Aristotle S Metaphysics

Gabriele Galluzzo
A istotle s Metaph si s
Introduction
General Overviews
Text and Editions
Translations
English Translations
Modern European Languages Translations
Commentaries
English Commentaries
Modern European Languages Commentaries
Collections of Essays
Colle tio s of Essa s o A istotle s Metaph si s
Collections of Essays on Individual Books or Groups of Books
Bibliographies
Metaphysics as a Science (Books I-VI)
The Subject-matter of Metaphysics
The Multivocity of Being
The Method of Metaphysics
The Principle of Non-Contradiction
Substance (Books VII-IX)
Substantiality in the Metaphysics
Hylomorphism
Essence and Definition
Universals
Potentiality and Actuality (Book IX)
Unity (Book X)
Theology (Book XII)
Philosophy of Mathematics (Books XIII-XIV)

Introduction
A istotle s Metaphysics, one of the most influential works in Western thought, is a collection of
fourteen treatises or books. The title is not by Aristotle and is due to a Hellenistic editor, traditionally
identified with Andronicus of Rhodes (I cent. BC). Metaphysics (ta meta ta phusika) ea s the things
afte the ph si al thi gs and may point to the position of the metaphysical books in the Hellenistic
edition of Aristotle s o ks (after the physical books) or possibly to the order in which metaphysical
issues should be learned in an ideal curriculum (after the study of physics). Aristotle is not responsible
for assembling the books of the Metaphysics into a single work, either. The collection is most likely to
have been put together by Andronicus or someone else on the basis of the thematic similarities among
the individual treatises. Although the Metaphysics is not a unified work in our sense, it seems
undeniable that the different treatises of the collection pursue a general philosophical project or
discipline, which Aristotle variously refers to as wisdom, first philosophy or even theology. Such a
discipline is described in the Metaphysics as a theoretical science, as opposed to practical and
productive sciences, and is sharply distinguished from the other two theoretical sciences, physics and
mathematics. In many ways it would not be incorrect to describe A istotle s p oje t i the Metaphysics
as metaphysics. Many of the issues Aristotle deals with – such as existence, essence, individuation,
identity, universals, the nature of material objects, just to mention a few – are certainly issues that we
would comfortably describe as metaphysical. But in other espe ts, A istotle s o eptio of
metaphysics is broader than ours, as it includes philosophical areas – such as rational theology,
cosmology, philosophy of mathematics and logic – that do not obviously fall within metaphysics in our
sense, though they may be closely related to it. A istotle s Metaphysics has been enormously
influential in shaping Arabic and Latin Medieval thought and has remained central to Early Modern
Philosophy as well. Over the last sixty years or so, the Metaphysics has been rediscovered by
metaphysicians in the analytic philosophy tradition as a source of philosophical insights. This renewal
of philosophical interest has been matched by a proliferation of sophisticated scholarly works on
A istotle s iti g. This article has the twofold aim of mapping out resources on the text of the
Metaphysics and offering bibliographical guidance on the philosophical issues dealt ith i A istotle s
writing.
General Overviews
Jaeger 1948 (originally published in 1923) contains the most influential developmental account of
A istotle s Metaphysics: not only is the Metaphysics a collection of different treatises more than a
unified work, but it also displays different strata and phases of composition, measured in terms of
increasing distance f o A istotle s ea l Plato is . Although Θaege s app oa h is still i po ta t
when it comes to evaluating the position of individual books of the Metaphysics (see for instance Frede
2000, cited under *Theology*) recent overviews of the Metaphysics o of A istotle s etaph si al
thought rather emphasise, to different degrees, the ohe e e of A istotle s metaphysical project in
spite of the lack of textual unity of the Metaphysics. Donini 2007 (originally published in 1995) is a
balanced introduction to the structure and contents of the Metaphysics, which does justice to the
developmental approach but also reconstructs fundamental strands in A istotle s metaphysical
project. Politis 2004 is a comprehensive and readable guide to the Metaphysics, which takes the
reader through the different sections of the o k a d a gues fo the u it of A istotle s etaph si al
project around a set of fundamental questions. Halper 2012 is a more concise and student-oriented

guide, which takes the reader through the text and introduces to the philosophical issues it raises.
Reeve 2000 is an ambitious book-length attempt to provide a strongly holistic and unitary account of
A istotle s etaph si s a d of the Metaphysics), which basically disregards issues of chronology and
only focuses on philosophical issues. Other introductory studies fo us o e o A istotle s
metaphysical doctrines than the structure of the Metaphysics. Barnes 1995 is an overview of
A istotle s metaphysics which covers many areas of interest: the subject-matter of metaphysics,
existence, substance and theology. Cohen 2016 discusses some major metaphysical issues, with
particular reference to substance theory, and offers an extensive and up-to-date bibliography.
Barnes, J. 1995. Metaphysics. In The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Edited by J. Barnes, 66-108.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. A lea o e ie of A istotle s etaph si al thought, hi h
covers four main areas: the subject-matter of metaphysics; the multivocity of being; the theory of
substance; theology. Provides valuable bibliographical information. Good for an introduction to the
topic.
Cohen, M. 2016. A istotle s Metaph si s. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/]*. An overview of some of the major ideas
de eloped i A istotle s Metaphysics, with an emphasis on substance theory in the central books (VII-
IX). Provides extensive and up-to-date bibliography.
Donini, P. 2007. La Metafisica di Aristotele. Introduzione alla lettura. Rome: Carocci. Originally
published in 1995, this is a clear and short introduction to the structure and contents of the
Metaphysics. Also provides valuable information about the history of the text and its transmission.
Especially good for beginners.
Halper, E.C. 2012. A istotle’s Metaphysics. A Reade ’s Guide. London and New York: Continuum. A
concise and student-o ie ted guide to A istotle s Metaphysics. Offers an overview of themes as well
as an introduction to the different sections of the text. Also provides a short discussion of the
reception of the Metaphysics.
Jaeger, W. 1948. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development. Trans. by R. Robinson.
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. The ost i po ta t a ou t of the de elop e t of A istotle s thought.
Chs. 7, 8 and 14 present a developmental analysis of the Metaphysics. Argues that the Metaphysics
contains two fundamental strata: one in which Aristotle is still influenced by the Platonic conception
of metaphysics as a science of immaterial substances, and a later anti-Platonic stratum, in which
Aristotle develops his idea of metaphysics as a general study of reality. Originally published in German
in 1923.
Politis, V. 2004. The Routledge Guide to Aristotle and the Metaphysics. London and New York:
Routledge. A readable and comprehensive section-by-section guide to the Metaphysics, which
atte pts to e o st u t A istotle s o e all etaph si al p oje t and puts emphasis on its unity around
a set of fundamental questions. Particularly i te esti g is the a al sis of A istotle s a ti-Platonic
arguments in Ch. 9.
Reeve, C.D.C. 2000. Su sta tial K owledge. A istotle’s Metaph si s. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Company. An ambitious book-le gth stud of the hole of A istotle s etaph si al thought.
A gues fo the fu da e tal u it of A istotle s Metaphysics. Sees A istotle s theolog as the solutio
to the difficulties surrounding the notion of substance (and in particular the tension between the
ontological priority of particulars and the epistemic priority of universals) and so in some sense as the
poi t of a i al of A istotle s etaph si al i estigatio .

Text and Editions
Fazzo 2012 provides an excellent reconstruction of the complex history of the text of the Metaphysics
as well as a critical survey of the 19th
- and 20th
-century editions. Ross 1924 and Jaeger 1951 are the
two fundamental 20th
-century editions of the Metaphysics and the only ones that are still in use. They
both make use of three independent witnesses of the Metaphysics, i.e. manuscripts E (Parisinus gr.
1853: 10th
cent.), J (Vindobonensis phil. gr. 100: 9th
cent.) and Ab
(Laurentianus plut. 87.12: 12th
cent.).
While manuscripts E and Ab
were known to 19th
-century editors, we owe to Gerke 1892 the discovery
of manuscript J. Gerke also showed that the three manuscripts represent two independent branches
of the text of the Metaphysics, E and J being witnesses of the so-called α-text and Ab
of the so-called
β-text. Since Ross and Jaeger published their important editions our knowledge of the text has
considerably increased. Harlfinger 1979 produced a complete stemma codicum for the Metaphysics.
He also introduced two new independent witnesses of the β-text, i.e. manuscripts M (Ambrosianus F
113 sup.: 14th
century AD) and C (Taurinensis VII. B. 23). Harlfinger also proved that from Met. XII.7,
1073a1 onwards Ab
eases to elo g to the β-branch and so manuscripts M and C are the only
witnesses of the β-text for the final portion of the Metaphysics. Luna 2005 provides accurate collations
of M and C for Books XIII and XIV togethe ith a e isio of ‘oss s a d Θaege s iti al appa atuses.
For Books VI-XIV of the Metaphysics, for which the 2nd
-century commentary by Alexander of
Aphrodisias has not survived, Ross and Jaeger make extensive use as an indirect source of a
o e ta t a s itted togethe ith Ale a de s a d k o as Pseudo-Alexander. But Luna 2001
has shown that the commentary by Pseudo-Alexander is the work of the 11th
/12th
century Byzantine
scholar Michael of Ephesus and so makes no independent contribution to the constitution of the text.
Finally, Ross and Jaeger make no use as indirect sources of the Arabic translations of the Metaphysics
Ustāth th e t. a d Mattā i Yû us th e t. , hi h a e olde tha ou est Greek
manuscripts. All these advancements in our knowledge of the text have led scholars to call for a new
edition of the Metaphysics. Primavesi 2012 is a critical edition of Book I, which represents a
fundamental first step toward a new edition of the full text. Fazzo 2012 and Alexandru 2014 are
editions of Book XII that take full account of recent developments.
Alexandru, S. 2014. A istotle’s Metaphysics Lambda: Annotated Critical Edition Based upon a
Systematic Investigation of Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Sources. Leiden, The Netherlands, and
Boston: Brill. An annotated edition of Book XII of the Metaphysics, which takes full account of recent
discoveries and makes full use of indirect sources. Particularly noteworthy is the rich and exhaustive
critical apparatus, based on a systematic analysis of the tradition.
Fazzo , S. 2012. Il libro Lambda della Metafisica di Aristotele. Naples, Italy: Bibliopolis. A new critical
edition, with introduction, Italian translation and philological notes, of Book XII of the Metaphysics.
Suggests an amendment to the stemma codicum in Harlfinger 1979 by arguing that manuscript Ab
does ot elo g to the β-text for the whole of Book XII and not only for a portion of it. The introduction
provides a first rate reconstruction of the history of modern editions.
Gerke, A. 1982. Aristoteleum. Wiener Studien 14: 146-148. A fundamental paper that makes two
crucial contributions to our knowledge of the text of the Metaphysics. Calls attention to an
independent witness of the text – the Vienna manuscript E – that had escaped 19th
- e tu edito s
notice. Shows that the independent witnesses represent two independent textual traditions.

