Behaviour, and communication

Editor's Notes

• #4: Anthropologically speaking, we’ve developed lots of rules of thumb and schematic about the world around us in order to reduce the           burned of cognitive load for day-to-day tasks liberating us to focus on advantage and survival. However, the last few hundred years of              development have placed us in a world we no longer recognise:             We jump a mile at snakes [show snake], but are ambivalent about electricity cable [show cable (ref: Pinker)]
• #5: Deal with hits developed lots of rules of thumb (and they are in system 1 – we get the answers for ‘free’ so we can think about protecting ourselves from lions, tigers, and strange monks lurking in the woods) [shot from In The Name Of The Rose]
• #6: There are so many decisions to make in life, those that are made for us a often welcomed. “ Defaults work best when decision makers are too indifferent, confused, or conflicted to consider their options. That principle is particularly relevant in a world that’s increasingly awash with choices https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/A_marketers_guide_to_behavioral_economics_2536
• #7: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #8: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #9: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #10: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #11: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #12: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #13: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #17: Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple.   The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.)   But here come the additions.   A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this.   Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal.   With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split.   The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
• #18: Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple.   The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.)   But here come the additions.   A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this.   Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal.   With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split.   The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
• #19: Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple.   The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.)   But here come the additions.   A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this.   Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal.   With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split.   The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
• #20: Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple.   The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.)   But here come the additions.   A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this.   Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal.   With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split.   The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
• #21: Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple.   The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.)   But here come the additions.   A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this.   Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal.   With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split.   The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
• #22: Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple.   The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.)   But here come the additions.   A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this.   Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal.   With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split.   The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
• #23: Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple.   The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.)   But here come the additions.   A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this.   Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal.   With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split.   The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
• #24: Huber and Puto recruited over one hundred respondents and gave them a simple hypothetical choice: would you buy a beer that’s $1.80 with a quality ‘score’ of 50/100, or a beer that’s $2.60 with a quality ‘score’ of 70/100? Pay more, get better. Simple.   The choice saw 30% choosing the $1.80 beer, and 70% wanting the quality beer. (They obviously like the posh stuff.)   But here come the additions.   A low-quality ‘decoy’ at $1.60 with a 30/100 quality was added. No one chose it – not one. But it changed the desire for the original beers: With 0% wanting the $1.60 decoy, instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a near 50/50% split. How odd. Rational actors in a rational world would not have changed their minds based on the addition of an unwanted outlier, and most choice models don’t allow for this.   Does it work at the other end of the price spectrum? They tried a high-quality decoy at $3.40 with a quality of 75/100, and 10% chose it. Obviously (or so it seems), there were a few people for whom the original highest-price $2.60 choice was not high-quality enough. But the rest of the choice shift was phenomenal.   With the addition of the $3.40 decoy (which 10% plumped for), absolutely no one wanted the original $1.80 beer – despite 30% originally preferring it – leaving 90% climbing up to the $2.60 option. So instead of a 30/70% split for the original beers it now shifted to a 0/90% split.   The addition of options twisted the original choice: the decoy effect is powerful.
• #25: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #26: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #35: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #36: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.
• #37: We know that decisions about brands – the decisions we aim to influence – are complex. They involve not only direct utility (a car that will take you from A to B) and opportunity cost (what else could the same money buy?), but also status (what does this car say about me?), concern with the needs of others (who else will use the car, and for what purposes? And what would this car say about them?), social concerns (should I drive less or get a hybrid?), fashion (who does buy yellow cars?), and many other issues and concerns. NOTES: Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales http://nudges.wordpress.com/gas-prices-arent-the-only-reason-for-more-hybrid-sales/ http://www.thehuntingdynasty.com/2010/01/death-and-taxes-why-your-decisions-kill-you-and-cost-you-money/ Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales | Nudge blog
• #38: We know that decisions about brands – the decisions we aim to influence – are complex. They involve not only direct utility (a car that will take you from A to B) and opportunity cost (what else could the same money buy?), but also status (what does this car say about me?), concern with the needs of others (who else will use the car, and for what purposes? And what would this car say about them?), social concerns (should I drive less or get a hybrid?), fashion (who does buy yellow cars?), and many other issues and concerns. NOTES: Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales http://nudges.wordpress.com/gas-prices-arent-the-only-reason-for-more-hybrid-sales/ http://www.thehuntingdynasty.com/2010/01/death-and-taxes-why-your-decisions-kill-you-and-cost-you-money/ Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales | Nudge blog
• #39: We know that decisions about brands – the decisions we aim to influence – are complex. They involve not only direct utility (a car that will take you from A to B) and opportunity cost (what else could the same money buy?), but also status (what does this car say about me?), concern with the needs of others (who else will use the car, and for what purposes? And what would this car say about them?), social concerns (should I drive less or get a hybrid?), fashion (who does buy yellow cars?), and many other issues and concerns. NOTES: Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales http://nudges.wordpress.com/gas-prices-arent-the-only-reason-for-more-hybrid-sales/ http://www.thehuntingdynasty.com/2010/01/death-and-taxes-why-your-decisions-kill-you-and-cost-you-money/ Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales | Nudge blog
• #40: ” In Israel – one of the first countries to sign a zero-emissions agreement with the Renault-Nissan Alliance – the government cut the purchase tax for new vehicles from 80% to 10% for all-electric vehicles.” We know that decisions about brands – the decisions we aim to influence – are complex. They involve not only direct utility (a car that will take you from A to B) and opportunity cost (what else could the same money buy?), but also status (what does this car say about me?), concern with the needs of others (who else will use the car, and for what purposes? And what would this car say about them?), social concerns (should I drive less or get a hybrid?), fashion (who does buy yellow cars?), and many other issues and concerns. NOTES: Gas prices aren’t the only reason for more hybrid sales http://nudges.wordpress.com/gas-prices-arent-the-only-reason-for-more-hybrid-sales/ http://www.thehuntingdynasty.com/2010/01/death-and-taxes-why-your-decisions-kill-you-and-cost-you-money/
• #41: It’s quite a broad term. In fact, almost all the other effects described here can ‘frame’ a choice, and in so doing create different outcomes. In that sense, ‘framing’ tells us that what is said is less significant than how it’s said. In broad terms ‘choice architecture’ concerns itself with how people gather information, when they choose, and how absolute values are crowded out by other influences. The broad groups of effects are framing biases (e.g. the ‘availability’ heuristic, and ‘ anchoring effects’), where the grouping of choices influences final choice, and ordering effects (e.g. the ‘primacy’ effect and the ‘recency effect’), where relative order in the group creates bias. The whole area of Behavioural Economics dedicated to choice architecture is perhaps one of the richest seams for our industry, and the one which we believe we should make into a special subject for priority investigation of its potential applications. ■ We are all choice architects because there is no neutral way to present a choice. Presenting something first on a list can bias its choice (the ‘primacy’ effect), as can presenting it last (the ‘recency’ effect). This phenomenon is well known to the market research industry, who try to eliminate its affect by rotating stimulus. People tend to choose relative to what is available rather than to any absolute standard (this is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic). The way we frame choice is therefore fundamental to the decisions that we make. ■ We are all familiar with the experience of choosing the second-cheapest wine on the wine list. We are also familiar with never choosing the most expensive item on the menu. However, having one very expensive item on the menu can increase the average value of dishes ordered, even if the most expensive choice is rarely chosen.