Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argumentative Theory
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This document provides a summary and critique of Oswald Ducrot's Theory of Argumentation within Language (AWL). It discusses the key developments of the AWL from its initial conception to later refinements. The theory initially considered the meaning of utterances to be defined by their argumentative relations to other utterances. Later versions incorporated the notion of "topois" or principles that support arguments, and considered meanings to be composed of "semantic blocks" linking arguments and conclusions. A key contribution of Ducrot's work was establishing the "polyphonic" nature of utterances, which can reference multiple subjective viewpoints. The document aims to situate Ducrot's theory in a broader semiotic context while preserving
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In line with these observations, Eggs (2009) returns to DucrotÊs theory and specifically to a discussion
aimed at characterizing the ironic utterance as a Âtransparent concealmentÊ. Here is an example:
6) QuÊelle mette toujours ces chaussures de ↑SPO::::RT ! [Atroce !] [=DEPLAISIR]
7) QuÊelle mette toujours ces chaussures de ↑SPO::↓ :↑::RT↓ ? [Chapeau !] [=ADMIRATION]
Eggs says that an ironic interpretation is only possible in 7), and only thanks to the unmistakable
intonation (represented by the punctuation marks); in a certain sense, it is still a reference to the
consideration of extra-linguistic elements, but this time of different nature: there is still information, but
not directly stated within the speech: it is extracted from the speakerÊs perceptive environment instead.
In this case, the central role of inferences within communication is evident, that is the treatment of the
information through the understanding process.
The above-mentioned critics pivot on two issues: the gradual disappearance of information from the
theory of Ducrot and his collaborators; and the lack of an explicit consideration of the relationship
between knowledge, language and communication.
These considerations bring to wonder if it isnÊt actually the lack of a broader semiotic perspective the
fact that could compromise some aspects of DucrotÊs theory. We know that connecting the AWL with
a theoretical context of a semiotic nature could bring to a syncretism, but we still want to try to put
forward a general proposal. With no ambitions of completeness, this operation could, in the worst
case, highlight the aspects of DucrotÊs theory that are worthy a deep semiotic analysis; in the best case,
it could offer a way out of the issues that other authors attributed to it.
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4. A semiotic interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentative Theory
A semiotic interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentative Theory
A semiotic interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentative Theory
A semiotic interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentative Theory
As we have seen so far, the first formulations of DucrotÊs theory left enough space for different
questions about language and speech functioning, about conveyed information, about predication and
about referent disambiguation. Progressively, and in particular with the Theory of Semantic Blocks,
the informative dimension get smaller until it disappears, because of the principle of interdependence
between the utterances, which does not consider any informative development. Hence, it is important
to understand in the first place why Ducrot and his collaborators increasingly ignore the informative
dimension.
In my opinion, this is due a certain polemical attitude that, in order to be developed, needs a clear
and well-defined purpose; it is the argumentative „strategy of enemy construction‰. Since the
beginning, Ducrot fought against the standard orientation in the field of semantic reflection, which is
the informative-referential one, building an image that would summarize the ideas to be questioned.
The fact is that, like every straw-man argument, this simulacrum represents only the extreme aspects
and positions within the field of semantic theories: it is a caricature. Clearly, I am not affirming that the
image did not correspond to existing doctrines, especially until the 80Ês. But Ducrot carries on his
battle ignoring many intermediate approaches, throwing away informativity along with exclusively
extensional approaches. An indication of the Manichaean conception – either argumentativity or pure
extensionality – of Argumentation within Language theorists, is traceable even in Anscombre (2009)
who, distancing himself from Ducrot, affirms to have never denied the possibility to refer to the world;
the only fact is that, beside a stereotypical characterization, he embraces the perspective of rigid
designation. In short, all or nothing.
This probably led to a marked insistence on the argumentative logic, always more considered as the
only antidote against the exclusively extensionalist theories. However, by accepting that language
incorporates some argumentative values, we are not necessarily forced to explicitly ignore information
and communication. Of course, one can assert that the argumentative dimension is the only one that
interests Ducrot, but the consequences are somewhat partial, if not bluntly reductive.
Now, I will try to give some suggestion, without demanding exhaustiveness, about to a semiotic
interpretation of the semantic interdependence phenomenon.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/argumentationandtensiveness-230805213557-f4f2b2f2/85/Argumentation-And-Tensiveness-A-Semiotic-Interpretation-Of-Ducrot-S-Argumentative-Theory-8-320.jpg)
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If talking about integrated pragmatics entails the introduction of pragmatical elements in the mere
morphology, then there is nothing to say: the integration is impossible, because there is no
autonomous dimension of the signifier (which is necessarily linked with a signified), but after all this is
not DucrotÊs position. If on the one hand this means that the signification bears with it pragmatical
elements, in the hypothesis that beside the argumentative values lay also the informative ones, finding
their justification within the pragmatic dimension, then DucrotÊs approach is interesting, because it
considers the syntax as strictly correlated with semantics and pragmatics. Nevertheless, I am convinced
that Ducrot took a property of the meaning, of the syntax in particular, that represents a species of a
wider genre, with roots in a more general semiotic ground.
