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CASA: Context-Aware 
Scalable Authentication 
Eiji Hayashi, Sauvik Das, Shahriyar Amini 
Jason Hong, Ian Oakley 
Human-Computer Interaction Institute 
Carnegie Mellon University
One Fits All? 
Devices require the same user 
authentication regardless of contexts
If Cost Too Much 
Stop using authentication system
A Few Could Fit All 
How can we choose security lock 
system for different situations? 
Do they provide better security and 
usability from users’ perspectives?
Context-Aware 
Scalable Authentication 
•Authenticate users using active factors 
and passive factors 
•Adjust an active factor based on 
passive factors 
•Quantitative way to choose an active 
factor
Prototype
Outline 
• Underlying Model 
• Feasibility Analysis (Field Study #1) 
• Prototype Evaluation (Field Study #2) 
• Security Analysis 
• Design Iteration (Field Study #3) 
• Conclusion
Outline 
• CASA Framework 
• Feasibility Analysis (Field Study #1) 
• Prototype Evaluation (Field Study #2) 
• Security Analysis 
• Design Iteration (Field Study #3) 
• Conclusion
CASA Framework
Combining Multiple Factors
Combining Multiple Factors 
The probability that a person is a 
legitimate user given a set of signals
Combining Multiple Factors 
The probability that a person is NOT a 
legitimate user given a set of signals
Combining Multiple Factors 
Weight that balances false positives 
and false negatives
Combining Multiple Factors 
Authenticate: A user is more likely to 
be a legitimate user
Combining Multiple Factors 
Reject: A user is less likely to be a 
legitimate user
Naive Bayes Model
Prototype Evaluation 
(Field Study #2)
Field Study #2 
Test system that changes authentication 
schemes based on location
Choosing an Authentication Scheme 
Location Active Factor 
Home ? 
Workplace PIN 
Other Places ?
Naive Bayes Model
Compare Confidence 
Type PIN Be at workplace 
Type PIN Be at other place
Compare Confidence
Compare Confidence
Compare Confidence 
Type PIN Be at workplace 
Type Password Be at other place
Compare Confidence
Chosen Authentication Scheme 
Location Active Factor 
Home ? 
Workplace PIN 
Other Places Password
Two Conditions 
Location w/ PIN w/o PIN 
Home PIN None 
Workplace PIN None 
Other Places Password PIN
Screenshots
Field Study #2 
• 32 participants 
• 18 to 40 years old (mean=24) 
• On their phones 
• For 2 weeks
Result: # of Activations 
Condition Home Workplace Other Places 
w/o PIN None 
13.1 (1.4) 
None 
2.5 (0.4) 
PIN 
8.1 (1.1) 
w/ PIN PIN 
24.5 (3.2) 
PIN 
7.1 (1.0) 
Password 
15.7 (2.0)
Result: # of Activations 
Condition Home Workplace Other Places 
w/o PIN 65.8% 34.2% 
w/ PIN 66.8% 33.2%
Result: User Feedback 
Condition Easy to 
understand Secure Prefer to use 
w/o PIN 5 4 3.5 
w/ PIN 4 4 3
Quotes 
P3 said, “I don't normally use a security 
lock, but I would be much more inclined to 
use one if it didn't require constant 
unlocking.”
Quotes 
P5 said, “I like the system. It’s a great pain 
to type pin at home, because the nature of 
the phone, it goes to sleep quickly, then I 
have to type pin again, which is super 
annoying.”
Quotes 
P12 said, “Typing passwords to check text 
was annoying. I don't think I will use it.”
