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2. El crédito solidario, el colateral social, y la colusión. Algunos apuntes. (2003). Galarza, Francisco.
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1. Borrowers’ Participation in Group Borrowing. (2016). Tutlani, Ankur.
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   RePEc:pra:mprapa:69506.

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2. Effective Cost of Borrowing from Microfinance Institutions. (2016). Tutlani, Ankur.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:69502.

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3. ENHANCING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE CONTRACTS IN OIC COUNTRIES. (2015). Zouari, Zeineb ; NABI, Mahmoud.
   In: Policy Papers.
   RePEc:ris:irtipp:1435_002.

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4. Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance. (2014). Sengupta, Kunal ; Roy Chowdhury, Prabal.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:syd:wpaper:2014-07.

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5. Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection. (2014). lensink, robert ; Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis.
   In: Economics Letters.
   RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:2:p:185-187.

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6. Long-Term Relationships, Group lending and Peer Sanctioning in Microfinance: New Experimental Evidence. (2013). Masclet, David ; CORNEE, Simon.
   In: Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen).
   RePEc:tut:cremwp:201316.

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7. Group Lending with Heterogeneous Types. (2013). Liu, Yanyan ; Hernandez, Manuel ; Gan, Li.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18847.

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8. Outreach and Mission Drift in Microfinance: An Interpretation of the New Trend. (2013). Caserta, Maurizio ; Reito, Francesco.
   In: Economics Bulletin.
   RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00664.

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9. Voting with the wallet. (2012). Becchetti, Leonardo.
   In: International Review of Economics.
   RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:59:y:2012:i:3:p:245-268.

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10. Risk-sharing Contracts with Asymmetric Information. (2012). HENRIET, Dominique ; Bourlès, Renaud ; Renaud Bourlès, .
    In: The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review.
    RePEc:pal:genrir:v:37:y:2012:i:1:p:27-56.

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11. Lenders’ blind trust and borrowers’ blind spots: A descriptive investigation of personal loans. (2012). Loewenstein, George ; Dezs, Linda.
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:33:y:2012:i:5:p:996-1011.

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12. Moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment. (2012). Maitra, Pushkar ; Gangadharan, Lata ; Cason, Timothy.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:82:y:2012:i:1:p:192-209.

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13. Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection. (2012). Zazzaro, Alberto ; Busetta, Giovanni.
    In: Journal of Financial Stability.
    RePEc:eee:finsta:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:15-24.

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14. Group lending with endogenous group size. (2012). Schindele, Ibolya ; Bourjade, Sylvain.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:556-560.

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15. Group lending with endogenous group size. (2011). Schindele, Ibolya ; Bourjade, Sylvain.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:34817.

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16. When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?. (2011). Menicucci, Domenico ; Jeon, Doh-Shin.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:55:y:2011:i:5:p:720-731.

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17. The Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis in India: manifestation, causal analysis, and regulatory response. (2011). Ghalib, Asad K. ; Priyadarshee, Anurag.
    In: Global Development Institute Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:bwp:bwppap:15711.

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18. Microfinance and Mechanism Design: The Role of Joint Liability and Cross-Reporting. (2010). Abdul Karim, Zulkefly.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:23934.

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19. The Dynamics of Cooperation in Group Lending - A Microfinance Experiment. (2010). Werner, Peter.
    In: Working Paper Series in Economics.
    RePEc:kls:series:0049.

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20. Microfinance, subsidies and local externalities. (2010). Pisani, Fabio ; Becchetti, Leonardo.
    In: Small Business Economics.
    RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:309-321.

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21. A model of microfinance with adverse selection, loan default, and self‐financing. (2010). Beladi, Hamid ; Batabyal, Amitrajeet.
    In: Agricultural Finance Review.
    RePEc:eme:afrpps:v:70:y:2010:i:1:p:55-65.

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22. Group lending and individual lending with strategic default. (2010). Bhole, Bharat ; Ogden, Sean .
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:91:y:2010:i:2:p:348-363.

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23. On Mission Drift In Microfinance Institutions. (2009). Szafarz, Ariane ; Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz.
    In: Working Papers CEB.
    RePEc:sol:wpaper:09-015.

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24. Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions. (2009). Sadoulet, Elisabeth ; de Janvry, Alain ; AUBERT, Cécile.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:90:y:2009:i:1:p:153-162.

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25. Moral Hazard and Peer Monitoring in a Laboratory Microfinance Experiment. (2008). Maitra, Pushkar ; Gangadharan, Lata ; Cason, Timothy.
    In: Purdue University Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:pur:prukra:1208.

