1. Does regulatory and supervisory independence affect financial stability?. (2025). Fraccaroli, Nicol ; Whitworth, Andrew ; Sowerbutts, Rhiannon.
   In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
   RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:170:y:2025:i:c:s0378426624002322.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Consecutive decentralization: The effect of central bank independence on capital account liberalization. (2024). Lee, Joon Hyeok.
   In: Economics and Politics.
   RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:36:y:2024:i:2:p:809-831.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Central Bank Independence and its Impact on Fiscal Deficit: Evidence from India. (2023). Javaid, Iqbal Khan ; Waseem, Ahmad Parray ; Sajad, Ahmad Bhat ; Aijaz, Ahmad Bhat.
   In: Studia Universitatis „Vasile Goldis” Arad – Economics Series.
   RePEc:vrs:suvges:v:33:y:2023:i:2:p:71-94:n:1.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Do monetary policy mandates and financial stability governance structures matter for the adoption of climate-related financial policies?. (2023). Dorazio, Paola ; Popoyan, Lilit.
   In: International Economics.
   RePEc:eee:inteco:v:173:y:2023:i:c:p:284-295.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL REGIMES: A GLOBAL EVIDENCE. (2022). Salisu, Afees ; Opuala-Charles, Silva ; Udeaja, Elias A.
   In: Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking.
   RePEc:idn:journl:v:25:y:2022:i:2b:p:155-172.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021). (2022). masciandaro, donato.
   In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
   RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:122:y:2022:i:c:s0261560621002308.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Political Pressure on Central Banks. (2021). Binder, Carola.
   In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
   RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:53:y:2021:i:4:p:715-744.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Political constraints and currency crises in emerging markets and less developed economies. (2021). Meyer, Jacob.
   In: Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv).
   RePEc:spr:weltar:v:157:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s10290-021-00407-4.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. The limits of central bank independence for inflation performance. (2021). Lim, Jamus.
   In: Public Choice.
   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00771-8.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence. (2021). Kern, Andreas ; Rau-Gohring, Matthias ; Reinsberg, Bernhard.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s017626802030135x.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa. (2021). Yayi, Constant ; Strong, Christine.
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s0164070421000239.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Aid for trade and inflation: Exploring the trade openness, export product diversification and foreign direct investment channels. (2021). Gnangnon, Sena Kimm.
    In: Australian Economic Papers.
    RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:60:y:2021:i:4:p:563-593.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020). (2021). .
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp20153.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Agencies’ formal independence and credible commitment in the Latin American regulatory state: A comparative analysis of 8 countries and 13 sectors. (2020). Mediano, Andres Pavon.
    In: Regulation & Governance.
    RePEc:wly:reggov:v:14:y:2020:i:1:p:102-120.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Taking up the climate change challenge: a new perspective on central banking. (2020). D'Orazio, Paola ; Popoyan, Lilit.
    In: LEM Papers Series.
    RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2020/19.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Money and monetary stability in Europe, 1300–1914. (2020). Pamuk, Sevket ; Karaman, Kıvanç ; Yildirim-Karaman, Seil.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:115:y:2020:i:c:p:279-300.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Public knowledge about and attitudes towards central bank independence in New Zealand. (2020). Neumeier, Florian ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:113:y:2020:i:c:s0378426620300042.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Does regulatory and supervisory independence affect financial stability?. (2020). Sowerbutts, Rhiannon ; Fraccaroli, Nicolò ; Whitworth, Andrew.
    In: Bank of England working papers.
    RePEc:boe:boeewp:0893.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Political economy behind central bank independence. (2019). Burkovskaya, Anastasia.
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:61:y:2019:i:c:10.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. WHAT BIRD IS THAT? CENTRAL BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE LAST FORTY YEARS. (2019). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp19127.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. BEHAVIORAL MONETARY POLICYMAKING: ECONOMICS, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PSYCHOLOGY. (2019). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp19105.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. The political economy of reforms in central bank design: evidence from a new dataset. (2018). Romelli, Davide.
    In: Trinity Economics Papers.
    RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep0918.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Cultural Differences in Monetary Policy Preferences. (2018). Jost, Adriel.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:snb:snbwpa:2018-02.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Central Bank Independence Before and After the Crisis. (2018). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Hicks, Raymond ; Haan, Jakob ; Bodea, Christina.