Appropriate Security Level 
Location Using PIN No Security Locks 
Home None 
Workplace 
Other Places PIN
Appropriate Security Level 
Location Using PIN No Security Locks 
Home PIN 
Workplace PIN 
Other Places PIN
Appropriate Security Level 
Location Using PIN No Security Locks 
Home PIN None 
Workplace PIN 
Other Places PIN
Appropriate Security Level 
Location Using PIN No Security Locks 
Home PIN None 
Workplace PIN None 
Other Places PIN None
Design Iteration 
(Field Study #3)
Design Iteration 
• Appropriate security level 
• Workplace is not as safe as home
Appropriate Security Level 
Location Active Factor 
Home None 
Workplace 
Other Places
Appropriate Security Level 
Location Active Factor 
Home None 
Workplace 
Other Places PIN
Workplace is not safe 
+ 
No Active Factor Be at Home 
+ 
No Active Factor Be at Workplace
Workplace is not safe 
+ 
No Active Factor Be at Home 
+ 
Type PIN Be at Workplace
Workplace is not safe 
+ 
No Active Factor Be at Home 
No Active Factor + + 
Using Computer Be at Workplace
Active Factor Selection 
Location Active Factor 
Home None 
Workplace when using computers None 
Workplace when not using computers PIN 
Others PIN
Notification
Field Study #3 
• 18 participants 
• 21 to 40 years old (mean=26.3) 
• On their phones and laptops 
• For 10 to 14 days
Result: At Workplace 
Grey: Computer not used 
Black: Computer used
Result: User Feedback 
Feature Easy to 
understand Useful Secure Prefer to 
use 
Location-based 
5 4.5 4 4 
Comp-based 
4.5 4 3.5 3.5 
Notification - 4 - 4
Quote 
• P17 said, “It is annoying to use security 
locks all the time, but whereas if I had 
such a system which requires pin only 
at unsecure places its usefulness adds 
more value when compared to the 
annoyance caused by it. So, I will 
definitely use it.”
Conclusion 
• Proposed a Naive Bayes framework to 
combine multiple factors to adjust active 
authentication schemes 
• The framework allowed us to choose 
active factor in a quantitative way 
• Field studies indicated that users 
preferred the proposed system
Backup
Feasibility Analysis 
(Field Study #1)
Location as a Signal 
• People have their own mobility patterns 
• Random people don’t have access to 
certain places
Field Study #1 
• Where do people log in to their phones? 
• 32 participants 
• 7 to 140 days 
PPllaaccee MMeeaann TTiimmee [[%%]] MMeeaann AAccttiivvaattiioonn [[%%]] 
1 (Home) 38.9 31.9 
2 (Workplace) 18.7 28.9 
Others 42.4 39.2
Security Analysis
Security Analysis 
Condition 
Knowledge about target users 
Uninformed Informed 
Technical 
expertise 
Novice Uninformed Novice Informed Novice 
Expert Uninformed Expert Informed Expert
Security Analysis 
Condition 
Knowledge about target users 
Uninformed Informed 
Technical 
expertise 
Novice Uninformed Novice Informed Novice 
Expert Uninformed Expert Informed Expert 
Strangers 
•CASA is as strong as PIN/password
Security Analysis 
Condition 
Knowledge about target users 
Uninformed Informed 
Technical 
expertise 
Novice Uninformed Novice Informed Novice 
Expert Uninformed Expert Informed Expert 
Family members, Friends, Co-workers 
•Trusted people 
•However, users trust co-workers less
Security Analysis 
Condition 
Knowledge about target users 
Uninformed Informed 
Technical 
expertise 
Novice Uninformed Novice Informed Novice 
Expert Uninformed Expert Informed Expert 
Dedicated attackers 
•Rare, but difficult to prevent 
•Detection rather than prevention
Adjusting Security Levels
Results: # of Activations 
Gray: w/ PIN 
Black: w/o PIN
Compare Confidence
Result: User Feedback 
Condition Easy to 
understand Secure Prefer to use 
w/o PIN 5 4 3.5 
w/ PIN 
4 4 3 
3 4
Compare Confidence

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CASA: Context-Aware Scalable Authentication, at SOUPS 2013

Editor's Notes

  • #3: Today, devices require the same authentication regardless of the contexts. for instance, when a phone is at user’s home and in a foreign country which the user has never been to, the phone always require a PIN to unlock. Because of this, we need to design authentication system to be secure even in the most risky case.