Barbieri (2004) draws a coherent and fascinating picture of relationships between time, meaning and
novelty. Inspired by Leonard Meyer studies, his theory of tension tries to take into account the
anticipation and expectation phenomena, based on a semiotic-gestaltic mechanism of form
completion. In substance, any perceptive term that does not have a complete meaning in itself, refers
to the form that covers it assigning to it a specific role in determining the meaning.
In fact, a perceptive term is defined as „any textual element on the basis of which it is possible to
forecast something, [⁄] which could create some expectations‰ (Barbieri 2004: 43). The form it is
described as „any perceptive or conceptual configuration to which we are able to confer some kind of
completeness [...] In the absence of closure, we shall have at most perceptive terms, not forms‰
(Barbieri 2004: 48).
The recognition of the forms obviously depends on the depth of the applied segmentation, and a
whatsoever perceptive configuration (form) is always at least one perceptive term.
Upon these bases, the cross-reference between single term and form can be generalized; it is rather
possible that we are dealing with the more common signic cross-reference, or even that every kind of
cross-reference could be ascribed to this species. For example, the smoke seen in the distance would
not simply recall a fire, but the whole smoke-fire form attested by experience and registered in the
encyclopaedia (cfr. Eco 1976; 1984).
Barbieri takes from Meyer (1956) the tripartition in denotative meaning, embodied meaning,
determined meaning; if the first one does not need further explanation, the other ones do. The
incorporated meaning is none other than the probable continuation of the text itself; the determined
meaning is in some way ÂdefinitiveÊ: it is deducible from the speech when this one is finished,
nullifying (answering to) the expectations produced by it.
It is clear how these notions could be applied to our case: every utterance ÂtendsÊ to the next one,
showing an incorporated meaning that points to the possible continuation, banning at the same time
some of the outcomes. In so far as every utterance refers to a complete text that specifies its meaning
(of variable size depending on the context, and the context, in turn, is definable thanks to the
information taken from the speech), we are in the presence of a signic cross-reference from term to
form. In this way we find again the interdependence in the meaning, but another path to explore
comes into light, this goes from the first utterance, which acts as perceptive term, to the second one,
which completes the form that covers it. The complete form, in turn, allows us to draw out the
determined meaning. The fact that the signification of some morphemes makes some connections
possible perfectly matches this picture, even in its topic variant: we should not forget that it is the
knowledge background that makes possible the determination of the meaning.
However, all the argumentative relationships identified by Ducrot are reducible to a single species of
relationships between terms and forms that takes into account the orientation of the speech for an
intersubjective influence. Beside these, within our hypothesis remain a number of connections that do
not necessarily have an argumentative nature, or at least not exclusively. This allows to put again into
play all the dimensions that DucrotÊs approach does not want to consider, reducing in this way the
whole articulation of the meaning at the point of being argumentative connections with no possible
informative or inferential progress (as in the TBS).
Instead, within the picture that has been quickly sketched, there is still room for taking into account
the inferential transitions between one section of speech and another one, and also the role played by
the encyclopaedic notions within our communicative processes.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/argumentationandtensiveness-230805213557-f4f2b2f2/85/Argumentation-And-Tensiveness-A-Semiotic-Interpretation-Of-Ducrot-S-Argumentative-Theory-9-320.jpg)
Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argumentative Theory
- 1. Argumentation and Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentation and Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentation and Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentation and Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentative Theory Argumentative Theory Argumentative Theory Argumentative Theory Eduardo Grillo 1. 1. 1. 1. Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction1 With the present article, I am going to critically discuss the Theory of Argumentation within Language (AWL) by Oswald Ducrot and his associates (especially Jean-Claude Anscombre and Marion Carel). DucrotÊs approach represents a pragmatical turning point, which tries to bring back the facts of parole within a linguistic theory of structural inspiration. Essentially, DucrotÊs theory considers the meaning of every utterance as incomplete in itself, because it just refers to the next one, like a premise refers to its conclusion. Ultimately, Ducrot overlaps an argumentative grid upon the linguistic meaning, so to build its object of study: how utterances can be connected with other utterances and with the concrete communicative interchanges between subjects, orienting one another through speech. Now, even accepting the premises of DucrotÊs approach, a chronological observation of his works leaves a sense of doubt, mainly because the role played by the information within the linguistic meaning progressively disappears. This is actually the key point of the main critics addressed to the DucrotianÊs approach, which will be discussed in paragraph 3. My aim is to propose an attempt to set DucrotÊs linguistic theory in a wider interpretative context of semiotic nature. The purpose is to keep his enlightening observations without rejecting the analysis of the other dimensions of linguistic meaning. The level of the suggestion is general, and it does not aspire to be complete. I will show the elements of this suggestion in paragraph 4, after having examined the possible reasons for the progressive exclusion of the information by Ducrot and his collaborators. Instead, the next paragraph provides a short reconstruction of AWL. Since there is not enough space to in-depth illustrate the mentioned theory, I am going to restrict my discussion to its general aspects. 1 When possible without losses, the examples have been translated from French.
