![Cabul, a kotal was gained eight or ten miles from Camp, from which
a splendid view of the Lughman Valley was obtained. There was a
track right through this, and this was undoubtedly the road used by
the late Shere Ali for his military convoys. It seemed to traverse an
almost level country; and except that to use it would involve two
bridges—one near Naghloo and the other at Jellalabad,—there can
be no question that it would he far easier than viâ Jugdulluck,
Gundamak, and Futtehabad. The country, however, north of the
Cabul is known to be inhabited by Safis—converted Kafirs, whose
fanaticism exceeds that of almost any other Mahomedans. Tagao, in
which they live, boasts of several fertile valleys, watered by the
Panjshir, Tagao, and Uzbin rivers, and might furnish supplies if the
people could be reduced to obedience. Their chief is one Usman
Khan,[25]
a noted robber; and of the temper of his followers we have
already had an example. When the reconnoitring party were looking
into the Lughman Valley, some seventy Safis, all armed with jhezails
and swords, appeared a few hundred yards off, and threatened to
attack the troops if they proceeded further into their country. As they
did not open fire, no notice was taken of their threats, and
Lieutenant Smith returned to Naghloo in peace. On the next day, the
10th, a foraging party of one company of the 67th Foot, under
Captain Poole, was ordered to march up the Cabul river to a village
some six or seven miles to the west of Naghloo. This village is in
close proximity to Doaba, at the junction of the Panjshir and Cabul
rivers. The villagers near the Cabul are not Safis; and as they had
expressed their willingness to sell grain and forage, only a small
party of men were sent out in charge of about 100 camels and
mules. The road taken was found to be rather difficult, a narrow
defile close to the river having to be passed through, four miles from
Naghloo. After passing through this, the narrow camel-track passed
over a small semicircular piece of open ground, the hills falling away
to the north. At the western end was a second defile, with a high
ridge running up to the right and shutting out from view the village
beyond. When Captain Poole was crossing the open with thirty men,
some distance in front of the baggage animals, he met a number of
villagers hastening along with their household goods and cattle.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/12451-250315093046-e1147cdc/85/Competing-for-Advantage-2nd-Edition-Hoskisson-Solutions-Manual-23-320.jpg)
![disadvantage. That one-sixth of Captain Poole’s company was put
out of action is too significant to be lightly regarded.
CHAPTER XIII.
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry upon the Massacre—The Suspicion
against the Amir Yakub Khan—The Report forwarded to the Government of
India—Probable Deportation of the Amir to India—Gatherings of Tribesmen at
Ghazni—The Necessity of collecting Supplies for the Winter—The Khyber Line
of Communications—No Supplies obtainable from Peshawur—Slowness of the
Khyber Advance—Projected Expedition to Ghazni—The Reason of its falling
through—The Strength of the Army of the Indus—General Baker’s Excursion
to the Maidan Valley—The Chardeh Valley in Winter—Sir F. Roberts joins
General Baker-The Destruction of Bahadur Khan’s Villages in the Darra Narkh.
Sherpur, 18th November.
One part of the important work which the British force came to
Cabul to fulfil has been done: the Commission appointed to inquire
into the circumstances of the massacre of our Envoy and the after-
events, culminating in the battle of Charasia, has completed its task,
and to-day the report was duly signed by Colonel Macgregor, Dr.
Bellew, and Mahomed Hyat Khan. For the past two days Sir F.
Roberts has had the report before him, and has telegraphed a
summary of it to the Government of India, who will thus be put in
possession of its main features several days before the text of the
document can reach them. In due course the Government will, no
doubt, furnish a connected narrative of the events of the early part
of September, and the world at large will then be able to judge on
what basis of proof our suspicions against Yakub Khan and his most
favoured ministers have rested.[26]
The Commission began examining
witnesses on the 18th of October; so that it is exactly a month to-
day since the first step was taken towards compiling the mass of
evidence now understood to have been recorded. I have before](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/12451-250315093046-e1147cdc/85/Competing-for-Advantage-2nd-Edition-Hoskisson-Solutions-Manual-26-320.jpg)
![at the same time to arrest any sepoys found in his villages. To
accomplish this double object the cavalry were sent out yesterday,
with the result already stated, that they were fired upon by a large
body of men, including some 200 sepoys armed with Sniders. It was
necessary to make an example of Bahadur Khan, and at the same
time to break up the tribal gathering, which, if left alone, might grow
to serious proportions. Our foraging parties would probably have
been roughly handled in scattered villages, all of which boast of
towers and fortified enclosures, if the rumour had been allowed to
circulate that our cavalry had been driven back.
Tents having been struck at daybreak, the baggage of the force
was packed up and placed within a fort near the Cabul river, under a
guard of 300 men, drawn equally from the 92nd Highlanders, 3rd
Sikhs, and 5th Punjab Infantry, with a squadron of the 14th Bengal
Lancers and a troop of the 9th Lancers. The two guns of 9-3[prev G-
3], R.H.A., were also left behind, as the road to the villages was
known to be difficult for wheeled guns. The troops which marched
out were 400 of the 92nd, 300 of the 3rd Sikhs, 300 of the 5th N.I.,
a troop of the 9th Lancers, a squadron of the 14th B.L., and four
guns of the Kohat Mountain Battery. General Baker was in command
of this compact little column, which was not encumbered with
transport animals, as a rapid march was intended. Sir F. Roberts,
with Colonel Macgregor, also rode out with his personal escort. It
was bitterly cold in the early morning, and all but the swiftest
running streams were coated over with ice. The troops carried with
them one day’s cooked provisions, but were otherwise in light
marching order. A point was made for a little to the south-west,
where the Darra Narkh stream falls into the Cabul river, and then a
due westerly course was followed up the narrow valley through
which the former stream runs. The usual mountainous country was
seen on either hand, high hills closing down on the valley, and
presenting treeless slopes barren of all verdure. The two rivers had
to be crossed by fords, and the men went through the icy-cold water
as carelessly as if wading a stream in summer. The sepoys stripped
off their putties, and made light of the floating ice which barked their
shins, while the Highlanders in their kilts seemed rather to enjoy the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/12451-250315093046-e1147cdc/85/Competing-for-Advantage-2nd-Edition-Hoskisson-Solutions-Manual-39-320.jpg)
![skilfully burrowed to form ovens, and round holes cut out on which
to place the dekchies which serve for Afghan pots and kettles. Such
of the rooms as I went into were dark and dirty enough, small
square holes in the walls serving as windows, and the roofs being
made up of thick logs laid a foot apart, and covered over with twigs,
on which a foot of mud had been plastered. The Sikhs fired house
after house, and every room was soon converted into a huge
reverberating furnace, the fire having no means of escape through
the roofs, which were very strong. Nearly all the houses were two-
storied, with narrow wooden or mud staircases, and many a sepoy in
his haste first fired the lower rooms, stored with wood or bhoosa,
and then rushed upstairs intent on loot, soon to be driven down
again by the smoke and flames from below. The search after
household goods was varied by exciting chases after the fowls,
ducks, and donkeys of the village. Sikhs and kahars, who had come
up with the dandies (stretchers for wounded men), scrambled over
housetops, and through blinding smoke, to capture the dearly-prized
moorgie, while below an unoffending donkey would be chased
frantically round awkward corners and over frozen watercourses,
where pursuers and pursued alike came to grief. A donkey when
captured was laden with such little loot as the men thought worth
while carrying off. Each fowl had its neck wrung on the spot, was
thrown into a convenient bit of fire in some blazing house, and
having been singed clean of its feathers, was cooked in a few
minutes, and eaten with infinite enjoyment. The cavalry were
fortunate enough to secure fifty sheep and a few cows, which were
driven to camp. After two or three hours had been spent in firing the
various villages owned by Bahadur Khan, the order to fall in for the
homeward march was given, and leaving the valley draped in smoke
and the fire still working its will, the troops filed off for Maidan. They
reached camp by evening, having marched seventeen miles over
difficult ground and through half-frozen streams without mishap. As
the rear-guard left, a few men appeared on the heights of the north
and fired a few shots at long ranges, but these were merely in
bravado.[27]
We could learn nothing of the body of tribesmen and the
200 sepoys, and it is believed they have dispersed. The punishment](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/12451-250315093046-e1147cdc/85/Competing-for-Advantage-2nd-Edition-Hoskisson-Solutions-Manual-42-320.jpg)
![now and again as the steel-heads caught a glint from the moon. It
was a fantastical sight, this endless circling of misty horsemen,
moving apparently without aim or object and growing momentarily
more and more distinct as dawn began to creep up over the distant
Luttabund and Khurd Cabul hills, and struggle with the clear
moonlight which had before been supreme. In an hour everything
was ready for departure. Yakub Khan’s horses were waiting ready
saddled, and the Lancers had ceased their circling, and were formed
up waiting for the order to march. Sir Frederick Roberts, Colonel
Macgregor, Chief of the Staff, and Major Hastings were present to
see the prisoner start on his rapid journey, and at half-past six
exactly Yakub Khan rode off surrounded by Lancers. He had
exchanged salaams with the General and those about him, and, if
not positively elated, was seemingly quite content to leave Cabul.
Captain Turner was the Political Officer to whose care he was
assigned; and Abdullah Khan, son of the Nawab Gholam Hussein,
was the native officer in attendance. His four body servants and a
favourite attendant, Abdul Kayun, who had been released at the last
moment, rode with the escort. No notice was given beforehand to
his servants; and when the royal cooks heard that they were to start
for India, they abandoned their master and took refuge in the city.
They were afterwards sought out and sent on to Luttabund, the
halting-place for the night, as the comfort of Yakub Khan is to be
strictly considered. The news of the departure soon spread through
Cabul, and the Mussulman population, according to a Hindu
informant, are greatly depressed and uneasy. They are now
convinced that the Durani dynasty is at an end; and, while not
regretting Yakub personally, they mourn over the fall of that reign of
turbulence which they could always carry out in the city under a
Barakzai. Double marches are to be made the whole way to
Peshawur, where Yakub Khan is expected to arrive in eight days. Part
of the Cabul Field Force escort will accompany him to Jugdulluck,
where the advanced Khyber Brigade will assume charge, and he will
be passed through the various posts until the Punjab Frontier is
reached.[28]
His son, the so-called heir-apparent, remains here, as](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/12451-250315093046-e1147cdc/85/Competing-for-Advantage-2nd-Edition-Hoskisson-Solutions-Manual-48-320.jpg)
![well as the members of his harem, who will be pensioned and
properly cared for by the British authorities.
