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Iden%ty	
  &	
  Security	
  In	
  AllJoyn	
  14.06	
  
Tim	
  Kellogg	
  
Saturday,	
  July	
  19	
  2014	
  
hAps://github.com/tkellogg/alljoyn-­‐examples	
  
	
  
hAps://github.com/tkellogg/alljoyn-­‐core/tree/
master/alljoyn_core/src	
  
	
  
hAp://www.slideshare.net/kellogh/security-­‐
iden%ty-­‐in-­‐alljoyn-­‐1406	
  	
  
Embedded	
  Security	
  
Mitsubishi	
  EMI	
  Incident	
  (2003)	
  
•  Brakes	
  disabled	
  when	
  given	
  1000-­‐10000x	
  legal	
  
levels	
  of	
  EMI	
  radia%on	
  
•  Car	
  thinks	
  brakes	
  are	
  locked,	
  so	
  it	
  releases	
  
•  All	
  within	
  limits	
  required	
  by	
  law	
  
Slammer	
  Worm	
  (2003)	
  
•  Nuclear	
  plant	
  safety	
  monitoring	
  disabled	
  for	
  5	
  
hours	
  
•  “The	
  business	
  value	
  of	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  data	
  
within	
  the	
  control	
  center	
  worth	
  the	
  risk	
  of	
  
open	
  connec%ons	
  between	
  the	
  control	
  center	
  
and	
  the	
  corporate	
  network”	
  
•  Unpatched	
  MSSQL	
  Server	
  
Hello,	
  my	
  name	
  is	
  Bruce	
  Schneier	
  and	
  I	
  
think	
  routers	
  are	
  super	
  duper	
  easy	
  to	
  
hack,	
  mostly	
  because	
  you	
  nerds	
  never	
  
patch	
  the	
  so`ware	
  
hAps://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/01/
the_internet_of_thin.html	
  
University	
  of	
  Washington	
  Study	
  (2010)	
  
“We	
  demonstrate	
  that	
  an	
  aAacker	
  who	
  is	
  able	
  
to	
  infiltrate	
  virtually	
  any	
  Electronic	
  Control	
  Unit	
  
(ECU)	
  can	
  leverage	
  this	
  ability	
  to	
  completely	
  
circumvent	
  a	
  broad	
  array	
  of	
  safety-­‐cri%cal	
  
systems”	
  
hAp://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-­‐
oakland2010.pdf	
  
	
  
Hey,	
  check	
  it	
  out!	
  I	
  
made	
  my	
  own	
  
encryp%on	
  algorithm	
  
CIS14: Handling Identity in AllJoyn 14.06
Embedded	
  Needs	
  “Rails”	
  
