1990s, compared with less than 1 per cent in the rest of the world. For TNCs, FDI, including the acquisition of privatized firms, was the fastest way to enter the region. Moreover, the underdeveloped business environment and a lack of appropriate partners often precluded non-equity forms of operation (franchising). Gradually, as the transition economies advance, foreign operators are increasingly opting to develop their retail networks through franchising. Their foreign affiliates, including purchasing and marketing organizations, logistics networks and warehouses, often serve as a basis for building franchising operations. In addition, through their local operations they have built local capabilities and skills, both by bringing in expatriate staff and by training local personnel. Thus with the evolution of the local market, retail TNCs are shifting their operations from FDI to franchising, though many maintain an FDI presence. For example, in 2011, in the Russian Federation there were 305 foreign franchise systems out of 595, compared to only 33 in 1996. The number of franchisee outlets linked to foreign franchisors had risen to 3,446, up from only 440 in 1996. Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by the East European Franchise Association. markets through FDI. Examples include Foxconn (Taiwan Province of China) (contract manufacturing) and Arcos Dorados (Argentina) (franchising). The mix of FDI and NEMs within GVCs can also shift as technologies and standards change. The evolution of TNC strategies in transition economies, broadly from FDI to franchising after the region opened up to international investors, is a case in point (box IV.1). 2. Defining features of NEMs A cross-border non- equity mode of TNC operation3 arises when a TNC externalizes part of its operations to a host-country-based partner firm in which it has no ownership stake, while maintaining a level of control over the operation by contractually specifying the way it is to be conducted. Specifications may relate to, for example, the design and quality of the product or service to be delivered, the process and standards of production, or the business model that the partner firm must adhere to. In distinction to purely arm’s-length transactions, they have a material impact on the conduct of the business, requiring the host-country partner firm to, for example, make capital expenditure, change processes, adopt new procedures, improve working conditions, use specified suppliers, and so forth. Thus the defining feature of cross-border NEMs, as a form of governance of a TNC’s global value chain, is control over a host-country business entity by means other than equity holdings, although each type of NEM has its own particularities.4 A parallel can be drawn with FDI. The defining feature of FDI, to distinguish it from other forms of investment, is a significant level of control (a minimum equity stake of 10 per cent in host-country business entities) and a long-term interest in the host-country operation. This issue of a long-term interest also avises in the case of NEMs, as partner firms become an integral part of the TNC’s GVC and their performance is an integral part of the TNC’s overall competitiveness. The various forms of NEM, summarized in table IV.2, can also be compared to FDI in terms of their motivation. Some, such as contract farming, are resource-seeking; some are efficiency- seeking (contract manufacturing, outsourcing); and some are market-seeking (brand licensing, franchising). Furthermore, some types of NEM NEMs are contractual rela- tionship between TNCs and partner firms, without equity involvement. Bargaining power represents an additional lever with which TNCs influence their partners, and the sources of this power vary by mode.
  • 152. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development128 are similar to FDI in that they entail a “package” of assets, resources, technology and know-how to be put in the care of host-country firms, as in the case of contract manufacturing, outsourcing, franchising and concessions. Other NEM types are more “narrow asset transfers”, as in the case of licensing, management contracts, or some sub-types of franchising such as distributor ships or agencies. This report focuses on NEMs where the relationship between TNCs and partner firms is relatively simple – essentially the first five types of NEM in table IV.2, from contract manufacturing to management contracts – to enable a relatively unambiguous analysis based around GVCs, facilitating assessment of impact and policy issues. Strategic alliances, concessions and contractual joint ventures are complex NEM forms, with less clear-cut scope and implications meriting separate treatment. (Concessions in extractive industries and infrastructure, respectively, were dealt with in WIR07 and WIR08.) The defining features of NEMs – coordination and control of independent firms through contractual and non-contractual means, with a material impact on the conduct of their business – in some instances blur the rigid distinction between FDI, NEMs and trade. In some industries such as electronics, contract manufacturers are very large operators Table IV.2. Definitions of selected types of cross-border NEMs NEM type Definition Contract manufacturing Services outsourcinga Contractual relationships whereby an international firm contracts out to a host-country firm production, service or processing elements of its GVC (extending even to aspects of product development). All go under the general rubric of outsourcing. Services outsourcing commonly entails the externalization of support processes including IT, business and knowledge functions. Contract farming Contractual relationship between an international buyer and (associations of) host-country farmers (including through intermediaries), which establishes conditions for the farming and marketing of agricultural products. See also WIR09. Licensing Contractual relationship in which an international firm (licensor) grants to a host country firm (licensee) the right to use an intellectual property (e.g. copyrights, trade marks, patents, industrial design rights, trade secrets) in exchange for payment (a royalty). Licensing can take various forms, including brand licensing, product licensing and process licensing. In-licensing refers to a company acquiring a licence from another firm; out-licensing entails sale of intellectual property to other firms. See also WIR05. Franchising Contractual relationship in which an international firm (franchisor) permits a host country firm (franchisee) to run a business modelled on the system developed by the franchisor in exchange for a fee or a mark-up on goods or services supplied by the franchisor. Franchising includes international master franchising, with a single equity owner of all outlets in a market, and unit franchising, with individual entrepreneurs owning one or more outlets. Management contracts Contractual relationship under which operational control of an asset in a host country is vested to an international firm, the contractor, which manages the asset in return for a fee. Concessions Contractual relationship under which operational control of an asset in a host country is vested to an international firm, the concessionaire. The firm manages the asset in return for an entitlement to (part of) the proceeds generated by the asset. Concessions are normally complex agreements, such as build-own-transfer (BOT) arrangements, which might include elements of investment by the TNC or ownership of the asset for a period. Legally they can be structured in many ways, including as public–private partnerships (PPPs). See also WIR07 and WIR08. Strategic alliances Contractual joint ventures Contractual relationship between two or more firms to pursue a joint business objective. Partners may provide the alliance with products, distribution channels, manufacturing capability, capital equipment, knowledge, expertise, or intellectual property. Strategic alliances involve intellectual property transfer, specialization, shared expenses and risk. Contracts set forth terms, obligations, and liabilities of the parties but do not entail the creation of a new legal entity. Source: UNCTAD. a The generic terms “subcontracting” and “OEM” will be avoided in this report as they are used in a number of different ways in the literature and business.
  • 153. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 129 and TNCs in their own right. For example, Inventec (Taiwan Province of China) designs, builds and internationally distributes electronics products for lead TNCs such as Apple (United States), Fujitsu- Siemens (Japan), and Lenovo (China); and it does this from production affiliates in countries such as Malaysia, Czech Republic and Mexico. NEMs are therefore inextricably linked with international trade and FDI, shaping global patterns of trade in many sectors. In industry segments such as automotive components, consumer electronics, garments, hotels and IT and business process services, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing represent a very large share of total trade. NEMs are thus a major “route-to-market” for countries aiming at export-led growth, and a major point of access to TNC global value chains. TNC governance, control and coordination of host- country operations through NEMs can be indirect. In contract farming, the numbers of individual suppliers are so great that arrangements with TNCs are made by intermediaries. For example, in 2008 Olam (Singapore) sourced 17 agricultural commodities from approximately 200,000 suppliers in 60 countries (most of them developing countries). Similarly, in 2008 food manufacturer Nestlé (Switzerland) had more than 600,000 contract farmers in over 80 developing and transition economies as direct suppliers of various agricultural commodities (WIR09). Contractual relationship between a TNC and host-country farmers can be channelled through associations of farmers, cooperatives or other intermediaries, which then establish conditions for the production of farm products. In the garments industry, large intermediaries such as Li Fung (Hong Kong, China) arrange production in dozens of countries for branded clothing companies such as Gap (United States) via its long-standing relationship with independent contractors. Similarly, in franchising, extended networks of business outlets are often governed through a master franchisee that contracts rights for an entire market (a country or region) in which it manages relationships with individual unit franchisees. The means of control and the sources of bargaining power in NEM relationships vary by type. Partnerships are seldom equal, with power relationships depending on a range of factors which vary by NEM-type and industry, and include the capabilities and other assets possessed by TNCs and partner firms. In each NEM-type contractual levers of control are complemented with elements of soft bargaining power that strengthen TNCs’ governance of GVCs (table IV.3). At the same time, partner companies in host countries possess or can develop “countervailing power”, often with the support of their government. Sources of such countervailing power on the part of NEM partners include specialized knowledge (including patents and other intellectual property), advanced productive capabilities (e.g. the ability to scale operations quickly), access to key assets or resources (including human resources) or know- how related to the local market of the NEM partner. This countervailing power can also be exercised in a number of ways, including in negotiations defining the terms of a contract. Ultimately, it is the TNC which orchestrates the value chain. Thus, the most important source of TNC bargaining power, outweighing any countervailing forces that a host-country NEM may put forward, is its role as the coordinator of the GVC itself. This has implications for both partner firms and developing countries. The TNC’s governance of its integrated international production network and of the web of loosely dependent entities that make it up allows it to regulate access to the network and to set the conditions. Thus the segmentation or “fine-slicing” of value chains into ever more numerous and discrete activities that can be carried out by partner firms in any location plays into the hands of TNCs. It also makes them important interlocutors for policymakers aiming to stimulate the development of specific economic activities in specific locations, independent of whether such development is driven by FDI or domestic partners’ investment.
  • 154. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development130 To assess the extent to which TNCs govern global value chains it is no longer sufficient to consider equity ownership (FDI) alone as a control mechanism. However, analysing non-equity modes is complex, because the web of directly owned, partially owned, contract-based and arm’s-length forms of international operation of TNCs is tangled, and some of the distinctions between the different modes are blurred. Moreover, the relationship between FDI, NEMs and trade is also intertwined in many GVCs. In electronics contract manufacturing, for example, most of the top players, primarily from developing economies, have become TNCs in their own right. From the perspective of developing host countries, the activities of such firms are equivalent to FDI, B. THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF CROSS-BORDER NEMs NEMs are an important part of TNC-governed GVCs, and are growing rapidly. NEM activity is becoming ever more wide- spread geographically, though there are significant varia- tions by mode and industry. even if their productive capacity is employed to serve other TNCs. However, their NEM identity is vital information for policymakers – all the more so because such operations generate significant amounts of trade. Including the activities of such contract manufacturers in the measurement of non-equity modes of internationalization risks some “double-counting” between FDI and NEMs. Nevertheless, their inclusion in this section is essential in order to understand the nature and extent of value chain governance by individual TNCs. Measuring the scale and scope of cross-border NEMs is crucial to our understanding of the overall development of world trade and investment. Recognizing the complexity of NEMs and their interconnections with other aspects of TNC operations, the aim here is to establish a baseline to evaluate NEMs in a number of dimensions (box IV.2 describes the methodology used for the analysis and calculations). The overall methodology Table IV.3. TNCs’ contractual levers and sources of bargaining power Modes Contractual levers of TNC control over host-country firmsa Sources of TNC bargaining power Contract manufacturing Services outsourcing Contract farming • Specifications for design, process, product or service, and quality • Commercial terms and capital expenditure obligations/assurances • Supply guarantees and restrictions on side-selling • Obligations to purchase specific inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilizer) • Obligations regarding the TNC’s CSR practices • Access to the TNC internal market, guaranteed sales • Access to TNC know-how, supplies of inputs, logistics network • Existence of many potential contract suppliers Licensing • Obligations placed on the licensee restricting or conditioning the use of the intellectual property • Access to know-how, intellectual property • Access to the TNC internal market where part of a subcontracting arrangement •  Existence of many competing licensees Franchising • Obligations placed on the franchisee conditioning the use of the intellectual property and the running of the business (e.g. use of the supply network, choice of suppliers, service levels, capital expenditure, CSR) • Access to the TNC supply and business support network • Market strength of established brand names • Existence of alternative choices of franchisees Management contracts • Obligations regarding the state and maintenance of the asset and future investments (capital expenditure obligations/assurances) • Access to TNC managerial competencies and know-how, supply network, and intellectual property Source: UNCTAD. a Contractual arrangements also include obligations on the part of TNCs.
  • 155. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 131 Box IV.2. Methodological note Measurement of NEM activity is difficult, given the lack of national and international statistics that cover NEM-specific transactions. In order to provide some sense of the scale and scope of NEM activity worldwide, and specifically cross-border activities, UNCTAD employed a three-step methodology to establish estimates for WIR11. First, the prevalence of various forms of NEMs was mapped across industries. For example, contract manufacturing is most prevalent in industries such as electronics, automotive parts, garments, footwear etc. Where possible, overall NEM activity, measured by sales or exports, was gathered for all industry/mode combinations: • In some cases (contract manufacturing in electronics, automotive components, and pharmaceuticals; services outsourcing; franchising; and management contracts in hotels) estimates of global activity were obtained from recognized industry analysts, industry associations or consultancy firms. These estimates were then refined by analysing the major players in each market and adjusting total NEM sales by an appropriate internationalization ratio to derive cross-border sales. • In cases where NEM estimates do not exist in any form (contract manufacturing in garments, footwear, and toys) cross-border sales were estimated by taking world exports of those goods, subtracting re-exports, and applying an estimate of the share of exports related to the given mode/industry combination based on industry interviews and industry reports. Second, value added related to cross-border NEM sales was estimated in most cases by applying the ratio of value added (calculated as the sum of pre-tax income, personnel costs, and amortization/depreciation) to sales generated from a sample of representative companies in each industry. For franchising, the data was obtained through national franchise associations. Third, employment estimates, both total and in developing and transition economies, were also derived for each mode/industry combination: • In cases where the players in a given industry/mode combination are highly concentrated (contract manufac- turing: electronics, automotive components, and pharmaceuticals; and management contracts in hotels), the estimate of cross-border employment was constructed by taking the sum of their employment and inflating it by their share in the global NEM market for their industry/mode and applying an internationalization ratio. Estimates of employment in developing and transition economies were derived by applying the share of assets or employ- ment in these economies for the largest players to the total employment estimate. • In cases where the concentration of players is low (contract manufacturing: garments, footwear, and toys) total employment was estimated by using industrial data from UNIDO to determine worldwide employment in a given industry (2007 data, or latest available year) and applying industry-specific ratios related to the share of production destined for export and an estimate of the share of exports related to the given mode/industry combination. Estimates of employment in developing and transition economies were derived by applying the ratio of worldwide employment located in these economies to the total mployment estimate. • Data for franchising and IT services and business process outsourcing were obtained from national associa- tions and from industry reports. For franchising, an internationalization ratio (share of franchising activity carried out by foreigners) was applied to estimate cross-border NEM employment. For IT services and business pro- cess outsourcing, industry reports provided the necessary cross-border related employment. Estimates of em- ployment in developing and transition economies were constructed using information from the same sources. The data on major players used to derive estimates are included in annex tables IV.1–7. Source: UNCTAD. estimates a minimal size for NEMs, but the actual level is likely to be somewhat higher. The various contractual forms included in our discussion – contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, licensing, franchising and management contracts – are commonly also employed between firms within the same country. This section focuses only on those NEM activities that cross borders. Linkages between foreign affiliates and local firms that take the form of NEM contracts5 are, for the most part, excluded from the data presented here. The usage of NEMs in firm internationalization is common across many industries and in every segment of GVCs. This ubiquity creates difficulties for analysis of the phenomenon, given the general lack of relevant statistics. The report limits its analysis to a number of industries in which NEMs
  • 156. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development132 are especially important; and in some cases, to particular stages of a GVC, for similar reasons.6 Finally, firms sometimes simulate internal markets, in which their affiliates compete with each other or with outside suppliers for contracts. Because of this, contractual types such as licensing, contract manufacturing and management contracts are also commonly used within a TNC, i.e. between different legal entities of the same parent company. However, such intra-firm arrangements are excluded from the scope of cross-border NEMs in this report, as by definition they cannot be considered “non-equity”; and also because including them would again result in double-counting with FDI. 1. The overall size and growth of cross- border NEMs Cross-border NEM activity worldwide is estimated to have generated about $2 trillion of sales in 2010 in selected modes. Of this amount, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing accounted for about $1 Figure IV.3. Estimated worldwide sales by type of NEM, 2010 (Trillions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: See box IV.2 for the methodology used. The dotted area depicts the range estimates for each item. These figures include additional estimates not covered in table IV.4 for contract manufacturing (sporting goods, white goods, textiles, and electronics components) and management contracts (infrastructure services). trillion, franchising for $330–350 billion, licensing for $340–360 billion, and management contracts for some $100 billion (figure IV.3). These estimates are incomplete, including only the most important industries in which each NEM type is prevalent. The total also excludes other NEMs – principally contract farming – for which reliable data are not available. Other non-equity forms such as strategic alliances and concessions are not in the scope of this report, as explained in section IV.A.7 Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing as a whole clearly top the list on all major indicators, including total sales generated, value added, exports, worldwide employment and employment in developing countries as indicated by selected industries (table IV.4). Nevertheless, other NEM types are often significant on individual quantitative indicators (e.g. franchising, for employment generation in developing countries) or in terms of qualitative impacts (section D). Looking at major indicators by NEM type also hides significant differences by industry. Sales, value added and employment in more technology-intensive industries such as electronics, automotive components and pharmaceuticals, where contract manufacturing is concentrated in a number of major international Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing Franchising Licensing Management contracts Total value of selected cross-border NEM types 1.1–1.3 ~0.3 ~0.3 ~0.1 1.8–2.1 Cross-border NEMs are worth at least $2 trillion in sales globally, much of it in developing countries. In most cases, NEMs are growing more rapidly than the industries in which they operate.
  • 157. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 133 Table IV.4. Key figures of cross-border NEMs, selected industries, 2010a (Billions of dollars and millions of employees) Estimated NEM-related worldwide Sales Value added Employment Employment in developing economies Contract manufacturing - selected technology/capital intensive industries Electronics 230–240 20–25 1.4–1.7 1.3–1.5 Automotive components 200–220 60–70 1.1–1.4 0.3–0.4 Pharmaceuticals 20–30 5–10 0.1–0.2 0.05–0.1 Contract manufacturing - selected labour intensive industries Garments 200–205 40–45 6.5–7.0 6.0–6.5 Footwear 50–55 10–15 1.7–2.0 1.6–1.8 Toys 10–15 2–3 0.4–0.5 0.4–0.5 Services outsourcing IT services and business process outsourcing b 90–100 50–60 3.0–3.5 2.0–2.5 Franchising Retail, hotel, restaurant, and catering, business and other services 330–350 130–150 3.8–4.2 2.3–2.5 Management contracts - selected industry Hotels 15–20 5–10 0.3–0.4 0.1–0.15 Estimated NEM-related worldwide Fees Associated sales Associated value added Licensing Cross-industry 17–18 340–360 90–110 Source: UNCTAD estimates. a Data for 2010 or latest available year. b For data reliability reasons this estimate only reflects pure cross-border sales and is therefore an underestimate of NEM activity in this industry. Note: See box IV.2 for the methodology used. All figures are cross-border, inter-firm NEM only. operators, are different from those in traditional labour-intensive industries such as garments, footwear and toys, which are characterized by large numbers of smaller producers, at best aggregated under international operators specializing in GVC coordination. Equally, grouping businesses as diverse as retail, quick-service restaurants and business services under the single banner of franchising undoubtedly hides wide variations in value added and employment. There are large variations in relative size. In the automotive industry, contract manufacturing accounts for 30 per cent of global exports of automotive components and a quarter of employment. In contrast, in electronics, contract manufacturing represents a much larger share of trade and employment. In labour-intensive industries such as garments, footwear and toys, contract manufacturing is even more important. Putting different modes of international production in perspective, cross-border activity related to selected NEMs of $2 trillion compares with exports of foreign affiliates of TNCs of some $6 trillion in 2010. However, NEMs are particularly important in developing countries, which in many industries account for almost all NEM-related employment and exports, compared with the developing country share in global FDI stocks of 30 per cent and in world trade of less than 40 per cent. NEMs are also growing rapidly. In most cases, the growth of NEMs outpaces that of the industries in which they operate (figure IV.4). 2. Trends and indicators by type of NEM a. Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing relationships across borders are extensive. They knit together the widely dispersed activities of many of the largest TNCs in the world. The bulk of integrated international manufacturing occurs within
  • 158. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development134 the confines of TNCs’ global operations, manifesting itself through significant levels of intra-firm trade. Contract manufacturing with third parties, however, has grown rapidly in the past decade as TNCs move towards network forms of operation. Globally, UNCTAD estimates that the market for contract manufacturing and services outsourcing combined was in the range of $1.1–1.3 trillion in 2010 (figure IV.3). The use of contract manufacturing varies considerably across industries (figure IV.5). For instance, the toys and sporting goods, electronics and automotive industry are major users of contract manufacturing, outsourcing more than 50 per cent shareofcostofgoodssold.Contractmanufacturing, in industries such as pharmaceuticals, on the other hand, is relatively new and is still small measured as a percentage of cost of goods sold. The nature and origin of NEM players, the geographical dispersion of NEM operations and their scale and industrial concentration differ by industry. For example, whereas contract manufacturers in electronics and IT-BPO services (information technology and business process outsourcing) are major TNCs in their own right, with large-scale operations in a relatively small number of locations worldwide, those in industries such as garments and footwear are relatively small firms in low-cost locations with a very wide geographical dispersion (tables IV.5 and IV.6). In technology and capital-intensive industries a small number of NEMs – often TNCs – dominate. In automotive components, pharmaceuticals and IT- BPO, companies from developed countries are the largest contract manufacturers, while in electronics and semiconductors the situation is more mixed, but with developing country companies the more significant (tables IV.5 and IV.6). In the case of labour- intensive industries such as garments, footwear and toys, however, a number of developing country TNCs act as intermediaries or agents between lead TNCs and NEMs, managing the manufacturing part of the GVC. Many of these intermediaries, such as Li Fung Ltd (Hong Kong, China), have evolved from NEM roots. The examination of contract manufacturing in electronics, garments and IT-BPO that follows is illustrative of the various patterns of evolution, activity and geographic dispersal, which depend on the nature of industries and other conditions. Figure IV.5. Use of contract manufacturing by selected industries, estimated share of cost of goods sold Source: Polastro (2009). Contract manufacturing in the electronics industry evolved early. Offshoring up to the mid- 1980s took the form of manufacturing FDI, as TNCs took advantage of cheaper, relatively skilled labour8 in host countries to process and assemble intermediate goods for shipping back to their home economies. In the latter part of the Pharmaceuticals (branded) Pharmaceuticals (generic) Automotive Consumer electronics Toys/sporting goods ~ 90% ~ 80% ~ 60–70% ~ 40% ~ 20% 0 5 10 15 20 Garments (contract manufacturing) Toys (contract manufacturing) Retail (franchising) Footwear (contract manufacturing) Pharmaceuticals (contract manufacturing) Electronics (contract manufacturing Industry growth NEM growth Figure IV.4. Comparative growth rates of NEMs’ sales, selected industries, 2005-2010 (Per cent) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: Global industry growth estimates based on industry market research from Ibisworld (garments and footwear) and Datamonitor (all others). Estimates for NEM growth are based on data for the 10 largest contract manufacturers in each industry, except for franchising in retail, which is based on data available for 24 countries. Contract manufacturing/ services outsourcing, franchising and licensing are among the largest NEMs in terms of sales and employment. Other NEMs – such as contract farming and management contracts – are significant in various ways.
  • 159. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 135 1980s, a number of electronics companies started shedding manufacturing operations to concentrate on RD, product design and brand management. The manufacturing was taken up by electronics manufacturing services (EMS) companies, including Celestica, Flextronics and Foxconn. Some of these emerged from existing suppliers, especially those based in Taiwan Province of China (e.g. Foxconn); others were spinoffs,9 such as Celestica from IBM (McKendrick, Doner and Haggard, 2000; Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2010). A small number of contract manufacturers now dominate the industry, with the largest 10 by sales accounting for some two-thirds of the EMS activity. They produce for all major brands in the industry, from Dell and Hewlett-Packard in computing to Apple, Sony and Philips in consumer electronics (annex table IV.1), with overall sales in electronics contract manufacturing amounting to $230–240 billion in 2010 (table IV.4). All but three of the top 10 players in electronics contract manufacturing are headquartered in developing East Asia – the bulk of manufacturing production in the industry is centred on East and South-East Asia, particularly China. During the last decade, however, contract manufacturing firms in the industry have accelerated their spread to other regions, often by purchasing manufacturing facilities from lead TNCs. This has made them into large TNCs in their own right. Today, they own and run hundreds of facilities in developing economies that lie beyond their region of origin, including Brazil, India, Mexico and Turkey (annex table IV.1). In addition to these large global NEM firms, there are many smaller contract manufacturers in the industry, both established and emerging, in Table IV.5. Major developing economy players in contract manufacturing and services outsourcing, 2009 (Billions of dollars and thousands of employees) Company name Sales Employment Company name Sales Employment Electronics Garments Foxconn/Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) 59.3 611 Youngor Group Co. Ltd (China) 1.8 47 Flextronics (Singapore) 30.9 160 Luen Thai (Hong Kong, China) 0.8 20 Quanta (Taiwan Province of China) 25.4 65 Makalot Industrial (Taiwan Province of China) 0.4 21 Compal (Taiwan Province of China) 20.4 58 Tristate (Hong Kong, China) 0.4 15 Wistron (Taiwan Province of China) 13.9 39 High Fashion International (Hong Kong, China) 0.3 12 Automotive components Footwear LG Chem (Republic of Korea) 13.1 8 Pou Chen (Taiwan Province of China) 6.5 333 Hyundai Mobis (Republic of Korea) 11.2 6 Stella International (Taiwan Province of China) 1.0 50 Mando (Republic of Korea) 2.1 4 Feng Tay (Taiwan Province of China) 0.8 68 Nemak (Mexico) 1.9 15 Symphony (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 14 Randon (Brazil) 1.4 10 Kingmaker Footwear (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 12 Pharmaceuticals Toys Piramal Healthcare (India) 0.7 7 Kader (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 20 Jubilant Life Sciences (India) 0.7 6 Herald (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 8 Divi's Laboratories (India) 0.2 1 Lerado Group (Hong Kong, China) 0.2 5 Dishman Pharmaceuticals (India) 0.2 1 Dream International (Hong Kong, China) 0.1 9 Hikal (India) 0.1 1 Matrix (Hong Kong, China) 0.1 9 Semiconductors IT-BPO TSMC (Taiwan Province of China) 9.2 26 Tata Consultancy Services (India) 5.2 160 UMC (Taiwan Province of China) 2.9 13 Wipro (India) 4.2 108 Chartered Semiconductor (Singapore) 1.5 4 China Communications Services (China) 2.7 127 SMIC (China) 1.1 10 Sonda (Chile) 0.9 9 Dongbu HiTek (Republic of Korea) 0.4 3 HCL Technologies (India) 0.8 54 Source: UNCTAD Note: Data refers, where possible, to sales and employment associated with cross-border NEM activities.
  • 160. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development136 Table IV.6. Top 10 players in contract manufacturing and services outsourcing, selected industries, 2009 (Billions of dollars and thousands of employees) Company name Sales Employment Company name Sales Employment Electronics Foxconn/Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) 59.3 611 Inventec (Taiwan Province of China) 13.5 30 Flextronics (Singapore) 30.9 160 Jabil (United States) 13.4 61 Quanta (Taiwan Province of China) 25.4 65 TPV Technology (Hong Kong, China) 8.0 24 Compal (Taiwan Province of China) 20.4 58 Celestica (Canada) 6.5 35 Wistron (Taiwan Province of China) 13.9 39 Sanmina-SCI (United States) 5.2 32 Automotive components Denso (Japan) 32.0 120 LG Chem (Republic of Korea) 13.1 13 Robert Bosch (Germany) 25.6 271 Faurecia (France) 13.0 58 Aisin Seiki (Japan) 22.1 74 Johnson Controls (United States) 12.8 130 Continental (Germany) 18.7 148 Delphi (United States) 11.8 147 Magna International (Canada) 17.4 96 ZF Friedrichshafen (Germany) 11.7 60 Pharmaceuticals Catalent Pharma Solutions (United States) 1.6 9 Jubilant Life Sciences (India) 0.7 6 Lonza Group (Switzerland) 1.3 4 NIPRO Corp. (Japan) 0.6 10 Boehringer Ingelheim (Germany) 1.1 6 Patheon (Canada) 0.5 4 Royal DSM (Netherlands) 1.0 4 Fareva (France) 0.4 5 Piramal Healthcare (India) 0.7 7 Haupt Pharma (Germany) 0.4 2 Semiconductors TSMC (Taiwan Province of China) 9.2 26 Dongbu HiTek (Republic of Korea) 0.4 3 UMC (Taiwan Province of China) 2.9 13 VIC (Taiwan Province of China) 0.4 3 Chartered Semiconductor (Singapore) 1.5 4 TowerJazz (Israel) 0.3 2 Globalfoundries (United States) 1.1 10 Samsung Electronics (Republic of Korea) 0.3 .. SMIC (China) 1.1 10 IBM Microelectronics (United States) 0.3 .. IT-BPO International Business Machines (United States) 38.2 190 NTT Data Corp. (Japan) 8.9 35 Hewlett-Packard (United States) 34.9 140 Computer Sciences Corporation (United States) 6.5 45 Fujitsu (Japan) 27.1 18 Cap Gemini (France) 6.1 109 Xerox (United States) 9.6 46 Dell (United States) 5.6 43 Accenture (Ireland) 9.2 204 Logica (United Kingdom) 5.5 39 Source: UNCTAD, based on annex tables IV.1, 2, 3, 5 and 7. Note: Data refers, where possible, to sales and employment associated with cross-border NEM activities. locations around the world which are important players in local value chains. These firms lack the global footprint of the top players and their close interaction with major lead TNCs in the electronics industry; instead many act as second- and third-tier suppliers to the large NEM players in the industry. The garment and footwear industries have a long history of contract manufacturing, especially by companies located in developing countries. Although there are large-scale developing country firms involved in contract manufacturing, such as Gama Tek (Turkey) or Alok Industries (India), generally speaking contract manufacturing is a highly competitive industry typified by vast numbers of small suppliers servicing a limited number of international brands and retailers. Examples of the larger brands include Adidas (Germany), Christian Dior (France), and Nike (United States) (annex table IV.4); retailers include mass merchandisers such as Walmart (United States) and Marks and Spencer’s (United Kingdom), and speciality retailers including Gap (United States) and HM (Sweden). Contracts are often managed through agents or intermediate players (mostly from East Asia),
  • 161. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 137 formerly contract manufacturers, which have evolved into providers of “value chain management services”, taking on board more and more elements of the value chain (e.g. design and outsourcing), and sometimes shedding their original manufacturing operations. This happened in the case of Li Fung Ltd, which has 80 offices globally (many in developed countries, to work with and secure orders from major brand owners) and 12,000 suppliers under contract manufacturing arrangements in 40 developing economies. Some of the suppliers within such arrangements are themselves TNCs, for instance Hong Kong and Indonesian manufacturers with affiliates in (neighbouring) countries with lower labour costs such as Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic or Lesotho (Gereffi and Frederick, 2010; McNamara, 2008). The size of the market in contract manufacturing of garments, by sales, is some $200–205 billion (table IV.4), with production occurring in widely dispersed locations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The location of factories used by Gap Inc (United States) is a good reflection of this spread (figure IV.6). Beyond the manufacturing elements of TNCs’ value chains, increasing fine-slicing of business functions, including corporate and support activities (e.g. back-office functions or customer services), has fuelled a surge in the outsourcing of services. Figure IV.6. Location of factories used by Gap Inc, 2009 Source: UNCTAD, based on company report. Services outsourcing began as an “onshore” activity in information technology in the 1990s, but rapidly shifted to offshore markets, especially in developing and transition economies. The facility to separate location of production and related services arising from the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution hastened the extension of services outsourcing and offshoring to a range of business processes and other knowledge processes such as market research, business intelligence and RD (Gereffi and Fernadez-Starck, 2010). UNCTAD estimates that the global scale of services outsourcing exports, mostly IT-BPO, was around $90–100 billion in 2009 (table IV.4). This may be a considerable underestimate, with other valuations ranging up to $380 billion or more,11 although the higher figures often include elements such as services outsourcing by TNC affiliates. Because of its development out of ICT and knowledge activities, the industry is dominated by major developed country players such as Accenture (Ireland), Cap Gemini (France), Hewlett-Packard (United States), IBM (United States), and NTT Data (Japan) (table IV.6). The largest developing country firms providing services under contract to overseas clients are from India, including Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys Technologies and Wipro, with others dispersed from China to Chile (table IV.5). The top developing country locations for outsourcing services (managed both by major developed country players and by local firms) are still in Asia. Three countries, India, the Philippines and China, accounted for around 65 per cent12 of global export revenues related to IT-BPO services in 2009, partly because of locational advantages, such as specific language and IT skills, the low cost of labour, and ICT infrastructure. However, the industry is expanding to countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa (AT Kearney, 2011; annex table IV.5). Unlike contract manufacturing, services outsourcing is tied to cities as locations, because of the need for knowledge workers and ready connectivity. A number of new city locations for services outsourcing are coming to the fore (table IV.7). East Asia 33% South Asia 26% South-East Asia 25% Latin America and the Caribbean 7% Developed countries 5% Africa and West Asia 4%
  • 162. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development138 b. Franchising Worldwide sales franchised enterprises reached nearly $2.5 trillion in 2010 (table IV.8), of which the value of cross-border franchising was around $330– 350 billion (table IV.4). The share of international franchising varies significantly by country. In most developed markets domestic franchising accounts for 80–90 per cent of the total, but franchising has reached maturity in some major emerging markets as well. In Brazil, for example, foreign franchise chains represent only around 10 per cent of the total, all of the top 10 chains being domestic Table IV.7. Locations for global services outsourcing: top 10 established and emerging cities, 2010 Top 10 established cities Top 10 emerging cities Bangalore (India) Krakow (Poland) Mumbai (India) Beijing (China) Delhi (India) Buenos Aires (Argentina) Manila (Philippines) Cairo (Egypt) Chennai (India) Sao Paolo (Brazil) Hyderabad (India) Ho Chi Minh City (Viet Nam) Dublin (Ireland) Dalian (China) Pune (India) Shenzhen (China) Cebu City (Philippines) Curitiba (Brazil) Shanghai (China) Colombo (Sri Lanka) Source: Global Services, Destination Compendium 2010. Available at www.globalservicesmedia.com. Note: The ranking of the cities is based on a range of quantitative and qualitative factors such as the number and quality of IT engineers and other skilled labour, the business environment, connectivity and infrastructure support, risk profiles and quality of life. Table IV.8. Franchise systemsa in the world, 2010 Region/economy Franchise systems Number of outlets (Thousands) Sales ($ billion) Employees (Thousands) Cross-border (Per cent) b World 30 000 2 640 2 480 19 940 15 Developed economies 12 200 1 310 2 210 12 400 10 Europe 7 700 370 340 2 830 20 Japan 1 200 230 250 2 500 5 United States 2 500 630 1 480 6 250 5 Developing/transition economies 17 400 1 330 270 7 540 30 Africa 1 600 40 30 550 70 Latin America and the Caribbean 3 800 190 70 1 810 20 Asia 11 200 1 070 170 4 810 25 South-East Europe and the CIS 800 30 5 370 50 Source: UNCTAD estimates, based on a joint UNCTAD/World Franchise Council survey of national franchise associations. a A franchise system consists of all the franchised units and units managed by the franchisor itself that operate under the same banner and business format, for example the McDonalds franchise system. b Refers to the share of cross-border outlets in the total number of outlets. franchises. However, initial growth of franchising in developing markets is often driven by international franchise operators. In most African markets, except for South Africa, international franchisors account for 80 per cent or more of the total, and in emerging markets such as Mexico, the Russian Federation and Turkey, the rate is still between 30 and 40 per cent. The franchising formula is found in different sectors, and takes different forms. The most important franchising sectors are retail (including high-street retailing as well as grocery), restaurants (often quick- service restaurants), hotels, business services, as well as a diverse range of other services sectors, from education to personal care services. In developed countries the share of higher value added services tends to be higher; in the United States, for example, business and personal services account for 37 per cent of the total franchising sector. By contrast, in developing countries, micro-franchising (mostly one-person businesses) and lower value added services are more common. For example, in South Africa the most important franchising sector is quick-service restaurants, with a share of almost 25 per cent of franchised systems, followed by retail (also a limited value added sector) with 22 per cent. Similarly, in India the leading sector is retail, with a share of 32 per cent, followed by quick-service restaurants with 16 per cent. Most large global franchising operators (franchisors) originate in developed countries, whether they are
  • 163. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 139 international retailers expanding through franchise networks, luxury brands expanding internationally on the high street, in shopping malls and at airports, or restaurants transplanting their successful formulas to new markets as consumers develop an “international taste”. The top 15 global franchisors by number of outlets are all United States firms, apart from one company each from Japan, Canada and the United Kingdom (annex table IV.6). Most of these 15 firms are fast-food chains such as McDonald’s (United States) and Pizza Hut (United States). The remaining companies out of this group are essentially convenience stores or hotels, including 7-Eleven (Japan) and InterContinental (United Kingdom). Global franchise chains are frequently widely dispersed, with many franchisees in developing countries. For example, KFC (United States) has franchisees in about 110 countries globally, of which some 75 are developing economies; the equivalent numbers for Holiday Inn are over 100 and 80. The choice of location is driven by market size, which is reflected in the top franchising country locations. c. Licensing International licensing spans a wide range of industries and activities, touching on nearly every step of many industries’ global value chains. UNCTAD estimates that cross-border NEM-related licensing resulted in sales of $340–360 billion in 2010 (figure IV.7). NEM-related licensing has grown steadily since 1990, registering a steady 10 per cent average annual growth rate as measured by estimated sales up to 2008, although there was a decline in 2009 because of the financial and economic crisis. Balance of payments statistics suggest that licensing activity directed at developing markets increased markedly in the past decade, though developed economies continue to dominate. Global royalty payments are indicative of licences received (and hence the location of NEM partners to TNCs) and, on this basis, developing and transition economies now pay out roughly a quarter of global royalty fees (table IV.9). The geographical dispersal of licensees (based on royalty payments) is wide, although South, East, 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 1990 2000 2005 2008 2009 Figure IV.7. Estimated sales related to cross-border inter-firm licensing, various years (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: The dotted area depicts the range estimates for each year. Data from the United States was used to calculate the amount of cross-border inter-firm licensing associated with industrial processes and trade marks. This number was scaled-up to the world total by using the share of the United States in world licensing receipts. Table IV.9. Royalties and licence payments by selected developing and transition economies, 2005, 2008, 2009 (Billions of dollars) Region/economy 2005 2008 2009 World 143.4 204.2 197.4 Developed economies 113.1 153.5 149.2 Developing and transition economies 30.3 50.7 48.2 Africa 1.6 2.5 2.5 South Africa 1.1 1.7 1.6 Egypt 0.2 0.3 0.3 Nigeria 0.1 0.2 0.2 Latin America and the Caribbean 3.3 6.5 6.1 Brazil 1.4 2.7 2.5 Argentina 0.7 1.5 1.5 Mexico 0.1 0.6 0.5 Chile 0.3 0.5 0.5 Asia and Oceania 23.1 35.8 34.4 West Asia 0.5 1.1 1.0 Turkey 0.4 0.7 0.6 Iraq 0.0 0.4 0.3 South, East and South-East Asia 22.7 34.7 33.5 Singapore 9.3 12.5 11.6 China 5.3 10.3 11.1 Taiwan Province of China 1.8 3.0 3.4 Thailand 1.7 2.6 2.3 India 0.7 1.5 1.9 South-East Europe and the CIS 2.3 5.9 5.2 Russian Federation 1.6 4.6 4.1 Ukraine 0.4 0.8 0.6 Croatia 0.2 0.3 0.2 Source: UNCTAD, based on IMF’s balance-of-payment statistics.