During the past few days reports have come in of growing
uneasiness among various sections of the tribes about Cabul, and
these culminated yesterday in the news that the Kohistanis had
actually risen, and were at Khoja Serai, on the Charikar Road. They
were said to have cooked three days’ food, and to meditate
attacking Sherpur on the last day of the moon. From the Luttabund
direction also it was reported that the Safis of Tagao and the hillmen
west of Jugdulluck were also meditating mischief, though beyond
gathering together in small bands they had not made open
demonstration of hostility. The change in the attitude of the
Kohistanis has warned us that it is idle to expect a peaceful quiet
among men who have always been unruly and turbulent. The
sections which will probably give us most trouble now and in the
future are—the Wardaks inhabiting the country about the Ghazni
Road, who may drag in the Logaris, the Safis of Tagao, and the
Kohistanis. With the two former we have already come into collision;
General Macpherson having ventured into Tagao in search of
supplies, while General Baker on a similar mission at Maidan has had
to burn Beni-Badam in the Wardak country.[29]
It is probable that
both Safis and Wardaks will seek hereafter to have their revenge;
but in the meantime we shall not trouble them further, as we have
the Kohistanis to deal with. Kohistan lies due north of Cabul between
the Pughman, a spur of the Hindu Kush, and Tagao, and includes the
upper valley of the Panjshir River, which stretches away north-east
from Charikar, the most important town in the province. The lower
portion of Kohistan is known as the Koh-Daman (Mountain Skirt),
and is the district renowned for its vineyards and orchards, from
which Cabul is largely supplied with fruit. It is fertilized by
innumerable streams running down from the Pughman mountains,
and uniting to form a river, which, turned to the north by ranges of
hills facing Pughman, eventually empties itself into the Panjshir on
the western border of Tagao. Looking northwards from the Bemaru
Heights above Sherpur cantonments, one sees nothing but a mass of
hills piled together in picturesque confusion, the foreground being a](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/12451-250315093046-e1147cdc/85/Competing-for-Advantage-2nd-Edition-Hoskisson-Solutions-Manual-49-320.jpg)
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- 5. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–1 Chapter 7: Cooperative Strategy CHAPTER SUMMARY This chapter discusses the reasons cooperative strategies are important in the current competitive environment. The topic is examined generally as well as by market type. Examples of various cooperative strategy types are provided on the basis of their primary strategic objectives, with strategic alliances highlighted as a frequently-used form of cooperative strategy. Associated risks and effective management to overcome risks are presented to complete the discussion of cooperative strategies. CHAPTER OUTLINE Importance of Cooperative Strategy Strategic Alliances in Slow-Cycle Markets Strategic Alliances in Fast-Cycle Markets Strategic Alliances in Standard-Cycle Markets Types of Alliances and Other Cooperative Strategies Cooperative Strategies That Enhance Differentiation or Reduce Costs Complementary Strategic Alliances Network Cooperative Strategies Cooperative Strategies That Address Forces in the External Environment Competitive Response Alliances Uncertainty-Reducing Alliances Competition-Reducing Cooperative Strategies Associations and Consortia Cooperative Strategies That Promote Growth and/or Diversification Diversifying Strategic Alliances Franchising International Cooperative Strategies Competitive Risks of Cooperative Strategies Implementing and Managing Cooperative Strategies Summary KNOWLEDGE OBJECTIVES 1. Define cooperative strategies and explain why they are important in the current competitive environment. 2. Explain how the primary reasons for the use of cooperative strategies differ depending on market context (fast-cycle, slow-cycle, or standard cycle). 3. Define and discuss equity and non-equity strategic alliances. 4. Discuss the types of cooperative strategies that are formed primarily to reduce costs or increase differentiation. 5. Identify and describe cooperative strategies that help a firm to address forces in the external environment. 6. Explain the cooperative strategies that firms use primarily to foster growth.
- 6. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–2 7. Discuss the risks associated with cooperative strategies. 8. Describe how firms can effectively implement and manage their cooperative strategies. LECTURE NOTES See slides 1-3. Key Terms ▪ Cooperative Strategy - strategy in which firms work together to achieve a shared objective. ▪ Strategic Alliance - cooperative strategy in which firms combine resources and capabilities to create a competitive advantage. Importance of Cooperative Strategy - This section discusses how cooperative strategies have become integral to the competitive landscape and central to the success of partnered companies. See slide 4. Key Terms ▪ Co-opetition - condition that exists when firms that have formed cooperative strategies also compete against one another in the marketplace. See slides 5-6. See Table 7.1: Reasons for Strategic Alliances by Market Type (slide 7). 1. What are some of the reasons that cooperative strategies have become important to businesses today? a. Most firms lack the full set of resources and capabilities needed to reach their objectives. b. Cooperative behavior allows partners to create value that they couldn‘t develop by acting independently. c. Aligning stakeholder interests, both inside and outside of the organization, can reduce environmental uncertainty. d. Alliances can provide a new source of revenue. e. Alliances can be a vehicle for firm growth. f. Alliances can enhance the speed of responding to market opportunities, technological changes, and global conditions. g. Alliances are a way that firms can gain new knowledge and experiences to increase competitiveness. Compare how the reasons for using cooperative strategies vary across market type. 2. Compare how the reasons for using cooperative strategies vary across market type. a. Slow-cycle markets - Strategic alliances are used to enter restricted markets or establish franchises in new markets with ease and speed. The alliance partner might better understand the new market’s conditions
- 7. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–3 See Additional Notes Below. See slide 8. and have knowledge of and relationships with key stakeholders. b. Fast-cycle markets - Strategic alliances between firms with excess resources and promising capabilities aid in the transition required to evolve markets and to gain rapid entry into new markets. c. Standard-cycle markets - Strategic alliances between large firms with economies of scale are likely to combine complimentary resources/capabilities to gain market power. This type of partnership allows firms to learn new business techniques and technologies. 3. Why are slow-cycle markets becoming rare in the 21st century competitive landscape? a. Privatization of industries and economies b. Rapid expansion of the Internet’s capabilities c. Quick dissemination of information and speed with which advancing technologies permit quick imitation of even complex products. Additional Discussion Notes for Strategic Alliances by Market Type - These notes include additional materials that cover reasons for strategic alliances by market type, citing corporate examples to illustrate the concepts. The competitive conditions of slow-cycle, fast-cycle, and standard-cycle markets impel firms to use cooperative strategies to achieve slightly different objectives (see Table 7.1 in text). Market type examples of cooperative strategic alliances follow. Slow-Cycle Access to restricted market; establish franchises in new markets; maintain stability (e.g., establishing standards). ▪ French steelmaker Usinor formed an equity strategic alliance with Dofasco, Canada’s second largest steel mill, to build a plant to supply car bodies for Honda, Toyota, GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler. Through this alliance, Usinor and Dofasco established a new franchise in the import-averse U.S. steel market. ▪ American AIG formed a joint venture with India to gain entry into India’s restricted insurance market. ▪ Petrochemical companies from Venezuela and Brazil formed a joint venture for cross investments between partners. The eventual goal is to attract other oil companies in the region (Colombia and Mexico).
- 8. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–4 Fast-Cycle Compress R&D time and capital; market leadership; form standards; reduce risk and uncertainty: ▪ Visa formed a venture capital program to scout technologies and capabilities that will affect the future of the financial services industry in order to meld and integrate the physical and the virtual financial world, where customers have the trust, convenience, protection and security in addition to the ease in performing transactions. Standard-Cycle Gain market power; access to resources; economies of scale; overcome barriers; reduce risk; compress learning: ▪ In 1993 Lufthansa and United Airlines formed the Star Alliance. Since then, 12 other airlines have joined the Star Alliance to share resources and capabilities and to access over 700 cities in 124 countries. The goal is to combine worldwide routes and offer seamless booking and travel throughout the world. Types of Alliances and Other Cooperative Strategies - This section discusses two basic types of strategic alliance based on legal form and introduces other cooperative strategies as they relate to the primary strategic objectives of firms. See slide 9. Key Terms ▪ Equity Strategic Alliance - alliance in which two or more firms own a portion of the equity in the venture they have created. ▪ Joint Venture - strategic alliance in which two or more firms create a legally independent company to share resources and capabilities to develop a competitive advantage. ▪ Non-equity Strategic Alliance - alliance in which two or more firms develop a contractual relationship to share some of their unique resources and capabilities to create a competitive advantage. See slide 10. See slide 11. 4. How can tacit knowledge create a competitive advantage? a. Tacit knowledge is complex knowledge that is difficult to codify. It is learned through experience and, when shared between partnering organizations, can become a source of competitive advantage. 5. How do nonequity strategic alliances differ from equity strategic alliances? a. A separate independent company is not established. b. The partnering firms do not take equity positions in a separate entity. c. The relationship is less formal.
- 9. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–5 See slide 12. See Figure 7.1: Strategic Objectives of Cooperative Strategies (slide 13). See Additional Notes Below. d. The relationship demands fewer partner commitments. 6. Name some types of nonequity strategic alliances that are increasingly being used. a. Licensing agreements b. Distribution agreements c. Supply contracts d. Outsourcing commitments 7. Discuss some common types of cooperative strategies that support different strategic objectives. a. Refer to Figure 7.1, which lists types of cooperative strategies that support the following strategic objectives: ▪ Differentiation ▪ Low cost ▪ Address environmental conditions ▪ Growth ▪ Diversification Additional Discussion Notes for Types of Strategic Alliances - These notes include additional materials that cover different types of strategic alliances, with specific examples of joint ventures, equity strategic alliances, and nonequity strategic alliances. Joint Ventures ▪ Sprint and Virgin Group’s joint venture targets 15- to 30-year- olds as customers for pay-as-you-go wireless phone service. Brand (from Virgin) and service (from Sprint). ▪ Sony Pictures, Warner Bros., Universal Pictures, Paramount Pictures, and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, each have a 20% stake in a joint venture to use the Internet to deliver feature films on demand. Equity Strategic Alliance ▪ Foreign direct investments made by Japanese and U.S. companies in China are completed through equity strategic alliances. ▪ Cott Corporation, the world’s largest soft drink supplier, and J.D. Iroquois Enterprises formed an equity strategic alliance. Cott gained exclusive supply rights for Iroquois’ private label spring water products and Iroquois expanded its branded business in the West and Far East. Nonequity Strategic Alliance ▪ Licensing agreements, distribution agreements, supply
- 10. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–6 contracts. For example, chemical processes tend to be improved along technology corridors; and therefore, licensing and cross licensing are well-established practices in chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Licensing and cross licensing mitigates the potential impact of overbroad patents. ▪ Ralph Lauren uses licensing agreements to support its Polo brand. It uses 29 domestic licensing agreements, including West Point Stevens (bedding), Reebok (casual shoes), and ICI Paints (Ralph Lauren Home Products). ▪ Magna International, a leading global supplier of automotive systems, components, and modules, has formed many nonequity strategic alliances with GM, Ford, Honda, DaimlerChrysler, and Toyota. ▪ Procter & Gamble (P&G) has formed over 120 strategic alliances: with Dana Undies to make Pampers cotton underwear; with Magla to make Mr. Clean disposable gloves and mops; with GM to distribute its Tempo car cleanup towels; and with Whirlpool to develop a new “clothes refresher” product and appliance. Cooperative Strategies That Enhance Differentiation or Reduce Costs - This section introduces a discussion of business level cooperative strategies used to combine resources and capabilities to improve firm performance in individual product markets and create competitive advantages that cannot be created by the individual firm. See slide 14. 8. What are the two general categories of cooperative strategies used to enhance differentiation or reduce costs? a. Complementary strategic alliances b. Network cooperative strategies Complementary Strategic Alliances - This section introduces the two types of complementary strategic alliances used to support differentiation and cost objectives and discusses why the benefits of such partnerships are not always balanced evenly across partnering firms. See slide 15. Key Terms ▪ Complementary Strategic Alliance - business-level alliances in which firms share some of their resources and capabilities in complementary ways to develop competitive advantages. See slide 16. See Figure 7.2: Vertical and Horizontal 9. What are two types of complementary strategic alliances and how do they differ? a. Vertical complementary strategic alliances - the partnering firms share their resources and capabilities
- 11. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–7 Complementary Strategic Alliances (slide 17). See slide 18. See Additional Notes Below. from different stages of the value chain to create a competitive advantage. b. Horizontal complementary strategic alliances - the partnering firms share their resources and capabilities from the same stage of the value chain to create a competitive advantage - commonly used for long-term product development and distribution opportunities. 10. What affects the different opportunity levels and benefits that partnering firms are able to achieve through complementary alliances? a. Partners may learn at different rates. b. Partners may have different capabilities to leverage complementary resources. c. Some firms are more effective at managing alliances and deriving benefits from them. d. Partners may have different reputations in the marketplace, differentiating the types of actions they can legitimately take. Additional Discussion Notes for Complementary Strategic Alliances - These notes include additional materials that provide examples of vertical and horizontal complementary strategic alliances to illustrate the business-level cooperative strategies. Vertical ▪ McDonald’s alliances with oil companies and independent store operators. With just one stop, customers can fill up their car, buy a meal, and pick up items for the home. ▪ Boeing’s 777 alliance is accredited with the fastest and most efficient construction of a new commercial aircraft. The partners, including UAL, brought unique resources and capabilities to a different part of the value chain. Horizontal ▪ SCM is a 40-year old joint venture between Caterpillar and Mitsubishi to share resources and capabilities in order to yield products that neither firm could design and produce by itself. ▪ CSK Auto, Inc. (Checker Auto Parts, Shuck’s Auto Supply, Kragen Auto Parts) and Advance Auto Parts established PartsAmerica.com. The venture provides easy access to nearly $1.5 billion in inventory and 3,000 locations in all 50 states, where buyers can use either store to pick up and return parts ordered online.
