Aristotle and Modern Argumentation Theory.pdf

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Argumentation
An International Journal on Reasoning
ISSN 0920-427X
Argumentation
DOI 10.1007/s10503-012-9280-9
On Some Aristotelian Sources of Modern
Argumentation Theory
Christof Rapp & Tim Wagner

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On Some Aristotelian Sources of Modern
Argumentation Theory
Christof Rapp • Tim Wagner
Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Abstract Although he does not provide a general analysis of argumentation,
Aristotle is a highly influential source of modern argumentation theory. In his
treatises the Topics, the Sophistical Refutations and the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents
complementary aspects of a theory of sound arguments that are seen as the most
effective means of persuasion. Aristotle’s central notion of a deductive argument
(sullogismos) does not include references to an addressee, the situative context or
non-verbal aspects of communication, and thus differs from some modern views on
argumentation. A deductive argument in the Aristotelian sense is a sequence of
intellectual steps where the conclusion follows of necessity from the premises.
Aristotle does not relativize or relax this notion but takes other factors into account
by providing supplementary theoretical elements. For example, he reflects on
acceptable premises (endoxa), the adjustment of rhetorical arguments to the horizon
of the audience, methods of finding premises on the basis of argumentative schemes
(topoi), the use of non-argumentative means of persuasion, and a framework of
implicit discourse rules. Many of these themes are, albeit under a different name,
still discussed in modern argumentation theory.
Keywords Aristotle Dialectic Rhetoric Deductive Argument Topoi
Persuasion Fallacy
Ch. Rapp
Lehrstuhl für Philosophie III, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1,
80539 Munich, Germany
e-mail: Office.Ch.Rapp@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
T. Wagner ()
Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6,
10099 Berlin, Germany
e-mail: tim.wagner@hu-berlin.de
123
Argumentation
DOI 10.1007/s10503-012-9280-9
Author's personal copy

Aristotle’s writings provide a fundamental point of reference not only for historical
approaches to argumentation theory, but also for some important modern theories of
argumentation. This does not mean, of course, that all contemporary argumentation
theorists are necessarily Aristotelians in one way or another; it only implies that
down to the present day argument theorists have been profoundly inspired by
Aristotle’s theory of argumentation.
It is a remarkable coincidence that the founding fathers, as it were, of modern
argumentation theory (MAT), Chaı̈m Perleman and Stephen Toulmin, define their
projects by almost identical references to Aristotle: Both of them stress that logic in
the sense that Aristotle calls ‘‘analytical’’ must be complemented by a project that
corresponds to what Aristotle has delineated as ‘‘dialectic’’.1
They also converge in
emphasizing that this dialectical dimension has been unduly neglected by the recent
development of philosophical logic. Against the alleged one-sidedness of formal
logic they both appeal to ancient dialectic in general and Aristotelian dialectic in
particular for the study of real argumentation between concrete interlocutors in
concrete situations. What they actually understand by Aristotelian ‘‘dialectic’’ can
best be seen when one examines their own theories—theories which set the agenda
for major parts of an emerging, modern argumentation theory; the program that is
carried out in The Use of Arguments2
and in The New Rhetoric elaborates on
something like a blend of Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric, where Toulmin’s
argumentation scheme seems to be closer to the Topics, while the systematics of
Chaı̈m Perleman’s and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work is closer to the Rhetoric.
Some subsequent developments of MAT put more stress on the notion of fallacy,
thus also taking Aristotle’s treatise Sophistical refutations into account.3
In all these
cases the recourse to Aristotle is significantly more than a revival of a historical
position. The adaptation of selected Aristotelian theorems by MAT presupposes
specific theoretical interests in the theory of argumentation and requires a
theoretical framework like the one that has emerged from certain developments
in twentieth-century philosophy. If we therefore speak of ‘‘Aristotelian sources’’ of
MAT, we do not imply that these theorists have just picked up ready-made
Aristotelian theorems that were waiting in textbooks and manuals to be rediscov-
ered; we express, on the contrary, our awareness of the fact that these theories
together with their Aristotelian ingredients are the result of the ongoing debate on
how one can make the best sense of the rich, but sometimes ambiguous and
inconsistent, Aristotelian material that has come down to us and of how this material
fits best with the theoretical interests we happen to have.
In this contribution we comment on just this sort of discussion; we try to lay bare
some of the presuppositions made by some of the main representatives of MAT
about the directions of the Aristotelian texts, and we attempt to point out theoretical
options that, to our mind, are present in the Aristotelian texts. Thus, we will touch
not only on Aristotelian theorems that were actually taken up by modern
1
Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 5), and Toulmin (1986, 62).
2
Toulmin (1958).
3
Cf. e.g. Walton and Krabbe (1995), Woods and Walton (1989). On the state of the art in the study of
fallacies see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, chapter 7).
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

argumentation theorists, but also on Aristotelian ideas that are congenial with
certain strands of MAT, but have not yet been explicitly used, finally on points
where the direction of the Aristotelian texts seems to diverge from the modern ideas
they inspired. Of course, we cannot do justice here to the complex state of
discussion in MAT, therefore, we let our agenda be informed by what strike us as
some of the core convictions of the aforementioned founding fathers of MAT, as
well as by a more or less random selection of recent developments in MAT that we
have lately encountered.
1 The Topics and the Rhetoric as Building Blocks of a Unified Theory
of Argumentation?
Let us start with an assumption that seems so obvious that it is seldom really
discussed, but almost always tacitly presupposed, namely the assumption that there
is something like a more or less coherent theory of argumentation in Aristotle. In
fact, there is no single work of Aristotle’s that systematically unfolds his
argumentation theory. The work that comes closest is Aristotle’s Topics—either
alone or together with its sister treatise the Sophistical Refutations. Still, if we look
into the Topics, we find instructions for a quite peculiar sort of discourse, namely the
dialectical examination of philosophical theses on the basis of accepted or
acceptable premises. The exercise that is pictured in the Topics is constrained by a
set of artificial rules that distinguishes the dialectical exercise sharply from more
natural, more conversational and more persuasion-oriented types of argumentation.4
If we look, however, into the Rhetoric—the other place in Aristotle that might be
associated with his argumentation theory—we do find ample material for an account
of persuasiveness; but, again, the types of arguments that are analysed or
recommended in the Rhetoric are inseparably connected with public speaking and
the narrowly defined occasions when these speeches have to be delivered: judicial
speeches in court, political speeches at people’s assemblies, and epideictic speeches
held at certain ceremonial events, most notably funerals.5
Given that neither the Topics nor the Rhetoric provide a general systematic
theory of argumentation, what do we mean, after all, by an ‘‘Aristotelian theory of
argumentation’’? Either we use this idea to refer selectively to particular
Aristotelian theorems or techniques (e.g. the use of topoi) or we use it assuming
that there is something like a more coherent underlying theory that can, in principle,
be pieced together from Aristotle’s works, even if this underlying theory is not
explicitly presented in any particular work. In following the second line of thought
we have to explore whether the scattered ingredients of an Aristotelian theory of
argumentation are interrelated in such a way that, taken together, they make up
something like a coherent whole. For such an enterprise it will probably help to
observe that the Topics and the Rhetoric can, up to a point, be seen as providing
complementary aspects of such a theory of argumentation. For this reason, the
4
Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.
5
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.3.
On Some Aristotelian Sources
123