  • #4: However, if security system costs too much, users simply stop using it. In the case of mobile phones, people stop using security lock. Actually, many existing work reported that about half of the users do not use security lock.
  • #5: This clearly shows that the concept of one fits all does not work well. Then, a question is, do a few fit all? If we have a few security lock system, do they cover all situations? More specifically, How can we choose security lock system for different situations? Do they provide better security and usability for users? These are questions that we investigated in this work.
  • #6: So, we propose context-aware scalable authentication In
  • #7: And we tested the framework through filed studies with two rather simple implementations of the framework
  • #17: I will come back to this term later in this presentation. Now, we can compare confidence levels given by different sets of signals. The next questions is what signal we should combine ----- Meeting Notes (7/9/13 13:09) ----- explain sign
  • #19: In the second field study, we developed a authentication system that changes authentication schemes based on users’ locations. Then, we tested the system using users’ own phones for two weeks
  • #20: Now, the question is what authentication schemes we have to use for different locations. For simplicity, we used three locations in our system. Home. workplace ad others. Also, we used three different authentication scheme, None, PIN and password. Finally, we used authentication at workplace as a standard.
  • #21: Now, we come back to this equation.
  • #22: We can compare confidence levels from different sets of signals. As an example, let’s compare a scenario where a person types correct PIN at workplace and a scenario where a person types correct PIN at other places.
  • #23: the first terms in these equation denotes the confidence given by typing a correct PIN. These values can be calculated using entropies of PIN. The second term denotes the confidence given by being at certain locations these values were obtain in the first field study.
  • #24: When we compare these two, the confidence in the second scenario is smaller than the first one. Intuitively, being at other place provide smaller confidence than being at workplace.
  • #25: So, if we want the confidence level in the second scenario as high as the one in the first scenario, we have to change the authentication scheme. If a person types a correct password at other places,
  • #26: it can provide higher confidence than the first scenario ----- Meeting Notes (7/9/13 13:09) ----- entropy
  • #27: by repeating the process, we came up with the two sets of configurations.
  • #28: by repeating the process, we came up with the two sets of configurations.
  • #31: ----- Meeting Notes (7/9/13 13:09) ----- comparison between the first study
  • #32: ----- Meeting Notes (7/9/13 13:09) ----- add take aways
  • #33: Qualitative feedback? 10
  • #38: ----- Meeting Notes (7/25/13 07:30) ----- fix
  • #45: So, if we want the confidence level in the second scenario as high as the one in the first scenario, we have to change the authentication scheme. If a person types a correct password at other places,
  • #46: So, if we want the confidence level in the second scenario as high as the one in the first scenario, we have to change the authentication scheme. If a person types a correct password at other places,
  • #47: So, if we want the confidence level in the second scenario as high as the one in the first scenario, we have to change the authentication scheme. If a person types a correct password at other places,
  • #50: ----- Meeting Notes (7/25/13 00:46) ----- laptop
  • #54: ----- Meeting Notes (7/9/13 12:34) ----- location identification
  • #57: We decided to start from a very simple and effective signal. That is location. Because people have their own mobility patterns, and random people don’t have access to users’ home or workplaces. We thought that location can provide strong confidence about a person’s identity
  • #58: We conducted two field study to investigate our idea. In the first study, we investigated how much we could improve the usability of user authentication in our system. The results were very positive. 60% of the time, people log into their phones at home or workplace. ----- Meeting Notes (7/9/13 13:09) ----- definition of other places
  • #60: We categorized attackers in a 2x2 grid.
  • #66: logfrac{P(PIN|u=1)}{P(PIN|u=-1)}+logfrac{P(W|u=1)}{P(W|u=-1)}\ logfrac{P(A|u=1)}{P(A|u=-1)}+logfrac{P(H|u=1)}{P(H|u=-1)}
  • #68: logfrac{P(PIN|u=1)}{P(PIN|u=-1)}+logfrac{P(W|u=1)}{P(W|u=-1)}\ logfrac{P(A|u=1)}{P(A|u=-1)}+logfrac{P(H|u=1)}{P(H|u=-1)}