- 12. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–8 Network Cooperative Strategies - This section discusses the effective use of network cooperative strategies and the role that strategic center firms play in alliance networks. See slide 19. See Figure 7.3: A Strategic Network (slide 20). Key Terms ▪ Network Cooperative Strategy - cooperative strategy in which multiple firms agree to form partnerships to achieve shared objectives - also known as alliance networks. ▪ Strategic Center Firm - firm at the core of an alliance network and around which the network’s cooperative relationships revolve. See slide 21. See slide 22. See Additional Notes Below. See slide 23. See slide 24. See slide 25. 9. How can network cooperative strategies be effectively used to benefit participating firms? a. Knowledge and information gained from multiple sources can produce more and better innovations. b. Network alliances can be particularly effective for geographically clustered firms. c. Effective social relationships and interactions among partners while sharing resources and capabilities lead to more successful network alliances. d. A strategic center firm that manages the complex, cooperative interactions among network partners also contributes to the effectiveness of network alliances. e. Gaining access to partners’ partners can open up advantages to the networking firms. f. Multiple collaborations increase the likelihood of additional competitive advantages and value creation. 10. As the foundation for an alliance network’s structure, what are the primary tasks of a strategic center firm? a. Strategic outsourcing with non-network members. b. Support of efforts to develop core competencies. c. Coordination and sharing of technology-based ideas and efforts. d. Emphasis on healthy rivalry to generate network-based competitive advantages. 11. What are two types of alliance networks and how do they differ? a. Stable alliance network i. Formed in mature industries in which demand is relatively constant and predictable. ii. Directed primarily toward developing products at a low cost. b. Dynamic alliance network i. Used in industries characterized by
- 13. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–9 environmental uncertainty, frequent product innovations, and short product life cycles. ii. Directed primarily toward continued development of products that are uniquely attractive to customers. Additional Discussion Notes for Network Cooperative Strategies - These notes include additional material that uses the airline industry to illustrate multiple partners in network cooperative strategies. Network Cooperative Strategies: Numerous Partners United Technologies is involved with over 100 worldwide cooperative strategies. One of these networks is the alliance formed by the firm’s Sikorsky business unit to produce the S-92 helicopter. Five firms from four continents joined with Sikorsky to form this alliance. Using its unique resources and capabilities, each partner assumed different responsibilities for the design and production of the S-92. No individual member of the alliance could have developed the design or manufactured it; a product with size and cost benefits over competing helicopters. The combination of the partners’ resources and capabilities has resulted in a competitive advantage for the alliance. Unlike the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, some experts note that initial progress in the airline industry was hindered due to a lack of cross-licensing agreements (cf., Merges & Nelson, 1990). That is, the Wright brothers’ patent—an efficient stabilizing and steering system that enabled a multiplicity of future flying machines— significantly held back the pace of development of aircrafts and the entire airline industry. In the absence of cross-licensing strategies, incumbents (like Curtiss and even the Wright brothers) wasted huge energies and diverted their efforts simply to avoid infringement, not to advance technology. The problems caused by the Wright brothers’ initial patent were compounded as improvements and complementary patents, owned by different companies, came into existence, but compatibility was null. The situation was so serious that at the insistence of the Secretary of the Navy, during World War I, an arrangement was worked out to enable automatic cross licensing. This, like in the licensing of automobile patents, turned out to be a durable institution. By the end of World War I there were many patents on different aircraft features and rivals could easily negotiate licenses to produce state-of-the-art planes. Cooperative Strategies That Address Forces in the External Environment - This section introduces a discussion of business level cooperative strategies used to combine resources and capabilities to meet the challenges of complex and ever-changing external environments. See slide 26. 11. What are the four types of cooperative strategies that serve to
- 14. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–10 See Additional Notes Below. See slide 27. keep firms abreast of rapid changes in their environments, and how do they differ? a. Competitive response alliances - used to respond to competitors’ strategic attacks. b. Uncertainty-reducing alliances - used to reduce environmental uncertainty, particularly in fast-cycle markets, new product markets, emerging economies, or new technologies. c. Competition-reducing cooperative strategies - used to reduce competition in an industry, often through the use of collusion. d. Associations and consortia - used to form coalitions with stakeholders to achieve common objectives. 12. Describe the two types of collusion used to reduce competition. a. Explicit collusion, which is illegal in the U.S., involves direct negotiation amongst firms to establish output levels and pricing agreements to reduce industry competition. b. Tacit collusion, common to highly-concentrated industries, involves several firms indirectly coordinating production and pricing decisions which impact the degree of competition faced in the industry. Mutual forebearance is one form of tacit collusion that occurs when firms avoid competitive attacks against rivals they face in multiple markets. Additional Discussion Notes for Cooperative Strategies That Address Forces in the External Environment - These notes include additional materials that cover the competition response strategy, uncertainty-reducing strategy, and competition-reducing strategy and examples to illustrate each concept. Competition Response Strategy ▪ FedEx responded to the success of UPS’s logistics business. FedEx formed a strategic alliance with KPMG to deliver end-to- end supply-chain solutions to large and mid-sized companies. FedEx committed its supply-chain consulting, IT systems, and transportation and logistics expertise, whereas KPMG provided its supply-chain consulting and e-integration services. ▪ Marathon Oil and Russia’s Yukos formed an alliance to achieve international expansion and as a response to rivals’ alliances. Uncertainty Reducing Strategy ▪ Overcapacity, risk, uncertainty, and cost competition led Siemens and Fujitsu to form an alliance associated with their PC operations. By uniquely combining technology from Fujitsu
- 15. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–11 with manufacturing, marketing, and logistics capabilities from Siemens, the joint venture has become Europe’s top supplier of PCs. ▪ GM and Toyota (# 1 U.S. and Japanese automakers) formed an R&D alliance to develop and standardize alternative-power cars. ▪ GM, Toyota, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, and Renault joined to develop a standard for communications and entertainment equipment for automobiles. Competition Reducing Strategy ▪ Explicit Collusion (illegal): Examples include the 1995 price- fixing scandal, in which Archer Daniels Midland executives were convicted of cooperating with competitors to fix prices. Similarly, Toys ‘R’ Us colluded with toy manufacturers to not sell popular toys to rivals, such as Costco and Sam’s Club. ▪ Tacit Collusion: Kellogg, General Mills, Post, and Quaker accounted for 84% of the U.S. cereal market. Some believe the high price gaps vis-à-vis rivals in this industry suggest the possibility that the dominant firms were using a tacit collusion cooperative strategy. ▪ Mutual Forbearance: Firms choose not to attack each other or engage in what could be destructive competition in multiple product markets. Cooperative Strategies That Promote Growth and/or Diversification - This section introduces a discussion of cooperative strategies used as an attractive alternative when the firm’s primary goal is growth and/or diversification. See slide 29. See slide 30. See slide 31. See Figure 7.4: A Distributed Strategic Key Terms ▪ Diversifying Strategic Alliances - corporate-level cooperative strategy in which firms share some of their resources and capabilities to diversify into new product or market areas. ▪ Franchising - cooperative strategy in which a firm uses a franchise as a contractual relationship to describe and control the sharing of its resources and capabilities with partners. ▪ Franchise - contractual agreement between two legally independent companies whereby the franchisor grants the right to the franchisee to sell the franchisor’s product or do business under its trademarks in a given location for a specified period of time. ▪ Cross-Border Strategic Alliance - international cooperative strategy in which firms with headquarters in different nations combine some of their resources and capabilities to create a competitive advantage. ▪ Distributed Alliance Network - organizational structure used to
- 16. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–12 Network (slide 32). manage complex and challenging international cooperative strategies. See slide 28. See slide 33. See Additional Notes Below. See slide 34. See slide 35. 13. What types of cooperative strategies are used by firms trying to grow or diversify? a. Diversifying strategic alliances b. Franchising c. International cooperative strategies 14. Why might cooperative strategies be an attractive alternative to mergers and acquisitions (presented in Chapter 9) to achieve growth or diversification goals? a. Require fewer resource commitments b. Permit greater strategic flexibility c. Not as permanent 15. What behaviors contribute to the successful use of franchising as a cooperative strategy? a. Partners working closely together, finding ways to strengthen the core company’s brand name. b. Franchisors developing programs to transfer knowledge and skills needed for franchisees to successfully compete at the local level. c. Franchisees providing feedback to franchisors regarding how to become more effective and efficient. d. Using the strategy in fragmented industries where no firm has a dominant share. 16. What are some of the reasons for the increase in use of cross- border strategic alliances? a. Multinational corporations outperform firms that operate only domestically. b. Due to limited domestic growth opportunities, firms look outside their national borders to expand business. c. Some foreign government policies require investing firms to partner with a local firm to enter their markets. Additional Discussion Notes for Cooperative Strategies That Promote Growth and/or Diversification - These notes include additional materials that illustrate diversifying strategic alliances and franchising as cooperative strategies that promote growth and/ or diversification. Diversifying Strategic Alliances Boeing and Insitu formed an alliance to develop an unmanned aerial vehicle system. Boeing brings systems integration, communications technologies, and payload technologies. Insitu is designing its
- 17. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–13 capabilities in producing low-cost, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (an earlier prototype flew 2,000 miles using 1.5 gallons of gasoline). Boeing hopes to diversify into government and commercial markets. Insitu gains “big firm” experience and access to Boeing’s technology, resources, and capabilities. Franchising Franchising is a lower-risk strategy to grow the brand. It is attractive when you don’t have the capital for growth. It is particularly attractive in fragmented industries, where a company can gain a large market share by consolidating independent companies through contractual relationships (e.g., Papa John’s, McDonald’s, Hilton International). Source: Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Columbia. Law. Review 839 (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ipcoop/90merg2.html). Competitive Risks of Cooperative Strategies - This section discusses the high failure rate of cooperative strategies and the factors that have a negative impact on their success. See slide 36. See Figure 7.5: Managing Competitive Risks in Cooperative Strategies (slide 37). 17. What are the prominent risks of cooperative strategies? a. Partners may choose to act opportunistically, either when formal contracts fail to prevent the behavior or when an alliance is based on a false perception of partner trustworthiness. b. Partner competencies may be misrepresented, particularly when the contributions are intangible assets. c. Partner may fail to make available the complementary resources and capabilities that were committed, which often occurs in international arrangements when different interpretations of contractual terms or trust- based expectations exist. d. Partner may make investments specific to the alliance while the other partner does not. Implementing and Managing Cooperative Strategies - This section explains the value of building superior skills in effectively implementing and managing cooperative strategies. See slide 38. 18. Describe several effective ways to implement and manage cooperative strategies. a. Internalize experiences with successful cooperative strategies to gain maximum value from the knowledge learned. This involves organizing the knowledge and
- 18. Chapter 7—Cooperative Strategy 7–14 See slide 39. Refer to Figure 7.5: Managing Competitive Risks in Cooperative Strategies (slide 37). See slide 40. See slide 41. properly distributing it to those involved with forming and using cooperative strategies. b. Establish appropriate controls. c. Assign managerial responsibility for cooperative strategy to high-level executive or team. d. Increasing the level of trust between partners increases the likelihood of alliance success and is an efficient way to influence and control alliance partners’ behaviors. 19. Describe two methods used to manage cooperative strategies. a. Cost minimization i. Relationship with partner is formalized with contracts. ii. Contracts specify how the cooperative strategy is to be monitored and how partner behavior is to be controlled. iii. Goal is to minimize costs and prevent opportunistic behaviors by partners. iv. Costs of monitoring cooperative strategy are greater. v. Formalities tend to stifle partner efforts to gain maximum value from their participation. b. Opportunity maximization i. Focus is on maximizing partnership’s value- creation opportunities. ii. Informal relationships and fewer constraints allow the partners to take advantage of unexpected opportunities to learn from each other and explore additional marketplace possibilities. iii. Partners need a high level of trust that each party will act in partnership’s best interest, which is more difficult in international situations. Ethical Questions - Recognizing the need for firms to effectively interact with stakeholders during the strategic management process, all strategic management topics have an ethical dimension. A list of ethical questions appears after the Summary section of each chapter in the textbook. The topic of ethics is best covered throughout the course to emphasize its prevalence and importance. We recommend posing at least one of these questions during your class time to stimulate discussion of ethical issues relevant to the chapter material that you are covering.
