- An alternative explanation is that citizens’ willingness to punish the government is reference dependent, meaning that it is determined by their reference point for the government’s behavior (Martin, 2016; Paler, 2013; Sandbu, 2006). More specifically, it could be theorized that citizens get a higher utility from punishing negative deviations from their reference point than from punishing positive deviations from their reference point, because negative deviations are perceived as losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Banerji, Abhijit and Neha Gupta (2014). “Detection, identification, and estimation of loss aversion: Evidence from an auction experiment,†American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(1): 91–133.
Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2014). “Why do developing countries tax so little?†Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(4): 99–120.
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer (2012). “Salience theory of choice under risk,†Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3): 1243–1285.
- Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer (2013a). “Salience and asset prices,†The American Economic Review, 103(3): 623–628.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer (2013b). “Salience and consumer choice,†Journal of Political Economy, 121(5): 803–843.
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer (2016). “Competition for attention, †Review of Economic Studies, 83(2): 481–513.
Borge, Lars-Erik, Pernille Parmer, and Ragnar Torvik (2015). “Local natural resource curse?†Journal of Public Economics, 131: 101–114.
- Bräutigam, Deborah, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, and Mick Moore (2008). Taxation and statebuilding in developing countries: Capacity and consent, Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Cappelen, Alexander W., Astri Drange Hole, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden (2007). “The pluralism of fairness ideals: An experimental approach,†American Economic Review, 97(3): 818–827.
de la Cuesta, Brandon, Helen Milner, Daniel Nielson, and Steve Knack (2017). “No greater representation with taxation: Experimental evidence from Ghana and Uganda on citizen action toward oil, aid, and taxes,†World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8137.
- de la Cuesta, Brandon, Lucy Martin, Helen V. Milner, and Daniel L. Nielson (2018). “Owning it: Accountability and citizens’ ownership over aid, oil, and taxes,†mimeo, Princeton University.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- de Quervain, D.J., Urs Fischbacher, Valerie Treyer, Melanie Schellhammer, Ulrich Schnyder, Alfred Buck, and Ernst Fehr (2004). “The neural basis of altruistic punishment,†Science, 305(5688): 1254–1258.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Dhami, Sanjit and Ali al Nowaihi (2007). “Why do people pay taxes? Prospect theory versus expected utility theory,†Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64(1): 171–192.
Engström, Per, Katarina Nordblom, Henry Ohlsson, and Annika Persson (2015). “Tax compliance and loss aversion,†American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(4): 132–64.
Ericson, Marzilli, Keith M., and Andreas Fuster (2011). “Expectations as endowments: Evidence on reference-dependent preferences from exchange and valuation experiments, †Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(4): 1879–1907.
Falk, Armin, Anke Becker, Thomas Dohmen, Benjamin Enke, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde (2018). “Global evidence on economic preferences,†Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(4): 1645–1692.
- Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter (2000). “Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity,†Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3): 159–181.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter (2002). “Altruistic punishment in humans,†Nature, 415(6868): 137–140.
Fehr, Ernst and Urs Fischbacher (2003). “The nature of human altruism,†Nature, 425(6960): 785–791.
- Fehr, Ernst and Urs Fischbacher (2004a). “Social norms and human cooperation,†Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(4): 185–190.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Fehr, Ernst and Urs Fischbacher (2004b). “Third-party punishment and social norms,†Evolution and Human Behavior, 25(2): 63–87.
- Fehr, Ernst, Urs Fischbacher, and Simon Gächter (2002). “Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms,†Human Nature, 13(1): 1–25.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2011). “Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audits of local governments,†American Economic Review, 101(4): 1274–1311.
Gadenne, Lucie (2017). “Tax me, but spend wisely? Sources of public finance and government accountability,†American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9(1): 274–314.
Gill, David and Victoria Prowse (2012). “A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition,†American Economic Review, 102(1): 1–35.
Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo (2011). “Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse,†The American Political Science Review, 105(1): 1–26.
- Henrich, Natalie and Joseph Patrick Henrich (2007). Why humans cooperate: A cultural and evolutionary explanation, Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Herb, Michael (2005). “No representation without taxation? rents, development, and democracy,†Comparative Politics, 37(3): 297–316.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hopfensitz, Astrid and Ernesto Reuben (2009). “The importance of emotions for the effectiveness of social punishment,†The Economic Journal, 119(540): 1534–1559.
Jordan, Jillian J, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G Rand (2016). “Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness,†Nature, 530(7591): 473–476.
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979). “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk,†Econometrica, 47(2): 263–291.
- Karl, Terry Lynn (2007). “Ensuring fairness: The case for a transperant fiscal social contract, †in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), “Escaping the Resource Curse,†Columbia University Press, pp. 258–293.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Köszegi, Botond and Adam Szeidl (2013). “A model of focusing in economic choice,†Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(1): 53–104.
Köszegi, Botond and Matthew Rabin (2006). “A model of reference-dependent preferences, †Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4): 1133–1165.
- Köszegi, Botond and Matthew Rabin (2007). “Reference-dependent risk attitudes,†American Economic Review, 97(4): 1047–1073.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Köszegi, Botond and Matthew Rabin (2009). “Reference-dependent consumption plans,†The American Economic Review, 99(3): 909–936.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Lederman, Daniel, Norman V. Loayza, and Rodrigo R. Soares (2005). “Accountability and corruption: Political institutions matter,†Economics & Politics, 17(1): 1–35.
- Mahdavy, Hossein (1970). “The patterns and problems of economic development in rentier states: The case of Iran.†in M. Cook (ed.), “Studies in the history of the Middle East from the rise of Islam to the present day,†Oxford University Press, pp. 428–467.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- MartıÌÂnez, Luis R. (2016). “Sources of revenue and government performance: evidence from Colombia,†mimeo, University of Chicago.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Martin, Lucy (2016). “Taxation, loss aversion and accountability: Theory and exexperiment evidence for taxation’s effect on citizen behavior,†mimeo, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Nelissen, Rob M. A. and Marcel Zeelenberg (2009). “Moral emotions as determinants of third-party punishment: Anger, guilt and the functions of altruistic sanctions,†Judgment and Decision making, 4(7): 543–553.
- OED (2017). “accountability, n.†in “Oxford English Dictionary Online,†Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Paler, Laura (2013). “Keeping the public purse: An experiment in windfalls, taxes, and the incentives to restrain government,†American Political Science Review, 107(4): 706–725.
- points and effort provision,†American Economic Review, 101(2): 470–492. Ahmadov, Anar K. (2014). “Oil, democracy, and context: A meta-analysis,†Comparative Political Studies, 47(9): 1238–1267.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Prichard, Wilson, Paola Salardi, and Paul Segal (2018). “Taxation, non-tax revenue and democracy: New evidence using new cross-country data,†World Development, 109: 295–312.
- Rand, David G and Martin A Nowak (2013). “Human cooperation,†Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8): 413–425.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ross, Michael L. (2001). “Does oil hinder democracy?†World Politics, 53(3): 325–361.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ross, Michael L. (2015). “What have we learned about the resource curse?†Annual Review of Political Science, 18: 239–59.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Sandbu, M. E. (2006). “Natural wealth accounts: A proposal for alleviating the natural resource curse.†World Developement, 34(7): 1153–1170.
- UNDP (2008). Primer on corruption and development, United Nations Development Programme.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Weigel, Jonathan L. (2017). “Building state and citizen: How tax collection in Congo engenders citizen engagement with the state,†mimeo, Harvard University.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now