- 2. 2 2. The developments of the Theory of Arg 2. The developments of the Theory of Arg 2. The developments of the Theory of Arg 2. The developments of the Theory of Argumentation within Language (AWL) umentation within Language (AWL) umentation within Language (AWL) umentation within Language (AWL) 2.1 AWL first edition 2.1 AWL first edition 2.1 AWL first edition 2.1 AWL first edition2 Result of a life-long work, the AWL was born from the observation that some discursive phenomena a could not be explained through a classic semantic analysis. In particular, the AWL states that some connections supported by argumentative relations (argument + conclusion) do not have rhetorical nature in a classic sense; that is to say, these relations should not be added to the basic semantic value of the utterance, but considered as basic themselves. Even if expressions such as Âto have the same height ofÊ and Âto be as tall asÊ seem to indicate the same informative content Âheight samenessÊ, they actually have divergent argumentative behaviours, which allows opposite conclusions3. Generalizing, Ducrot and Anscombre affirm that some connections cannot be explained in terms of vehiculated information but, even when two expressions have the same informative content, they can bring to conclusions (they can connect with subsequent utterances) with opposite orientation. Starting from this idea, they take the general hypothesis that there are some indications of argumentative nature, in the deep semantic value of some words, expressions or utterances. The basic thesis can be expressed in this way: there are argumentative semantic values in the meaning of utterances that cannot be reduced or cannot come from informative semantic values. Therefore, at this stage of Ducrot and AnscombreÊs research, the argumentative values have the same relevance as informative ones. Starting from these considerations, AWL could be considered as a theory of reasoning within language, which represents the core of the meaning; a core articulated by the relations that every utterance creates with the ones coming before and after it. So, in its first version, the AWL is a theory about the argumentative relations between utterances that have the form Âargument - conclusionÊ, being these relations influenced by the presence of specific morphemes). Relations of this kind have gradual nature: an argument can be more or less strong in view of a conclusion. In other terms, a conclusion is drawn more or less easily (or no easily at all) from an argument in a given context. If the just expressed assumptions remain mostly constant, the structure of the theory, during the years, is subjected to many reviews, and in some cases to definite changes in perspective. It is possible to isolate two other big systematizations: the Theory of Topoi (also known as Standard Theory), and the Theory of Semantic Blocks (TSB). 2.2 The Standard Theory: Theory of Topoi 2.2 The Standard Theory: Theory of Topoi 2.2 The Standard Theory: Theory of Topoi 2.2 The Standard Theory: Theory of Topoi4 In its first edition, the AWL considers the argumentative relation as a two terms binary relation: the argument and the conclusion; this implies that the transition from the former to the latter is direct, nearly automatic. This sort of automatism comes together with the belief that an utterance would allow only one possible connection: only one is the „argumentative aim‰, and only one is the class of conclusions going in the same direction of the utterance – argument. Actually, it is possible to imagine different possible outcomes, different ÂwaysÊ, more or less direct, from the argument to the conclusion. In the very moment when an utterance occurs, the speaker can provide some indications about the chosen way, and the interpreter re-enact the path starting from these indications. The indications that help in making a choice among the different directions through which the speaker can channel his speech, are called topoi by our authors. 2 The essential works for this period are Ducrot (1972, 1973a, 1973b); Anscombre, Ducrot (1983). 3 For example, we can say ÂPeter is tall for his age: he is as tall as Mary, who is two years olderÊ, but it sounds weird to say ÂMary is tall for her age: Peter, who is two years older, is as tall as herÊ, while you can say ÂMary is tall for her age: Peter, who is two years older, has the same heightÊ. 4 For this version of the theory, consider at least: Anscombre, Ducrot (1986); Ducrot (1983, 1988, 1993); Anscombre (1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1995d).