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- 20. near the body. The man was in extremis, and was said to be insensible; and by Dr. Bourke’s orders a European soldier shot him through the head. Another Afghan lying near had also his white clothing smouldering, and he was shot in a similar way. This seems to be the plain truth about the affair, which has been exaggerated into the wholesale burning alive of wounded men. The Ghoorkas know the superstitious dread among Mussulmans of any part of their body being destroyed after death; and, on the face of it, there is the probability of a lighted match having been applied to the clothes of men seemingly dead, in order to send their souls to perdition. The passions of the Ghoorkas have also been highly inflamed by a story which reached Ali Kheyl from Cabul, that a Ghoorka, with the Guides’ escort, was led through the city streets with his face blackened, was horribly tortured, and afterwards burned alive. They believed fervently in this story, and, as I have said, they may have thought to kill the Afghans in the next world as well as this. No one in the force would seek to be an apologist for such cruel acts as burning alive, deliberately and systematically, the wounded men of an enemy even so cruel as are the Afghans; but the reflections cast upon the 72nd Highlanders and upon General Roberts himself, as letting such acts go unpunished, are as unjust as they are absurd. The General knew nothing whatever of the incident until his attention was called to it in the newspapers, and his action then was prompt enough. I understand that he has now called upon Dr. Bourke to give his reasons for not reporting the matter officially. 16th November. Yesterday Sir Frederick Roberts and Brigadier-General Baker rode over to Butkhak, where Brigadier-General Macpherson is encamped after his late excursion in the Tagao country. There have been so many movements of troops in the Cabul plain lately, that the only escort the General thought it necessary to take with him was six sowars of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. Since the first brigade marched to Butkhak on the 1st instant, the villagers in the plain and in the lower Logar Valley, which runs down from the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, have
- 21. seen small parties of cavalry constantly on the move backwards and forwards, and within the last few days have watched the 23rd Pioneers encamped on the banks of the Logar and the long convoy of sick and wounded march along on the way to India. There have been so many evidences of our presence, that any unruly tribesmen or disbanded sepoys have wisely kept very quiet. The road may be considered safe, even for a solitary traveller; the telegraph wire has hitherto been scrupulously respected; and our foraging parties have never been molested. We were, of course, anxious to learn some particulars of the late skirmish, in which a company of the 67th had come to close quarters with the Safis; and, leaving the invalid camp, we passed up to the head-quarters of the 1st Brigade near the village walls. Sir Frederick Roberts heard the details of the affair from General Macpherson as well as an account of the work done by the Brigade in opening up communication with the Khyber Force. I may here incidentally state that Sir F. Roberts has now received the local rank of Lieutenant- General, and commands all the troops in Eastern Afghanistan, Jumrood being the point in the Peshawur direction to which his power of control extends. Some severe strictures have been passed upon those who have hitherto had the supreme control of the force operating from Peshawur, and the answer given to these is that General Bright’s advanced Brigade was a “flying column.” If that were so, how was it that it took twenty-four days to “fly” from Jellalabad to Kata Sung, a distance of about sixty miles? Surely its wings must have been clipped by Transport or Commissariat scissors, in which case it would cease to be a flying column at all, and would drop down to the lower level of a sedate brigade moving two and a half miles a day, sleeping comfortably in tents, and living on the fat of the land. But in that case there should have been supplies sufficient to have justified the stay of the troops at Kata Sung, and so to have secured the road. General Macpherson had of course no supplies with his force, as everything is being gathered into Sherpur for the winter; and he could not stay at Kata Sung, but had to try and find food north of the Cabul river. Here accordingly came in the story of the reconnaissance northward into Tagao and of
- 22. the collision with the Safis. The bed of the Cabul river lies about ten miles north of Kata Sung, Sei Baba, and the Luttabund Kotal, its direction being due east and west. From the vast pile of mountains which shut out the Cabul plain from Gundamak high spurs run down towards the river, and among these the Tezin stream, with two or three small tributaries, finds its way. When General Macpherson found that the force he had come to meet at Kata Sung had withdrawn, he turned off to the north, and proceeding down the bed of the Tezin stream for six or seven miles, reached the banks of the Cabul. He encamped at Sirobi, and on the 8th, resolved to cross the river to the village of Naghloo, on the opposite bank, two miles higher up. The natives had reported that a good road was in existence on the northern side of the Cabul from that point, and that it had been regularly used as the military convoy route between Cabul and Jellalabad. General Macpherson found, without much difficulty, a ford over the Cabul, which is here a stream with a strong current travelling very rapidly on account of the descent of 4,000 feet, which the river makes from Cabul to Jellalabad. Like all fords, however, in the Cabul river, this crossing-place was found to have its dangers, the least divergence from the narrow roadway—if the word can be used where there is no dry land—plunging men and horses into deep water. The fatal experience of the 10th Hussars at Jellalabad last spring was remembered, and ropes were stretched across the stream by which the men were guided. This marked the road to be taken and minimized the danger. On the evening of the 8th half the force had crossed to Naghloo without any accident, except that Lieutenants Forbes and Macgregor, of the 92nd Highlanders, acting as orderly officers to the General, were swept away by the current. By a little hard swimming they managed to reach the bank again. The troops bivouacked without tents. On the following day a reconnaissance was made from Naghloo eastwards, towards the Lughman country, Lieutenant Manners Smith, Assistant Quartermaster-General, going out with a few cavalry to examine the district. The orders given to the troops were not to fire upon any of the local tribesmen, unless the latter first opened fire; and this order was rigorously carried out. Working down on the left bank of the
- 23. Cabul, a kotal was gained eight or ten miles from Camp, from which a splendid view of the Lughman Valley was obtained. There was a track right through this, and this was undoubtedly the road used by the late Shere Ali for his military convoys. It seemed to traverse an almost level country; and except that to use it would involve two bridges—one near Naghloo and the other at Jellalabad,—there can be no question that it would he far easier than viâ Jugdulluck, Gundamak, and Futtehabad. The country, however, north of the Cabul is known to be inhabited by Safis—converted Kafirs, whose fanaticism exceeds that of almost any other Mahomedans. Tagao, in which they live, boasts of several fertile valleys, watered by the Panjshir, Tagao, and Uzbin rivers, and might furnish supplies if the people could be reduced to obedience. Their chief is one Usman Khan,[25] a noted robber; and of the temper of his followers we have already had an example. When the reconnoitring party were looking into the Lughman Valley, some seventy Safis, all armed with jhezails and swords, appeared a few hundred yards off, and threatened to attack the troops if they proceeded further into their country. As they did not open fire, no notice was taken of their threats, and Lieutenant Smith returned to Naghloo in peace. On the next day, the 10th, a foraging party of one company of the 67th Foot, under Captain Poole, was ordered to march up the Cabul river to a village some six or seven miles to the west of Naghloo. This village is in close proximity to Doaba, at the junction of the Panjshir and Cabul rivers. The villagers near the Cabul are not Safis; and as they had expressed their willingness to sell grain and forage, only a small party of men were sent out in charge of about 100 camels and mules. The road taken was found to be rather difficult, a narrow defile close to the river having to be passed through, four miles from Naghloo. After passing through this, the narrow camel-track passed over a small semicircular piece of open ground, the hills falling away to the north. At the western end was a second defile, with a high ridge running up to the right and shutting out from view the village beyond. When Captain Poole was crossing the open with thirty men, some distance in front of the baggage animals, he met a number of villagers hastening along with their household goods and cattle.
- 24. They were evidently panic-stricken and shouted wildly to Captain Poole, but as he did not understand their language he pushed on to the second defile. It appears that what they really said was that the Safis were in force over the defile, had attacked their village, burned their houses, and murdered some of the inhabitants. Upon getting through the second defile, Captain Poole saw on the slope below some 800 or 1,000 armed men, who immediately opened fire. The thirty men of the 67th returned the fire and checked the enemy, who had tried to rush forward. It was important to keep them back until the baggage animals with their small guard of twenty-four men could retrace their steps through the first defile. After firing for some time, our men observed 300 or 400 Safis creeping round over the hill to the north, with the evident intention of getting into the open plain and cutting off all retreat. The position of the handful of men then became so hazardous, that Captain Poole ordered them to fall back, and for an hour and a half he faced towards the Safis, who advanced to within 40 yards. It was in the open that our men began to drop, although one had been shot dead in the defile. Cover was taken under the river bank, which was three or four feet above the level of the stream; and though the enemy opened fire from the southern bank, they could not do much mischief. The steadiness of the soldiers, who used their Martinis with good effect, was remarkable throughout, one or two incidents being worth recording. The crack shot of the regiment, Corporal Woolley, was with the company, and his practice was wonderfully good. He was unfortunately shot through, the leg, but still continued firing. One of his comrades, on being shot down, fell into the river, and struggled hard to gain the bank. Two Safis ran down to cut him up; and these men Corporal Woolley shot before they could make their way to the wounded man. The latter was so exhausted by his efforts that he fell back, and was drowned in the stream. Corporal Woolley also brought down two standard-bearers. The fighting was so close that Captain Poole could not carry off his dead (two others were killed in the open besides the men in the defile); and the Safis mutilated them in a horrible way. Their eyes were gouged out, and faces cut to pieces by sharp knives, so that the bodies could scarcely be identified.