  • 164. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development140 agreement. Although there is no available figure for the overall scale of cross-border contract farming, a key NEM in terms of development impact (section D), it is widespread. TNCs utilize contract farming in over 110 developing and transition economies, and this involves a large range of agricultural commodities. This NEM is a significant feature of many TNC GVCs, including food and beverages, biofuels and retail (supermarkets). Contract farming plays an important role in underpinning agricultural production and related activities (WIR09): • In Brazil about 75 per cent of poultry and 35 per cent of soya bean production are sourced through contract farming. • In Kenya, about 60 per cent of tea and sugar – and nearly all of cut flower exports – are pro- duced through contract farming arrangements. • In Mozambique a majority of the 400,000 con- tract farmers are smallholders. • In Viet Nam some 90 per cent of cotton and fresh milk, 50 per cent of tea and 40 per cent of rice are sourced through this mode. • In Zambia 100 per cent of cotton and paprika are produced through contract farming. and South-East Asia comprised nearly 70 per cent of the total from developing and transition economies in 2009, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean, South-East Europe and the CIS, Africa, and West Asia. Within each region there is a high concentration of licensing activity in a few countries, e.g. South Africa and Egypt in Africa; Brazil and Argentina in Latin America; and Turkey in West Asia. This is slightly less the case for East, South and South-East Asia, with Singapore, China and Taiwan Province of China most involved as licensing partners. d. Other modalities In addition to contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, franchising and licensing, discussed above, there are many other NEMs – such as management contracts and contract farming – for which overall scale is difficult to estimate (reliable data are often unavailable), but which are nevertheless large and important from a development perspective. In the case of cross- border management contracts, UNCTAD estimates sales of $100 billion (figure IV.3) in an eclectic range of industries from hotels (box IV.3) to infrastructure services, such as electricity and water distribution. The management contract element in infrastructure is often a sub-element of a more complex
  • 165. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 141 Box IV.3. The use of management contracts in the hotel industry The international hotel industry is a good example of how TNCs vary their use of internationalization modes depending on circumstances. Historically, hotel chains have favoured franchising as a mode of expansion, both domestically and internationally. Hotel groups largely stick to franchising in more mature markets, while they have a stronger preference for management contracts (and ownership, i.e. FDI) in developing markets. They also exhibit a preference for management contract when it comes to luxury and upscale hotels – categories with a larger share in hotel group portfolios in developing markets, compared to mature markets. Globally, eight of the 10 largest hotel groups use management contracts. The average share of management contracts in the global branded market (by number of rooms) is around 28 per cent (24 per cent for the top 10 groups). Among the top 10 groups Hyatt makes the most use of this mode (53 per cent share in rooms), and Marriot accounts for the highest amount of sales associated with management contracts ($8.9 billion). These chains combined have 41 per cent of their operations abroad. The resulting share of management contracts in sales abroad by the top 10 groups provides an estimate of $16 billion; and by branded hotels of $19 billion. UNCTAD estimates that cross-border management contracts employ 233,000 people in the top 10 chains and 353,000 for the entire branded market. These figures most likely understate the employment impact in developing countries, as employment intensity in those markets is much higher due to low labour costs and more services provided in-house (box table IV.3.1; MKG Hospitality, 2011). Source: UNCTAD. Box table IV.3.1. Top 10 hotel groups, 2010 Group Home economy Number of rooms Estimated hotel system sales Estimated hotel system employment Internation- alization (Per cent) Franchising (Per cent) Management contracts (MC) (Per cent) Total sales MC International employment MC IHG InterContinental Hotels Group United Kingdom 647 161 18 700 335 000 90 74 25 4 701 75 786 Marriot International United States 618 104 19 691 300 000 20 53 45 8 860 27 00 Wyndham Hotel Group United States 612 735 7 169 315 970 25 96 1 47 519 Hilton Hotel Corp. United States 587 813 18 757 303 118 17 69 26 4 885 13 082 Accor France 507 306 10 083 261 603 75 24 22 2 208 42 728 Choice Hotel International, Inc. United States 495 145 6 538 145 000 15 100 - - - Starwood Hotel Resorts Worlwide United States 308 736 12 260 159 206 43 39 52 6 323 35 353 Best Western International United States 308 477 6 931 145 000 39 100 - - - Carlson Hotels Worldwide United States 159 756 4 844 160 000 55 65 21 1 017 18 541 Hyatt Hotels Corp. United States 127 507 5 124 130 000 30 16 53 2 716 20 376 Total top 10 hotel groups - 4 372 740 110 101 2 254 898 41 68 22 30 760 233 488 Source: UNCTAD estimates, based on company and consultancy reports. Note: Sales are the gross sales of the global hotel system, including sales generated by franchised and managed hotels. The share of management contracts is the proportion of rooms in hotels under management contracts in the total number of rooms.
  • 166. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development142 Table IV.10. NEMs: key advantages and drivers of growth Advantages of NEMs for TNCs Drivers of the continuing growth of NEMs Low upfront investment outlays and working capital • Increasing focus on return on capital employed (ROCE) and need to de-leverage • Ever greater levels of capital expenditure required for expansion of production and entering new markets Limited risk exposure • Increasing market and political risk-aversion • Limitation of legal liability Flexibility • Increasing awareness of the need to anticipate cyclical shocks Leveraging of core competencies • Increasing value-chain segmentation, combined with improving knowledge codification, prevalence of industry standards and improving IP regimes as enabling factors • Growing availability of sophisticated NEM partners in emerging markets capable of providing core (e.g. design facilities) and non-core activities efficiently and effectively Source: UNCTAD. 1. Driving forces behind the growing importance of NEMs The use of non-equity modes in international production by TNCs has increased rapidly over the last decade. The growth of NEMs has outpaced the growth of FDI, the traditional means of overseas expansion for TNCs. They have also expanded faster than the average in those sectors in which NEMs are most prevalent (section IV.B). The rapid growth of NEMs as a means of internationalization can be explained by both firms’ strategic choices and a number of enabling factors. The choice on the part of firms to expand overseas through the use of NEMs is based on a number of key advantages they possess (table IV.10). Overall, these advantages, without nuancing them by type of NEM, are: (1) the relatively lower upfront capital expenditure and working capital needed for operation; (2) related to this, the reduced risk exposure; (3) greater flexibility in adapting to changes in the business cycle and in demand; and (4) the externalization of non-core activities that can be carried out at lower cost or more effectively by other operators. These core advantages of NEMs for firms indicate that the growth of NEMs as a means of internationalization is likely to persist. The ever- present attention of shareholders on return on capital employed (ROCE),13 the need for firms to de-leverage in the post-crisis world, and greater risk-aversion all increase the relative attractiveness of NEMs, as these modes require less capital. The greater awareness of the need to anticipate shocks in the business cycle makes the flexibility that contract manufacturers provide in changing production levels, or the shifting of market risks to partners through licensing or franchising, more important. In industries such as hotels, franchising and management contracts allow for much faster expansion of the brand than would be feasible when owning all properties. Finally, across industries the trend to focus on core competencies, externalizing parts of the value chain not considered central to other operations, will if anything accelerate, given the drive to ensure maximum efficiency along the value chain to serve emerging markets demanding low-cost versions of mature-market products and services. There are also disadvantages and risks associated with NEMs. To start with, the externalization of any part of the value chain through the use of an NEM will cause a firm to capture less of the total value created in the chain. In addition, natural and structural market imperfections and resulting NEMs are driven by a number of factors, including their relatively lower upfront capi- tal requirements, reduced risk exposure and greater flex- ibility in adapting to change, allowing TNCs to leverage their core competencies. C. DRIVERS AND DETERMINANTS OF NEMs
  • 167. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 143 transaction costs can make NEMs less attractive. This is balanced by the relative profitability of other segments of the value chain and by potential cost advantages that can be obtained through the externalization of activities (e.g. to low-cost providers and locations). Risks associated with NEMs stem from a lower degree of control over processes, with potential implications for quality and service levels (e.g. on-time delivery), and over technology, skills, or other forms of intellectual property transferred to a partner. The purpose of the contract establishing the NEM partnership is to address precisely these disadvantages and risks, from the TNC’s perpective, setting out the parameters for the sharing of value and profits, and including clauses to mitigate the risks for both parties. In addition to the trends pushing TNCs towards a greater use of NEMs, a number of enabling factors are facilitating their growth. The increasing fragmentation of production processes between locations, growing sophistication in codification of knowledge and prevalence of industry standards, improving intellectual property protection regimes worldwide, and growing capabilities and increasing availability of credible and technologically sophisticated partner firms in new markets are all contributing to NEM growth. Due to the inherent advantages of NEMs and the factors enabling their development, TNCs appear to be increasingly choosing NEMs rather than FDI as a means of internationalization. However, TNCs make a deliberate choice between the two options only in some cases; frequently the use of NEMs is either opportunistic or is determined by a firm’s business model, or by industry- and country- specific factors. Where the use of NEMs is optional for TNCs, the choice between ownership and partnership is analogous to a “make or buy” decision (as discussed in section IV.A). For example, a pharmaceutical firm can either build its own plant to serve an overseas market, or grant a licence to a local manufacturer to do so, as in the case of GlaxoSmithKline’s licensing of the drug Seretide to Hanmi in the Republic of Korea (Avafia, Berger and Hartzenberg, 2006; Berger et al., 2010). NEMs and FDI operations can also be developed in parallel. Many retailers operate both directly owned and franchised stores in the same markets. For example, Carrefour operates most of its hypermarkets and larger supermarkets as directly owned stores, and uses franchising for some of its convenience stores in both developed countries (e.g. France, Italy) and emerging markets (e.g. Brazil) In many cases a TNC’s business model or plan may predispose it to use a particular mode. In the case of franchising, while the choice of using FDI remains, a business model that is built around the exploitation of intellectual property or product development core competencies leads some brand owners, such as Benetton, to use exclusively franchising for distribution in both domestic and foreign markets (Reid, 2008). In pharmaceuticals, the trend to outsource production stages along the pharmaceutical value chain in their home markets is leading TNCs to adopt the same lean model globally. For example, as part of Pfizer’s outsourcing strategy, the company manages approximately 150 contract manufacturers around the world. A number of developing country companies, such as LaboratoriosPhoenix(Argentina)havebenefitedfrom this process.14 In contract manufacturing, in some industries such as automotives or electronics where the model is mature and contract manufacturers have themselves grown into large TNCs with strong competencies and cost advantages, it would be almost unthinkable for brand owners to invest in their own intermediate manufacturing facilities. For example, Denso (Japan), in automotive parts, and Foxconn (Taiwan Province of China), an electronics contract manufacturer, have huge operations in many locations, as well as considerable investment in research (section D.4; Cattaneo, Gereffi and Staritz, 2010). Industry and host economy factors can also necessitate the use of NEMs. The competitive advantages possessed by local businesses may make entry into a market through FDI unfeasible or a losing proposition. In a more extreme case, prohibitive restrictions on FDI as an entry mode into a host economy may foster greater use of NEMs by TNCs. For example, the cap on foreign ownership and restriction on retailing business in the Indian food retail sector has kept out or limited the nature of market entry by large international
  • 168. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development144 retailers such as Walmart15 that exclusively operate fully owned stores; but the same policy has created an opportunity for Spar International (Germany), an international retail franchisor, to expand its network in the huge and expanding Indian consumer market (Ravichandran, Jayakumar and Samad, 2008). Restrictions on land ownership by foreign firms in India have also, in part, led to the use of contract farming by TNCs in order to secure supplies for the local or global value chains (Barrett et al., 2010). Clearly the opposite is also possible: firm-, industry- or host country-specific factors may preclude the use of NEMs and dictate the choice of FDI in entering foreign markets. A TNC may have a business model and cost structure based on maximizing internal value added, or be dependent on full control over marketing or retail mix (product and price), which cannot be achieved in external structures. At the industry level, in highly knowledge-intensive sectors, and in those industries where knowledge still tends to be tacit and difficult to transfer to third parties, developing NEMs may not be feasible. And at the country level, where countries lack credible and capable local partners, or where local partners do not have access to capital, FDI may be the only feasible entry option. Firms’ preferences, enabling factors, and factors that predetermine the use of a particular mode of internationalization will play out in different ways to drive the growth of different non-equity modes across industries. Table IV.11 summarizes the main drivers of growth for each mode. 2. Factors that make countries attractive NEM locations The factors that make countries attractive locations for NEM operations are in many respects the same as for FDI operations. These factors, or locational determinants, are usually analysed for FDI in a standard framework (WIR98; WIR10) that encompasses a country’s policies, business facilitation, and its general economic environment (table IV.12). A stable policy environment conducive to business, including well-developed competition policy, trade and fiscal rules, is equally relevant for NEM operations as for direct invested operations. A numberofFDI-specificlocationaldeterminants,such as rules regarding entry and operations, standards of treatment of foreign affiliates, and adherence to international agreements on FDI, are relevant only to the extent that TNCs aiming to enter a foreign market through the use of a non-equity mode may NEM locational determinants consist of the policy frame- work, economic conditions and business facilitation. Such determinants are con- text- and mode-specific. Table IV.11. Selected mode-specific drivers of international NEM growth Mode Drivers of growth Contract manufacturing Services outsourcing • Increasing fragmentation of production processes between locations • Easier codification and sharing of knowledge and increasing prevalence of industry standards • Improving intellectual property protection regimes • Growing presence of large and sophisticated potential partners Licensing • Strengthening intellectual property regimes • Increasing availability of sophisticated partners in emerging markets Franchising • Large emerging consumer markets moving from traditional to modern retail and services, leading to: - growth of demand exceeding the capacity of TNCs to expand through directly owned business networks - increasing “pull” of potential franchisors by willing entrepreneurs in rapidly growing emerging markets • Market saturation and high levels of competition in home countries Management contracts • Increasing number of passive property investors • Market saturation and high levels of competition in home countries Contract farming • Increasingly volatile commodity prices pushing TNCs to seek stable sources of supplies and predictability of costs • Rising concerns in many countries regarding foreign ownership of agricultural land Source: UNCTAD.
  • 169. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 145 Table IV.12. Locational determinants and relevance for FDI and NEMs Relevant for FDI and NEMs More relevant for FDI More relevant for NEMs Policy framework • Economic, political and social stability • Competition policy • Trade policy • Tax policy • Rules regarding entry and operations • Standards of treatment of foreign affiliates • International investment agreements • Privatization policy • Stable general commercial and contract law • Specific laws governing NEM contractual forms (e.g. recognizing licensing, franchising contracts) • Intellectual property protection Business facilitation • Reduction of hassle costs (e.g. cost of doing business) • Investment promotion • Investment incentives • Provision of after-care • Provision of social amenities (e.g. quality of life) • Facilitation efforts aimed at: - upgrading of technological, quality, productivity standards of local firms - enterprise development, increasing local entrepreneurial drive, business facilitation - subsidies, fiscal incentives for start-ups - information provision, awareness-building on NEM opportunities with local groups - supporting minimum standards of working conditions and CSR in local firms Economic determinants • Infrastructure • Market size and per capita income • Market growth • Access to regional and global markets • Country-specific consumer preferences • Access to raw materials • Access to low-cost labour • Access to skilled labour • Relative cost and productivitity of resources/assets • Other input costs (e.g. transport, communications, energy) • Access to strategic assets: - created assets (e.g. technology, intellectual property) - strategic infrastructure • Presence of credible local entrepreneurs and business partners • Access to local capital Source: UNCTAD. have to establish a “foothold” operation to support the NEM business. Such a foothold can range from a minimal commercial presence, for example a purchasing and quality control organization to support outsourced manufacturing, or a marketing and customer service presence to support a licensed consumer business, to significant logistical support operations as in the case of franchisors of retail or quick-service restaurant businesses which need to provide supplies to franchised outlets. FDI-specific policies are also relevant where TNCs operate a mixed model, developing for example franchised outlets next to directly owned outlets, as in the case of McDonald’s in China, or where the NEM is combined with a limited equity stake held by the TNC, as in the case of the Jordanian pharmaceuticals company, JPM, which licenses technology to five ventures in Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Mozambique and Tunisia in which it also holds equity stakes. JPM’s role in these ventures is primarily one of technical oversight, given the relatively low capacities of the local partners (UNCTAD, WHO and ICTSD, forthcoming). In addition to the policy-related locational determinants considered standard for FDI, there are a number of factors specifically favouring the development of NEMs in host countries. These include a stable commercial and contract law, as NEMs are essentially a contract-based form of TNC engagement in a host economy; the specific laws that may govern NEMs in the country, such as laws recognizing and setting parameters for NEM contractual forms (e.g. franchising, contract farming); and the IP regime (see also section E.2). Businessfacilitation,thesecondsetofdeterminants, is equally important for the attraction of NEMs as for FDI. Some FDI-specific business facilitation
  • 170. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development146 efforts are clearly less relevant, unless promotion activities and incentives are applicable more widely, for example where investment promotion agencies engage in matchmaking between foreign franchisors and local aspiring franchisees (about a quarter of IPAs do so, according to this year’s IPA survey (section E.3). However, in addition to the business facilitation efforts considered standard for FDI, a number of measures are relevant for the development of NEMs. Initiatives to upgrade technological, quality, or productivity standards of local firms, or to support minimum standards of working conditions and CSR, can all increase the pool of potential local NEM partners capable of engaging with TNCs (section E.2). For example, the Government of Malaysia introduced franchising-specific legislation, and undertook other measures which facilitated entry into the local economy by TNCs. Through various agencies it offers financial support to those setting up franchising businesses.16 In the case of services outsourcing, the Government of the Philippines contributed to strengthening the development of the call centre industry.17 The Government of Brazil has also provided incentives and institutional support to develop this industry.18 The economic determinants of the attractiveness of a country for NEM and FDI operations, the third area of determinants, again are very similar. For example, the size and growth of the market and the access to regional markets are equally important for NEM forms such as franchising or out-licensing as for their directly invested equivalents. The provision of basic infrastructure and the costs of transport, energy and communications are important for all businesses, although an adverse local infrastructure environment may be less of a deterrent for local entrepreneurs setting up a business to engage in an NEM relationship than for a foreign investor. The only economic locational determinant that is likely to be less relevant for NEMs is access to local strategic assets, which TNCs will aim to own outright. The types of economic determinants that are especially relevant to NEMs include the presence of credible and capable local entrepreneurs and business partners and access to capital for local businesses (section E.2). Most NEMs, unlike FDI, generally require strong and sometimes sophisticated local partners that can shoulder risks transferred to them. For example, in the case of contract farming, farmer associations and Table IV.13. Main locational determinants by type of NEM Mode Most relevant locational determinants Contract manufacturing Services outsourcing • Open trade policy, access (or preferential access) to international markets • Access to cheap labour (both unskilled and skilled); favourable relative costs and productivity of local resources • Strong intellectual property regime • Facilitation initiatives aimed at upgrading local technological capabilities Licensing • Strong intellectual property regime • Availability of skilled local labour • Stable commercial law and contract enforcement regime • Facilitation initiatives aimed at upgrading local technological capabilities • Market size and growth Franchising • Stable commercial law and contract enforcement regime • Availability of capable local entrepreneurs and access to local finance • Market size and growth • Business facilitation aimed at local entrepreneurial development and start-up incentives Management contracts • Stable commercial law and contract enforcement regime • Underperforming locally owned assets Contract farming • Access to agricultural and related resources (i.e. land, water) • Stable political and economic environment • Open trade policy, access (or preferential access) to international markets • Transport and storage infrastructure • Market size and growth (for local value chains) Source: UNCTAD.
  • 171. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 147 cooperatives offer a degree of sophistication and certainty to TNCs which not prevail in contracts with individual farmers (WIR09; Barrett et al., 2010). Access to capital for local firms is crucial, insofar as NEMs imply the development of a locally financed business, even if the very contractual engagement of the local partner in the NEM relationship generally works as a facilitator of access to finance with local banks or other financiers. The relative importance of locational determinants varies by non-equity mode and industry. While all determinants contribute to the overall attractiveness of a country for any form of NEM, certain determinants are fundamental for the development of specific modes. The most relevant locational determinants for each mode are summarized in table IV.13. The choice between FDI and NEMs, insofar as it is a choice, is clearly one for firms to make. However, differences between the locational determinants of the two types of internationalization show that developing countries can influence that choice. Where host countries’ efforts to become more attractive for foreign investors can be politically difficult or economically costly, as in the case of adhering to international investment agreements or providing tax incentives, the cost of improving locational determinants for NEMs can be lower. D. DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF NEMs The development implications of NEMs vary according to the NEM type, the sector or industry and the value chain segments in which they take place. Individual contractual arrangements can also play a role, as do country-specific conditions and policy influences. NEMs bring to a host country a package of tangible and intangible assets. The analytical framework for the assessment of their development impact is similar to that for FDI – it looks at employment, value added, exports, technology dissemination and social and environmental impacts, among others (table IV.14). In each of these areas NEMs can bring a number of benefits to a developing host country which, combined, can make a positive contribution to its long-term industrial development by supporting the build-up of productive capacity and improving access to international markets (Narula and Dunning, 2010). Not all of the benefits that NEMs can bring are automatic; the extent to which they materialize will depend on the capabilities of local firms and on the balance of power between them and partner TNCs, as well as on the general policy framework in host countries. In addition, there are a number of concerns and risks associated with NEMs which need to be addressed, including substandard working conditions in some NEM facilities, a lack of employment stability, and prolonged reliance on low value added activities or technological dependence on foreign firms. 1. Employment and working conditions UNCTAD estimates that worldwide, some 18 to 21 million workers are directly employed in firms operating under NEM partnership arrangements in selected industries and value chain segments (section B). Most of the jobs created are in contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and franchising activities (figure IV.8). Around 80 per cent of NEM-generated employment is in developing and transition economies; especially in contract manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, services outsourcing. Beyond this, there is significant direct employment in other NEMs or industries, such as contract farming, as well as considerable indirect employment. The jobs created are both skilled and unskilled, depending on industry factors. Contract manufacturing comprises two types of industry: “hi-tech” or technology-intensive industries such as electronics, semiconductors, auto components, pharmaceuticals; and “low-tech” or labour-intensive ones like garments, footwear and NEMs can make a significant contribution to employment, but concerns remain about working conditions and stability of employment.
  • 172. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development148 toys. Among the first group of industries, activity is largely dominated by a relatively small group of major players with a worldwide employment footprint. In the electronics and semiconductor industries, the largest of these firms, mostly from developing economies, have a centre of gravity in East and South-East Asia, with a global web of factories in emerging economies in Latin America, Eastern Europe and elsewhere (table IV.6). Foxconn, a subsidiary of Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) and one of the largest electronics manufacturing services firms in the world, has nearly a million Table IV.14. Main development impacts of NEMs Impact category Highlights of findings Employment generation and working conditions • NEMs have significant job-creation potential: especially contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and franchising account for large shares of total employment in countries where they are prevalent • Working conditions have been a source of concern in the case of contract manufacturing based on low-cost labour in a number of countries with relatively weak regulatory environments • Stability of employment is a concern, principally in the case of contract manufacturing and outsourcing, as contract-based work is more susceptible to economic cycles Local value added and linkages • NEMs can generate significant direct value added, making an important contribution to GDP in developing countries where individual modes achieve scale • Concerns exist that contract manufacturing value added is often limited where contracted processes are only a small part of the overall value chain or end-product • NEMs can also generate additional value added through local sourcing, sometimes through “second-tier” non- equity relationships Export generation • NEMs imply access to TNCs’ international networks for local NEM partners; in the case of those modes relying on foreign markets (e.g. contract manufacturing, outsourcing, management contracts in tourism) this leads to significant export generation and to more stable export sales • In the case of contract manufacturing this is partly counterbalanced by increased imports of goods for processing • In the case of market-seeking NEMs (e.g. franchising, brand-licensing, management contracts) NEMs can lead to increased imports Technology and skills transfer • NEM relationships are in essence a form of intellectual property transfer to a local NEM partner, protected by the contract • NEM forms such as franchising, licensing, management contracts, involve transfer of technology, business model and/or skills and are often accompanied by training of local staff and management • In contract manufacturing, local partners engaging in NEM relationships have been shown to gain in productivity, particularly in the electronics industry • NEM partners can evolve into important technology developers in their own right (e.g. in contract manufacturing and services outsourcing) • They can also remain locked into low-technology activities • NEMs, by their nature, foster local entrepreneurship; positive effects on entrepreneurship skills development are especially marked in franchising Social and environmental impacts • NEMs can serve as a mechanism to transfer international best social-and-environmental practices • They equally raise concerns that they may serve as mechanisms for TNCs to circumvent such practices Long-term industrial capacity building • Through the sum of the above impacts, NEMs can support or accelerate the development of modern local productive capacities in developing countries • In particular, NEMs encourage domestic enterprise development and domestic investment in productive assets and integration of such domestic economic activity into global value chains • Concerns need to be addressed especially in issues such as long-term dependency on foreign sources of technology; over-reliance on TNC-governed GVCs for limited-value-added activities; and “footlooseness”. Source: UNCTAD. employees in China alone, making it one of the single largest employers in the country.19 Contract manufacturing in the second group of industries is characterized by wide geographical dispersion. In garments, footwear and toys, roughly 90 per cent of NEM-related employment is located in developing and transition economies, including LDCs. For some of these countries, NEM- related activities generate significant employment. Contract manufacturing for major brands such as Nike (United States) and Hugo Boss (Germany), in particular, is an important generator of employment
  • 173. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 149 in terms of GDP, exports and employment. By 2009, in India the sector had created some 2.2 million direct jobs and indirectly impacted the lives of about 8 million people;20 in Chile, the outsourcing services industry in 2008 employed 20,000 people;21 and in the Philippines, another stronghold of the industry, total employment was some 525,000 people in 2010.22 Contract farming is linked to very large numbers of jobs for smallholder farmers; its employment and poverty reduction implications are generally viewed positively. The overall number of contract farmers is uncertain but individual projects can have several hundred thousand participant farmers at a time. For instance, the PTP Group, a joint venture between Asia Timber Products (Singapore) and the local government in Leshan, China, involves the participation of 400,000 forestry workers in fibreboard production (WIR09: 144). Similarly, Nestlé (Switzerland) is working with more than 550,000 farmers around the globe supplying it with commodities for its food and beverage businesses.23 In Mozambique, some 400,000 contract farmers are participating in GVCs.24 On a smaller scale, but nevertheless significant for the countries and GVC segment involved, the Coca-Cola/SABMiller value chain involved 3,741 workers in Zambia and 4,244 in El Salvador in 2008, mostly in contract farming Figure IV.8. Estimated global employment in contract manufacturing, selected industries, 2010 (Millions of employees) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: See box IV.2 for the methodology used. The dotted area depicts the range estimate for each item. Box IV.4. Employment impact in developing countries of NEMs in garment and footwear production The employment impact of contract manufacturing in low technology-intensive industries such as garments and footwear is significant in developing economies. Most major brand companies such as Nike, Adidas, HM, Gap, Puma, Collective Brands and Hugo Boss use extensive networks of contract manufacturers based in different developing economies to produce their brand products. For instance, all of Nike’s footwear is produced by contract suppliers outside of the United States – some 600 factories in 33 countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, China, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and Viet Nam – which involves over 800,000 workers. Similarly, Puma has contract manufacturing arrangements with some 350 factories, a majority of which are in developing economies, involving 300,000 workers. Thus, unlike electronics contract manufacturing, which is relatively concentrated in East Asia, contract manufacturing in garments and footwear is far more dispersed, especially in poor countries. In some developing economies foreign contract manufacturers constitute the bulk of the contract manufacturing activity. The rapid growth of the garment industry in countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, China and Viet Nam owes much to the participation of foreign contract manufacturing firms producing locally for international clients, at least initially (UNIDO, 2009; McNamara, 2008). In the case of Cambodia, 95 per cent of exports in the industry are by foreign firms, mostly developing economy TNCs from China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. These companies employed around 300,000 people in 2009, accounting for nearly 50 per cent of Cambodia’s manufacturing employment. Source: UNCTAD. across the developing world (box IV.4). For example, there are about 376,000 workers in the Cambodian garments sector, where the vast bulk of production is carried out under contract manufacturing arrangements. In Sri Lanka, the garments industry employs some 400,000 people, many working under similar contractual arrangements. In services outsourcing the employment impact is also large in India, the Philippines and a few other developing economies. For instance, IT-BPO is one of the largest contributors to a number of economies 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Garments Automotive components Electronics Footwear Toys NEM-related employmentemployment Global industry employmentemployment
  • 174. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development150 arrangements (SABMiller, Coca-Cola and Oxfam, 2010). International franchising is also a significant contributor to employment in host countries, where theformulaiswidelyused.Thenumberoffranchising businesses, mostly micro- and small enterprises, in developing countries is growing rapidly and franchising in some countries is considered an important tool for unemployment reduction for its potential to create both formal entrepreneurial employment and dependent employment in small business outlets. For example, in Brazil around 780,000 people were employed in franchised businesses in 2010 (just under 1 per cent of the total workforce) (Rocha, Borini and Spers, 2010; UNCTAD–WFC survey), while in South Africa, franchised businesses employed 460,000 people in 2010, almost 2.5 per cent of the total labour force,25 and in Malaysia, franchising businesses employ more than 200,000 people, or some 1.7 per cent of the workforce. Management contracts in some industries can also have a sizeable employment impact in host countries. The potential of the hotel industry to create jobs is one of the reasons that many developing-country governments are aiming to grow the industry. The global branded hotel market has an estimated employment of 3.5 million people, of which roughly 400,000 jobs are attributable to operations run under management contracts abroad (box IV.3). International hotels often offer a higher service level (requiring more staff per room) than local hotels (Fontanier and van Wijk, 2010). Research in six developing countries has shown that foreign-owned accommodation has a staff-to- guest ratio of 8:1, compared to the 1:1 or 1:2 ratio reported for domestically owned accommodation (UNCTAD, 2007). International hotel groups are currently expanding their reach, particularly in Asia. In China, for instance, the InterContinental Hotel Group has an expansion plan to double its current complement of 150 hotels over the next five years. This expansion plan will be mostly carried out using management contracts, creating an additional 90,000 jobs – on top of the current 40,000 employees in China.26 International hotel chains operating through management contracts or franchising in host countries are a powerful pull factor in complementary activities employing low- skilled workers, such as laundry, cleaning and security (in addition to higher-skilled areas such as surveillance and IT services) in developing countries (Lamminmaki, 2005; UNCTAD, 2007: 81; MKG Hospitality, 2011). The employment impact of NEMs is even more significant when indirect employment is taken into account, through linkages with local firms, as in the case of IT-BPO in India above, or contract farming in Kenya (box IV.10). In terms of backward linkages, sources of indirect employment include workers employed by subsequent tiers of contractors (for instance in contract manufacturing), providing services or parts and components to NEM partner firms.Inaddition,employmentiscreatedbyproviders of ancillary services. For instance, in franchising in the retail sector, further employment is created by local service providers to the NEM operations, such as logistics companies, advertising firms, interior design companies, local suppliers of raw materials and local packaging companies. Similarly, licensing of host country firms in the pharmaceutical industry creates employment opportunities in other parts of the local value chain, such as in pharmaceutical RD or product distribution. The factors that influence working conditions in non-equity modes are the type of mode and the industry, the sourcing practices of lead firms, and the role of governments in defining, communicating and enforcing labour standards. NEMs such as franchising, licensing and management contracts are frequently perceived as enhancing employment conditions in host countries, often due to relatively strong management control or oversight from international partners, although franchising businesses are not immune to bad working conditions.27 In an UNCTAD-World Franchise Council survey of franchising associations, which represent the interests of franchisors and franchisees, 64 per cent of franchising associations around the world state that employees in foreign chains enjoy at least the same working conditions as prevailing in local host-country chains; while 30 per cent declare that franchisees and their employees have better working conditions in foreign chains compared to local competitors.
  • 175. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 151 NEMs that are focused on reducing production costs, such as contract manufacturing or services outsourcing, are more often criticised for weak employment conditions, including the violation of national and international labour rights. In order to keep costs down and remain competitive and attractive as partners for lead TNCs, NEM firms can take measures that impinge on workers’ rights and freedoms – low wages and benefits, excessive overtime, job instability28 and poor health and safety practices (Milberg and Amengual, 2008). In some extreme cases, heavy criticism in the media and by activists and consumer organizations has forced international firms to intervene and to work with their local NEM partners in order to improve working conditions (box IV.5). While contract manufacturing, contract farming and similar modes can employ large numbers of workers, the very nature of cost-sensitive production can be problematic because TNCs can shift to other locations with even lower operating costs. This “footloose” nature of some NEMs can have severe consequences for workers, NEM partners and industries in host economies. For instance, in 2000 the garment industry in Lesotho employed over 45,000 workers and accounted for 77 per cent of the country’s exports, chiefly produced by contract manufacturers from Taiwan Province of China under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which gave privileged access to the United States market. After 2003, however, as quotas on garment imports to the United States from large, low-cost locations such as China and India were removed ,the industry in Lesotho was devastated. Many factories were closed and thousands of jobs lost (McNamara, 2008). Jobs in labour-intensive NEMs are highly sensitive to the business cycle in GVCs, and can be shed quickly at times of economic downturn. One example is the electronics cluster in Guadalajara which, although an example of successful value chain upgrading, also illustrates the highly volatile nature of certain types of employment created through NEMs. Box IV.6 illustrates, however, that it is possible for NEMs to manage demanding customers, seasonality and other sources of volatility, for example through diversifying the customer base. Over the last two decades, however, the relationship between core firms and their NEM partners has started to change. Campaigns by civil society, NGOs and media have begun a process assigning social and environmental responsibilities in supply chains back to lead firms. In 2009 for example, one of Nike’s NEM partners in Honduras closed two of its factories, leaving 1,800 workers unemployed and without the legally mandated severance payments they were due. With the help Box IV.5. Labour conditions in Foxconn’s Chinese operations – concerns and corporate responses Foxconn, a subsidiary of Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd (Taiwan Province of China), is the world’s largest contract manufacturer in the electronics industry. In common with many other contract manufactures, Foxconn has been involved in several controversies concerning working conditions. Reports on Foxconn’s Chinese operations have in the past identified facility-specific issues on wages and benefits, work intensity, occupational health and safety, working hours, management quality, employee breaks, grievance mechanisms, treatment of student workers, and dining and living conditions. A number of Foxconn’s customers, including Apple, Dell and HP, have responded to these concerns by carrying out an independent investigation and subsequently by working with Foxconn senior management on corrective actions towards higher international labour standards. The action plan consists of several steps to improve working conditions in factories, including the introduction of new salary standards that reduce pressure for overtime as a personal necessity for employees, the relocation of some manufacturing operations closer to migrant workers’ hometowns (thereby maintaining social structures and support systems), and helping employees to integrate better into the community to promote a positive work-life balance and create a more extensive support network. Despite these positive actions, a recent report by a Hong Kong (China)-based NGO (SACOM) argues that labour rights abuses persist at some of Foxconn’s facilities in China.a Source: UNCTAD. a “Foxconn and Apple fail to fulfill promises: predicaments of workers after the suicides”, SACOM website at http:// sacom.hk.
  • 176. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development152 Box IV.6. Cyclical employment in contract manufacturing in Guadalajara Guadalajara, the capital of Jalisco State in south-west Mexico, is home to an electronics cluster deeply embedded in GVCs. Until 2001, when the technology bubble burst, Guadalajara’s factories competed directly with those in China in the production of high-volume, price-sensitive items such as mobile phone handsets and notebook computers. During 1994–2000, when large contract manufacturers such as Flextronics, Jabil Circuit and Solectron, all established facilities in Guadalajara, the value of electronics exports from Jalisco State increased at an average rate of 35 per cent per year. In contrast, during 2000–2005, the average annual export growth rate was reduced to near zero, with falling exports in two consecutive years (box figure IV.6.1). Box figure IV.6.1. Volatility in contract manufacturing employment in Guadalajara, 1996–2009 Source: Cadelec, 2010. With the downturn in the business cycle, the decline in output and employment after 2001 was precipitous. Total hi-tech employment peaked in Jalisco State at more than 76,000 in 2000, and after 2001 dropped by 40 per cent to less than 46,000; in some plants, employment fell by up to 60 per cent. Some contract manufacturers with facilities both in Guadalajara and in other locations shifted high-volume work to lower-cost plants in China. High variations in employment, as in the case of electronics in Guadalajara, are a general feature of the Mexican maquiladora industries. Employment volatility in such Mexican plants was found to be twice that of United States facilities in the same industry. The close economic ties between the two countries, resulting in a “synchronization” of business cycles, had some observers speaking of the United States exporting a portion of its employment fluctuations over the business cycle to Mexico (Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson, 2008; Blecker and Esquivel, 2010). However, to increase the utilization of facilities in Guadalajara, contract manufacturers found new partners in retail outlets in the United States, and started to produce lower-volume goods, often on a direct-ship, rapid replenishment basis. Examples of such electronics products include low- and mid-range computer servers, electronic fish finders for use in recreational boating and alarm systems for homes and businesses. Very few of the products made in Guadalajara in 2000 are still made there today. Contract manufacturers and workers have had to adapt to more complex production and supply processes. New logistics functions have been added to ship small lots directly to retailers for distribution, and materials management, testing, and quality assurance processes have been upgraded to accommodate the increased product variety. Over time, the industrial upgrading that took place has led to a gradual recovery to previous levels of employment and exports. Source: Sturgeon and Dussel-Peters, 2006; Cadelec, 2010. of “The Workers’ Rights Consortium” NGO, civil society groups initiated intense public campaigns until Nike agreed to take over the supplier’s full obligations (severance payment, nine months of medical care and job training for laid-off workers). This “public relations liability” has extended the social responsibility of TNCs beyond their actual legal boundaries and compelled them to increase their influence over the activities of their value chain partners. It is increasingly common for TNCs, in order to manage risks and protect their brand and image, to control their NEM partners through codes of conduct, to promote international labour standards and good management practices. Although most codes are developed individually by companies, 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2004 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Thousandsofemployees Exports($billion) Employment (left scale) Exports (right scale) 80 90 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
  • 177. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 153 they are commonly based on international principles such as ILO labour standards, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (chapter III). In combination with individual company codes, many TNCs also adopt third party standards, such SA8000 (for labour practices) or ISO14001 (for environmental management). Currently there are over 2,600 facilities certified to SA8000 across 65 industries,29 and more than 200,000 ISO 14001 certificates have been issued in more than 150 countries.30 These certifiable third-party standards assure TNCs that their suppliers meet certain basic standards, and help developing country enterprises to differentiate themselves when seeking international business partners (Riisgard and Hammer, 2010). NEM firms in most industries need to commit to the terms set forth in a code before entering into business relationships with lead firms. Thus, for many NEM partners the adherence to internationally recognized labour standards is part of their contractual obligations. In this way, core firms themselves are emerging as a regulator of sorts, issuing process guidelines covering a range of social and environmental practices. To ensure that the code of conduct is implemented and followed by their partners, core firms engage in compliance monitoring, which often includes management audits and on-site factory inspections. For instance, HM has an inspectorate in South Asia which investigates the working conditions in the approximately 40 clothing factories in India and Sri Lanka with which the company works. In 2010 they carried out 251 visits, about half of which were unannounced.31 Although questions remain about TNCs’ motives vis-à-vis CSR in global value chains (Starmanns, 2010), it can be observed that lead firms that have worked with codes over a longer period of time have introduced a systematic approach to supplier monitoring and rating. Accordingly, they integrate the outcomes of the inspections into their purchasing decisions, rewarding those NEM partners that comply with the standards, or at least show strong commitment to meeting them. However, it has also become evident over the past decade, that many companies are reluctant to drop a supplier for failure to meet the conditions of the code. Instead, NEM partners typically have to implement corrective action plans to rectify critical issues identified during the audits. To support their NEM partners in their efforts to meet compliance with the code, lead firms offer special supplier development programmes for social and environmental issues. In this way, codes are being used as a basis for capacity-building programmes aimed at transferring specific management know- how to developing country enterprises. 2. Local value added The direct impact of NEMs on local value added can be significant; however, the scale of additional indirect value creation depends greatly on the nature of the particular NEM, the structure of the TNC’s GVC and the underlying capabilities of other local firms. UNCTAD estimates that the direct value added impact of cross-border NEMs is roughly $400–500 billion dollars a year (table IV.4). Of this amount, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing are the largest single contributor, accounting for more than $200 billion (figure IV.9). Among those industries with significant contract manufacturing activity, automotive OEM components and garments generate the largest share of value added. Electronics contract manufacturing, footwear, and toys are manifestly smaller, due in part to industry size – footwear and toys are smaller markets – and the nature of the manufacturing being contracted – much of the activity covered in electronics is related to final assembly of goods. Cross-border franchising, which includes a spectrum of discrete activities, accounts for roughly $150 billion of value added worldwide. The real significance of NEM-related value added stems from its importance within a particular country’s economic context. While global NEM value added accounts for less than 1 per cent of global GDP, in some developing countries it NEMs can generate signifi- cant value added in the host economy – including through second-tier linkages – even when their share of value created in the global value chain is limited.
  • 178. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development154 represents a significant share of economic activity. For example, in the Philippines, IT-BPO activities accounted for 4.8 per cent of GDP and generated $9 billion export revenues in 2010.32 India’s auto components industry, working mostly under contracting arrangements, contributes about 2.3 per cent to the country’s GDP and is expected to generate $30 billion in revenues in fiscal year 2010–11.33 This value added activity, however, is often only a small part of the value generated within the GVC of any particular product. For efficiency-seeking NEMs, such as contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and contract farming, value capture in the host economy can be small, depending crucially on the nature of a NEM’s integration into lead TNCs’ GVC and the balance of power between the two. If the NEM partner’s role is confined to processing inputs from one step in a TNCs’ value chain to be passed onto the next, the scope for local sourcing, and thus for additional indirect value generation, is relatively limited as goods are imported, processed, and subsequently exported. On the other hand, greater autonomy has the potential to generate substantial indirect local value added, as NEM partners can make greater use of local suppliers, retaining value in the host economy. 0 100 200 300 Franchising Toys Footwear Electronics Garments IT services and business process outsourcing Automotive components Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing Electronics contract manufacturing provides a clear example of the interplay of these forces. The explosive growth of this mode in the industry has stemmed largely from lead firms wanting to outsource the lowest value added activities of their internal processes. Combined with their significant bargaining power over their NEM partners, lead firms’ logic in using contract manufacturing often squeezes local capture of value added. This has led to a steady fall in the generation of value added by their NEM partners, who face ever-smaller margins (figure IV.10). For instance, in the case of the iPhone that Foxconn (Taiwan Province of China) assembles on behalf of Apple (United States), only a small share of the unit value added is captured by the company’s Chinese factories. Much of the remaining global value added is accounted for by Japanese, Korean and other international suppliers pre-selected by Apple, as part of the firm’s globally integrated value chain, as well as by Apple and its vendors (box IV.7). Importantly, the low value captured by the NEM partner in this example reflects the industry (and the balance of power within it), rather than the country location of production. For example, in a similar case – the Nokia N95 Smartphone – the value added in manufacturing was determined to be 2.1 per cent of the total, whether the phone is produced in Finland or China, though production methods and factor inputs might differ (Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2011). Local NEM partners are not, however, necessarily locked into a low local value added trap. Many electronics contract manufacturers are quickly evolving to provide additional services to their clients in higher value-generating activities in other segments of the value chain. In some cases, former contract manufacturers have created their own brands and are now competing with lead TNCs in the global consumer electronics market (Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2010). One argument in favour of developing countries undertaking low value added NEM activities is that the apparently unfavourable balance in value capture for local NEM firms is the initial price they pay for access to TNCs’ knowledge assets and long-term capability development (Moran, 2011). Figure IV.9. Estimated global value added in contract manufacturing, services outsourcing and franchising, selected industries, 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: See box IV.2 for the methodology used. The dotted area depicts the range estimate for each item.
