WritingSample
- 1. ARGUMENT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MS. COBBS HAD NOT BEEN SUBJECTED TO A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION BECAUSE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THE FACTORS COMPRISING THE TEST COURTS APPLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION HAS TAKEN PLACE. Ms. Cobbs endured a custodial interrogation because there is sufficient evidence under the factors that courts use to determine if a custodial interrogation has taken place showing that she was indeed in custody for Miranda purposes. Furthermore, under the second prong of the test used, a reasonable person in Ms. Cobbs’s place, given the circumstances presented under the factor test, would have felt that she was not free to stop the interrogation and leave. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates that “No person shall…be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…” U.S. Const. Amend. V. The landmark Supreme Court opinion, Miranda v. Arizona, established that once an individual is sufficiently restrained by law enforcement in an interview or interrogation predicament, they must be informed of their rights under the Fifth Amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 (1966). These are part of the “prophylactic procedural rules” that law enforcement must adhere to when a custodial interrogation occurs. The test for whether an interrogation has occurred revolves around whether a person is in custody. “Custody” is a term of art entailing circumstances which give rise to a serious danger of coercion on the part of law enforcement that would cause a person to self-incriminate without being advised of their rights, in violation of the Fifth Amendment and the precedent set forth in Miranda. Howes v. Fields 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). Courts have developed a two-pronged test for analyzing whether a person is in custody for the purposes of a Fifth Amendment violation. First, a totality of the circumstances test
- 2. examines five factors: 1) the location of the questioning; 2) the duration of the questioning; 3) statements made during the questioning; 4) presence or absence of restraints; and 5) whether the interviewee was released after being questioned. Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189. The fifth factor is not at issue in this case because Ms. Cobbs was in jail at the time of her questioning, so she could not be formally released at the end of her interrogation; she was simply released back into the general jail population. The second prong of the analysis involves an objective inquiry as to whether “in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation” (Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322- 323, 325 (1994)) would “a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave” (Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). The subjective viewpoints of both the questioning officer and the interviewee are irrelevant. Id. Thus, it is always true that if a defendant is found to be in custody under the totality test, and a reasonable person in her shoes would not have felt free to leave, a violation of her 5th Amendment rights has occurred, and any statements obtained during the questioning at issue are inadmissible. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. In this case, Ms. Cobb’s endured a lengthy, isolated interrogation where officers shut her inside a small room within the jail and interrogated her for hours, failing to communicate directly to her that she was free to leave, made coercive statements towards her, and left an officer by the closed door with his hand on his holster to keep her from getting up. This not only meets the totality of the circumstances case, but a reasonable person in Ms. Cobbs’s place would not have felt free to leave. Therefore, the statements made during the questioning of Ms. Cobbs should have been suppressed.
- 3. A. The trial court erred in holding that Ms. Cobbs was not subjected to a custodial interrogation because there is sufficient evidence to show that Ms. Cobbs satisfies the totality of the circumstances test for determining whether an individual is in custody. 1. Ms. Cobbs satisfies the “location” factor of the totality test because the room she was interrogated in was small, windowless, and in general reflective of the “jailhouse” type of rooms implicated in Miranda. Because Ms. Cobbs was locked away into a small, windowless room where she was interrogated for hours, she satisfies the “location” factor of the totality test. The location of questioning establishes whether there was a restraint on the freedom of movement on the person being questioned such that a custodial interrogation may be taking place. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010). The court in that case reasoned that a typical situation where a custodial interrogation may be taking place is one where a person is taken from their normal life and placed in isolation in a police-dominated environment while being questioned. Id at 1220- 1221. Furthermore, in Miranda the Court held that interrogation in an “unfamiliar”, “police dominated” environment where the defendant was held “incommunicado” gives rise to the inference that the defendant is in custody, and thus under the umbrella of protections that Miranda mandates under the 5th Amendment. Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 467. For example, in Miranda the defendant was held incommunicado in a room at the police station where he was questioned by police officers, detectives and a prosecuting attorney. The Court found that such a location implicated a custodial interrogation because the defendant was separated from the outside world and his normal life. Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 445. However, the Court in Miranda also held that custodial interrogations may occur when a defendant’s “freedom of action” is curtailed “in any significant way.” Id at 436. This is demonstrated in cases where a