- 25. While fighting across the open, Captain Poole was struck by a bullet in the calf of the leg, and four other soldiers were wounded. One, who was too badly hit to be able to walk, was put upon a camel, and carried safely away. Lieutenant Carnegy kept the men together after his Captain had been hit; and although eight men and an officer out of fifty-six had been either killed or wounded, the others never wavered. A sowar had galloped back to Naghloo for assistance, and General Macpherson sent out at once a squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry and four mountain guns; 150 of the 67th, and a company of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry following. The cavalry arrived at the trot, but the defile was so blocked by the baggage animals, that to get through was impossible. The sowars dismounted and went up the hill to use their carbines, and the guns, also arriving, went up the crest under escort of the 28th and one company of the 67th, under Major Baker, and opened fire at 1,000 yards into the mass of the Safis below. The shells had a wholesome effect upon the enemy, and volleys from the Martinis and Sniders were also fired at long ranges. One man of the 28th was killed by a stray bullet. The other company of the 67th, under Lieutenant Atkinson, went along the river bed, and the enemy then retreated behind a sungar on the ridge to the north of the second defile, and covering their right flank. The mountain guns came into action again at 1,700 yards, having been brought down into the plain, and Major Baker marched over the hills to take the sungar in flank. Lieutenant Atkinson advancing at the same time, the Safis fled towards the Doaba, the cavalry pursuing them for six miles. Their loss must have been heavy, as they left many of their dead behind; seven bodies were found in one nullah. The mutilated bodies of three men of the 67th were recovered: the fourth had been swept down the river. The whole affair proves how great a risk small foraging parties run in an unexplored country, where the temper of the inhabitants is uncertain. It is true no resistance was expected; but the fanaticism of the Safis is so well known, that extra precautions should have been taken. The difficult ground to be traversed also put a small body of infantry, encumbered with baggage animals, at a great
- 26. disadvantage. That one-sixth of Captain Poole’s company was put out of action is too significant to be lightly regarded. CHAPTER XIII. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry upon the Massacre—The Suspicion against the Amir Yakub Khan—The Report forwarded to the Government of India—Probable Deportation of the Amir to India—Gatherings of Tribesmen at Ghazni—The Necessity of collecting Supplies for the Winter—The Khyber Line of Communications—No Supplies obtainable from Peshawur—Slowness of the Khyber Advance—Projected Expedition to Ghazni—The Reason of its falling through—The Strength of the Army of the Indus—General Baker’s Excursion to the Maidan Valley—The Chardeh Valley in Winter—Sir F. Roberts joins General Baker-The Destruction of Bahadur Khan’s Villages in the Darra Narkh. Sherpur, 18th November. One part of the important work which the British force came to Cabul to fulfil has been done: the Commission appointed to inquire into the circumstances of the massacre of our Envoy and the after- events, culminating in the battle of Charasia, has completed its task, and to-day the report was duly signed by Colonel Macgregor, Dr. Bellew, and Mahomed Hyat Khan. For the past two days Sir F. Roberts has had the report before him, and has telegraphed a summary of it to the Government of India, who will thus be put in possession of its main features several days before the text of the document can reach them. In due course the Government will, no doubt, furnish a connected narrative of the events of the early part of September, and the world at large will then be able to judge on what basis of proof our suspicions against Yakub Khan and his most favoured ministers have rested.[26] The Commission began examining witnesses on the 18th of October; so that it is exactly a month to- day since the first step was taken towards compiling the mass of evidence now understood to have been recorded. I have before
- 27. pointed out very fully how difficult was the work which lay before the Commissioners: there was scarcely any clue to be laid hold of which would lead them direct to their chief point—the cause of the outbreak of the Herat regiments; and they had to take such witnesses as were forthcoming, and to trust to later evidence to clear away the darkness in which they were at first groping. The consideration shown to the Amir seemed, to the suspicious minds of the Cabulis, a sign which foreboded his future restoration, or that of his near relatives; and those who were well inclined to us shrank from declaring their partisanship too boldly, for fear of after- consequences, when the Barakzai family should again be all- powerful in the country. There was a slight dissipation of this feeling when the Proclamation of October 28th was issued, announcing Yakub Khan’s voluntary abdication, and ordering all chiefs in Afghanistan to look to the Commander of the British force at Cabul for their authority in future; but we are known to be so eccentric a people that there still lurked uneasiness in many minds, and mouths were sealed that might reasonably have been expected to be open. The actual presence of the late sovereign in our Camp—even though he was known to be under a close guard—was too powerful an influence to be easily swept away: if he had been hurried away to India in disgrace, the atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty would have cleared up. But our ideas of justice are too strict to be warped by passionate anger, and it was resolved to give Yakub Khan as fair a chance of defending himself as he could possibly expect. That he lost his personal liberty by listening to foolish councillors, who thought he might gain something by flight, was nothing to us. One cannot always guard a man against his own stupidity. Having, then, to keep Yakub Khan with us, we had to do as best we could in gaining means of judging what were his relations with the men who stood forth as leaders of the rebel army, and how far he had sympathized with their plans. In endeavouring to trace out the palace intrigues which Nek Mahomed, Kushdil Khan, and others had set on foot, the Commission had often to rely upon men themselves tainted with suspicion; and when this was the case the statements had to be carefully weighed and critically compared with facts which
- 28. were attested beyond doubt. To dwell, as I have dwelt before, upon the strong point of an Afghan, and the strongest of a Barakzai—the capacity for lying—would be merely to repeat an old story: the lies might contain in them a germ of truth shining out as a silent protest against the mass of falsehood; and many of these germs have, after careful nursing, borne such fruit, that very tangible results have been arrived at. In spite of the religious antipathy always manifested by Mussulmans against Christians, increased a thousandfold when it is thought a Mussulman’s life is in danger; in the face of a strong feeling against the restoration of a Barakzai Amir on the one hand, and of the feudal reverence shown towards the dynasty on the other; in silent but cautious calculation of those opposing influences, the Commission felt its way forward. Such men as professed friendship for us were invited to tell us all they knew, and that all seemed so little that it was disheartening to listen to it; such others as were Yakub Khan’s faithful followers were asked to give their version of events, and their garbled stories were just as disappointing. Towards the close of the inquiry, however, there was more tangible matter to be used as a lever by which to force disclosures; and I believe that such fair evidence as will fully justify Yakub Khan’s deportation to India was obtained. That it will justify more I cannot venture to hope, and I must guard myself against misconception by saying that officially no sign has been given as to the conclusions of the Commission. There are inferences which observant men cannot fail to draw from little episodes in a camp-life so limited as this, and the rigorous attention paid to the safe- keeping of Yakub Khan is but one in a string of collateral circumstances which have been interesting us since the Proclamation in the Bala Hissar and the arrest of the Wazir and his fellow- ministers. We may be all wrong in our surmises as to what will occur: there is only the charmed circle of three, who have had to shape the conclusions now before the Government of India, in which speculation may be safe; but we believe in our prescience, and are proportionately happy. The final decision on so important a step as the punishment of a sovereign supposed to have been guilty of treachery—whether of the blackest kind, or merely of the nature
- 29. arising from pusillanimity and indecision—must rest with the highest authorities; and if we were tempted to chafe at our helplessness in having the knowledge of all that has transpired withheld from us, we should be consoled at once by the thought that it is the voice of the Government alone which can pronounce the final sentence. That the Commission will have spoken freely, and not have shrunk from any startling conclusions it may have been driven to, I am fully convinced—they are not the men for half measures who have composed it—and in the full expectation that their recommendations will be carried out, even if the end is more than usually bitter, all of us who have sojourned before Cabul since we camped on Siah Sung Ridge, on 8th October, are content to rest until everything is made known. The latest arrivals in Camp are Mahomed Syud, Governor of Ghazni, and Faiz Mahomed, the Afghan General, whose name became so familiar when Sir Neville Chamberlain’s Mission was turned back in the Khyber. Faiz Mahomed was then in command at Ali Musjid, and his interview with Cavagnari just below the fortress is matter of history. He does not seem to have shared in the rebellion, and his adherence to Yakub Khan was never shaken. Mahomed Syud was compelled to leave Ghazni, as he found himself powerless to control the local moollahs, who have been preaching a jehad on their own account, and have gathered together several thousand tribesmen from the villages in the district. There are but few trained sepoys in their ranks, and, although they have made the road between Ghazni and the more northern districts very unsafe, their efforts are too insignificant to be at present seriously regarded. 21st November. “Nae, nae! I’ll nae fa’ out till I’ve washed ma’ hands in th’ Caspian!” These were the words, not of any veteran soldier looking forward to crossing bayonets with the Russians, but of a plucky little drummer boy, of the 92nd Highlanders, when toiling painfully along the road to Cabul. The lad had his heart in the right place at any rate; and if the strength of an army is to be judged by its marching
- 30. powers, we have rare material in our ranks. It is a long cry from Cabul to the Caspian; but the drummer boy may have many years of soldiering before him; and if ever the Gordon Highlanders form up on the shores of Russia’s inland sea, to that boy should belong the honour of leading the van. But we are only at Cabul, and it now seems beyond doubt that we shall not advance any further this year. The winter has come down upon us with a suddenness that we little expected from the mildness of the last season; and 20° of frost have warned us that bivouacking out would be nearly impossible for well- clad soldiers, and would be certain death to hundreds of camp- followers. The news of the disturbances on the Ghazni Road may, perhaps, call forth the remark, that after Cabul had been captured, and the country around cowed into order, a rapid march to Ghazni should have been ordered. There is much virtue in sudden and striking displays of force in an enemy’s country, particularly when the enemy is disorganized by defeat, and is debating as to the possibility of waging guerilla warfare. But there are considerations which must override even rapidity of action, and the first of these is the provision of supplies on which an army can subsist when far removed from its base of action. Cabul was practically in our possession on the 9th of October, though the formal march into the Bala Hissar did not take place until three days later; and our cavalry and spies had shown us that no organized resistance was being prepared within many miles of the capital. The rebel regiments had melted away; the city people were cowering in abject submission; and the local tribes had seen that their day had not come and were once more in their homesteads, nursing their wrath and their jhezails until the Kafirs should be delivered into their hands. Sir. F. Roberts was at this time quite cut off from India, so far as a connected line of communication went; the Shutargardan post was the only link between Cabul and Kurram, and that was beset by an army of hill- men. From that direction he might hope, by relieving the garrison, to get one convoy through; but beyond that point he could not go. The great height of the Shutargardan Pass precluded all hope of keeping troops there during the winter. He had come from Ali Kheyl with but a few days’ provisions; and it was plain that, unless supplies came
- 31. by way of the Khyber, the army must rely upon the country for food for its 18,000 soldiers and followers. That one might have reasonably expected a long string of baggage animals to be moving westwards from Peshawur at the end of October did not seem so preposterous as men with General Bright’s column would now have us believe. To say that Peshawur was swept clean of all transport animals for Kurram, is begging the question. The Kurram Valley Force was only half-equipped when it began the advance upon Cabul, and northern India still held many thousands of mules, donkeys, camels, and their kind. We hoped that some of the energy our own Commander had shown would have been displayed in the “Army of the Indus,” and that a few troops at least would have kept pace with us, or, say, have moved on a parallel line five marches in rear. If this had been done, and a well-equipped brigade of 2,500 men had been pushed forward to Jugdulluck, the massing of 12,000 men in rear might have been postponed—for a few months, say,— and some of the transport (swallowed up by regiments who will never be wanted west of Peshawur) then liberated. But to look to the Khyber for supplies was soon found to be an expensive amusement. The troops would starve before a seer of atta or grain passed Jumrood. We could live from hand-to-mouth for a week or two; but there were the four months of winter to be thought of; and it became merely a question of arithmetic whether a brigade strong enough to march to Ghazni could be spared, with all its equipment of baggage animals and followers, and at the same time four months’ supplies could be bought up and swept into our Camp by those left behind at Cabul. There seemed just a chance of this being done, if our broken reed in the Jellalabad Valley could be propped fairly straight for a few weeks. The work of collecting grain, forage, and all other supplies, was begun in earnest; and we resigned ourselves to hard labour until the troops from the Shutargardan should come in, and our communications viâ Jugdulluck be well established. Expeditions to Kohistan and Ghazni were looked upon as certain of accomplishment in the near future. We knew that Jellalabad had been occupied by the advanced brigade of General Bright’s force on October 12th, and it was only sixty miles from that