Harlfinger, D. 1979. Zur Überlieferungsgeschichte der Metaphysik. In Études sur la Métaphysique
d’A istote. Actes du VIe Symposium Aristotelicum. Edited by P. Aubenque, 7-36. Paris: Vrin 1979. A
fundamental paper that presents a complete stemma codicum for the Metaphysics. Introduces two
new independent witnesses (manuscripts M and C) of the β-branch of the tradition and shows they
a e the o l i depe de t it esses of the β-text for the final portion (from XII.7, 1073a1 onwards) of
the Metaphysics.
Jaeger, W., 1951. Aristotelis Metaphysica. Oxford Classical Text. Oxford: Clarendon Press. An edition
minor of the Metaphysics, with a reduced critical apparatus, which owes much to Ross 1924. Shows
t a es of Θaege s de elop e tal app oa h. The p efa e is still i po ta t fo a se ies of h potheses
about the two branches of the manuscript tradition and the analysis of Aristotle s iti g st le.
Luna, C. 2001. T ois etudes su la t aditio des o e ta ies a ie s à la Métaph si ue d’A istote.
Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. A comparative analysis of the commentaries on the Metaphysics by
Alexander of Aphrodiasias, Pseudo-Alexander, Syrianus and Asclepius. Following a suggestion by
Praechter, shows that Pseudo-Ale a de s o e ta o Books V-XIV of the Metaphysics is the work
of the the 11th
/12th
century Byzantine scholar Michael of Ephesus.
Luna, C. 2005. Le texte des livres M-N de la Métaphysique. Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica
medievale 16: 553-593. A study of the text of the final two books (XIII and XIV) of the Metaphysics.
Revises the critical apparatuses of Ross 1924 and Jaeger 1951 and provides collations of manuscripts
M and N.
Primavesi, O. 2012. Aristotle. Metaphysics A. In Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha: Symposium
Aristotelicum. Edited by C. Steel and O. Primavesi, 384-516. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. A new critical
edition of Book I of the Metaphysics that takes into full account recent advancements in our
knowledge of the text. The edition is preceded by an extremely useful introductory study, which also
provides a state-of-the-art overview of current research on the text of the Metaphysics.
Ross, W.D. 1924. A istotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. The most important edition to date of the Metaphysics. It is the first edition to use
of manuscript J. Also confirms Gerke s i tuitio a out the ipa tite manuscript tradition of the
Metaphysics. Makes use as indirect sources of the commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias (Books
I-V) and Pseudo-Alexander (Books VI-XIV).
Translations
T a slati g A istotle s Metaphysics is notoriously hard. A istotle s lecture-style Greek is terse and
difficult from a syntactical point of view, and contains a number of technical terms including a few
eologis s of A istotle s invention. Even ordinary words are often put to a different, philosophical use.
Translations of the Metaphysics tend to be non-literal and try to strike the right balance between
rendering A istotle s G eek i to readable modern-language sentences and giving a sense of his
philosophical jargon. The rendering of technical terms is normally standardized and heavily relies on
Latinizations drawn from Latin medieval translations and commentaries.
English Translations of the Full Text

Ross 1984 is a i i all e ised Θ. Ba es ep i t of ‘oss s 1928 translation for the Oxford
Translation series, which still remains the most reliable English translation to date of the Metaphysics.
The translation is based on Ross 1924 edition (cited under *Text and Editions*). It is a non-literal, but
accurate, translation, which tries to strike the right balance between readability and faithfulness to
the original Greek. Tredennick 1936 is the Loeb translation of the Metaphysics. It is a classic and
elegant rendering of the Greek and can still be usefully consulted, although the text on which the
t a slatio is ased is less elia le tha ‘oss s. Sachs 1999 is an attempt to restore the flow of
A istotle s o igi al G eek a d to get rid of the abstract terminology often employed by modern
translators. Lawson-Tancred 2004 is non-literal, at times loose translation, which mainly aims for
readability and is primarily intended for students. Reeve 2016 is a recent annotated translation, which
offers an accurate and consistent rendering of the Greek text.
Lawson-Tancred, H. trans. 2004. Aristotle. The Metaphysics. By Aristotle. Penguin: London. A
translation, with introduction and bibliography, of the Metaphysics. S ooths out A istotle s Greek in
favour of readability. Intended for students.
Reeve, C.D.C. trans. 2016. Aristotle. Metaphysics. By Aristotle. Indianapolis: Hackett. A reliable and
accurate annotated translation. The long introduction lays out the main coordinates for reading the
Metaphysics, while the large apparatus of notes tackles difficult issues of translation and
interpretation.
Ross, W.D., trans. 1984. Metaphysics. By Aristotle. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised
Oxford Translation. Edited by J. Barnes, vol. 2, 3346-3716. Princeton. Princeton Univ. Press. This is the
i i all e ised Θ. Ba es ep i t of the ‘oss s lassi t a slation for the Oxford Translation
series (In The Complete Works of Aristotle Translated into English, vol. VIII. Edited by W.D. Ross, and
J.A. Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press). It is still the best and more reliable translation of the Metaphysics,
ased o ‘oss s editio .
Sachs, J., trans. 1999. A istotle’s Metaphysics. By Aristotle. Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press. A
translation of the Metaphysics that ai s to esto e the o igi al flo of A istotle s G eek and to do
away with the abstract terminology and Latinizations often employed by modern translators under
the influence of Latin medieval philosophy.
Tredennick, H., trans. 1933 and 1935. Aristotle. Metaphysics. By Aristotle. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Loeb.
The Loeb edition of the Metaphysics, with translation and historical introduction. The translation is
clear and accurate, and can still be usefully consulted, although Tredennick s editio , hi h is ai l
based on Bekker edition (1831), is not reliable.
Modern European Languages Translations of the Full Text
Although dated, Tricot 1986 (originally published in 1933) remains the standard French translation of
the Metaphysics, with useful introduction and explanatory notes. Duminil and Jaulin 2008 is a more
recent and readable French translation, with introduction and notes. It is intended for a wide
readership and for students. Viano 1974 is a classic and accurate Italian translation, prefaced by a
critical note that provides an overview of the Metaphysics (vol. 2 of Reale 1993, cited under *Modern
European Languages Commentaries* contains another reliable Italian translation). Szlezák 2003 is a
new and clear German translation with useful introduction.

Duminil, M.-P., Jaulin, A. trans. 2008. Métaphysique. Paris : Flammarion. A new French translation of
the Metaphysics with useful introduction and notes. Intended for students and a wide readership.
Szlezák, T.A., trans. 2003. Metaphysik. Berlin: Academia Verlag. An accurate and reliable German
translation, with useful introduction.
Tricot J., trans. 1986. Métaphysique. Paris: Vrin. The standard modern French translation of the
Metaphysics, with introduction, notes and index. Originally published in 1933.
Viano, C.A. 1974, trans. Aristotele. La Metafisica. Turin: UTET. An accurate Italian translation of the
Metaph si s. The iti al ote p efa ed to the t a slatio is useful fo a fi st o e ie of A istotle s
work.
Commentaries
With the only exception of Reale 1993, which is an Italian commentary on the entire Metaphysics, all
commentaries cited in this section are partial commentaries, devoted to an individual book or to
groups of thematically related books. They all follow the same format by providing original translations
of the book(s) under study, together with an introduction and a section-by-section philosophical
commentary. They also include extensive and up-to-date bibliographies. For ease of reference they
have been subdivided into English Commentaries and Modern European Languages Commentaries.
English Commentaries
The Clarendon Aristotle Series comprises reference English commentaries on A istotle s o ks, with
new translations, notes and introductions. Although commentaries slightly differ in format, they are
all intended for a large philosophical audience, and so generally focus more on arguments than on
strictly textual matters. They also offer extensive bibliographical guidance. The ones cited in this
section are commentaries on individual books, or groups of connected books, of the Metaphysics.
Kirwan 1991 (originally published in 1971) is an influential commentary on Met. IV-VI, especially
oti ea le fo its a al sis of A istotle s t eat e t of ei g a d the p i iple of o -contradiction in
Met. IV. A as o igi all pu lished i is still the est a ou t to date of A istotle s
philosophy of mathematics in Books XIII and XIV. Bostock 1994 is a commentary on Met. VII-VIII, which
takes full account of the scholarly interest in Aristotle s theo of su sta e i the s a d early
1990s. Madigan 1999 provides analysis of Met. III, a comparatively little studied book, where Aristotle
presents and discusses a series of philosophical aporiae or puzzles. Makin 2006 is a comprehensive
and problem-oriented commentary on Book IX, which, besides providing an original interpretation of
the book, is also pa ti ula l useful to get a se se of the u e t de ate o A istotle s otio s of
potentiality and actuality.
Annas, J. 1988. Aristotle: Metaphysics Books M and N, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Originally published
in 1976, this commentary with translation and extensive introduction still represents the best analysis
of A istotle s dis ussio of athe ati al e tities in Books XIII and XIV. The introduction pays particular
atte tio to A istotle s iti ue of Plato ist philosophies of athe ati s and reconstructs the
histo i al a kg ou d agai st hi h A istotle s dis ussio should e u de stood.
Bostock, D. 1994. Aristotle: Metaphysics Books a d . Oxford: Clarendon Press. An English
commentary, with introduction and translation, on Books VII and VIII. Takes full account of the boom

of s hola l i te est i A istotle s theo of su sta ce in the 1980s and early 1990s. The approach is
more problem-oriented than textual.
Kirwan, C. 1993. Aristotle: Metaphysics Books , , a d . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Originally published
in 1971, this English commentary with translation has become a point of reference for the study of
Books IV, V and VI, especially in relation to the topics of being and the principle of non-contradiction.
The commentary is in note-form, and no general introduction is provided. But further comments on
individual topics are appended to the notes on the text.
Madigan, A. 1999. Aristotle: Metaphysics Books B and K 1-2. Oxford: Clarendon Press. An English
commentary with translation on Met. III, where Aristotle presents a series of philosophical aporiae,
and XI.1-2. The short but useful introduction discusses important issues such as the nature of the
aporiae in Book III and their place in the Metaphysics.
Makin, S. 2006. Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Θ. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A philosophically penetrating
and accurate commentary, with introduction and translation, on Book IX. The introduction places Book
IX ithi A istotle s etaph si al p oje t a d elu idates so e ke otio s. The se tio -by-section
commentary offers a consistent narrative of the progression of the argument in the book.
Fundamental for any study of Aristotle s treatment of potentiality and actuality.
Modern European Languages Commentaries
Reale 1993 is a three-volume Italian commentary on the full text of the Metaphysics, with original
translation, introduction and extended notes. It presents a strongly anti-developmental account of
the Metaphysics a d is u h i flue ed Medie al o e ta ies, i pa ti ula Tho as A ui as s
13th
-century commentary. All the other works cited in this section are commentaries on the individual
books of the Metaphysics. Frede and Patzig 1988 is still a reference ook fo the stud of A istotle s
theory of substance in Met. VII. The introduction and the notes defend a number of controversial
interpretations including the theory of particular forms (see *Universals*) and the view that the
essence and definition of sensible substances is confined to their form alone (see *Essence and
definition*). Bodeus and Stevens 2014, Berti 2015 and Morel 2015 are part of a French project, to
appear with Vrin, which includes commentaries with translation, introduction and notes, on all the
books of the Metaphysics. Although being of an excellent scholarly standard, these commentaries are
intended for a large philosophical audience and for students as well. Bodeus and Stevens 2014 deals
with Met. V, where Aristotle presents an analysis of the meaning of a series of key philosophical terms.
They pa ti ula l i sist o the o e tio of this athe u de studied ook ith A istotle s ge e al
metaphysical project. Berti 2015 is a useful commentary on Book VI, which deals with a number of
topics related to the scientific status of metaphysics. Morel 2015 is a particularly innovative analysis
of Met. VIII, hi h u de sta ds the ook as a sig ifi a t step i A istotle s t eat e t of se si le
substances and not only as an appendix to the celebrated book VII. Finally, Bordt 2006 is a German
commentary with translation of Book XII, which aims to be introductory and is intended for non-
specialists.
Berti, E. 2015. Aristote, Métaphysique, Livre Epsilon. Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire. Paris :
Vrin. A recent French commentary on Met. VI with introduction and translation. The very clear and
useful i t odu tio deals ith a ide a ge of topi s i ludi g A istotle s di isio of theoretical
sciences, accidental being, being as true, as well as the place of Book VI in the Metaphysics.