  • 179. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 155 Beyond contract manufacturing, value added in predominantly market-seeking NEMs such as franchising, management contracts and licensing essentially remains in the host economy – apart from the fees and royalties involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, operations linked to a TNC were found to source no less locally than host country competitors (UNCTAD, 2007). The extent and nature of backward linkages by NEMs and their concomitant additional local value capture vary by mode, industry and host country, depending on the capabilities of local firms. The use of local inputs, and the overall impact on host country value added, increase if the emergence of contract manufacturing leads to a concentration of production and export activities in clusters (e.g. industrial parks). The greater the number of plants and the more numerous the linkages with TNC buyers, the greater are the spillover effects and local value added, as seen in the Republic of Korea in the 1980s and 1990s, Malaysia in the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, cluster policies can reduce the risk of TNCs shifting production to other locations because of the benefits they gain from cooperation with firms in such agglomerations. The extent of local sourcing is also governed by contractual agreements between NEM partners. For example, adherence to specified quality standards is a common feature in licensing, contract manufacturing and franchising agreements, which can limit sourcing in host economies if local suppliers do not meet the required quality levels. Nevertheless, franchise operations can create significant local linkages. McDonald’s (United States), for example, often builds up a domestic food value chain to supply its stores. Once a supplier and McDonald’s have agreed on standards and quality guarantees along the food chain, contracts and local value creation tend to be long-term.34 3. Export generation NEMs shape global patterns of trade in many industries. In toys, footwear, garments and electronics, contract manufacturing and services outsourcing represent more than 50 per cent of global trade (figure IV.11). Modes such as contract manufacturing, business- process outsourcing and contract farming, by their nature create substantial exports and foreign exchange earnings. As industries associated with these modes often show significant clustering effects, this can lead to high shares of individual industries in a country’s or region’s exports: for 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Value added/sales $ billion Per cent NEMs generate export gains – the extent of which is context and mode-specific. Figure IV.10. Total sales and value added as per cent of sales for top electronics contract manufacturers, 2003–2010 (Billions of dollars and per cent) Source: UNCTAD. Note: Value added is calculated as the sum of pre-tax income, personnel costs (wages), and amortization/ depreciation. Value added as per cent of sales based on data from six of the top 10 major companies in this segment (Hon Hai, Compal Electronics, Inventec, Quanta Computer, Wistron Corp, and TPV Technology). Figure IV.11. World and NEM-related exports, selected industries, 2010 (Billions of dollars) Source: UNCTAD estimates. Note: See box IV.2 for methodology used. The dotted area depicts the range estimate for each item. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Electronics Garments Automotive components Footwear Toys World exports NEM exports
  • 180. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development156 Box IV.7. Value capture can be limited: iPhone production in China The relative value added captured by contract manufacturers in developing countries, compared to the total value created in the overall global value chain and expressed in currency units of the final destination market (or as a percentage of the final product sales price), can appear very limited. This is illustrated by the well-known case of the Apple iPhone, for which it is estimated that only $6.50 of the $179 production cost (retail price, $500 in the US market) is captured by Foxconn (Taiwan Province of China), the company’s NEM partner in China (box figure IV.7.1). The share captured by domestic Chinese companies is even less, limited to packaging and local services. This is, in part, because iPhone are assembled from components made mostly in other countries, such as the United States, Japan, Germany and the Republic of Korea. Box figure IV.7.1. Breakdown of the production costs of the iPhone, 2010 (Dollars per unit) Source: UNCTAD, based on Xing and Detert, 2010. Note: The remaining $321 of the $500 retail price is accounted for by Apple and other companies’ returns to RD, design, distribution and retailing etc. 124.46 48.00 6.50 Components Other materials Assembly instance, toys made up $12.9 billion, i.e. more than half, of Guangdong province’s (China) exports in 2010.35 In Bangladesh and Cambodia the garment industry accounted for some 70–80 per cent of total national exports in 2008–2009.36 In India, textiles and apparel exports were $22 billion, i.e. 12.5 per cent of total exports, in fiscal year 2009, and were expected to grow fast.37 Looking beyond individual industries, goods for processing trade, the shipping of intermediate goods for assembly or further processing (and thus a good proxy in international statistics for trends in contract manufacturing), has exploded during the past decade. In China, the gross value of such exported goods reached $655 billion in 2009, up from roughly $138 billion in 2000 (IMF, BoP database).38 IT-BPO and contract farming also underline the significant export generation of efficiency-seeking NEMs. During 2005–2009 average IT-BPO exports from India, amounting to two-thirds of the country’s total IT-BPO industry revenues, were equivalent to 14 per cent of India’s total exports. Similarly, exports of cut flowers (produced under contract) from Ethiopia, Kenya and Zimbabwe accounted for more than 8, 9 and 14 per cent of the respective countries’ total merchandise exports in 2009.39 In NEMs that are primarily oriented towards the host country market – such as franchising, licensing and management contracts – export gains are clearly more limited, but not absent. In the global hotel industry, with almost all international operations run either as a franchise or under a management contract, global chains give hotel-owners access to new customer groups, in particular international tourists and business travellers. In the upper segments of the hotel market in particular, the high proportion of international guests is an important feature.40 In licensing, constraints on exporting activity can be built into contractual agreement between the TNC and host country licensees, especially in terms of geographical delimitation of the sales activities of the NEM partner. For example, the South African pharmaceutical company Aspen Pharmacare is limited in its exports of patented anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs under the terms of its licensing agreements
  • 181. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 157 with GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim (Berger, 2006; Amuasi, 2009: 14). Net export generation may differ appreciably by mode and industry. Franchising in retail goods, for instance, normally creates few exports, but imports can rise in the case of branded goods retailing. In the case of management contracts in hotels, the influx of international tourists constitutes a rise in services exports and normally the associated imports are low. Similarly, modes such as contract manufacturing and contract farming lead to net export gains, although these can be limited where the import of intermediate goods or services accounts for a significant part of the value, as in the case of the iPhone (box IV.7). The impact on export generation is higher in the case of other contracting modes, such as services outsourcing. As an alternative route to international market access, international franchising can be an avenue for brands from developing countries to grow internationally (including as master franchisees for lead TNCs) with little need for high up-front investments. In the case of Brazil, for example, 68 home-grown brands – about 5 per cent of the total national franchised networks – have internationalized and expanded to some 50 countries around the world through franchising as a mode of entry (Rocha, Borini and Spers, 2010). Similarly, franchised businesses based in South Africa have opened outlets in neighbouring countries across Southern Africa (figure IV.12) 4. Technology and skills acquisition by NEMs Technology encompasses a range of hard and soft elements, often in combination, e.g. intellectual property (including patents, blueprints, manuals etc.); machinery and other capital equipment; production and organisational knowledge and skills (including quality standards and norms); managerial, engineering and other skills (including tacit ones); business models; and even – potentially – corporate culture and values. The extent and combination of technology and skills received by NEM partners differs. Licensing involves a TNC granting an NEM partner access to intellectual property – usually with some contractual conditions – and with or without training or skills transfer. A good example is MAN BW Diesel (MBD), a Danish subsidiary of MAN AG (Germany), which has been licensing marine engine technology primarily – with some training – to shipbuilders in Asia (Japan, the Republic of Korea and China account for 92 per cent of production). Such narrow technology transfers, with limited interaction between the TNC and partners, imply that in licensing, the NEM company normally must already possess significant capabilities and absorptive capacities, in order to assimilate and utilize the knowledge received. Since the 1960s, companies in Asia and Latin America, especially in Argentina, Brazil and the Republic of Korea, have been active in pursuing such strategies (acquiring and absorbing narrow, specific technologies), primarily because of their existing industrial base, in sectors such as automobiles, electronics, pharmaceuticals and shipbuilding41 (Kim, 2003; Mudambi, Schrunder and Mongar, 2004; Pyndt and Pedersen, 2006; UNCTAD, WHO and ICTSD, forthcoming). In contrast, in the case of international franchising, which transfers a business model, extensive training and support are normally offered to local partners in order to properly set up the new franchise, with wide- ranging implications for technology dissemination. In addition to professional skills – which are industry- specific – the training and support given usually includes general managerial competencies, e.g. financial, marketing and management knowledge to let entrepreneurs manage the new business efficiently (i.e. elements in creating absorptive capacity). For example, the 7-Eleven franchise system provides not only structural support (store equipment), but also field consultants who regularly meet with franchisees in order to help them maximize store performance and profitability. Also, prior to the establishment of a 7-Eleven store, the TNC provides training to facilitate the start-up of the new business and provides ongoing in-store and computer-based assistance to help the franchisee in developing their business.42 Some TNC hotel groups, apart from providing internal training programmes, contribute to initiatives NEMs can diffuse technology and skills to local partners. The extent of technology uptake depends on local absorptive capacities.
  • 182. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development158 to build capacity in the sector. One example is the current expansion of the InterContinental Group in China. The company has launched the IHG Academy, a public partnership that provides hospitality job training in local communities. The Academy has 23 partners located in 10 cities, training 5,000 students per year. Other examples include Best Western’s establishment of a Centre for Hotel Management and Training in India and the creation of the Hospitality Training Campus in UAE, to address the needs of the international hospitality and tourism industry (Intercontinental Hotel Group, 2010). TNCs exist primarily because they possess intellectual property, or other forms of knowledge; it is therefore normally in their interest to create or seek barriers to make acquisition of this knowledge by other firms more difficult. Nevertheless, for host countries, NEMs can be an important interface for acquisition and diffusion of knowledge from lead TNCs – in a similar fashion to JVs and affiliate- supplier linkages. This is because NEMs are a part of TNCs’ global value chains; it is in TNCs’ interest to disseminate technology – including building local absorptive capacities – to their partners, at least to a degree (UNCTAD, 2010c).43 A good example of how a TNC may do this is provided by IKEA’s relationship with its developing country suppliers in the home furnishing industry. IKEA has a policy of working long-term with its suppliers, but without “lock-in” (i.e. NEM partners can continue to supply to other customers). The relationship with suppliers is managed by dedicated regional trade sales offices (TSOs) which ensure that necessary technology and skills are provided, either through the TSO, staff despatched from the parent office or external expertise (consultants, international manufacturers) (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2010a; 2010b). Technology acquisition and assimilation by NEM firms, whether in processes, products or along the value chain, are therefore not infrequent and are consistent with the role that these firms play in value chains (UNCTAD, 2010c; Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2008). Most relevant research on this issue has been conducted on contract manufacturing and services outsourcing. In some East and South-East Asian economies in particular, but also in Eastern Europe, Latin America and South Asia, technology and skills acquisition and assimilation by NEM companies in electronics, garments, pharmaceuticals and IT-BPO services – among others – has led to their evolution into TNCs and technology leaders in their own right (WIR06; section B).44 A good example of a company which has become a significant TNC and technology leader by being Figure IV.12. Regional spread of selected South African franchise chains, 2010 Source: UNCTAD, adapted from Beck, Deelder and Miller (2010). Woolworth's Debonair's Shoprite Protea Hotels Nando's Wimpy Numberofunits 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Namibia Zambia Botswana Swaziland Zimbabwe MozambiqueMalawi Madagascar Angola
  • 183. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 159 (and continuing as) an NEM is Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) – holding company to Foxconn – which was the 13th largest recipient of patents45 granted in the United States in 2010.46 With 1,438 patents (up from about 500 in 2000), Hon Hai is one of only four developing country companies in the top 50 assignees of United States patents in 2010;47 and the number is not far off the 1,490 received by LG Electronics (Republic of Korea). Hon Hai is following in the footsteps of other Taiwanese companies such as Acer and AsusTek, in moving from a pure contract manufacturer to becoming a brand. All these companies made this transition on the basis of deep expertise established over time in product definition and design.48 Although technology acquisition and assimilation through NEMs is a widespread phenomenon, it is not a foregone conclusion, especially at the level of second- and third-tier suppliers, where linkages may be insufficient or of low quality, or the absorptive capacity of suppliers low. The Taiwan Province of China notebook computer production network in China, for instance has not yet resulted in significant upgrading by small local suppliers (Yang, 2010). Overall, a number of factors affect technology and knowledge acquisition and assimilation by NEMs. Among the most important of these are (1) the industry, (2) local absorptive capacities, and (3) NEM strategies. With respect to the industry, key determinants are the industry’s structure, GVC and learning opportunities. For example, in “low- tech” industries such as garments, footwear and furniture, most opportunities for technological/ skill upgrading are inherent in product design (controlled by brands) and production methods (capital goods and inputs, generally purchasable from manufacturers independent of the brands). As most technology is embodied in capital goods, this means that there are few barriers to technology upgrading, apart from the cost of the equipment.49 On the other hand, in industries such as automotives and components, technology assimilation requires mastery of complex products, processes or systems. This makes technology and assimilation more difficult for new players on the scene, and explains the dominance of developed country TNCs in such industries. How NEMs fare despite these constraints depends greatly on absorptive capacity (Giuliani, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2005). For example, although the Philippines is successful in various services outsourcing GVCs, the recent financial and economic crisis that created a competitive impulse for upgrading such industries also showed that local NEMs may lack the necessary capabilities to do so, including services requiring “creative” work, such as animation (Tschang and Goldstein, 2010). In the Philippine animation industry, the local NEMs’ combination of high wages, limited skills sets and fragile markets led TNCs such as Warner Brothers to move their contracts to other countries such as India and China. Even in the case of IKEA, mentioned earlier, only a small proportion of its suppliers improve their innovative capabilities (albeit all suppliers achieve better operational capacity and about half are able to absorb adaptive technologies) (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2010a). To benefit fully from technology and skills available through particular NEM arrangements, it is therefore important for local firms to develop their absorptive capacities. Strategies of NEM partners also matter. For example, it is possible for companies to engage in “deep niche” specialization, whereby they become technologically advanced in particular components on a mass scale and realize profits through cost reductions. For instance, Bharat Forge (India) is now the world’s second largest producer of forgings for car engines and chassis components. Its customers include most major automobile companies and it has affiliates in China, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Finally, NEM partners can adopt strategies in their dealings with TNCs to improve their bargaining power and technology acquisition and upgrading. A very common strategy which pays dividends is customer diversification leading to cross- chain learning (i.e. NEM companies benefit from knowledge gained from a number of TNCs). For example Acer and AsusTek (both Taiwan Province of China) achieved their success in notebooks through leveraging knowledge gained from supply chains of many TNC customers. They were able to innovate on the basis of the wider technological base thus gained, through an entrepreneurial pioneering of new niches. For instance this led to AsusTek –
  • 184. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development160 followed by Acer and others – subverting Intel’s product roadmap by expanding its target market for netbooks to include customers in the developed world (Intel’s vision had only encompassed sales of the devices to developing countries, hence their lower cost) (Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2010; Shih et al., 2008). IKEA actually encourages such cross-chain learning, despite the risks, because it improves their supplier capabilities (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2010c). Another example, from a low-tech industry, is that of the Brazilian furniture and footwear industries. Research shows that companies which have serviced multiple value chains in NEM relationships in this industry (rather than operating as affiliates under a single TNC network), including creating brands for domestic and regional customers, are able to use the learning in design, marketing and branding to interact more effectively as they gradually gain the capacities to sell direct to final customers. Operating in multiple value chains appears to improve NEMs’ options for upgrading (Navas-Aleman, 2011). 5. Social and environmental impacts Many socio-cultural and political issues arise from TNC involvement in developing countries, including a range of externalities such as changing consumption patterns and cultural values. In the case of NEM operations, to the extent that the TNC is not directly involved, some of these issues are weaker in scope, but they remain in essence. For instance, franchising can influence local socio- cultural norms by contributing to the growth of consumerism, increasing the use of imported inputs, and the development and strengthening of commercial values and standards (Freund and Martin, 2008; Grünhagen, Witte and Pryor, 2010). In this context, although there are many economic benefits arising from modern retail franchise networks,50 there is often a tension between the elements of “modernization” – some brought about through NEM activities – and the essence of traditional identity.51 The entry of “fast food” restaurants offering accessible non-traditional fare has met with some resistance in countries such as China, India and Mexico (Alon, 2004). At the same time, some governments have become adept at using NEMs to address and overcome important social issues in their countries. Franchising, for example, is an effective system of localizing the operations of a foreign company, by integrating its business model into a population of entrepreneurs who will then have ownership interests in the business and who can cater to national development goals. With this in mind, the Government of South Africa has officially promoted franchising, for instance when issuing a mobile phone licence to Vodacom in the 1990s with specific requirements that involved providing services to the poor, who either had limited or no access to phone lines. Vodacom subsequently set up a system of franchised “Telecom Kiosks”, often consisting of renovated shipping containers with some installed phones linked to the mobile network.52 The use of micro-franchising as a distribution channel to the poor or low-income segments of a market is common in developing countries, with telecom services a widespread example, e.g. in Ghana, India, Indonesia, Senegal or Thailand; while in some countries like Bangladesh and Peru a similar franchising model is used to broaden internet access (Falch and Anyimadu, 2003; ITU, 2010: 22–23). In Malaysia, Bank Rakyat together with Perbadanan Nasional Bhd (PNS), an agency under the Ministry of Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development, has allocated $4 million to a loan scheme to back the Women Franchise Programme and the Graduate Franchise Programme. Other examples include the sale of household products to the poor, e.g. for Unilever in India through its Project Shakti.53 In a similar vein, the Government of Liberia uses TNCs and their supply chains to support job creation for young people, including in the agriculture and forestry sectors (Arai, Cissé and Sock, 2010). TNCs and NEMs can also take social-cultural initiatives, while at the same time addressing their needs. It is possible for NEMs, such as hotel chains entering markets through franchising and contract NEMs can serve as a means to transfer international best social and environ- mental practices, but they may also allow TNCs to circumvent such practices.
  • 185. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 161 management, to diversify their local capability programmes to support wider goals than their immediate skill needs (though the two can be interrelated). An example of such an approach in Thailand involves major international chains (InterContinental Hotels Group (United Kingdom), Marriott International (United States), Fairmont Hotels and Resorts (Canada), Four Seasons Hotels Resorts (Canada), Hyatt Hotel Corporation (United States), Hilton Worldwide (United States), Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide (United States), NH Hotels (Spain)) in establishing and sustaining “the international tourism partnership youth career service”.54 This has developed into a strong, private–public cooperation, focusing on poverty alleviation and youth employability. NEMs, like all industry, inevitably have environmental impacts – mostly similar in type to FDI. Contract farming can have serious impacts, among others through soil erosion and biodiversity loss (WIR09: 155–157). The specific environmental impacts of contract farming activities depend on contingent factors, including the specific crop or activity undertaken, production technologies, the scale of operations, and host-country and international rules and regulations on the environment. An important factor is the technical support or encouragement provided to the NEM by the TNC, which can be controversial, e.g. in terms of inputs and production methods to support the farming of genetically modified crops (box IV.8). There is a significant body of evidence to suggest that TNCs are likely to use more environmentally friendly practices than domestic companies in equivalent activities. Applying a uniform environmental standard across all global operations is normally less costly than taking advantage of laxer environmental regulations in some locations. The extent to which TNCs guide NEM operations to the same effect depends, first, on their perception of and exposure to legal liability risks (e.g. reparations in the case of environmental damages) and business risks (e.g. damage to their brand and lower sales). Second, it depends on the extent to which they can control NEMs. TNCs employ a number of mechanisms to influence NEM partners, including codes of conduct, factory inspections/audits, and third party certification schemes. Ultimately the level of influence a TNC has over its NEM partners is determined by a range of factors including how fragmented or concentrated the industry is at the level of the NEM partner, which determines how much choice the TNC has in selecting the partner. In the cases of franchising and management contracts, NEMs for which the TNC’s brand is a key driver, environmental reporting is of high importance. For example, seven of the 10 largest hotel groups worldwide (all extensively involved in franchising and/or management contracts) provide extensive information on their global policies to promote environmental responsibility, including reductions in waste, water use and electricity consumption, as well as their carbon footprint in their annual and CSR reports. In this respect, training of personnel and recycling facilities are two of the most commonly adopted measures to tackle environmental challenges and encourage an ecological conscience. Some, such as InterContinental Hotels Group PLC and Marriot International are pioneering the construction of sustainable hotels and buildings using renewable resources, thereby contributing to the diffusion of more environmentally friendly practices. 6. Long-term industrial capacity-building NEMactivityindeveloping host countries can make immediate contributions to employment, to GDP, to exports, to linkages and to the local technology base. In doing so, NEMs also help to provide the resources, skills and access to global value chains that are prerequisites for long-term industrial capacity building. The long-term industrial development impact of NEMs filters through each of the impact types discussed in previous sections: oo The employment generated by NEM activities contributes to the build-up of a formalized workforce, with the potential to obtain skills NEMs can enhance productive capacities in developing countries through their integration into global value chains, but there are also concerns related to long-term dependency, limited value added and “footlooseness”.
  • 186. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development162 that can be transferred to the wider economy, as workers change jobs. Skills include technical, managerial and professional skills, as well as values and experience of business culture. The extent to which the labour force is flexible and can afford to look for new opportunities (i.e. is not forced for subsistence reasons to stay in occupations where working conditions limit possibilities to seek improvement) is an important aspect of the potential of NEMs to contribute to longer-term development. oo The local value added generated by NEMs may be limited in the early stages of development of an economy, where NEM activities may be confined to low value added and low-tech segments of global value chains. In the longer term there are opportunities through NEMs to grow a country’s presence in such limited value chain segments to a “dominant” international position to maximize development potential, to extend its presence to adjacent segments of the value chain, or to enter other value chains that may depend on similar skills, resources and endowments. oo NEMs are a major “route-to-market” for countries aiming at export-led growth, and a major point of access to TNC global value chains. While initially NEMs in countries in the early stages of development may be the only point of access, local firms can grow into independent exporters and gain independent access to global value chains, often by gradually moving to serve more than one TNC network. oo Long-term industrial capacity building implies the gradual upgrading of local technological capabilities and the pursuit of a degree of technological independence. The path to such independence is, for example, often from third-party factories in the early stages of development, to contract manufacturing activities for multiple TNC value chains at a later stage, to design and own brand development (including for domestic or regional markets) (box IV.9). oo Even the impact of NEMs on social and environmental standards can have a bearing on long-term sustainable industrial development, insofar as industrial upgrading, moving up to higher value added segments of global value chains, is conditioned increasingly by extended corporate social responsibility demands placed on all actors in the chain by lead TNCs. A major part of the contribution of NEMs to the build-up of local productive capacity and long-term prospects for industrial development is through impact on enterprise development as, in contrast to Box IV.8. Managing the environmental impact of contract farming In the cut flower industry, operations by TNCs and their contract farming schemes have often been criticized for negative environmental impacts due to their high water consumption leading to water depletion, and due to the fact that many producers are far from their customers, thus creating significant impact from transport activities. In response, farms working with TNCs have introduced environmentally sustainable practices, such as geothermal steam and integrated pest management systems (Wee and Arnold, 2009). For similar reasons, since the late 1990s, the banana industry in Latin America (where contract farming is also common) has progressively seen the adoption of environment-friendly farming techniques in plantations. Organic planting technologies introduced through foreign firms’ networks have boosted value creation and led to higher incomes for farmers (Liu, 2009). Despite these recent efforts for sustainable farming, TNCs have been consistently criticized for their environmental impact through contract farming. One positive result of these criticisms seems to be the fact that TNCs are increasingly embracing environmental certification for produce in their GVCs, to protect their corporate image and to manage risks. (In some cases, environmentally friendly methods also contribute to reducing cost, through lower inputs and recycling.) Regular environmental and social inspections are performed to guarantee that contract farmers conform to good agricultural practices (GAPs), sustainable environmental standards and good working conditions for their employees. Compliance is implemented through codes of practice and certification by industry associations. Source: UNCTAD, based on WIR09: 155–157.
  • 187. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 163 FDI, local entrepreneurs and domestic investment are intrinsic to NEMs. Such domestic investment, and access to local or international financing, is often facilitated for NEMs, either through explicit measures by TNCs providing support to local NEM partners such as supplier capacity-building initiatives or financing guarantees, or through the implicit assurance stemming from the partnership with a major TNC itself or from the contract setting out terms and conditions obtained by the local partner. There can also be indirect impacts on capital formation.55 For example, in the case of franchising, access to a proven business model facilitates access to commercial credit for start-up capital requirements for local micro- and small entrepreneurs. The reduced risk associated with a “tried and tested” business model, and in some cases explicit guarantees offered by TNC franchisors, ease negotiations with banks. Contract farming also tends to increase local investment in agriculture by giving farmers a guaranteed fixed income against which they can borrow money from local financial institutions (WIR09). In the case of other NEM types, such as contract manufacturing, UNCTAD has included such practices into its roster of good practices in business linkages (WIR04). * * * The potential contributions of NEMs as catalysts for long-term development are clear and typified by economies such as India, Kenya and Taiwan Province of China (box IV.10). However, concerns are often raised (especially with regard to contract manufacturing and licensing) that countries relying to a significant extent on NEMs for industrial development risk remaining locked into low value added segments of TNC-governed global value chains and cannot reduce their technology dependency. In such cases, developing economies would run a further risk of becoming extremely vulnerable to TNCs shifting productive activity to other locations, as NEMs are more “footloose” than equivalent FDI operations. The related risks of “dependency” and “footlooseness” must be addressed through policies touching on each of the impact areas discussed above, but above all they must be addressed by embedding NEMs in the overall development strategies of countries. Box IV.9. From contract manufacturing to building brands – the Chinese white goods sector Chinese manufacturers are key players in the white-goods household appliance sector globally; over 50 per cent of Chinese production is destined for overseas markets. Few Chinese players are operating internationally with their own brands. Nevertheless, several contract manufacturers, active in international supply in mass product categories such as refrigerators, washing machines, microwaves, air-conditioners or domestic cooling fans, have progressively moved into design and secondary innovation. For example, Hisense develops multiple product variants each year that exhibit innovative design. Many of these manufacturers entered the market barely a decade ago, but have migrated from pure outsourced third- party factories to independent contract manufacturers. Internationally, the high levels of exports still largely compete on the basis of cost advantages in contract manufacturing arrangements, based on large consignment orders, for both manufacturers and large retail chains. For a particular product category, these operations are often heavily clustered in a particular town or city; microwave- oven production for example is dominated by the manufacturers Galanz and Midea, who between them represent some two-thirds of global production volumes, and are both based in Shunde. Their supplier base is located within a two-hour road transport network, facilitating rapid response and low cost. Price competition is fierce both in the domestic market and in consignment-based international contract production, where manufacturers have routinely accepted single-digit profit margins. A number of producing firms are now aiming to establish independent footholds in overseas markets to improve these margins. Manufacturers, including Hisense, Midea and Haier, are now producing designs that are increasingly producer-branded. This will also help them in the domestic market, as domestic consumers are becoming increasingly brand aware. Source: UNCTAD, based on case studies by the Institute for Manufacturing, University of Cambridge.
  • 188. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development164 Box IV.10. NEMs as catalysts for capacity-building and development Contract manufacturing in Taiwan Province of China Taiwan Province of China has successfully transformed into an industrial power through contract manufacturing, especially in electronics. This strategy was pursued after the Second World War because the economy possessed an educated labour force, a developed infrastructure and a large number of entrepreneurial SMEs in manufacturing and other industries. The Government built on this by providing a strong policy influence and institutional support aimed at fostering local capabilities, including establishing links with foreign TNCs. In the case of electronics, the State-owned Electronics Research and Services Organization, National Chiao Tung University and National Development Fund have played a significant role in the development of the industry. Local firms and the economy have upgraded their capacities over time, moving from the production of goods using simple technologies, through more capital and technology intensive processes, to – increasingly – innovation. Over a period, this strategy has produced many local world-class electronics companies such as Acer, BenQ, Asus, Quanta, Foxconn, many of which are now TNCs. The process has also led to a formidable industrial cluster, on which the economy continues to build, e.g. through a move to semiconductors. Both Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and United Mircoelectronics Corporation (UMC), two leading global semiconductor producers, owe much to the Government for their existence. Services outsourcing in India India is today a world-leading destination for IT-BPO and offshoring activities. The industry accounted for about 6.4 per cent of the country’s GDP, about 26 per cent of export revenues, and over two million jobs in 2011. The success of the industry in India owes much to the existence of significant IT companies, such as Tata Consultancy Services, most with existing links with TNCs in the United Kingdom and North America, when IT-BPO services offshoring began to accelerate in the 1990s. Indian NEMs were able to take advantage of a large low-cost labour force with English language and technology skills, as well as the strong policy and institutional support from the Government and the industry’s organization. Indian firms’ existing scale and links with local industrial groups meant that they had the absorptive capabilities to acquire, assimilate and develop technology and skills from their relationship with TNC partners. Many of them have become TNCs themselves. The rapid growth of the services outsourcing industry has improved India’s competitiveness and the overall investment environment. The IT-BPO industry has evolved over the past two decades and is a significant support or infrastructure industry for the Indian economy. It provides skilled, IT-savvy employees and entrepreneurs who are now playing a significant role in other industries (e.g. telecommunications) – all of which has fostered economic diversification. Contract farming in Kenya Contract farming has helped Kenya emerge as a major agriculture exporter and helped to modernize the processes utilized by its local farmers. This is exemplified by the country’s floriculture industry, which produces cut flowers for foreign auction centres and retailers. A combination of active government support, favourable agro-climatic condition, availability of low-cost farm workers and the role of foreign-owned farms have contributed to Kenya’s floriculture development. Through out-grower arrangements, small cut flower farms in Kenya produce and sell their flowers to larger local Kenyan or foreign companies, which control, grade, bunch and export the flowers to auction centres in the Netherlands. Local and foreign-owned farms also produce cut flowers under contract for customers, including major supermarkets, in other developed countries. Kenya’s cut flowers industry has grown rapidly at 18.6 per cent CAGR between 2000 and 2009, and employs a significant number of people with some 2 million or about 7 per cent of the population relying on the industry for their livelihood; the industry contributes to poverty alleviation and rural employment and development. Technology acquisition, quality control and improved infrastructure play a role in modernizing Kenya’s farming sector and furthering the competitiveness of the agriculture industry. In addition, the introduction of a business culture with a stress on quality and reliability develops capacities among workers and entrepreneurs beyond agriculture, and is a force for diversification of the economy. Source: UNCTAD.
  • 189. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 165 Appropriate policies are necessary if countries are to maximize the development benefits from the integration of domestic firms into NEM networks of TNCs. There are four key challenges for policymakers. First, how to integrate NEM policies into the overall context of national development strategy; second, how to support the building of domestic productive capacity to ensure the availability of attractive business partners that can qualify as actors in global value chains; third, how to promote and facilitate NEMs; and fourth, how to address negative consequences related to NEMs (table IV.15). 1. Embedding NEM policies in development strategies Many countries are increasingly opting for more proactive industrial development policies, in particular since the recent global economic crisis. These policies interact increasingly with the national and international policy frameworks for FDI (see chapter III) and trade. Given the importance of E. POLICIES RELATED TO NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION Maximizing the development benefits of NEMs requires embedding them into overall development strategies, building domestic NEM- related productive capacity, NEM-specific promotion, and policies to mitigate negative effects. NEMs in global value chains and in developing country economies, there is a case for industrial development policies to embrace NEMs as an additional means to achieving development objectives. Analogous to the common policy challenge in industrial policy of “picking winners”, successful government strategies towards using NEMs to galvanize capacity-building reflect the economy’s natural and created endowments, its industrial structure and the capabilities of local enterprises. These strategies should build on concrete opportunities to integrate local players into specific activities or segments of global value chains, such as existing linkages with international production networks and existing export markets. Because of the evolutionary nature of GVCs, initial success in one “GVC niche” can breed additional outsourcing and induce rapid growth (Whittaker et al., 2010). NEM policies within industrial development strategies that aim at industrial upgrading support firms in moving up to higher stages in the value Embedding NEM policies in overall development strategies requires their integration into industrial development strategies, ensuring co- herence with trade, in- vestment and technology policies, and mitigating dependency risks. Table IV.15. Maximizing development benefits from NEMs Policy areas Key actions Embedding NEM policies in overall development strategies • Integrating NEM policies into industrial development strategies • Ensuring coherence with trade, investment, and technology policies • Mitigating dependency risks and supporting upgrading efforts Building domestic productive capacity • Developing entrepreneurship • Improving education • Providing access to finance • Enhancing technological capacities Facilitating and promoting NEMs • Setting up an enabling legal framework • Promoting NEMs through IPAs • Securing home-country support measures • Making international policies conducive to NEMs Addressing negative effects • Strengthening the bargaining power of domestic firms • Safeguarding competition • Protecting labour rights and the environment Source: UNCTAD.
  • 190. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development166 chain, reducing their technology dependency, developing their own brands, or becoming NEM originators in their own right. Policies can support businesses to extend their operations into adjacent activities and segments of the value chain to maximize value added and job creation (see below). Most importantly, embedding NEMs into comprehensive industrial development strategies can help address the risks arising from dependency on a limited range of technologies, market segments or TNC partners. In the short term, the implications of “footlooseness” can be mitigated by improving the “stickiness” of NEMs, with a view to retaining existing TNC engagements with domestic NEM partners. Policymakers can maintain – and possibly even increase – domestic NEM partners’ attractiveness by building sufficient local mass and clusters of secondary suppliers, by nurturing existing NEM relationships or by improving the overall NEM climate (e.g. improving soft and hard infrastructure). As part of the longer-term strategy, countries can reduce dependency risks by balancing specialization and diversification. Policies that foster specialization can improve NEM partners’ competitive edge within a value chain, allowing them ultimately to move towards segments with greater value capture, or even to become “NEM originators” themselves. This is of particular importance in situations where countries’ development paths, and related structural changes, result in a reduction of their low labour cost competitiveness. Diversification, in turn, can help mitigate dependency risks by ensuring that domestic companies are engaged in many different activities, both within and across different value chains, and connected to a broad range of NEM partners. These strategies can be complemented by labour and social policies aimed at cushioning adjustment costs and smoothing adjustment processes. Bridging support, while local industry builds capacity in other activities to fill gaps or finds alternative international NEM partners, can help address social and other challenges arising. On a more permanent basis, periodic review by host countries of their international competitiveness as NEM destinations, involving close monitoring of key indicators concerning labour and other cost factors, is critical. Competitiveness based only on cheap labour can easily vanish as the economy develops. Continuous learning and skills upgrading of domestic entrepreneurs and employees are necessary preconditions for domestic firms to qualify as attractive business partners for higher value added activities, when foreign companies move relatively “low-end” economic activities and production processes to cheaper locations. People-embodied technology ultimately is the most effective anchor for TNCs. 2. Domestic productive capacity-building NEM-related development strategies can only be successful if enterprises in developing countries qualify as potential NEM partners of TNCs. Several policies related to productive capacity-building are important in this context: • Entrepreneurship policy, to develop local entrepreneurs capable of partnering international NEMs and taking advantage of them. • Education policy, to improve the entrepreneurial, technological and managerial skills of the local labour force, including vocational training, so as to be able to engage in NEMs. • Technology policy to support local technological uptake and upgrading so as to enable local firms to capture more value added in NEM relationships. • Policies geared towards easing access to finance. Effective policies to attract and benefit from NEMs require the promotion of local business partners with good entrepreneurial and technological capabili- ties, and sufficient access to finance.
  • 191. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 167 a. Entrepreneurship policy Proactive entrepreneurship policies consist of measures to raise awareness of entrepreneurship as a career option and to support individuals who are willing to assume the risks of engaging in business activities. Awareness is also necessary to promote an entrepreneurial culture among a country’s population. Building on this, support for start-ups and commercialization is fundamental at the early level of business development, including in the NEM context. Business “incubators” are a useful government tool to assist producers that engage, for instance, in contract manufacturing. Most incubators are linked to or sponsored by government institutions, universities or industry associations. Governments can also support the creation of business networks and linkages to assist new entrepreneurs in their interaction with established companies and facilitate access to resources and clients. Finally, supportive administrative regulations can help entrepreneurs to turn new ideas into business products and firms, including through simplification of administrative steps and the provision of specific information through government websites and portals. b. Education Education plays a fundamental role in developing entrepreneurial attitudes, technological and managerial skills and behaviours relevant for NEMs. Key in this respect is to embed entrepreneurship knowledge (including financial literacy and business strategy for start-ups) into the formal educational system at all levels, including schools, universities and private sector bodies. This can be supported by reaching out to the business community and integrating it into the learning process, e.g. Box IV.11. Educational reforms in Viet Nam promote entrepreneurship In Viet Nam, the Government has supported higher education vocational training schools through its Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). Recently, MOET has supported various initiatives to improve the knowledge base of the population. A new education law was passed in 2005 and a plan was formulated by MOET to implement a National Policy Framework for development of a profession-oriented education system, to convert most existing universities into professional higher education institutions. The system will make it possible to connect the curricula with the ever-changing educational and training needs of the industrial sector, the service sector and respective labour markets. Source: UNCTAD, based on Pham Truong Hoang, “Industrial Human Resource Development in Vietnam in the New Stage of Industrialization” Vietnam Development Forum, available at: www.vdf.org.vn. by offering practical training and internships in companies. Vocational training and the development of specialized skills can be a key policy to enhance the capacity of local companies to engage in NEMs (box IV.11). It prepares trainees for jobs involving manual or practical activities, which are non-academic and related to a specific trade or occupation. An example is education programmes for local farmers to increase their productivity and to enhance sustainable methods of agricultural production (WIR09). Depending on the educational systems of countries, vocational training can be set up at the secondary or post-secondary level, and can also interact with apprenticeship systems. To promote the development of specialized skills, entrepreneurship centres can be established that serve as hubs to coordinate activities across business and educational institutions. These centres can also focus on the coordination of after- school programmes or activities in community centres. c. Enhancing technological capacities National technology policies play a vital role in the development of local capacities for technology- related NEMs. This requires a combination of policies geared towards developing technology clusters, encouraging acquisition and dissemination of technology and skills through improved local absorptive capacity, and protecting intellectual property rights. In a broader sense, it also encompasses policies to disseminate information on international business standards expected from local NEM partners of TNCs, such as quality standards, automation processes and prevailing ITC systems.
  • 192. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development168 Generating and disseminating technologies are both vital activities for the development of local capacities in technology-related NEMs. Disseminating technology can foster technological upgrading and hence facilitate the involvement of domestic producers in global value chains. The promotion of partnerships between SMEs and organizations overseas, for the dissemination of key technology, products, processes or management practices, can be useful. The provision of technologies, for instance in the form of new seeds and pesticides, can support local farmers in contract farming (WIR09). Policies aimed at generating technology can strengthen the technological base and attractiveness of domestic NEM partners. For example, technology clusters that promote RD in a particular industry can help generate technology by bringing together technology firms, suppliers and research institutes. Recent years have witnessed some successful initiatives by governments to stimulate not only the involvement of national producers in global value chains, but also to foster their upgrading through technological innovation. For instance, through a combination of targeted incentives and the establishment of centers of excellence, both Egypt56 and the Philippines57 have promoted technological upgrading among local contractors with a focus on improving the competitiveness of call centers and business processing operations. Both countries built their strategies on existing capacities and comparative advantages and policies supported the creation of linkages with the wider business community. In the long run these kind of initiatives may also allow the domestic NEM contractor to become an NEM originator in its own right. Technology-related policies are also crucial to avoid local firms being limited to low value-added activities within NEM relationships; upgrading helps host countries to capture higher economic rents within the value chain. Specific policies include supporting training and capacity-building via skill development and business development service programmes, establishing logistic technology centres as demonstration and testing facilities, facilitating technological upgrading and promoting partnerships. Appropriate protection and enforcement of IP rights is a precondition for IP holders to disclose their technology to licensees in developing countries, especially in areas involving RD-intensive, but at the same time easily imitateable technologies, such as pharmaceuticals (UNCTAD, 2010b). Hence, IP protection plays an important role in the NEM context. It can also be a means of encouraging RD by local NEM partner firms. A new UNCTAD study of developing country cases in the automotive components, software and audiovisual industries emphasizes the relevance and mutual dependence of technological upgrading and the protection of intellectual property rights (UNCTAD, 2010b). SMEs are more likely to invest resources in RD and technological upgrading if their innovations are protected against piracy. d. Access to finance Access to finance is a key concern for SME entrepreneurs in general, and it can be a particular constraint when engaging in NEMs. Government policies aimed at promoting credit for SMEs can take the form of tax breaks, subsidies and government loan guarantees,58 or of alternatives to traditional bank credit, e.g. the formation of venture capital funds to assist start-ups. Policies can be instituted to address the circumstances of SMEs involved in NEMs with foreign companies. For example, in order to reduce the commercial risks faced by contract manufacturers, governments can create a legal framework for “factoring”, where a firm can sell its accounts receivable (i.e. invoices) to a third party in exchange for money with which to finance current expenditure.59 Also, governments can promote finance for licensing and franchising through official institutions that provide special windows for this type of activity, or encourage their formation within existing private institutions (box IV.12). The establishment of agricultural development banks can particularly focus on serving the financial needs of local farmers and small holders (WIR09).