    In: Comparative Economic Studies.
    RePEc:pal:compes:v:60:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1057_s41294-017-0050-4.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Money and Monetary Stability in Europe, 1300-1914. (2018). Pamuk, Sevket ; Karaman, Kıvanç ; Yildirim, Secil.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12583.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions. (2018). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1883.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. CENTRAL BANKS AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS. (2018). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1878.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence. (2018). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1871.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?. (2017). Higashijima, Masaaki ; Bodea, Cristina.
    In: British Journal of Political Science.
    RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:47:y:2017:i:01:p:47-70_00.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
    In: Other publications TiSEM.
    RePEc:tiu:tiutis:54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b865f90cb42b.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
    In: Other publications TiSEM.
    RePEc:tiu:tiutis:34d07610-3844-4cf9-baa5-9caee7c67bf6.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
    In: Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:tiu:tiucen:54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b865f90cb42b.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers. (2016). Volpicella, Alessio ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:61:y:2016:i:c:p:101-119.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. The politics of central bank independence. (2016). de Haan, Jakob.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:539.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions. (2015). Hicks, Raymond ; Bodea, Cristina.
    In: International Organization.
    RePEc:cup:intorg:v:69:y:2015:i:01:p:35-61_00.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics. (2015). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: Financial History Review.
    RePEc:cup:fihrev:v:22:y:2015:i:03:p:259-289_00.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option. (2015). Neugart, Michael ; Hefeker, Carsten.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5244.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option. (2015). Neugart, Michael ; Hefeker, Carsten.
    In: Review of International Economics.
    RePEc:bla:reviec:v:23:y:2015:i:3:p:489-508.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. The Impact of Independence on Regulatory Outcomes: the Case of EU Competition Policy. (2015). Guidi, Mattia.
    In: Journal of Common Market Studies.
    RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:53:y:2015:i:6:p:1195-1213.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics. (2015). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1503.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. Le autorita indipendenti nel settore bancario (Indipendent authorities in the banking sector). (2014). Papi, Luca.
    In: Moneta e Credito.
    RePEc:psl:moneta:2014:41.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance. (2014). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Roszbach, Kasper ; Koetter, Michael.
    In: International Journal of Central Banking.
    RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2014:q:4:a:2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. Can Developing Countries Both Decentralize and Depoliticize Urban Water Services? Evaluating the Legacy of the 1990s Reform Wave. (2014). Herrera, Veronica ; Post, Alison E..
    In: World Development.
    RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:64:y:2014:i:c:p:621-641.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. Social trust and central-bank independence. (2014). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Berggren, Niclas ; Hellstrom, Jorgen.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:425-439.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. Institutionalisation without internalisation. The cultural dimension of French-German conflicts on European Central Bank independence. (2013). Esch, Femke ; Jong, Eelke.
    In: International Economics and Economic Policy.
    RePEc:kap:iecepo:v:10:y:2013:i:4:p:631-648.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. Social Trust and Central-Bank Independence. (2012). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Berggren, Niclas ; Hellstrom, Jorgen.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0920.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. Social trust and central-bank independence. (2012). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Berggren, Niclas ; Hellstrom, Jorgen.
    In: HUI Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0066.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Institution Building with Limited Resources: Establishing a Supreme Audit Institution in Rwanda. (2012). Isaksson, Ann-Sofie ; Bigsten, Arne.
    In: World Development.
    RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:9:p:1870-1881.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence. (2012). Markwardt, Gunther ; Hielscher, Kai .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:3:p:286-301.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. Political institutions and central bank independence revisited. (2011). Ferrari, Davide ; Salsano, F. ; Pistoresi, B..
    In: Applied Economics Letters.
    RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:18:y:2011:i:7:p:679-682.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