question whether there is something like a coherent theory of argumentation in
Aristotle partly boils down to the issue of whether and how the two treatises or the
two projects that are carried out in the respective treatises are interrelated, and this
latter purpose, again, depends on some far from trivial assumptions concerning the
nature of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.
In what follows, we try to answer the questions of whether there is such a
common on-going project underlying both the Topics and the Rhetoric, and, if so,
how it might contribute to a unified or coherent theory of argumentation. To this
end, we would like to start off with a preliminary characterisation of both sub-
projects.
It is the declared purpose of the Topics to outline a method by which we can find
arguments for and against any given thesis, so that we will be able to attack or
defend it at will.6
Although this method might, in principle, have manifold
applications, the Topics applies it only to a specific kind of competition, in the
course of which one of two disputants has to defend one of a contradictory pair of
assertions, while his opponent tries to deduce the contradiction of the defendant’s
original claim from assertions to which the defendant has committed himself during
the debate. The aggressor, as it were, plays the role of the questioner, as he is the
one who asks the answerer to assent to certain statements that, once admitted, can be
used as premises for a final conclusion that contradicts the defendant’s original
claim.
Given this general setting, dialecticians as pictured in the Topics, are primarily
interested in conclusive arguments, as it is the very goal of such conversations to
compel the opponent to arrive at and assent to the intended conclusion. If the
dialectical arguments were of a less binding type and were only meant to propose or
suggest the step from the acceptance of certain premises to the acceptance of the
insinuated conclusion, there would be no means by which to make the opponent
accept a certain conclusion or give up his original claim. Some, mostly
inexperienced, disputants may be vulnerable to accepting arguments that appear
to be conclusive without really being so. It may happen that a disputant succeeds in
driving his thesis home with the help of such fallacious arguments; but when the
quality of the disputants’ arguments is assessed—and Aristotle mentions criteria for
this kind of assessment in the eighth book of the Topics7
—the disputant will be
criticized for using fallacious inferences.
Furthermore, the dialectician has to be interested in endoxa, in accepted,
acceptable or reputable assertions, as the answerer, in general, is committed to
accept assertions that are of the acceptable type, and as the answerer would be
foolish to accept assertions which are contrary to them (i.e. paradoxa in contrast to
endoxa).
The themes that are discussed in the dialectical disputations are taken from the
philosophical debates of Aristotle’s time. This is why the examples given for
dialectical theses are mostly general, not particular, in form; only the topoi from the
third book of the Topics are suitable for forming arguments about particular claims.
6
Cf. Aristotle, Topics I.1, 100a
18–21.
7
Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.11.
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

But this is not a major surprise since this third book is most likely an appendix or
even a later addition to the agenda of the second book of the Topics.
Just as the Topics is, thus, interested in conclusiveness and validity, the Rhetoric
deals with persuasiveness. And just as the Topics distinguishes between the valid and
the only seemingly valid, the Rhetoric distinguishes between what is persuasive and
what is only seemingly persuasive.8
Finally, just as the Topics promises to develop a
method by which we can argue for and against any given thesis, the Rhetoric attempts
to determine what can be considered persuasive on any given topic.9
Hence, both
disciplines, dialectic and rhetoric, are, in principle, thematically unrestricted and
attempt to determine the conclusive and the persuasive, respectively—regardless of
whether the case in question is rather true than false or rather good than bad. Still,
although the Rhetoric provides considerations that might be significant for persuasion
in all possible fields of discourse, the three-book treatise that has come down to us
under the title of rhêtorikê technê, turns out to be interested—as already indicated—
only in persuasion in the realm of public speaking. Due to this limited field of
application, the Rhetoric is mostly concerned with particular, non-general topics, such
as whether, say, Alcibiades is guilty or not, but not with what it means to be guilty in
general, or whether, for example, it is useful for the Athenians to build a wall here and
now, but not with whether walls in general contribute to the flourishing of a city,
let alone the question of what the flourishing of a city consists in.
It seems, then, that for Aristotle dialectic and rhetoric are, at least in some
respects, complementary: Dialectic applies to dialogical, face-to-face disputations
about general topics, while rhetoric applies to speeches delivered to mass
audiences on non-general, particular topics. Such a division of labour between the
two projects might be taken as an indication that there is something like an on-
going project involving the two disciplines of dialectic and rhetoric and the
corresponding treatises the Topics and the Rhetoric. However, we must not forget
that even if we take both treatises together, thus obtaining complementary aspects
of a general theory of argumentation, the Topics and the Rhetoric as such do not
provide a general, let alone exhaustive, analysis of argumentation; what we get
are, for example, analyses of particular, contingent issues presented to a public
audience and analyses of general philosophical questions discussed in the
characteristic question–answer format that distinguishes Aristotelian dialectics;
what we do not get, however, is an analysis of, say, arguments about particular
and contingent issues presented in a dialogical face-to-face-situation. Nor do we
get, if our description of the two sub-projects is right, the complementary analysis
of the persuasiveness of arguments in the non-public sphere (given that it is not
the purpose of dialectic to actually persuade or convince an opponent, but to bring
him take positions from which his original position can be defeated). We can
state, then, as an interim result that MAT is perfectly justified in assuming that, to
a certain extent, Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric present something like an on-
going project that covers different aspects of a general theory of argumentation.
At the same time it is important to note that none of these writings aims at
8
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355b
15 et seq.
9
26 et seq.
123

explicitly developing such a general theory, but that all pertinent writings, the
Topics, the Rhetoric and the Sophistical Refutations confine themselves to certain
narrow fields of argumentative discourse; taken together they fill some important
spots on the map of different fields and types of argumentation, but they are far
from providing a complete picture.
2 Delineating Dialectic and Rhetoric
In the previous section we discussed the relation between the Topics and the
Rhetoric and the corresponding fields of dialectic and rhetoric with a view to the
possibility of a coherent Aristotelian theory of argumentation based on a division
of labour. The relation between dialectic and rhetoric, however, is significant in
at least one further respect: different strands of MAT associate themselves with
either dialectic or rhetoric. Up to a point this might be a question of different
terminologies and different traditions, but sometimes the association with one or
the other of these fields indicates actual differences in the theoretical approaches.
Quite tentatively, some of the self-declared dialecticians are more interested in
the difference between sound and fallacious arguments, and some of the
rhetoricians are more interested in all perlocutionary aspects of our speech acts.
The former display an interest in refraining from ‘‘merely’’ psychological
questions, while the latter warn against a too narrow notion of argumentation.
Hence, the delineation between dialectic and rhetoric is definitely an issue in
MAT.10
Against that background, it is natural that authors attempt to position their own
approaches by way of reference to Aristotle, who gave the first elaborate account of
the interrelation of both fields. Unfortunately, the reference to Aristotle and his
model for correlating dialectic and rhetoric does not lead to an unambiguous result,
because his statements to the effect that rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic or an
offshoot of it11
have been deemed highly obscure. Notwithstanding the notorious
difficulties in understanding these formulas, it is beyond all doubt that for Aristotle
dialectic and rhetoric are similar, since neither discipline is conceived as an
epistêmê of a well-defined subject matter; both are rather concerned with arguments
for and against any given position; just as dialecticians command a technê by which
they can attack and defend any given (philosophical) thesis, the rhetorician is
supposed to command a technê in virtue of which he will be able, for example, to
accuse or defend any given defendant in court. Furthermore, both of them deal with
arguments derived solely from accepted or acceptable opinions, and not from
scientific principles. It is possible to delineate the common ground between dialectic
and rhetoric by such similarities. The most basic philosophical rationale, however,
10
Cf. the papers that are collected in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) as well as van Eemeren’s
contribution to this issue.
11
Rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic: Rhetoric I.1, 1354a
1; it is an offshoot of dialectic and the study of
character: I.2, 1356a
25–27, it is a part of dialectic: I.2, 1356a
30 et seq., it is similar to it: I.2, 1356a
31.
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