  • 193. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 169 3. Facilitation and promotion of NEMs a. Setting up an enabling legal framework NEMs are based on contractual relationships. The laws and regulations governing these contracts are therefore an important NEM determinant, and can constitute either an incentive or an obstacle for this kind of business cooperation.60 According to investment promotion agencies (IPAs) from developing countries and economies in transition, weak contract laws and cumbersome administrative rules on business start-ups are perceived as the main regulatory obstacles by TNCs. This is particularly the case for contract manufacturing and management contracts. NEMs would be facilitated by a clear and stable regulatory framework. NEM parties need to know what domestic rules govern their contract, the extent to which these regulations constrain their contractual discretion, whether and to what extent they have the right to chose the law of a third (neutral) country to apply to the contract, the consequences of a breach of contract, what procedures apply in the event of a dispute, in particular whether they can opt for international arbitration instead of domestic court proceedings, and how a judicial decision or arbitration award can be enforced. Identifying the applicable laws and regulations is Box IV.12. Providing access to finance for SMEs engaging in franchising activities In the Philippines, the Philippine Franchise Association (PFA), Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SBGFC), the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Export Industry Bank (EIB) launched franchise financing facility windows specifically for franchisors and franchisees. Additionally, SBGFC provides credit through the banking system to finance the requirements of small and medium enterprises, including franchises, in various productive sectors such as manufacturing, agribusiness and service. Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Philippine Franchise Association and Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation. complicated by the fact that most countries do not have specific rules for individual NEM types, such as contract manufacturing, contract farming or franchising, but apply general contract laws, together with other legislation that may be relevant in the specific context. Many law areas may come into play, such as regulations on intellectual property (e.g. for licensing or franchising), competition, consumer protection, employment and environmental protection. Under these circumstances, ensuring transparency and coherence of the legal framework becomes particularly important. An additional task to improve the legal framework for NEMs is to promote the simplification of administrative steps needed to set up new businesses. For example, “one-stop shop” initiatives that concentrate registration procedures in a single agency can reduce the time needed to set up a company, and also reduce costs. Communication campaigns that provide information on existing regulations through media and websites can also contribute to business facilitation. b. The role of investment promotion agencies UNCTAD’s latest survey of IPAs indicates that at present they are only modestly involved in attracting NEMs, with most of their attention to date devoted to contract manufacturing (table IV.16). This is the case for almost all regions; only agencies in Asia seem to give more attention to franchising. A review of existing NEM-specific promotion activities, implemented either by IPAs or by other government institutions, reveals variations between different NEM modes: (i) fiscal and financial subsidies Facilitating and promoting NEMs requires an enabling legal framework, strengthened promotion policies, securing home-country support and harnessing international policies.
  • 194. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development170 Table IV.16. Share of IPAs actively involved in the promotion of NEMs, 2011 (Percentage of respondents) Mode Current promotion Expected importance in the future Main industries Strategic Alliances, Contractual joint ventures 54 60 Across the board Contract manufacturing 40 49 Textiles and apparel, electrical and electronic equipment and business services Franchising 26 43 Hotels and restaurants and retail and wholesale trade Management contracts 24 36 Hotels and restaurants Contract farming 20 32 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing Licensing 19 31 Pharmaceuticals Source: UNCTAD, forthcoming c. are mainly used for contract manufacturing; (ii) promoting local entrepreneurship is, in particular, linked to franchising; (iii) technological upgrading is mostly mentioned in connection with contract manufacturing; while (iv) matchmaking plays an important role across the board. Beyond assisting domestic NEM partners, IPAs can play an important role in promoting the use of NEMs to TNCs. Figure IV.13 indicates that, in general, IPAs involve themselves mainly with information provision and project facilitation in this respect. For instance, investment fairs play an import role in the promotion of franchising opportunities. Involvement in project negotiations mainly occurs in the case of management contracts. Investor targeting, investment missions and the provision of incentives are more common in the case of contract manufacturing. Figure IV.13. Use of IPA policy tools for NEMs, 2011 (Percentage of respondents) Source: UNCTAD, forthcoming c. c. Home-country policies There are examples of TNC home countries promoting specific forms of NEM, in particular franchising. For example, the Australian Trade Commission (AUSTRADE) provides a number of services to Australian franchisors abroad, including coordinating missions around international events, undertaking market research, business partner searches and individual market visit programmes.61 The United States Exim Bank offers long-term financing in emerging markets to United States franchisors involved in international franchising (Richter, 2009). In Malaysia, export promotion activities for the franchise industry by the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE) include participation in international fairs and organizing special marketing missions in conjunction with franchise exhibitions.62 National export insurance schemes as well as political risk insurance for FDI can be extended to NEMs. For example, the United States Exim Bank can provide insurance for franchising related to export activities.63 Official development aid can be used to fund supplier development programmes in host countries (WIR01) and can include technical assistance aimed at domestic capacity-building for NEM. d. International policies While there is no comprehensive international legal and policy framework for fostering NEMs and their development implications, a number of different international treaties and policies merit attention. 0 10 20 30 40 50 Financial and fiscal incentives Advertisement and publicity Project negotiation Policy advocacy Missions Aftercare Company targeting Fairs and seminars Project facilitation Information provision
  • 195. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 171 The role of IIAs in protecting – and hence promoting – NEMs and NEM-related investments is not straightforward. IIAs are not designed to cover NEM arrangements, which do not involve an (equity) investment and hence miss the element that typically triggers IIA application.64 Moreover, the type of protection offered by IIAs (i.e. protection against government interference or conduct) might not correspond to what is mostly required by NEM partners. However, certain NEM components can be considered part of an investment package, under the broad or asset-based definition of “investment” in IIAs (e.g. a trade mark or patents), particularly when TNCs have both FDI and NEMs in the same host country. In such cases, IIAs could have some application. However, there are other international treaties that may impact – directly or indirectly – on NEMs, including for example, the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (e.g. by reducing barriers to trade in services, and hence to a certain extent facilitating business process outsourcing or cross-border franchising in, for example, hotel, restaurant, or distribution services). NEMs relying on intellectual property may benefit from IP rules at national, regional and multilateral levels. Also relevant are other non-binding guidelines and recommendations in specific areas such as licensing, technology transfer and innovation. Regional integration agreements can foster NEMs by encouraging harmonization and institution- building and helping establish regionally integrated production networks and value chains. Of relevance also is the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which, from November 2010, may provide political risk insurance also for activities other than FDI, including management contracts, services, franchising and licensing agreements.65 Some international “soft law” instruments can promote NEMs by harmonizing the rules governing the contractual relationship between private NEM parties, or by guiding private NEM parties in the crafting of the NEM contract. For example, (i) the Model International Franchising Contract, issued by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) provides franchisors and franchisees with drafting suggestions; and (ii) the 1998 UNIDROIT Guide to International Master Franchising Arrangements (in its 2007 revision) comprehensively examines and explains master franchise arrangements. Some of these international initiatives also aim at addressing potential negative effects of NEMs. For example, in terms of strengthening the bargaining power of domestic NEM partners, the 2002 Model Franchise Disclosure Law developed by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) addresses pre-contractual disclosure on the part of the franchisor, and the ICC Model Contract explicitly aims at striking a balance between the interests of the franchisor and franchisee. As regards potential anti-competitive effects, international competition policies remain patchy.66 International environmental law, international labour standards, and soft law initiatives, including CSR, all play a part in ensuring that NEMs deliver tangible development benefits without detrimental side-effects. 4. Addressing potential negative effects of NEMs a. Strengthening the bargaining power of domestic firms Negotiating a NEM contract with a foreign TNC can be a challenge for firms in developing countries, where local entrepreneurs will often be in a weaker position, have little or no experience or knowledge of NEMs, and sometimes do not fully understand the implications of concluding a deal. The local firm’s negotiation position might further be weakened by the fact that TNCs often use standard contract forms with local foreign partners, leaving little room for individual bargaining. Strengthening the negotiating power of domestic firms can be an important means to achieving a fair sharing of risk between the contracting parties, and to preventing the contract from confining the local company to low value-added activities. Addressing negative effects of NEMs requires strengthening the bargaining power of local firms, safeguarding competition, and protect- ing labour rights and the environment.
  • 196. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development172 One means of backing domestic firms in their negotiations is through the imposition by the host country of mandatory requirements on NEM counterparts. The respective issue is then no longer a bargaining chip between the negotiators. Such mandatory rules exist particularly for franchising and contract farming. For instance, numerous countries have franchising regulations, establishing certain pre-contractual requirements for the franchisor vis- à-vis the franchisee (box IV.13). Specific laws on contract farming have been adopted in a few countries, including India, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The provisions address, inter alia, the establishment of a special register or a notification procedure for contract farming agreements, special regulations on leasing of land by enterprises and land property rights of farmers, compensation in case of contract breach, and rules relating to force majeure. Another key aspect relates to special dispute settlement mechanisms, e.g. facilitating access to justice for farmers and ensuring that decisions are final, binding and enforceable (WIR09). With such provisions in place, NEMs may be more appropriate than FDI in sensitive situations, since contract farming is more likely to address responsible investment issues – respect for local rights, livelihoods of farmers and sustainable use of resources – than large-scale land acquisition. Local entrepreneurs can also benefit greatly from advice on how to negotiate a NEM contract. This includes economic aspects (distribution of business risks), financial considerations (e.g. taxation) and legal elements (implications of the contract). In most cases it is not the lack of an adequate legal framework, but the lack of carefully drafted contracts, that lies at the root of subsequent problems and failures. Governments can play a role, for instance, by developing and publishing negotiating guidelines, checklists of issues to be considered in negotiations, codes of conduct, model contracts (including for contract farming) or benchmark prices for the respective product or service. Promoting a “contract culture”, i.e. a better understanding of the merits of entering into formal contracts, is also vital. Finally, supporting collective bargaining, including the formation of domestic producer associations, can help to create a better counterweight to TNCs’ negotiating power. b. Addressing competition concerns NEMs, like FDI, can have serious implications for competition in the host countries. Specific Box IV.13. Pre-contractual requirements in franchising The most common obligation on the franchisor is to provide pre-contractual disclosure of all relevant information, allowing the prospective franchisee to enter the contract with full knowledge of the facts. How much information needs to be disclosed, and how long in advance, depends on the country. Some countries have set a detailed list with required information (e.g. China, France, Japan, Mexico, United States) while for others this is based on general principles (e.g. United Kingdom) or is derived from case law (e.g. Germany). The most common requirements include information on the franchisor’s business experience, past or pending litigation, financial statements, franchise fees and the existing network of franchisees. Other information may include operational details, including the franchisor’s involvement in supervision or training of the franchisee. How long in advance these documents need to disclosed varies, e.g. from seven days in Singapore to 14 in Australia, Canada or the United States, or 30 days in China or Mexico. Franchising regulation may also include other obligations for the franchisor. For instance, the United States requires the franchise offering to be registered with the state. In China, the franchisor must fulfil the “2+1” requirement, that is the franchisor must have owned at least two stores that carry out the franchised business for more than one year, although these do not necessarily need to be in China. In France, the franchisor needs to have run a similar business in a manner and for a time necessary to be considered a success. In other countries similar requirements are not part of the legal framework itself, but are set out in a franchise code of ethics (e.g. in Germany and the United Kingdom). Source: UNCTAD, based on Getting the Deal Through – Franchise 2011, available at www.franchise.org.
  • 197. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 173 contractual provisions in NEMs, such as exclusive dealing oblilcations, territorial constraints, and resale price maintenance, frequently raise competition concerns. They are considered as per se anti- competitive in many competition law regimes. If TNCs engaged in NEMs acquire dominant positions, they may be able to abuse their market power to the detriment of their competitors (domestic and foreign) and their own trading partners. Therefore, policies to promote NEMs need to go hand in hand with policies safeguard competition (WIR97). Competition-related considerations may go beyond the enforcement of the “rules of the game” to ensure that enterprises do not undertake restrictive business practices. Other public interest criteria may require attention as well. Protection of indigenous capacities and traditional activities that may be crowded out by a rapid increase in market shares of successful NEMs, may be relevant, particularly in market-seeking forms of NEMs, such as franchising. c. Labour issues and environmental protection Concerns about labour malpractices and environmental damage related to NEM require government and industry efforts to ensure that internationally recognized labour rights are respected, and environmental protection is in place. One crucial policy issue is to ensure respect for labour standards as embodied in ILO conventions. This not only requires translating these standards into domestic law, but also effective control by the host-country authorities that domestic NEM firms respect these standards. Another critical issue is the protection of domestic stakeholders in case of a termination of the NEM relationship by the TNC. Ensuring “responsible divestment” is not only an issue of contractual relationships and relevant host-country regulatory and legal farmeworks (including social adjustment policies) but also a social responsibility dimension on the part of the TNCs involved. The causing of environmental harm by NEM operations raises the issue of legal liability. While the domestic NEM firm bears direct responsibility as owner and operator of the plant, there is the issue of whether liability could be extended to the TNC, in case that the latter controls or strongly influences many of the processes within the NEM. These labour and environmental issues are also addressed in TNCs’ voluntary CSR standards. Governments can play an important role in creating a coherent policy and institutional framework to address the challenges and opportunities presented by the universe of CSR standards. As explained in chapter III, various approaches are already underway that increasingly mix regulatory and voluntary instruments to promote responsible business practices. There is also a role for policies to build the capacity of local NEM firms to meet the labour and environmental standards expected by TNCs. As TNC CSR codes and other CSR standards proliferate to include international value chains, domestic NEM partners are increasingly expected to meet international standards of labour practice and environmental protection. The potential for legal liability and brand damage discourages TNCs from engaging in NEMs with partners having poor labour or environmental records. Many TNCs will conduct audits and factory inspections of NEM partners, and will disengage from business with partners that consistently fail to meet the TNC’s code of conduct. Developing country governments can consider partnering with donor states, international organizations, civil society specialists and industry associations to deliver practical management training and technical assistance to domestic firms in these areas. * * * Maximizing the development contribution of NEMs requires an integrated policy approach, combining a wide range of different policy tools and instruments, with particular attention given to overall industrial policy objectives, investment, trade and technology policies. What kind of policies fit best is situation- and context-specific, depending among others on, (i) a country’s level of economic and technological development, (ii) its actual and latent NEM-potential, and (iii) its broader development and industrial policy
  • 198. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development174 strategies. All of this is taking place in a dynamic context, where the rise and fall of competitive NEM-related industries around the globe requires a continuing reassessment and adjustment of a particular country’s overall development strategy and policy instruments. Enhanced coordination between different policymakers and institutions, as well as building on first-hand private sector experience, with a view to fostering synergies, is crucial in this context. Notes 1 Strictly speaking, alternative forms of TNC overseas operations are not new; some forms, such as licensing and management contracts, were commonly used in past eras (Jones, 2010; Wilkins and Schröter, 1998). 2 The OLI model explains why some firms choose to expand overseas and others do not (ownership advantages), why firms choose specific locations (location advantages), and why they choose to “make” rather than “buy” (internalization advantages). 3 NEMs can be both domestic and international/ cross-border in scope. In WIR11 all reference to NEMs will be to cross-border arrangements. 4 For example, in management contracts and concessions the TNCs are technically the NEMs because they offer technology and expertise to local partners, including governments in the case of infrastructure and extractive industries. However, this leads to control over a host country business entity without ownership. 5 These linkages between affiliates and local NEMs may also include second- and third-tier suppliers that are in some way dependent on or controlled by the TNC principal. 6 For instance, in contract manufacturing, the report focuses on the final stage of production. In electronics this is associated with the final assembly of a consumer electronic good, typified by large electronics manufacturing services firms like Hon Hai (Taiwan Province of China) and Flextronics (Singapore). Seen from this perspective, NEM firms dominate world trade associated with final consumer electronics goods. However, within the context of the entire electronics supply there are many other players. 7 Assigning a sales-equivalent value to some of these forms is conceptually difficult (e.g. concessions are generally measured as investment values). There is also a paucity of reliable data. 8 Much of this labour was trained by affiliates, especially in South-East Asia, thereby creating assets which were later taken up by contract manufacturers. 9 Such strategies remain very much a part of the dynamics of the industry. 10 See the company website at: www.lifunggroup. com/eng/businesses/sourcing.php (accessed 9 June 2011). The company’s business is largely in garments and footwear. 11 Based on information from Nasscom, XMG Global, IDC and Gartner. 12 Estimates of the global share of these countries in the industry range as high as 78 per cent. See XMG Global report cited in “World’s outsourcing revenue worth $373 billion”, by Eileen Yu, ZDNet Asia, 23 September 2009; available at: www.zdnetasia.com. 13 There remain doubts about how persistent higher returns might be. For example, in the case of franchising, Alon, Drtina and Gilbert (2007) found no sustainable profit advantage for franchise networks over non-franchise networks. 14 Pfizer decreased its own plants by almost 50 per cent (to 46 plants) from 2003 to 2008. Key considerations for outsourcing decisions include the ability to supply, capacity flexibility, cost competitiveness, and technology, while ensuring supply chain integrity/reliability, product quality, and regulatory compliance. Information from Pfizer website www.pfizer.com. 15 See “Why Wal-Mart’s First India Store Isn’t a Wal- Mart”, Time, 15 May 2009; available at: www.time. com and “Walmart: India Fact Sheet”, February 2011; available at: http://walmartstores.com. 16 See Franchise Malaysia, “Government to the fore”, available at www.ifranchisemalaysia.com. 17 This included an English skill enhancement programme for which funding was granted to support language training of individuals; and other initiatives such as tax incentives and concessions. See “Philippines call center industry enjoy the strong Government support”, available at: www.piton- global/resource16.html. 18 For instance, it has taken initiatives to improve human resources quality and has encouraged innovations to strengthen the development of the industry. Expenses on staff training and on development, including research and development can be deducted against income tax at 200 per cent and 160 per cent to 200 per cent, respectively. A 50 per cent excise tax deduction is provided for purchase of equipment for research and development. Companies established in technological parks will be exempted from property taxes and will receive discounts on service taxes. See Brasscom, “Brazil IT-BPO Book: 2008−2009”, (brazilexportati.files.wordpress.com) and Brasscom “Government Support”, (www.brasscom.org).
  • 199. CHAPTER IV Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development 175 19 See “Foxconn to hire more workers in China”, BBC News, 19 August 2010; available at: www.bbc. co.uk. 20 See NASSCOM, India (2010), “Impact of the IT-BPO industry in India: a decade in review”, available at: www.nasscom.in. 21 See “Chilean global services industry”, IDC Study for CORFO, 2009, available at: www.investchile.com. 22 See “IT-BPO Road Map 2011-2016” (www.bpap. org) and “IT-BPO road map 2011-2016: driving to global leadership”. 23 Information provided by Nestlé. 24 See “Contract farming offers fresh hope for Africa’s declining agriculture”, East Africa Policy Brief, No. 2, 2007 (www.worldagroforestry.org). 25 The Franchise Factor. Franchise directions, franchising consulting and trainings, by Bendeta Gordon (2008). Available at: www.franchize.co.za. 26 “IHG invests in China’s future hospitality talent with three new IHG academies”, 31 May 2011; IHG website at: www.ihgplc.com; and “IHG in Greater China - IHG Greater China Facts Sheet”, IHG website. 27 Fast food chains including McDonald’s, Taco Bell and Burger King have been criticized for underpayment to contracted tomato suppliers (contract farmers). In 2005 Florida tomato suppliers won their first wage rise since the 1970s after Taco Bell’s decision to end a consumer boycott by paying an extra cent per pound of tomatoes. Actions continue towards ensuring better conditions for contracted tomato suppliers (Schlosser, Eric (2007) “Penny foolish”, New York Times, 29 November. 28 For instance, in order to gain greater flexibility in responding to the sourcing requirements of TNCs’ contract manufacturers, services outsourcing firms and contract farmers increasingly hire short-term workers or outsource human resources to “temp agencies” (Barrientos, 2007; van Liemt, 2007). 29 Data as of 31 March 2011 www.saasaccreditation. org/certfacilitieslist.htm. 30 ISO (2010) ISO Survey for 2009. 31 Interview with Linda Johansson, head of inspections for HM India; http://somo.nl. The company applied a methodology for obtaining bona fide responses from workers. 32 See “Philippine IT-BPO road map 2016: driving to global leadership”, Everest Global and Outsource2Philippines; available at: www.ncc.gov. ph. 33 See “Auto parts cost strike JVs for technology, consolidation looms”, The Economic Times, 23 May 2011, available at: http://articles.economictimes. indiatimes.com. 34 Carl J. Kosnar, “Global economic development through the utilization of the franchising system”, www.kosnar.com. 35 Total exports from Guangdong province amounted to $22.2 billion, while total Chinese exports amounted to $1,577.9 billion (Ministry of commerce PRC). Toy exports from Guangdong province held a share of 58 per cent of total Chinese toy exports (Chinese Toy Association). 36 See “Bangladesh ranks fourth in global apparel exports”, The Daily Star, 25 July 2010. 37 This is expected to grow to $37 billion by 2011. Increasingly, companies such as Marks and Spencer, Haggar Clothing, Little Label, Boules Trading Company, Castle, Quest Apparel, Wal-Mart, JC Penny, Nautica, Docker and Target are sourcing textiles and apparels from India. See “Textiles and apparel”, IBEF, November 2010; www.ibef.org. 38 A share of goods for processing trade is due to intra-firm trade between affiliates or between parents and affiliates of the same TNC. 39 Calculated from UN Comtrade data. 40 “Segments”, IHG website at: www.ihgplc.com. This access is created by international chains’ brand reputation, international quality standards, centralized marketing and customer loyalty programmes, and in particular their global booking systems. In addition, they are able to negotiate directly with tour operators, large travel agencies and large companies and other organizations, thus generating preferred access to otherwise unreachable customer segments. 41 In fact, partly because licensees can possess significant absorptive capacity, there are risks for TNCs. In the case of MBD its largest customer, Hyundai Heavy Industries, with 26 per cent of MBD’s licensing deals, is now competing with it for market shares based on its own proprietary diesel engine (Pyndt and Pedersen, 2006). 42 7-Eleven, Inc. – Web Corporate Communication 2011. Available at: www.franchise.7-eleven.com. 43 For example, cooperatives and other associations in contract farming arrangements, albeit ostensibly tipping the balance of power against TNCs, are generally regarded favourably by the latter. 44 Examples of such companies include, Acer and HTC (both consumer electronics, Taiwan Province of China), Integrated Microelectronics Inc. (the Philippines), LG and DA Corporation (electronics, Republic of Korea), Piramal Health Care (India), Sonda (IT-BPO, Chile), Trinunggal Komara (garments, Indonesia), Varitronix (electronic displays, Hong Kong (China)) and Yue Yuen (footwear, Taiwan Province of China) (WIR06). 45 Other electronic contract manufacturers, especially Taiwanese, are also being granted an increasing number of patents – e.g. Inventec and Quanta – but the numbers they are assigned are a long way behind Hon Hai.
  • 200. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development176 46 “IFI CLAIMS announces top global companies ranked by 2010 U.S. patents”; available at: www. ificlaims.com. 47 The other three are from the Republic of Korea. 48 Acer and AsusTek spun off their contract manufacturing arms as “Wistron” and “Pegatron” respectively. 49 However, there is also a significant market in renovated machinery (Rasiah, 2009). 50 Important local industries for wealth and job creation such as construction and real estate benefit from the growth of commercial and shopping centres based on the expansion of franchise networks. 51 In this framework, conflicts arise because of concern that foreign brands and products alter local consumers’ preferences or habits (i.e. losing touch with host-country culture and traditions) (Grünhagen, Witte and Pryor, 2010). 52 See, for instance, Magleby (2007). 53 Project Shakti was launched by Hindustan Lever (Unilever’s business in India) in 2000 to distribute its soaps and shampoos, by the end of 2009 employing some 45,000 “Shakti entrepreneurs”. See www.unilever.com. 54 Source: www.tourismpartnership.org. 55 This can occur through “crowding out” (where NEMs out-compete local firms which do not enjoy the advantages of transfers of knowledge and skills from TNCs), or its obverse, “crowding in”. 56 In Egypt, a new Ministry for Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) was established and assigned the mandate to upgrade the national telecommunication system to enhance Egypt’s insertion on global value chains. See the national strategy of Egypts’ Ministry for Communication and Information Technology (MCIT), available at: www. mcit.gov.eg. 57 In the Philippines, the government not only offered tax benefits for the relocation of business processing operations buy foreign companies, but it also established centers of excellence to support the training of its labor force. The industrial policy authorities also supported the creation of linkages through an “Industry Cluster” approach to enhance industrial competitiveness, promote investments in the countryside and develop micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. See the Philippines’ Department of Trade and Industry: www.dti.gov.ph/ dti. 58 The record of active credit support is mixed. While on the one hand subsidized finance does increase access to credit for SMEs, it does so at the risk of lower profitability and non-performance of borrowers (UNCTAD, 2001). 59 Because factoring relies less on collateral, it can assist access to finance for producers who are less creditworthy than their clients (often TNCs). It can also be particularly attractive in financial systems with weak commercial laws and enforcement (Klapper, 2006). 60 UNCTAD conducted a survey of 238 IPAs on their role in attracting NEMs. A total of 91 questionnaires were completed, representing an overall response rate of 38 per cent. Respondents included 27 IPAs from developed countries, 54 from developing countries and 10 from economies in transition (UNCTAD, forthcoming c). 61 See “Franchising overview” on the Austrade website available at: www.austrade.gov.au. 62 See a list of export promotion activities related to franchise at MATRADE’s website, available at: www. matrade.gov.my. 63 Richter, John (2009). “Ex-Im Bank: a valuable partner for ifa members seeking to export”, Franchising World, October; available at: www. franchise.org. 64 For a discussion of the criteria for determining a “covered investment” and the role of development considerations in this context, see UNCTAD (2011 d). 65 See MIGA’s website: www.miga.org. 66 While there is no international legally binding competition instrument, a series of non-binding instruments offer recommendations on the design of domestic competition laws (e.g. the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices or the UNCTAD Model Law on Competition). In terms of regional initiatives, European competition law stands out as supranational law directly applicably in EU Member States, but competition rules also exist in RTAs (UNCTAD, 2000).
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  • 209. ANNEX TABLES 185 ANNEX TABLES I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005–2010.................................................................... 187 I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 ......................................................... 191 I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 ....... 195 I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 ...................................................................................................................... 199 I.5. Cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2005–May 2011 ................................................... 203 I.6. Number of cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2005–May 2011 ................................. 204 I.7. Cross-border MA deals worth over $3 billion completed in 2010 .................................... 205 I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 ......................... 206 I.9. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 ..................... 210 III.1. List of IIAs, as of end May 2011 ........................................................................................... 213 III.2. Selected MSI standards ........................................................................................................ 216 III.3. Selected industry association codes ................................................................................... 218 IV.1. Top 10 contract manufacturers in electronics, ranked by revenues, 2009 ......................... 219 IV.2. Top 10 auto parts contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009 .............................. 220 IV.3. Top 10 pharmaceutical contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009 ..................... 221 IV.4. Use of contract manufacturing by major garment and footwear brand owners, selected indicators, 2009 ...................................................................................................... 222 IV.5. Top 15 outsourcing IT-BPO service providers, ranked by revenues, 2009 ......................... 223 IV.6. Top 15 global franchise chains, ranked by revenues, 2009 ................................................ 224 IV.7. Top 10 global semiconductor foundry contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009 ...................................................................................................................... 225
  • 210. 186 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development List of annex tables available on the UNCTAD website, www.unctad.org/wir 1. FDI inflows, by region and economy, 1990–2010 2. FDI outflows, by region and economy, 1990–2010 3. FDI inward stock, by region and economy, 1990–2010 4. FDI outward stock, by region and economy, 1990–2010 5. FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 1990–2010 6. FDI outflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 1990–2010 7. FDI inward stock as percentage of gross domestic products, by region and economy, 1990–2010 8. FDI outward stock as percentage of gross domestic products, by region and economy, 1990–2010 9. Value of cross-border MA sales, by region/economy of seller, 1990–May 2011 10. Value of cross-border MA purchases, by region/economy of purchaser, 1990–May 2011 11. Number of cross-border MA sales, by region/economy of seller, 1990–May 2011 12. Number of cross-border MA purchases, by region/economy of purchaser, 1990–May 2011 13. Value of cross-border MA sales, by sector/industry, 1990–May 2011 14. Value of cross-border MA purchases, by sector/industry, 1990–May 2011 15. Number of cross-border MA sales, by sector/industry, 1990–May 2011 16. Number of cross-border MA purchases, by sector/industry, 1990–May 2011 17. Cross-border MA deals worth over $1 billion completed in 2010 18. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source, 2003–April 2011 19. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by destination, 2003–April 2011 20. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by sector/industry, 2003–April 2011 21. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source, 2003–April 2011 22. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by destination, 2003–April 2011 23. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by sector/industry, 2003–April 2011 24. Estimated world inward FDI stock, by sector and industry, 1990–2009 25. Estimated world outward FDI stock, by sector and industry, 1990–2009 26. Estimated world inward FDI flows, by sector and industry, 1990–1992 and 2007–2009 27. Estimated world outward FDI flows, by sector and industry, 1990–1992 and 2007–2009 28. Inward FDI Performance and Potential Index ranking, 1990–2010 29. The world’s top 100 non-financial TNCs, ranked by foreign assets, 2010 30. The top 100 non-financial TNCs from developing and transition economies, ranked by foreign assets, 2010 31. The top 50 financial TNCs, ranked by Geographical Spread Index (GSI), 2010 32. Outward FDI projects by State-owned TNCs, by home region/economy, 2003-2010 33. Outward FDI projects by State-owned TNCs, by sector and industry, 2003-2010 34. Number of parent corporations and foreign affiliates, by region and economy, latest available year
  • 211. ANNEX TABLES 187 Annex table I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005–2010 (Millions of dollars) Region/economy FDI inflows FDI outflows 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 World 982 593 1 461 863 1 970 940 1 744 101 1 185 030 1 243 671 882 132 1 405 389 2 174 803 1 910 509 1 170 527 1 323 337 Developed economies 619 134 977 888 1 306 818 965 113 602 835 601 906 745 679 1 154 983 1 829 044 1 541 232 850 975 935 190 Europe 503 730 635 832 895 753 514 975 387 825 313 100 686 671 792 652 1 274 118 983 284 434 171 475 763 European Union 496 075 581 719 850 528 487 968 346 531 304 689 606 515 690 030 1 199 325 906 199 370 016 407 251 Austria 10 784 7 933 31 154 6 858 7 011 6 613 11 145 13 670 39 025 29 452 7 381 10 854 Belgium 34 370 58 893 93 429 142 041 23 595 61 714 32 658 50 685 80 127 164 314 - 21 667 37 735 Bulgaria 3 920 7 805 12 389 9 855 3 351 2 170 310 177 282 755 - 119 238 Cyprus 1 186 1 864 2 234 4 050 5 725 4 860 558 902 1 245 4 142 5 052 4 220 Czech Republic 11 653 5 463 10 444 6 451 2 927 6 781 - 19 1 468 1 620 4 323 949 1 702 Denmark 12 871 2 691 11 812 2 216 2 966 - 1 814 16 193 8 206 20 574 14 142 6 865 3 183 Estonia 2 869 1 797 2 725 1 731 1 838 1 539 691 1 107 1 746 1 114 1 549 133 Finland 4 750 7 652 12 451 - 1 035 - 4 4 314 4 223 4 805 7 203 9 297 3 831 8 385 France 84 949 71 848 96 221 64 184 34 027 33 905 114 978 110 673 164 310 155 047 102 949 84 112 Germany 47 439 55 626 80 208 4 218 37 627 46 134 75 893 118 701 170 617 77 142 78 200 104 857 Greece 623 5 355 2 111 4 499 2 436 2 188 1 468 4 045 5 246 2 418 2 055 1 269 Hungary 7 709 6 818 3 951 7 384 2 045 2 377 2 179 3 877 3 621 3 111 2 699 1 546 Ireland - 31 689 - 5 542 24 707 - 16 453 25 960 26 330 14 313 15 324 21 146 18 949 26 616 17 802 Italy 19 975 39 239 40 202 - 10 845 20 073 9 498 41 826 42 068 90 778 67 002 21 271 21 005 Latvia 707 1 663 2 322 1 261 94 349 128 170 369 243 - 62 16 Lithuania 1 028 1 817 2 015 2 045 172 629 346 291 597 336 217 128 Luxembourg 6 564 31 843 - 28 260 9 785 30 196 20 350 9 932 7 747 73 350 10 171 18 726 18 293 Malta 676 1 840 1 006 845 760 1 041 - 21 30 14 305 134 87 Netherlands 39 046 13 976 119 383 3 577 34 514 - 16 141 123 071 71 174 55 608 67 485 26 927 31 904 Poland 10 293 19 603 23 561 14 839 13 698 9 681 3 406 8 864 5 405 4 414 5 219 4 701 Portugal 3 930 10 902 3 055 4 665 2 706 1 452 2 111 7 139 5 490 2 741 816 - 8 608 Romania 6 483 11 367 9 921 13 910 4 847 3 573 - 31 423 279 277 - 86 193 Slovakia 2 429 4 693 3 581 4 687 - 50 526 150 511 600 530 432 328 Slovenia 588 644 1 514 1 947 - 582 834 641 862 1 802 1 390 167 151 Spain 25 020 30 802 64 264 76 993 9 135 24 547 41 829 104 248 137 052 74 717 9 737 21 598 Sweden 11 896 28 941 27 737 36 771 10 322 5 328 27 706 26 593 38 836 31 326 25 778 30 399 United Kingdom 176 006 156 186 196 390 91 489 71 140 45 908 80 833 86 271 272 384 161 056 44 381 11 020 Other developed Europe 7 655 54 113 45 225 27 006 41 294 8 411 80 156 102 622 74 793 77 085 64 155 68 512 Gibraltar 122 a 137 a 165 a 159 a 172 a 165 a - - - - - - Iceland 3 071 3 843 6 824 917 83 2 950 7 072 5 473 10 186 - 4 209 2 281 - 1 935 Norway 5 413 6 415 5 800 10 781 14 074 11 857 21 966 21 326 13 588 25 990 28 623 12 195 Switzerland - 951 43 718 32 435 15 149 26 964 - 6 561 51 118 75 824 51 020 55 305 33 251 58 253 North America 130 465 297 430 330 604 363 543 174 298 251 662 42 907 270 434 451 244 388 090 324 351 367 490 Canada 25 692 60 294 114 652 57 177 21 406 23 413 27 538 46 214 57 726 79 794 41 665 38 585 United States 104 773 237 136 215 952 306 366 152 892 228 249 15 369 224 220 393 518 308 296 282 686 328 905 Other developed countries - 15 060 44 626 80 460 86 595 40 712 37 144 16 101 91 897 103 682 169 858 92 454 91 937 Australia - 24 246 31 050 45 397 46 843 25 716 32 472 - 31 137 25 409 16 786 33 604 16 160 26 431 Bermuda 44 261 577 - 146 - 88 210 31 579 1 040 563 208 693 Israel 4 818 15 296 8 798 10 875 4 438 5 152 2 946 15 462 8 604 7 210 1 695 7 960 Japan 2 775 - 6 507 22 550 24 426 11 939 - 1 251 45 781 50 264 73 548 128 019 74 699 56 263 New Zealand 1 548 4 526 3 138 4 598 - 1 293 561 - 1 521 182 3 703 462 - 308 589 Developing economies 332 343 429 459 573 032 658 002 510 578 573 568 122 143 226 683 294 177 308 891 270 750 327 564 Africa 38 160 46 259 63 132 73 413 60 167 55 040 1 968 6 943 10 719 9 750 5 627 6 636 North Africa 12 236 23 143 24 775 24 045 18 468 16 926 287 134 5 545 8 751 2 543 3 384 Algeria 1 081 1 795 1 662 2 594 2 761 2 291 - 20 35 295 318 215 226 Egypt 5 376 10 043 11 578 9 495 6 712 6 386 92 148 665 1 920 571 1 176 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 1 038 2 013 4 689 4 111 2 674 3 833 a 128 - 534 3 933 5 888 1 165 1 282 a Morocco 1 654 2 449 2 805 2 487 1 952 1 304 a 75 445 622 485 470 576 a Sudan 2 305 3 534 2 426 2 601 2 682 a 1 600 a - 7 11 98 45 a 51 a Tunisia 783 3 308 1 616 2 758 1 688 1 513 13 33 20 42 77 74 Other Africa 25 924 23 116 38 357 49 367 41 699 38 114 1 681 6 809 5 173 999 3 084 3 252 West Africa 7 126 6 976 9 522 12 718 12 662 11 323 289 342 977 1 341 1 504 1 120 Benin 53 53 255 171 135 111 - 0 - 2 - 6 - 4 31 7 Burkina Faso 34 34 344 137 a 171 a 37 a - 0 1 0 0 a 1 a 0 a Cape Verde 82 131 190 209 119 111 - - 0 - 0 0 0 Côte d’ Ivoire 312 a 319 a 427 a 446 a 381 a 418 a 52 a - 27 a - 0 a 8 a - 7 a 0 a Gambia 45 71 76 70 47 37 a - - - - - - Ghana 145 636 855 1 220 1 685 2 527 - - - 9 7 8 Guinea 105 125 386 382 141 303 a - - - 126 a - a - a Guinea-Bissau 8 17 19 6 14 a 9 a 1 0 - 0 0 0 0 a Liberia 83 108 132 395 218 248 a 255 47 65 119 - 93 30 a Mali 225 82 65 180 a 109 a 148 a - 1 1 7 3 a 4 a 5 a Mauritania 814 106 138 338 - 38 14 a 2 5 4 4 4 4 a Niger 30 51 129 566 739 947 a - 4 - 1 8 a 24 a 10 a 14 a Nigeria 4 978 4 898 6 087 8 249 8 650 6 099 15 322 875 1 058 1 542 923 Saint Helena 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - - Senegal 52 210 273 a 272 a 208 a 237 a - 8 10 25 a 9 a 15 a 154 a Sierra Leone 83 59 97 53 a 33 a 36 a - 8 - - - - 5 a Togo 77 77 49 24 a 50 a 41 a - 15 - 14 - 1 - 16 a - 10 a - 31 a Central Africa 2 675 3 051 5 985 4 395 5 400 7 959 84 127 87 159 117 94 Burundi 1 0 1 a 14 a 10 a 14 a - - 0 - - - Cameroon 225 309 284 270 337 425 a - 9 - 1 - 2 2 a - 9 a 2 a Central African Republic 32 35 57 117 42 72 a - - - - - - Chad - 99 - 279 - 69 234 462 781 a - - - - - - /…