- 3. 3 The topoi are general principles that serve as a ÂsupportÊ for the speech, but they are never stated. The speaker never shows himself as their author and he restricts himself to present them as an object of agreement among a more or less wide community. Their main aspect is their law-like validity. Afterwards, the speakers build their argumentative connections about these topoi; under this perspective, it is possible to say that a topos stands as guarantor for the transition from an argument to a conclusion. It is now important to explain the consequences that such a way of considering speech brings: 1. According to the AWL topic version, given an utterance A you can conclude an utterance B, not because A presents facts (f1, f2, f3,⁄) which make possible to deduce the facts (g1, g2, g3,⁄), but because A is shown as legitimizing the application of a topos, or more topoi, bringing to B. In this sense, the meaning of a sentence is the entirety of the topoi that the sentence enables, once uttered. 2. The meaning is principally gradual, or gradable. Graduality is a basic property because the argumentation is set at the core of the language, and the relation argument + conclusion is gradual by nature, because an argument can be more or less strong in making a conclusion possible. However, the graduality is not in the idea that we have of an object, but in the linguistic properties of the lexical item that represents it; so there is no point in objecting the existence of words like „tree‰, „table‰, „car‰, which cannot have a gradual meaning. This implies that not only the sentences are linked to some topoi, the words are too: according to this approach, to know the meaning of a word is to know which topoi are linked to it. 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 The Theory of Semantic Blocks (TBS) The Theory of Semantic Blocks (TBS) The Theory of Semantic Blocks (TBS) The Theory of Semantic Blocks (TBS)5 However, the Theory of Topoi collides with a large set of counterexamples taken from the field of paradoxical expressions. This issue creates problems to DucrotÊs entire theoretical project: if the signification is only completed within a bundle of topoi (lexical signification too) that are objects of common agreement, how could all paradoxical utterances be explained? This issue is particularly serious, because a) either you reject to allow their possibility within the language b) or you have to declare that these utterances contain an internal contradiction. Given a), the assumption behind DucrotÊs work, not to reserve an independent space to pragmatics, but rather to allow its possibility within the morphology and the syntax of a language, would fall down; given b), the descriptive aspect would be reintroduced within the signification: the contradiction would be originated by the attribution of a predicate to an object described by the predicate itself, which is exactly the point contested by Ducrot and Carel. Before exposing the solution proposed by Ducrot together with Marion Carel, letÊs see an example that could describe the situation: i. Peter worked a bit: he should be tired. ii. Peter worked just a bit: he should be rested. These two connections are made possible by a topos (applicable in its various topical forms) which links work and fatigue, something like „the more you work, the more you are tired‰. What happens if someone utters „work is restful‰? This utterance expresses a „Socially Paradoxical Expression‰ (ESP), as Ducrot and Carel call it; how can be explained the possibility of such sentence in a given circumstance, exclusively considering the topic equipment that we saw so far? The solution provided by the two authors consists in giving the argumentative nature of speeches a principle of interdependence, denying the fact that a process of justification regulates this nature. 5 See in particular: Carel, Ducrot 1999a, 1999b, 2006; Ducrot 2008.
- 4. 4 LetÊs say we are attending a meeting. The President, during the reading of the agenda, could similarly declare6: a) The promotions issue presents some problems: therefore I suggest to adjourn this topic discussion; b) The promotions issue presents some problems: therefore, I suggest to solve them immediately. According to an interpretation that Ducrot and Carel call logiciste, in the above utterances the President qualifies the promotions issue in the same way. From this perspective, the two connections will come to an opposition only in a second time: the speaker of a) will admit a1) „the issues presenting problems have to be adjourned‰, the speaker of b) will admit b1) „the issues presenting problems have to be promptly solved‰. According to Ducrot and Carel, if a1) and b1) are excluded from the semantic representation of „presenting problems‰, its meaning is lost; the two speakers do not agree about a state of things, later disagreeing regarding the matter of the speech: they do not agree about anything. In so far as the possibility of the conclusion can be considered already contained in the argument, there is no path from the latter to the former, there is no informative progress: if the two utterances (argument and conclusion) do have sense, they have sense together. In this way, an atom of meaning is identified, which consists in a semantic block and is made of all the connections between an utterance-argument and an utterance-conclusion (but clearly these terms are no longer appropriate because of the interdependence of the meaning), connections made possible thanks to two basic operators: DONC (DC) and POURTANT (PT). These operators characterize every block, giving them a normative aspect and a transgressive one. Ducrot and Carel consider these two aspects as the basic semantic units that define the argumentative character of all the connections while stating the relation of semantic interdependence of the segment-argument and of the segment- conclusion. The two kinds of speech involve every possible connection: all utterances with if, therefore, since, etc... belong to the group P DC Q (P and Q are used to stand for any sentences), while all the utterances with however, despite, even if, etc... belong to the group P PT Q. P DC Q and P PT NON Q speeches are both within the same argumentative block, in opposition to the one made by P PT Q and P DC NON Q speeches. 2.4 Utterance (Énonciation) a 2.4 Utterance (Énonciation) a 2.4 Utterance (Énonciation) a 2.4 Utterance (Énonciation) and Linguistic Polyphony nd Linguistic Polyphony nd Linguistic Polyphony nd Linguistic Polyphony7 From argumentative values to argumentative interdependence: that is how DucrotÊs theoretical process could be described; among this process a growth is evident in the ambition and in the extent of the theory, always more general and all-comprehensive. But the building of an intrinsically argumentative theory of meaning is not DucrotÊs only contribution to linguistics; beside that, though closely related to that, stands the theory of the act of utterance which, passing through some basic conceptual clarifications, become a polyphonic theory of meaning. Linguistic theory owes to Ducrot a systematization of the notion of act of utterance without precedents. Although it is the core of all linguistic studies in the XX Century, the concept of act of utterance appears to be, from the fundamental contributions by Bally and Benveniste onwards, essentially polysemous: every author highlighted some aspects of it in relation to different notions, contributing in this way to a perpetuation of the various ambiguities. Ducrot, on the other way, believes that it is 6 The example is taken from Carel, Ducrot (1999a: 10-11). 7 See at least Ducrot 1978a, 1978b, 1984, 1989; Ducrot et al. 1980; Carel, Ducrot 2009; Anscombre 2009.