51. Quest for the Best: How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inflation. (2011). Masłowska-Jokinen, Aleksandra.
    In: Czech Economic Review.
    RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2011_132.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

52. What determines debt intolerance? The role of political and monetary institutions. (2011). Tommasino, Pietro ; Giordano, Raffaela.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:3:p:471-484.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

53. Does membership in international organizations increase governments credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers. (2011). Voigt, Stefan ; Dreher, Axel.
    In: Journal of Comparative Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:39:y:2011:i:3:p:326-348.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

54. Inflation and central bank independence: Two-way causality?. (2011). BRUMM, HAROLD.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:220-222.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

55. The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence. (2011). Markwardt, Gunther ; Hielscher, Kai .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3396.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

56. Staatsfonds als Ankerinvestoren: Eine Note zum Einstieg von Aabar bei Daimler. (2011). Mietzner, Mark ; Schiereck, Dirk.
    In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
    RePEc:bla:perwir:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:92-100.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

57. When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data set. (2010). Sturm, Jan-Egbert ; Dreher, Axel ; de Haan, Jakob.
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:32:y:2010:i:3:p:766-781.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

58. New policies create a new politics: issues of institutional design in climate change policy. (2010). Ergas, Henry.
    In: Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    RePEc:bla:ajarec:v:54:y:2010:i:2:p:143-164.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

59. New policies create a new politics: issues of institutional design in climate change policy. (2010). Ergas, Henry.
    In: Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    RePEc:ags:aareaj:162000.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

60. Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?. (2009). Quintyn, Marc.
    In: Constitutional Political Economy.
    RePEc:kap:copoec:v:20:y:2009:i:3:p:267-295.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

61. Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability–Exploring the Determinants. (2008). Quintyn, Marc ; masciandaro, donato ; Taylor, Michael W.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2008/147.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

62. Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks. (2008). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Roszbach, Kasper ; Frisell, Lars .
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0221.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

63. Goal independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate. (2008). Crowe, Christopher.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:4:p:748-762.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

64. Should Australia Encourage Developing Countries to Adopt Competition Laws?. (2008). Ergas, Henry.
    In: Asia Pacific Economic Papers.
    RePEc:csg:ajrcau:376.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

65. Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks. (2008). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Roszbach, Kasper ; Frisell, Lars .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6888.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

66. How Delegation Improves Commitment. (2008). Perino, Grischa.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:awi:wpaper:0466.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

67. Explaining de facto judicial independence. (2007). Voigt, Stefan ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:27:y:2007:i:3:p:269-290.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

68. Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB. (2006). Berger, Helge.
    In: The Review of International Organizations.
    RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:3:p:207-235.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

69. The Independence of International Organizations. (2006). .
    In: Journal of Conflict Resolution.
    RePEc:sae:jocore:v:50:y:2006:i:2:p:253-275.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

70. Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB. (2006). Berger, Helge.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1697.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

71. Membership has its Privileges: On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally. (2005). Voigt, Stefan.
    In: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge.
    RePEc:zbw:kasvdb:73.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

72. Optimal central bank design: benchmarks for the ECB. (2005). Berger, Helge.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:200527.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

73. Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System. (2005). Voigt, Stefan ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005.
    RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:57.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

74. Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System.. (2005). Voigt, Stefan ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: ICER Working Papers.
    RePEc:icr:wpicer:02-2005.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

75. Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management. (2004). Lybek, Tonny ; Morris, Joanne.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2004/226.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

76. Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability. (2003). Padovano, Fabio.
    In: Constitutional Political Economy.
    RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:1:p:47-70.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

77. Central Bankers and Central Bank Independence. (2003). Beblavý, Miroslav ; BADRAN, rema ; Beblavy, Miroslav.
    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:50:y:2003:i:1:p:61-68.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

78. Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability. (2002). Quintyn, Marc ; Taylor, Michael W.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2002/046.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

79. Why are price stability and statutory independence of central banks negatively correlated? The role of culture. (2002). de Jong, Eelke.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:4:p:675-694.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

80. Reconsidering central bank independence. (2002). Hefeker, Carsten ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:4:p:653-674.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

81. Political determinants of central bank independence. (2002). Farvaque, Etienne.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:77:y:2002:i:1:p:131-135.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

82. Divided boards: Partisanship through delegated monetary policy. (2001). Farvaque, Etienne ; Lagadec, Gael.
    In: ZEI Working Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zeiwps:b012001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

83. Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination. (2001). Hefeker, Carsten ; Hayo, Bernd ; BADRAN, rema.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0103006.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

84. Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments. (2001). Keefer, Philip ; Stasavage, David.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2542.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

85. Wars of Attrition in Italian Government Coalitions and Fiscal Performance: 1948-1994.. (2001). Padovano, Fabio ; Venturi, Larissa.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:109:y:2001:i:1-2:p:15-54.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