for Aristotle’s attempt to align rhetoric with dialectic becomes obvious from the
following train of thought:
The activity of persuasion is, as Aristotle points out at the beginning of the
Rhetoric, a kind of proof or proving.12
Why so? People are most convinced, or so
Aristotle says,13
when they take something to have been proven. It is therefore
legitimate to model the persuasive endeavour of the rhetorician as a kind of proof
(apodeixis). Given that all proofs are kinds of sullogismoi—which we take to be
deductive arguments—persuasion can essentially be described in terms of
sullogismoi, i.e. deductive arguments. What Aristotle seems to presuppose is that
persuasion essentially follows the structure of a deductive premise-conclusion
argument: In order to convince the audience of a suggested thesis or suggestion, the
orator has to infer this thesis from what the audience already believes. In a similar
vein, Aristotle claims in the De Anima that each doxa, each opinion in the proper
sense, derives from an inference (sullogismos)—and this is, in Aristotle’s view, the
reason why animals cannot have opinions in the proper sense.
Within whose purview does the deductive argument fall? We would probably say
within the purview of the logician. Aristotle, by contrast, says that it falls within the
purview of the dialectician14
—regardless of whether he simply had no word for
logic in our sense or whether he really meant that it is the dialectician, if anyone,
who is the real expert for all kinds or applications of the sullogismos.
However this may be, if it is true that all sullogismoi fall within the purview of
the dialectician and if the syllogistic, i.e. deductive, premise-conclusion structure is
essential for all persuasive endeavours, then it follows that rhetoric, if it is
concerned with persuasion, essentially relies on the part of dialectic that is
responsible for the sullogismos. Indeed, Aristotle says in the Rhetoric that it is the
dialectician who is in fact responsible for all kinds of sullogismos and that the
dialectician will also become the master of the rhetorical argument if he only
acknowledges the differences between the dialectical and the rhetorical sullogismos.
On this account, there is no fundamental conflict between dialectic and rhetoric.
Furthermore, if sound arguments guarantee the reasonableness of argumentation and
if arguments are thought to be an efficient means of persuasion, neither is there a
fundamental conflict between reasonableness and effectiveness. This, we think, is
the essential rationale behind the dialectical turn of rhetoric initiated by Aristotle;
against rhetorical predecessors who, from Aristotle’s point of view, were too much
concerned with effectiveness, he aspires to show that arguments are central to
persuasion and not less effective than certain techniques by which the rhetorician is
instructed to speak outside the subject. Of course, no argument is thought to be
persuasive as it stands; it is one of the most crucial ingredients of Aristotle’s
rhetorical theory of argumentation that the general dialectical account of arguments
must be adjusted to the hearers and the subject matters of a public speech. And it is
of course true that Aristotle’s theory of persuasion includes moments beside mere
argumentation: Among the three technical means of persuasion (pisteis) there are
12
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355a
4 et sq.
13
5 et sq.
14
8–10.
123

also the emotional state of the audience (pathos) and the character or credibility of
the speaker (êthos); to this list we might add the linguistic form (lexis) and the order
of the parts of speech (taxis). There have been many scholarly debates about how
these non-argumentative means of persuasion (or should they also be called
‘‘argumentative’’ in some way? See Sect. 6, below) are related to logos, argument15
;
however, there are many indications that the introduction of these non-argumen-
tative means of persuasion are not meant to relativize the central role of
argumentation; after all, almost three-fourths of the text of Rhetoric I and II are
dedicated to argumentation in the narrow sense, and when Aristotle turns to the
discussion of lexis in Rhetoric III, he stresses that this is only a secondary concern.16
Also, when Aristotle says that it is necessary not only to look at the argument, but
also to present oneself as a certain kind of person and to prepare the emotional state
of the audience, as rhetoric always aims at the judgment of the audience,17
it seems
as if the non-argumentative means are required just to stabilize the audience’s
judgment formation and thus to enhance the effect of the given arguments.18
However one construes these aspects of the Aristotelian theory in detail, it seems
clear that the model he offers for reconciling dialectic and rhetoric is one in which
rhetoric is firmly based on dialectic, and rhetorical effectiveness is thought to flow
from reasonable arguments—assuming they are suitably chosen—and to not ask too
much of the audience of a public speech.19
3 Aristotelian Arguments and MAT Argumentation: A Mismatch?
Every argumentation theory should include an elucidation of what it is to be an
argument and what is meant by ‘‘argumentation’’. It is not entirely trivial, however,
to map Aristotle’s contributions to the definition of arguments onto the consensus of
MAT. As for MAT, there are, of course, many different approaches to defining
arguments and argumentation. There are, however, some recurring characterisations
that we would like to take as a starting point. Toulmin, to begin with, emphasizes
that while formal logic is concerned with propositions, argumentation theory deals
with concrete utterances.20
In a similar vein, Perelman loves to contrast
demonstration with argumentation: While demonstration proceeds in an impersonal
and abstract way, argumentation is always addressed at somebody; it ‘‘aims at
gaining the adherence of minds’’.21
Finally, in van Eemeren and Grootendorst
15
For a brief and useful overview see Kienpointner (2011, 10–12).
16
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric III.1, 1403b
18–20.
17
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1, 1377b
21–24.
18
For an elaboration of this view, see Rapp (2012).
19
Put in such general terms, this goal seems to be congenial with more recent developments in MAT:
‘‘The Aristotelian rhetorical norm of successful persuasion is not necessarily in contradiction with the
ideal of reasonableness that lies at the heart of the pragma-dialectical approach’’ (van Eemeren and
Houtlosser 1999, 165). We owe this reference to Kientpointner (2011).
20
Cf. Toulmin (1996).
21
Cf. e.g. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 14), Perelman (1994, 85).
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

argumentation is defined as ‘‘a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at
convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward
a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the propositions expressed in
the standpoint.’’22
Let us leave it at that for the moment and go back to Aristotle.
First, it seems that there is no single word or terminus in Aristotle equivalent to
‘‘argument’’. In Topics I.12 he writes that there are two kinds of dialectical logos,
and then he hastens to distinguish between sullogismos and epagôgê—which is best
rendered as deductive and inductive argument. What most nearly approximates the
notion of an argument in this context is logos—but this word’s lack of specificity is
almost proverbial. The most neutral meaning in this context is that a logos is a
sequence of words, but this reading renders the division into exactly two kinds
inappropriate. Of course, logos can also be translated as ‘‘reason’’—the faculty of
reasoning as well as the reasons we can give. That arguments have to do with
reasoning is clear, as is the fact that providing reasons for what we maintain is close
to the notion of arguing. It seems, then, that due to these several ingredients,
Aristotle finds it natural to use the word logos as a generic term for what the two
irreducible forms of argument, sullogismos and epagôgê, have in common. In the
same chapter of the Topics Aristotle also states that an epagôgê is given when we
proceed from the particular to the general.23
This is why epagôgê came to be
translated as ‘‘induction’’ or ‘‘inductive argument’’. In the Rhetoric Aristotle briefly
revisits the issue of induction and tells us that the rhetorical form of induction is an
example of an argument which proceeds not from the particular to the general, but
from one particular to another.24
The sad truth about the theory of induction in
Aristotle is that this is almost all he has to say about it. In both treatises, the Topics
and the Rhetoric, he hastens to get back to the sullogismos, and in both fields,
dialectic and rhetoric, he seems to be almost oblivious to the inductive form of
argumentation and models both dialectical disputation and rhetorical persuasion
almost entirely in terms of ‘‘syllogistic’’, i.e. sullogismos-based, reasoning. Possibly,
this privileging of the sullogimos can be partly relativized, as Eggs (1992, 918)
suggests, if we assume that in some passages the word sullogismos takes over the
role of the missing generic concept for both forms of arguments, but it remains true
and indisputable that major parts of Aristotle’s argumentation theory are centred
around the notion of sullogismos, while the corresponding inductive form of
argumentation is widely neglected.
What is meant in Aristotle by sullogismos? Aristotle defines the sullogismos as an
argument in which, certain things being supposed, something different from the
suppositions results of necessity from them.25
According to this definition, the
sullogismos is roughly what we would call a deductive argument; it is remarkable
that this definition does not refer to the syllogistic theory that is developed in the
Prior Analytics. This means that when Aristotle speaks of the sullogismos in the
Topics and the Rhetoric (which, by the way, uses the same definition of sullogismos)
22
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, 1).
23
13 et seq.
24
25–36.
25
25–27.
123