- 5. 5 necessary to distinguish between three different phenomena alternatively described to with the term „act of utterance‰: 1) the achieved „thing‰, the product, what takes place within the chain of the phenomena, which Ducrot calls utterance; 2) the process, the production activity, the psychophysical work that has concretely generated the new entity, which Ducrot calls linguistic activity. 3) the event or act through which the appearance of a new utterance is made possible: according to Ducrot this is the act of utterance, and in its transeunt character he finds its whole specificity. Ducrot adds to this first characterization the ability of every utterance to refer to its act of utterance; actually, the meaning itself of the utterances corresponds, according to the author, with the comment to their act of utterance. Considering this property of the utterances, Ducrot discovers that every utterance, referring to the instance of the utterance itself, implements a variety of „consciousnesses‰ which can be held responsible for its appearance, in whole or in part; the polyphonic theory of the act of utterance originates from this discovery. The key principle of the theory of the polyphonic act of utterance is the coexistence of many voices, or points of view, within the same utterance. The aim is to dissolve the „myth‰ of the uniqueness of the speaker, which assigns to every utterance one sole responsible for its production. According to Ducrot, on the other hand, every utterance we produce is constituted by different perspectives woven together about what is being said, and it is not possible to distinguish a simple dictum from the modus: the word is therefore always subjective. Subjective and plural: why using a negation in an utterance such as: „this wall is not white‰ but for evoking at least two different subjects, called utterers (énonciateurs) by Ducrot, which express two contradictory points of view in respect of the utterance content (the whiteness of the wall)? Then the speaker (locuteur), that is the responsible for the act of utterance as it is introduced by the same utterance, chooses to assimilate his own position to the position of one of the utterers, conferring to the utterance an orientation not only of ideological nature, but also of argumentative nature. Theory of Argumentation and polyphony then interconnected the one with the other in different ways, obviously depending on the paradigm each time followed by Ducrot. However, it is still one of most discussed and applied approaches within contemporary linguistics, with a great favour in Northern Europe, while the Theory of Argumentation Within Language principally founds its followers within the Hispanic world. 3. 3. 3. 3. Criticisms and Criticisms and Criticisms and Criticisms and debates debates debates debates This paragraph reports and comments some critiques to the argumentative orientation, in order to illustrate why it seems appropriate to implement a semiotic approach to DucrotÊs Theory. A constant criticism is the reference to the denotative and informative dimension of the utterances semantics, mostly ignored by the theory; moreover, Ekkehard Eggs, a scholar of language argumentative aspects, claims the encyclopaedic nature of meaning. All criticisms are provided and briefly discussed. 3.1 Shadow 3.1 Shadow 3.1 Shadow 3.1 Shadow zones of AWL zones of AWL zones of AWL zones of AWL Corinne Iten (2000) has dedicated an extensive article to the Theory of Argumentation within Language, proposing an alternative based upon the Theory of Pertinence. Iten notices the tendency of Ducrot and his associates to multiply not autonomously justified laws and axioms, as well as a particular ease in using conceptual definitions. Ducrot is also accused of ignoring all the expressions that do not fall in the category of argumentative operators. Actually, these criticisms apply only to the first phases of DucrotÊs theory development, at least for the most part; but it is to be reported an oscillation, by the side of the AWL theorists, between the attempt to explain the speakerÊs intuition and its employment as a passepartout, this time explicative. ItenÊs analysis covers also the theory of
- 6. 6 topoi, but she states that the identification procedure of the context in which the topic principle can be applied is not defined: if someone suddenly says „itÊs hot‰ without providing contextual indications in his previous speech, how can the interlocutor understand, for example, if the speaker is talking about the weather or about his spaghetti dish? In other terms, how could the topos evoked by the speaker be indentified? Besides this consideration, which - generally speaking - could be extended also to the Theory of Semantic Blocks, a substantial silence remains about a certain number of linguistic elements such as quantifiers, the verbal tense, referential expressions. Iten summarizes her observations with these words: In a nutshell, a theory which ends up saying that language cannot be used to describe the world, be it the actual or some possible world, and doesnÊt have a good explanation of why it is that people nevertheless not only believe than language is used to convey information but are also prepared to act on information they have been given purely linguistic meaning, simply cannot be adequate (Iten 2000: 75). At this point, Iten presents some examples indicating cases in which it is difficult denying the fact that two speakers have reciprocally exchanged information: if I ask someone „where can we meet?‰, my interlocutor will provide the necessary spatiotemporal data for our rendez-vous, and I will be able to reach him. Iten locates the origin of the problem in the lack of a clear distinction between semantics and pragmatics, coherently with the Gricean-Sperberian theoretical picture; but here we can put aside this problem, going on reading the cahier de doléances of the argumentative theory of the meaning. 