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26. Confidi, Piccole Imprese E Banche: UnAnalisi Empirica. (2008). Presbitero, Andrea ; Busetta, Giovanni.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:7832.

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27. COMPETITION AND ACCESS REGULATION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY WITH MULTIPLE NETWORKS. (2008). Sun, Guang-Zhen ; Liu, Yan.
    In: Monash Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-25.

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28. INTRA-GROUP TRANSFERS AND GROUP FORMATION. (2008). Sethi, Anupama ; Banerjee, Dyuti.
    In: Monash Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-24.

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29. Group versus Individual Lending in Microfinance. (2008). Lehner, Maria .
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:7486.

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30. Cosigned vs. group loans. (2008). Rai, Ashok ; Bond, Philip.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:85:y:2008:i:1-2:p:58-80.

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31. Social Connections and Group Banking. (2007). Karlan, Dean.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6194.

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32. THE COST STRUCTURE OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA. (2006). Hartarska, Valentina ; Gropper, Daniel ; Caudill, Steven B.
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2006-809.

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33. Determinants of Moral Hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Programs in Malawi. (2006). Zeller, Manfred ; Simtowe, Franklin.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:461.

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34. Microfinance Games. (2006). Morduch, Jonathan ; Karlan, Dean ; Jakiela, Pamela ; Gine, Xavier.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:feb:wpaper:2102.

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35. Group versus individual liability: A field experiment in the philippines. (2006). Karlan, Dean ; Gine, Xavier.
    In: Natural Field Experiments.
    RePEc:feb:natura:00253.

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36. Financial constraints and unemployment equilibrium. (2006). Messori, Marcello ; Cesaroni, Giovanni.
    In: Research in Economics.
    RePEc:eee:reecon:v:60:y:2006:i:3:p:131-147.

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37. Mutual Loan-Guarantee Societies in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection: Do They Act as a Sorting Device?. (2006). Zazzaro, Alberto ; Busetta, Giovanni.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:anc:wpaper:273.

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38. Collateral and risk sharing in group lending: evidence from an urban microcredit program. (2005). Oppes, Rossella ; Kugler, Maurice.
    In: Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics.
    RePEc:stn:sotoec:0504.

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39. The effect of social capital on group loan repayment: Evidence from artefactual field experiments. (2005). Wydick, Bruce ; Cassar, Alessandra ; Crowley, Lucas.
    In: Artefactual Field Experiments.
    RePEc:feb:artefa:00036.

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40. Social Connections and Group Banking. (2005). Karlan, Dean.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:egc:wpaper:913.

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41. Collateral and Risk Sharing in group lending: evidence from an urban microcredit program. (2005). Kugler, Maurice ; Oppes, Rossella .
    In: Working Paper CRENoS.
    RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200509.

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42. Dual Financial Systems and Inequalities in Economic Development.. (2003). Tressel, Thierry.
    In: Journal of Economic Growth.
    RePEc:kap:jecgro:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:223-57.

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43. Collusion and group lending with adverse selection. (2003). .
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:70:y:2003:i:2:p:329-348.

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44. Do Peer Group Members Outperform Individual Borrowers? A Test of Peer Group Lending Using Canadian Micro-Credit Data. (2003). Santor, Eric ; Gomez, Rafael.
    In: Staff Working Papers.
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45. Microfinance and Poverty Reduction: The problematic experience of Communal Banking in Peru. (2002). Marr, Ana.
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46. The Impact of Grameen Bank Credit on the Levels of Income, Employment, and Productivity of Poor Landless Households in Rural Bangladesh. (2002). Iqbal, Jhilam Zebunnessa.
    In: Fordham Economics Dissertations.
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47. Do Banks Ration Credit to New Enterprises? And Should Governments Intervene? Presidents Lecture Delivered at the Annual General Meeting of the Scottish Economic Society 4-5 September 2001.. (2002). .
    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:162-95.

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48. THE HAZARD OF CLIENT EXIT IN MICROFINANCE. (2002). Pagura, Maria E..
    In: 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA.
    RePEc:ags:aaea02:19698.

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49. Risk-Matching in Credit Groups: Evidence from Guatemala. (2000). Carpenter, Seth ; Sadoulet, Loic .
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
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50. Is Grameen Lending Efficient?. (). Sjostrom, Tomas ; Rai, Ashok S..
    In: CID Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:cidhav:40.

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