we should not expect the formally restricted canonical sullogismos that we know
from the syllogistic theory, with exactly two premises and three terms, one of which
is the middle term, etc. The Topics seems to be entirely untouched by this theory
and hence it is no surprise that the arguments we do find in the Topics and in the
Rhetoric do not obey to any formal restriction of this kind. That they are formally
less rigid than the arguments from Aristotle’s syllogistic theory does not mean,
however, that they are meant to be logically more relaxed. On the contrary, the
definition quoted makes clear that the conclusion of a sullogismos is something that
follows of necessity from the premises.
According to Aristotle’s definition, it is certainly true of the sullogismos that it
includes a constellation of propositions put forward in order to justify the
proposition that is expressed as the conclusion. On the basis of the same definition it
seems, however, that the justification is only seen as successful if the conclusion
follows of necessity from the premises. In comparison to modern accounts, which
only expect that in argumentation we try to make our standpoint more acceptable or
reasonable or that we justify it one way or another, this would be a much more
severe constraint. It is also clear that the notion of the sullogismos is neutral with
respect to the difference between demonstration and (dialectical) argumentation.
The definition of the sullogismos that is used either with scientific principles in order
to provide a scientific demonstration or with (only) accepted opinions in order to
serve as a dialectical argument is the same in both cases. This corresponds to the
fact that, as opposed to the MAT definitions we mentioned, the audience and the
expected effect on the audience is not mentioned in Aristotle’s definition of the
sullogismos.
On the basis of this brief and preliminary comparison we can state the following
possibly substantial discrepancies (disregarding the fact that, as we said, the notion
of sullogismos covers only one of the two species that fall under the generic notion
of argument): (1) In comparison to a rich notion of argumentation that includes a
reference to the addressee the notion of the sullogismos seems to be rather
underdetermined. Looking from this perspective, it seems promising not to take the
‘‘bare’’, as it were, notion of sullogismos as possibly equivalent to the MAT notion
of argumentation, but to look at the class of arguments with ‘‘endoxic’’ premises, i.e.
premises that are accepted by certain addressees.26
(2) According to some—not
all—MAT-accounts of argumentation, the addressee’s readiness to find a standpoint
acceptable can be increased by many means, both verbal and non-verbal, and not
only by putting forward premise-like constellations of propositions. From this point
of view, the Aristotelian premise-conclusion model of argumentation may seem too
narrow. One possible response would be to include means of persuasion that do not
belong to logos, as Aristotle puts it, in the notion of argumentation (see Sect. 6,
below); there is the risk, however, that we might broaden the notion of
argumentation to the point where everything that is possibly persuasive is rated
as argument, which is most probably not Aristotle’s intention. Another, more
conservative response would be to look for places where Aristotle himself
cautiously broadens the concept of argument. One such passage, e.g., would be the
26
See Sect. 4, below; there will be, however, different uses of the accepted premises.
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

discussion of maxims in Rhetoric II.21, where Aristotle acknowledges that
arguments can be given without the explicit use of the premise-conclusion scheme:
In the maxims ‘‘Being a mortal, do not cherish immortal anger’’ or ‘‘A mortal
should think mortal, not immortal, thoughts’’ the reason is, as Aristotle says,
implicitly given by the mention of ‘‘mortal’’.27
(3) The conviction that deductive
arguments are nearly omnipresent (Aristotle defines the sullogismos as deductive
argument and finds sullogismoi in everything from logic and dialectic to scientific
demonstration and rhetoric) seems to be absent from most MAT schools. Even those
who are concerned about the reasonableness of argumentation need not require all
acceptable arguments to be deductive; quite often it seems to be sufficient that the
transition from a premise to a conclusion seems to be reasonable—but not
necessary—under the given circumstances. This would be a substantial discrepancy.
For this reason it seems that Aristotle’s notion of an argument can be adapted to
MAT and fully modernized only if we can find hints of more ‘‘relaxed’’ notions of
argument in Aristotle. It is widely held that one can find such a notion in Aristotle’s
Rhetoric. Let us briefly examine this possibility:
Taking up a terminus from traditional rhetoric, Aristotle calls the rhetorical form
of proof an ‘‘enthymeme’’. Again and again he stresses that the enthymeme28
is a
kind of sullogismos or that it is the rhetorical form of the sullogismos, i.e. of the
deductive argument, while the example is the rhetorical version of the inductive
argument. As we have already said, Aristotle even invokes the dialectician’s
expertise in all kinds of sullogismos for the construction of enthymemes. Even the
advocates of ‘‘relaxed’’ arguments must admit that so far this entire setting does not
indicate any relaxation for rhetorical arguments. They therefore take recourse to the
definition of the enthymeme in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where they try to detect
indications of a more relaxed way of arguing. In fact, the definition of the
enthymeme slightly modifies the standard definition of the sullogismos that we
discussed above; in rhetoric we speak of an enthymeme, Aristotle says, when,
‘‘certain things being the case, something different beside them results because of
their being either universally or for the most part the case.’’29
The most
controversial modification of the standard definition obviously lies in the
qualification ‘‘for the most part’’. On the one hand, if this qualification was meant
to qualify the inference itself—indicating that the conclusion does not follow of
necessity, but only for the most part—then, indeed, the idea of a deductive argument
would have to be abandoned. On the other hand, it is also possible to understand this
definition as saying that the premises maintain something to be the case either
universally or (only) for the most part. This latter reading would qualify the status of
the premise(s), not the inference itself. One could argue now, from a modern point
of view, that a premise that holds only for the most part or is only probable does not
allow for any necessary, but only for probable inferences. Again, this would result in
a remarkable deviation from, and a relaxation of, the deductive model. However, it
27
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II.21, 1394b
20–25.
28
There is a long-standing tradition that takes the enthymeme to be an incomplete syllogism. This is not
Aristotle’s view: see below, Sect. 4.
29
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric. I.2 1356b
15–17. For a different interpretation cf. Burnyeat (1994).
123

seems that this is not Aristotle’s view, for he seems to be happy with saying that
what follows from a for-the-most-part premise is a for-the-most-part conclusion, but
that this modally qualified conclusion still follows of logical necessity (‘‘If such-
and-such is for the most part true, then it follows of necessity that something else is
for the most part true’’). On this account, Aristotle is being generous in granting that
due to the contingent subject matter of a public speech the premises and the
conclusions of rhetorical arguments very rarely express necessities, but he is still
insistent on his view that the deductive scheme can be used for relating for-the-
most-part premises to for-the-most-part conclusions.30
In recent scholarship the deductivist reading of Aristotle’s enthymemes has come
under scrutiny by interpreters who are obviously interested in bringing Aristotle
closer to the insights of MAT. Here, it seems quite clear that it is not Aristotle who
inspired MAT, but MAT that encouraged certain readings of Aristotle. Whichever
reading will prevail in the long run, it seems fair to say that Aristotle heavily relied
on his deductive scheme, that he stressed the less stringent character of rhetorical
premises rather than the possibility of less rigid inferences and that, if he was really
willing to deviate from the deductive scheme, he was not quite explicit in doing so.
4 Paying Attention to the Addressee’s Convictions and Capacities
As we said at the outset of this paper, MAT sets itself off from the analytic part of
logic or from the fixation on formal aspects of arguments by emphasizing that all
arguments are directed to concrete addressees with individual convictions. If
argumentation in general, as for example Perelman stresses,31
aims at increasing the
addressee’s readiness to approve a suggested point of view, a substantial account of
argumentation has to take into account what different groups of hearers are
convinced of and how arguments can be adjusted to the convictions of the people
they address.
If we look for an equivalent interest in Aristotle, we will first be faced with his
highly developed account of the role of endoxa—accepted, acceptable or reputable
opinions that play a major role in both his Topics and his Rhetoric. The dialectical
argument is defined by Aristotle as an argument, sullogismos, from accepted or
acceptable (endoxa) premises. This is what distinguishes dialectical from scientific
arguments,32
as the latter have to apply premises that are true (i.e. established as
true) and, as Aristotle puts it, ‘‘first’’. For the dialectical disputation, it does not
matter whether the deployed premises are true or not; it suffices that they are
acceptable and that they have actually been accepted or granted by the dialectical
interlocutor. Neither does it matter whether the defendant who grants a certain
premise is personally convinced of the truth of this premise or not. Due to the rules
30
At this point the supporter of relaxed rhetorical arguments could refer to one type of the sign-
enthymeme, which, as Aristotle says, does not yield a sullogismos, but is nevertheless rated as
‘‘enthymeme’’. The status of such arguments, however, is precarious, since in some passages Aristotle
treats them straightforwardly as fallacies (see below, Sect. 7).
31
Cf. Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, § 3 et seqq).
32
29–100b
23.
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