Bodéüs, R., and Stevens, A. 2014. Aristote, Métaphysique, Livre Delta. Introduction, Traduction et
Commentaire. Paris : Vrin. A new French commentary, with original translation, on Met. V. The useful
introduction challenges the traditional view that Book V is a philosophical dictionary unrelated to the
rest of the Metaphysics, and insists that the book closely connects with the discussion of being and its
per se attributes in Books III and IV.
Bo dt, M. . A istoteles Metaphysik XII. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. A
commentary with translation of Met. VII, which is of a rather introductory nature and is intended for
a wide audience. The commentary is mainly based on Frede and Charles 2000 (*Collections of Essays
on Individual Books or Groups of Books*).
Frede, M. and Patzig, G. 1988. Aristoteles Metaphysik . 2 vols. Munich: C. H. Beck. A two-volume work
on Book VII of the Metaphysics, with commentary and translation (vol. 2), and extensive philosophical
introduction (vol. 1). Still remains one of the most authoritative and influential interpretations of Met.
VII.
Morel, P.-M. 2015. Aristote, Métaphysique, Livre Èta. Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire. Paris :
Vrin. An innovative French commentary with translation on Met. VIII. The introduction makes a strong
case for the view that Met. VIII a ks a sig ifi a t de elop e t i A istotle s t eat e t of se si le
substances and is not just an appendix to Book VII.
Reale, G. 1993. Aristotele. Metafisica, 3 vols. Milan: Vita e Pensiero. A commentary on the whole
Metaphysics, with introduction and translation ith pa allel G eek te t, f o ‘oss s editio . Defends
a strongly non-developmental account. The o e ta is hea il i flue ed Tho as A ui as s
13th
-century exposition of the Metaphysics.
Collections of essays
It is convenient to split collections of essays on the Metaphysics into two broad categories: those that
deal ith A istotle s etaph si al thought a d so ith the Metaphysics as a whole and those that are
devoted to individual books or groups of books. The former tend to address general metaphysical
issues and may include essays on works other than the Metaphysics when they are relevant to the
e o st u tio of A istotle s etaph si al p oje t. Colle tio s of essa s o i di idual ooks or groups
of books, by contrast, are more text-oriented and often present a commentary-style format, offering
guidance on the individual chapters of the book(s) under consideration.
Collections of essays on the Metaphysics
The collections cited in this section deal either with the Metaphysics as a whole or, more broadly, with
A istotle s etaph si al thought. Aubenque 1979 collects the proceedings of the 6th
Symposium
Aristotelicum and includes French, German and English papers on the Metaphysics. It remains a very
useful collection in consideration of the quality of the contributions and the variety of topics covered.
Barnes et al. 1979 makes available to an English-speaking readership classic English papers as well as
translations of French and German articles o A istotle s etaph sical thought from 1910-1976.
Scaltsas et al. 1994 is an influential collection of English papers on the Metaphysics, which is
representative of a a al ti philosoph app oa h to A istotle s etaph si s. It is particularly

recommended for a philosophical audience. The other two collections cited contain very useful
ate ial o A istotle s etaph si al thought. Pelletier and King-Farlow 1984 is a short collection of
seven papers, many of which actually deal with metaphysical issues such as essentialism, substance
and individuation. Preus and Anton 1992 is a three-pa t olle tio of pape s o A istotle s o tolog
broadly construed. Only part II actually deals with the Metaphysics, but Part I and III, on the Organon
and the De Anima, respectively, also touch upon issues that are relevant to the stud of A istotle s
metaphysical thought.
Aubenque, P., ed. 1979. Études sur la Métaphysique d’A istote. A tes du VIe S posiu A istoteli u .
Paris: Vrin 1979. The proceedings of the 6th
Symposium Aristotelicum. Collects eleven papers in French,
German and English, all devoted to the Metaphysics. Contributions cover a wide range of topics,
including the manuscript tradition of the Metaphysics, the relationship between metaphysics and logic,
bei g a d o e, the theo of su sta e a d A istotle s theolog .
Barnes, J., Schofield M., and Sorabji, R, eds. 1979. Articles on Aristotle: 3, Metaphysics. London:
Duckworth. A collection of twelve classic 20th
-century papers (1910- o A istotle s etaphysical
thought. Collects articles in English as well as English translations of French and German papers.
Pelletier, F. J., and King-Farlow, J., eds. 1984. New Essays on Aristotle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy
10 (Suppl.). A collection of seven essays, many of which deal with metaphysical issues, with particular
efe e e to A istotle s ie s o esse tialis , su sta e, i di iduatio a d ausatio .
Preus, A., and Anton, J.P., ed. 1992. Essa s i A ie t G eek Philosoph V: A istotle’s O tolog . Albany,
NY: The State Univ. of New York Press. A collection of fourteen previously unpublished English papers
o o tologi al a d etaph si al issues a oss A istotle s o pus. Pa t I deals ith the Organon, Part II
with the Metaphysics, while Part III is concerned with the De Anima. Useful to get a sense of the debate.
Scaltsas, T., Charles, D., and Gill, M.L., eds. 1994. Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's
Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Collects fourteen previously unpublished English papers
dealing with a wide range of metaphysical topics from the central books (VII-IX) of the Metaphysics
and from Book IV. Recommended for a philosophical audience.
Collections of Essays on Individual Books or Groups of Books
The Symposium Aristotelicum collections are commentary-style collections of English papers on
individual books of the Metaphysics: Frede and Charles 2000 is devoted to Book XII, Crubellier and
Lacks 2009 to Book III, and Steel and Primavesi 2012 to Book I. They contain papers on each of the
chapters of the book under study, as well as comprehensive introductions and updated bibliographies.
Centrone 2005 is a similar commentary-style collection of Italian papers on Book X, which also offers
a new Italian translation of the book. Hecquet-Devienne 2008 is a collection of French and English
papers on Book IV, which also contains a critical edition and a French translation of the text by the
volume editor. Horn 2016 is a recent collection of English paper on Book XII, more thematic in
character but that still follows the general structure of the book. Rapp 1996 collects English and
German papers on the so-called central books (VII-IX) of the Metaphysics and covers a wide range of
issues elated to A istotle s otio of su sta e. Crubellier et al. 2008 collects French and English
pape s o A istotle s otio of potentiality (and its Presocratic and Platonic antecedents), with
particular but not exclusive reference to Book IX of the Metaphysics.

Centrone, B., ed. 2005. Il libro Iota (X) della Metafisica di Aristotele. Sankt Augustine: Academia Verlag.
A commentary-style collection of eight original essays in Italian on Book X, with a translation of the
book and introduction by the editor. Papers cover a number of important issues dealt with in Book IX,
including unity, multiplicity, identity and contrariety. Also provides an up-to-date bibliography.
Crubellier M., Jaulin A., Lefebvre D., and Morel P.-M., eds. 2008. Dunamis. Autour de la puissance chez
Aristote. Louvain: Peeters Publishers. A collection of eighteen previously unpublished papers in French
and English on the notion of dunamis, ith pa ti ula ut ot e lusi e efe e e to A istotle s
discussion in Met. IX. Part I deals with pre-Platonic discussions and Part II with Plato, while Part III is
concerned with Aristotle and his reception in Late Antiquity.
Crubellier, M. and Laks, A., eds. 2009. Aristotle's Metaphysics Beta: Symposium Aristotelicum. Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press. A commentary-style collection of nine papers on Book III of the Metaphysics,
where Aristotle presents and discusses a series (14 according to the traditional numbering) of
philosophical puzzles or aporiae. The particularly useful introduction by the editor discusses general
issues such as the nature and function of the aporiae as well as their place within the structure of the
Metaphysics.
Frede, M. and Charles, D., eds. 2000. Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum.
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. A commentary-style collection of eleven monographic papers on each
individual chapter of Book XII (two on Ch. 9). A efe e e o k fo the stud of A istotle s theolog .
F ede s i t odu tio to the olle tio is a fu da e tal o e ie of the st u ture, nature and contents
of Book IX.
Hecquet-Devienne, H. ed. 2008. Aristote, Métaphysique Gamma: Edition, Traduction, Études. Louvain-
la-Neuce: Peeters. A two-part volume entirely devoted to Met. IV. In the first part the volume editor
presents a critical edition (based on a fresh collection of the manuscripts) and French translation of
the text; the second part collects eleven studies (ten in French and one in English) on the most
controversial aspects of Met. IV.
Horn, C., ed. 2016. A istotle’s Metaphysics Lambda. New Essays. Boston and Berlin: De Gruyter. A
collection of eleven new English essays on Book XII plus a useful introduction by the volume editor.
Although not in commentary format, it provides analysis of most chapters of Book XII and discusses a
wide range of issues, including textual matters as well as aspects of the e eptio of A istotle s
theology.
Rapp, C., ed. 1996. Aristotele, Metaphysik. Die Substanzbücher (Zeta, Eta, Theta). Berlin: De Gruyter.
A useful collection of eleven not previously published German and English papers by internationally
recognized scholars. Covers most of the issues elated to A istotle s theo of su sta e, ith
particular reference to Book VII.
Steel, C. and Primavesi, O., eds. 2012. Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha: Symposium Aristotelicum. Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press. A commentary-style collection of eleven papers on the first book of the
Metaphysics, a doxographic treatise where Aristotle reconstructs his predecessors views in light of
his own theory of the four causes. Fundamental for any study of Met. I as well as of pre-Aristotelian
metaphysics. The appendix contains a new edition of Met. I by A. Primavesi.
Bibliographies