3.2 Argumentation and denotation 3.2 Argumentation and denotation 3.2 Argumentation and denotation 3.2 Argumentation and denotation Moura (2001) analyzes the relationship between denotative meaning and argumentative meaning in a contextual perspective of the meaning, and dedicates some pages to the Theory of Semantic Blocks. The analysis starts from a deep belief that the linguistic meaning is determined within the speech dynamics and every information about the world can be found only after a meaning has been assigned to the employed words. The assumption is clearly opposed to the suppositions that lead DucrotÊs approach: the interlocutors continuously and reciprocally exchange information about the semantic content of the words, which stands in a common ground; from this basic idea, the thought moves to a list of possible clarifications. This clarification principle (précision) is based upon three fundamental suppositions: 1) the denotative meaning is directly tied with the context in which it appears, that is „le calcul du sens de lÊénoncé est fonction de la précision du sens lexical définie par lÊétat informationel du discours‰ (Moura 2001: 79); 2) the truth conditions do not stand in the centre of the signification, since 3) the meaning is represented by the set of information that can be detected from the utterance, this information has the function of indicating a possible interpretation. In substance, it is the information about the world, and not the relationship between language and world, that represents the core of the meaning. Even accepting a substantial independence between argumentative meaning and denotative meaning, Moura brings a crucial critic to the argumentative theory: there are cases in which the argumentative meaning cannot be determined unless starting from the denotative one. See the following example (Moura 2001: 89): 1) Il fait de la politique dans le sens grec du mot, il ne se mêle donc pas des affaires. According to the scholar, „in the Greek sense of the word‰ represents a clarification of the meaning of politics ‰ imposed by the context: „ à partir dÊun sens de base sous-déterminé, on parvient à un sens plus précis: il sÊagit de construire un sens dans la diynamique du discours‰ (Moura 2001: 89). On the other side, according to the TSB, it would be an inversion, a revaluation of ÂpoliticÊ, which in connected aspects would be characterized by being not implied in funny business, thanks to a modifier (in the Greek sense...). However, it is not a matter of being „plus ou moins politicien, de renforcer ou affaiblir le sens du mot politique: il sÊagit de le construire‰ (Moura 2001: 89). Therefore,
- 7. 7 Moura argues that the denotative meaning can determine the argumentative meaning, imposing some modifications to it. This article has the merit of highlighting an intrinsic limit of the Theory of the Semantic Blocks. The issue regards a forced overlap between informative values and truth-conditional values, about which I will discuss later on. Anyways, it is possible to say that it is not clear why issues regarding information conveyed by the language, the reference and the co-determination of the meaning within the speech, have to overlap or exclude each other. In the first case, we are dealing with conveyed knowledge about something (real or imaginary); in the second case with the relationship between language and world, in the last case with coherence, co-reference and contextual semantic clarification. 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 Encyclopaedic and argumentative Encyclopaedic and argumentative Encyclopaedic and argumentative Encyclopaedic and argumentative Eggs (1994) carried out an in depth analysis of the relationships among linguistics, dialectics, rhetoric and argumentation; as his reflections were developing, he has dedicated some pages to the argumentative theory. In particular, in the first chapters of his book he lingers over the question of the coherence within an argumentative discourse, with very interesting observations, as demonstrated by the following examples: 2) *Renan got more than 50 votes. Therefore, he will not become president. 3) *Renan got just 50 votes. Therefore, he will become president. It is easy to understand the peculiarity of these sentence connections: the second utterance expresses, in both sentences, a contrary orientation compared to the one expected, that is the one ÂpreparedÊ by the first. However, if we replace the pronoun with another name, they become completely reasonable: 2Ê) Renan got more than 50 votes. Therefore, Le Breton will not become president. 3Ê) Renan got just 50 votes. Therefore, Le Breton will become president. The reason is simple: the two names (Renan and Le Breton) are not co-referential, that is they refer to two different people. On the other hand, an automatic co-referentiality is established in the following cases: 4) Renan got more than 50 votes. Therefore, Le Breton will become president. 5) Renan got just 50 votes. Therefore, Le Breton will not become president. Analysing the mechanism that generates the co-referentiality, Eggs points out that the linguistic interpretation, especially the one applied to ambiguous indexical expressions, is determined by the argumentative orientation; in short, „lÊargumentatif prime le linguistique‰ (Eggs 1994: 26). It is a semantic ÂadjustmentÊ, the shaping of the possible interpretation, carried out by the argumentative intention of the utterance - not substantially different from putting argumentative values within the language structures, that is what Ducrot did. Nevertheless, what happens in the following situation, assuming that the co-referentiality relationship (of identity) between the characters is known? 5) Renan got just 50 votes. Therefore, Le Breton will become president. The only possible interpretation will be of ironic nature: „Cette lecture montre que le Âjeu constructifÊ a une frontière naturelle: notre connaissance du monde. Formulons donc cette observation en forme dÊun principe: lÊencyclopédique prime lÊargumentatif ‰ (Eggs 1994: 28; italic within the text). Without any reference to our knowledge of the world - conveyed as information in linguistic communication - it is not often possible to determine the argumentative orientation of the speech, besides the relationships of reference and co-reference; then a hierarchy is created, to distinguish the encyclopaedic, argumentative and linguistics tout court elements.