of a dialectical disputation, he has no choice but to accept it if it is accepted by all,
by most or by the experts—provided he cannot come up with a counterexample. For
the rhetorician, on the contrary, everything depends on whether he is able to provide
premises that coincide with the convictions of the audience. It is the fundamental
idea of Aristotle’s technique of persuasion that it is possible to bring an audience to
an intended conclusion by appealing to the audience’s extant convictions and by
inferentially connecting these pre-existing convictions with the insinuated conclu-
sion. For this reason, the endoxa, the acceptable assertions that are used by the
rhetorician, are only a subset of the assertions that can be considered by the
dialectician; in a word, the rhetorician is not interested in the variety of accepted
opinions, but only in what a given audience might possibly be convinced of. In
dialectic, it is not the aim of the dialectical competitor to change the opponent’s
conviction or attitude; he can be content if he succeeds in compelling the competitor
to accept the insinuated conclusion; in rhetoric, by contrast, the rhetorician is
expected to steer the audience’s judgment formation up to the point that people give
their vote or cast their ballot in accordance with what the rhetorician suggests. To
achieve this, the rhetorician cannot rely on the audience’s willingness to obey
certain procedural rules (as the dialectical competitors are bound to do). Either the
rhetorician succeeds in tracing the intended conclusion back to the audience’s pre-
existing convictions or he has no influence whatsoever on what they decide.
We can then say that although both dialectic and rhetoric make use of accepted
opinions, endoxa, they do not use the same set of endoxa, they do not use them for the
same purpose and they do not use them in the same way. Although all dealings with
endoxa fall within the purview of the dialectician, it is the field of rhetoric that
applies the use of endoxa in a way that comes close to the interests of MAT to
systematically include the addressee’s individual conviction or mental horizon in the
study of arguments. In a similar vein, Aristotle says in the Rhetoric that whatever is
persuasive is persuasive to somebody.33
However, he admits that not even the
rhetorician can pick out individual convictions, but must confine himself to what is
persuasive to people of a certain general type.34
In practice, when the orator is
confronted with a mass audience he often has to start from quite general or
widespread convictions (koina),35
without being able to do justice to individual
preference or to preferences of certain groups (e.g. the young, the elderly, the rich,
the poor, etc.36
)—however that might be, this is one example where we could say that
although the scope of Aristotle’s is quite limited (here: limited to the expectations of
a mass audience of a public speech), the theoretical instrument for generally
incorporating the convictions and expectations of the addressees is actually present.
Beside the system of the endoxa, there is another important aspect of how
Aristotelian rhetoric tries to adjust arguments to the addressee’s intellectual horizon:
when Aristotle describes the peculiarities of rhetorical arguments, to which he
33
26 et seq.
34
28–34.
35
27.
36
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.12–17. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 20), refer to these chapters as
contributions to the rhetorician’s knowledge of the audience.
123

assigns the traditional rhetorical term ‘‘enthymeme’’, he stresses that the rhetorical
proofs must not be taken from ‘‘too far away’’, because the typical hearer of a public
speech is supposed to be a simple person who is not able to follow long chains of
argument.37
Due to a long-standing interpretative tradition which understands
Aristotelian enthymemes to be abbreviated arguments in which one of the required
premises is suppressed, commentators have often taken this remark as a comment
on the suppression of premises. In fact, what Aristotle says is that enthymemes must
not be as precise as a scientific demonstration and that they should be shorter than
ordinary dialectical arguments. This, however, is not to say that the enthymeme is
defined by incompleteness and brevity. The orator can avoid lengthy chains of
arguments by selecting the right premises, i.e. premises that are not too far from the
intended conclusions. On this reading, it seems that it is essential for the rhetorical
argument that it be adjusted to the capacity, expectation and intellectual horizon of
the given audience. The drawback, however, is that Aristotle’s effort to adjust
arguments to public audiences remains rather one-dimensional, as all these
arrangements are made with a view to the intellectual insufficiency of a public
mass audience.
5 The Uses of Topoi
We have already said that in the Rhetoric the sullogismos falls within the purview of
the dialectician. Part of this purview certainly consists in a sullogismos in the way
we discussed above in Sect. 3. It is likely, however, that the dialectician’s
competence also includes the ability to discern valid and invalid arguments or to
overlook, in general, the manifold ways in which such sullogismoi can be construed.
In the Topics the long catalogues of topoi seem to present different ways of
construing such deductive arguments. If we regard the topoi as something like
argumentative schemes, acquainting ourselves with these schemes will help us to
identify valid arguments, just as acquainting ourselves with a list of possible
fallacies will help us to detect deceptive arguments. At the same time, the catalogue
of topoi can be seen as a manual for the construction of arguments. How exactly the
topoi guide us in finding and constructing arguments is a controversial issue.38
The
minimal scholarly consensus is that the topoi are meant to be useful for the
construction of premises for a given conclusion. This means that we already have to
know the conclusion we intend to draw (within the dialectical game this is the
contradiction of what the opponent says), and that the topos helps us to construe a
premise from which we can deduce the intended conclusion—provided the
opponent assents to this premise. In the literature this is often called the ‘‘inventive’’
function of a topos. According to this inventive function the topos contributes to the
task of premise selection (although it is not the topos itself that determines whether
the required premise is an endoxon or not). We, at least, think that the topos has not
37
17–22.
38
Cf. De Pater (1965) and the introduction to Brunschwig (1967); for a brief summary of the scholarly
discussion see also Wagner and Rapp (2004, 29–35).
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

only this inventive but also a probative function in that it also guarantees the
transition from the premises to the conclusion (if the topos, e.g., says that whatever
holds of the genus, must also hold of each species, then the same topos is a warrant,
as it were, for the transition from a premise concerning a particular genus to a
conclusion about its species).
What we should add about the use of topoi is this: the use of topoi is essential for
both projects, the Topics and the Rhetoric. In the Topics the topoi deployed are not
dependent on specific subjects or themes. Therefore, the topoi here are mostly taken
from semantic, logical or otherwise general rules. In the Rhetoric Aristotle
distinguishes between general and specific topoi, where the general correspond to
the topoi of the Topics39
and the specific are such in the sense that they can only be
used to construe arguments with a specific predicate, for example arguments about
what is good, just or noble. If Aristotle says that the latter type of topoi, the specific,
are more appropriate for rhetorical use, this certainly reflects the difference we
already alluded to, i.e. that dialectic is mostly about general topics, while rhetoric
aims at judgments about particular states of affairs.
The Aristotelian technique of topoi has generally met with sympathy and
approval by the proponents of MAT. Quite generally, the Aristotelian topoi are
often invoked as ‘‘role models’’ when the notion of an argumentation scheme is
introduced. In particular, Toulmin’s general analysis of the structure of argumen-
tation introduces the important notion of an ‘‘inference warrant’’,40
and it has often
been observed that the role of these warrants resembles that of the topoi in
Aristotle41
—at least in its probative function. In legal theory Viehweg appealed to
Gian Battista Vico’s contraposition of the old rhetorical/topical and the new critical/
geometrical method42
; Viehweg attempts to show that within the realm of
jurisprudence, the topical method (for which he explicitly refers to Aristotle and
Cicero) is far superior to the axiomatic-systematic approach. Perelman, too, often
highlights that in jurisdiction there are remnants of the old rhetorical art of
argumentation. He regards Aristotelian topoi as the most general premises, but
wishes to distinguish his own use of loci from the Aristotelian one; first, he attempts
to get rid of what he takes to be a metaphysical contamination of Aristotelian
39
Even if most of the general topoi in the Rhetoric are not really general in the same sense as the topoi of
the Topics are; most are general only in the sense that they can be used in all three genres of speech, while
the specific ones are always peculiar to one such genre or to one of the key notions of a genre, ‘‘just’’ in
the judicial speech, ‘‘good’’ in the forensic speech, and ‘‘noble’’ in the epideictic speech. Still, the notion
of a general topos in the Rhetoric clearly refers back to the project of the Topics, though only five out of
28 general topoi in Rhetoric II.23 clearly resemble the topoi of the Topics (1397a
7–19, 1397a
20–23,
1397b
12–174
, 1397b
174
–27, 1399a
6–9). Insofar as the topoi in the Topics rest on, as we have said,
semantic, logical or otherwise general rules it makes little sense to stress, as Warnick (2000, 111 et seq.)
does, the cultural dependency of these topoi. As an example Warnick introduces the topos from the
opposites—that if a and b are opposites and a has the quality q, the opposite of quality q can be predicated
of b. To our mind, this is just one application of Aristotle’s complex logical system of opposites and does
not indicate specific cultural preferences. Revealingly, Warnick uses the example that Aristotle gives
afterwards to make her point, not the general scheme.
40
Cf. Toulmin (1958, Chapter 3).
41
Cf. Bird (1961).
42
Cf. Viehweg (1963, §§ 1–2).
123