Radice and Davies 1997 is the only comprehensive annotated bibliography o A istotle s Metaphysics,
which offers guidance on editions, translations, studies and instruments o A istotle s o k up to 1996.
Barnes et al. 1995 is a selective i liog aph o A istotle s thought as a hole, ith o e tha ,
thematically organized entries on the Metaphysics. Barnes et al. 1981 is a very selective bibliography,
which is intended for an English audience and is particularly useful for beginners. Gill 2005 is an
extremely helpful paper, which discusses at some length the main strands in contemporary
scholarship on the Metaphysics as well as a number of individual books and papers. The International
Aristotle Bibliography is an online subscription database collecting over 50,000 books, papers, reviews
and dissertations on Aristotle.
Barnes, J., Schofield M., and Sorabji, R., eds. 1981. Aristotle. A Selective Bibliography. Oxford: Sub-
Faculty of Philosophy. Though obviously dated, this very selective bibliography is still a useful
instrument for a first orientation. Intended for an English-speaking audience.
Barnes, J., Schofield, M., and Sorabji, R.. 1995. Bibliography. In The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle.
Edited by J. Barnes, 295–384. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. An annotated bibliography on
all the diffe e t a eas of A istotle s philosoph . Citatio s a e o ga ized the ati all . Contains over
e t ies o A istotle s Metaphysics.
Gill, M.L. 2005. A istotle s Metaphysics Reconsidered. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3: 223-
241. The paper provides a critical overview of the most recent strands in scholarship o A istotle s
Metaphysics and discusses several individual contributions to the field. Excellent for a first overview
of the literature.
Radice, R, and Davies, R. 1997. Aristotle's Metaphysics: An Annotated Bibliography of the Twentieth-
Century Literature. Leiden, The Netherlands, New York, and Cologne, Germany: Brill. This is the English
version of an Italian bibliography published in 1997 as La Metafisica di Aristotele nel XX secolo:
bibliografia ragionata e sistematica. Milano: Vita e Pensiero. Compiled with the help of a large team
of around fifty scholars, it is a complete, annotated bibliography of 20th
-century (up to 1996) studies,
material a d i st u e ts o A istotle s Metaphysics. Especially useful for scholarly work.
*International Aristotle Bibliography [http://bibliographies.brillonline.com/browse/international-
aristotle-bibliography]*. An online subscription database giving access to over 50,000 books, articles,
e ie s a d disse tatio s o A istotle. Ma aged ‘. I ga dia, f o St. Θoh s U i e sit , Ne Yo k.
Updated biannually.
Metaphysics as a Science (Books I-VI)
It seems clear that there is a science or discipline that Aristotle self-consciously theorizes about and
practises in the fourteen treatises that have come down to us under the title Metaphysics. Although
this is ot A istotle s a of des i i g it, let us all su h a s ie e etaph si s isdo , theolog ,
fi st philosoph o si pl philosoph a e a o g A istotle s a s of ha a te izi g the dis ipli e he
is after in the Metaphysics). There are several issues that scholars have discussed in connection with
metaphysics as a scientific discipline, but four have been particularly central to the debate. (i) One
obvious question concerns the subject-matter of metaphysics, i.e. what metaphysics is about and
what it studies. (ii) The second issue naturally stems from the first. In Met. IV.1-2 Aristotle presents
metaphysics as a universal science that studies all beings, everything that there is. Although there are

different kinds of being, Aristotle is confident that such different kinds are enough unified or
connected as to be the object of one single science. Commentators, therefore, have gone out of their
way to understand what kind of unification Aristotle envisages for the different kinds of things that
there are. (iii) If metaphysics is a science, it is natural to ask what kind of method it follows: is
metaphysics a demonstrative science or does it follow some other method of enquiry, for instance
dialectic? (iv) There is a fourth topic which has been particularly popular with scholars. In Met. IV 3
Aristotle states that metaphysics should study the logical axioms and in IV.4-6 provides a defence of
the most important of such axioms, the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC). A istotle s defe e of
PNC – the meaning, validity and extension of such defence – has been at the centre of a particularly
heated debate. Although the four aforementioned issues are clearly connected and interrelated, it
may be useful for ease of reference to discuss them separately under different headings.
The Subject-matter of Metaphysics
In the Metaphysics Aristotle provides different and potentially conflicting accounts of the subject-
matter of metaphysics, i.e. what metaphysics studies. Two have been particularly important for the
scholarly debate. (1) On one account (Met. IV.1-2), the subject-matter of metaphysics is being qua
being: metaphysics studies all beings and the properties that belong to them insofar as they are beings.
On this account metaphysics is portrayed as general ontology: unlike the so-called special sciences,
which all study a particular kind or genus of being, metaphysics is a general discipline, which is
concerned with the totality of reality. (2) On a different account (Met. VI.1 and XII.1), metaphysics
studies immaterial, divine substances. On this second account, metaphysics is not general ontology,
but a form of rational theology: it does not study the totality of reality, but a particularly eminent kind
of being, divine being. Jaeger 1948 (cited under *General Overviews*) is an attempt to solve the
tension between metaphysics as general ontology and metaphysics as theology in developmental
terms, with the theological phase being the earlier. Merlan 1968 offers a radically theological
i te p etatio of A istotle s positio that basically denies that Aristotle ever conceived metaphysics
as general ontology. More popular strategies have rather tried to reconcile the two different accounts
of metaphysics by arguing that metaphysics is indeed general ontology, but also that the study of
immaterial, divine substances holds a special place in the discipline. Patzig 1979 (originally published
in 1960) and Frede 1987 exploit to this effe t A istotle s view in Met. IV-1-2 that being is spoken of in
both primary and secondary ways (see *Multivocity of Being*): just as being is said primarily of
substances and secondarily of things in categories other than substances, so being is said primarily of
immaterial, divine substances and only secondarily of the other kinds of substances. Thus, the study
of everything that is said to be (ontology) must have as its core part the study of what is said to be
primarily (theology). Duarte 2007 is a detailed defence of an Aquinas-style solution: metaphysics
studies being qua being, but theology is an essential part of metaphysics because divine substances
are the causes of all other beings and so of everything else that there is. Shields 2012 is a balanced
and innovative reconsideration of the debate, which sets the problem of the subject-matter of
metaphysics ithi the oade o te t of A istotle s ie o the atu e of ei g and its per se
attributes.
Duarte, S. 2007. A istotle s Theolog a d its ‘elatio to the Science of Being qua Being. Apeiron 40.3:
267-318. A Thomistic solution to the issue of the subject-matter of metaphysics. Argues that
metaphysics studies indeed being qua being, but that theology is part of metaphysics because divine
beings are the causes of all other beings: being is either an unmoved mover or is causally dependent
on unmoved movers.

Frede, M. 1987. The U it of Ge e al a d Spe ial Metaph si s: A istotle s Co eptio of Metaphysics.
In Essays in Ancient Philosophy. By M. Frede, 85-91. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A substantial refinement
of the position in Patzig 1979. Solves the tension between ontology (general metaphysics) and
theology (special metaphysics) by arguing that the way of being of non-sensible substances is the focal
or core way of being in relation to which all other ways of being (both the way of being of non-sensible
substances and that of accidents) should be understood.
Me la , P. . O the Te s Metaph si s a d Bei g-Qua-Bei g . The Monist 52: 174–94. A classic,
theological interpretation of the subject-matter of metaphysics. Argues that the exp essio ei g ua
ei g de otes all alo g di i e ei g a d ot u i e sal ei g o ei g i ge e al.
Patzig, G. 1979. Theolog a d O tolog i A istotle s Metaph si s. I Articles on Aristotle: 3,
Metaphysics. Edited by J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji, 33-49. London: Duckworth. A seminal
paper. Solves the issue of the subject-matter of metaphysics by applying to the relationship between
sensible and non-sensible substances the focal structure of being Aristotle develops in Met. IV.1-2 to
account for the relationship between substances and accidents. Originally published in German in
as: Theologie u d o tolog i de Metaph sik des A istoteles. Kant-Studien 52: 185–205.
Shields, C. 2012. Being qua Being. In The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle. Edited by C. Shields, 343-371.
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. An innovative reconsideration of the nature of metaphysics. Argues that
the issue of the possibility (Possibility Problem) and subject-matter (Extension Problem) of
metaphysics can be solved only when we understand what attributes belong per se to being (Intension
Problem). Ends up endorsing a solution similar to Duarte 2007.
The Multivocity of Being
Being, Aristotle claims, is said in many ways, as many as there are categories of being. Let us call this
doctrine the multivocity of being. This do t i e ust e u de stood i o ju tio ith A istotle s
further claim in Met. III.3 that being is not a genus (Loux 1973 remains the best philosophical
discussion of this claim; see also Shields 1999): the different things that are do not fall under one single
genus, but split immediately into different categories of being. Although the different kinds of being
do not fall under one single genus, Aristotle is confident in Met. IV1-2 that they are enough unified to
be studied by one single science. More particularly, although being is said in many ways, the different
ways in which being is said depend on the way being as substance is said, and so it is the dependence
of all categories on substance that guarantees the unity of metaphysics. Following the seminal Owen
1960, scholars describe the dependence of the other categories on substance as the doctrine of focal
meaning. Owen 1960 argues for three important claims about focal meaning: that the focal meaning
is a semantic doctrine about the different senses of the Greek expressions for being or what is; that
focal meaning is a semantic structure intermediate between homonymy and synonymy; that the
multivocity of being and the focal meaning are two different and incompatible doctrines, the former
ep ese ti g a ea l stage i A istotle s thoughts a out ei g. The su se ue t de ate a e
u de stood as a espo se to o e o a othe of O e s i flue tial lai s. Irwin 1981 argues that the
focal meaning is not a semantic structure, but an ontological relationship among essences – a view
which has become prevalent in recent analyses of the focal meaning and is further developed in Lewis
2004. Irwin 1981 also understands focal meaning not as intermediate between homonymy and
synonymy, but as a special case of homonymy. Shields 1999 and Ward 2007 take a step further and
offe a a al sis of ei g ithi ge e al studies of A istotle s otio of homonymy. Finally, Yu 2001
calls into questio O e s o te tio that the ulti o it of ei g a d the do t i e of fo al

meaning are incompatible, together with the developmental hypothesis that underpins that
contention.
Irwin, T. 1981. Homonymy in Aristotle. Review of Metaphysics 34: 523–544. A survey of homonymy in
Aristotle. Argues that the focal structure of being is a case of homonymy and is not intermediate
between homonymy and synonymy. Against Owen 1960 understands the focal structure of being as a
relationship among essences and not meanings.
Lewis, F. A. 2004. Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
68.1: 1–36. Addresses the objections raised in Shields 1999 against classifying being as a case of
homonymy. Argues that solutions are available by conside i g A istotle s atu e t eat e t of the
homonymy of substance in Met. VII and VIII. Also provides a good overview of the debate to date.
Loux, M. 1973. Aristotle on the Transcendentals. Phronesis 18.3: 225–239. The best philosophical
analysis of Aristotle s t eat e t of the t a s e de tals ei g a d o e. E a i es o e pa ti ula l
A istotle s lai that ei g a d o e do ot o stitute ge e a a d the elated lai that the a e ot
predicated univocally i.e. s o ousl i A istotle s te i olog of all things.
Owen, G. E. L. 1960. Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle. In Plato and Aristotle
in the Mid-Fourth Century. Edited by I. During and G.E.L. Owen, 163-190. Göteborg: Almquist and
Wiksell. A seminal paper on Met. IV 1-2. Understands A istotle s theo of being in semantic terms
a d oi s the fo ula fo al ea i g to describe it. Argues that focal meaning is intermediate
between homonymy and synonymy. Makes also the influential claim that in the Metaphysics Aristotle
reconsiders his early view that being is homonymous to make room for the possibility of a universal
science of being.
Shields, C. 1999. Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press. The first monograph to study the homo of ei g i the ge e al o te t of A istotle s
treatment of homonymy. Part I offers an in-depth analysis of the different kinds of homonymy in
Aristotle and Part II considers its applications. Ch. 9 provides an extensive treatment of the homonymy
of being. Argues that Aristotle is mistaken in taking being as a genuine case of homonymy.
Ward, J. K., 2008. Aristotle on Homonymy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. Building on Shields
2009, offers a concise and effective analysis of homonymy in Aristotle, with reference to its role in
dialectic. Ch. 4 presents a balanced and up-to-date analysis of the homonymy of being.
Yu, J. 2001. What is the Focal Meaning of Being in Aristotle? Apeiron 34.3: 205-231. Argues that the
following two Aristotelian claims are compatible: (1) being is said in as many ways as the categories;
(2) being is said primarily of substance and secondarily of all other categories. Challenges the view in
O e that is A istotle s ea l positio a d his fi al positio i the Metaphysics.
The method of metaphysics
Scholars have long debated the issue of the method of metaphysics: what kind of science is
metaphysics? How do metaphysical arguments proceed? There are mainly two polar options:
metaphysics is a demonstrative science conforming to the model of science described by Aristotle in
the Posterior Analytics; metaphysics proceeds dialectically and not demonstratively. Against the
demonstrative character of metaphysics militates the requirement in the Posterior Analytics that the
things a demonstrative science deals with should belong to one single genus. Now, metaphysics
studies being qua being; but being is not, for Aristotle, a genus and so the things metaphysics deals

