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Do Banks Ration Credit to New Enterprises? And Should Governments Intervene? Presidents Lecture Delivered at the Annual General Meeting of the Scottish Economic Society 4-5 September 2001.. (2002). .
In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:162-95.

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  1. Start-up incentives: Entrepreneurship policy or active labour market programme?. (2013). Román, Concepción ; Millan, Jose Maria ; Congregado, Emilio ; Roman, Concepcion.
    In: Journal of Business Venturing.
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  2. SMEs, foreign direct investment and financial constraints: The case of Belgium. (2012). De Maeseneire, Wouter ; Claeys, Tine.
    In: International Business Review.
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  3. Dependent self-employment as a way to evade employment protection legislation. (2011). Román, Concepción ; Millan, Jose Maria ; Congregado, Emilio ; Roman, Concepcion.
    In: Small Business Economics.
    RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:363-392.

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  4. Minority Self-Employment in the United States and the Impact of Affirmative Action Programs. (2008). Blanchflower, David.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13972.

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  5. Entrepreneurship in the UK. (2007). Blanchflower, David ; Shadforth, Chris.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2818.

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  6. Entrepreneurship and the Process of Firms’ Entry, Survival and Growth. (2006). Vivarelli, Marco ; Santarelli, Enrico.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2475.

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  7. Is the Cost of Debt Capital Higher for Younger Firms?. (2004). Pajarinen, Mika ; Hyytinen, Ari.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:rif:dpaper:946.

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  26. Confidi, Piccole Imprese E Banche: UnAnalisi Empirica. (2008). Presbitero, Andrea ; Busetta, Giovanni.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  27. COMPETITION AND ACCESS REGULATION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY WITH MULTIPLE NETWORKS. (2008). Sun, Guang-Zhen ; Liu, Yan.
    In: Monash Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-25.

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  28. INTRA-GROUP TRANSFERS AND GROUP FORMATION. (2008). Sethi, Anupama ; Banerjee, Dyuti.
    In: Monash Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-24.

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  29. Group versus Individual Lending in Microfinance. (2008). Lehner, Maria .
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:7486.

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  30. Cosigned vs. group loans. (2008). Rai, Ashok ; Bond, Philip.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:85:y:2008:i:1-2:p:58-80.

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  31. Social Connections and Group Banking. (2007). Karlan, Dean.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6194.

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  32. THE COST STRUCTURE OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA. (2006). Hartarska, Valentina ; Gropper, Daniel ; Caudill, Steven B.
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2006-809.

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  33. Determinants of Moral Hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Programs in Malawi. (2006). Zeller, Manfred ; Simtowe, Franklin.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:461.

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  34. Microfinance Games. (2006). Morduch, Jonathan ; Karlan, Dean ; Jakiela, Pamela ; Gine, Xavier.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:feb:wpaper:2102.

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  35. Group versus individual liability: A field experiment in the philippines. (2006). Karlan, Dean ; Gine, Xavier.
    In: Natural Field Experiments.
    RePEc:feb:natura:00253.

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  36. Financial constraints and unemployment equilibrium. (2006). Messori, Marcello ; Cesaroni, Giovanni.
    In: Research in Economics.
    RePEc:eee:reecon:v:60:y:2006:i:3:p:131-147.

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  37. Mutual Loan-Guarantee Societies in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection: Do They Act as a Sorting Device?. (2006). Zazzaro, Alberto ; Busetta, Giovanni.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:anc:wpaper:273.

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  38. Collateral and risk sharing in group lending: evidence from an urban microcredit program. (2005). Oppes, Rossella ; Kugler, Maurice.
    In: Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics.
    RePEc:stn:sotoec:0504.

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  39. The effect of social capital on group loan repayment: Evidence from artefactual field experiments. (2005). Wydick, Bruce ; Cassar, Alessandra ; Crowley, Lucas.
    In: Artefactual Field Experiments.
    RePEc:feb:artefa:00036.

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  40. Social Connections and Group Banking. (2005). Karlan, Dean.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:egc:wpaper:913.

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  41. Collateral and Risk Sharing in group lending: evidence from an urban microcredit program. (2005). Kugler, Maurice ; Oppes, Rossella .
    In: Working Paper CRENoS.
    RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200509.

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  42. Dual Financial Systems and Inequalities in Economic Development.. (2003). Tressel, Thierry.
    In: Journal of Economic Growth.
    RePEc:kap:jecgro:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:223-57.

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  43. Collusion and group lending with adverse selection. (2003). .
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:70:y:2003:i:2:p:329-348.

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  44. Do Peer Group Members Outperform Individual Borrowers? A Test of Peer Group Lending Using Canadian Micro-Credit Data. (2003). Santor, Eric ; Gomez, Rafael.
    In: Staff Working Papers.
    RePEc:bca:bocawp:03-33.

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  45. Microfinance and Poverty Reduction: The problematic experience of Communal Banking in Peru. (2002). Marr, Ana.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:soa:wpaper:122.

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  46. The Impact of Grameen Bank Credit on the Levels of Income, Employment, and Productivity of Poor Landless Households in Rural Bangladesh. (2002). Iqbal, Jhilam Zebunnessa.
    In: Fordham Economics Dissertations.
    RePEc:frd:theses:2002.5.

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  47. Do Banks Ration Credit to New Enterprises? And Should Governments Intervene? Presidents Lecture Delivered at the Annual General Meeting of the Scottish Economic Society 4-5 September 2001.. (2002). .
    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:162-95.

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  48. THE HAZARD OF CLIENT EXIT IN MICROFINANCE. (2002). Pagura, Maria E..
    In: 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA.
    RePEc:ags:aaea02:19698.

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  49. Risk-Matching in Credit Groups: Evidence from Guatemala. (2000). Carpenter, Seth ; Sadoulet, Loic .
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1310.

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  50. Is Grameen Lending Efficient?. (). Sjostrom, Tomas ; Rai, Ashok S..
    In: CID Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:cidhav:40.

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