topoi,43
and second, he tries to preserve the term for premises about what is valuable
and preferable.44
Others have tried to show that the argument schemes that
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca unfold in The New Rhetoric45
broadly correspond to
the common topoi in Aristotle’s Rhetoric II.23. Indeed, several accounts of
argumentation schemes have been development in MAT quite independently from
Aristotle, but with an awareness of the historical origins of such schemes, e.g.
Kientpointner and Walton, to mention only two, have worked extensively on such
an argumentation theory.46
Kienpointner and Rigotti have also stressed the
inventive/generative aspect of Aristotelian topoi; Rigotti has even labeled them as
‘‘argument generators’’.47
Tetens observes that formal logic is of limited use for
argumentation training. He refers to the ancient tradition in general and the
Aristotelian tradition in particular, which abstracted paradigmatic arguments to
more general argumentation schemes which are limited to certain fields and themes,
and are not universally applicable. The formulation of such argumentation patterns
and the use of such patterns in making students sensible of differences between
good and bad argumentation belong, as Tetens puts it, to the realm of topics, as
originally formulated by Aristotle.48
In the light of these few examples it seems that the success of Aristotle’s
technique of topoi in MAT is undisputed. We would nevertheless like to point out
some differences between Aristotle’s use of topoi and the various uses that MAT
has made of them:
43
What Perelman means by ‘‘metaphysical’’ is Aristotle’s system of the four predicables (definition,
accidental predicate, genus, proprium), by which the topoi of the Topics are structured and from which
many of the general rules that make up the topoi are taken. It is certainly true that, e.g., the difference
between essential and accidental predicates rest on a certain metaphysics; it is still disputable whether this
topical system is therefore ‘‘metaphysically loaded’’. After all, the way in which the predicables are
introduced in the Topics gives clear criteria for the distinction of four sorts of predicates and does not
appeal to specific theorems of Aristotle’s metaphysics.
44
This is obviously the reason for Perelman’s somewhat surprising interest in the topoi of Aristotle,
Topics III (Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, § 21, and Perelman 1994, Chapter II.4). This narrow
focus is surprising, since, as we already said, the topoi of book III of the Topics are in several respects
exceptional within the Topics, most notably because they (also) apply to practical-particular and to
philosophical-general questions.
45
Cf. Warnick (2000, 109): I. The quasi logical ones: contradiction, incompatibility (1), identity,
definition, analyticity, tautology (2), reciprocity, rule of justice (3), transitivity, inclusion, division (4),
weights, measures, probabilities (5), II. The ones based on the structure of reality: (liaisons of succession
(6), liaisons of coexistence (7), symbolic liaisons, double hierarchies, differences of degree and order (8),
III. The ones establishing the structure of reality: example (9), illustration (10), model and anti-model
(11), analogy and metaphor (12), IV. Dissociation.—To be honest, we find not only Warnick’s general
account of the general topoi questionable (see footnote 39 above), but also regard many of the similarities
between Aristotle and The New Rhetoric she wishes to discover quite superficial. The problem is that
many of the common or general topoi of the Rhetoric are—due to Aristotle’s use of historical speeches—
too narrowly formulated and not really abstracted from the examples used.
46
Cf. Kienpointner (1997). Among the many titles by Walton we just want to mention one of his most
recent works on argumentation schemes: Walton et al. (2008). This latter book generously includes a
historical survey of argumentation schemes (chapter 8). Unfortunately, the section on Aristotelian topoi
turns out to be quite distorting, so that no informative conclusion about Walton’s view of Aristotle can be
drawn. For Kienpointner on Aristotle see Kienpointner (2005, 2011).
47
Cf. Rigotti (2007).
48
Cf. Tetens (2011), in particular, 491 et seqq., see also Tetens (2004, 54).
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

Quite often when Aristotle’s technique of topoi is invoked by MAT-authors the
topical approach is used to construe a contrast between the topical method and all
sorts of deductive reasoning. The assumption of such a contrast is certainly correct
in one important way, but it is also misleading in several other ways. It is right, to
begin with, also from an Aristotelian point of view to say that the topical method is
different from an axiomatic-deductive method; when using Aristotelian topoi for
construing arguments we choose a particular topos out of a plurality of topoi and we
take the reliability of the topos for granted, without investigating its credentials. We
are not interested, unlike those taking an axiomatic-deductivist approach, in
reducing the multitude of topoi to a few axioms or in deriving the topoi or the
conclusions we drew with their help from first, improvable axioms. This is, we
think, the basic sense, in which the topical and the axiomatic methods are opposed.
This does not exclude, however, the possibility of inquiring into some more general
rules or principles that govern several sets of topoi. For example, in the Topics many
topoi are derived from the rules inherent in the four kinds of predication (the
predicables), while others derive from the rules implied by the several forms of
oppositions, from the genius-species-relation, etc. Even in ancient times, commen-
tators were therefore seeking to identify such general ‘‘maxims’’.49
It would also be misleading to separate the use of topoi from deductions by making
topoi a mere matter of invention (of premises), while the construction of the
corresponding arguments is left to the logician. Such a characterization of Aristotelian
topoi derives from a traditional picture of the division of labour between Aristotle’s
Topics and his Analytica. According to this tradition, the Topics is exclusively
concerned with the finding of premises, while the business of logic is left to another
discipline. This tradition obviously derives from an over-systematization of the
Aristotelian Organon. It is more plausible to assume, as we have already said, that for
Aristotle the topoi also represented different modes of how a sullogismos can be
conclusive, and thus he meant to ascribe an additional probative function to the topoi.
Most notably, it is misleading to use Aristotle’s topical approach to construe a contrast
between topical and deductively valid arguments. A widespread assumption is that as
soon as topoi enter the stage, people are no longer really interested in deductive
arguments, but in mere plausibility, in inferences that seem likely, understandable and
in accordance with common opinion, but that do not necessarily form a valid deductive
argument. It is quite obvious where this picture comes from, if we take into account
that topoi regularly occur together with endoxa, accepted premises, in Aristotle’s
dialectics. However, within an Aristotelian frame this picture appears misleading on
closer examination, as in Aristotle’s dialectic topoi are supposed to construe
sullogismoi (deductive arguments) that are formally equivalent to scientific demon-
strations. Dialectical arguments differ from demonstrations not in their form or logical
rigour, but only in the quality of the premises.50
For Aristotle, then, there is no tension
between the use of topoi and the adherence to deductive arguments.
49
Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top. II, 135, 2 et seq. (Wallies); for the idea of grouping
several topoi under more general headings, see also Rapp (2000).
50
The same is also true of rhetorical arguments or enthymemes, which are defined as sorts of sullogismoi
(see above, Sect. 3).
123