- 32. post to the point beyond Jugdulluck, where they would join hands with the Cabul Army. The end of October would surely see them within a few marches of us. But it had been apparent from the first that drag-ropes were upon the “Army of the Indus,” and that every tug forward made by Brigadier Charles Gough was responded to by a double tug behind. The end of the month came; the convoys from the Shutargardan were well on their way, the troops under Brigadier Hugh Gough had also started; and the Jugdulluck route seemed about to be opened. On 1st November Brigadier Macpherson was at Butkhak, and four days later he shook hands with General Bright at Kata Sung. Then it was decided at head-quarters here that a force should visit Ghazni. The mass of our supplies were being stored away in Sherpur; General Macpherson could march his brigade back after garrisoning Luttabund and Butkhak; Cabul would not be denuded of troops; and from Sherpur to Peshawur the road would be guarded by an overwhelming force. But the programme went all wrong: the broken reed, after being straightened for twenty-four hours, failed us. The Khyber advanced brigade had no supplies; General Macpherson had to cross into Tagao to feed his force; and we, in Sherpur, saw the 15th November—the day fixed for our departure for Ghazni—come and go, and still the army remained stationary. The weather, too—an element that can never be despised in our calculations in a semi-barren country like Afghanistan—had punished our delay by declaring against us. Snow and sleet fell in and around Cabul, and no man knew when the next storm might come. So the Ghazni expedition fell through; and if the ruffians who are now trying to make capital out of our failure to visit the place, succeed in their efforts to cry a jehad, the blame for any mischief that may ensue cannot be thrown upon the Cabul Army, but upon the short-sighted policy which could leave it to its own resources, while nominally moving a supporting force in a parallel line in order to secure its alternative communications. Foreign military critics have reflected severely upon the want of skill shown in the plan of the campaign, and have condemned the rashness of the Shutargardan- Cabul advance, without support from the Khyber. But the supports were said to be there, and General Roberts could not know that they
- 33. would be steadily kept back, and would be unable to take up their share of the alternative road a month after he had captured the position they were both supposed to be converging upon. Supports which travel at the rate of two or three miles a day are worse than useless. When it is considered what the numerical strength of the Khyber supporting column is, one cannot understand the timidity of the advance. There may have been tribes in front, in flank, and in rear; but so there were on the Shutargardan route, and tribes far more capable of mischief than Afridis and Shinwaris. Yet the menace at Budesh Kheyl, Ali Kheyl, the Shutargardan, and on either flank at Charasia, did not check the forward movement of an army half the strength of that supposed to have been put in motion from Peshawur simultaneously with the advance from the Kurram side. Looking at General Bright’s force at the end of October, we find that, inclusive of troops at Nowshera and Peshawur, he had under his orders over 16,000 men, viz., British troops: 148 officers and 4,287 men; Native troops: 147 British officers and 11,795 men. These included five batteries of artillery and one mountain battery, and six cavalry regiments, three British and three Native. Out of the total, two batteries were in Peshawur; and there must also be subtracted the following regiments, which had not crossed the old frontier:— 11th Bengal Lancers (356), part of the 17th Bengal Cavalry (338), 1- 17th Foot (443), 1-25th (715), part of 51st (209), 1st Native Infantry (774), 22nd Native Infantry (638), and 39th Native Infantry (609). Deducting all these, there was left a force of 11,800 men actually moving on, or garrisoning the Peshawur-Gundamak line; supports equal, it might have been supposed, to any work required of them. That there were conflicting ideas as to the object with which such a body of troops had been sent from India, must have been apparent even to a superficial observer; but upon whom the responsibility of playing with such an army rests, no one here pretends to say. The local rank of Lieutenant-General, which has at last been given to Sir F. Roberts, brings these 11,800 men under his command, and their future movements are likely to be directed in sympathy with the advanced army at Cabul. For the next few months they will probably
- 34. be required to do little more than keep the road; but during the winter their transport equipment and commissariat arrangements— defects in which are said to have been the chief cause of their tardy movements—will have to be so far put on a footing of efficiency that, if the necessity arises in the spring for the Cabul Army continuing its march westwards, they will be able to keep pace with its movements. There are good men and tried soldiers enough in the Khyber Force to do all that is required, if they are allowed scope for their energies, and are not trammelled and crippled at every step by those influences in the background, which I have already described as being “drag-ropes” upon their freedom of action. General Roberts has now in his command—that of Eastern Afghanistan—two divisions of 8,000, and 11,800 men, respectively: in all, nearly 20,000 troops, whose movements he controls from his headquarters at Sherpur. Matters of detail on the Khyber side are left, as before, to local commanders. I have dwelt at length upon the shortcomings of the Peshawur column, not so much because very serious results have followed its laggard advance, but as showing how helpless the small force here would have been if, in case of a check, it had looked for support to “the Army of the Indus.” General Macpherson’s brigade returned to Sherpur cantonments yesterday, having left at Luttabund 300 of the 23rd Pioneers and half the 28th Punjab Native Infantry. Before the brigade marched in, a strong body of troops had been warned for service, their destination being the district of Maidan, twenty-five miles distant on the Ghazni Road, where large supplies of grain and bhoosa are said to have been collected for us by the sirdars employed to purchase it on our account. Over 100,000 maunds of bhoosa are still wanted to complete our winter supply; and as the villagers have not sufficient carriage to bring in their supplies so long a distance, we must needs go out ourselves. Every available baggage animal will be employed for the next week or ten days in carrying in this forage; and as there are rumours innumerable of gatherings on the Ghazni Road further south, it has been determined to run no risk with reference to our valuable mules and yaboos. A string of between 2,000 and 3,000 animals needs to be well protected, and the brigade which marched
- 35. out this morning under General Baker was therefore very strong. It was made up as follows:—500 of the 92nd Highlanders; 400 of the 3rd Sikhs; 400 of the 5th Punjab Infantry; two guns, G-3, Royal Artillery; four guns Kohat Mountain Battery; one squadron 9th Lancers, two squadrons 5th Punjab Cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th Bengal Lancers. The display of so large a force half-way to Ghazni is sure to have an excellent effect upon the surrounding country. Sir F. Roberts rides out to-morrow to join General Baker at Maidan. A Divisional order was issued to-night, directing the public reading of an order of the Commander-in-Chief dismissing Subadar Mahomed Karim Khan, 1st Punjab Infantry, from the service for having failed in his duty to the Queen-Empress on the occasion of the attack upon the Residency. This man is a Logari, and was on furlough at Cabul in September. On the morning of the outbreak he was in the Residency, and after the lull following the first collision of the Herat troops with the Guides—while the Afghans went for their arms—he was sent with a message to the Amir by Sir Louis Cavagnari. This he does not seem to have delivered with the spirit that might have been expected from a soldier in our service; and afterwards, when Gholam Nubbi, Cavagnari’s chuprasse, found money and horses for him to carry the news of the disaster to the British Camp at Ali Kheyl, he behaved in a dastardly way. He changed clothes with Gholam Nubbi and started out, but only went as far as Beni Hissar. There he stayed for two days, and then returned to Cabul, where he hid himself for five days in the Kizilbash quarter. Afterwards he quietly made his way to his own village; and, upon our troops appearing at Kushi, came into camp and told some wonderful stories of what he had done. These were afterwards proved to be false, and the Military Commission when trying prisoners found that his conduct had been really that of a poltroon. They recommended his dismissal from the service, and he has now been summarily discharged, all arrears of pay being forfeited. This is another striking instance of the shifty and untrustworthy nature of our Pathan soldiers, for Karim Khan was an old native officer.
- 36. Camp Maidan, Ghazni Road, 24th November. The Lieutenant-General Commanding is now out on a visit to the force under Brigadier-General Baker, which is collecting supplies of forage from the villages along the Ghazni Road. Leaving Brigadier- General Macpherson in command at Sherpur, Sir F. Roberts, accompanied by his personal Staff and Colonel Macgregor, Chief of the Staff, with a small escort of ten men of the 14th Bengal Lancers, rode through the Cabul gorge on the afternoon of the 22nd, and, following the road which traverses the Chardeh Valley, made for the village of Argandeh, about sixteen miles away. The Chardeh Valley, which we passed through, gave evidence on all sides of that fertility which has earned for it the name of the “Garden of Cabul;” but it is so late in the year that only autumn tints mark the fields on either side. Here and there the young wheat is shooting up, but the small green blades are scarcely strong enough to do more than chequer the general area of brownness. The long lines of willows and poplars which line the hundreds of watercourses threading the valley, are mere skeletons of trees; their leaves rustling down in eddying circles as the cold wind sweeps blusteringly from the snowy tops of the Pughman Hills. The valley is shut in on all sides by high mountain ranges, the hills which guard Cabul from approach on the west seeming to rise perpendicularly from the plain. The range above Indikee village is overtopped by the sheer cliffs which dominate the plain between Zahidabad and Charasia, and these are already covered with snow, which gleams out in startling whiteness above the barren rocks in the foreground. Far away to the north lies the Hindu Kush, with its long undulating sky-line similarly snow-laden, the lower intermediate hills of Kohistan being still mere brown masses jostling each other in grand confusion. Looking towards Bamian the view is bounded scarcely ten miles away by the Pughman spur, which boasts of several lofty peaks rising in sullen grandeur from the hills about Argandeh. For fully twelve miles, or about as far as Kila Kazi, the road is an extremely good one; stones, the curse of Afghanistan, being few and far between. After this the dry bed of a snow-fed stream has frequently to be crossed or followed, and boulders are not uncommon. Guns, however, could be
- 37. got along without much trouble, and if necessary a new track on a higher level, across the cultivated land, could be laid out. The road ascends gradually the whole way, and when near Argandeh a kotal is gained, about a mile and a half across and two or three miles long. It is now a bare plain without tree or shrub, but for the most part is under cultivation, the fields of course lying fallow during the winter. To the right or north the hills are rather precipitous, and in a sheltered curve at their base the village of Argandeh lies. It is fully a mile from the road, and all about it are terraced fields said to yield magnificent crops of wheat and barley. The high pitch to which irrigation attains in Afghanistan is strikingly exemplified in this district, the water-channels being so arranged that the distribution of the water is admirable. Sir Frederick Roberts rested for the night at Argandeh, and yesterday morning rode on to Maidan. Striking the Ghazni Road a mile from Argandeh, we followed its course over the kotal and soon began to descend. The hills on either side were as bare as any in Afghanistan, and the plain between them was only partially cultivated. After about four miles a chowki (watch-tower) was reached on a little rise, and looking to the south we saw the district of Maidan stretching before us. It is a beautiful valley, landlocked on every side, the Cabul river running through it about a mile from the foot of the western hills. The valley must be at least four miles across; and, with the exception of low rolling downs, covered with stones and rocks, for about a mile on its eastern flank is as flat as its name, Maidan (open plain), implies. Twenty or thirty walled enclosures and villages on the banks of the Cabul stream stand out from amid poplars, willows, and plane trees, which fringe the banks of the sparkling little river, and for many square miles nothing is seen but endless corn-fields, each with its little boundary of mud, along which the water slowly wanders as it does its work of irrigation. The road falls rapidly from the chowki, and a few hundred yards below bifurcates, the main route to Ghazni going straight to the south over the rolling downs I have mentioned, and a bridle- path leading down to the villages of the plain. General Baker’s camp is pitched at Naure Falad, two miles from the chowki, down in the