with do not belong to one single genus. It follows that metaphysics cannot be a demonstrative science.
Fraser 2002 is the most consistent attempt to overcome this difficulty. For one thing, she argues that
it is false that Aristotle requires that the things a demonstrative science deals with belong to one single
genus. For another, she insists that the genus metaphysics studies is substance and not being. So,
metaphysics studies substances and demonstrates that a number of properties belong to them. Bell
2000 takes a less radical line and argues that, while metaphysics is deeply influenced by the Posterior
Analytics demonstrative procedures, such procedures are significantly adapted to new aims and tasks.
The general character of metaphysics invites the thought that it may have something in common with
dialectic, which is equally general in scope. But the view that metaphysics is dialectical in character is
problematic as well. The main difficulty is that dialectical arguments have as their premises received
or common opinions. Since there is no guarantee, in principle, that such opinions are true, it seems
that dialectical conclusions are only probable and not definitely true. Aubenque 1962 is a classic
defence of the view that metaphysics proceeds dialectically. He fully takes on board the consequences
of viewing metaphysical arguments as dialectical and argues that conclusions in metaphysics are only
probable and provisional. Irwin 1988 is an influential attempt to come to terms with the dialectical
character of metaphysics. While maintaining that metaphysics is not a demonstrative science, Irwin
argues that it is not dialectical in the standard sense, either. Irwin distinguishes between pure dialectic
and strong dialectic and argues that metaphysics is an instance of strong dialectic. Pure dialectic is
based on common and only probable opinions, while strong dialectic is based on those common
opinions no one could seriously deny – and so its conclusions are not merely probable or provisional.
Aubenque, P. 1962. Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Although dated, this is still a classic and provocative a ou t of A istotle s app oa h to etaph si s.
Argues that A istotle s ethod i the Metaphysics is fundamentally dialectical and not demonstrative,
and so his arguments remain inconclusive, as dialectic is based on common and hence only probable
opinions.
Bell, I. 2004. Metaphysics as an Aristotelian Science. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. An original
e o side atio of A istotle s ethod i the Metaphysics. A sustained attempt to argue that
metaphysics conforms, at least to some extent, to A istotle s odel of de o st ati e s ie e as
described in the Posterior Analytics. Bell contends that the Posterior Analytics model of scientific
investigation is both endorsed and adapted to new tasks in the Metaphysics.
Fraser, K. 2002. Demonstrative Science and the Science of Being qua Being. Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 22: 43-82. One of the most convincing attempts to defend the view that Aristotelian
metaphysics is a demonstrative science. Makes two main claims: that substance is the subject genus
of metaphysics and accidental predicates are proved to belong per se to substances; that it is false
that, in a demonstrative science, all items the science deals with belongs to the same genus.
Irwin, T. 1988. A istotle’s Fi st P i iples. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. A remarkable examination of the
epistemic status of A istotle s fi st p i iples i etaph si s a d ethi s. Argues that metaphysics
proceeds neither demonstratively nor through pure dialectic (which is based on common opinions),
but through strong dialectic (which is based on a select set of common opinions no one could seriously
reject).
Principle of Non-contradiction
In Met. IV.3 Aristotle asserts that the science of being qua being should also study logical axioms and
in IV.4-6 provides an extensive discussion and defence of the most important of such axioms, i.e. the

Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC). Wedin 2012 discusses at length the issue as to why metaphysics
should stud the logi al a io s. A istotle s defe e of PNC is particularly complex and problematic.
Gottlieb 2015 is a comprehensive and detailed overview of the main problems raised by Aristotle s
text with extensive and up-to-date bibliography. Łukasie i z o igi all pu lished i is a
ea l a d i flue tial assess e t of the oge of A istotle s defence of PNC. One major difficulty is
that, as Łukasie i z observes, in IV.4-6 Aristotle seems to present at least three different versions of
PNC – an ontological, a semantic and a doxastic version – and it is often difficult to decide which
version he has in mind at each stage of the argument. The main difficulty, however, is the very nature
of A istotle s defe e of PNC in IV.4. Code 1997 and Bolton 1994 provide two different assessments
of Aristotle s st ateg . A istotle observes in IV.4 that PNC is indemonstrable and can be defended only
through elenctic refutation, i.e. by refuting those who deny its validity. Code 1997 takes this to mean
that, if PNC a ot e de o st ated, it a ot e p o ed i a othe a , a d so A istotle s ele ti
defence of PNC is not a proof. Of course there may be a series of truths that can be proved about PNC,
such as its being the firmest of all principles, but the principle itself remains unproved. This somehow
traditional view has been challenged by Bolton 1994, who maintains that the elenctic refutation is a
proper dialectic proof of PNC, conducted according to the rules of peirastic, a particular sub-species
of the dialectical method. A istotle s dis ussio of PNC lea es a se ies of othe uestions open: does
the dis ussio p esuppose A istotle s esse tialis ? Does PNC appl to all p edi ates o o l to
su sta tial o es? Is A istotle s a gu e t t a s e de tal? Shi e is a jou al issue e ti el
devoted to PNC, which addresses these and other questions. One final feature of the discussion of
PNC has puzzled interpreters. In IV.5- A istotle o e ts the de ial of PNC ith P otago as a d
He a litus elati is . The issue is discussed at some length in Wedin 2004.
Bolton, R. 1994. A istotle s Conception of Metaphysics as a Science. In Unity, Identity, and Explanation
i A istotle’s Metaph si s. Edited by T. Scaltsas, M.L. Gill, and D. Charles, 321-354. Oxford: Oxford Univ.
P ess. A o igi al e a i atio of A istotle s ele ti p oof of PNC. Against Code 1987, argues that PNC
itself is proved. Insists on the dialectical (in particular peirastic) nature of the proof. Challenges the
ie that the p oof of PNC p esupposes A istotle s esse tialis .
Code, A. 1987. Aristotle's Investigation of a Basic Logical Principle: Which Science Investigates the
Principle of Non-Contradiction? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16.3: 341-357. An influential paper,
which argues that, although PNC is indemonstrable, Aristotle demonstrates in Met. IV several truths
about it, including the claim that PNC is the firmest of principles.
Gottlieb, P. 2015. Aristotle on Non-contradiction. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-noncontradiction/]* A detailed and comprehensive
o e ie of A istotle s t eat e t of PNC i IV. -6. Touches upon all the major issues discussed in the
literature. Provides up-to-date and extensive bibliography.
Łukasiewicz, J. 1979. Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction. In Articles on Aristotle: vol. 3 Metaphysics.
Edited by J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji, 50-62. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. A classic
and still penetrating analysis of PNC by a major 20th
-century logician. Clearly distinguishes between
A istotle s different versions (ontological, logical and psychological) of PNC and raises a number of
critical points. Fundamental for any subsequent discussion. Originally published as: Über den Satz des
Widerspruchs des Aristotles. Bull. I te . de l’A ade ie des S ie es de Cracovie 1910.
Shiner, R., ed. 1999. Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 23.3. A journal issue entirely
de oted to A istotle s dis ussio PNC. Topi s o e ed i lude: PNC in early Greek philosophy; the role

of dialectic in Met. IV.4-6; the ontological version of PNC; the nature of the proof of PNC in Met. IV.4;
the e te t to hi h A istotle s dis ussio of PNC elies o his o esse tialis .
Wedin, M.V. 2004. On the Use and Abuse of Non-Co t adi tio : A istotle s C iti ue of P otagoras and
Heraclitus in Metaphysics Gamma 5. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26: 213-239. A detailed
e o st u tio of A istotle s a gu e ts i Met. IV.5 to the effect that Protagoras and Heraclitus are
committed to the strong denial of PNC, i.e. to the claim that every thing has every property and does
not have it. Requires knowledge of logical formalism.
Wedin, M. V. 2009. The Science and the Axioms of Being. In A Companion to Aristotle. Edited by G.
Anagnostopolous, 125-143. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. A clear introduction to the topic of PNC.
Deals in particular with the reason why the study of logical axioms is part of metaphysics by insisting
on the characterization of metaphysics as a science of being qua being. Good for a first orientation.
Substance (Books VII-IX)
No a ea of A istotle s etaph si al thought has ee o e discussed over the last few decades than
his theory of substance in the so-called central books (VII, VIII and IX) of the Metaphysics. This is not
surprising given the revival of Aristotelian metaphysics and of metaphysics in general in contemporary
analytic philosophy. Five thematic areas have been particularly at the centre of the debate. (i)
A istotle s ie s o su sta e i Books VII a d VIII; ii) the analysis of sensible objects in terms of
atte a d fo h lo o phis ; iii the a i hi h h lo o phis affe ts A istotle s a ou t of
essence and definition; (iv) universals; (v) the discussion of potentiality and actuality in Book IX. The
present section offers guidance on each of these issues.
Substantiality in the Metaphysics
A la ge po tio of the de ate o e s the uestio as to hat A istotle ea s su sta e in the
central books, and in particular in Book VII, where he explicitly raises the issue of substantiality.
Galluzzo and Mariani 2006 provides a survey of the debate against the background of contemporary
metaphysics. Witt 1989 is an accessible introduction to the philosophical issues of the central books,
while Lou a d Wedi a e o e te h i al a d de a di g e o st u tio s of A istotle s
theory of substance, with emphasis on the role of Book VII. One major issue is the relationship
between the theory of substance in the Met. VII and the (arguably earlier) account of substance in the
Categories. In the Categories, Aristotle identifies particular sensible objects such as human beings,
animals and plants as the fu da e tal e tities o p i a su sta es ; In Met. VII, however, sensible
objects are analysed as composites of matter and form, with form being often described as primary
substance. Are these two accounts compatible? Graham 1988 takes a developmental approach and
argues that the Categories and Met. VII ep ese t t o diffe e t a d i o pati le stages i A istotle s
metaphysical thought. Loux 1991 and Wedin 2000 take a more compatibilist line and argue that the
central books are meant to explain facts about sensible objects that are simply described, but not
explained, in the Categories. O A istotle s theo of su sta e i the e t al ooks li i g ei gs tu
out to be the most paradigmatic, and perhaps the only genuine cases, of substances. Furth 1988 takes
this idea seriously and discusses the relationships among the Categories, the central books and
A istotle s iologi al o ks. In recent years, Book VII has become even more predominant in the
debate, and a few studies have shifted the attention from the content to the argumentative structure
of the book. How does Aristotle reach the conclusion that form is substance? Burnyeat 2001 argues