  • 212. 188 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005–2010 (continued) (Millions of dollars) FDI inflows FDI outflows Region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Congo 1 475 1 925 2 275 2 483a 2 083a 2 816a - - - - - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - 256 1 808 1 727 664 2 939 13 18 14 54 35 7 Equatorial Guinea 769 470 1 243 - 794 1 636 695a - - - - - - Gabon 242 268 269 209a 33a 170a 65a 106a 59a 96a 87a 81a Rwanda 14 31 82 103 119 42 - - 13 - - - São Tomé and Principe 16 38 35 33a 14a 3a 15 3 3 7a 4a 5a East Africa 1 424 2 588 4 085 3 667 3 638 3 728 91 42 112 109 89 153 Comoros 1 1 8a 8a 9a 9a - - - - - - Djibouti 22 108 195 229 100 27 - - - - - - Eritrea - 1 0 - 0 - 0 0 56a - - - - - - Ethiopia 265 545 222 109 221a 184a - - - - - - Kenya 21 51 729 96 141 133a 10 24 36 44 46 18a Madagascar 86 295 773 1 169 1 066 860 - - - - - - Mauritius 42 105 339 383 257 430 48 10 58 52 37 129 Mayotte 5 0 - - - - - - - - - - Seychelles 86 146 239 179 275 369a 33 8 18 13 5 6a Somalia 24a 96a 141a 87a 108a 112a - - - - - - Uganda 380 644 792 729 816 848 - - - - - - United Republic of Tanzania 494 597 647 679 645 700a - - - - - - Southern Africa 14 699 10 501 18 764 28 588 19 999 15 105 1 218 6 298 3 998 - 610 1 373 1 885 Angola 6 794 9 064 9 796 16 581 11 672 9 942 221 194 912 2 570 8 1 163a Botswana 279 486 495 528 579a 529a 56 50 51 - 91 - 65a - 38a Lesotho 57 89 97 56 48 55 - - - - - - Malawi 52 72 92 9 60a 140a 1 1 1 25 1a 1a Mozambique 108 154 427 592 893 789 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 3 1 Namibia 348 387 733 720 516 858 - 13 - 12 3 5 - 3 - 4 South Africa 6 647 - 527 5 695 9 006 5 365 1 553 930 6 063 2 966 - 3 134 1 151 450 Swaziland - 46 121 37 106 66 93a 21 1 - 23 8 - 7 8a Zambia 357 616 1 324 939 695 1 041 - - 86 - 270 289 Zimbabwe 103 40 69 52 105 105 1 0 3 8 20 15 Latin America and the Caribbean 78 082 98 459 169 514 206 733 140 997 159 171 33 999 68 129 61 731 80 580 45 544 76 273 South and Central America 72 198 69 833 108 701 126 163 75 772 111 103 19 645 43 603 23 412 37 374 13 471 47 062 South America 44 266 43 916 71 546 92 134 55 287 86 481 11 898 35 449 12 247 34 161 4 066 30 294 Argentina 5 265 5 537 6 473 9 726 4 017 6 337 1 311 2 439 1 504 1 391 712 964 Bolivia, Plurinational State of - 288 281 366 513 423 622 3 0 7 4 - 3 - 58 Brazil 15 066 18 822 34 585 45 058 25 949 48 438 2 517 28 202 7 067 20 457 - 10 084 11 519 Chile 6 984 7 298 12 534 15 150 12 874 15 095 2 183 2 172 2 573 8 041 8 061 8 744 Colombia 10 252 6 656 9 049 10 596 7 137 6 760 4 662 1 098 913 2 254 3 088 6 504 Ecuador 493 271 194 1 006 319 164 10 8 - 8 8 36 12 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - Guyana 77 102 152 178 144a 188a - - - - - - Paraguay 54 173 185 320 209 419 6 7 7 8 8 - 4 Peru 2 579 3 467 5 491 6 924 5 576 7 328 - - 66 736 398 215 Suriname 348 323 179 209 151 180a - - - - - - Uruguay 847 1 493 1 329 2 106 1 593 2 355 36 - 1 89 - 11 16 9 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 2 589 - 508 1 008 349 - 3 105 - 1 404 1 170 1 524 30 1 273 1 834 2 390 Central America 27 932 25 916 37 155 34 029 20 485 24 622 7 747 8 154 11 164 3 213 9 405 16 768 Belize 127 109 143 170 109 97 1 1 1 3 0 1 Costa Rica 861 1 469 1 896 2 078 1 347 1 413 - 43 98 263 6 7 9 El Salvador 511 241 1 551 903 366 78 - 113 26 - 95 - 80 - - Guatemala 508 592 745 754 600 687 38 40 25 16 26 24 Honduras 600 669 928 1 006 523 797 - 1 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 Mexico 24 122 20 052 29 734 26 295 15 334 18 679 6 474 5 758 8 256 1 157 7 019 14 345 Nicaragua 241 287 382 626 434 508 18 21 9 16 15 14 Panama 962 2 498 1 777 2 196 1 773 2 363 1 372 2 209 2 704 2 095 2 336 2 377 Caribbean 5 884 28 626 60 813 80 570 65 226 48 068 14 354 24 526 38 320 43 207 32 073 29 211 Anguilla 117 142 119 99 46 25 - - - - - - Antigua and Barbuda 221 359 338 174 118 105 0 - - - - - Aruba 101 565 - 127 200 73 161 - 9 - 13 30 3 1 4 Bahamas 912 1 159 1 164 1 103 657 977 - - - - - - Barbados 128 245 338 267 160 80a 9 44 82 3 - 80 2a British Virgin Islands - 9 090a 7 549a 31 443a 51 742a 42 100a 30 526a 6 380a 15 698a 29 339a 29 121a 25 742a 20 598a Cayman Islands 10 221a 14 963a 22 969a 18 749a 17 878a 12 894a 7 451a 8 333a 8 769a 13 333a 6 379a 8 539a Cuba 16a 26a 64a 24a 24a 86a - 2a - 2a - - - - Dominica 19 26 40 57 41 31 - - - - - - Dominican Republic 1 123 1 085 1 667 2 870 2 165 1 626 21 - 61 - 17 - 19 - 32 - 23 Grenada 70 90 152 142 103 89 - - - - - - Haiti 26 160 75 30 38 150 - - - - - - Jamaica 682 882 867 1 437 541 201a 101 85 115 76 61 67a Montserrat 1 4 7 13 3 2 - - - - - - Netherlands Antillesb 42 - 22 234 266 117 138 65 57 - 3 - 15 - 7 17 Puerto Rico 36 - - - - - - - - - - - /…
  • 213. ANNEX TABLES 189 Annex table I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005–2010 (continued) (Millions of dollars) FDI inflows FDI outflows Region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Saint Kitts and Nevis 93 110 134 178 104 141 - - - - - - Saint Lucia 78 234 272 161 146 99 - - - - - - Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 40 109 131 159 106 92 - - - - - - Trinidad and Tobago 940 883 830 2 801 709 549 341 370 0 700 - - Turks and Caicos Islands 108a 58a 97a 99a 95a 97a - 3a 14a 5a 6a 9a 7a Asia and Oceania 216 101 284 741 340 387 377 857 309 414 359 357 86 176 151 611 221 727 218 560 219 579 244 656 Asia 215 834 283 463 339 252 375 665 307 527 357 846 86 051 151 566 221 688 218 436 219 500 244 585 West Asia 44 498 67 112 78 211 91 564 65 993 58 193 12 452 22 570 34 175 40 180 26 309 12 999 Bahrain 1 049 2 915 1 756 1 794 257 156 1 135 980 1 669 1 620 - 1 791 334 Iraq 515 383 972 1 856 1 452 1 426 89 305 8 34 116 52 Jordan 1 984 3 544 2 622 2 829 2 430 1 704 163 - 138 48 13 72 28 Kuwait 234 121 112 - 6 1 114 81 5 142 8 211 9 784 9 091 8 636 2 069 Lebanon 3 321 3 132 3 376 4 333 4 804 4 955 715 875 848 987 1 126 574 Oman 1 538 1 588 3 431 2 528 1 471 2 045 234 263 70 481 66 317 Palestinian Territory 47 19 28 52 265 115a 13 125 - 8 - 8 - 15 - 11a Qatar 2 500a 3 500a 4 700a 3 779 8 125 5 534a 352a 127a 5 160a 6 029a 11 584a 1 863a Saudi Arabia 12 097 17 140 22 821 38 151 32 100 28 105 - 350 - 39 - 135 3 498 2 177 3 907 Syrian Arab Republic 583 659 1 242 1 467 1 434 1 381a 80 - 11 2 2 - 3 0a Turkey 10 031 20 185 22 047 19 504 8 411 9 071 1 064 924 2 106 2 549 1 553 1 780 United Arab Emirates 10 900 12 806 14 187 13 724 4 003 3 948 3 750 10 892 14 568 15 820 2 723 2 015 Yemen - 302 1 121 917 1 555 129 - 329a 65a 56a 54a 66a 66a 70a South, East and South-East Asia 171 337 216 351 261 041 284 100 241 534 299 653 73 599 128 997 187 513 178 256 193 191 231 585 East Asia 116 189 131 829 151 004 185 253 161 096 188 291 51 907 85 402 114 391 133 173 142 941 174 283 China 72 406 72 715 83 521 108 312 95 000 105 735 12 261 21 160 22 469 52 150 56 530 68 000a Hong Kong, China 33 625 45 060 54 341 59 621 52 394 68 904 27 196 44 979 61 081 50 581 63 991 76 077 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 50a - 105a 67a 44a 2a 38a - - - - - - Korea, Republic of 7 055 4 881 2 628 8 409 7 501 6 873 6 359 11 175 19 720 20 251 17 197 19 230 Macao, China 1 240 1 608 2 305 2 591 2 770 2 558a 60 636 3 - 102 - 708 - 269a Mongolia 188 245 373 845 624 1 691 2 54 13 6 54 62 Taiwan Province of China 1 625 7 424 7 769 5 432 2 805 2 492 6 028 7 399 11 107 10 287 5 877 11 183 South Asia 14 411 27 821 34 297 51 901 42 458 31 954 3 524 14 812 17 709 19 897 16 405 15 079 Afghanistan 271 238 243 300 185 76 - - - - - - Bangladesh 845 792 666 1 086 700 913 3 4 21 9 29 15 Bhutan 9 6 78 28 15 12 - - - - - - India 7 622 20 328 25 350 42 546 35 649 24 640 2 985 14 285 17 234 19 397 15 929 14 626 Iran, Islamic Republic of 3 136 1 647 1 670 1 615 3 016 3 617 452 386 302 380 356 346 Maldives 53 64 91 135 112 164 - - - - - - Nepal 2 - 7 6 1 39 39a - - - - - - Pakistan 2 201 4 273 5 590 5 438 2 338 2 016 45 109 98 49 71 46 Sri Lanka 272 480 603 752 404 478 38 29 55 62 20 46 South-East Asia 40 737 56 701 75 740 46 947 37 981 79 408 18 169 28 782 55 413 25 185 33 845 42 223 Brunei Darussalam 289 434 260 239 370 496a 15 17 - 7a 16a 9a 6a Cambodia 381 483 867 815 539 783 11 12 5 24 18 17 Indonesia 8 336 4 914 6 928 9 318 4 877 13 304 3 065 2 726 4 675 5 900 2 249 2 664 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 28 187 324 228 319 350a - 0 39 1 - 75 1 6 Malaysia 4 065 6 060 8 595 7 172 1 430 9 103 3 076 6 021 11 314 14 965 7 930 13 329 Myanmar 236 428 715 976 579 756a - - - - - - Philippines 1 854 2 921 2 916 1 544 1 963 1 713 189 103 3 536 259 359 487 Singapore 15 460 29 348 37 033 8 588 15 279 38 638 11 218 18 809 32 702 - 256 18 464 19 739 Thailand 8 067 9 517 11 355 8 448 4 976 5 813 529 970 3 003 4 053 4 116 5 122 Timor-Leste 1a 8 9 40 50 280 - - - - - - Viet Nam 2 021 2 400 6 739 9 579 7 600 8 173a 65 85 184 300a 700a 853a Oceania 267 1 278 1 134 2 192 1 887 1 511 124 45 39 125 79 71 Cook Islands 1 3 - 0 1a 1a 1a 0 0 - - - - Fiji 160 370 376 354 114 129a 10 1 - 6 - 8 3 3a French Polynesia 8a 31a 58 14 10 26a 16a 10a 14a 30a 8a 16a Kiribati 5 1 1 3 3 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 Marshall Islands 7a 6a 12a 6a 8a 9a 54a - 8a - - - - Micronesia, Federated States of 0a 1a 17a 6a 8a 10a - - - - - - Nauru 1a - 0a 1a 1a 1a 1a - - - - - - New Caledonia - 7 749 417 1 673 1 146 1 003a 31 31 7 93 58a 49a Niue - 1 - - - - - 1a - 2a 4a 2a - 0a - Palau 1a 1a 3a 2a 2a 2a - 2 - - - - - Papua New Guinea 34 - 7 96 - 30 423 29 6 1 8 0 4 0 Samoa - 4 3 3 17 1 2 2 2 - 0 0 - 0 0 Solomon Islands 19 34 64 95 120 238 0 7 10 4 3 2 Tokelau 0 - - - - - - - - - - - Tonga 17 10 28 6 15 16a 5 2 2 2 2 - Tuvalu - 0a 5a 0a 2a 2a 2a - - - - - - Vanuatu 28 72 57 44 32 39 1 1 1 1 1 1 Wallis and Futuna Islands - 0a 1a 1a 1a 1a - - - - - - /…
  • 214. 190 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2005-2010 (concluded) (Millions of dollars) FDI inflows FDI outflows Region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 South-East Europe and the CIS 31 116 54 516 91 090 120 986 71 618 68 197 14 310 23 723 51 581 60 386 48 802 60 584 South-East Europe 4 877 9 875 12 837 12 601 7 824 4 125 273 395 1 448 1 896 1 371 52 Albania 264 325 656 988 979 1 097 4 11 28 81 36 - 12 Bosnia and Herzegovina 613 766 2 080 932 246 63 0 4 28 13 - 9 47 Croatia 1 825 3 473 5 035 6 179 2 911 583 239 259 289 1 425 1 235 - 203 Montenegro 501 622 934 960 1 527 760 4 33 157 108 46 29 Serbia 1 577 4 256 3 439 2 955 1 959 1 329 22 88 947 283 52 189 The FYR of Macedonia 96 433 693 586 201 293 3 0 - 1 - 14 11 2 CIS 26 239 44 642 78 252 108 385 63 794 64 072 14 037 23 328 50 134 58 490 47 432 60 532 Armenia 239 453 699 935 778 577 7 3 - 2 10 53 8 Azerbaijan 1 680 - 584 - 4 749 14 473 563 1 221 705 286 556 326 232 Belarus 305 354 1 805 2 180 1 886 1 350 2 3 15 31 102 43 Georgia 453 1 170 1 750 1 564 658 549 - 89 - 16 76 70 - 1 6 Kazakhstan 1 971 6 278 11 119 14 322 13 771 9 961 - 146 - 385 3 153 1 204 3 118 7 806 Kyrgyzstan 43 182 209 377 190 234 0a 0a - 0a 0a - 0a 0a Moldova, Republic of 191 240 534 713 128 199 - 0 - 1 17 16 7 4 Russian Federation 12 886 29 701 55 073 75 002 36 500 41 194 12 767 23 151 45 916 55 594 43 665 51 697 Tajikistan 54 339 360 376 16 45a - - - - - - Turkmenistan 418 731 856 1 277 3 867a 2 083a - - - - - - Ukraine 7 808 5 604 9 891 10 913 4 816 6 495 275 - 133 673 1 010 162 736 Uzbekistan 192 174 705 711 711a 822a - - - - - - Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)c 14 831 20 888 26 083 33 030 26 538 26 390 555 393 1 234 3 049 441 1 819 Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)d 6 832 11 935 15 736 25 420 26 190 23 022 1 169 476 3 627 1 693 3 809 8 352 Small island developing states (SIDS)e 3 728 5 083 5 833 7 968 4 250 4 210 623 526 291 851 42 215 Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Estimates. b This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010. c Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. d Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. e Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
  • 215. ANNEX TABLES 191 Annex table I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 (Millions of dollars) FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Region/economy 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 World 2 081 299 7 445 637 19 140 603 2 094 169 7 962 170 20 408 257 Developed economies 1 563 969 5 653 192 12 501 569 1 948 644 7 083 477 16 803 536 Europe 808 896 2 440 473 7 614 844 887 519 3 759 713 10 023 881 European Union 761 851 2 322 264 6 890 387 810 472 3 492 863 8 933 485 Austria 10 972 31 165 154 999 4 747 24 821 169 697 Belgium and Luxembourg 58 388 195 219 - 40 636 179 773 - Belgium .. .. 670 013 .. .. 736 725 Bulgaria 112 2 704 47 971 124 34 1 486 Cyprus ..a,b 2 846 29 530 8 557 20 600 Czech Republic 1 363 21 644 129 893 .. 738 15 523 Denmark 9 192 73 574 139 205a 7 342 73 100 194 948a Estonia .. 2 645 16 438 .. 259 5 779 Finland 5 132 24 273 82 706 11 227 52 109 130 617 France 97 814 390 953 1 008 378 112 441 925 925 1 523 046 Germany 111 231 271 613 674 217a 151 581 541 866 1 421 332a Greece 5 681 14 113 33 559 2 882 6 094 37 876 Hungary 570 22 870 91 933 159 1 280 20 685 Ireland 37 989 127 089 247 097 14 942 27 925 348 737 Italy 59 998 121 170 337 401 60 184 180 275 475 598 Latvia .. 2 084 10 838 .. 23 833 Lithuania .. 2 334 13 449 .. 29 2 092 Luxembourg .. .. 114 691a .. .. 137 575a Malta 465 2 385 9 866a .. 203 1 528a Netherlands 68 731 243 733 589 825 106 900 305 461 890 222 Poland 109 34 227 193 141 95 1 018 36 839 Portugal 10 571 32 043 110 241 900 19 794 64 253 Romania 0 6 953 70 012 66 136 1 486 Slovakia 282 4 762 50 678 .. 379 2 830 Slovenia 1 643 2 893 15 022 560 768 7 603 Spain 65 916 156 348 614 473 15 652 129 194 660 160 Sweden 12 636 93 995 348 667 50 720 123 256 336 086 United Kingdom 203 905 438 631 1 086 143 229 307 897 845 1 689 330 Other developed Europe 47 045 118 209 724 457 77 047 266 850 1 090 396 Gibraltar 263a 642a 1 903a - - - Iceland 147 497 11 771 75 663 10 504 Norway 12 391 30 265 171 833a 10 884 34 026 170 481a Switzerland 34 245 86 804 538 950 66 087 232 161 909 411 North America 652 444 2 995 951 4 012 516 816 569 2 931 653 5 459 459 Canada 112 843 212 716 561 111 84 807 237 639 616 134 United States 539 601 2 783 235 3 451 405 731 762 2 694 014 4 843 325 Other developed countries 102 629 216 769 874 209 244 556 392 111 1 320 196 Australia 80 364 118 858 508 123 37 505 95 979 402 249 Bermuda - 265a 3 266a - 108a 2 932a Israel 4 476 22 367 77 810 1 188 9 091 66 299 Japan 9 850 50 322 214 880 201 441 278 442 831 074 New Zealand 7 938 24 957 70 129 4 422 8 491 17 642 Developing economies 517 322 1 731 604 5 951 203 145 525 857 354 3 131 845 Africa 60 675 154 268 553 972 20 229 44 224 122 429 North Africa 23 962 45 728 206 067 1 836 3 281 23 562 Algeria 1 561 3 537 19 498 183 249 1 814 Egypt 11 043 19 955 73 095a 163 655 5 447a Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 678 451 19 342a 1 321 1 942 13 269a Morocco 3 011 8 842 42 023a 155 402 2 745a Sudan 55 1 398 20 743a - - - Tunisia 7 615 11 545 31 367 15 33 286 Other Africa 36 712 108 540 347 905 18 393 40 942 98 867 West Africa 14 013 33 401 95 396 2 202 6 699 6 793 Benin ..a,b 213 849 2 11 63a Burkina Faso 39a 28a 905a 4a 0a 11a Cape Verde 4a 192a 1 140 - - 1 Côte d’ Ivoire 975a 2 483 6 641a 6 9 23a Gambia 157a 216a 675a - - - Ghana 319a 1 605a 9 098a - - - Guinea 69a 263a 1 917a .. 7a 139a Guinea-Bissau 8a 38a 190a - - 3a Liberia 2 732a 3 247a 4 888a 846a 2 255a 960a Mali 229a 132a 1 234a 22a 22a 62a Mauritania 59a 146a 2 155a 3a 4a 27a Niger 286a 45a 2 310a 54a 117a 171a Nigeria 8 539a 23 786a 60 327a 1 219a 4 144a 5 041a Senegal 258a 295a 1 615a 47a 117a 364a Sierra Leone 243a 284a 495a - - - Togo 268a 427a 955a - 13a ..a,b /…
  • 216. 192 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 (continued) (Millions of dollars) FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Region/economy 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 Central Africa 3 808 5 733 38 835 372 648 1 039 Burundi 30a 47a 86a 0a 2a 2a Cameroon 1 044a 1 600a 4 828a 150a 254a 245a Central African Republic 95a 104a 369a 18a 43a 43a Chad 250a 576a 4 168a 37a 70a 70a Congo 575a 1 889a 15 983a - - - Congo, Democratic Republic of 546a 617 3 994 - - - Equatorial Guinea 25a 1 060a 7 374a 0a ..a,b 3a Gabon 1 208a ..a,b 1 438a 167a 280a 663a Rwanda 33a 55 435 - - 13 São Tomé and Principe 0a 11a 163a - - - East Africa 1 701 7 199 30 913 165 387 1 063 Comoros 17a 21a 58a - - - Djibouti 13a 40 878 - - - Eritrea ..a 337a 438a - - - Ethiopia 124a 941a 4 102a - - - Kenya 668a 931a 2 262a 99a 115a 306a Madagascar 107a 141 4 452 1a 10a 6a Mauritius 168a 683a 2 319a 1a 132a 504a Seychelles 213a 515 2 017 64a 130 247 Somalia ..a,b 4a 566a - - - Uganda 6a 807 5 853 - - - United Republic of Tanzania 388 2 778 7 966 - - - Southern Africa 17 191 62 208 182 762 15 653 33 208 89 971 Angola 1 024 7 978 25 028a 1 2 4 672a Botswana 1 309 1 827 1 299 447 517 448 Lesotho 83 330 1 129a 0 2 2a Malawi 228 358 961a - ..a,b 24a Mozambique 25 1 249 5 489 2 1 3 Namibia 2 047 1 276 5 290 80 45 57 South Africa 9 207 43 451 132 396a 15 004 32 325 81 127a Swaziland 336a 536a 902a 38a 87a 60a Zambia 2 655a 3 966a 8 515a - - 3 290a Zimbabwe 277a 1 238a 1 754a 80 234 288 Latin America and the Caribbean 111 377 502 012 1 722 278 57 645 204 515 732 781 South and Central America 103 311 424 209 1 307 203 56 014 115 170 406 071 South America 74 815 309 055 899 541 49 346 96 041 307 495 Argentina 9 085 67 601 86 685 6 057 21 141 29 841 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 1 026 5 188 6 869 7 29 21 Brazil 37 143 122 250 472 579 41 044 51 946 180 949 Chile 16 107 45 753 139 538 154 11 154 49 838 Colombia 3 500 11 157 82 420 402 2 989 22 772 Ecuador 1 626 6 337 11 815 18a 247a 324a Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 0a 58a 75a - - - Guyana 45a 756a 1 754a - 1a 2a Paraguay 418 1 325 3 105 134 214 238 Peru 1 330 11 062 41 849 122 505 3 319 Uruguay 671 2 088 14 830 186 138 304 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 3 865 35 480 38 022 1 221 7 676 19 889 Central America 28 496 115 154 407 662 6 668 19 129 98 576 Belize 89 301 1 243 20 43 51 Costa Rica 1 324 2 709 13 500 44 86 88 El Salvador 212 1 973 7 760 56 104 7 Guatemala 1 734 3 420 6 399 .. 93 382 Honduras 293 1 392 25 870 - - 168 Mexico 22 424 97 170 327 249a 2 672 8 273 66 152a Nicaragua 145 1 414 4 698 - 22a 169a Panama 2 275 6 775 20 945 3 876 10 507a 31 559a Caribbean 8 066 77 803 415 074 1 630 89 345 326 710 Anguilla 11a 231a 978a - - - Antigua and Barbuda 290a 619a 2 401a - - - Aruba 145 760 2 284 - 374 366 Bahamas 586a 2 988a 9 062a - - - Barbados 171a 308a 1 706a 23a 41a 98a British Virgin Islands 126a 32 093a 212 034a 875a 67 132a 239 252a Cayman Islands 1 749a 25 585a 133 967a 648a 20 788a 84 478a Cuba 2a 74a 317a - - - Dominica 66a 275a 590a - - - Dominican Republic 572a 1 673a 14 731a - - - Grenada 70a 348a 1 268a - - - Haiti 149a 95a 603a .. 2a 2a Jamaica 790a 3 317a 10 829a 42a 709a 288a Montserrat 40a 83a 118a - - - /…
  • 217. ANNEX TABLES 193 Annex table I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 (continued) (Millions of dollars) FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Region/economy 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 Netherlands Antillesc 408a 277a 1 222a 21a 6a 106a Saint Kitts and Nevis 160a 487a 1 560a - - - Saint Lucia 316a 807a 2 110a - - - Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 48a 499a 1 312a - - - Trinidad and Tobago 2 365a 7 280a 17 424a 21a 293a 2 119a Turks and Caicos Islands 2a 4a 557a - - - Asia and Oceania 345 270 1 075 324 3 674 953 67 651 608 615 2 276 635 Asia 342 937 1 072 694 3 662 985 67 600 608 366 2 276 194 West Asia 31 194 60 465 575 214 8 674 16 564 161 029 Bahrain 552 5 906 15 154 719 1 752 7 883 Iraq ..a,b ..a,b 6 487a - - - Jordan 1 368 3 135 20 406 158 44 483 Kuwait 37 608 6 514 3 662 1 677 18 676 Lebanon 53 4 988 37 040 43 586 7 150 Oman 1 723a 2 577a 15 196 590a 611a 2 228 Palestinian Territory - 932a 1 551a - 809a 1 644a Qatar 63a 1 912a 31 428a .. 74a 25 712a Saudi Arabia 15 193 17 577 170 450 2 328 5 285 16 960 Syrian Arab Republic 154a 1 244a 8 715a 4a 107a 418a Turkey 11 150 19 209 181 901 1 150 3 668 23 802 United Arab Emirates 751a 1 069a 76 175a 14a 1 938a 55 560a Yemen 180a 1 336a 4 196a 5a 12a 513a South, East and South-East Asia 311 743 1 012 229 3 087 772 58 927 591 801 2 115 165 East Asia 240 645 716 103 1 888 390 49 032 504 301 1 586 468 China 20 691a 193 348 578 818a 4 455a 27 768a 297 600a Hong Kong, China 201 653a 455 469 1 097 620 11 920 388 380 948 494 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 572a 1 044a 1 475a - - - Korea, Republic of 5 186 43 738 127 047 2 301 21 497 138 984 Macao, China 2 809a 2 801 14 631a - - ..a,b Mongolia 0a 182a 4 512a - - 191a Taiwan Province of China 9 735a 19 521 64 288 30 356 66 655 201 228 South Asia 6 795 29 834 260 980 422 2 949 97 168 Afghanistan 12a 17a 1 625a - - - Bangladesh 477 2 162 6 072 45 69 100 Bhutan 2a 4a 160a - - - India 1 657 16 339 197 939 124 1 733 92 407 Iran, Islamic Republic of 2 039a 2 597a 27 600a .. 572a 2 555a Maldives 25a 128a 876a - - - Nepal 12a 72a 205a - - - Pakistan 1 892 6 919 21 494 245 489 1 727 Sri Lanka 679 1 596 5 008 8 86 380 South-East Asia 64 303 266 291 938 401 9 472 84 551 431 529 Brunei Darussalam 33a 3 867a 11 225a 0a 512a 681a Cambodia 38 1 580 5 958 .. 193 343 Indonesia 8 732a 25 060a 121 527a 86 6 940a 1 703a Lao People’s Democratic Republic 13a 588a 2 088a 1 26 ..a,b Malaysia 10 318 52 747 101 339 753 15 878 96 758 Myanmar 281a 3 211a 8 273a - - - Philippines 4 528a 18 156a 24 893a 406a 2 044a 6 582a Singapore 30 468 110 570 469 871a 7 808 56 755 300 010a Thailand 8 242 29 915 127 257a 418 2 203 25 454a Timor-Leste - - 342 - - - Viet Nam 1 650a 20 596a 65 628a - - - Oceania 2 333 2 630 11 967 51 249 441 Cook Islands 14a 34a 41a - - - Fiji 284a 356 2 256a 25a 39 41a French Polynesia 69a 139a 342a - - 122a Kiribati -a -a 20a - - 4a New Caledonia 70a 67a 5 354a - - - Niue -a 0a 7a - - - Palau -a 97a 129a - - - Papua New Guinea 1 582a 935a 1 745a 26a 210a 225a Samoa 9 53 51a - - 1a Solomon Islands -a 106a 654 - - 27 Tokelau -a 0a 1a - - - Tonga 1a 15a 115a - - - Tuvalu -a ..a,b 35a - - - Vanuatu -a 61a 450 - - 21 /…
  • 218. 194 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.2. FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2010 (concluded) (Millions of dollars) FDI inward stock FDI outward stock Region/economy 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 South-East Europe and the CIS .. 60 841 687 832 .. 21 339 472 876 South-East Europe .. 5 682 76 414 .. 840 8 775 Albania .. 247 4 355a .. .. 145a Bosnia and Herzegovina .. 1 083 7 152a .. .. 82a Croatia .. 2 796 34 374 .. 824 4 154 Serbia .. 1 017 20 584 .. .. 3 928 Montenegro .. .. 5 456 .. .. 375 The FYR of Macedonia .. 540 4 493a .. 16 91a CIS .. 55 159 611 418 .. 20 499 464 101 Armenia 9a 513 4 206a .. 0 85a Azerbaijan .. 3 735 9 593 .. 1 5 790 Belarus .. 1 306 9 940 .. 24 205 Georgia .. 784 7 821 .. 92 155 Kazakhstan .. 10 078 81 352 .. 16 16 176 Kyrgyzstan .. 432 974 .. 33 1 Moldova, Republic of .. 449 2 837 .. 23 68 Russian Federation .. 32 204 423 150a .. 20 141 433 655a Tajikistan .. 136a 915a .. .. .. Turkmenistan .. 949a 8 186a .. .. .. Ukraine .. 3 875 57 985 .. 170 7 966 Uzbekistan .. 698 4 460a .. .. - Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)d 11 051 37 437 151 689 1 089 2 974 10 865 Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)e 7 471 35 896 169 599 844 1 448 27 144 Small island developing states (SIDS)f 7 166 20 102 60 634 202 1 555 3 576 Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Estimates. b Negative stock value. However, this value is included in the regional and global total. c This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010. d Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. e Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. f Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
  • 219. ANNEX TABLES 195 Annex table I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) World 462 253 625 320 1 022 725 706 543 249 732 338 839 224 163 462 253 625 320 1 022 725 706 543 249 732 338 839 224 163 Developed economies 403 731 527 152 891 896 581 394 203 530 251 705 189 614 359 551 497 324 841 714 568 041 160 785 215 654 135 369 Europe 316 891 350 740 559 082 273 301 133 871 123 354 56 764 233 937 300 382 568 988 358 981 102 709 33 825 63 981 European Union 304 740 333 337 527 718 251 169 116 226 113 539 47 314 210 111 260 680 537 890 306 734 89 694 17 328 48 869 Austria 1 713 1 145 9 661 1 327 1 797 432 6 584 3 871 6 985 4 720 3 049 3 345 1 653 1 275 Belgium 4 277 1 794 961 2 491 12 089 9 406 799 4 067 3 640 8 258 30 146 - 9 638 - 238 - 176 Bulgaria 2 551 807 971 227 151 24 - 234 - - 5 7 2 9 - Cyprus 24 294 1 343 - 909 52 684 400 52 1 274 775 1 725 1 395 - 12 - 2 560 Czech Republic 6 196 1 154 107 5 169 2 669 - 457 468 579 812 846 34 1 608 - 17 - 552 Denmark 12 093 11 235 5 761 6 095 1 651 1 448 - 1 181 11 921 2 078 3 226 2 841 3 198 - 3 519 - 1 066 Estonia 82 3 - 57 110 28 3 92 16 179 - 4 - 0 4 - Finland 2 923 1 321 8 313 1 153 508 324 - 42 2 720 2 169 - 1 128 13 179 653 391 1 014 France 25 172 19 423 28 207 4 590 724 3 785 4 162 58 255 41 030 78 451 56 806 41 565 7 157 - 7 468 Germany 47 501 41 388 44 091 31 911 12 790 10 893 1 668 4 677 16 427 58 795 61 340 24 313 7 138 1 310 Greece 872 7 309 723 6 903 477 - 1 185 621 1 159 5 238 1 495 2 697 386 518 0 Hungary 2 470 2 337 721 1 559 1 853 213 1 707 415 1 522 1 41 0 465 17 Ireland 725 2 731 811 2 892 1 712 2 127 674 3 375 10 176 6 677 3 693 - 526 2 505 - 5 247 Italy 40 445 25 760 23 630 - 2 377 1 109 6 762 3 018 23 565 6 887 55 880 21 358 17 505 - 5 336 672 Latvia 9 11 47 195 109 72 - - - 4 3 - 30 40 - Lithuania 61 97 35 98 20 462 - 10 - - 30 31 - - - Luxembourg 7 989 35 005 7 339 - 3 570 444 2 083 - 6 847 15 539 22 631 8 109 3 382 2 998 - 21 147 Malta 12 517 - 86 - 13 315 - - 115 - - 25 - 235 - Netherlands 21 326 25 560 162 770 - 8 156 17 988 4 002 2 176 3 140 51 304 - 3 268 53 668 - 3 273 14 252 23 065 Poland 1 487 773 728 966 776 1 042 2 958 586 194 128 432 117 292 310 Portugal 1 648 537 1 715 - 1 279 504 2 208 984 - 1 612 644 4 023 1 164 1 236 - 8 885 2 426 Romania 1 851 5 324 1 926 993 314 148 11 - - - 4 7 24 - Slovakia 117 194 50 136 13 - - 493 - 142 - - - - - 18 Slovenia 148 15 57 418 - 332 - 47 29 74 320 251 - 50 - Spain 21 217 7 951 51 686 33 708 32 173 8 669 5 961 24 162 71 481 40 893 - 14 654 - 1 278 1 898 10 954 Sweden 7 892 15 228 4 563 18 770 1 098 1 439 2 711 11 606 3 199 32 390 6 108 9 024 - 128 - 4 668 United Kingdom 93 940 125 421 171 646 147 748 25 164 58 309 13 788 50 170 19 900 222 984 54 653 - 3 546 - 4 068 50 724 Other developed Europe 12 150 17 403 31 363 22 132 17 645 9 816 9 451 23 826 39 702 31 099 52 247 13 015 16 496 15 112 Andorra - 433 1 174 - - - - - - - - - - - 136 Faeroe Islands - - - 0 - 85 - - - - - - - - Gibraltar 4 - 50 212 - - - 13 404 116 1 253 - 1 757 Guernsey - - 31 17 260 427 - 667 1 424 1 144 556 4 001 8 425 2 333 Iceland 12 39 - 227 - - 14 - 3 714 2 171 4 664 737 - 317 - 221 - 881 Isle of Man 606 - 221 35 66 157 129 489 990 720 319 136 858 - 325 Jersey 32 254 816 251 414 52 - - 1 561 96 814 - 829 844 1 234 81 Liechtenstein - - - - - - - - 154 270 - 1 - - Monaco - - 437 - - - - - 455 - 13 - - 100 100 0 Norway 4 568 4 289 7 831 14 997 1 630 7 171 6 318 6 994 9 465 10 641 6 102 611 - 4 084 3 016 Switzerland 7 361 11 647 22 206 6 620 15 275 1 910 3 004 13 966 25 010 12 729 45 362 7 385 10 184 8 994 North America 79 865 165 591 265 866 262 698 51 475 94 737 136 322 94 088 138 576 226 646 114 314 40 477 118 670 57 873 Canada 12 464 37 841 100 888 35 253 11 389 14 470 19 516 8 000 20 848 46 751 44 141 16 718 32 328 14 313 United States 67 401 127 750 164 978 227 445 40 085 80 267 116 806 86 088 117 729 179 895 70 173 23 760 86 342 43 560 Other developed countries 6 975 10 821 66 948 45 395 18 185 33 613 - 3 472 31 525 58 366 46 080 94 747 17 598 63 159 13 515 Australia 2 070 10 508 44 222 33 530 22 206 26 530 - 5 871 26 602 31 949 43 439 18 454 - 2 981 15 323 3 987 Bermuda 1 613 1 083 1 424 850 820 - 405 - 400 503 - 40 691 4 507 3 248 5 330 - 2 045 Israel 1 223 8 061 684 1 363 803 1 024 406 403 9 747 8 408 11 316 167 6 453 835 Japan 662 - 11 683 16 538 9 251 - 5 771 6 675 1 469 5 012 16 966 30 346 56 379 17 440 31 016 9 506 New Zealand 1 407 2 853 4 081 401 126 - 211 524 - 892 - 799 4 578 4 092 - 275 5 037 1 232 Developing economies 63 801 89 163 100 381 104 812 39 077 82 813 25 473 68 680 114 922 144 830 105 849 73 975 96 947 25 395 Africa 8 685 11 181 8 076 21 193 5 140 7 608 454 14 494 15 913 9 891 8 216 2 702 3 184 3 316 North Africa 3 351 6 773 2 182 16 283 1 475 1 141 - 12 892 5 633 1 401 4 665 1 004 1 470 - Algeria - 18 - 82 - - - - - - 47 - - - - Egypt 1 478 2 976 1 713 15 895 993 195 - 12 892 5 633 1 448 4 613 76 1 091 - Libyan Arab Jamahiriya - 1 200 307 145 91 - - - - 51 601 377 - Morocco 1 438 133 269 - 125 333 846 - - - - - 324 - - Sudan 390 1 332 - - - - - - - - - - - - Tunisia 46 2 313 - 122 4 9 - - - - - 3 2 - Other Africa 5 334 4 408 5 894 4 910 3 665 6 467 454 1 603 10 279 8 490 3 551 1 697 1 714 3 316 Angola 175 1 - - 475 - 471 1 300 - - - - 60 - - - - Botswana - 57 1 - 50 - 14 88 - - 3 - - - Burkina Faso - 289 - 20 - - - - - - - - - - Cameroon - - - 1 - - 0.2 - - - - - - - Cape Verde - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - /…
  • 220. 196 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (continued) (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Congo 13 20 - 435 - - - - - - - - - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - - - - 5 175 - - - - 45 - - - - Equatorial Guinea - - - - 2 200 - - - - - - - - - - Eritrea - - - - - 12 - - - - - - - - Ethiopia - - - - - - - 18 - - - - - - - Gabon - - 82 - - - - - - - 16 - - - - Ghana - 3 122 900 - - - - - - - - 1 - Guinea 0.1 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - Kenya 32 2 396 - - - 18 12 - - 18 - - - Liberia - - - - - 587 - - - - - - - - Madagascar - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - Malawi - - 5 - 0.5 0.1 - - - - - - - - Mali - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - Mauritania - - 375 - - - - - - - - - - - Mauritius - 25 268 - 26 27 203 1 - 265 232 89 206 191 - 50 - Mozambique - 34 2 - - 35 21 - - - - - - - Namibia 7 181 2 15 59 8 40 - - - - - - - Nigeria 25 4 883 490 - 597 - 241 296 119 - - - 418 - - - Rwanda - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - Senegal - - - - - - 457 - 22 - - - - - - Seychelles - - 89 49 - 19 - 115 - 0 66 - 11 0 Sierra Leone - - 31 40 - 13 - - - - - - - - South Africa 5 092 - 1 336 4 301 6 676 4 215 3 943 232 1 604 10 046 8 541 2 817 1 491 1 488 3 316 Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 - Togo - - - - - - - - - - 20 - - - Uganda - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 257 - United Republic of Tanzania - - - - 2 60 - - - - - - - - Zambia 8 4 - 1 11 272 - 29 - 25 - 16 2 - Zimbabwe 7 - - 7 6 - 27 - 0 1 - 44 1 - - - Latin America and the Caribbean 14 563 12 768 20 648 15 452 - 4 358 29 481 9 024 10 013 28 064 40 195 2 466 3 740 15 710 5 979 South America 8 427 4 503 13 697 8 121 - 5 342 18 026 8 240 2 513 19 923 13 152 4 765 3 104 11 686 2 592 Argentina 358 344 877 - 3 283 111 3 457 - 1 079 - 173 160 569 274 - 77 92 200 Bolivia, Plurinational State of - - 39 - 77 24 - 0 - - - - - - - - Brazil 2 993 2 637 6 539 7 568 - 1 369 8 874 11 006 2 505 18 629 10 785 5 243 2 501 7 757 3 384 Chile - 779 447 1 480 3 234 829 1 642 - 131 - 80 431 466 - 88 55 544 244 Colombia 5 775 1 319 4 303 - 57 - 1 633 - 1 594 - 2 029 258 697 1 384 16 211 3 210 315 Ecuador - 21 29 0 6 356 72 - - - 0 - - 2 Guyana - - 3 1 1 - 3 - - - - - - - Paraguay - - 10 4 - 60 - 1 - - - - - - - - Peru 55 53 1 135 293 38 684 329 3 6 195 679 416 77 34 Uruguay 0 164 157 8 3 448 70 - - - - - 7 13 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 26 - 443 - 760 329 - 3 268 4 158 - - - - 248 - 1 358 - 2 - - 1 600 Central America 3 903 2 898 4 889 2 899 153 8 854 166 3 140 3 699 17 452 - 1 053 3 434 3 324 3 899 Belize - - - 0.4 - 1 - - 4 - 43 - 2 - - Costa Rica 59 294 - 34 405 - 5 - - 97 642 - - - - El Salvador 441 173 835 - 30 43 103 15 370 - - - - - Guatemala 10 - 2 5 145 - 650 - 1 317 140 - - - - Honduras - - 140 - - 1 - - - - - - - - Mexico 2 899 874 3 717 2 304 104 7 990 9 3 036 2 750 18 226 - 463 3 247 3 306 3 453 Nicaragua - 2 - - - 1 - 4 - - - - - - - Panama 493 1 557 226 44 20 164 50 88 160 - 1 512 - 591 185 17 446 Caribbean 2 232 5 367 2 061 4 432 832 2 601 619 4 359 4 442 9 592 - 1 245 - 2 799 701 - 512 Anguilla - - - - - - - 71 - 1 - 30 - - 10 - Antigua and Barbuda 160 85 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Aruba 1 468 - - - - - - - - - - - - Bahamas - 3 027 - 41 - 82 212 - 146 - 411 2 693 537 11 112 - Barbados - 999 1 207 - 413 - 166 - 3 3 - - - British Virgin Islands 524 19 559 980 242 432 275 2 086 2 900 5 017 - 1 635 - 1 579 - 700 2 264 Cayman Islands 449 49 - 969 - 84 92 1 800 1 563 2 047 2 079 - 1 237 759 - 3 929 Dominican Republic - 427 42 - 0.4 1 39 - - 93 - 25 - 31 - Haiti - - - - 1 59 - - - - - - - - Jamaica - 0.2 67 595 - - - - 1 158 3 13 28 1 - Netherlands Antillesc 43 10 - - 2 19 - - 20 350 - - - 30 - 156 3 Puerto Rico 1 085 216 862 - 587 1 037 1 512 - 216 - 261 - 2 454 13 665 - Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.3 - /…
  • 221. ANNEX TABLES 197 Annex table I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (continued) (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Trinidad and Tobago - 30 - - 2 236 - - - - 129 97 - 2 207 - 10 - - US Virgin Islands - - - - - 473 - 21 - - - 4 - 1 150 Asia 40 537 65 250 71 423 68 909 38 291 36 706 15 991 44 023 70 792 94 469 94 398 67 310 77 962 16 100 West Asia 13 358 22 431 22 602 16 287 3 543 4 617 3 969 19 983 35 350 40 103 22 099 26 843 - 15 560 - 2 487 Bahrain 85 - 410 190 178 - 452 - 4 514 4 275 1 002 4 497 323 - 3 319 - 1 810 Iraq - - - 34 - - - - - 33 - - - - Jordan 89 750 440 773 108 - 103 - - 4 45 322 - - 34 - Kuwait - 13 3 963 496 - 55 473 3 725 1 345 1 416 2 147 124 - 10 810 1 097 Lebanon 236 5 948 - 153 108 - 642 - 103 716 210 - 233 283 0.3 142 Oman 116 1 621 10 - 386 - 6 5 79 601 893 - 529 172 Qatar - - - 124 298 13 - 352 127 5 160 6 029 10 266 865 - 1 200 Saudi Arabia - 21 125 102 42 264 216 6 603 5 405 15 780 1 442 121 422 - 129 Syrian Arab Republic - - - - - 41 - - - - - - - - Turkey 12 771 15 340 16 415 13 238 2 849 2 053 3 574 199 356 767 1 313 - 2 538 United Arab Emirates 61 53 856 1 225 300 376 176 7 481 23 117 15 611 5 983 14 831 - 2 157 - 1 297 Yemen - 716 144 - - 20 - - - - - - - - South, East and South- East Asia 27 179 42 819 48 822 52 622 34 748 32 089 12 022 24 041 35 441 54 365 72 298 40 467 93 521 18 587 East Asia 20 998 25 456 23 390 17 226 15 741 16 144 3 097 12 597 21 163 - 667 39 888 35 851 53 089 - 7 070 China 7 207 11 298 9 332 5 375 10 898 5 965 2 825 3 653 12 090 - 2 282 37 941 21 490 29 201 13 476 Hong Kong, China 5 449 9 106 7 102 8 707 3 028 12 024 264 8 195 8 003 - 7 980 - 1 048 7 461 14 455 - 1 325 Korea, Republic of 5 165 - 161 46 1 194 1 956 - 2 169 - 64 194 1 057 8 646 3 882 6 951 9 915 1 863 Macao, China 67 413 133 593 - 57 33 34 0 - - 0 - 580 52 - Mongolia - 2 7 - 344 65 55 - - - 106 - 24 - - Taiwan Province of China 3 110 4 798 6 770 1 356 - 429 227 - 17 554 14 949 - 993 552 - 533 316 South Asia 738 7 883 5 371 12 654 6 094 5 556 1 170 1 877 6 745 29 096 13 488 291 26 434 - 2 005 Bangladesh - 330 4 - 9 10 - - - - - - 1 - Iran, Islamic Republic of - - - 695 - - - - - - - - - - India 526 4 424 4 405 10 427 6 049 5 537 886 1 877 6 715 29 083 13 482 291 26 421 74 Maldives - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - 3 - Nepal - - 15 - 13 - - - - - - - - - - Pakistan 207 3 139 956 1 147 - - 0 247 - 30 - - - 15 - Sri Lanka 5 4 6 370 36 9 36 - - 12 6 - - - South-East Asia 5 443 9 480 20 061 22 743 12 913 10 389 7 755 9 567 7 533 25 936 18 922 4 325 13 998 - 1 167 Brunei Darussalam - 0 0 - 3 - - - 112 - - 10 - - Cambodia - 9 6 30 - 336 5 - - - - - - - 0 Indonesia 6 171 388 1 706 2 070 1 332 1 667 4 496 290 - 85 826 913 - 2 590 893 74 Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - - - - 110 5 - - - - - - - Malaysia 1 141 2 509 6 976 2 781 354 3 441 734 1 946 2 664 3 654 9 751 3 277 2 306 858 Myanmar - - - 1 - - 0 - - - - 1 010 - - - - - Philippines - 5 180 - 134 1 165 2 621 1 291 30 661 1 829 190 - 2 514 - 174 - 7 25 30 Singapore 3 933 2 908 7 426 14 240 9 693 4 578 1 162 5 706 5 566 23 916 6 992 2 762 7 851 2 139 Thailand - 632 3 771 2 372 142 346 457 388 - 203 88 54 1 416 872 2 864 1 083 Viet Nam 10 29 412 859 230 101 308 - 8 - 25 - 59 - Oceania 16 - 36 234 - 742 4 9 019 4 150 154 275 770 224 91 - Cook Islands - - - - - - - - - - - 50 - - Fiji 1 - 12 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - French Polynesia - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - Guam - 72 - - - - - 150 - - - - - - Marshall Islands - - 45 - - - - - - - - 0.3 - - Nauru - - - - - - - - 3 - - - 172 - - New Caledonia - - 100 - - - - - 3 - - - - - - Niue 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - Papua New Guinea 9 7 160 - 758 0 9 018 4 - - 275 1 051 - - 4 - Samoa - - 18 3 13 - - - - 64 - - 324 - 95 - Solomon Islands - - 14 - - - - - - - - - - - Tuvalu - - - - - - - - - - 43 - - - Vanuatu - 3 - - 4 - - - - - - - - - South-East Europe and the CIS - 5 279 9 005 30 448 20 337 7 125 4 321 9 076 6 188 2 940 21 729 20 167 7 432 9 698 2 352 South-East Europe 955 3 942 2 192 767 529 266 97 - 654 - 2 092 1 039 - 4 - 167 325 - Albania 7 41 164 3 146 - - - - - - - - - Bosnia and Herzegovina 21 79 1 022 2 8 - - - - - - - - - Croatia 360 2 530 674 204 - 201 84 - 125 3 - 2 8 325 - /…
  • 222. 198 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.3. Value of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (concluded) (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Montenegro - 7 0.1 - 362 - - - - 4 - - - - Serbia - 582 280 501 10 19 13 - - 1 898 860 - 7 - 174 - - Serbia and Montenegro 549 419 - - 3 - - - - - - - - - The FYR of Macedonia 0 280 53 57 - 46 - - - - - - - - Yugoslavia (former) 17 5 - - - - - - 529 - 198 175 - - - - CIS - 6 234 5 064 28 256 19 570 6 596 4 056 8 979 6 842 5 032 20 691 20 171 7 599 9 373 2 352 Armenia 4 - 423 204 30 - 26 - - - - - - - Azerbaijan - - - 2 - 0.2 - - - - 519 - - - Belarus 4 - 2 500 16 - 649 - - - - - - - - Georgia 232 115 53 104 14 30 - - - - - - - 0 - 10 Kazakhstan 1 474 - 1 751 727 - 242 1 322 101 137 430 1 503 1 833 2 047 - 254 - Kyrgyzstan 155 - 179 - - 44 - - - - - - - - Moldova, Republic of - 10 24 4 - - - 9 - - - - - - - Russian Federation - 14 547 6 319 22 529 13 507 5 079 2 907 7 502 6 029 3 507 18 598 16 634 7 599 9 082 2 346 Tajikistan 12 - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - Turkmenistan 47 - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ukraine 6 386 261 1 816 5 933 147 322 1 324 383 23 260 972 - 37 16 Uzbekistan - 110 - 42 4 1 - - - - - - - - Unspecified - - - - - - - 24 613 10 134 11 981 12 486 7 528 16 192 61 046 Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)d 573 2 688 584 - 2 552 - 774 2 201 8 51 - 946 - 80 - 261 16 354 - Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)e 1 707 - 1 052 1 357 144 1 708 639 237 546 1 504 1 814 2 676 - 8 518 - Small island developing states (SIDS)f 115 4 438 920 1 824 31 9 735 217 - 263 141 3 061 1 803 393 161 - Source: UNCTAD cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Net sales by the region/economy of the immediate acquired company. b Net purchases by region/economy of the ultimate acquiring company. c This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010. d Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. e Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. f Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net cross-border MA sales in a host economy = Sales of companies in the host economy to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the host economy; net cross-border MA purchases by a home economy = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.