86. Collective bargaining in the public sector and the role of budget determination. (2001). Falch, Torberg.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:75-99.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

87. Federal Monetary Policy. (2001). Hefeker, Carsten.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_422.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

88. Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?. (2000). Keefer, Philip ; Stasavage, David.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2356.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

89. Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments.. (2000). Gartner, Manfred.
    In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
    RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:14:y:2000:i:5:p:527-61.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

90. News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government. (2000). Thum, Marcel ; Berger, Helge.
    In: German Economic Review.
    RePEc:bla:germec:v:1:y:2000:i:4:p:465-493.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. Al-Marhubi, F. ; Willett, T.D. The anti inflationary influence of corporatist structures and central bank independence: The importance of the hump shaped hypothesis. 1995 Public Choice. 84 153-162

2. Alesina, A. ; Summers, H.L. Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance. 1993 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 25 151-162

3. Alesina, A., Gatti, R., 1995.Independent central banks: Low inflation at no cost? American Economic Review 85, 196–200.

4. Barro, R.J. ; Gordon, D.B. Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. 1983 Journal of Monetary Economics. 12 101-121

5. Beck, N. Congress and the Fed. 1990 En : Thomas, M. The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy. University Press Cambridge: Cambridge
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
6. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. ; Van der Ploeg, F. Does inequality cause inflation?. 1996 Public Choice. 87 143-162
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
7. Busch, A. . 1995 Leske und Budrich: Opladen
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
8. Calvert, R.L. ; McCubbins, M.D. ; Weingast, B.R. A theory of political control and agency discretion. 1989 American Journal of Political Science. 33 588-611
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
9. Cukierman, A. . 1992 MIT Press: Cambridge, MA
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
10. Cukierman, A. Commitment through delegation, political influence and central bank independence. 1994 En : de Beaufort Wijnholds, J.O. ; Eijffinger, S. ; Hoogduin, L.H. A Framework for Monetary Stability. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

11. Cukierman, A. ; Kalaitzidakis, P. ; Summers, L.H. ; Webb, S.B. Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates. 1993 Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 39 95-140

12. Cukierman, A., Webb, S.B., 1995. Political influence on the central bank: International evidence. World Bank Economic Review 9.

13. de Haan, J. ; van't Hag, G.J. Variations in central bank independence across countries. 1995 Public Choice. 85 335-351
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

14. Eijffinger, S. ; de Haan, J. The political economy of central-bank independence. 1996 En : . Princeton University: Princeton, NJ

15. Eijffinger, S. ; Schaling, E. Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries. 1993 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.. 184 1-41

16. Eijffinger, S. ; Schaling, E. Central bank independence. 1997 En : Eijffinger, S. Independent Central Banks and Economic Performance. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK

17. Eijffinger, S. ; Schaling, E. The ultimate determinants of central bank independence. 1998 En : Eijffinger, S. ; Huizingu, H.P. Positive Political Economy. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

18. Eijffinger, S. ; Van Keulen, M. Central bank independence in another eleven countries. 1995 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review. 192 39-83

19. Ferejohn, J.A. ; Shipan, C. Congressional influence on bureaucracy. 1990 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 6 1-20

20. Ferejohn, J.A. ; Weingast, B.R. A positive theory of statutory interpretation. 1992 International Review of Law and Economics. 12 263-279

21. Frey, B.S. ; Schneider, F. Central bank behavior. 1981 Journal of Monetary Economics. 7 291-315
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

22. Gärtner, M. Democracy, elections, and macroeconomic policy. 1994 European Journal of Political Economy. 10 85-109

23. Gärtner, M. Time-consistent monetary policy under output persistence. 1997 Public Choice. 92 429-437

24. Gely, R. ; Spiller, P.T. The political economy of supreme court constitutional decisions. 1992 International Review of Law and Economics. 12 45-67
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
25. Grüner, H.P. Monetary policy, reputation and hysteresis. 1996 Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften. 116 15-29
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
26. Grier, K.B. Congressional influence on U.S. 1991 monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics. 28 201-220
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
27. Grilli, V. ; Masciandaro, D. ; Tabellini, G. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries. 1991 Economic Policy. 13 342-392
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
28. Havrilesky, T., 1995. The Pressures on American Monetary Policy, 2nd ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