Finally, it is misleading if the Aristotelian use of topoi is captured by the contrast
of formal and material reasoning or argumentation.51
As we have said, many of the
general topoi of the Topics are taken from rules that derive from the several types of
predication. If, e.g., a thesis expresses a definitional predication, then it is clear that
whatever holds for the subject must also hold for the (defining) predicate and vice
versa. If a topos is derived from such rules, it is the form of predication and not the
content that matters and, hence, such a topos is far from being ‘‘material’’. This is
also the reason why the restricted applicability of topoi is sometimes overempha-
sized.52
In the Topics the system of topoi is supposed to provide arguments for and
against any thesis, regardless of content, and for that purpose a ‘‘material’’ character
and the resulting limited applicability are not useful. What these MAT authors seem
to have in mind are rather specific topoi, as we find them in the first book of the
Rhetoric. These topoi, however, are often understood as merely providing
acceptable opinions on different subjects, while a topos in the proper sense is
expected to do more, i.e. to ‘‘find’’ or to ‘‘construe’’ a premise or to formulate a
complete argument. Whether and how the specific topoi match up to this
expectation has seldom been examined.53
At any rate, it would be mistaken to
take the less interesting lists of specific topoi as paradigmatic for all Aristotelian
topoi.
6 Character and Emotions: Towards a Broader Notion of Argumentation?
Aristotle’s theory of argumentation as it is laid out in the Topics does not seem to be
interested in factors related to interpersonal communication situations. Arguments
are primarily seen as sequences of intellectual steps. Their linguistic realization, the
form in which they are presented and their effect on the hearers are only touched
upon at random. Aristotle’s treatise on the art of rhetoric, by contrast, even though it
rather focuses on monologic speeches and not on dialogical situations, is less
restricted; the person of the speaker, the disposition and horizon of the hearer, the
general situation and context are all taken into consideration. This leads to the
question whether the rather narrow notion of argumentation that can be found in the
Topics (and likewise in the Analytics) is altered to fit into the framework of the
Rhetoric. If so, Aristotle could be seen as an early source of broader, more
pluralistic notions of argumentation, as they are discussed in MAT.
From a technical point of view the addressee can be persuaded through proof and
argument (logos), by displaying the speaker’s character (êthos) and by arousing the
emotions of the audience (pathos). These so-called ‘‘technical’’ means of persuasion
51
This contrast is emphasized by Toulmin (1986), passim. According to an often quoted example from
Toulmin (1958) the premise that a Swede can generally be taken not to be a Roman Catholic can be used
as warrant for the inference that, if Peter is a Swede, he is almost certainly not a Roman Catholic. If such
empirical facts belong to what Toulmin takes to be ‘‘material’’ in contrast to ‘‘formal’’, then none of
Aristotle’s general or common topoi and only a few of his specific topoi would qualify as material.
52
Cf. Toulmin (1996, 303) and Tetens (2011, 491).
53
Some attempts at construing specific topoi not as ready-premises, but as tools that are supposed to
generate arguments, are made in Rapp (2002, vol. II, 290–298).
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

can be coordinated to the three vertices of the triangle of speaker, hearer and subject
matter. The theory of persuasion as it is laid out in the Rhetoric thus broadens the
scope of the analysis. Whereas the theory of the Topics neglected or idealized the
vertices of speaker and hearer (by imposing artificial procedural rules on them), the
Rhetoric seems to raise them to the same level as the subject matter and the
corresponding means of persuasion, i.e. proof or argument.
The aspects of persuasion which we may call ‘‘non-argumentative’’—just for the
purpose of contrasting them with proofs or arguments in the narrow sense—may
interfere with or impede theintended persuasion process. Ifthe audience does not think
that the speaker is trustworthy, the best argument will fail to achieve the desired effect.
And if the hearers happen to be in an emotional state that prevents their minds from
forming clear thoughts, they will presumably not even be able to follow the speaker’s
train of thought. Conversely, the rhetorician may use the strong personal impact he
makes or the emotional disposition he arouses for emphasizing or highlighting those
aspects of the subject matter that are capable of influencing the audience’s judgment.
Aristotle does not give a very detailed account of the non-argumentative means
of persuasion. And the little he actually says about them is stated rather negatively,
in that it tells us what should be avoided, rather than positively instructing us on
how to support the argumentative strategy; persuasion may be accomplished by
showing character virtues the lack of which would prevent the audience from
believing that the speaker is trustworthy. If the speaker does not display practical
intelligence, the audience will not be inclined to believe that he has anything true to
say about the case at hand. But it may also be the case that a person is competent
and intelligent but seems to lack moral integrity. If the hearers have doubts about the
virtuous character of the speaker, they may concede that he is clever but refrain
from accepting what he says because he may pursue aims which are not acceptable
to them. And if the speaker is perceived as competent and virtuous, the possibility
still remains that he has, for whatever reason, an aversion to the audience. If the
speaker appears to lack goodwill for the audience and seems to display subtle
hostility or arrogance, the readiness to adopt his views will completely disappear.
If the rhetorician succeeds in presenting himself as a trustworthy person, the
audience forms a second-order judgment that what is put forward by a credible
person should be accepted. This second-order judgment has nothing to do with the
subject matter of the speech. And even though Aristotle does not give detailed
instructions on exactly how character should be displayed, he clearly seems to
prefer using rather indirect forms to express personal virtues. A speaker who opens
his speech by explicitly praising his intelligence, his virtuous character or his
benevolence before the audience, will come across as a suspect individual who
aspires to distract from some other hidden motif.
Some short remarks in the Poetics show how practical instructions on how to
display a person’s character might look. In a tragedy the character of a person can be
seen when it comes to a choice (prohairesis) between different possible actions—
‘‘hence there is no room for character in a speech in which the speaker does not
show what he chooses or avoids’’.54
Conversely, character can be displayed in a
54
Cf. Aristotle, Poetics 6, 1450b8 et seq.
123

speech in which the speaker shows how he would choose. If the speaker uses this
means of persuasion there are two possibilities: either an element of the speech can
be stated only to serve the goal of producing a certain appearance without its being
related to the subject matter of the speech, or a statement about the subject matter of
the speech serves at the same time as a means to show the speaker’s character. But
even if the latter is the case it should not be confused with an argument that is
merely about the case at hand. The moment the hearer accepts what the speaker says
not only because of the content but also because of the speaker’s credibility, the
argument is no longer independent of the person who presented it.
The means of persuasion that is related more directly to the hearer, the arousal of
emotions (pathos), allows for a greater range of variation. Aristotle introduces this
subject as the analysis of emotions.55
The rhetorician has to know the complete
definition of an emotion in order to be able to arouse it. Aristotle therefore offers
accounts of different emotions in some detail. If the rhetorician knows, e.g., that
anger is ‘‘a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a
conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no right to slight oneself or one’s
friends’’,56
he will be able to arouse anger by presenting a case that instantiates this
definition. Definitional knowledge allows one to model a given case correctly. For
example, anger cannot be directed against universal entities like man in general, but
must be directed against individuals, because only individuals can commit slights.
That anger is a kind of desire implies that it is followed by a certain pleasure which
arises from the expectation of revenge. It is pleasant to think that one will attain
what one aims at. Therefore, the rhetorician should rather highlight the possibility of
taking revenge than neglecting it. The rhetorician who wants to arouse a certain
emotion can do so by emphasizing aspects of the subject matter of his speech in
such a way that the persons involved and the courses of action seem to be in
accordance with the definition of the emotion. Thus, the rhetorician can steer the
hearers’ emotional state by making them believe that, for example, a slight has been
committed by someone who was not entitled to do so; and the emotional state
resulting from such a belief is likely to have an impact on the judgment the hearers
finally make.
As we have seen, both the display of the speaker’s character (êthos) and the
arousal of the hearer’s emotions (pathos) work on the basis of inferences or
judgments made by the hearer, even though they cannot be reduced to these
inferential aspects. How can the dividing line between proper argumentation and
non-argumentative means of persuasion be drawn? Obviously, it is not sufficient to
check whether or not inferences and judgments come into play. What matters is the
relationship between the premises and the target conclusion. If the speaker wants to
make the addressee accept a certain claim (for example the claim that a city wall
should be built), an argument in the proper sense should be directly relevant to this
claim. The second-order judgment that the speaker is a trustworthy person has no
direct bearing on such a claim. The emotional state of fear or anger that influences
the hearer’s judgment formation does not necessarily depend on pertinent premises.
55
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1, 1378a20 et sqq.
56
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.2, 1378a31 et sqq.
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