- 8. 8 In line with these observations, Eggs (2009) returns to DucrotÊs theory and specifically to a discussion aimed at characterizing the ironic utterance as a Âtransparent concealmentÊ. Here is an example: 6) QuÊelle mette toujours ces chaussures de ↑SPO::::RT ! [Atroce !] [=DEPLAISIR] 7) QuÊelle mette toujours ces chaussures de ↑SPO::↓ :↑::RT↓ ? [Chapeau !] [=ADMIRATION] Eggs says that an ironic interpretation is only possible in 7), and only thanks to the unmistakable intonation (represented by the punctuation marks); in a certain sense, it is still a reference to the consideration of extra-linguistic elements, but this time of different nature: there is still information, but not directly stated within the speech: it is extracted from the speakerÊs perceptive environment instead. In this case, the central role of inferences within communication is evident, that is the treatment of the information through the understanding process. The above-mentioned critics pivot on two issues: the gradual disappearance of information from the theory of Ducrot and his collaborators; and the lack of an explicit consideration of the relationship between knowledge, language and communication. These considerations bring to wonder if it isnÊt actually the lack of a broader semiotic perspective the fact that could compromise some aspects of DucrotÊs theory. We know that connecting the AWL with a theoretical context of a semiotic nature could bring to a syncretism, but we still want to try to put forward a general proposal. With no ambitions of completeness, this operation could, in the worst case, highlight the aspects of DucrotÊs theory that are worthy a deep semiotic analysis; in the best case, it could offer a way out of the issues that other authors attributed to it. . 4. 4. 4. 4. A semiotic interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentative Theory A semiotic interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentative Theory A semiotic interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentative Theory A semiotic interpretation of DucrotÊs Argumentative Theory As we have seen so far, the first formulations of DucrotÊs theory left enough space for different questions about language and speech functioning, about conveyed information, about predication and about referent disambiguation. Progressively, and in particular with the Theory of Semantic Blocks, the informative dimension get smaller until it disappears, because of the principle of interdependence between the utterances, which does not consider any informative development. Hence, it is important to understand in the first place why Ducrot and his collaborators increasingly ignore the informative dimension. In my opinion, this is due a certain polemical attitude that, in order to be developed, needs a clear and well-defined purpose; it is the argumentative „strategy of enemy construction‰. Since the beginning, Ducrot fought against the standard orientation in the field of semantic reflection, which is the informative-referential one, building an image that would summarize the ideas to be questioned. The fact is that, like every straw-man argument, this simulacrum represents only the extreme aspects and positions within the field of semantic theories: it is a caricature. Clearly, I am not affirming that the image did not correspond to existing doctrines, especially until the 80Ês. But Ducrot carries on his battle ignoring many intermediate approaches, throwing away informativity along with exclusively extensional approaches. An indication of the Manichaean conception – either argumentativity or pure extensionality – of Argumentation within Language theorists, is traceable even in Anscombre (2009) who, distancing himself from Ducrot, affirms to have never denied the possibility to refer to the world; the only fact is that, beside a stereotypical characterization, he embraces the perspective of rigid designation. In short, all or nothing. This probably led to a marked insistence on the argumentative logic, always more considered as the only antidote against the exclusively extensionalist theories. However, by accepting that language incorporates some argumentative values, we are not necessarily forced to explicitly ignore information and communication. Of course, one can assert that the argumentative dimension is the only one that interests Ducrot, but the consequences are somewhat partial, if not bluntly reductive. Now, I will try to give some suggestion, without demanding exhaustiveness, about to a semiotic interpretation of the semantic interdependence phenomenon.
- 9. 9 If talking about integrated pragmatics entails the introduction of pragmatical elements in the mere morphology, then there is nothing to say: the integration is impossible, because there is no autonomous dimension of the signifier (which is necessarily linked with a signified), but after all this is not DucrotÊs position. If on the one hand this means that the signification bears with it pragmatical elements, in the hypothesis that beside the argumentative values lay also the informative ones, finding their justification within the pragmatic dimension, then DucrotÊs approach is interesting, because it considers the syntax as strictly correlated with semantics and pragmatics. Nevertheless, I am convinced that Ducrot took a property of the meaning, of the syntax in particular, that represents a species of a wider genre, with roots in a more general semiotic ground. Barbieri (2004) draws a coherent and fascinating picture of relationships between time, meaning and novelty. Inspired by Leonard Meyer studies, his theory of tension tries to take into account the anticipation and expectation phenomena, based on a semiotic-gestaltic mechanism of form completion. In substance, any perceptive term that does not have a complete meaning in itself, refers to the form that covers it assigning to it a specific role in determining the meaning. In fact, a perceptive term is defined as „any textual element on the basis of which it is possible to forecast something, [⁄] which could create some expectations‰ (Barbieri 2004: 43). The form it is described as „any perceptive or conceptual configuration to which we are able to confer some kind of completeness [...] In the absence of closure, we shall have at most perceptive terms, not forms‰ (Barbieri 2004: 48). The recognition of the forms obviously depends on the depth of the applied segmentation, and a whatsoever perceptive configuration (form) is always at least one perceptive term. Upon these bases, the cross-reference between single term and form can be generalized; it is rather possible that we are dealing with the more common signic cross-reference, or even that every kind of cross-reference could be ascribed to this species. For