  • 223. ANNEX TABLES 199 Annex table I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) World 5 004 5 747 7 018 6 425 4 239 5 405 2 036 5 004 5 747 7 018 6 425 4 239 5 405 2 036 Developed economies 3 805 4 326 5 187 4 603 2 920 3 638 1 420 3 741 4 446 5 443 4 732 2 666 3 644 1 484 Europe 2 271 2 531 2 955 2 619 1 476 1 944 804 2 109 2 519 3 117 2 853 1 522 1 989 737 European Union 2 108 2 354 2 717 2 419 1 344 1 780 718 1 828 2 216 2 782 2 548 1 328 1 723 662 Austria 57 44 48 30 19 31 11 62 77 104 75 42 36 13 Belgium 64 87 81 86 50 77 22 49 63 77 61 15 21 13 Bulgaria 29 29 30 28 14 4 - 1 2 2 6 3 1 2 Cyprus - 5 17 32 22 23 13 3 23 21 46 160 273 53 Czech Republic 31 53 54 72 29 26 13 7 14 12 10 6 9 3 Denmark 90 90 89 75 39 85 22 112 85 82 102 43 43 9 Estonia 13 10 13 19 5 8 6 3 8 10 4 - 3 4 Finland 53 68 91 52 25 37 18 56 66 66 109 32 58 26 France 222 224 232 178 101 155 56 253 265 404 381 191 219 87 Germany 374 426 434 337 169 185 108 226 229 264 286 196 147 82 Greece 9 11 9 13 15 - 1 1 13 20 17 27 7 1 2 Hungary 20 46 27 26 8 20 4 8 13 14 10 5 2 - Ireland 42 49 76 62 41 36 13 48 94 128 82 32 33 17 Italy 118 111 140 150 85 113 55 52 59 121 119 45 55 15 Latvia 14 10 17 14 4 15 4 1 1 4 - 1 - 4 - Lithuania 14 18 17 18 4 7 - 1 3 2 2 7 2 4 1 Luxembourg 11 12 20 10 10 12 4 26 39 42 53 34 33 17 Malta 3 3 2 - 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 Netherlands 126 88 163 116 74 107 54 91 146 173 221 104 165 53 Poland 44 49 55 43 48 62 20 15 8 30 28 3 21 5 Portugal 37 29 32 11 15 8 7 10 16 25 36 20 18 2 Romania 41 44 48 38 18 17 8 - 1 - 1 7 3 6 - Slovakia 13 12 15 14 6 7 1 2 2 1 7 2 5 - Slovenia 5 7 8 6 2 3 - 6 7 6 4 4 5 - 1 Spain 81 148 162 193 147 150 54 82 109 156 106 50 54 13 Sweden 115 144 148 164 73 117 42 154 185 207 161 94 167 69 United Kingdom 482 537 689 632 317 474 181 544 681 814 600 231 336 176 Other developed Europe 163 177 238 200 132 164 86 281 303 335 305 194 266 75 Andorra - 1 1 - - - - - - 1 - 1 1 2 2 Faeroe Islands 1 - - 1 - 1 - - - 1 - - 1 - Gibraltar 2 1 2 1 - 1 - - 1 3 3 1 3 - 3 Guernsey - 2 6 3 6 6 - 5 14 21 20 11 32 - Iceland 5 3 1 - - 3 - 47 50 38 4 - 11 - 15 - 2 Isle of Man 7 4 3 4 3 4 1 11 14 25 5 3 14 - 1 Jersey 3 3 7 6 4 5 - 4 18 28 13 8 17 5 Liechtenstein - 2 1 - - 1 - - 1 1 1 3 - - Monaco 1 - 4 1 - 2 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 2 2 1 Norway 78 81 93 86 53 87 40 82 84 93 84 41 53 14 Switzerland 67 80 121 98 66 55 44 131 119 125 174 133 160 53 North America 1 200 1 380 1 717 1 491 1 013 1 228 487 1 234 1 458 1 667 1 436 888 1 301 578 Canada 252 324 420 374 303 344 130 337 395 426 351 306 422 196 United States 948 1 056 1 297 1 117 710 884 357 897 1 063 1 241 1 085 582 879 382 Other developed countries 334 415 515 493 431 466 129 398 469 659 443 256 354 169 Australia 180 229 252 306 283 305 87 209 246 363 153 58 107 52 Bermuda 6 8 7 8 5 8 - 11 8 28 31 9 2 8 Israel 25 35 31 30 16 22 6 38 49 59 42 22 34 11 Japan 44 57 106 99 85 98 16 126 137 161 185 160 192 90 New Zealand 79 86 119 50 42 33 20 14 28 48 32 7 19 8 Developing economies 1 062 1 219 1 552 1 501 975 1 290 501 765 839 1 047 1 011 746 1 061 360 Africa 72 107 116 106 58 75 44 54 53 60 47 56 60 13 North Africa 21 25 20 23 15 14 4 6 16 11 8 14 13 1 Algeria 2 5 2 4 1 - - - 1 - 1 - - 1 - Egypt 11 14 9 11 3 9 3 4 14 8 6 5 8 1 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 2 1 1 1 2 2 - 1 - 2 1 3 3 - Morocco - 1 1 4 2 7 - 1 1 1 2 1 3 - - Sudan 3 2 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - Tunisia 4 2 3 4 2 3 - - - - - 3 1 - Other Africa 51 82 96 83 43 61 40 48 37 49 39 42 47 12 Angola 1 2 1 - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - Benin - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - Botswana 1 1 4 1 1 1 2 1 - 1 - 3 1 1 - /…
  • 224. 200 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (continued) (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Burkina Faso - 1 - 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - Burundi - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Cameroon 1 1 - 2 - - 1 1 - - - - - - - Cape Verde 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Congo 1 4 - 1 1 1 - - - - - - - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - - 2 - 2 1 - - - - 2 - - - - Equatorial Guinea - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Gabon - 1 3 2 - - - - - - 1 - - - - Ghana 1 2 5 3 2 - - - - - - - 1 - Guinea 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - Kenya 3 2 2 5 - 1 3 2 4 4 3 1 2 1 Liberia - 1 - - - 3 - - - - - - - - Madagascar - 3 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Malawi - - 2 - 1 1 - - - - - - - - Mali - 2 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Mauritania - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Mauritius 3 4 2 5 5 9 3 14 12 6 6 10 5 1 Mozambique - 5 2 - - 4 2 - - - - - - 1 - Namibia 2 2 7 2 3 1 1 - - - - 1 - - Nigeria 2 5 1 - - 2 2 4 2 - 1 1 4 1 - - Reunion - - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - Rwanda - 1 3 2 - - - - - - - - - - Senegal 1 - 1 1 - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - Seychelles - - 2 1 - 1 - 3 - 2 - 1 - 1 3 2 Sierra Leone - - 1 3 - 1 - - - - - - - - South Africa 24 34 41 37 22 27 23 26 22 38 22 29 33 7 Swaziland 1 - 2 - - - - - - - - - 1 - Togo - - - - - - - - 1 - - 2 - - - Uganda 2 2 5 3 1 1 1 - - 1 - - 1 - United Republic of Tanzania - 4 2 2 3 1 - - - - - - - - Zambia 3 3 - 5 2 4 - 1 1 1 - 1 1 - Zimbabwe 2 - 5 2 2 - - - 1 2 - - - - - Latin America and the Caribbean 147 250 425 378 221 400 161 80 132 174 146 116 192 68 South America 77 135 265 266 130 250 116 24 39 67 63 37 92 39 Argentina 5 40 43 44 11 41 20 - 3 - 1 3 - 5 6 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 1 - 2 2 - - 1 - - - 1 - 1 - - Brazil 37 54 126 116 44 112 43 15 20 35 50 19 36 15 Chile 9 14 20 31 29 21 11 3 7 13 1 3 23 5 Colombia 13 13 26 30 22 36 19 3 4 16 2 8 14 6 Ecuador 1 6 9 2 7 8 3 - 1 - 1 - - 1 Guyana - 1 1 1 1 1 4 - - - - - - - Paraguay - - 2 5 - 1 2 1 - - - - 1 - - Peru 3 8 30 28 24 28 9 - 2 1 6 4 13 5 Suriname - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - Uruguay 2 - 6 4 3 6 3 2 - - - - 1 2 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 5 - 1 - 1 3 - 10 - 4 2 - 2 2 - 1 - - 1 Central America 37 79 97 64 39 86 27 27 42 38 19 34 37 18 Belize - - - 1 1 1 - - 2 1 - 1 1 5 11 - 1 Costa Rica 3 2 2 7 3 4 1 2 3 3 2 - 1 - 2 El Salvador 4 4 5 - 3 5 1 1 13 - - - - - Guatemala 2 - 3 4 2 2 - 5 9 3 1 3 - - Honduras 1 1 2 - - 1 - - - - - - - - Mexico 23 67 75 46 26 59 18 17 14 28 16 22 20 17 Nicaragua 1 2 1 - - 1 4 3 - - - - - - - Panama 3 3 9 6 5 10 4 4 2 5 - 1 5 6 - Caribbean 33 36 63 48 52 64 18 29 51 69 64 45 63 11 Anguilla - - - - - - - 2 - - 1 - - 1 - Antigua and Barbuda 6 1 1 - - - - 1 2 - 2 - 1 - - Aruba 1 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - Bahamas 1 - 2 4 1 4 2 1 1 1 4 2 - - Barbados - 1 2 - - 2 - 6 3 9 4 1 - 1 - 1 British Virgin Islands 10 8 20 25 39 42 11 3 9 19 20 21 39 10 Cayman Islands 4 4 5 12 3 3 3 5 19 35 37 17 14 - 2 Cuba - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - Dominican Republic - 2 6 1 3 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 - 5 - /…
  • 225. ANNEX TABLES 201 Annex table I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (continued) (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Haiti - 2 - - 1 2 - - - - - - - - Jamaica 1 3 13 1 - - - 3 6 4 - 6 1 - Netherlands Antillesc 5 5 1 - 3 2 - - 3 - - - 1 2 4 Puerto Rico 4 6 9 1 - 5 1 7 5 - - 4 - 6 - 1 Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - Saint Lucia 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Trinidad and Tobago 1 1 1 2 2 - - 1 - - 1 1 - 3 - 2 - 1 US Virgin Islands - 1 - 1 - - 2 - 1 1 - - 2 - 2 Asia 832 854 999 1 011 693 808 295 630 649 809 813 565 808 278 West Asia 57 86 116 138 77 101 37 66 91 129 166 73 60 30 Bahrain 3 2 6 9 3 3 - 8 14 15 28 3 9 2 Iraq 4 - - 2 2 - 1 - - 1 - - - - Jordan 4 9 4 8 12 4 3 3 4 3 2 1 - 1 - Kuwait - 1 4 14 2 13 2 11 6 19 23 7 6 7 Lebanon 3 2 - 1 2 - 3 - 2 2 3 1 5 6 3 Oman 1 2 9 2 2 2 1 1 4 2 7 5 7 1 Qatar - - 2 2 2 - - 4 1 8 19 9 6 - 1 Saudi Arabia 1 5 10 12 8 11 5 8 14 10 13 3 8 2 Syrian Arab Republic - - - - 2 2 - - - - - - - - Turkey 29 51 63 60 31 44 12 7 4 12 5 4 3 5 United Arab Emirates 12 13 18 27 13 18 13 22 42 56 68 36 15 11 Yemen - 1 1 - - 1 - - - - - - 1 - South, East and South-East Asia 775 768 883 873 616 707 258 564 558 680 647 492 748 248 East Asia 408 396 430 403 279 325 98 190 190 226 252 266 345 - 49 China 217 224 232 236 142 146 52 45 38 61 69 97 148 47 Hong Kong, China 138 119 144 93 67 105 22 117 118 116 110 88 117 45 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - Korea, Republic of 25 17 19 37 59 45 12 17 30 39 50 57 55 25 Macao, China 7 6 5 - - 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 2 - Mongolia 1 1 3 2 5 8 6 - - - 1 - - - Taiwan Province of China 20 28 27 35 6 20 5 10 3 10 21 25 23 11 South Asia 101 139 159 158 112 122 46 99 137 176 166 57 142 - 15 Bangladesh 1 1 1 1 1 2 - - - - - - 3 - Iran, Islamic Republic of - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - India 94 130 147 136 104 115 39 98 134 175 163 56 139 44 Maldives 1 - - 2 - 1 - - - - - - - 1 - Nepal - - 1 - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - Pakistan 5 7 7 10 - 1 - 1 3 - 1 - 1 1 - - Sri Lanka - 2 4 5 8 5 3 - 2 2 2 - 1 - South-East Asia 266 233 294 312 225 260 114 275 231 278 229 169 261 - 49 Brunei Darussalam - 5 2 - 2 2 - - 1 - - 2 1 - Cambodia 2 3 3 1 2 1 1 - - - - - - 1 Indonesia 30 24 40 54 35 60 29 5 1 5 11 9 13 7 Malaysia 92 67 91 80 75 59 19 120 117 123 113 63 86 16 Myanmar - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - - Philippines 13 5 11 18 3 12 7 8 2 10 9 4 4 2 Singapore 96 91 103 89 62 76 36 134 100 129 78 74 134 40 Thailand 29 36 31 41 12 18 7 10 9 11 17 16 21 10 Viet Nam 2 2 14 30 35 31 14 - 2 2 - 1 1 3 - Oceania 11 8 12 6 3 7 1 1 5 4 5 9 1 1 American Samoa - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - Cook Islands - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - Fiji 3 1 1 3 - 1 - - - - 1 1 - - - French Polynesia - 1 1 - - 1 - - - 2 1 - 2 - - Guam - 2 - - - - - 1 - - - - - - Marshall Islands - - 1 - 1 1 - - - 1 - 3 - - New Caledonia 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 1 - - - 1 - Northern Mariana Islands 1 - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - Papua New Guinea 4 3 3 1 1 3 1 - - 2 2 1 - 1 - Samoa - 1 3 1 1 - - - 1 - 1 - 1 1 Solomon Islands - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Tonga - - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - Tuvalu - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - Vanuatu - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - /…
  • 226. 202 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.4. Number of cross-border MAs, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2005–May 2011 (concluded) (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Region / economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) South-East Europe and the CIS 137 202 279 321 343 477 115 51 62 102 123 70 83 31 South-East Europe 30 39 73 46 17 18 10 - 9 - 2 9 4 - 3 - Albania 1 1 4 6 2 - - - - - - - - - Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 9 8 4 2 1 - - - - 1 - 1 - Croatia 7 8 18 12 2 11 5 1 2 6 3 1 1 1 Montenegro - 1 2 - 3 1 - - - 1 - - - - Serbia - 4 21 20 7 4 4 - 4 2 - - 1 1 - 1 Serbia and Montenegro 14 10 - 2 1 - - - - - - - - - The FYR of Macedonia 1 5 20 2 - 1 1 - - - - - - - Yugoslavia (former) 1 1 - - - - - - 10 - 8 - - - - - CIS 107 163 206 275 326 459 105 60 64 93 119 70 80 31 Armenia 3 2 5 4 3 - 3 - - - - - - - Azerbaijan - - 1 3 2 3 - - - - - 1 - - Belarus 1 1 7 4 - 10 3 - 1 1 - - 1 - Georgia 5 7 9 4 - 1 3 - - - 1 - - - 1 - Kazakhstan 6 2 9 6 12 12 2 9 4 11 6 - 1 1 - Kyrgyzstan 3 2 5 - 1 3 2 - - - - - - - Moldova, Republic of 1 5 2 6 - - 2 - - - 1 - - - Russian Federation 66 101 118 181 185 343 73 45 54 70 108 65 75 27 Tajikistan 1 - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - Turkmenistan 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Ukraine 19 37 43 63 122 84 20 6 4 10 4 5 4 4 Uzbekistan - 6 3 4 2 1 - - 1 - - - - - Unspecified - - - - 1 - - 444 399 425 554 752 608 160 Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)d 17 36 31 23 14 25 6 2 - - 2 4 - 5 - Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)e 30 33 79 50 31 38 21 11 7 13 11 3 4 - Small island developing states (SIDS)f 22 16 34 22 12 22 6 27 25 23 21 19 4 - 2 Source: UNCTAD cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Net sales by the region/economy of the immediate acquired company. b Net purchases by region/economy of the ultimate acquiring company. c This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010. d Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. e Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. f Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net cross-border MA sales in a host economy = Sales of companies in the host economy to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the host economy; net cross-border MA purchases by a home economy = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.
  • 227. ANNEX TABLES 203 Annex table I.5. Cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2005–May 2011 (Millions of dollars) Net salesa Net purchasesb Sector/industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Total 462 253 625 320 1 022 725 706 543 249 732 338 839 224 163 462 253 625 320 1 022 725 706 543 249 732 338 839 224 163 Primary 17 145 43 093 74 013 90 201 48 092 73 461 45 096 2 816 32 650 95 021 53 131 29 097 52 971 38 525 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries 7 499 - 152 2 422 2 898 1 033 5 441 1 813 85 2 856 887 4 240 1 476 675 183 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 9 647 43 245 71 591 87 303 47 059 68 019 43 283 2 731 29 794 94 134 48 891 27 622 52 296 38 342 Manufacturing 147 527 212 998 336 584 326 114 76 080 129 183 62 688 118 804 163 847 218 661 244 667 37 632 119 862 79 220 Food, beverages and tobacco 37 047 6 736 49 950 131 855 9 636 39 125 5 393 17 763 3 124 36 280 54 667 - 804 35 011 7 710 Textiles, clothing and leather 1 818 1 799 8 494 2 112 410 962 356 3 266 809 - 1 220 - 189 537 4 320 458 Wood and wood products 333 1 922 5 568 3 166 821 - 462 291 - 524 1 660 4 728 - 251 536 8 112 220 Publishing and printing 4 933 24 386 5 543 4 658 66 4 977 87 3 882 7 783 843 8 228 - 130 570 769 Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel - 77 2 005 2 663 3 086 2 214 2 584 - 605 820 5 429 7 691 - 3 244 - 1 096 - 5 477 255 Chemicals and chemical products 31 709 48 035 116 736 73 563 32 559 32 243 35 781 29 069 35 192 89 397 71 293 28 861 43 080 37 869 Rubber and plastic products 2 639 6 577 7 281 1 200 15 5 987 322 684 5 409 658 - 235 - 197 183 388 Non-metallic mineral products 11 281 6 166 37 800 28 944 118 3 151 - 115 17 534 6 370 16 613 23 053 - 260 4 352 161 Metals and metal products 20 371 46 312 69 740 14 215 - 2 953 1 938 3 302 15 255 47 613 44 241 20 695 1 433 2 773 2 604 Machinery and equipment 1 467 17 664 20 108 15 060 2 431 7 922 3 360 6 421 14 890 - 37 504 7 868 2 635 5 800 2 994 Electrical and electronic equipment 11 938 35 305 24 483 14 151 17 763 13 237 9 439 8 305 27 908 33 644 32 401 1 880 6 404 11 748 Precision instruments 11 339 7 064 - 17 184 23 059 4 105 9 465 1 665 9 102 9 118 19 339 19 176 4 428 7 397 4 923 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 8 524 7 475 3 099 11 608 8 753 7 484 2 621 5 827 - 2 031 3 795 10 254 - 480 6 638 6 783 Other manufacturing 4 205 1 552 2 305 - 565 141 570 792 1 400 574 158 951 290 701 2 337 Services 297 581 369 228 612 128 290 228 125 561 136 196 116 379 340 634 428 822 709 043 408 746 183 003 166 007 106 418 Electricity, gas and water 40 158 1 402 103 005 48 969 61 627 - 1 881 2 856 25 274 - 18 197 50 150 25 270 47 613 - 18 656 1 561 Construction 4 319 9 955 12 994 2 452 10 391 7 035 - 714 3 683 3 372 10 222 - 5 220 - 1 704 - 2 113 - 3 088 Trade 15 946 11 512 41 307 17 458 3 658 14 468 8 472 406 4 241 7 422 19 766 3 360 9 526 - 185 Hotels and restaurants 3 273 14 476 9 438 3 499 1 422 5 411 489 - 779 - 164 - 8 357 3 702 673 1 045 527 Transport, storage and communications 75 783 113 915 66 328 34 325 15 912 15 762 15 715 49 802 87 466 45 574 48 088 12 187 15 386 33 943 Finance 53 912 107 951 249 314 73 630 9 535 31 929 67 434 224 103 316 920 548 901 311 409 110 555 125 669 65 811 Business services 84 366 80 978 102 231 100 701 17 167 45 634 15 107 42 487 47 087 50 893 57 088 17 652 27 025 10 050 Public administration and defense 324 - 111 29 30 110 63 14 - 9 201 - 15 477 - 17 058 - 46 337 - 8 202 - 4 422 - 1 663 Education 1 474 - 429 860 1 048 559 1 931 27 1 112 122 42 155 51 111 5 Health and social services 2 293 10 624 8 140 2 222 1 123 9 056 - 4 198 - 2 247 506 9 493 - 176 40 3 799 225 Community, social and personal service activities 15 627 17 060 15 625 1 002 3 434 4 739 4 827 5 524 1 798 9 263 - 5 270 87 6 604 - 1 714 Other services 105 1 896 2 856 4 893 624 2 050 6 349 471 1 148 2 497 270 692 2 033 945 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Net sales in the industry of the acquired company. b Net purchases by the industry of the acquiring company. Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net Cross-border MAs sales by sector/industry = Sales of companies in the industry of the acquired company to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the industry of the acquired company; net cross-border MA purchases by sector/industry = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.
  • 228. 204 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.6. Number of cross-border MAs, by sector/industry, 2005–May 2011 (Number of deals) Net salesa Net purchasesb Sector/industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-May) Total 5 004 5 747 7 018 6 425 4 239 5 405 2 036 5 004 5 747 7 018 6 425 4 239 5 405 2 036 Primary 265 413 485 486 433 600 264 199 288 350 296 221 344 174 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries 38 39 64 59 63 70 25 24 34 35 40 28 42 14 Mining, quarrying and petroleum 227 374 421 427 370 530 239 175 254 315 256 193 302 160 Manufacturing 1 522 1 688 1 993 1 976 1 153 1 485 544 1 367 1 523 1 872 1 850 909 1 286 524 Food, beverages and tobacco 158 130 213 220 109 167 71 147 110 237 180 71 119 45 Textiles, clothing and leather 41 62 56 64 39 49 15 20 39 36 22 26 42 17 Wood and wood products 40 75 78 49 26 46 21 25 37 58 52 10 33 14 Publishing and printing 96 97 90 60 37 34 21 105 110 100 72 20 38 28 Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel 9 21 14 20 16 17 4 9 10 16 11 4 9 - Chemicals and chemical products 321 275 325 316 225 307 110 252 231 266 323 191 269 102 Rubber and plastic products 38 55 66 63 35 53 7 51 49 60 41 25 33 12 Non-metallic mineral products 76 91 130 91 22 42 10 79 102 110 92 16 24 6 Metals and metal products 146 155 218 199 95 123 51 133 162 205 224 87 139 54 Machinery and equipment 160 187 228 265 134 175 63 124 166 195 247 127 160 63 Electrical and electronic equipment 167 257 266 309 203 199 74 162 254 255 259 144 179 92 Precision instruments 148 152 155 184 109 140 45 140 159 164 203 91 120 55 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 78 84 86 95 74 86 31 77 49 122 88 60 78 23 Other manufacturing 44 47 68 41 29 47 21 43 45 48 36 37 43 13 Services 3 217 3 646 4 539 3 962 2 653 3 320 1 228 3 438 3 936 4 796 4 279 3 109 3 775 1 338 Electricity, gas and water 97 110 135 159 130 166 57 61 75 92 155 98 70 47 Construction 99 118 149 114 96 129 34 44 55 83 73 48 56 16 Trade 441 425 588 590 324 445 180 276 354 374 352 198 264 124 Hotels and restaurants 49 101 134 123 77 115 28 14 24 56 60 26 40 17 Transport, storage and communications 351 352 436 343 211 288 98 285 304 346 260 169 214 84 Finance 484 531 712 563 458 557 187 1 492 1 661 2 121 1 887 1 728 1 923 553 Business services 1 402 1 651 1 972 1 681 1 109 1 320 533 1 188 1 331 1 545 1 305 816 1 006 425 Public administration and defense 10 7 10 8 13 2 4 - 81 - 84 - 77 - 72 - 86 1 - 7 Education 22 22 19 43 30 26 12 22 12 12 22 15 18 7 Health and social services 85 85 124 95 59 110 34 35 39 69 52 22 68 26 Community, social and personal service activities 149 178 197 177 116 110 45 75 111 123 127 50 76 41 Other services 28 66 63 66 30 52 16 27 54 52 58 25 39 5 Source: UNCTAD, cross-border MA database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Net sales in the industry of the acquired company. b Net purchases by the industry of the acquiring company. Note: Cross-border MA sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net Cross-border MAs sales by sector/industry = Sales of companies in the industry of the acquired company to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the industry of the acquired company; net cross-border MA purchases by sector/industry = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.
  • 229. ANNEX TABLES 205 AnnextableI.7.Cross-borderMAdealsworthover$3billioncompletedin2010 Rank Value ($billion) AcquiredcompanyHosteconomya IndustryoftheacquiredcompanyAcquiringcompanyHomeeconomya Industryoftheacquiringcompany Shares acquired 118.8CadburyPLCUnitedKingdomCandyandotherconfectioneryproductsKraftFoodsIncUnitedStatesFoodpreparations,nec100 210.7ZainAfricaBVNigeriaRadiotelephonecommunicationsBhartiAirtelLtdIndia Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 100 39.7BrasilcelNVBrazilRadiotelephonecommunicationsTelefỏnicaSASpain Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 50 49.1EDFEnergyPLCUnitedKingdomElectricservicesInvestorGroupHongKong,ChinaInvestors,nec100 59.0LihirGoldLtdPapuaNewGuineaGoldoresNewcrestMiningLtdAustraliaGoldores100 68.5T-Mobile(UK)LtdUnitedKingdomRadiotelephonecommunicationsOrangePLCUnitedKingdomRadiotelephonecommunications100 77.6E.ONUSLLCUnitedStatesNaturalgasdistributionPPLCorpUnitedStatesElectricservices100 87.6SolvayPharmaceuticalsSABelgiumPharmaceuticalpreparationsAbbottLaboratoriesUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparations100 97.3FomentoEconomicoMexicanoSABdeCVMexicoMaltbeveragesInvestorGroupNetherlandsInvestors,nec100 107.1RepsolYPFBrasilSABrazilCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasChinaPetrochemicalCorporation{SinopecGroup}ChinaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas40 116.1MilliporeCorpUnitedStatesLaboratoryanalyticalinstrumentsMerckKGaAGermanyPharmaceuticalpreparations100 126.0SybaseIncUnitedStatesPrepackagedSoftwareSheffieldAcquisitionCorpUnitedStatesPrepackagedSoftware100 135.5ZAO“KyivstarGSM”UkraineRadiotelephonecommunicationsOAO“Vympel-Kommunikatsii”{Vimpelkom}RussianFederationRadiotelephonecommunications100 145.2UnitymediaGmbHGermanyCableandotherpaytelevisionservicesLibertyMediaCorpUnitedStatesCableandotherpaytelevisionservices100 154.9RatiopharmInternationalGmbHGermanyPharmaceuticalpreparationsTevaPharmaceuticalIndustriesLtdIsraelPharmaceuticalpreparations100 164.8RepublicofVenezuela-CaraboboBlock Venezuela,Bolivarian Rep.of CrudepetroleumandnaturalgasInvestorGroupIndiaInvestors,nec40 174.7EastResourcesIncUnitedStatesCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasRoyalDutchShellPLCNetherlandsCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas100 184.5PactivCorpUnitedStatesPlasticsfoamproductsReynoldsGroupHoldingsLtdNewZealandConvertedpaperandpaperboardproducts,nec100 194.5EgyptianCoforMobileServicesEgyptRadiotelephonecommunicationsOrangeParticipationsSAFrance Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 51 204.4TomkinsPLCUnitedKingdom Mechanicalpowertransmission equipment,nec PinaforeAcquisitionsLtdCanadaInvestmentoffices,nec100 214.1DenwayMotorsLtdHongKong,ChinaMotorvehiclepartsandaccessoriesChinaLoungeInvestmentsLtdHongKong,ChinaInvestors,nec62 224.1AXASA-LifeAssuranceBusiness,UKUnitedKingdomLifeinsuranceFriendsProvidentHoldings(UK)Ltd{FPH}UnitedKingdomLifeinsurance100 234.0OSIPharmaceuticalsIncUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparationsRubyAcquisitionIncUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparations100 244.0LibertyGlobalIncUnitedStatesCableandotherpaytelevisionservicesKDDICorpJapan Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 100 253.8BungeParticipacoeseInvestimentosSABrazilSoybeanoilmillsValeSABrazilIronores100 263.7PiramalHealthcareLtdIndiaPharmaceuticalpreparationsAbbottLaboratoriesUnitedStatesPharmaceuticalpreparations100 273.7KraftFoodsIncUnitedStatesFrozenspecialties,necNestléSASwitzerlandChocolateandcocoaproducts100 283.7AbertisInfraestructurasSASpainHighwayandstreetconstructionTrebolHoldingsSarlSpainInvestmentoffices,nec26 293.4TandbergASANorway RadioTVbroadcastingcommunications equipment CiscoSystemsIncUnitedStatesComputerperipheralequipment,nec100 303.4HS1LtdUnitedKingdomRailroads,line-hauloperatingInvestorgroupCanadaInvestors,nec100 313.4AndeanResourcesLtdUnitedStatesGoldoresGoldcorpIncCanadaGoldores100 323.4 SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDeutschland GmbH GermanyBooks:publishing,orpublishingprintingInvestorgroupGuernseyInvestors,nec100 333.3InteractiveDataCorpUnitedStatesInformationretrievalservicesInteractiveDataCorpSPVUnitedStatesInvestmentoffices,nec100 343.3GeneralGrowthPropertiesIncUnitedStatesRealestateinvestmenttrustsBrookfieldAssetManagementIncCanadaManagementinvestmentoffices,open-end36 353.3SunriseCommunicationsAGSwitzerlandRadiotelephonecommunicationsCVCCapitalPartnersLtdLuxembourgInvestors,nec100 363.3BPPLCCanadaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasApacheCorpUnitedStatesCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas100 373.2ArrowEnergyLtdAustraliaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasCSCSG(Australia)PtyLtdAustraliaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas100 383.2TommyHilfigerCorpNetherlandsMen’sshirtsandnightwearPhillips-VanHeusenCorpUnitedStatesMen’sshirtsandnightwear100 393.1DimensionDataHoldingsPLCSouthAfricaComputerintegratedsystemsdesignNipponTelegraphTelephoneCorpJapan Telephonecommunications,except radiotelephone 100 403.1BridasCorpArgentinaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasCNOOCLtdChinaCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas50 413.1BPPLC-PermianBasinAssetsUnitedStatesCrudepetroleumandnaturalgasApacheCorpUnitedStatesCrudepetroleumandnaturalgas100 423.1IntollGroupAustraliaInvestmentoffices,necCanadaPensionPlanInvestmentBoardCanadaInvestmentadvice100 433.0RBSWorldPayUnitedKingdomFunctionsrelatedtodepositorybanking,necInvestorgroupUnitedStatesInvestors,nec80 Source:UNCTAD,cross-borderMAdatabase(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). a Immediatecountry. Note:Aslongastheultimatehosteconomyisdifferentfromtheultimatehomeeconomy,MAdealsthatwereundertakenwithinthesameeconomyarestillconsideredcross-borderMAs.