•  So`ware	
  Updates	
  
•  Security	
  &	
  Iden%ty	
  
•  Communica%on	
  
•  Media	
  Streaming	
  
•  User	
  Interfaces	
  
Distributed	
  Bus	
  
Distributed	
  Bus	
  
Security	
  
Auth	
  Listeners	
  
•  ALLJOYN_RSA_KEYX	
  –	
  X.509	
  cer%ficates	
  
•  ALLJOYN_SRP_KEYX	
  –	
  Show	
  Random	
  PIN	
  
•  ALLJOYN_SRP_LOGON	
  –	
  preset	
  U/P	
  table	
  
•  ALLJOYN_ECDHE_NULL	
  
•  ALLJOYN_ECDHE_PSK	
  	
  
•  ALLJOYN_ECDHE_ECDSA	
  –	
  DSA	
  
ALLJOYN_RSA_KEYX	
  
•  RSA	
  =	
  Asymmetric	
  key	
  encryp%on	
  
•  X.509	
  cer%ficates	
  
– Trusted	
  Cer%ficate	
  Authority	
  
SRP_KEYX	
  &	
  SRP_LOGON	
  
•  Threshold	
  Cryptography	
  
•  No	
  trust	
  required	
  to	
  establish	
  a	
  secure	
  
connec%on	
  
•  LOGON	
  =	
  Username	
  &	
  Password	
  
•  KEYX	
  =	
  A	
  PIN	
  is	
  displayed	
  
ALLJOYN_SRP_KEYX	
  
ECDHE	
  
•  Ellip%c	
  Curve	
  (EC)	
  Cryptography	
  
•  DHE	
  =	
  Diffie-­‐Hellman	
  key	
  Exchange	
  
– Symmetric	
  key	
  encryp%on	
  
ALLJOYN_ECDHE_NULL	
  
•  Ellip%c	
  Curve	
  Encryp%on	
  
•  No	
  verifica%on	
  of	
  iden%ty	
  
ALLJOYN_ECDHE_PSK	
  
•  PSK	
  =	
  Pre-­‐Shared	
  Key	
  
•  Service	
  already	
  has	
  the	
  client’s	
  public	
  key	
  
•  A	
  password	
  may	
  also	
  be	
  used	
  
ALLJOYN_ECDHE_ECDSA	
  
•  ECDSA	
  –	
  Ellip%c	
  Curve	
  Digital	
  Signature	
  
Algorithm	
  
•  Cer%ficate	
  shows	
  iden%ty	
  
CIS14: Handling Identity in AllJoyn 14.06
Ques%ons?	
  
	
  
@kellogh	
  
	
  
	
  
Prac%cal	
  Internet	
  of	
  Things	
  

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CIS14: Handling Identity in AllJoyn 14.06

  • 1. Iden%ty  &  Security  In  AllJoyn  14.06   Tim  Kellogg   Saturday,  July  19  2014  
  • 2. hAps://github.com/tkellogg/alljoyn-­‐examples     hAps://github.com/tkellogg/alljoyn-­‐core/tree/ master/alljoyn_core/src     hAp://www.slideshare.net/kellogh/security-­‐ iden%ty-­‐in-­‐alljoyn-­‐1406    
  • 4. Mitsubishi  EMI  Incident  (2003)   •  Brakes  disabled  when  given  1000-­‐10000x  legal   levels  of  EMI  radia%on   •  Car  thinks  brakes  are  locked,  so  it  releases   •  All  within  limits  required  by  law  
  • 5. Slammer  Worm  (2003)   •  Nuclear  plant  safety  monitoring  disabled  for  5   hours   •  “The  business  value  of  access  to  the  data   within  the  control  center  worth  the  risk  of   open  connec%ons  between  the  control  center   and  the  corporate  network”   •  Unpatched  MSSQL  Server  
  • 6. Hello,  my  name  is  Bruce  Schneier  and  I   think  routers  are  super  duper  easy  to   hack,  mostly  because  you  nerds  never   patch  the  so`ware   hAps://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/01/ the_internet_of_thin.html  
  • 7. University  of  Washington  Study  (2010)   “We  demonstrate  that  an  aAacker  who  is  able   to  infiltrate  virtually  any  Electronic  Control  Unit   (ECU)  can  leverage  this  ability  to  completely   circumvent  a  broad  array  of  safety-­‐cri%cal   systems”   hAp://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-­‐ oakland2010.pdf    
  • 8. Hey,  check  it  out!  I   made  my  own   encryp%on  algorithm  
  • 10. Embedded  Needs  “Rails”   •  So`ware  Updates   •  Security  &  Iden%ty   •  Communica%on   •  Media  Streaming   •  User  Interfaces  
  • 14. Auth  Listeners   •  ALLJOYN_RSA_KEYX  –  X.509  cer%ficates   •  ALLJOYN_SRP_KEYX  –  Show  Random  PIN   •  ALLJOYN_SRP_LOGON  –  preset  U/P  table   •  ALLJOYN_ECDHE_NULL   •  ALLJOYN_ECDHE_PSK     •  ALLJOYN_ECDHE_ECDSA  –  DSA  
  • 15. ALLJOYN_RSA_KEYX   •  RSA  =  Asymmetric  key  encryp%on   •  X.509  cer%ficates   – Trusted  Cer%ficate  Authority  
  • 16. SRP_KEYX  &  SRP_LOGON   •  Threshold  Cryptography   •  No  trust  required  to  establish  a  secure   connec%on   •  LOGON  =  Username  &  Password   •  KEYX  =  A  PIN  is  displayed  
  • 18. ECDHE   •  Ellip%c  Curve  (EC)  Cryptography   •  DHE  =  Diffie-­‐Hellman  key  Exchange   – Symmetric  key  encryp%on  
  • 19. ALLJOYN_ECDHE_NULL   •  Ellip%c  Curve  Encryp%on   •  No  verifica%on  of  iden%ty  
  • 20. ALLJOYN_ECDHE_PSK   •  PSK  =  Pre-­‐Shared  Key   •  Service  already  has  the  client’s  public  key   •  A  password  may  also  be  used  
  • 21. ALLJOYN_ECDHE_ECDSA   •  ECDSA  –  Ellip%c  Curve  Digital  Signature   Algorithm   •  Cer%ficate  shows  iden%ty  
  • 23. Ques%ons?     @kellogh       Prac%cal  Internet  of  Things