29. Hibbs, D.C. Partisan theory after fifteen years. 1992 European Journal of Political Economy. 8 1467-1487

30. Jensen, H. Credibility of optimal monetary delegation. 1997 American Economic Review. 87 911-920

31. Kydland, F.E. ; Prescott, E.C. Rules rather than discretion. 1977 Journal of Political Economy. 85 473-491

32. Lockwood, B. ; Miller, M. ; Zhang, L. Central bank independence and the role of reputation. 1996 En : Canzoneri, M. ; Ethier, W. ; Grilli, V. The New Transatlantic Economy.. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge

33. Lohmann, S. Optimal credibility in monetary policy. 1992 American Economic Review. 82 273-286
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
34. Marks, B.A., 1988. A model of judicial influence on congressional policymaking: Grove City V. Bell. Working paper in Political Science, 88-7, Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

35. McCallum, B.T. Two fallacies concerning central-bank independence. 1995 American Economic Review. 85 207-211

36. McNollgast, 1989. Structure and process, politics and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies, Virginia Law Review 75, 431–482.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
37. Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. The disadvantage of tying their hands. 1995 Economic Journal. 105 1381-1402
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

38. Moser, P. Why is Swiss politics so stable. 1996 Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics. 132 31-60

39. Neumann, M.J.M., 1993. Die deutsche Bundesbank als Modell für eine Europäische Zentralbank? In: Duwendag, D., Siebke, J. (Eds.), Europa vor dem Eintritt in die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Bd. vol. 220, pp. 81–95.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

40. Persson, T. ; Tabellini, G. Designing institutions for monetary stability. 1993 Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 39 53-84

41. Posen, A.S. Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation. 1993 En : O'Brian, R. Finance and the International Economy. Oxford University Press: Oxford
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

42. Rogoff, K. Reputational constraints on monetary policy. 1987 Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy. 26 141-182

43. Rogoff, K. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. 1985 Quarterly Journal of Economics.. 100 1169-1189

44. Romer, D. Openess and inflation. 1993 Quarterly Journal of Economics. 108 869-903
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
45. Schiemann, J. ; Alshuth, S. Der Grad der Zentralbankautonomie und sein Einfluss im gesamtwirtschaftlichen Prozess. 1994 Aussenwirtschaft. 49 579-600
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

46. Steunenberg, B. Agency discretion, regulatory policymaking, and different institutional arrangements. 1996 Public Choice. 86 303-339

47. Steunenberg, B. Regulatory policymaking in a parliamentary setting. 1994 Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Oekonomie. 13 36-57
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

48. Svensson, L.O. Optimal inflation targets, conservative central banks, and linear inflation contracts. 1997 American Economic Review. 87 98-114

49. Tsebelis, G. Decisionmaking in political systems. 1995 British Journal of Political Science. 25 289-325
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

50. Vaubel, R. The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence. 1997 European Journal of Political Economy. 13 201-224

51. Vaubel, R., 1993. Eine Public-Choice-Analyse der Deutschen Bundesbank und ihre Implikationen für die Europäische Währungsunion Duwendag, D. Siebke, J. Europa vor dem Eintritt in die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, vol. 220, pp. 23–79.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

52. von Hagen, J. ; Süppel, R. Central bank constitution for federal monetary unions. 1994 European Economic Review. 38 774-782

53. Walsh, C. Optimal contracts for central bankers and the inflation bias of monetary policy. 1995 American Economic Review. 85 150-167

54. Weingast, B.R. ; Moran, M.J. Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. 1983 Journal of Political Economy. 91 765-800