- 4. police domination occurs even in a person’s home, such as when police enter a defendant’s apartment and hold him at gunpoint, subsequently restraining his movement with weapons lowered. U.S. v. Fautz, 812 F.Supp.2d 570, 619 (D.N.J. 2011). In that case, the court found that the defendant’s freedom of action was sufficiently curtailed by police actions to such an extent that custodial interrogation was implicated because the armed officers prevented the defendant from moving at all. Id. In contrast, police do not have to issue Miranda warnings during routine traffic stops because the public nature of the stop imposes less of a coercive atmosphere on an individual. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-438. The court there reasoned that because a motorist is typically able to continue on their way after a brief stop, and they are in view of the public rather than restrained in an incommunicado manner or held in a highly restrictive manner, they are not in custody for purposes of a Miranda inquiry. Id. In this case, the location of the interrogation took place in the “break-out room”, which was an 8x8 foot room with no windows and a flickering light. (R-13, ll. 11-14). This is like the “jailhouse” setting in Miranda, where a defendant feels the coercive effects of a police interrogation more readily, and contrasts sharply with a routine traffic stop in view of the general public, such as that in Berkemer. Furthermore, the fact that Ms. Cobbs was outnumbered by armed police, one of whom had his hand on his holstered weapon, makes her situation similar to the defendant in Fautz, and the court there found the defendant was not free to leave even when he was in his own home. Ms. Cobbs’s situation sufficiently meets the location factor because she was taken into a small interrogation room where she was outnumbered by armed officers. Thus, custodial interrogation was implicated because Ms. Cobbs’s freedom of action was limited in a significant way due to the location she was placed in.
- 5. 2. Ms. Cobbs was held for a sufficient duration to satisfy the “duration” factor of the totality test because she was held for several hours in the room she was questioned in. The “duration” factor is satisfied in this case because Ms. Cobbs was held for what appears to be many hours during the period of questioning. Courts have determined that longer, jailhouse-type interrogations that are demonstrated in Miranda are more conducive to an interrogation than an encounter which only lasts a few minutes. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-438 (1984). This characterization helps to determine whether a person may be in custody for the purposes of a Fifth Amendment inquiry. Id. For example, a routine customs inquiry that lasts fifteen minutes is too short a duration to be considered in the totality test. U.S. v. Pratt, 645 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 1981). In that case, even though the questioning had some other circumstances that could have implied a person was in custody, the duration of the questioning on its own was too short for the court to consider it a factor in its analysis. Id. On the other hand, “at least an hour” appears to be long enough to consider an in custody for the purposes of a duration analysis. U.S. v. Garcia, 496 F.2d 670, 672- 673 (5th Cir. 1974). In that case, the defendant was detained for an hour or more during a border crossing stop by border patrol agents. The court found that her being detained for as long as she was constituted a border patrol search that was not routine, and reasoned she was in custody. Id. Furthermore, in Howes the defendant was held for five to seven hours in a prison setting, in a separate room similar to the one Ms. Cobbs was held in. Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1193. The Court reasoned that because the defendant was held for such a long time, the possibility that he was under custodial interrogation was implicated. Id. In this case, Ms. Cobbs was held in the room she was questioned in for well over an hour. Officer Reynolds stated it was not “brief”, and went from the afternoon to well after the dinner
- 6. hour. (R-13, ll 34-36). This easily fits within the framework offered by the Fifth Circuit in Garcia. Moreover, she seems to have been held for several hours, rather than simple “at least one hour”, similar to the defendant in Howes, and the Court there reasoned that the defendant had been held long enough to implicate custodial interrogation. Thus, Ms. Cobbs has sufficient evidence to satisfy the duration factor of the totality test.