that the conclusion is reached in a non-linear way: Aristotle presents in Book VII self-contained
discussions of five different ways of understanding substance, all leading to the conclusion that form
is substance. Moreover, each discussion is conducted first at a logical and abstract level and then at a
metaphysical level, where the notions of matter and form are properly introduced. Bu eat s o -
linearity thesis has been criticised by Lewis 2013. Lewis also argues that the distinction between a
logical and a metaphysical level of analysis is artificial, and that the argument in Book VII must rather
be reconstructed as a o ple i te pla et ee A istotle s pa tisan theory of form and his
p ede esso s ie s.
Burnyeat, M. 2001. A Map of Metaphysics Zeta. Pittsburg: Mathesis Publications. An original and
controversial analysis of the structure, more than the content, of Met. VII. A gues that Book VII s
argument is not linear. Also holds that the argument is conducted at two levels of analysis, a logical
and a metaphysical level, which alternate each other in the course of the argument. Also offers
i te esti g ate ial o ho to ead A istotle s o pus as a hole and on Book XII.
Furth, M. 1988. Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelean Metaphysics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
U i . P ess. The fi st o og aph that atte pts to i g A istotle s iologi al o ks to ea o his
theory of substance in Book VII. Provides a general and non-de elop e tal a ou t of A istotle s
views on substance in the Categories, Met. VII and the biological works.
Galluzzo, G., and Mauro, M. 2006. A istotle’s Metaphysics Book Z: The Contemporary Debate. Pisa:
Edizioni della Normale. A book-length survey of the debate on th ee ajo the es i A istotle s theo
of substance: hylomorphism, definition and forms. Points to significant connections between
scholarship on Met. VII and the revival of Aristotelian metaphysics in contemporary philosophy.
Graham, D. 1987. A istotle’s Two S ste s. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A controversial book, which
argues that the Categories and the central books of the Metaphysics present two alternative and
incompatible theories of substance, with the Categories being the earlier. Is influenced by
de elop e tal a ou ts of A istotle s thought.
Lewis, F. A 2013. How Aristotle gets by in Metaphysics Zeta. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. A response to
Burnyeat 2001. Argues that Met. VII presupposes indeed a two-level analysis, but not so much in terms
of logi al a d etaph si al le els, as i te s of a o ple diale ti et ee A istotle s p ede esso s
views and his own partisan theory of form. Also alls i to uestio Bu eat s lai that the a gu e t
in Book VII is non-linear.
Loux, M. J. 1991. Primary Ousia. An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ.
Press. A classic interpretation of Met. VII and VIII by a leading Aristotelian metaphysician. Centres on
A istotle s esse tialis a d offe s a ua ed a ou t of the elatio ship between the Categories and
the Metaphysics. Recommended for a philosophical readership.
Wedin, M. V. 2000. A istotle’s Theo of Su sta e. The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press. A sophisticated and theory-oriented reconstruction of A istotle s a ou ts of
substance. Like Loux 1991, provides a nuanced assessment of the relationship between the Categories
and the Metaphysics. Also points to important connections between the argument in Met. VII and
Book II of the Posterior Analytics.
Witt, C. 1989. Substance and Essence in Aristotle: An Interpretation of Metaphysics VII-IX. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell Univ. Press. A concise, opinionated introduction to the central books. Argues that Aristotelian

essences are individual, teleological principles and not universal properties. The final chapter
compares A istotle s a d K ipke s varieties of essentialism. Especially good for beginners.
Hylomorphism
In Met. VII-IX sensible substances are analysed as composites of matter and form (hylomorphism).
Much of the critical debate focuses on how exactly the relationship between matter and form should
be understood. Rhenius 2005 provides a critical discussion of the problem and the main
interpretations on the market. In general terms, the question could be phrased as follows. Is the
matter of a sensible substance something independent of form? If matter is what it is independently
of form, we could say that matter is accidentally related to form (Hylomorphic Accidentalism); if it is
not, we could say that matter is essentially related to form (Hylomorphic Essentialism). Lewis 1991 is
the most consistent defence of Accidentalism, whereas Kosman 1984 is a classic defence of
Essentialism. Whiting 1992 attempts a reconciliation between the two views, with particular reference
to living beings, which are paradigmatic cases of hylomorphic composites. Living beings are
particularly problematic because their matter seem to be essentially living. Whiting argues that form
is differently related to different kinds of matter: the low-level or remote matter of a substance (the
elements) is accidentally related to form, whereas the proximate or functional matter (the organic
parts of a living being) is essentially related to it. One source of concern with Accidentalism is that, if
matter and form are only accidentally related, it becomes unclear how the composite substance they
jointly constitute could be a unity. Gill 1989 is the most detailed account of the problem of the unity
of the composite in Met. VII-IX. She argues that Aristotle shifts in the central books from Accidentalism
to a version of Essentialism to preserve the unity of the hylomorphic composite. Another important
strand of interpretation challenges the very idea that matter and form should be thought of as
constituents of a substance, whether essentially or accidentally related. Sellars 1967 argues that
matter and form are not two distinct parts or constituents, but just two different ways of considering
a sensible substance, which is in itself incomposite. In a similar vein, Scaltsas 1994 has defended a
holistic understanding of matter and form. Holism is the view that a sensible substance has no
metaphysical constituents. On this view, matter and form are abstractions that are obtained by
mentally isolating aspects of a sensible substance which never exist as independent constituents of
the substance itself.
Gill, M. L. 1989. Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. A
comprehensive analysis of hylomorphism and the unity of sensible substances in Met. VII-IX. Argues
that Aristotle presents matter and form as accidentally related in VII-VIII.5 and then abandons this
view in VIII.6-IX to preserve the unity of the hylomorphic composite.
Kosman, A. . Su sta e, Bei g a d e e geia . Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2: 121-149. A
classic, non-realist account of hylomorphism. Argues that matter and form are just two ways of
considering the simple composite substance and are identical in reality. Puts emphasis on the
argument in Met. VIII.6 that matter and form relate as potentiality and actuality.
Lewis, F. A. 1991. Substance and Predication in Aristotle. Cambridge, UK, New York, Port Chester,
Melbourne, and Sydney: Cambridge Univ. Press. A technical and sophisticated analysis of the different
varieties of composite Aristotle admits in the Metaphysics. Argues in particular that substantial

composites (matter plus form) should be understood on the model of accidental composites
(substance plus accident). Requires knowledge of logical formalism.
Rhenius, R. 2005. Die Einheit der Substanzen bei Aristoteles. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. A recent
e o side atio of A istotle s h lo o phis , which pays particular attention to the problem of the
unity of hylomorphic composites. Offers an excellent, critical reconstruction of the history of the
problem as well as of the different interpretations on the market.
Scaltas, T. 1994. Substantial Holism. In U it , Ide tit , a d E pla atio i A istotle’s Metaph si s.
Edited by T. Scaltsas, M.L. Gill, and D. Charles, 107-128. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. A philosophically
i o ati e a ou t of A istotle s h lo o phis . Defe ds the ie that su sta es ha e o eal pa ts
(holism) and so the unity of substances is not obtained by relating constituents. Describes matter and
form as abstractions from holomorphic composites.
Sella s, W. . A istotle s Metaph si s. A I te p etatio . I Philosophical Perspectives: History of
Philosophy. By W. Sellars, 73-124. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company. A provocative
e o st u tio of A istotle s theo of su stance by a leading 20th-century philosopher. Challenges
the traditional view that matter and form are two distinct parts or constituents of a sensible substance,
and argues that they should be understood as two ways of considering an entity, the sensible
substance, that is in itself incomposite.
Whiting, J. 1992. Living Bodies. In Essa s o A istotle’s De Anima. Edited by M.C. Nussbaum and A.
Rorty, 75-91. Oxford: Clarendon Press. A pape that t ies to e o ile A istotle s diffe e t state e ts
about matter and form, with particular reference to the case of living beings. Contends that form bears
different relationships to different kinds of matter: remote matter is accidentally related to form,
while proximate matter is essentially dependent on it.
Essence and definition
One major source of debate concerning the central books of the Metaphysics is how A istotle s
analysis of sensible objects in terms of matter and form affects his views on essence and definition.
Deslauriers 2007 provides an o e ie of A istotle s a ou ts of definition in the corpus with
particular attention to similarities and differences between the logical works (Topics and Analytics)
and the Metaphysics. It is traditionally thought (see Loux 1991, cited under *Substantiality in the
Metaphysics*) that, since sensible objects are composites of matter and form, their essence and
definition must make reference to both their matter and form. Thus, the definition and essence of a
human being, for instance, make reference to both the form characteristic of human beings (the
human soul) and their characteristic matter (say their flesh and bones). This view has been challenged
by Frede 1990, who argues that the traditional picture is wrong at least insofar as the central books
are concerned and so the essence and definition of sensible substance only makes reference to their
form to the exclusion of any material characteristics. Morrison 1990 contains a detailed response to
Frede 1990 and a new defence of the traditional view. Part of the difficulty is that Met. VII-VIII seem
to offer support to both the traditional interpretation and its rival. A few scholars have tried to
reconcile A istotle s appa e tl o fli ti g lines of argument. Gill 1989 (cited under *Hylomorphism*)
distinguishes between two formulae of a sensible substance, the definition in the strict sense and an
account of the way a substance exists: while the definition of a sensible substance makes reference
to its form alone, the account of the way a sensible substance exists mentions its matter as well.

Devereux 2010, by contrast, distinguishes different kinds of part. He argues that the functional parts
of a sensible substance (e.g. the organic parts of a living being) should be mentioned in its definition
because they are formal and not material parts. It is the non-functional parts (e.g. the flesh and bones
of a human being) that are material and so should be left out of the definition (see Deslauriers 2007
for a similar view). While disagreeing on the definition of hylomorphic composites, interpreters
o all ag ee that A istotle s ie i Met. VII-VIII is that the definition of form does not make
reference to matter. Peramatzis 2015 calls into question this view as well and argues that the forms
of sensible substances are essentially matter-involving.
Deslauriers, M. 2007. Aristotle on Definition. Leiden, The Netherlands, and Boston: Brill. A
o p ehe si e e o st u tio of A istotle s ie s o definition throughout the corpus. Ch. 4 deals
with Met. VII-VIII. Stresses more than any other reconstruction the o e tio s et ee A istotle s
accounts of definition in the Metaphysics and in the Organon.
Devereux D. 2010. Aristotle on the Form and Definition of Human Being. Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 26: 167-196. The paper argues that for Aristotle the functional
(i.e. organic) parts of a living composite substance should be included in its definition. This is not in
contrast, Devereux holds, with Frede 1990 s lai that the defi itio should i lude fo al pa ts alo e,
as functional parts are formal and not material parts.
Frede, M. 1990. The definition of sensible substances in Met. Z. In Biologie, Logique et métaphysique
chez Aristote. Edited by D. Devereux and P. Pellegrin, 113-129. Paris: Les Éditions du CNRS. A detailed
a d i sightful e o st u tio of A istotle s dis ussio of the o je t a d u it of defi itio i Met.
VII.10-12. Makes a powerful case for the view that the definition of sensible substances should
mention only their form. Fundamental for any study of Met. VII.
Morrison, D. 1990. Some Remarks on Definition in Met. Z. In Biologie, Logique et métaphysique chez
Aristote. Edited by D. Devereux and P. Pellegrin, 131-144. Paris: Les Éditions du CNRS. A detailed
response to Frede 1990, pointing to several passages in Met. VII. 10- that i ite us to esist F ede s
claim that the definition of sensible substances should mention their form alone.
Peramatzis, M. 2015. What is a For i A istotle s H lo o phis ? History of Philosophy
Quarterly 32.3: 195-216. A e a ou t of A istotle s h lo o phis . A gues that A istotelia fo s
are essentially matter-involving. The matter that is part of a fo s esse e is eithe e ote atte
nor proximate matter, but an abstract kind of matter conceived of as a way of being of a sensible
substance.
Universals
One of the most discussed topics in relation to the central books is the question as to whether
A istotle s forms are universal or particular. To say that forms are universal means to hold that they
are shareable and repeatable entities, whereas to say that they are particular means to hold that they
are peculiar to the substances of which they are the forms. Galluzzo and Mariani 2006 (cited under
*Substantiality in the Metaphysics*) provides a critical overview of the debate and its history. The
de ate as t igge ed Al itto , ho o luded that A istotle s positio is i o siste t a d
the textual evidence does not allow to settle the question. Met. VII seems indeed to pull in different
directions. One reason to take form to be universal is that form is an object of knowledge and