1. Minimising the inflationary impact of fiscal deficits in Africa: The role of monetary, financial and political institutions. (2021). Agoba, Abel M.
   In: International Journal of Finance & Economics.
   RePEc:wly:ijfiec:v:26:y:2021:i:1:p:724-740.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Institutions and Business Cycles. (2011). Neyapti, Bilin ; Altug, Sumru ; Emin, Mustafa.
   In: Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers.
   RePEc:koc:wpaper:1109.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. A Macro-economic Consequence of the Central Banks Reserve Fund: A Political-economic Perspective. (2011). Kim, Inbae.
   In: Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics.
   RePEc:hit:hitjec:v:52:y:2011:i:2:p:143-163.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS. (2010). de Haan, Jakob ; Klomp, Jeroen.
   In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
   RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:24:y:2010:i:4:p:593-621.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance. (2009). Anastasiou, Athanasios.
   In: Cyprus Economic Policy Review.
   RePEc:erc:cypepr:v:3:y:2009:i:1:p:123-156.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Independence Day for the “Old Lady? A Natural Experiment on the Implications of Central Bank Independence. (2006). BADRAN, rema ; MacMillan, Peter.
   In: CDMA Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:san:cdmawp:0602.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation: Why the Wage Contracts Length Matters?. (2006). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Diana, Giuseppe.
   In: International Advances in Economic Research.
   RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:287-297:10.1007/s11294-006-9017-3.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean. (2005). Vazquez, Francisco ; Jácome, Luis ; Jacome, Luis.
   In: Macroeconomics.
   RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0508011.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank. (2005). Klein, Michael ; Goldberg, Linda.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11792.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Openness, Centralized Wage Bargaining, and Inflation. (2005). VanHoose, David ; Nourzad, Farrokh.
    In: Working Papers and Research.
    RePEc:mrq:wpaper:0505.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Central Bank Reform and Inflation Dynamics in the Transition Economies theory and some evidence. (2005). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Papadopoulos, Athanasios ; Diana, Giuseppe.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005.
    RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:58.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank. (2005). Klein, Michael ; Goldberg, Linda.
    In: The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp105.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Establishing credibility: evolving perceptions of the European Central Bank. (2005). Klein, Michael ; Goldberg, Linda.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:231.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy. (2004). Rose, Andrew ; Mihov, Ilian ; Fatas, Antonio.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10846.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Bureaucrats or Politicians?. (2004). Tabellini, Guido.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10241.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker. (2004). Kempf, Hubert ; Aaron-Cureau, Corinne.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004.
    RePEc:mmf:mmfc04:85.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Central bank transparency in theory and practice. (2004). Demertzis, Maria.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003.
    RePEc:mmf:mmfc03:23.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy: Evidence from OECD Economies. (2004). Falk, Barry ; Doyle, Matthew.
    In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
    RePEc:isu:genres:11995.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Political support for anti-inflationary monetary policy. (2004). Sabani, Laura ; Di Gioacchino, Debora ; Ginebri, Sergio .
    In: International Journal of Finance & Economics.
    RePEc:ijf:ijfiec:v:9:y:2004:i:2:p:187-200.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2004 an Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott. (2004). Setzer, Ralph.
    In: Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim.
    RePEc:hoh:hohdip:248.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence. Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean. (2004). Gutierrez, Eva.
    In: Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA.
    RePEc:emc:ecomex:v:13:y:2004:i:2:p:255-287.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Central Bank Transparency: A Market Indicator. (2003). Howells, Peter ; biefang-frisancho, iris ; Mariscal, Iris Biefang-Frisancho.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:uwe:wpaper:0305.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio.. (2003). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Diana, Giuseppe.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
    RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2003-08.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. The Non-Monotonic Relationship Between Seigniorage and Inequality. (2003). Haslag, Joseph ; Bunzel, Helle ; Bhattacharya, Joydeep.
    In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
    RePEc:isu:genres:10252.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Bureaucrats or Politicians?. (2003). Tabellini, Guido.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:238.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Central Bank Independence and Price Stability: Evidence from 23 OECD-countries. (2003). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; de Luna, Xavier.
    In: Umeå Economic Studies.
    RePEc:hhs:umnees:0589.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. Political Business Cycles and Central Bank Independence. (2003). Pickering, Andrew ; Hadri, Kaddour ; Maloney, John.
    In: Economic Journal.
    RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:113:y:2003:i:486:p:c167-c181.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence. (2003). Manfred J. M. Neumann, .
    In: Economic Journal.
    RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:113:y:2003:i:484:p:43-64.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Independência e autonomia do Banco Central: mais sobre o debate [Central Bank independence and autonomy: more on this debate]. (2003). Jayme Jr, Frederico ; Crocco, Marco.
    In: Textos para Discussão Cedeplar-UFMG.
    RePEc:cdp:texdis:td199.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Inflation and the size of government. (2002). Mulligan, Casey.
    In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2002-1.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Institutions and macroeconomic performance: Central bank independence, labour market institutions and the perspectives for inflation and employment in the European Monetary Union. (2001). Hein, Eckhard.
    In: WSI Working Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:wsidps:95.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Reflections on the Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence. (2001). Bibow, Jörg.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0108004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. Financial Markets and Economic Development in Africa. (2001). NDIKUMANA, LEONCE.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:uma:periwp:wp17.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. Three Pillars of Conventional Wisdom. (2001). Cross, Rod.
    In: Review of Political Economy.
    RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:181-200.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Strategic Interactions of Monetary Policymakers and Wage/Price Bargainers: A Review with Implications for the European Common-Currency Area. (2001). .
    In: Empirica.
    RePEc:kap:empiri:v:28:y:2001:i:4:p:457-486.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. Central Bank Independence and Accountability Under Complete Information. (2001). Castellani, Francesca.
    In: IHEID Working Papers.
    RePEc:gii:giihei:heiwp05-2001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. Sacrifice ratios and monetary policy credibility: do smaller budget deficits, inflation-indexed debt, and inflation targets lower disinflation costs?. (2001). Durham, J. Benson.
    In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2001-47.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - An International Perspective. (2001). Neyapti, Bilin ; Cukierman, Alex ; Miller, Geoffrey .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2808.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. Wage Indexation, Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation. (2000). Diana, Giuseppe.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
    RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2000-03.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. Inflation Targeting Macroeconomic Distortions and the Policy Reaction Function. (2000). Karunaratne, Neil D..
    In: Discussion Papers Series.
    RePEc:qld:uq2004:269.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. Causes of the Korean Financial Crisis: Lessons for Policy. (2000). Mishkin, Frederic ; Hahm, Joon-Ho.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7483.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes. (2000). Mishkin, Frederic.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7044.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. Reliance, composition, and inflation. (2000). Haslag, Joseph ; Bhattacharya, Joydeep.
    In: Economic and Financial Policy Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedder:y:2000:i:qiv:p:20-28.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. Zentralbank-Politik und makroökonomische Ergebnisse: eine sozio-institutionelle Interpretation. (1999). Hein, Eckhard.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:18881.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes. (1999). Mishkin, Frederic.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6965.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. The European system of central banks. (1999). Wynne, Mark.
    In: Economic and Financial Policy Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedder:y:1999:i:qi:p:2-14.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. Is bank supervision central to central banking?. (1999). Tootell, Geoffrey ; Rosengren, Eric ; Peek, Joe.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedbwp:99-7.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence. (1999). Moser, Peter.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:8:p:1569-1593.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments. (1999). Demertzis, Maria.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2219.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. Inflation Target Instability and Interest Rates. (1998). Mellin, Stefan.
    In: Research Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:1997_0004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