- 38. plain near the first of the fortified enclosures, its rear being guarded by a high rocky ridge. From the summit of this a splendid view of Maidan is obtained, and the extraordinary fertility of the valley fully appreciated. To the west the ridge runs sharply down into the plain, and the valley is there narrowed to half a mile, but it opens out again to the north among the hills. The main road to Bamian, which strikes off from the Ghazni Road before the chowki in the kotal is reached, runs across this part of the valley and enters the Ispekhawk Pass, a few miles further on. Yesterday afternoon a small party of cavalry were fired upon in the Darra Narkh, a valley running in the Bamian direction, and to-day Bahadur Khan, who was responsible for the action, and who is known to be harbouring Afghan soldiers, has been visited and punished. He had already given much trouble. General Baker, since his arrival in Maidan, has found much difficulty in inducing the maliks of the villages of the district to bring in corn and bhoosa. They have given the tribute grain and forage readily enough, but have evaded furnishing the amount we required in addition to this. Every maund was paid for at a forced rate, which, I may state, was far higher than the normal prices; but the village headmen hung back, and, though profuse in promises, made but little effort to meet our wants. Several of them were very insolent in their bearing, and no doubt thought to worry us out by their procrastination. But General Baker is not the stamp of man to have his orders disobeyed, and by confining some of the maliks to the camp for a few days, he had gradually brought them to their senses. One malik, however, trusting to the obscure valley in which he lived, wherein Europeans had never been known to penetrate, was obstinate. This was Bahadur Khan, whose fort is about eight miles from the Maidan villages, along the branch road which leads to Bamian. He not only refused to sell any of his huge store of grain and forage, but insolently declined to come into camp. He was known to have great influence among the tribesmen in his neighbourhood, and it was reported that some sepoys of the Ardal regiments were living under his protection. When Sir F. Roberts heard of the contumacy of this malik, he agreed with General Baker that it would be well to fetch him in by force, and
- 39. at the same time to arrest any sepoys found in his villages. To accomplish this double object the cavalry were sent out yesterday, with the result already stated, that they were fired upon by a large body of men, including some 200 sepoys armed with Sniders. It was necessary to make an example of Bahadur Khan, and at the same time to break up the tribal gathering, which, if left alone, might grow to serious proportions. Our foraging parties would probably have been roughly handled in scattered villages, all of which boast of towers and fortified enclosures, if the rumour had been allowed to circulate that our cavalry had been driven back. Tents having been struck at daybreak, the baggage of the force was packed up and placed within a fort near the Cabul river, under a guard of 300 men, drawn equally from the 92nd Highlanders, 3rd Sikhs, and 5th Punjab Infantry, with a squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers and a troop of the 9th Lancers. The two guns of 9-3[prev G- 3], R.H.A., were also left behind, as the road to the villages was known to be difficult for wheeled guns. The troops which marched out were 400 of the 92nd, 300 of the 3rd Sikhs, 300 of the 5th N.I., a troop of the 9th Lancers, a squadron of the 14th B.L., and four guns of the Kohat Mountain Battery. General Baker was in command of this compact little column, which was not encumbered with transport animals, as a rapid march was intended. Sir F. Roberts, with Colonel Macgregor, also rode out with his personal escort. It was bitterly cold in the early morning, and all but the swiftest running streams were coated over with ice. The troops carried with them one day’s cooked provisions, but were otherwise in light marching order. A point was made for a little to the south-west, where the Darra Narkh stream falls into the Cabul river, and then a due westerly course was followed up the narrow valley through which the former stream runs. The usual mountainous country was seen on either hand, high hills closing down on the valley, and presenting treeless slopes barren of all verdure. The two rivers had to be crossed by fords, and the men went through the icy-cold water as carelessly as if wading a stream in summer. The sepoys stripped off their putties, and made light of the floating ice which barked their shins, while the Highlanders in their kilts seemed rather to enjoy the
- 40. bracing cold. The road was fairly well-defined and ran through cultivated fields, with an occasional fortified homestead or country villa relieving the monotony of the landscape. Information was brought from time to time of the movements of Bahadur Khan, it being at first stated that he had 2,000 or 3,000 men ready to meet us. About seven miles from the camp the road was commanded by a high ridge on the left, and beyond this, we were told, lay the open valley in which the cavalry had been attacked. This ridge was at its highest point 800 or 1,000 feet above the roadway, and on the previous evening had been lined with men. Now it appeared quite deserted, and the cavalry swept round it and waited in a friendly village until the infantry could come up. A local malik volunteered the news that Bahadur Khan and his followers had taken all their movable property away during the night and had fled to the hills. When the Lancers first appeared round the ridge and pushed forward into the horseshoe-shaped valley, they saw fifty or sixty men on some low hills to the north, a gunshot from Bahadur Khan’s chief fort; and as these moved down the slopes, it seemed probable that a body of tribesmen might be lying hidden behind the crests. Possibly the Ghilzais expected that only cavalry were again about to pay them a visit, and were emboldened to come to the lower levels. As soon as the advanced company of the Highlanders appeared on the road, the “enemy,” if fifty are worthy of the name, drew off hurriedly to the highest hill, a couple of miles distant, and watched our movements. General Baker directed one company of the 92nd to advance in skirmishing order, and occupy a rocky hill overlooking Bahadur Khan’s fort, and commanding it at 700 or 800 yards, and sent a company of Sikhs round to the north, with orders to drive out any men who might be occupying the lower hills. It was soon seen that the place was quite deserted, and not a shot was fired from any of the hills. The whole valley lay before us dotted over with fortified homesteads, surrounded by grain-fields already green with sprouting corn. It seemed wonderfully fertile, and extended over many square miles; other and smaller valleys penetrating between the hills wherever there was a break in their continuous line. The exact extent of these minor valleys could not be estimated, but native
- 41. report stated that the fertility was equal to that of the rich plain stretching away to the north-west for five or six miles. When it was seen that no opposition was to be offered, the Sikhs doubled down upon the fort from the low hills above it, and at the same time another company raced across the fields from the southern entrance to the valley, all being anxious to be in “at the loot.” It was a pretty sight watching the sepoys doubling along and spreading out as the fort and the village near it were gained. Clouds of dust with the gleam of lance-heads shining out soon arose further to the left in the heart of the valley, showing where the cavalry were galloping off to more distant homesteads. All Bahadur Khan’s villages, some ten in number, were marked down to be looted and burnt, and Sikhs and sowars were quickly engaged in the work. The houses were found stored with bhoosa, straw, firewood, and twigs for the winter as well as a small quantity of corn, and as there was not time to clear this out, and we could not afford to leave a force for the night in such a dangerous position so near to the hills, orders were given to fire the villages and destroy the houses and their contents. No better men than Sikhs could he found for such work, and in a few minutes Bahadur Khan’s villages were in flames, and volumes of dense black smoke pouring over the valley, a high wind aiding the fire with frantic earnestness. The villagers had carried off all their portable property, not even a charpoy remaining, but the Sikhs ransacked every place for hidden treasure, and smashed down the earthen corn-bins in hope of gaining a prize. These corn-bins seemed quite a feature of every house. They are three or four feet square and made of sun-dried clay, often fancifully ornamented with scroll-work. They stand on a raised platform in the living-room, and have near the bottom a small hole in which a piece of rag is stuffed. This answers to the tap of a barrel, for when the rag is withdrawn the grain pours out, and the daily supply can he drawn just as we would draw a tankard of beer in an English farm-house. Indian corn, from which rich chupaties (unleavened cakes) are made, is chiefly stored in this way, and near the bins stand the grinding-stones, at which the women of the house prepare the flour for the household. Generally an adjoining room is turned into a kitchen, the earthen floor being
- 42. skilfully burrowed to form ovens, and round holes cut out on which to place the dekchies which serve for Afghan pots and kettles. Such of the rooms as I went into were dark and dirty enough, small square holes in the walls serving as windows, and the roofs being made up of thick logs laid a foot apart, and covered over with twigs, on which a foot of mud had been plastered. The Sikhs fired house after house, and every room was soon converted into a huge reverberating furnace, the fire having no means of escape through the roofs, which were very strong. Nearly all the houses were two- storied, with narrow wooden or mud staircases, and many a sepoy in his haste first fired the lower rooms, stored with wood or bhoosa, and then rushed upstairs intent on loot, soon to be driven down again by the smoke and flames from below. The search after household goods was varied by exciting chases after the fowls, ducks, and donkeys of the village. Sikhs and kahars, who had come up with the dandies (stretchers for wounded men), scrambled over housetops, and through blinding smoke, to capture the dearly-prized moorgie, while below an unoffending donkey would be chased frantically round awkward corners and over frozen watercourses, where pursuers and pursued alike came to grief. A donkey when captured was laden with such little loot as the men thought worth while carrying off. Each fowl had its neck wrung on the spot, was thrown into a convenient bit of fire in some blazing house, and having been singed clean of its feathers, was cooked in a few minutes, and eaten with infinite enjoyment. The cavalry were fortunate enough to secure fifty sheep and a few cows, which were driven to camp. After two or three hours had been spent in firing the various villages owned by Bahadur Khan, the order to fall in for the homeward march was given, and leaving the valley draped in smoke and the fire still working its will, the troops filed off for Maidan. They reached camp by evening, having marched seventeen miles over difficult ground and through half-frozen streams without mishap. As the rear-guard left, a few men appeared on the heights of the north and fired a few shots at long ranges, but these were merely in bravado.[27] We could learn nothing of the body of tribesmen and the 200 sepoys, and it is believed they have dispersed. The punishment
- 43. of Bahadur Khan will have a great effect upon the whole district of Maidan, as it will show the maliks that they are not safe from our troops even in their most obscure valleys. General Baker remains in the neighbourhood of Maidan until next week, all the available transport animals from Sherpur being now engaged in carrying to our cantonments the large quantities of corn and bhoosa collected. Our winter supply of forage seems likely to be assured. CHAPTER XIV. Deportation of Yakub Khan to India—Review of his Reign—The Scene on the Morning of December 1st—Precautions along the Road to Jugdulluck— Strengthening of the Posts—Tribal Uneasiness about Cabul—Attitude of the Kohistanis—General Baker’s Brigade ordered to Sherpur—The State of Afghan Turkistan—Its Effect upon Kohistan—Gholam Hyder and his Army—The Extent of his Power—Return of his disbanded Regiments to their Homes in Kohistan —Our Policy towards the Afghans—Failure of the Attempt to conciliate the People—Modifications necessary—Murder of our Governor of Maidan. Sherpur, 1st December. The ex-Amir of Afghanistan, Sirdar Yakub Khan, is now well on his way to India: the order for his deportation having been carried out so silently and quickly that, while I am writing, the majority of men in Sherpur cantonments are ignorant of his departure. As I ventured to predict in forwarding the news of the close of the Commission of Inquiry, Yakub Khan’s fate is that of an exile to India; but even now we are in the dark here as to whether he will be treated as a State prisoner, and allowed to live in luxurious comfort, or will be sent to the Andamans, to drag out his life as a common malefactor. If the latter, it will be an ignoble ending of a career which in its earlier stages promised such brilliant achievements. Yakub Khan was once the first soldier in Afghanistan, but from the evil moment when he
- 44. confided in the word of his father, his fame was at an end. Five years’ captivity—and such captivity as only Shere Ali could devise— broke his spirit, dulled his intellect, and left him the weak incapable we treated with at Gundamak, and confided in so blindly until the fatal week in September. That under fairer auspices he might have proved a strong ruler, such as the Afghans require, can scarcely admit of a doubt; that he would have been a Dost Mahomed even his most ardent admirers would hesitate to assert. The conditions of government in a country like Afghanistan compel the sovereign either to be a tyrant or the tool of factions: Yakub Khan, during his few months of power, was the latter. His accession to the throne took place under circumstances to cope with which, even in the prime of his manhood before imprisonment had crippled him, would have taxed his power to the uttermost. After five years in a dungeon he was suddenly liberated by his father, only to find that father in the last stage of defeat and despair, his kingdom practically at the mercy of a powerful invader, and himself a panic-stricken fugitive. Left first as Shere Ali’s regent, Yakub Khan could do nothing beyond watch, with Oriental submission to fate, the advance of the two invading armies up the Jellalabad and Kurram Valleys. The help which Shere Ali expected to receive from his Russian friends over the Oxus was not forthcoming; in a few weeks came the news of the death of the Amir at Mazar-i-Sharif, and Yakub found himself in possession of a kingdom already tottering to its fall. If he had had the energy of Dost Mahomed he might have organized armies, called upon the semi-barbarous tribes still lying between Cabul and India to join his soldiers in a holy war, and make a supreme effort to check the invasion which had driven his father from the capital. But that energy was lacking; he made but a faint-hearted appeal to the fanaticism of the hill-tribes, and, unsupported as this was by any real attempt to collect the scattered units of Shere Ali’s once-powerful army, it necessarily failed. Nothing was left to him but negotiation; and, thanks to the clemency of the enemy to whom he was opposed, he was granted terms which, in his position, he could scarcely have hoped to gain. He allied himself with the most powerful State in Asia, and the safety of his kingdom was assured