definition (VII.10-11), and particulars can neither be known nor defined for Aristotle (VII.15). On the
other hand, in VII.13 Aristotle presents numerous arguments for the conclusion that no universal is
substance. Forms must be particular, therefore, since they are substances. Supporters of particular or
universal forms try to explain away texts that make trouble for their interpretation of the text. Sellars
1957 is one the first attempts to make a case for the particularity of forms on textual and philosophical
grounds. Frede 1987 remains the clearest and most consistent defence of particular forms. Besides
reviewing the textual evidence, Frede argues that only particular forms can explain the identity
through time of material substances. The history of universal forms has been more complex. Driscoll
1981 illustrates how early attempts to defend universal forms failed to distinguish between form and
species. Recent supporters of universal forms claim that the argument in VII.13 that no universal is
su sta e does ot st ike agai st A istotle s fo s. This is eithe ecause forms are common (i.e. non-
particular) but not universal (Code 1984); or because they are universal but not the universals par
excellence Aristotle has in mind in VII.1 Galluzzo ; o fi all e ause VII. s o lusio should
not be taken unrestrictedly (Wedin 2000, cited under *Substantiality in the Metaphysics*). Against
these popula li es of i te p etatio Gill ai tai s that A istotle s fo s a e ul e a le to
VII. s a gu e ts ega dless of hethe the a e u i e sal o pa ti ula , and that difficulties can be
overcome by completely re-thinking the relationship between matter and form – which Aristotle
would do in VIII.6-IX.
Albritton, R. 1957. Forms of Particular Substan es i A istotle s Metaphysics. Journal of Philosophy 54:
699–708. Together with Sellars 1957, one of the papers that triggered the debate on whether
A istotle s forms are particular or universal. Argues that the textual evidence does not allow
interpreters to settle the question once and for all.
Code, A. 1984. The Aporematic Approach to Primary Being in Metaphysics Z. In New Essays on Aristotle.
Edited by F.J. Pelletier, 1-20. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (Suppl.). An original analysis of
A istotle s a gu e t i Met. VII 13. Reads A istotle s t eat e t of universals in Book VII in light of
Book III s philosophi al apo iae o puzzles. Argues that Aristotelian forms are common (non-particular),
but not universal.
Driscoll, J. 1981. Η i A istotle s Ea lie and Later Theories of Substance. In Studies in Aristotle.
Edited by D. O Meara, 129-159. Washington DC: The Catholic Univ. of America Press. A seminal paper
on the shift in the meaning of eidos from the Categories to the Metaphysics. One of the first papers
that clearly distinguishes between eidos as species and eidos as form.
Frede, M. 1987. Individuals in Aristotle. In Essays in Ancient Philosophy. By M. Frede, 49-71. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. A comprehensive study of the notion of individual in the Categories and in the
Metaphysics. Makes the clearest and most incisive case to date fo the ie that A istotle s fo s are
particular, not universal. The main argument is that particular forms are necessary to explain the
identity of material objects across time.
Galluzzo, G. 2013. U i e sals i A istotle s Metaphysics. In Universals in Ancient Philosophy. Edited by
G. Galluzzo and R. Chiaradonna, 209-253. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale. A re-examination of the issue
of universals in the Metaphysics, which includes a review of current interpretative strategies. Argues
that forms are universal constituents of sensible substances, but not the kind of entities Aristotle
ould sta da dl all u i e sals .
Gill, M.L. 2001. Aristotle s Atta k o U i e sals. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 20: 235-260. A
controversial assessment of the argument in Met. VII.13 that no universal is substance. Holds that

A istotelia fo s too a e ul e a le to the a gu e t, gi e A istotle s o eptio of atte a d fo
in Met. VII and VIII.1-5. Identifies Met. VIII.6 as the solution to VII.13 s difficulties.
Sellars, W. 1957. Substance and Form in Aristotle. Journal of Philosophy 54: 688–99. A seminal and
theory-o ie ted pape o A istotle s fo s a e i e t th
-century analytic philosophers. Argues
that A istotle s fo s a e pa ti ula a d ot u i e sal. Insists that forms are explicitly described by
A istotle as theses , a d this ess a ou ts to o i plies pa ti ula it .
Potentiality and Actuality (Book IX)
Although not as studied as Books VII and VIII, Met. IX, the book about dunamis and energeia, has
become increasingly popular with scholars in recent years. Makin 2006 (cited under *English
Commentaries*) is a detailed and sophisticated philosophical commentary, while Makin 2012 is useful
for an overview of problems and arguments. Menn 1994 reconstructs the Platonic and Aristotelian
background against which Book IX should be read. Witt 2003 and Beere 2009 are two book-length and
commentary-style studies, which present general interpretations of the book. The place of Met. IX
ithi A istotle s etaph si al project is disputed (different options are discussed in Frede 1994,
Anagnostopoulos 2001, and also Makin 2006, cited under *English Commentaries*). Kosman 1994
makes a case for the view that the ook o pletes Book VII a d VIII s e ui i to se si le su sta es
by offering the conceptual resources to solve the problem of the unity of hylomorphic composites: in
VIII.6 Aristotle says that matter and form make up one thing because one is dunamis and the other
energeia, and Book IX explains what dunamis and energeia are. At the other end of the spectrum, Witt
2003 (and partly Beere 2009) sees the treatise as having a separate ontological purpose, independent
of the analysis of substance in Books VII and VIII. Equally disputed is the structure and the philosophical
meaning of the book. On a somehow traditional interpretation (well represented by Menn 1994) Book
IX discusses two different senses of dunamis and two corresponding senses of energeia: IX.1-6 are
concerned with dunamis in the sense of capacity for change and energeia in the sense of exercise (of
a capacity), and so with motion and change; IX.6-9 by contrast have to do with dunamis in the sense
of potentiality and energeia in the sense of actuality, and hence with being. This traditional
interpretation has been challenged by Frede 1994 and Witt 2003, who argue that the book has a
unified purpose. On their approach, Met. IX is about potentiality and actuality, understood as ways of
being. The discussion of capacity and exercise in IX.1-5 is not the treatment of a separate topic, but of
particularly clear cases of being potential and being actual. Although offering a unitary account of the
book, Anagnostopoulos 2011 challenges the view that Met. IX is about potentiality and actuality. On
his reading, the book deals with two kinds of capacity: the capacity for change and the capacity of
matter to become a substance.
Anagnostopoulos, A. 2011. Senses of Du a is a d the St u tu e of A istotle's 'Metaphysics' Theta.
Phronesis 56.4: 388–425. An original and sophisticated critique of the approach in Frede 1994 and
Witt 2003. Argues that Met. IX is not about ways of being, but different kinds of capacity: the capacity
for change and the capacity of matter to be a substance.
Beere, J. 2009. Doi g a d Bei g. A I te p etatio of A istotle’s Metaphysics Theta. Oxford: Oxford
Univ. Press. A commentary-style study of Met. IX.1-9, which emphasises the unity of the book around
the central claim that energeia is prior to dunamis. Reads Book IX as a response to the battle of Gods
and Gia ts i Plato s Sophist (245e-249d) and so as pursuing an ontological project partly independent
of the theory of substance in Books VII and VIII. Criticizes the dual translations of dunamis (as capacity
and potentiality) and energeia (as exercise and actuality).

Frede, M. 1994. A istotle s Notio of Potentiality in Metaphysics . In Unity, Identity, and Explanation
i A istotle’s Metaph si s. Edited by T. Scaltsas, M.L. Gill, D. Charles, 173-194. Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press. A fundamental article arguing for the unity of Met. IX. Maintains that the book is about
potentiality and actuality, understood as ways of being real. Holds that the discussion of capacities
and exercises in IX.1-5 is already a discussion of potentiality and actuality.
Kosman, A. 1994. The Activity of Bei g i A istotle s Metaphysics. In Unity, Identity, and Explanation
in A istotle’s Metaph si s. Edited by T. Scaltsas, M.L. Gill, D. Charles, 195-213. Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press. One of the most explicit defences of the view that Met. IX s ai is to provide the resources to
explain the unity of matter and form. Makes much of VIII. s disti tio et ee otio s a d
activities and argues that the matter and form of a substance are, respectively, its ability and activity
to be what it is.
Makin, S. 2012. Energeia and Dunamis. In The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle. Edited by C. Shields, 400-
421. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. A short and sophisticated introduction to Met. IX, ideal for an
o e ie of the philosophi al a gu e t. E do ses F ede s idea that the ook is a out the ge e al
notions of potentiality and actuality, and puts emphasis on the argument in IX.8 for the priority of
actuality over potentiality.
Menn, S. 1994. The Origins of Aristotle's Concept of Ἐ έργεια: Ἐ έργεια a d ύ α ις. Ancient
Philosophy 14.1: 73-114. A detailed investigation of the background to A istotle s dis ussio i Met.
IX. Proposes to understand dunamis and energeia by retracing their historical and linguistic origins,
oth i Plato a d A istotle s ea l iti gs. A gues fo a st o g disti tio et ee apa it a d
exercise on the one hand and potentiality and actuality on the other.
Witt, C. 2003. Wa s of Bei g. Pote tialit a d A tualit i A istotle’s Metaph si s. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press. The first English monograph on Met. IX. Offers a general interpretation of the book by
pushi g to the e t e e F ede s u de sta di g of pote tialit a d a tualit as a s of ei g.
Argues that Met. IX has a separate ontological purpose, independent of the analysis of substance in
Books VII-VIII.
Unity (Book X)
Unity is an important notion i A istotle s Metaphysics in different ways. For one thing, Aristotle
remarks in Met. IV.1-3 that metaphysics does not only study being but also the per attributes of being,
i.e. the properties that beings have only insofar as they are beings, and (being) one is identified as the
most important of such per se attributes. Moreover, Aristotle argues in Met. IV.2 that a series of
dialectical notions – such as the same and the other, similar and dissimilar, contrariety etc. – are
studied by metaphysics only because they are closely related to the one. It is in Met. X that Aristotle
provides the most comprehensive analysis of the one and the aforementioned dialectical notions.
Book X is little studied as compared to other parts of the Metaphysics. Centrone 2005 (cited under
*Collections of Essays on Individual Books or Groups of Books*) is a commentary-style collection of
essays that discuss in full detail the different chapters of the book as well as the philosophical issues
they raise. Halper 2007 offers an original interpretation of Book X, which breaks off with the traditional
view that the book is mainly about the one and other dialectical notions. O Halpe s e o st u tio ,
Met. X is the place where Aristotle develops his own (as opposed to Plato s e sio of pa adig atis
and more particularly the view that in any genus there is a species that is the measure of all the others.