51. What really matters: conservativeness or independence?. (1997). de Haan, Jakob ; KOOI, W..
    In: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.
    RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1997:12.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

52. What really matters: conservativeness or independence?. (1997). de Haan, Jakob ; KOOI, W..
    In: BNL Quarterly Review.
    RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1997:12.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

53. Central Bank Policy Rules: Conceptual Issues and Practical Considerations. (1997). Cecchetti, Stephen.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6306.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

54. Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?. (1997). Tirelli, Patrizio ; Natale, Piergiovanna ; Lossani, M..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gla:glaewp:9707.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

55. Is banking supervision central to central banking?. (1997). Tootell, Geoffrey ; Rosengren, Eric ; Peek, Joe.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedbwp:97-3.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

56. Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. (1996). Barro, Robert.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5698.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

57. Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions. (1996). Perotti, Roberto.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5556.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

58. Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences and Central Bank Independence. (1996). Muscatelli, Vito.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gla:glaewp:9615.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

59. Inflation and Economic Growth. (1995). Barro, Robert.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5326.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

60. Central bank independence : a critical view. (1994). Mas, Ignacio.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1356.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

61. Designing Monetary Policy when Unemployment Persists.. (1994). Zhang, Lei ; Miller, Marcus ; Lockwood, Ben.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:exe:wpaper:9408.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

62. Public Debt Indexation and Denomination with and Indipendent Central Bank. (). Missale, Alessandro ; Falcetti, Elisabetta.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:169.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

63. Too much cocited documents. This list is not complete

Report date: 2025-09-21 17:54:53 || Missing content? Let us know