- 45. against all foreign aggression. If he had been a tyrant to his subjects, and thoroughly determined to make his will their law, the reception in his capital of an Embassy from the Power with which he was allied would have been fraught with no danger either to himself or to the Ambassador. But he had not the strength of tyranny sufficient to control the factions of which he was a mere tool, and it seems only too probable that he gradually drifted from his first position of sincerity towards his new allies, to that of a timid spectator of intrigues against the alliance. His weakness and vacillation could not check the danger that was growing so formidable, and, when the final outbreak came, his personal influence was even unequal to saving the life of the man who had trusted so implicitly in his good faith. That Yakub desired the death of Sir Louis Cavagnari we do not believe; that he had been led, insidiously, by men about him to coincide in the view that the Embassy should be forced to leave may be readily credited. And once that Embassy had been destroyed, there is only too much reason to suppose that he was inclined to parley with the men who had brought about its destruction, and to listen to their plausible reasoning that what had been done was irrevocable. The access of personal fear, which drove him to seek safety in the British camp, no more excuses him of responsibility for his acts of omission or commission, than does the voluntary surrender of a murderer condone the crime he has committed. So far as human canons are concerned, repentance cannot blot out guilt, however much it may modify judgment: the supreme quality of mercy is impossible under ordinary conditions of life. Taking the most pitiful estimate of Yakub Khan’s offence, putting aside the idea even of participation in the views of the men who wished him to break the engagements to which he stood pledged, there is the one unpardonable crime still clinging to him—that he stood by, and made no sign, while the lives of men were sacrificed which should have been sacred to him, even according to the narrow creed of the fanatics who surrounded him. His own words, when refusing the help that was so dearly needed, rise up against him when he appeals to our forbearance: “It is not to be done.” Perhaps, hereafter, the same answer may be given when
- 46. we are asked to preserve the integrity of a country which has always repaid friendship with falsehood, trust with treachery. From the 28th of October until his departure for India this morning, Yakub Khan had been a close prisoner in our camp, the tent in which he was confined being always strongly guarded, and no one beyond our own officers being allowed access to him. The monotony and solitude have told upon him, of course, and he is now thinner and more worn than when he first took refuge with General Baker at Kushi. Before the closing day of the inquiry he was contented and placid enough; but of late he has displayed some anxiety as to his probable fate, the irksomeness of the restraint under which he was placed having, no doubt, largely contributed to this. He could hear all the busy life in camp about him, but was as much shut out from it as if a prisoner again in the Bala Hissar. The bayonets of the sentries who quartered the ground day and night about his tent were a barrier beyond which he could not pass. The departure for India, Malta, or London, which he had expressed himself so willing to undertake nearly two months ago, must have seemed to him hopeless, even so late as six o’clock last night, when Major Hastings, Chief Political Officer, paid his usual visit to the tent, then guarded by fifty men of the 72nd Highlanders. Major Hastings said nothing of the orders which had been received from the Government, as it had been resolved to give as short a notice as possible of the intended journey, for fear of complications on the road to Peshawur. Not that it was at all likely an effort would be made to rouse the tribes to attempt a rescue, but that nothing was to be gained by an open parade of the departure. At eight o’clock Major Hastings sent word to Yakub Khan that he intended paying him a second visit; and, accompanied by Mr. H. M. Durand, Political Secretary to the Lieutenant-General, he again went to the tent. Yakub Khan was a little astonished at the unusual hour chosen for the visit; but when told that he would have to leave Cabul for India at six o’clock the next morning, he kept his composure admirably. He expressed surprise that such short notice should be given, but beyond this did not question the arrangements. He asked that his father-in-law, Yahiya Khan, and two other sirdars now in
- 47. confinement should be released and allowed to accompany him. This, of course, could not be granted, and he then asked to what place in India he was to be taken, and where the Viceroy was. This was all the concern he showed. The orders received here are to convey him safely to Peshawur; so but little information as to his final resting-place could be vouchsafed him. I may here incidentally mention that he will probably go on to Umritsar or Lahore, where, perhaps, the decision of the Government will be made known to him. All the arrangements for the journey had been carefully made beforehand. There were, this morning, at Butkhak, the 12th Punjab Cavalry, and between that post and Sei Baba 400 of the 72nd Highlanders, 300 of the 23rd Pioneers, and a wing of the 28th Punjab Infantry; while the convoy of sick and wounded, with its escort, was between Kata Sung and Jugdulluck. The escort from Sherpur was simply two squadrons of cavalry drawn from the 9th Lancers and 5th Punjab Cavalry, under the command of Major Hammond, of the latter regiment. Soon after five o’clock this morning the little camp in which the ex-Amir was lodged, not far from head-quarters, was all astir with preparations for the journey. A bright moon was shining overhead and a few watch-fires were blazing brightly among the tents, by the light of which the mules and yaboos were loaded up. The squadron of the 5th Punjab Cavalry drew up outside the gateway which leads from the cantonments near the western end of the southern wall; while the Lancers passed from their lines, opposite the break in the Bemaru Heights, to a bit of open ground between the quarters of the 72nd Highlanders and Yakub Khan’s tent. The early morning air was bitterly cold, and the usual light mist which settles nightly over the Cabul plain still hung about. The camp was silent and deserted, every soldier being at that hour asleep, except the sentries at their posts and the patrols, stalking like armed ghosts from picquet to picquet, seeking for any rabid Kohistani who might have invaded the sanctity of our lines. The Lancers moved smartly round and round in small circles to keep themselves and their horses from freezing as they stood; and through the dust and mist enveloping them their lances shone out
- 48. now and again as the steel-heads caught a glint from the moon. It was a fantastical sight, this endless circling of misty horsemen, moving apparently without aim or object and growing momentarily more and more distinct as dawn began to creep up over the distant Luttabund and Khurd Cabul hills, and struggle with the clear moonlight which had before been supreme. In an hour everything was ready for departure. Yakub Khan’s horses were waiting ready saddled, and the Lancers had ceased their circling, and were formed up waiting for the order to march. Sir Frederick Roberts, Colonel Macgregor, Chief of the Staff, and Major Hastings were present to see the prisoner start on his rapid journey, and at half-past six exactly Yakub Khan rode off surrounded by Lancers. He had exchanged salaams with the General and those about him, and, if not positively elated, was seemingly quite content to leave Cabul. Captain Turner was the Political Officer to whose care he was assigned; and Abdullah Khan, son of the Nawab Gholam Hussein, was the native officer in attendance. His four body servants and a favourite attendant, Abdul Kayun, who had been released at the last moment, rode with the escort. No notice was given beforehand to his servants; and when the royal cooks heard that they were to start for India, they abandoned their master and took refuge in the city. They were afterwards sought out and sent on to Luttabund, the halting-place for the night, as the comfort of Yakub Khan is to be strictly considered. The news of the departure soon spread through Cabul, and the Mussulman population, according to a Hindu informant, are greatly depressed and uneasy. They are now convinced that the Durani dynasty is at an end; and, while not regretting Yakub personally, they mourn over the fall of that reign of turbulence which they could always carry out in the city under a Barakzai. Double marches are to be made the whole way to Peshawur, where Yakub Khan is expected to arrive in eight days. Part of the Cabul Field Force escort will accompany him to Jugdulluck, where the advanced Khyber Brigade will assume charge, and he will be passed through the various posts until the Punjab Frontier is reached.[28] His son, the so-called heir-apparent, remains here, as
- 49. well as the members of his harem, who will be pensioned and properly cared for by the British authorities. During the past few days reports have come in of growing uneasiness among various sections of the tribes about Cabul, and these culminated yesterday in the news that the Kohistanis had actually risen, and were at Khoja Serai, on the Charikar Road. They were said to have cooked three days’ food, and to meditate attacking Sherpur on the last day of the moon. From the Luttabund direction also it was reported that the Safis of Tagao and the hillmen west of Jugdulluck were also meditating mischief, though beyond gathering together in small bands they had not made open demonstration of hostility. The change in the attitude of the Kohistanis has warned us that it is idle to expect a peaceful quiet among men who have always been unruly and turbulent. The sections which will probably give us most trouble now and in the future are—the Wardaks inhabiting the country about the Ghazni Road, who may drag in the Logaris, the Safis of Tagao, and the Kohistanis. With the two former we have already come into collision; General Macpherson having ventured into Tagao in search of supplies, while General Baker on a similar mission at Maidan has had to burn Beni-Badam in the Wardak country.[29] It is probable that both Safis and Wardaks will seek hereafter to have their revenge; but in the meantime we shall not trouble them further, as we have the Kohistanis to deal with. Kohistan lies due north of Cabul between the Pughman, a spur of the Hindu Kush, and Tagao, and includes the upper valley of the Panjshir River, which stretches away north-east from Charikar, the most important town in the province. The lower portion of Kohistan is known as the Koh-Daman (Mountain Skirt), and is the district renowned for its vineyards and orchards, from which Cabul is largely supplied with fruit. It is fertilized by innumerable streams running down from the Pughman mountains, and uniting to form a river, which, turned to the north by ranges of hills facing Pughman, eventually empties itself into the Panjshir on the western border of Tagao. Looking northwards from the Bemaru Heights above Sherpur cantonments, one sees nothing but a mass of hills piled together in picturesque confusion, the foreground being a
- 50. low range running parallel to the narrow swampy lake, which borders the plain from which Bemaru rises. The road from Cabul to Kohistan passes close to Sherpur on the east, crosses the grassy plain, and over the lake on a raised causeway at a point where it is very narrow and shallow, and thence over a low kotal called Paen Minar. Koh-Daman is then fairly entered upon, and the route northwards is as follows:—Paen Minar to Kila Ittafal Khan, six miles; Ittafal Khan to Khoja Serai, five miles; Khoja Serai to Istalif, seven miles; Istalif to Charikar, viâ Isturgehteh, thirteen miles; or a total from Paen Minar, four miles from Sherpur, of thirty-one miles. While we were encamped at Siah Sung the Kohistan Chiefs came in and made professions of friendship, which were gladly accepted by General Roberts. They remained with us for several weeks, but were plainly disappointed that no large subsidy was promised to them for their future good behaviour. A Governor, Shahbaz Khan, a Barakzai sirdar who had intermarried with the Kohistanis, was appointed, and was sent to Charikar, his mission being chiefly to furnish supplies for our troops, and to prevent any Chief arrogating to himself power in the province. No sooner do the maliks seem to have returned to their villages than they began to concert measures to annoy us. They gathered armed men together, set at nought Shahbaz Khan, and, as I have said, have been bold enough to declare their intention of attacking Sherpur. That they will do this seems too absurd to believe, unless there is a general combination, but the precaution of building breastworks on the Bemaru Heights has been taken, and yesterday afternoon a small party of cavalry were sent out to reconnoitre past Paen Minar. They saw no signs of any gathering, but still there may be bands of men lurking about. We have but a very small infantry garrison in Sherpur at the present time, as 500 of the 92nd, 400 of the 3rd Sikhs, and 400 of the 5th Punjab Infantry are out in Maidan, while the troops sent to hold the road as far as Jugdulluck on the occasion of Yakub Khan’s journey down are, as already stated, very numerous. General Baker has, therefore, been warned to march to Sherpur with his brigade as rapidly as his foraging arrangements will allow.
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