In recent years, there has been a certain tendency in scholarship to regard unity not only in connection
to the per attributes of being and so to Book X, but also as a fundamental notion for the Metaphysics
as a whole on a par with being. Morrison 1993 is a seminal paper for this line of investigation, which
tries to sketch out an Aristotelian science of the one qua one, somehow parallel to the science of being
qua being. Halper 2005 (originally published in 1989), which deals with books VI-IX, and Halper 2009,
which analyses Books I-V, are part of a three-volume project whose ambition is to show that the
Metaphysics as a whole can be reconstructed around the problem of the one and the many. Castelli
2010 is a comprehensive study of unity in Aristotle which does justice to both traditional and more
recent strands in Aristotelian scholarship by analysing the role of the one in dialectical, cosmological
and ontological contexts.
Castelli, L. M. 2010. P o le s a d Pa adig s of U it . A istotle’s A ou ts of the O e. Sankt Augustine:
Academia Verlag. A comprehensive and detailed analysis of the notion of unity in Aristotle, with
particular but not exclusive reference to the Metaphysics. Tries to do justice to the different strands
in current scholarship by investigating the role of unity in dialectic, cosmology and ontology.
Halper, E. C. 2005. O e a d Ma i A istotle’s Metaphysics: The Central Books. Las Vegas: Parmenides
Publishing. Originally published in 1989, this is chronologically the first part of Halpe s project on unity
and multiplicity in the Metaphysics (for the second see Halper 2009). The present study focuses on
Books VI-IX and investigates unity in connection to sensible substances. Argues that the unity of
sensible substances is for Aristotle a form of imperfect unity as compared to the unity of separate
substances.
Halper, E. C. 2007. A istotle s Pa adig atism: Metaphysics I and the difference it makes. Proceedings
of the Boston Area Colloquium 22: 69-103. An original interpretation of Met. X as the place where
Aristotle puts forward his own version of paradigmatism. A istotle s otio of a pa adig does ot
rely on the existence of separate Forms, but on the claim that in any genus there is a species that is
the easu e of all the othe s. The pape also akes a o t i utio to a ds u de sta di g A istotle s
anthropocentrism.
Halper, E. C. 2009. One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books Alpha-Delta. Las Vegas-Zurich-
Athens: Parmenides Publishing. This is chronologically the se o d pa t of Halpe s p oje t o u it a d
multiplicity in the Metaphysics (for the first see Halper 2005). It offers an analysis of Books I-V and
argues that the problem of the one and the many is central to Aristotle s dis ussio of the possi ilit
of a single science of being qua being.
Morrison, D. 1993. The Place of Unity in Aristotle s Metaphysical Project. Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 9: 131-156. One of the most consistent attempts to date to
promote unity as a central notion i A istotle s Metaphysics. Deals at some length with the argument
for the convertibility of one and being in Met. IV, as well as with topics discussed in Met. X such as the
essence of unity and the relationship between the one as transcendental and the one as the measure
of quantity.
Theology (Book XII)
Book XII is traditionally regarded as the place in the Metaphysics where Aristotle presents his rational
theology, i.e. his account of the divine. Bodéüs 2000 challenges the traditional view and argues that

Book XII has little to say about God and the divine. While adhering to the traditional interpretation,
Menn 2012 offe s a o e ie of A istotle s theolog i hi h Book XII is ot u derstood in isolation,
but agai st the a kg ou d of Plato i theolog as ell as A istotle s thoughts a out the di i e i the
physical and ethical writings. The theology of Book XII should be understood in a cosmological setting:
in order to account for the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars, Aristotle posits a prime unmoved
mover, i.e. an immaterial, intelligent and divine substance that moves without being moved. Besides,
in order to explain the motion of the planets, he also posits a series of secondary unmoved movers,
which are equally immaterial, intelligent and divine. A istotle s a ou t i Book XII raises a number of
issues: the relationship between the Prime Mover and the other unmoved movers; the sense in which
the Prime Mover is the first principle of reality; the nature of its intellectual activity and causal role.
Frede and Charles 2000 (cited under *Collections of Essays on Individual Books or Groups of Books*)
is a commentary-style collection of essays on Met. XII, which offers guidance on the individual chapters
and the issues just mentioned; while Frede 2000, the introduction to the collection, is an invaluable
overview of the book, which discusses the main interpretative problems including the difficult
question as to the pla e of Book XII ithi A istotle s etaph si al p oje t. Horn 2016 (cited under
*Collections of Essays on Individual Books or Groups of Books *) is a recent and problem-oriented
collection of essays on Book XII, which can be usefully consulted for further guidance. A couple of
issues deserves special mention. It is commonly assumed that the Prime Mover moves as a final cause,
that is, as an object of love and desire. Broadie 1993 challenges this assumption together with the
equally widespread view that the fundamental activity of the Prime Mover is contemplative and not
kinetic. Interpreters who attributes final causality to the Prime Mover are at variance as to how far its
action as a final cause extends. Kahn 1985 makes a compelling case for attributing to Aristotle a version
of universal teleology, i.e. the view that the final causality of the Prime Mover is not limited to the first
Heaven, but extends to the all universe.
Bodéüs, R. 2000. Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals. Albany: State Univ. of New York
Press. A p o o ati e a ou t of A istotle s theologi al ie s, hose o e lai is that A istotle
endorsed many of traditional Greek beliefs about the divine and put them to use in his philosophical
works. Ch. 1 challenges the common view that Met. XII presents a rational theology on the grounds
that Aristotle says little or nothing in the book about the nature of God or the gods.
B oadie, S. . Que fait le p e ie oteu d A istote? Revue philosophique de la France et de
l’ét a ge 183.2 : 375-411. Challenges traditional interpretations of Met. XII on three crucial points:
describes the fundamental activity of the Prime Mover as kinetic and not contemplative; argues that
the Prime Mover is an efficient and not a final cause; identifies the Prime Mover with the soul of the
first Heaven and not with a separate intellect.
Frede, M. 2000. Introduction. In Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum. Edited by
M. Frede, and D. Charles, 1-52. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. The introduction to the Symposium
Aristotelicum on Met. XII (Frede and Charles 2000, cited under *Collections of Essays on Individual
Books or Groups of Books*). Provides an excellent overview of the argument of the book, the main
interpretative problems and the range of solutions available. Fundamental for any study of the subject.
Kah , C. . The Pla e of the P i e Mo e i A istotle s Teleolog . I Aristotle on Nature and Living
Things. Edited by A. Gotthelf. Pittsburgh, PA: Mathesis. One of the most compelling attempts to argue
that Aristotle endorses a form of universal teleology, and in particular the view that the teleological
ausalit of the P i e Mo e e te ds to the all u i e se a d ot o l to the Hea e s. O Kah s
reconstruction, the Prime Mover is responsible for the universal tendency of every being to achieve
the full actualization of its nature.

Menn, S. 2012. A istotle s Theolog . In In The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle. Edited by C. Shields, 422-
464. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. A ala ed o e ie of A istotle s theology. Reads the discussion of
Met. XII agai st the a kg ou d of Plato i theolog a d A istotle s ph si s a d ethi s. Tou hes upo
several issues discussed in recent literature.
Philosophy of Mathematics (Books XIII and XIV)
Aristotle discusses the existence and nature of mathematical objects (numbers and geometrical
objects) in Books XIII and XIV of the Metaphysics. The books contain rather heterogeneous material
a d a e ai l o upied ith A istotle s iti ue of a u e of Plato i theo ies of mathematical
objects, i.e. Plato s positio as ell as those of Plato su esso s at the head of the A ade ,
Speusippus and Xenocrates. A istotle s positi e ie is o fi ed to Met. XIII.3 and a few other remarks
throughout the books. Annas 1973 (cited under *English Commentaries*) remains the most complete
introduction to the structure and argument of Met. XIII-XIV and also offers a detailed reconstruction
of the Platonic background against which A istotle s dis ussio should e u de stood. In spite of its
e it , it is A istotle s positi e t eat e t of the atu e of athe ati al o je ts that has attracted
s hola s atte tio . Me dell is a o p ehe si e o e ie of A istotle s philosoph of
mathematics, which deals with a number of issues and texts from within and outside the Metaphysics.
A istotle s view on mathematical objects is phrased in rather technical jargon. Aristotle says: (i) that
mathematics involves considering ordinary physical objects qua (i.e. as) having mathematical
properties; (ii) that mathematical entities are reached by abstraction (from sensible objects); (iii) that
mathematical objects are not separate from physical objects, but mathematicians treat them as if they
e e sepa ate. A as is a good guide to A istotle s te h i al language. The main question in
connection with claims (i)-(iii) is whether they imply that for Aristotle mathematical objects are a
special kind of entities distinct from physical objects (though not separate from them in the way
Platonists would posit). Lear 1982 is a classic defence of the view that mathematical objects are on
A istotle s theo just ordinary physical objects considered in a certain (mathematical) way, whereas
Hussey 1991 argues that they are indeed a special kind of entities to be understood along the lines of
the contemporary metaphysical theory of arbitrary objects. Discussions of A istotle s philosoph of
mathematics have focused more on his geometry than his arithmetic. Mignucci 1987 is one of the few
exceptions, which provides extensive and technical dis ussio of A istotle s theo of u e s.
Annas, J. 1987. Die Gegenstände der Mathematik bei Aristotles. In Mathematics and Metaphysics in
Aristotle. Akten des X. Symposium Aristotelicum. Edited by A. Graeser, 131-147. Bern: Haupt. An
i sightful i te p etatio of A istotle s philosoph of athe ati s, ith pa ti ula efe e e to Met.
XIII.1-3. Particularly helpful fo the e pla atio of A istotle s te h i al otio s su h as a st a tio ,
separation in thought and the qua-theory.
Hussey, E. 1991. Aristotle on Mathematical Objects. In Peri tôn Mathêmatôn. Edited by I. Mueller.
Apeiron 24: 105-134. A paper that challenges the view in Lear 1982 that for Aristotle mathematical
objects are just ordinary physical objects considered as having mathematical properties. Argues that
athe ati al o je ts a e ep ese tati e o je ts, u de stood alo g the li es of Kit Fi e s theo of
arbitrary objects. n
Lear, J. 1982. Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Review 91.2: 161–92. A classic
p ese tatio of A istotle s philosoph of athe ati s. A gues fo the ie that fo A istotle

mathematical objects are not a distinct kind of objects, but just ordinary physical objects considered
as having mathematical properties.
Mendell, H. 2004, Aristotle and Mathematics. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-mathematics/]*. An excellent and comprehensive
o e ie of A istotle s philosoph of athe ati s o e of the leadi g e pe ts o G eek
mathematics. Contains extensive discussion of the major themes in Met. M and N and offers adequate
historical and theoretical context. Also provides extensive bibliography.
Mignucci, M. 1987. A istotle s A ith eti . In Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Akten des X.
Symposium Aristotelicum. Edited by A. Graeser, 175-211. Bern: Haupt. A comprehensive
e o st u tio of A istotle s philosoph of u e s a ith eti , mainly based on Met. XIII.3 and Phys.
IV. Defends a general interpretation along the lines of Lear 1982. Requires some knowledge of
mathematical formalism.

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