  • 230. 206 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (Millions of dollars) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination World 709 764 884 087 940 100 1 461 783 952 200 806 969 295 867 709 764 884 087 940 100 1 461 783 952 200 806 969 295 867 Developed countries 530 218 598 448 650 301 1 027 741 685 086 569 081 203 876 225 107 286 272 298 350 462 450 305 231 263 509 74 017 Europe 269 658 352 000 413 499 586 118 411 360 343 026 125 589 148 751 213 079 212 965 314 699 191 644 148 924 49 018 European Union 252 532 325 512 375 229 537 991 383 270 317 370 119 723 145 730 210 078 208 204 307 195 186 381 143 123 47 329 Austria 8 407 21 207 14 112 22 632 10 106 7 443 1 909 3 681 1 861 2 861 2 864 1 547 1 889 697 Belgium 2 766 3 048 5 951 13 731 8 407 4 890 1 177 4 101 3 879 9 568 10 634 3 540 4 554 557 Bulgaria 98 55 74 161 9 77 3 3 703 16 995 6 857 9 495 4 257 4 515 2 154 Cyprus 282 356 396 242 725 239 4 207 89 220 180 428 185 440 43 Czech Republic 784 1 356 4 926 4 110 1 487 2 001 329 4 815 6 887 6 799 4 516 3 805 5 473 1 759 Denmark 8 795 4 621 6 561 13 249 8 840 4 013 2 751 1 751 1 641 2 004 1 975 2 206 341 173 Estonia 632 959 2 448 403 94 1 245 1 062 1 898 698 764 1 371 1 144 996 297 Finland 8 674 9 555 13 159 9 294 3 385 4 292 2 938 1 274 1 455 1 083 2 252 956 1 475 699 France 31 432 46 102 53 171 83 660 64 849 46 893 12 311 10 321 16 104 17 572 22 201 11 201 8 516 2 585 Germany 58 853 69 942 73 012 92 741 67 727 66 161 22 565 13 188 17 884 18 514 35 163 19 750 13 748 5 854 Greece 1 006 2 107 1 600 5 406 1 670 1 332 392 680 1 669 4 195 4 704 1 748 1 035 888 Hungary 2 396 563 2 691 4 997 3 304 508 649 7 702 8 321 9 384 7 661 4 095 7 349 1 176 Ireland 4 267 8 937 8 321 17 252 14 871 5 055 823 9 397 6 687 3 903 8 176 4 776 4 436 2 492 Italy 15 549 15 372 24 187 41 024 28 440 21 469 7 164 7 536 9 939 9 790 14 112 12 121 10 084 1 815 Latvia 176 768 155 418 575 725 5 1 470 3 066 616 2 409 594 974 884 Lithuania 960 3 071 305 669 292 267 - 1 129 967 1 164 1 225 1 104 1 558 513 Luxembourg 2 016 11 046 10 959 11 565 8 366 4 772 3 426 30 204 654 182 619 356 152 Malta 67 4 36 164 622 14 9 89 870 287 383 197 261 29 Netherlands 27 928 35 230 25 148 32 483 29 299 18 488 6 677 4 105 4 879 5 288 9 131 8 721 9 826 1 156 Poland 644 864 2 809 2 459 1 042 2 334 512 13 771 15 014 21 530 32 766 13 557 9 999 3 131 Portugal 1 065 1 015 4 161 10 506 6 641 4 785 336 791 4 065 10 649 7 164 4 958 2 582 740 Romania 80 54 90 3 991 62 713 - 10 704 19 038 21 519 33 613 15 379 7 958 5 204 Slovakia - 346 486 297 400 1 571 130 9 021 11 258 5 732 3 331 5 416 3 760 2 808 Slovenia 749 3 039 600 1 638 661 545 90 380 616 927 822 193 776 49 Spain 10 586 24 941 35 838 41 876 38 928 36 335 16 132 9 974 17 516 19 397 27 726 13 729 14 833 3 255 Sweden 9 624 10 777 10 920 20 974 14 007 13 354 4 496 7 244 6 797 4 068 2 498 2 714 1 836 1 009 United Kingdom 54 697 50 176 73 112 102 049 68 461 67 849 29 630 16 888 31 548 22 898 60 395 47 869 23 556 7 212 Other developed Europe 17 125 26 488 38 270 48 128 28 090 25 656 5 866 3 021 3 001 4 762 7 505 5 263 5 800 1 689 Iceland 358 4 118 1 291 786 518 584 169 2 180 52 84 - 706 - Liechtenstein 79 40 24 88 74 35 27 15 - 94 2 - 16 - Norway 6 585 3 847 13 930 12 521 8 722 3 707 1 563 1 756 628 594 3 125 2 260 2 169 433 Switzerland 10 103 18 482 23 024 34 733 18 776 21 330 4 107 1 248 2 194 4 022 4 294 3 003 2 909 1 256 North America 192 441 167 743 142 970 306 426 182 289 148 127 50 793 58 059 52 959 55 733 107 896 87 961 71 524 19 347 Canada 40 661 13 772 13 745 76 871 29 039 16 135 6 740 21 501 14 623 7 767 17 594 16 043 14 397 3 626 United States 151 779 153 971 129 225 229 556 153 250 131 992 44 053 36 558 38 337 47 966 90 302 71 919 57 127 15 720 Other developed countries 68 120 78 706 93 832 135 197 91 438 77 929 27 494 18 297 20 233 29 652 39 855 25 626 43 061 5 652 Australia 14 322 18 988 17 597 29 919 16 156 9 049 4 111 6 847 3 815 20 937 27 362 15 200 37 107 3 774 Bermuda 928 807 763 3 521 5 156 1 424 378 - 4 17 - 1 13 7 Greenland 24 - 183 37 - - - 365 - - - - 475 - Israel 2 961 10 825 4 262 15 598 2 575 6 720 1 837 4 798 833 439 860 3 268 813 200 Japan 49 789 47 509 70 548 85 561 66 652 60 033 21 058 5 338 13 741 6 318 9 804 6 692 4 523 562 New Zealand 96 577 480 560 899 703 111 949 1 840 1 941 1 829 464 130 1 109 Developing economies 152 844 267 768 268 353 404 054 248 451 218 697 87 154 421 460 540 760 559 778 883 917 593 041 491 622 200 740 Africa 4 588 6 684 8 039 15 587 14 866 14 602 7 131 90 290 101 510 93 210 212 811 96 933 84 078 27 417 North Africa 2 257 4 047 4 150 7 019 2 216 3 211 5 42 208 67 453 53 452 100 174 37 708 25 407 4 414 Algeria - 15 10 2 504 34 - - 15 226 9 708 13 281 21 418 1 597 1 806 621 Egypt 2 109 3 844 3 651 3 541 1 810 3 138 5 13 689 27 349 13 003 13 363 18 213 13 827 704 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 21 - - - 18 - - 5 696 20 920 4 170 22 872 1 677 1 762 3 Morocco 96 60 26 560 237 27 - 4 300 5 201 4 842 17 855 5 760 3 516 2 300 Sudan - 9 7 - - - - 1 715 1 154 18 2 709 1 978 2 430 61 Tunisia 32 120 455 414 117 46 - 1 582 3 122 18 138 21 957 8 483 2 066 726 Other Africa 2 330 2 637 3 889 8 569 12 650 11 392 7 125 48 082 34 057 39 757 112 637 59 224 58 671 23 002 Angola - - 24 48 - 493 - 583 2 549 7 585 11 170 13 691 1 101 116 Benin - - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - Botswana - 108 - - 10 9 26 217 866 310 2 089 308 728 497 Burkina Faso - - - - - - - 488 - 9 252 234 447 25 Cameroon 9 - - - 18 - - 900 728 2 460 344 1 054 5 275 1 296 Cape Verde - - - - - - - - - 9 128 - 37 - Congo - - - - - - - - - 223 - 1 226 - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - - - 169 - - - 2 158 1 427 1 042 3 316 41 695 869 Côte d’ Ivoire 28 9 - 12 18 18 - 764 405 59 309 94 213 - Djibouti - - - - - - - 300 528 5 1 723 1 295 1 387 - Equatorial Guinea - - - - - - - - 85 - 6 2 887 1 1 600 /…
  • 231. ANNEX TABLES 207 Annex table I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (continued) (Millions of dollars) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Eritrea - - - 3 - - - 969 5 - - - - - Ethiopia - - - 24 3 - - 20 1 507 2 499 703 310 276 269 Gabon - - - - - - - 2 088 1 727 333 4 232 913 1 062 151 Gambia - - - - - - - 400 83 9 21 21 537 - Ghana - - - - 8 15 7 5 431 1 030 124 4 808 6 570 2 658 5 193 Guinea - - - - - - - 96 249 - - 56 1 400 234 Guinea-Bissau - - - - - - - - - 409 - 18 - - Kenya 24 42 18 590 216 3 517 121 546 81 354 437 3 708 1 549 1 766 Lesotho - - - - - - - - - 46 17 22 41 509 Liberia - - - - - - - 909 - - 2 600 820 4 319 3 Madagascar - 27 - - - - - 336 246 3 331 1 273 474 - - Mali - - - - - - - 598 372 - 174 47 5 0 Mauritania - - - - - - - 1 107 542 37 242 - 211 237 Mauritius 2 - 36 314 2 392 1 028 2 357 80 3 538 294 58 54 503 Mozambique - - - - - - - - 595 2 103 11 607 1 557 3 192 1 208 Namibia - 2 - 2 - - - 868 65 443 1 791 1 448 393 513 Niger - - - - - - - - 1 - 3 087 - 100 234 Nigeria 16 524 184 2 168 177 1 254 775 21 051 11 053 4 172 35 722 6 722 12 492 750 Reunion - - - - - - - - 13 - - - - - Rwanda - - - - 1 - - 11 - 273 253 313 1 717 83 São Tomé and Principe - - - - - - - 9 - 2 - - - - Senegal - - - - - - - 13 1 243 2 979 1 296 328 927 5 Seychelles - - - - - - - 57 - 1 421 137 1 128 - Sierra Leone - - - - - - - 727 247 - 68 - 230 - Somalia - - - - - - - - 400 - 409 - 52 - South Africa 2 212 1 926 3 589 4 452 9 608 4 953 3 830 3 467 4 947 5 148 11 873 7 509 5 891 1 042 Swaziland - - - - - - - 94 - - 14 3 - 468 United Republic of Tanzania - - - 9 32 49 - 1 520 263 315 2 090 726 994 990 Togo 9 - 29 64 104 36 9 - 421 400 - 1 - - Uganda 30 - 9 37 28 9 - 67 325 289 2 941 2 306 8 339 2 024 Zambia - - - - 9 - - 2 148 1 926 410 4 613 2 358 1 228 947 Zimbabwe - - - 667 15 10 - 60 127 2 022 965 903 682 1 449 Latin America and the Caribbean 5 358 7 961 12 074 20 023 16 164 19 946 9 838 65 433 64 461 63 847 125 406 109 094 118 195 58 257 South America 4 198 5 834 8 823 17 675 12 991 16 791 4 412 50 505 42 621 38 235 82 557 74 696 91 932 46 893 Argentina 33 811 447 370 573 1 434 781 3 537 10 389 5 489 6 700 7 593 7 100 3 494 Bolivia, Plurinational State of - - - - - - - 343 2 588 1 448 637 1 780 668 191 Brazil 3 224 3 523 5 383 14 803 9 693 8 755 1 029 20 487 10 578 16 720 35 952 36 866 43 184 28 714 Chile 723 318 1 928 371 1 453 2 207 362 4 919 4 244 2 891 8 951 11 325 8 077 8 421 Colombia - 35 84 541 54 3 362 33 1 719 2 043 3 080 8 836 2 280 8 835 2 903 Ecuador 10 9 31 24 213 75 - 2 822 1 058 515 313 325 64 269 Guyana - - - - - - - 422 311 10 1 000 12 7 - Paraguay - - - - - - - 5 - 607 175 38 6 304 12 Peru 20 33 267 16 88 135 34 4 852 6 593 2 540 10 693 13 324 11 599 2 016 Suriname - - - - - - - - - - 95 - - - Uruguay - - 25 2 48 2 3 490 1 756 2 648 4 299 352 308 474 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 189 1 105 659 1 549 870 821 2 172 10 908 3 060 2 288 4 906 801 5 787 400 Central America 443 1 711 2 625 919 2 369 2 988 5 273 9 737 17 825 23 172 37 716 31 036 19 052 9 646 Costa Rica 2 - 81 3 48 62 11 467 358 1 274 339 2 354 1 767 606 El Salvador - - 103 - 308 150 - 86 630 249 375 727 304 131 Guatemala 9 - 40 21 46 62 - 278 14 880 469 1 170 877 95 Honduras 11 54 61 - - - - 227 34 897 934 83 172 437 Mexico 421 1 656 2 296 842 1 919 2 578 5 250 7 651 16 199 17 767 32 517 23 761 14 462 7 478 Nicaragua - - 29 19 - 66 - 64 114 96 154 849 272 10 Panama - - 16 35 49 71 12 964 476 2 010 2 928 2 089 1 197 889 Caribbean 717 416 626 1 429 804 167 152 5 192 4 016 2 439 5 134 3 362 7 210 1 718 Aruba - - - - - - - 285 - - 64 - 7 22 Bahamas 390 5 1 11 7 - - 55 - 16 48 3 - 21 Barbados - - 2 - - 4 22 - - - - 27 130 - Cayman Islands 290 205 74 495 744 72 119 42 11 3 30 32 124 9 Cuba - - - 32 - - - 847 450 127 1 180 842 6 048 377 Dominican Republic 10 - 498 - 30 22 - 1 122 807 709 2 098 1 255 145 690 Guadeloupe - - - - - - - - 25 - 267 - - 22 Haiti - - - - - 2 - 9 139 - 1 136 59 241 /…
  • 232. 208 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (continued) (Millions of dollars) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Jamaica - 205 7 887 19 30 - 260 368 32 281 17 23 186 Martinique - - - - - 12 - - 25 17 - 6 - - Puerto Rico - - 17 4 3 22 11 425 672 857 715 746 496 86 Saint Lucia 17 - - - - - - - - 12 - 1 144 64 Trinidad and Tobago 9 1 28 - - 3 - 2 140 1 518 666 320 299 23 - Asia 142 898 252 513 248 239 368 400 217 413 184 143 70 135 265 726 374 346 398 579 540 948 385 457 288 227 111 962 West Asia 58 434 134 275 77 928 176 092 73 776 35 705 10 688 77 075 79 088 67 236 159 371 92 944 51 978 19 553 Bahrain 8 522 20 416 8 937 20 877 14 526 1 085 129 2 410 5 700 742 8 670 1 932 1 739 1 870 Iraq 82 - 48 - 20 - 33 1 489 5 249 456 20 110 3 447 2 766 1 024 Jordan 136 194 258 2 618 860 535 4 2 034 4 478 1 223 12 346 2 426 2 074 887 Kuwait 9 407 17 426 4 567 16 181 4 554 2 837 2 188 595 1 799 384 2 216 1 500 688 65 Lebanon 891 5 406 549 2 393 54 199 20 1 118 2 056 431 1 441 2 116 1 779 406 Oman - - 95 91 3 177 39 - 2 958 3 216 2 349 13 792 6 266 4 226 1 105 Palestinian Territory - 300 - - - - - - 88 6 1 050 4 18 - Qatar 293 1 440 1 883 9 763 13 302 2 925 1 757 11 694 3 977 1 109 19 009 21 848 6 030 2 573 Saudi Arabia 6 378 5 922 2 191 13 863 5 951 1 315 1 015 6 234 19 537 26 821 21 187 14 776 9 741 3 755 Syrian Arab Republic - - - 364 48 - - 18 370 2 628 3 434 6 236 3 207 1 919 676 Turkey 3 830 1 876 2 038 4 367 3 671 3 551 2 629 4 316 12 996 13 330 15 063 21 311 9 114 2 155 United Arab Emirates 28 897 81 296 57 365 105 523 27 613 23 217 2 913 23 715 17 057 16 762 34 241 13 160 10 835 5 016 Yemen - - - 54 - 1 - 2 144 308 190 4 010 952 1 049 22 South, East and South- East Asia 84 463 118 237 170 311 192 308 143 637 148 438 59 447 188 651 295 258 331 343 381 576 292 512 236 249 92 409 East Asia 52 273 60 206 94 376 105 888 81 460 96 524 39 749 99 422 128 068 140 398 130 813 108 662 99 781 34 759 China 9 689 15 433 29 923 49 029 28 202 29 178 9 834 83 691 114 024 95 115 111 582 94 555 84 579 31 561 Hong Kong, China 6 680 12 048 18 972 15 313 15 274 7 837 8 194 2 831 3 147 2 442 3 899 6 327 4 999 1 106 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of - - - - - - - - 175 338 509 173 - 56 Korea, Republic of 24 205 23 093 27 082 31 143 26 764 35 178 19 177 8 175 7 625 8 525 10 252 3 829 2 674 1 228 Macao, China - - - 1 - - - 324 70 4 719 556 354 108 3 Mongolia - - - - - 150 - 1 225 176 350 243 288 1 033 1 Taiwan Province of China 11 700 9 632 18 400 10 403 11 220 24 181 2 544 3 178 2 852 28 909 3 770 3 137 6 388 805 South Asia 12 667 33 914 30 034 38 442 25 953 17 961 7 045 43 986 110 957 64 396 90 380 67 492 54 404 30 248 Afghanistan 135 - - - - - 25 128 31 6 180 2 957 537 2 Bangladesh 208 20 - 14 24 50 - 1 942 511 169 510 574 2 447 93 Bhutan - - - - - - - - 32 - - 100 15 - India 11 232 28 192 23 928 35 666 20 651 17 314 6 400 27 224 86 738 51 564 74 335 50 022 45 358 28 538 Iran, Islamic Republic of 264 860 6 076 1 643 5 197 503 518 1 205 977 8 284 7 798 8 807 2 532 6 Maldives - - - - - - - - 847 170 179 347 1 441 177 Nepal - - - 6 - 4 31 - 3 3 392 259 303 48 Pakistan 351 83 22 1 087 16 54 20 13 237 21 270 3 600 5 901 2 744 1 055 852 Sri Lanka 477 4 760 7 26 65 36 52 249 547 602 1 085 1 682 716 531 South-East Asia 19 523 24 117 45 901 47 978 36 224 33 953 12 652 45 243 56 233 126 549 160 384 116 358 82 065 27 402 Brunei Darussalam 4 - - 66 - - 1 25 - 706 393 578 148 - Cambodia - - - 41 37 - - 206 1 103 139 2 701 2 978 865 523 Indonesia 4 554 633 1 659 390 1 039 400 4 927 12 747 12 467 18 266 36 731 27 317 11 659 8 863 Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - - 157 - - - 527 563 1 359 1 169 1 965 235 78 Malaysia 6 481 4 996 25 314 18 121 13 544 20 566 521 4 091 4 497 9 912 20 168 12 088 12 750 4 403 Myanmar - - 20 - - - - - 227 1 403 1 241 1 890 372 15 Philippines 238 242 1 310 344 1 111 1 538 11 4 368 4 954 19 755 16 057 10 400 4 380 1 528 Singapore 6 861 11 105 14 141 18 127 11 216 7 683 3 840 5 825 11 767 22 939 10 478 9 596 13 603 6 533 Thailand 975 2 366 2 881 7 951 7 898 3 193 2 230 6 048 4 291 7 173 12 369 7 036 7 696 1 157 Timor-Leste - - - - - - - 10 - - - - 1 000 - Viet Nam 410 4 774 576 2 782 1 379 573 1 122 11 395 16 365 44 897 59 075 42 510 29 358 4 301 Oceania - 611 - 43 9 6 51 11 443 4 142 4 751 1 558 1 122 3 104 Fiji - - - - 1 3 - - 173 169 77 372 - 53 Micronesia, Federated States of - 11 - - - - - - 66 - - - - - New Caledonia - - - - - - - 7 - 3 800 3 200 16 - - Papua New Guinea - - - 41 - 3 51 3 204 173 967 1 144 904 3 000 South-East Europe and the CIS 26 702 17 871 21 446 29 988 18 663 19 190 4 837 63 197 57 056 81 972 115 416 53 928 51 838 21 111 South-East Europe 464 306 2 734 1 961 545 1 432 53 5 506 9 327 13 553 19 160 6 852 7 043 3 521 Albania - - - - - 105 - 559 2 254 4 398 3 268 85 38 115 Bosnia and Herzegovina 48 - - - - 15 3 2 212 289 2 507 1 836 1 238 222 648 /…
  • 233. ANNEX TABLES 209 Annex table I.8. Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (concluded) (Millions of dollars) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Croatia 416 224 2 703 1 269 130 981 3 1 034 514 1 712 3 836 1 325 2 263 164 Montenegro - - - - - 7 - - 407 1 769 732 120 267 3 Serbia - 83 31 692 405 322 43 912 2 996 2 668 6 975 3 274 3 794 2 447 The FYR of Macedonia - - - - 10 1 5 788 2 867 499 2 514 809 458 144 CIS 26 238 17 565 18 712 28 026 18 118 17 758 4 784 57 691 47 729 68 419 96 256 47 077 44 796 17 590 Armenia 34 2 - 9 - 9 - 334 194 2 440 258 726 188 20 Azerbaijan 260 14 4 230 988 3 584 512 77 1 282 817 1 762 2 348 1 452 373 364 Belarus 33 35 53 1 715 525 1 991 62 828 753 376 2 255 1 781 1 724 403 Georgia - - - 47 30 35 18 886 455 998 1 905 4 105 718 23 Kazakhstan 237 70 13 97 523 429 - 3 705 3 437 4 196 19 489 1 504 2 034 3 464 Kyrgyzstan 2 - - 7 15 - - 538 63 3 440 534 10 - 101 Moldova, Republic of - - - 522 - - - 430 76 50 138 425 320 38 Russian Federation 25 404 14 812 13 221 22 211 11 951 13 617 4 563 40 819 37 031 46 459 58 453 30 198 33 355 9 224 Tajikistan - - - 31 5 - - 952 9 269 185 483 1 1 042 Turkmenistan - - - - - - - 2 - 834 3 463 1 370 348 407 Ukraine 267 2 632 1 195 2 400 1 487 1 166 64 7 015 4 306 6 751 6 740 4 123 3 320 819 Uzbekistan - - - - - - - 900 590 843 488 900 2 415 1 685 Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)a 383 656 90 638 255 645 65 19 141 17 083 25 427 62 915 42 524 37 037 10 510 Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)b 699 194 4 252 2 553 4 212 1 132 164 14 862 16 569 24 363 48 933 23 071 29 103 14 126 Small island developing states (SIDS)c 419 822 73 1 255 2 426 1 070 2 431 2 622 3 178 3 207 3 013 2 297 4 104 4 055 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. b Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. c Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Note: Data refer to estimated amount of capital investment.
  • 234. 210 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.9. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination World 10 560 12 277 12 245 16 422 14 192 14 142 4 874 10 560 12 277 12 245 16 422 14 192 14 142 4 874 Developed countries 9 057 10 291 10 356 13 474 11 651 11 574 4 022 5 145 6 163 6 355 7 526 6 618 6 766 2 216 Europe 4 920 5 860 6 344 8 027 7 147 6 872 2 295 4 074 4 888 4 912 5 802 4 633 4 418 1 400 European Union 4 586 5 426 5 896 7 331 6 583 6 316 2 127 3 975 4 756 4 725 5 578 4 466 4 265 1 344 Austria 220 263 252 281 201 214 51 104 90 109 111 74 82 30 Belgium 125 142 191 209 141 141 39 163 126 210 183 104 96 35 Bulgaria 6 6 7 12 4 11 2 134 286 150 146 101 122 28 Cyprus 5 22 8 10 18 23 11 5 15 7 18 10 17 2 Czech Republic 22 41 32 53 12 34 11 151 179 149 145 113 183 67 Denmark 152 142 136 179 208 138 36 78 68 67 66 36 31 12 Estonia 25 44 39 26 13 11 6 63 55 32 44 25 27 8 Finland 185 190 183 203 133 130 49 35 44 38 38 24 33 16 France 649 688 912 1 060 984 812 254 492 588 570 697 414 373 93 Germany 1 026 1 262 1 278 1 464 1 320 1 362 444 285 372 456 727 692 454 143 Greece 39 54 61 74 28 27 9 28 29 38 48 40 29 12 Hungary 12 19 30 30 21 15 13 205 243 218 154 110 150 55 Ireland 76 94 98 132 146 136 39 192 146 116 184 175 187 71 Italy 322 288 335 519 444 399 135 138 149 178 232 172 186 55 Latvia 11 24 15 18 9 17 2 84 110 33 52 28 23 9 Lithuania 54 66 13 18 12 15 - 75 59 45 47 35 42 4 Luxembourg 26 29 94 83 64 64 36 2 14 26 17 15 28 6 Malta 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 9 12 9 9 15 15 7 Netherlands 238 351 309 453 406 376 134 112 138 131 174 160 144 54 Poland 28 38 40 45 39 38 9 272 336 343 376 225 307 89 Portugal 21 26 37 88 47 57 12 30 56 82 82 57 51 11 Romania 13 13 13 26 13 13 - 260 375 371 360 204 218 73 Slovakia - 4 2 9 2 10 2 118 117 101 85 57 93 35 Slovenia 41 49 27 31 20 23 5 20 25 23 23 12 24 4 Spain 183 232 461 622 623 609 214 171 304 452 577 391 384 115 Sweden 272 285 294 334 326 335 117 106 122 86 87 98 67 20 United Kingdom 832 1 051 1 026 1 349 1 346 1 303 496 643 698 685 896 1 079 899 290 Other developed Europe 334 434 448 696 564 556 168 99 132 187 224 167 153 56 Iceland 17 30 27 25 9 11 8 1 5 1 2 - 4 - Liechtenstein 4 3 3 7 3 6 3 1 - 2 1 - 2 - Norway 90 102 71 113 109 93 38 20 22 25 45 31 29 8 Switzerland 223 299 347 551 443 446 119 77 105 159 176 136 118 48 North America 3 126 3 278 3 037 3 894 3 340 3 439 1 309 790 927 1 036 1 206 1 516 1 788 649 Canada 419 243 259 331 326 299 137 207 179 168 218 260 318 108 United States 2 707 3 035 2 778 3 563 3 014 3 140 1 172 583 748 868 988 1 256 1 470 541 Other developed countries 1 011 1 153 975 1 553 1 164 1 263 418 281 348 407 518 469 560 167 Australia 145 159 154 208 164 172 70 115 135 178 240 254 322 100 Bermuda 22 52 33 64 62 57 9 - 2 4 - 1 2 1 Greenland 1 - 1 1 - - - 2 - - - - 2 - Israel 55 108 66 120 74 84 30 23 34 21 42 21 29 18 Japan 775 808 702 1 131 827 915 296 122 149 179 203 163 179 34 New Zealand 13 26 19 29 37 35 13 19 28 25 33 30 26 14 Developing economies 1 321 1 779 1 700 2 650 2 297 2 302 781 4 509 5 337 5 110 7 728 6 731 6 470 2 379 Africa 70 87 64 199 173 151 60 463 448 388 852 692 630 232 North Africa 24 28 18 45 40 34 1 209 200 195 364 262 219 69 Algeria - 1 2 3 2 - - 45 50 33 73 32 20 7 Egypt 13 17 9 23 14 25 1 47 51 54 85 103 73 10 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 1 - - - 2 - - 15 11 20 40 17 17 1 Morocco 4 5 3 5 14 4 - 59 46 58 93 48 52 30 Sudan - 1 1 - - - - 10 15 2 13 12 9 6 Tunisia 6 4 3 14 8 5 - 33 27 28 60 50 48 15 Other Africa 46 59 46 154 133 117 59 254 248 193 488 430 411 163 Angola - - 2 4 - 4 - 18 15 10 35 33 34 7 Benin - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - Botswana - 4 - - 2 1 2 6 4 6 17 13 7 6 Burkina Faso - - - - - - - 3 - 1 2 1 3 1 Cameroon 1 - - - 2 - - 1 1 1 3 8 2 4 Cape Verde - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - 4 - Congo - - - - - - - - - 1 - 3 - - Congo, Democratic Republic of - - - 2 - - - 10 8 5 15 5 8 7 Côte d’ Ivoire 3 1 - 2 2 2 - 2 2 2 5 8 9 - Djibouti - - - - - - - 1 2 1 3 2 3 - Equatorial Guinea - - - - - - - - 3 - 1 2 1 1 Eritrea - - - 1 - - - 4 1 - - - - - Ethiopia - - - 2 1 - - 1 3 10 10 8 8 5 Gabon - - - - - - - 4 3 3 5 3 4 1 Gambia - - - - - - - 1 2 1 3 3 3 - Ghana - - - - 1 2 2 17 16 4 20 22 23 11 Guinea - - - - - - - 3 3 - - 2 3 1 Guinea-Bissau - - - - - - - - - 2 - 2 - - /…
  • 235. ANNEX TABLES 211 Annex table I.9. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (continued) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Kenya 4 3 2 26 26 17 10 13 12 8 19 29 35 19 Lesotho - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 2 Liberia - - - - - - - 2 - - 1 5 6 1 Madagascar - 2 - - - - - 4 3 3 4 3 - - Mali - - - - - - - 3 3 - 2 1 3 1 Mauritania - - - - - - - 3 4 2 1 - 5 2 Mauritius 1 - 2 5 8 8 8 5 1 4 14 5 5 2 Mozambique - - - - - - - - 5 5 23 10 16 5 Namibia - 1 - 1 - - - 7 6 5 14 8 6 3 Niger - - - - - - - - 1 - 2 - 1 1 Nigeria 3 7 6 27 21 13 7 38 25 20 47 40 33 13 Reunion - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - Rwanda - - - - 1 - - 2 - 8 13 26 6 3 São Tomé and Principe - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - - Senegal - - - - - - - 3 5 4 9 10 8 2 Seychelles - - - - - - - 3 - 3 2 1 1 - Sierra Leone - - - - - - - 2 2 - 5 - 2 - Somalia - - - - - - - - 1 - 2 - 1 - South Africa 32 41 29 65 50 61 29 62 76 59 120 109 95 41 Swaziland - - - - - - - 2 - - 3 1 - 1 United Republic of Tanzania - - - 1 2 3 - 11 7 6 17 11 23 7 Togo 1 - 4 7 9 3 1 - 1 1 - 1 - - Uganda 1 - 1 3 3 1 - 6 15 7 41 16 21 2 Zambia - - - - 1 - - 14 14 5 17 15 13 10 Zimbabwe - - - 7 3 2 - 2 3 2 5 13 13 3 Latin America and the Caribbean 86 128 226 219 230 273 92 568 588 820 1 169 1 229 1 180 524 South America 66 91 146 168 156 173 61 368 339 457 648 687 753 350 Argentina 2 16 27 15 21 22 7 42 52 112 123 114 116 56 Bolivia, Plurinational State of - - - - - - - 2 9 4 3 14 6 2 Brazil 34 40 66 102 63 72 35 169 152 154 254 276 348 163 Chile 15 15 26 24 37 50 11 39 39 30 70 112 58 34 Colombia - 2 9 13 6 12 2 46 32 77 78 61 106 51 Ecuador 1 1 3 2 12 5 - 4 5 8 10 6 7 5 Guyana - - - - - - - 3 3 1 1 1 2 - Paraguay - - - - - - - 2 - 2 4 3 8 1 Peru 3 2 6 3 5 5 1 29 23 37 64 76 59 22 Suriname - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - Uruguay - - 1 1 2 1 1 7 8 21 16 8 21 10 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 11 15 8 8 10 6 4 25 16 11 23 16 22 6 Central America 13 21 61 38 59 81 24 165 213 323 453 487 365 150 Costa Rica 1 - 7 2 5 5 2 12 20 39 19 68 43 14 El Salvador - - 2 - 5 2 - 4 5 7 11 19 13 8 Guatemala 1 - 2 4 7 5 - 1 2 16 17 18 11 3 Honduras 1 2 2 - - - - 3 2 11 10 7 9 5 Mexico 10 19 43 26 35 52 19 136 177 217 355 320 238 100 Nicaragua - - 2 2 - 7 - 1 3 6 7 7 10 2 Panama - - 3 4 7 10 3 8 4 27 34 47 40 18 Caribbean 7 16 19 13 15 19 7 35 36 40 68 55 62 24 Aruba - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - 1 2 Bahamas 1 1 2 1 1 - - 2 - 1 3 2 - 2 Barbados - - 1 - - 1 2 - - - - 1 2 - Cayman Islands 3 10 6 5 8 7 4 1 2 2 6 4 6 1 Cuba - - - 1 - - - 5 1 2 7 12 8 3 Dominican Republic 1 - 3 - 2 2 - 8 9 8 16 13 10 5 Guadeloupe - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - 2 Haiti - - - - - 1 - 1 2 - 1 2 1 2 Jamaica - 4 1 5 2 4 - 2 2 2 5 3 2 2 Martinique - - - - - 1 - - 1 2 - 1 - - Puerto Rico - - 4 1 2 2 1 8 13 18 20 15 26 4 Saint Lucia 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 2 1 Trinidad and Tobago 1 1 2 - - 1 - 6 5 4 5 1 2 - Asia 1 165 1 562 1 410 2 229 1 890 1 876 628 3 476 4 297 3 899 5 695 4 801 4 653 1 619 West Asia 232 423 297 582 437 414 118 498 699 588 1 106 1 016 914 339 Bahrain 3 9 11 34 32 13 4 27 49 34 68 70 56 26 Iraq 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 8 4 2 18 16 46 10 Jordan 6 12 6 14 13 9 2 24 32 20 34 26 47 9 Kuwait 15 46 28 77 39 29 14 10 21 9 30 28 32 7 Lebanon 11 16 6 11 4 14 2 11 18 11 9 27 32 11 Oman - - 4 6 3 4 - 13 37 16 55 42 38 25 Palestinian Territory - 1 - - - - - - 5 1 2 1 1 - Qatar 9 20 10 50 22 18 18 23 44 31 82 85 64 28 /…
  • 236. 212 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table I.9. Number of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2005–April 2011 (concluded) World as destination World as source Partner region/economy 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan-Apr) By source By destination Saudi Arabia 20 58 54 56 32 28 8 58 94 54 108 140 116 38 Syrian Arab Republic - - - 2 1 - - 24 16 16 29 19 21 8 Turkey 65 51 32 62 61 87 21 68 86 97 171 156 146 47 United Arab Emirates 102 210 145 266 229 211 47 229 290 293 490 401 309 128 Yemen - - - 4 - 1 - 3 3 4 10 5 6 2 South, East and South-East Asia 933 1 139 1 113 1 647 1 453 1 462 510 2 978 3 598 3 311 4 589 3 785 3 739 1 280 East Asia 514 586 643 844 820 806 267 1 589 1 734 1 526 1 972 1 638 1 721 563 China 141 129 207 261 330 267 85 1 257 1 407 1 218 1 548 1 167 1 301 424 Hong Kong, China 99 119 116 170 134 121 52 126 160 150 224 275 209 70 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of - - - - - - - - 2 4 4 1 - 1 Korea, Republic of 186 217 198 256 222 241 80 119 88 72 88 97 112 32 Macao, China - - - 1 - - - 9 6 13 14 9 7 1 Mongolia - - - - - 1 - 8 3 6 7 3 8 1 Taiwan Province of China 88 121 122 156 134 176 50 70 68 63 87 86 84 34 South Asia 214 315 226 380 294 372 157 691 1 056 764 1 072 850 857 357 Afghanistan 1 - - - - - 2 5 3 1 2 6 9 1 Bangladesh 4 3 - 3 2 6 - 7 12 5 13 17 30 6 Bhutan - - - - - - - - 2 - - 2 2 - India 191 297 215 358 267 339 148 591 984 695 972 745 747 329 Iran, Islamic Republic of 7 7 7 9 16 13 2 10 9 17 20 15 11 1 Maldives - - - - - - - - 5 2 4 3 8 2 Nepal - - - 1 - 3 2 - 2 1 11 4 4 2 Pakistan 6 4 3 6 5 8 2 66 28 28 28 35 20 6 Sri Lanka 5 4 1 3 4 3 1 12 11 15 22 23 26 10 South-East Asia 205 238 244 423 339 284 86 698 808 1 021 1 545 1 297 1 161 360 Brunei Darussalam 2 - - 1 - - 1 4 - 6 4 8 4 - Cambodia - - - 1 7 - - 6 5 8 35 31 34 13 Indonesia 9 5 9 5 10 14 2 76 98 82 136 118 124 46 Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - - 2 - - - 8 8 11 21 15 12 3 Malaysia 73 71 73 135 114 75 18 92 125 172 214 158 187 51 Myanmar - - 1 - - - - - 2 3 6 5 5 2 Philippines 6 9 25 19 14 23 2 66 62 97 143 119 96 24 Singapore 84 100 92 177 119 106 28 156 197 254 304 311 321 121 Thailand 19 36 29 47 51 38 25 120 112 123 331 276 209 40 Timor-Leste - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - Viet Nam 12 17 15 36 24 28 10 169 199 265 351 256 168 60 Oceania - 2 - 3 4 2 1 2 4 3 12 9 7 4 Fiji - - - - 1 1 - - 1 1 3 2 - 2 Micronesia, Federated States of - 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - New Caledonia - - - - - - - 1 - 1 1 1 - - Papua New Guinea - - - 2 - 1 1 1 2 1 6 5 5 1 South-East Europe and the CIS 182 207 189 298 244 266 71 906 777 780 1 168 843 906 279 South-East Europe 8 14 9 31 21 32 5 148 140 156 231 136 175 61 Albania - - - - - 1 - 13 11 8 16 7 6 3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 - - - - 2 2 26 17 23 25 20 20 9 Croatia 6 7 7 16 8 13 1 45 39 32 40 30 42 11 The FYR of Macedonia - - - - 4 2 1 11 27 9 22 18 14 3 Montenegro - - - - - 1 - - 3 5 14 1 11 1 Serbia - 7 2 15 9 13 1 53 43 79 114 60 82 34 CIS 174 193 180 267 223 234 66 758 637 624 937 707 731 218 Armenia 2 1 - 3 - 2 - 12 8 8 20 20 9 2 Azerbaijan 4 2 10 21 20 15 6 20 14 17 43 44 24 6 Belarus 2 7 14 8 9 19 6 11 19 19 28 26 39 9 Georgia - - - 2 3 3 1 11 19 20 40 29 30 4 Kazakhstan 12 5 2 7 10 9 - 29 25 33 62 46 32 21 Kyrgyzstan 1 - - 1 1 - - 3 3 4 7 2 - 2 Moldova, Republic of - - - 1 - - - 13 6 12 6 9 11 4 Russian Federation 139 154 133 192 151 160 46 512 396 383 573 403 451 135 Tajikistan - - - 3 2 - - 6 2 4 4 6 1 3 Turkmenistan - - - - - - - 1 - 5 11 10 7 2 Ukraine 14 24 21 29 27 26 7 126 128 108 125 92 113 22 Uzbekistan - - - - - - - 14 17 11 18 20 14 8 Memorandum Least developed countries (LDCs)a 7 7 9 33 29 22 5 133 152 109 327 267 288 97 Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)b 21 12 13 52 49 36 13 173 172 169 358 327 242 97 Small island developing states (SIDS)c 4 8 8 14 14 16 11 22 17 21 48 25 34 13 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com). a Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. b Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, The FYR of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. c Small island developing countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
  • 237. ANNEX TABLES 213 Annex table III.1. List of IIAs, as of end-May 2011a Economies and territories BITs DTTs Other IIAs b Total 1 Afghanistan 3 1 2 6 2 Albania 40 30 5 75 3 Algeria 46 31 6 83 4 Angola 8 - 7 15 5 Anguilla 0 4 1 5 6 Antigua and Barbuda 2 6 7 15 7 Argentina 58 41 16 115 8 Armenia 36 39 2 77 9 Aruba - 6 - 6 10 Australia 23 66 16 105 11 Austria 64 94 63 221 12 Azerbaijan 40 37 2 79 13 Bahamas - 1 - 1 14 Bahrain 30 26 12 68 15 Bangladesh 29 27 3 59 16 Barbados 10 22 3 35 17 Belarus 58 43 2 103 18 Belgium c 93 106 63 262 19 Belize 8 6 9 23 20 Benin 14 2 5 21 21 Bermuda - 6 1 7 22 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 22 8 14 44 23 Bosnia and Herzegovina 38 12 4 54 24 Botswana 9 7 6 22 25 Brazil 14 38 17 69 26 British Virgin Islands - 11 1 12 27 Brunei Darussalam 8 8 17 33 28 Bulgaria 68 68 61 197 29 Burkina Faso 14 2 6 22 30 Burundi 7 - 8 15 31 Cambodia 21 - 16 37 32 Cameroon 14 4 4 22 33 Canada 28 108 22 158 34 Cape Verde 9 1 2 12 35 Cayman Islands - 5 1 6 36 Central African Republic 4 1 5 10 37 Chad 14 - 5 19 38 Chile 51 26 25 102 39 China 127 107 15 249 40 Colombia 6 7 17 30 41 Comoros 6 1 8 15 42 Congo 12 3 5 20 43 Congo, Democratic Republic of 14 3 8 25 44 Cook Islands - 1 2 3 45 Costa Rica 20 4 15 39 46 Côte d’ Ivoire 10 20 6 36 47 Croatia 58 55 5 118 48 Cuba 58 12 3 73 49 Cyprus 27 43 60 129 50 Czech Republic 78 77 63 218 51 Denmark 55 116 63 234 52 Djibouti 7 - 9 16 53 Dominica 2 7 10 19 54 Dominican Republic 15 1 6 22 55 Ecuador 18 9 11 38 56 Egypt 100 49 15 164 57 El Salvador 22 2 10 34 58 Equatorial Guinea 7 - 4 11 59 Eritrea 4 - 4 8 60 Estonia 27 50 63 140 61 Ethiopia 29 9 5 43 62 Fiji - 8 3 11 63 Finland 71 94 63 228 64 France 101 133 63 297 65 Gabon 12 5 6 23 66 Gambia 13 6 5 24 67 Georgia 29 35 5 69 68 Germany 136 105 63 304 69 Ghana 26 8 5 39
  • 238. 214 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table III.1. List of IIAs, as of end-May 2011a (continued) Economies and territories BITs DTTs Other IIAs b Total 70 Greece 43 52 63 158 71 Grenada 2 3 9 14 72 Guatemala 17 - 11 28 73 Guinea 19 1 9 29 74 Guinea-Bissau 2 - 6 8 75 Guyana 8 4 10 22 76 Haiti 5 - 4 9 77 Honduras 11 1 10 22 78 Hong Kong, China 15 29 3 47 79 Hungary 58 69 63 190 80 Iceland 9 35 28 72 81 India 81 80 14 175 82 Indonesia 62 60 17 139 83 Iran, Islamic Republic of 60 37 1 98 84 Iraq 4 1 6 11 85 Ireland 1 71 63 135 86 Israel 37 52 4 93 87 Italy 94 96 63 253 88 Jamaica 16 12 10 38 89 Japan 16 75 20 111 90 Jordan 52 22 10 84 91 Kazakhstan 42 40 4 86 92 Kenya 11 13 8 32 93 Kiribati - 5 2 7 94 Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of 24 10 - 34 95 Korea, Republic of 90 85 15 190 96 Kuwait 58 49 13 120 97 Kyrgyzstan 28 16 1 45 98 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 23 5 14 42 99 Latvia 45 51 61 157 100 Lebanon 50 33 8 91 101 Lesotho 3 3 7 13 102 Liberia 4 4 5 13 103 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 32 12 10 54 104 Liechtenstein - 6 23 29 105 Lithuania 52 48 63 163 106 Luxembourg c - 70 63 133 107 Macao, China 2 7 2 11 108 Madagascar 9 2 8 19 109 Malawi 6 9 8 23 110 Malaysia 67 82 22 171 111 Mali 17 2 9 28 112 Malta 22 60 60 142 113 Mauritania 19 2 7 28 114 Mauritius 36 43 7 86 115 Mexico 28 49 17 94 116 Moldova, Republic of 39 46 3 88 117 Monaco 1 6 - 7 118 Mongolia 43 31 3 77 119 Montenegro 16 3 2 21 120 Montserrat - 6 5 11 121 Morocco 61 49 7 117 122 Mozambique 24 4 6 34 123 Myanmar 6 7 12 25 124 Namibia 13 8 4 25 125 Nepal 5 7 3 15 126 Netherlands 98 131 63 292 127 New Caledonia - 1 1 2 128 New Zealand 5 50 14 69 129 Nicaragua 17 - 11 28 130 Niger 5 1 6 12 131 Nigeria 22 15 5 42 132 Norway 15 110 27 152 133 Oman 33 28 9 70 134 Pakistan 47 59 6 112 135 Palestinian Territory 2 - 5 7 136 Panama 22 14 9 45 137 Papua New Guinea 6 7 4 17 138 Paraguay 24 5 15 44
  • 239. ANNEX TABLES 215 Annex table III.1. List of IIAs, as of end-May 2011a (concluded) Economies and territories BITs DTTs Other IIAs b Total 139 Peru 32 8 22 62 140 Philippines 35 40 16 91 141 Poland 62 90 63 215 142 Portugal 53 66 63 182 143 Qatar 45 37 11 93 144 Romania 82 74 61 217 145 Russian Federation 69 68 4 141 146 Rwanda 6 2 9 17 147 Saint Kitts and Nevis - 8 10 18 148 Saint Lucia 2 4 5 11 149 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2 5 10 17 150 Samoa - 3 2 5 151 San Marino 6 13 - 19 152 São Tomé and Principe 1 - - 1 153 Saudi Arabia 22 23 12 57 154 Senegal 24 14 6 44 155 Serbia 46 53 2 101 156 Seychelles 7 14 8 29 157 Sierra Leone 3 4 5 12 158 Singapore 41 81 29 151 159 Slovakia 53 63 63 179 160 Slovenia 37 42 63 142 161 Solomon Islands - 3 2 5 162 Somalia 2 - 6 8 163 South Africa 46 67 9 122 164 Spain 76 96 63 235 165 Sri Lanka 27 38 5 70 166 Sudan 28 11 11 50 167 Suriname 3 1 7 11 168 Swaziland 5 6 9 20 169 Sweden 70 109 63 242 170 Switzerland 118 118 26 262 171 Syrian Arab Republic 41 33 6 80 172 Taiwan, Province of China 23 19 5 47 173 Tajikistan 31 16 3 50 174 Thailand 39 62 23 124 175 The FYR of Macedonia 36 37 5 76 176 Timor-Leste 2 - 1 3 177 Togo 4 2 5 11 178 Tonga 1 - 2 3 179 Trinidad and Tobago 12 17 10 39 180 Tunisia 54 47 9 110 181 Turkey 82 82 19 183 182 Turkmenistan 23 12 3 38 183 Tuvalu - 4 2 6 184 Uganda 15 12 9 36 185 Ukraine 66 46 5 117 186 United Arab Emirates 38 48 11 97 187 United Kingdom 104 153 63 320 188 United Republic of Tanzania 15 10 7 32 189 United States 47 155 65 267 190 Uruguay 30 11 17 58 191 Uzbekistan 49 35 3 87 192 Vanuatu 2 - 2 4 193 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 28 28 6 62 194 Viet Nam 58 52 19 129 195 Yemen 37 9 7 53 196 Zambia 12 21 9 42 197 Zimbabwe 31 14 9 54 Source: UNCTAD, based on IIA database. a This includes not only agreements that are signed and entered into force, but also agreements where negotiations are only concluded. Note that the numbers of BITs and DTTs in this table do not add up to the total number of BITs and DTTs as stated in the text, since some economies/territories have concluded agreements with entities that are not listed in this table. Note also that because of ongoing reporting by member States and the resulting retroactive adjustments to the UNCTAD database the data differ from those reported in the WIR10. b These numbers include agreements concluded by economies as members of a regional integration organization. c BITs concluded by the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.