Whereas within the realm of rational argumentation a premise that turns out to be
false can no longer be used in building a sound argument, emotional states may
maintain their efficacy independently of the truth value of the premises they are
based on.
The fact that inferences and judgments are involved when the speaker presents
himself as trustworthy or arouses the emotions of the audience should not blind us to
the differences between non-argumentative means of persuasion and pertinent
argumentation. It is no coincidence that Aristotle distinguishes êthos and pathos
from logos and seems not to see these means as instances of a wider notion of
argumentation. His definition of a deductive argument (sullogismos) stresses the
‘‘causal’’ role of the premises for the conclusion. The conclusion comes about
‘‘through’’ the premises or ‘‘because of’’ them. If the addressee accepts a claim
because of the presumed character of the speaker or under the influence of an
emotional state, these factors may not be pertinent in the same sense as the premises
of a proper argument. Aristotle takes the non-argumentative factors into account,
gives a neutral explanation and sketches methods for exploiting their potential; he
does not incorporate them into his notion of an argument. The concept of pertinence
or relevance that is central here, nevertheless, still awaits detailed reconstruction.57
7 Fallacies and Other Violations of Discourse Rules
The study of fallacies is one of the central topics of MAT. It is generally accepted
that Aristotle is among the founding fathers of this discipline. Especially the treatise
on Sophistical Refutations is regarded as an important contribution to the systematic
analysis of arguments that are incorrect or deceptive. As often happens in the history
of philosophy, Aristotle’s doctrine has not only served as a point of reference for
affirmative reconstruction but also as a model that has been extended, modified,
criticized and contrasted with different approaches. In recent decades, the ‘‘Standard
Treatment’’—as Hamblin (1970) called the Aristotelian heritage in the study of
fallacies—has been criticized as incomplete, insufficient, or unclear because on the
one hand it seems to be restricted to the dialectical context it stems from and on the
other hand it uses unclear, ‘‘metaphysical’’ notions and distinctions such as essential
versus accidental properties.58
Indeed, Aristotle’s system of fallacies is quite
inflexible. For him, a fallacy is an inference that seems to be a sullogismos, without
actually being conclusive. Each type of fallacy is connected with a specific reason
why people are deluded into thinking that the conclusion follows from the premises.
Appealing to these various sources of delusion, Aristotle even attempts to prove that
the list of fallacies he gives is systematically complete.59
Within Aristotle’s
conceptual frame it seems that all inferences that are non-conclusive (apart from
57
Although, of course, MAT has already incorporated the concept of relevance into its agenda; cf. e.g.
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, chapter 4).
58
This second criticism resembles a motif that we already encountered in Perelman: cf. footnote 43.
59
Cf. the contribution by Pieter Sjoerd Hasper to this issue.
123

inductions, of course) are fallacious. At least there is no single concept by which to
classify such inferences.60
The Amsterdam School has taken an entirely different approach. The concept of
pragma-dialectical fallacies which was introduced in the 1990s exemplifies a
position which seems to have little in common with Aristotle’s views about
fallacies. According to this approach fallacies are violations of discussion rules
intended to ensure that differences of opinion can be resolved. The pragma-
dialectical rules are recapitulated in ten principles—the ‘Ten Commandments’ of
critical discussion. Among these principles there are rules about logical validity61
or
the avoidance of unclear formulations62
which are not too far from Aristotle’s
account. Other rules concern the general setting of the discourse, e.g. the freedom to
advance or cast doubt on a standpoint or to define which moves are allowed and
which are not.63
If, for example, a premise represents an accepted starting point, the
other party is not allowed to deny it; otherwise this will be counted as a fallacy.
The pragma-dialectical concept of fallacies is not restricted to logical incorrect-
ness or misleading use of linguistic expressions. It also covers moves which within
the framework of Aristotelian dialectics are sometimes necessary and seem to be
part of the game. If, for example, a premise within a dialectical disputation might be
used to deduce the target conclusion of the opponent, the defendant is advised by
Aristotle not to grant it.64
Thus, we seem to be confronted with a straightforward
opposition between Aristotle’s views and MAT approaches.
On closer examination, however, the supposed opposition turns out to be less
pronounced. Aristotle does not speak about the rules of discourse in terms of fallacies
or fallacious moves. Nevertheless, the Topics rests on the ideal of an ‘‘impeccable’’
dialectical argument, which comes close to some modern normative rules of discourse.
In Topics VIII.11, Aristotle enumerates six criteria for retrospective evaluation of an
argument. Implicitly, the possible points of criticism form a set of rules which define
ideal dialectical arguments. In an ideal dialectical dispute the desired conclusion
which is opposed to the answerer’s original thesis is established only through premises
which are necessary, relevant and more acceptable than the conclusion.65
This ideal
result is only accessible for interlocutors who aim at jointly achieving deeper
knowledge about the subject-matter.
The preconditions that have to be fulfilled to realize this co-operative form of
dialectical argumentation are demanding: the dialecticians have to know which
60
Some commentators think that in Rhetoric I.2 Aristotle regards sign-enthymemes as acceptable
arguments, even if they are non-conclusive. However, he does not express his appreciation for sign-
enthymemes in so many words. In Rhetoric II.24 he straightforwardly classifies sign-enthymemes as
fallacies. The example given in this latter chapter clearly involves a dilution; possibly, Aristotle thinks
that people could accept the sign-examples in Rhetoric I.2—without being deluded. For the ancient and,
in particular, Aristotelian treatment of fallacies see also Pieter Sjoerd Hasper and Christof Rapp (eds.),
Ancient Fallacies. In Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 15, forthcoming.
61
Cf. van Eemeren et al. (1996, 284: Rule (8) with fn. 23).
62
Cf. loc. cit.: Rule (10).
63
Cf. loc. cit.: Rules (1) and (6).
64
Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.6, 160a
3–6.
65
Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.11, 161b
19–33.
Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner
123

views are generally accepted and what the experts think; they have to be capable of
foreseeing the consequences of a statement; they should neither block the partner’s
strategy nor go down without a fight; and they should be able to establish valid
deductions. If they fail to do the latter, they commit what Aristotle would call a
fallacy. If a dialectician fails to comply with one of the other implicit rules, this is
noted in subsequent evaluations of his argumentative capacities, but is not called a
‘‘fallacy’’. All in all, the set of possible violations of discursive rules Aristotle’s
dialectic is aware of clearly extends beyond his own notion of fallacies; the spirit of
some of these rules is not too far from certain pragmatic fallacies in MAT.
8 Conclusions
Modern argumentation theorists frequently focus on oppositions such as dialectic
versus rhetoric, analytical versus topical, reasonable versus effective, formal versus
informal, or normative versus descriptive. Many of these pairs are related to the
ancient tradition of public speech and argumentative discourse, in particular to
Aristotle’s treatises the Topics and the Rhetoric. The conceptual field that they
survey and map with the help of these distinctions is broad and not always clearly
delimited. Even though Aristotle did not treat the multifaceted aspects of
argumentation under one common heading, one may see the different theoretical
elements that center around his notion of a sound argument as parts of a coherent
project. This project might anachronistically be called Aristotle’s argumentation
theory. Aristotle himself did not see argumentation as a single field of research. He
studied logical and semantical relations that could be used to find or establish
premises, he analysed the relations between the terms of standardized deductive
arguments, he systematized and evaluated accepted opinions, and he accounted for
the factors of persuasion processes. In doing so, he raised many of the questions that
are still discussed in contemporary argumentation theory. His answers to these
questions are sometimes formulated in a language that sounds unfamiliar and seems
to be far away from the modern world. But under the surface of texts that may be
difficult or sketchy, we find a coherent and self-contained approach that combines a
realistic view of what people actually do when the dispute, argue, or try to persuade
others with the normative emphasis of how people should construct and present
sound arguments. This approach has set the agenda ever since and has provoked
criticism ever since. In one way or another the elements of Aristotle’s theory still
remain important sources for modern argumentation theory.
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