example, the smoke seen in the distance would not simply recall a fire, but the whole smoke-fire form attested by experience and registered in the encyclopaedia (cfr. Eco 1976; 1984). Barbieri takes from Meyer (1956) the tripartition in denotative meaning, embodied meaning, determined meaning; if the first one does not need further explanation, the other ones do. The incorporated meaning is none other than the probable continuation of the text itself; the determined meaning is in some way ÂdefinitiveÊ: it is deducible from the speech when this one is finished, nullifying (answering to) the expectations produced by it. It is clear how these notions could be applied to our case: every utterance ÂtendsÊ to the next one, showing an incorporated meaning that points to the possible continuation, banning at the same time some of the outcomes. In so far as every utterance refers to a complete text that specifies its meaning (of variable size depending on the context, and the context, in turn, is definable thanks to the information taken from the speech), we are in the presence of a signic cross-reference from term to form. In this way we find again the interdependence in the meaning, but another path to explore comes into light, this goes from the first utterance, which acts as perceptive term, to the second one, which completes the form that covers it. The complete form, in turn, allows us to draw out the determined meaning. The fact that the signification of some morphemes makes some connections possible perfectly matches this picture, even in its topic variant: we should not forget that it is the knowledge background that makes possible the determination of the meaning. However, all the argumentative relationships identified by Ducrot are reducible to a single species of relationships between terms and forms that takes into account the orientation of the speech for an intersubjective influence. Beside these, within our hypothesis remain a number of connections that do not necessarily have an argumentative nature, or at least not exclusively. This allows to put again into play all the dimensions that DucrotÊs approach does not want to consider, reducing in this way the whole articulation of the meaning at the point of being argumentative connections with no possible informative or inferential progress (as in the TBS). Instead, within the picture that has been quickly sketched, there is still room for taking into account the inferential transitions between one section of speech and another one, and also the role played by the encyclopaedic notions within our communicative processes.
- 10. 10 In fact, BarbieriÊs tensivity takes root explicitly within the interpretative semiotics, of peircean derivation, developed by Eco. Now, every „form completion‰ not only requires an inferential operation, but also a variety of previous notions that could make possible the act of conceiving the whole form to which the perceptive term refers. To this end, Eco (1979) talked about common screenplays, i.e. subject to the direct knowledge of the world; and about intertextual screenplays, i.e. originating from the knowledge of texts that are within the encyclopaedia. It is a specific skill, which depends on each personÊs level of knowledge and in-depth analysis. In every case, the screenplays represent a guide for the action and the interpretation (from a peircean viewpoint, both dimensions are strictly linked), and, obviously, in the on-line interpretation of our linguistic interchange. Clearly, a semiotic approach suits well enough the principles of the AWL and the Theory of topoi, but it suits much less the TSB. The fact is that in this last formulation, DucrotÊs theory of argumentation makes the argumentative dimension nearly exclusive, and thereÊs no room within it for the analysis of other elements of linguistic meaning. In the best case, the TSB is a semantic-pragmatic theory that is partial; in the worst, it is an excessively reductive theory. In conclusion, within every concatenation seen by Ducrot and collaborators lays a semiotic principle that is more general than the argumentative logic; by its side, the latter gets its legitimacy exactly from the fact that it is not exclusive. In fact, it is because some discursive regularities do exist that some concatenations are possible, and others are prohibited; the argumentative logic explicates a condition of the speech, while overlooking other conditions, which are instead related with the inference rules, with the leveraging of previous notions, with the information transmission. 5. 5. 5. 5. Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions After delineating some representative criticisms to the AWL theorists, I have suggested, without demanding exhaustiveness, a way out from the shallows of the AWL, appealing to an encyclopaedic conception of meaning and to the concept of tensiveness, in order to cover the phenomena highlighted by the AWL within a more general semiotic approach that would not be exposed to the same potential excesses. An approach of this kind could allow an integration of DucrotÊs enlightening observations with a proper consideration of the informative values, without losing sight of DucrotÊs pragmatic inclination. After all, even the exchange of information is part of a form of life, of a linguistic game – or even semiotic, because it involves different meanings production and communication systems. Someone could object that in this way we could lose sight of DucrotÊs structuralism. If structuralism pretends to analyse the language itself aside from what human beings do with it, then I sustain the objection, and I object in turn; but Ducrot himself was more cautious, in spite of the excesses. Actually, the greater inheritance that the Structuralist adventure leaves us is the primacy of relationship, materialized on many different levels: in linguistic entities and in intersubjectivity in general. In this sense, the exchange of information is the same as playing a game, as entering a communicative form that we learned through our cultural training, as acting together with others in a significative way overall through spoken language; then it is a typically pragmatical question, surely not based on a truth-conditional logic. Consequently, with a semiotic approach, the idea of semiotic (argumentative) interdependence of the theory of semantic blocks not only becomes more captivating, but surely more acceptable and plausible. In this perspective, it becomes only a dimension of meaning; in addition, the relationships that it could maintain with the other dimensions become clearer. However, as far as this relationships determination is concerned, there is still a lot to do. pubblicato in rete il 30 luglio 2014
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