  • 240. 216 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table III.2. Selected MSI standards (Standards referenced and subjects covered in code) Multi-stakeholder initiatives Standard Universal principles referenced in the standards Topics addressed 4C Association 4C code of conduct • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Human rights Labour practices Environment Bonsucro Bonsucro Standard • UN Declaration on Rights of Indigenous People • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment CERES CERES Principles • None specifically Environment Clean Clothes Campaign Code of Labour Practices for the Apparel Industry Including Sportswear • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) ETI Base Code • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Fair Labour Association Fair Labor Association Workplace Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Fair Wear Foundation Fair Wear Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards • Universal Declaration of Human Rights Human rights Labour practices Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) FSC Principles and Criteria • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Labour wwpractices Environment GoodWeave GoodWeave code of conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Framework Convention on Climate Change • UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Green-e Energy Greene Climate Standard • UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Environment International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOSM) IFOAM Standard (Currently under development) • UN Charter of Rights for Children ILO Conventions relating to Labour Welfare Human rights Labour practices Environment ISO ISO14000 • None specifically Environment ISO 26000 • The major international standards relevant for CSR are referenced in ISO 26000 Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) MSC environmental standard for sustainable fishing • The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (UN FAO) Environment Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) RSB Principles Criteria • None specifically Human rights Labour practices Environment Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) RSPO Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production (RSPO P C) • UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples • UN Convention on Biological Diversity • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards • ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Human rights Labour practices Environment Social Accountability International SA8000 • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women • UN Convention on the Rights of the Child • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices
  • 241. ANNEX TABLES 217 Multi-stakeholder initiatives Standard Universal principles referenced in the standards Topics addressed Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) /Rainforest Alliance SAN Standards • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Children´s Rights Convention • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment Transparency International Transparency International Business Principles for Countering Bribery • None specifically Bribery UTZ CERTIFIED UTZ CERTIFIED Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Official • UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law enforcement Officials Human rights Workers Rights Consortium Workers Rights Consortium Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards • Other ILO Conventions Human rights Labour practices Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) WRAP Code of conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Source: UNCTAD. Annex table III.2. Selected MSI standards (concluded) (Standards referenced and subjects covered in code)
  • 242. 218 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table III.3. Selected industry association codes (Subjects covered and intergovernmental organization standards referenced) Industry association Standard [code] Intergovernmental organization standards referenced Topics addressed Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) BSCI Code of conduct • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Global Compact • ILO Fundamental Human Rights Conventions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Caux Round Table Caux Round Table Principles for Business • None specifically Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) CEPI Code of Conduct • None specifically Environment Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition Electronic Industry Code of Conduct • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Global Compact • UN Convention Against Corruption • ILO Fundamental Human Rights Conventions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Equator Principles Equator Principles • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Environment Forética Norma SGE 21 • UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights • UN Global Compact • Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Businesses and Social Policy • Other ILO Conventions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery International Chamber of Commerce ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development • None specifically Environment ICC Rules of Conduct to Compact Extortion and Bribery • UN Convention Against Corruption • UN Global Compact • OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials Bribery International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI) International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI) CARE Code of conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices International Hydropower Association (IHA) IHA sustainability Guidelines • None specifically Environment International Mining and Metals Council (IMMC) Principles for Sustainable Development Performance • UN Global Compact • Rio Declaration • Other ILO Conventions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises • OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials Human rights Labour practices Environment Bribery Petroleum Industry (IPIECA) Guidelines for Reporting Greenhouse Gas Emissions • None specifically Environment Responsible Care (Chemical industry) The Responsible Global Charter • UN Global Compact Labour practices Environment World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) The PACI Principles for Countering Bribery • UN Global Compact • OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions • OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Bribery World Cocoa Foundation Sustainability Principles • None specifically Human rights Labour practices Environment World Federation Sporting Foods Industry (WFSFI) WFSFI Code of Conduct • ILO Fundamental Labour Standards Human rights Labour practices Source: UNCTAD, based on data from individual initiatives.
  • 243. ANNEX TABLES 219 Annex table IV.1. Top 10 contract manufacturers in electronics, ranked by revenues, 2009a Company Home economy Revenues ($ billion) Selected major clients Global employment Major overseas production bases Other relevant information Foxconn/ Hon Hai Taiwan Province of China 59.3 Apple Inc, Hewlett-Packard, Dell, Nokia, Sony Ericsson, Samsung, Microsoft, Acer, Intel, Samsung, Cisco, Nintendo, Amazon 611 000 China, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Czech Republic Manufacturing operations in many countries. About 20 factories in China. Flextronics Singapore 30.9 Alcatel-Lucent, Cisco, Dell, Sony Ericsson, Hewlett-Packard, Huawei, Lenovo, Microsoft, Eastman Kodak, Western Digital, Research in Motion, Motorola 160 000 Brazil, China, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Ukraine, India Manufacturing facilities in 30 countries covering the Americas, Europe and Asia. Quanta Taiwan Province of China 25.4 Apple Inc, Compaq, Dell, Hewlett- Packard, Fujitsu, LG, Siemens AG, Sony, Gateway, Cisco, Lenovo, Siemens AG, Sharp Corporation, Panasonic, Research in Motion, Gericom, Toshiba 64 719 China, United States, Germany Manufactuirng operations in the Americas, Asia and Europe. A number of factories are in China. Compal Taiwan Province of China 20.4 Acer Inc, Dell, Toshiba, Hewlett- Packard, Fujitsu-Siemens, Lenovo 58 025 China, Viet Nam, Poland, Brazil, United States Have a number of factories in China. Wistron Taiwan Province of China 13.9 Acer, Sony, Dell, Microsoft, Lenovo, FSC, Hewlett-Packard 39 239 China, Philippines, Czech Republic, Mexico Wistron has RD centres in China and the Netherlands. Inventec Taiwan Province of China 13.5 Apple Inc, Acer, Hewlett-Packard, Toshiba, Fujitsu-Siemens, Lenovo 29 646 China, Republic of Korea, United States, Mexico, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Malaysia RD facilities in the United States, United Kingdom and Japan. Software and service outsourcing centres in China. Jabil United States 13.4 Apple Inc, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, IBM, Echostar, NetApp, Pace, Research in Motion, General Electric 61 000 Brazil, Mexico, Austria, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Hungary, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Viet Nam 59 manufacturing and design facilities in over 20 countries covering the Americas, Europe and Asia. TPV Technology Hong Kong, China 8.0 Dell, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Mitsubishi Electric 24 479 Mainly in China. Also in Poland, Brazil and Mexico Also sell PC monitors under its various own brands such as AOC and Topview. 2009 revenues of PC monitors was made up of 31% own brand manufacturing (OBM) and 69% original design manufacturing (ODM), while LDC TV was 12% OBM and 88% ODM. Celestica Canada 6.5 Cisco, Hitachi, IBM, Research in Motion 35 000 China, Malaysia, Singa- pore, Thailand, Mexico, United States, Czech Republic, Ireland, Romania, United Kingdom 20 manufacturing and design facilities world wide. Celestica has a regional technology centre in Thailand and a global design services facility based in Taiwan Province of China. Sanmina-SCI United States 5.2 IBM, Lenovo, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, Dell, Nokia, Caterpillar 31 698 Mexico, Brazil, Hun- gary, Malaysia, Singapore, China, Indonesia, Thailand Manufactures products in 18 countries. Total of the top 10 .. 196.5 .. .. .. .. Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Bloomberg and company annual reports. a These companies are commonly referred to as “electronic manufacturing services”(EMS) providers.
  • 244. 220 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development AnnextableIV.2.Top10autopartscontractmanufacturers,rankedbyrevenues,2009 Company Home economy Totalglobalauto- motivepartssales ($billion) SelectedmajorclientsEmployeesc Otherrelevantinformationc DensoCorpJapan32a GeneralMotors,Chrysler,BMW, MercedesBenz,Toyota,Honda,Isuzu, Subaru,Mazda,Hino,Mitsubishi,Hyun- dai,Kia,DeerCo,Caterpillar,Suzuki, Cummins,CNH.In2008,Toyota accountedfor30%ofDenso'ssales. 120000Operatesin33countrieswith34overseassubsidiariesintheAmericas,Europe(34)andAsia-Oceania(48). About42%ofsalesinfiscalyear2009-2010weregeneratedoutsideJapan,with15%intheAmericas,Europe (12%)andAsia-Pacific(15%).About76%ofthesalesinJapanwerewiththirdpartycustomers,intheAmericas (99%),Europe(98%)andAsia-Pacific(93%). RobertBoschGermany25.6About76%ofthesalesrevenueswere generatedoutsideGermany. 270687with41%inGermany, Europe(26%),Americas (12%),Asia-Pacificandother countries(21%). Thecompanyhas300subsidiariesandregionalcompaniesin60countries. AisinSeikiJapan22.1InadditiontoToyota,othermajor customersincludeVolkswagen,Suzuki, Ford,Mitsubishi,GeneralMotors, Mazda,Daewoo,NissanandHyundai. 74447Has154subsidiaries,ofwhich71domesticand83overseas.MajorproductionbasesincludeThailand,China andtheUnitedStates(withmanyfactories).Othermajormanufacturingcentres:UnitedKingdom,Belgium, CzechRepublic,Turkey,Indonesia,India,Brazil,MexicoandCanada.About25%ofsalesin2009-2010were outsideofJapan. ContinentalGermany18.7Volkswagen,Daimler,Ford,Volvo, Iveco,BMW,Toyota,Honda,Renault, GeneralMotors,Koegel,Freightliner Trucks. 148228with33%inGermany, Europe(33%),NAFTA(14%) andAsia(15%). Operatesin46countriesandconsistsofautomotiveandrubbergroups.About99%ofthesalesaretoexternal customers.Thisincludesforthechassisandsafetydivision,powertrain,interior,andpassengerandlighttruck tires.Salesin2009wereconcentratedinEurope(34%ofglobalsales),29%inGermany,17%inNAFTAand 14%inAsia.Ithas18factoriesinChinaalone. Magna International Canada17.4GeneralMotors,Ford,BMW,Fiat/ Chrysler,VW,Daimler. 96000mainlyinEurope, UnitedStates,Mexicoand Canadainthatorder. Has256manufacturingoperationsin26countriescoveringfivecontinentswiththefollowingmanufacturing/ assemblingfacilitiesin:UnitedStates(49),Mexico(29),China(15),India(5),Brazil(5),Argentina(4),Republic ofKorea(4),SouthAfrica(2),Thailand(1). LGChemRepublic ofKorea 13.1b GeneralMotors,HyundaiMotor,Volvo, FordandRenault. 13000Thecompanyhasaglobalnetworkof25businesslocationsin15countries.About81%ofthecompany'stotal revenuesin2008werefromthepetrochemicalsectorand19%frominformation,electronicmaterialsandbatte- ries.Chinaisthelargesthostcountryintermsofrevenues.In2008,Chinaaccountedfor64.4%oftheoverseas sales.MostofitsoverseasmanufacturingfacilitiesareconcentratedinChina(9locations).Ithasmanufacturing facilitiesinIndia,VietNam,TaiwanProvinceofChinaandPoland.Ithas2RDcentresintheUnitedStates. FaureciaFrance13PSAPeugeot-Citroëncontributed20% ofthe2009sales.Othermajorcusto- mersincludeVWGroup,Ford,Renault/ Nissan,BMW,GM,Daimler,Toyota, Chrysler-Fiat. 58414PartofthePeugeotgroup.Ithasanetworkof200productionsitesin32countries.Mostoftheoverseas productionplantsareintheUnitedStates,Spain,Germany,China.FaureciahasplantsinMexico,Brazil, Argentina,UnitedKingdom,Portugal,Sweden,Poland,CzechRepublicandIndia.Ithas33RDcentersacross theworldwithsignificantpresenceinEuropeandtheUnitedStates.OtheroverseasRDfacilitiesareinChina, IndiaandBrazil. Johnson Controls United States 12.8a InFY2010,thecompany'slargest customerswereFordMotorCompany, GeneralMotors(GM),Daimler,Chrys- ler.ForFY2009,thegeographical salesdistributionwereUnitedStates (39%),Germany(10%),Mexico(3%), otherEuropeancountries(26%),and therestoftheworld(22%). 130000Thecompanyhas175manufacturing/assemblyplantsin27countries. Delphi Holding United States 11.8GeneralMotors,Fordandother automotivemanufacturers.Customers aremainlythetier1autosuppliers. About21%oftherevenueswerefrom GMandaffiliates,and79%withother customers. 146600Thecompanyhasoperationsin32countries. ZFFriedrichs- hafen Germany11.7Amongthemajorcustomersinclude: AlfaRomeo,BMW,DKW,Fahr,Ford, KruppTitan,Lotus,MercedesBenz, Peugeot,Porsche. 59771ZFGrouphas117productioncompaniesin26countriesandeightmaindevelopmentlocations.ZFoperations cover5continents:Europe,NorthAmerica,SouthAmerica,Asia-PacificandMiddleEastAfica. Ofthe117productioncompanies,31wereinGermany,China(19),UnitedStates(10),France(7),Brazil(5), India(5),SouthAfrica(5),Mexico(4),Slovakia(3),UnitedKingdom(3)andItaly(3). Totalofthe top10 ..178.2...... Source:UNCTAD,basedonBloomberg,annualreportsofcompanies,andAutomotiveNews:“Top100GlobalSuppliers”,14June2010. a Fiscalyear.b Estimate.c 2010. Note:Thesefiguresdonotincludeafter-marketsalesandunrelatedsalesoftherespectivecompanies.
  • 245. ANNEX TABLES 221 Annex table IV.3. Top 10 pharmaceutical contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009a Companyb Home economy Contract mfg revenue ($ million) Selected major clients Global employment Major overseas production bases Catalent Pharma Solutions, Inc. United States 1 640 Most of the top 50 pharmaceutical com- panies, including Pfizer, Merck, Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, Bayer, Amgen, Roche and AstraZeneca. Top 20 customers account for 55% of revenues. 9 200 The company has 20 facilities worldwide covering 5 continents. Lonza Group AG Switzerland 1 310 KaloBios Pharmaceuticals Inc, Genentech, Enobia, Athera. 8 386 United States, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, China, and Singapore. Has RD facili- ties in India, Japan and France. Boehringer Ingelheim Verwaltungs GmbH Germany 1 096 MorphoSys, Elan, Amgen Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Bayer Schering Pharma Ag, Genentech, Genzyme Corp, GlaxoS- mithKline, InterMune, MedImmune, Merck, Nycomed Danmark. 6 200 Production sites in North and South America, Europe and Asia. Production facilities for contract manufacturing are in Austria, United States, Italy, Spain, Indonesia, Brazil and Greece. Royal DSM Netherlands 1 006 Novacta Biosystems Ltd, APT Pharmaceu- ticals Inc, GlycoMimetics Inc, Genzyme Pharmaceuticals, MorphoSys, NicOx. 4 374 Has faclities in United States, China, India, Austria and other European countries. Piramal Healthcare Ltd India 735 Major customers from 50 top pharma companies. Asia revenues are mainly gene- rated in India. However, share of revenues from outside India is growing. About 28% of the total revenues are from contract manufacturing. 7 311 Production facilities in Canada and the United Kingdom include also process pharma deve- lopment. In China operation limited to material sourcing. Jubilant Life Sciences (formerly known as Jubilant Orga- nosys Limited) India 710 Clients include Amgen, AstraZeneca, Duke Medicine, Endo Pharmaceuticals, GlaxoSmithKline, Guerbet. 5 950 The company has production facilities in the United States and Canada. NIPRO Corporation Japan 625 .. 9 939 In the area of pharmaceutical, has facilities in Brazil, United States, Thailand, China and India. About 33% of the company's revenues is from contract pharmaceutical operations. Patheon Inc. Canada 530 Has about 300 customers worldwide. Of which: 19 of the world’s 20 largest pharmaceutical companies, 6 of the world’s 10 largest biotechnology companies and 5 of the world’s 10 largest speciality pharma- ceutical companies. 4 000 Also operates in 14 locations with development and manufacturing facilities in the United States, United Kingdom, France and Italy. Fareva Holding France 418 Has many pharmaceutical company cus- tomers including some of the largest ones and Omega Pharma. 5 000 Has facilities in a number of countries, including Germany, Italy, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ita- ly and Turkey. It has a RD facility in Germany. Haupt Pharma AG Germany 348 Has over 200 international pharmaceutical companies including some of the major global ones. 2 000 Italy, France and Japan. Total of the top 10 .. 8 418 .. .. .. Source: UNCTAD, based on Bloomberg, company’s annual reports and information. a Only includes revenues from contract manufacturing activities. b Evonik (Degussa) is a significant contract manufacturer and specific information on the company is not available.
  • 246. 222 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development AnnextableIV.4.Useofcontractmanufacturingbymajorgarmentandfootwearbrandowners,selectedindicators,2009 BrandfirmHomeeconomyTotalsales Numberof supplier countries Number ofsuppliers Numberof supplierfactoriesNumberofsupplierworkersMajorproductionbases/otherinformation ChristianDior (includesLVMH) France25459........ Theuseofsubcontractorsforfashionandleathergoodsoperationsrepresentedabout43%ofthecostofsalesofChristian Diorin2010.About70%ofChristianDior'sproductionaresuppliedfromEurope(France,ItalyandSpain),Asia~20%,North America~5%,andOthers~5%. NikeUnitedStates1908346.... 600823026(490670in NorthAsia,256385inSouth Asia,51604intheAmericas and24367inEMEAa ). AllfootwearisproducedbycontractsuppliersoutsideoftheUnitedStates.InFY2010,contractfactoriesinVietNam,China, Indonesia,ThailandandIndiamanufacturedapproximately37%,34%,23%,2%and1%oftotalNIKEBrandfootwear,res- pectively.NIKEalsohascontractmanufacturingagreementswithindependentfactoriesinArgentina,Brazil,IndiaandMexico toproducefootwearforsaleprimarilywithinthosecountries.AlmostallofNIKEBrandapparelismanufacturedoutsideofthe UnitedStatesbyindependentcontractmanufacturerslocatedin33countriessuchasinChina,Thailand,Indonesia,Malaysia, VietNam,SriLanka,Turkey,Cambodia,ElSalvador,MexicoandTaiwanProvinceofChina. AdidasGroupGermany1489469..1230.. Adidasisservicedbymultiplesuppliersinmanylocations.MostofthesuppliersareinAsiaincountriessuchasChina,India, Indonesia,ThailandandVietNam. HMHennes MauritzAB Sweden14507306751693.. HMisservicedbymultiplesuppliersinmanydifferentlocations.Thebrandfirmworkswithsome675contractsuppliersin about30countries,mainlyinAsiaandEurope.About660factoriesinEastandSoutheastAsia,580intheEMEAregionand over400inSouthAsiaproducedforHM. TheGapIncUnitedStates14197....728.. Likeotherbrandfirms,Gapusescontractmanufacturingextensively.Ithasmultiplecontractsuppliersbasedindifferentlow costproducingcountries.Gap'scontractfactoriesincludeSouthAsia(188factories),China(186),SoutheastAsia(180),North Asia(57),Mexico,CentralAmericatheCaribbean(39),NorthAfricaMiddleEast(20),Europe(20),UnitedStatesand Canada(18),SouthAmerica(14)andSub-SaharanAfrica(5). InditexSASpain13336..1237.. 308508(forfactoriespartofthe cluster):161080Bangladesh, 43275Turkey,14264Portugal, 36804Morocco,53085India. Some599suppliersinEurope,480inAsia,94inAfricaand51inAmericasproducedforInditex. VFUnitedStates714360..1500+.. In2010,about66%ofgoodsofVFweremanufacturedbyoutsourcingwith51%ofsuppliersfromAsia,NorthAmerica(18%), CentralandSouthAmerica(16%),Europe(12%)andAfrica(3%). PoloRalphLaurenUnitedStates5019..400+.... InFY2010,lessthan2%,bydollarvolume,ofthebrandfirm'sproductswereproducedintheUnitedStates,andover98%,by dollarvolume,wereproducedoutsidetheUnitedStates,primarilyinAsia,EuropeandSouthAmerica. PumaRudolfDassler Sport Germany353045.. 351(292indeveloping andtransitioneconomies, 100inChina,30inTurkey, and22inVietNam). 300000inauditedfacilities (includingtier2and3suppliers). AmajorityofPuma'scontractsuppliersareinAsia.ChinaandVietNamarethemainprocurementsourcesinadditionto Indonesia,CambodiaandBangladesh.Regionalprocurementcontinuestoplayanimportantrole,inparticularforSouth America.Asaconsequence,theprocurementvolumeincreasedconsiderablyinBrazilandArgentina. TheJonesGroupUnitedStates3327........ ApparelsoldbyJonesGroupisproducedinaccordancewiththefirm'sdesign,specificationandproductionschedulesthrough anextensivenetworkofindependentfactorieslocatedthroughouttheworld,primarilyinAsia,withadditionalproduction locatedintheMiddleEastandAfrica.NearlyalltheapparelproductsweremanufacturedoutsideNorth Americaduring2010.JonesGrouphaslong-termmutuallysatisfactorybusinessrelationshipswithmanyofitscontractorsand agentsbutdonothavelong-termwrittenagreementswithanyofthem. CollectiveBrandsIncUnitedStates3308....101.. Nearly85%ofthecostoffootwearofCollectiveBrandsin2009weresuppliedbycontractfactoriesinChina.Thefirmis diversifyingitsmanufacturingbasenotonlybetweencountriesbutalsowithinChinainordertoreducecosts.In2010,thefirm sourced13%offootwearfromVietNamandtheremaining3%fromdifferentcountriesincludingBrazil,India,Indonesiaand Thailand.Productsaremanufacturedtomeetthefirm'sspecificationsandstandards. AmericanEagle OutfittersInc UnitedStates299120+..450+.. Thebrandfirmdoesnotownoroperateanymanufacturingfacilities.Itsbrandedproductsareproducedbythird-partycontract manufacturerslocatedinmorethan20countries. AbercrombieFitch Company UnitedStates292928191.... DuringFY2010,thisbrandfirmpurchasedmerchandisefromapproximately191vendorsindifferentpartsoftheworld;primar- ilyinAsiaandCentralandSouthAmerica.Thefirmdidnotsourcemorethan5%ofitsmerchandisefromanysinglefactoryor supplierduringFY2010. BenettonItaly2925........ Benettonhasanetworkofcontractsuppliersindifferentcountries.Itoutsourceproductiontosuppliersinvariouscountries, includingChina,India,ThailandandTurkey.ThreemainareasofsourcingforBenettonare:ChinacoordinatedfromHong Kong(China);SouthEastAsia(Thailand,Cambodia,LaoPDR,VietNam,Indonesia)coordinatedfrom Bangkok;India(coordinatedfromBangalore).AsofDecember2010,thesourcedproductsofBenettonincludingthoseunder contractmanufacturingrepresentedapproximately50%ofitstotalproduction. OnwardHoldingsJapan2668........ Onwarddoesnotownanyfactories.Itskeysuppliersareoverseaspartners(90%ofmanufacturingisdoneoutsideJapan,of which70-80%isdoneinChina). PhillipsVanHeusenUnitedStates239955..1014.. Mostofthebrandfirm'sdressshirtsandallofitssportsweararesourcedandmanufacturedintheFarEast,theIndiansub- continent,theMiddleEast,theCaribbeanandCentralAmerica.Itsfootwearissourcedandmanufacturedthroughthirdparty suppliersprincipallyintheFarEast,Europe,SouthAmericaandtheCaribbean. HugoBossGermany2241..~300.... HugoBosshasitsownproductionfacilitiesandoutsourcedasignificantportionofitsproductionrequirementtothird-party suppliers.About76%ofthefullproductlineisproducedbyindependentsuppliersforHugoBoss.About51%ofitsproduction areproducedinEasternEurope,27%inAsia,11%WesternEurope,9%NorthAfricaand2%Americas. Totaloftheselected majorbrandowners ..139956.......... Source:UNCTAD,basedonFairLabourAssociation,“2009AnnualReport”,June2010(www.FairLabor.org)andcompany’sreports. a Europe,theMiddleEastandAfrica(EMEA).
  • 247. ANNEX TABLES 223 Annex table IV.5. Top 15 outsourcing IT-BPO service providers, ranked by revenues, 2009 Company Home economy IT-BPO Revenue ($ Million) Global employment Major service centres International Business Machines Corporationa United States 38 201 426,751, of which 190,000 in global business services. About 100,000 staff work in IBM’s delivery centres in India where most are involved in BPO services. IBM has over 50 IT-BPO related service centres in more than 40 countries, with most of them located in developing economies. Hewlett-Packard Companya United States 34 935 324,600 of which 139,500 in IT-BPO in over 50 countries. In 2007, about 30% of HP Services’ global work force was based in India. Key service centres are in the United States, India and the United Kingdom. HP has services locations in more than 50 countries. It has 7 global business centres located in India, China, Singapore, Mexico, Costa Rica and Spain. Fujitsu Ltd Japan 27 071 172,438 of which 18,000 are in Fujitsu Services. It’s subsidiary, TDS, has about 1,200 employees in IT-BPO services. Fujitsu has a network of 91 data centers and outsourcing services in 16 countries worldwide, including United Kingdom, Finland, Australia, China, Singapore, the Philippines and India. Xerox Corporationa United States 9 637 136,500, of which 46,000 are in services. The global service centres are located in various parts of the world, including India, Mexico, the Philippines, Jamaica, Ghana, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, Spain, Poland and Ireland. Accenturea Ireland 9 179 204,000, majority in technology services and outsourcing activities. Accenture has a global delivery network of more than 50 centres located in different parts of the world. It operates in the Americas, Europe, Middle East and Africa. NTT Data Corporation Japan 8 925 231,315, of which 34,543 is in System Integration and IT services. Emerio, a subsidiary, employs 1,400 people in 14 global bases. NTT locations include the United States, the United Kingdom and also many developing countries such as China, India, Singapore and the Phlippines. Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) United States 6 451 94,000, of which 45,000 in managed services sector. CSC has services centres globally including in India, China, South Asia, Eastern Europe, Australia, Singapore and Viet Nam. Capgeminia France 6 071 108,698. It has more than 20,000 outsourcing service workforce in India alone. Capgemini has presence in over 36 countries. It has outsourcing centres in India, Romania, Viet Nam, Australia and other locations. Dell United States 5 622 96,000, of which 43, 000 in services. Dell Services Applications and BPO activities include more than 15,000 employees globally.b Dell International Services has a number of operations in India, Europe, Latin America, Canada and the Philippines. Logicaa United Kingdom 5 459 38,963 (5,750 in offshore sites). Logica has service operations in more than 35 countries with outsourced service delivery in India, Philippines, Morocco, Malaysia and Eastern European countries. Tata Consultancy Services India 5 164 396,517, of which 143,000 Tata Consultancy Services. TCS has achieved scale in Latin American markets, as well as Eastern Europe, Middle-East, Africa and the Asia Pacific region. Atos Origina France 5 011 49,036, of which 41,324 in Managed Services, Medical BPO, Systems Integration. Four key offshore locations for Managed Services: India, Malaysia, Morocco and Poland. Wipro India 4 189 108,071, out of which 22,000 in BPO activities. Wipro has service facilities in the United States, France, Germany, Australia, Netherlands, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It has presence also in Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Philippines, Poland, Brazil and China. EMC Corporation United States 3 875 48,500 It has presence in many countries, including China and Singapore. Unisys Corporation United States 2 754 22,900, of which 17,000 experienced services professionals. It has significant operations in different parts of the world including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. In developing countries, its presence in India and China is notable. Total .. 172 554 .. .. Sources: UNCTAD, based on data from International Association of Outsourcing Professionals, “Global Outsourcing 100: 2010” for ranking of top 15 IT-BPO service providers; Bloomberg; respective companies’ annual reports and information; Outsourcing Alert (http://www.outsourcing-alert.com/2010/); and research papers by consultancy firms. a 2010 data. b See “Vaswani to lead Dell Services” applications and BPO arm”, Business Standard, 6 April 2011.
  • 248. 224 World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development Annex table IV.6. Top 15 global franchise chains, ranked by revenues, 2009 Franchise Brand Parent company Home economy World- wide sales in 2009 ($ million) Total units Domestic units International units Internationali- zation degree (Per cent) Number of countries covered (world- wide) Number of developing and transition economies covered McDonald's McDonald's Corporation United States 70 693 31 967 13 918 18 049 56 117 77 7-Eleven Seven and i Hol- dings Co. Ltd. Japan 53 700 35 603 6 378 29 225 82 15 9 KFC Yum! Brands, Inc United States 17 800 12 459 5 166 7 293 59 109 75 Subway Doctor's Associates, Inc. United States 12 900 30 257 21 881 8 376 28 98 60 Burger King Burger King Holdings, Inc. United States 12 789 11 925 7 534 4 391 37 76 60 Ace Hardware Ace Hardware Corp. United States 12 500 4 630 4 410 220 5 70 34 Pizza Hut Yum! Brands, Inc United States 10 400 11 068 6 119 4 949 45 95 90 Circle K Stores Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. Canada 9 148 7 077 3 324 3 753 53 8 6 Wendy's Wendy's/Arby's Group United States 9 000 6 630 5 905 725 11 47 35 Marriott Hotels, Resorts Suites Marriott International United States 8 539 531 348 183 34 72 57 Hilton Hotels Resorts Hilton Worldwide United States 7 700 526 253 273 52 76 40 RE/MAX RE/MAX, LLC United States 7 500 6 552 3 745 2 807 43 98 75 Taco Bell Yum! Brands, Inc United States 7 000 5 345 5 142 203 4 21 10 Blockbuster Blockbuster, Inc United States 6 200 7 405 4 585 2 820 38 21 12 Holiday Inn Hotels Resorts InterContinental Hotels Group United Kingdom 5 840 1 353 920 433 32 100 (all brands) 80 Total of the top 15 .. .. 251 709 .. .. .. .. .. .. Source: UNCTAD, based on Franchise Times, “Top 200 Franchise Systems”, October 2010; Franchise Direct, “Top 100 Global Franchises 2010” (http:www. franchisedirect.com/top100globalfranchises/rankings/?year=2010) and company’s annual reports.
  • 249. ANNEX TABLES 225 Annex table IV.7. Top 10 global semiconductor foundry contract manufacturers, ranked by revenues, 2009 Company Home economy Revenue ($ Million) Selected clients Global employ- ment Major production bases Market share (Per cent) Other relevant information Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) Taiwan Province of China 9 246 TSMC serves more than 400 cus- tomers worldwide, which include Applied Micro Circuits Corporation, Qualcomm, Altera, Broadcom, Conexant, Marvell, Nvidia, LSI Logic, Intel, Xilinx, AMD, Apple and Texas Instruments. 26 390 Taiwan Province of China, United States, China, Singapore 46 TSMC is a significant outsource manufacturer for advanced IC producers. It is the world's largest pure play semiconductor foundry. Like many other foundries, TSMC does not design, manufacture or market semiconductor products under its own brand name. United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) Taiwan Province of China 2857 The major customers of UMC include Qualcomm, Texas Instruments, Infineon, STMi- croelectronics, Sony, Agilent Technologies and leading fabless design companies, such as Xilinx, Broadcom, MediaTek, Realtek and Novatek. 13 051 Taiwan Province of China, Singapore, Japan 14 UMC purchased a majority of silicon wafers from a few suppliers. In 2010, four suppliers; Shin-Etsu Handotai Corporation, Siltronic AG, MEMC Corporation and Sumco Group (including Sumco Corpo- ration and Formosa Sumco Technology Corporation) were the major suppliers. In 2010, the top 10 customers accounted for 63.2% of the net operating revenues. More than 62% of revenues in 2008–2010 came from overseas customers outside of the economy. Chartered Semiconductora Singa- pore 1 542 Motorola, National Semiconductor, Qualcomm, Texas Instruments. 3 500 Singapore 8 Although all its production/fabrication facilities are in Singapore, the company has a business presence in 11 countries in 2009. GlobalFoun- driesb United States 1 101 With Chartered Semiconductor, GlobalFoundries has more than 150 customers, which include many of the world's largest semi- conductor companies. Some of its customers include ST Microelec- tronics, ARM, AMD, Broadcom and Qualcomm. 10 000 Fabrication facilities are located in the United States, Germany and Singapore. 5 GlobalFoundries was formerly part of AMD and has only started operations in March 2009. With the acquisition of Chartered Semiconductor in late 2009, GlobalFoundries' revenues and market share are expected to surge in 2010. It is also engaged in collaborative RD with Freescale, IBM, Infineon, NEC, Samsung and Toshiba. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) China 1 071 About 69% of the revenues are outside China (with 56% from North America and 13% from Taiwan Province of China). 10 307 All its production facilities are based in China. 5 The company has marketing offices in the United States, Europe and Japan, and a representative office in Hong Kong (China). Dongbu HiTek Republic of Korea 440 Analog Devices, Sanken, Silicon Mitus 3 360 It has two fabs in the Republic of Korea 2 The company has two fabrication facilities and both are in Republic of Korea. It has a sales and RD networks in Taiwan Province of China, Japan, United States, France and Italy. Vanguard International Semiconductor (VIS) Taiwan Province of China 394 TSMC account for nearly 30% of its revenues. Another major customer is Winbond Electronics Corporation. 3 236 Taiwan Province of China 2 VIS started as a subcontractor to TSMC. The top 10 of its major customers accounted for more than 80% of the company's revenues. TowerJazz Israel 309 Include semiconductor companies such as Atheros Communications, Conexant, Fairchild Semiconduc- tor, International Rectifier, Ikanos, Intersil, Marvell Technology Group, National Semiconductor, Freescale Semiconductor, On Semiconductor, Panavision, Toshiba, Vishay - Siliconix, Texas Instruments, VIA Technologies and Zoran Corporation. 1 600 Israel, United States 2 Jazz Semiconductor was acquired by Tower Semiconductor in 2008. The new company's name is TowerJazz. Through manufacturing partnerhsip with strategic alliances TowerJazz has accessed to production facilities in China. IBM Microelectronics United States 285 .. .. United States 1 .. Samsung Electronics Republic of Korea 290 Customers include Dell, Ixys, Qualcomm, Xilinx and Apple. 39 900 Republic of Korea and the United States 1 It has 15 fabrication facilities, 10 test and assembly facilities, 5 RD pilot lines. Semiconductor fabs are located mainly in Republic of Korea and United States. IC assembly plants are located in Republic of Korea and China. Semiconductor RD facilities in United States, China, Japan, Russia, India and Israel. Total of the top 10 .. 14 678 .. - .. 73 .. Source: UNCTAD, based on Gartner, “Market Share: Semiconductor Foundry, Worldwide, 2009”, April 2010, Bloomberg and company’s information and reports. a In 2009, the company was acquired by Advanced Technology Investment Company (Abu Dhabi). b Globalfoundries was formerly part of AMD. Sales are from AMD annual report “foundry services”.
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