Contents1) Socratic Logic by Peter Kreefta. The Two L.docx

Contents:
1) Socratic Logic by Peter Kreeft
a. The Two Logics
b. All Logic in Two Pages: An Overview (B)
c. The Three Acts of the Mind (B)
d. The First Act of the Mind: Understanding
e. The Problem of Universals
2) Gene Odening Presentation on the Trivium
a. Discussion on Cognition
b. Discussion on Grammar
I would like to recapitulate some of the concepts that were
discussed at the end of the first logic
saves lives podcast. The first hour was mainly Brett and I
discussing historical topics to present
some context to the narratives we’ve come to study and
understand, but the last half hour we
delved into the most important aspect of the essence of logic
and the rules associated with it. I

had prepared for reviewing and applying the fallacies last week
to the Steve Shives presentations
we’ll be going over in later episodes, but I felt as though I
might’ve lost some people with some of
the concepts presented towards the end of the podcast as I
hadn’t planned to present those in
particular, which created a sort of disharmonious blend of many
different ideas that might be hard
to piece together. I would like to concisely clarify some of
those concepts, as they are vitally
important to understanding what logic is, what the Trivium is,
and how it’s a basic description of
the mind. This short introduction is necessary to understand
what an informal fallacy is, as
concept formation applies directly to the improper usage of
language which creates faulty
arguments. The above table of contents is for further reading
into the concepts I’ll be divulging in
this brief, but substantive description.
The ideas of logic are built upon a foundation of how the mind
processes information. From
observation, we have observed three types of responses to sense
stimuli. The first type would be
called the primary level, that of a direct-sense experience

involving one stimulus and one
automatic response, or reflex, with no attendant memory. An
example would be a doctor testing
out your reflex by applying a mallet against your knee. Your
knee automatically responds to the
stimulus, with no attendant conscious action on your part. The
second level is called the
perceptual level. This involves the first level, but adds a brain
to the nervous system and
subsequently a memory associated with discrete units of
stimulus. This memory allows us to
connect stimulus together in a causal recognition. An example
would be the behavioral
conditioning of animals, whereby which they can respond to a
sound or a gesture through their
sense of hearing or sight, and because of their memory they can
respond, automatically, to the
behavior that has been conditioned based on the stimulus. This
is automatic as well, but has a
level of complexity due to the memory of the stimulus.
The last level is the conceptual level, and builds upon the first
two. This allows us to abstract, from
memory, perceptual instances and differentiate the unique
characteristics associated with a

sensed phenomenon or thing in reality. An example would be
using our five senses to perceive an
apple, and then form a concept that extracts the unique
characteristics that are universal to all
apples, and use a symbol or sound to communicate this abstract
concept to others. This level is
not automatic – it has a degree of freedom often called free will.
Free will is the ability to judge,
accurately or inaccurately, the unique characteristics of a
concept.
Concept formation is the foundation upon which logic is built,
and it’s the beginning of the first
stage of the Trivium, which we call the General Grammar stage.
I mentioned concept formation
mixed in with a host of other concepts that might’ve presented
some confusion to the listeners, so
let me briefly and basically explain why this idea is so
important to logic and the Trivium, and why
this is necessary to understand before we dive into applying
fallacies to the language people use.
Concepts are immaterial ideas. They have no extension in space
and time – you can’t measure it.

They rest upon an interaction of electrochemical machinery and
impulses, but that only allows for
the potential for this phenomenon we call conscious reason, it
doesn’t state what thought we will
have or how our ideas match up with reality or other people’s
thoughts. Concept can be loosely
traced back to the Medieval Latin word conceptum, “draft,
abstract” or classical Latin “(a thing)
conceived”. It comes from the past participle of concipere,
concept, which means “to take in”.
We humans take in stimulus through our five senses, and
through our nervous system and
memory we can abstract, Latin for “to draw from, to drag out
of”, in other words, to extricate or
extract properties, qualities, and characteristics that we observe
from the thing perceived. This is
what means it to form a concept. An example would be the
apple; we can sense certain
characteristics that are in common to many different apples like
colors, shapes, sizes, and tastes.
From this, we can create a concept about what makes an apple.
In order to do that, there are two
properties of concept formation that are critical to philosophy
and classical, Aristotelian logic.

These properties are abstraction and universals.
As I mentioned, to abstract something is Latin for to lift out of,
or to extract from something
characteristics from the thing being perceived. You can think
of it as our mind’s ability to compare
and contrast information to find what makes things alike or
different. From this property, we can
identify what I mentioned in the first podcast as key,
differentiating factors; qualities and
properties that make something truly unique compared to the
other things we perceive in reality.
Those unique characteristics, through abstraction, are called
universals. Universals come from the
Latin uni, one, versal, with respect to many. In other words,
universals are properties and qualities
that can be said about many things that exist. An apple is a
round fruit with red, yellow, or green
skin and firm white flesh. A tree is a plant that has branches,
bark, and a root system. The
following examples can be said about all apples and all trees.
How did I identify those
characteristics? I perceived many different apples and trees,
and I was able to abstract the unique
characteristics that all apples and trees have in common. This

is what we call essence in
Aristotelian logic. We see many different types of apples and
trees, but we don’t see the nature of
the apple or tree, its appleness or treeness. Through
abstraction, we bring all apples and trees
under one concept “apple” or “tree”, held in our mind, and
communicated through language.
What definition does is to take concept formation one step
further and ask you to use multiple
concepts to define new ones. It asks you to define a term,
which is a word or group of words or
phrase that identifies a concept, and asks you to define it using
other concepts. Man is a rational
animal. So we understand the concept man, rational, and animal
all separately. But, when you
combine them together you use multiple concepts to define what
is implied in the concept of
man. In other words, you’re breaking the art of abstraction into
its component parts, like a
physicist reducing a force down to its component parts, to help
identify the characteristics that
make something truly unique and universal. You can think of
it, loosely, as the formula logicians
use to help identify the universal essence to a concept. The way

this is done is by identifying the
genus, or the general characteristics that are in common to man,
in contrast to the specific
difference, or the properties that make man different. In this
case, the genus would be animal,
and the specific difference would be rational. Man is a rational
animal. From this, you can glean
what question this answers, thereby relating it to what category,
in existence, this belongs.
So now we have a very basic understanding of what a concept
is, and how it relies on two
properties to create a concept; abstraction and universals, which
identify the essence of a
concept, and the “formula” used to define concepts (definition
of concept = genus + specific
difference). Once we identify the essence of a concept, the
universal, we tend to group them into
categories based on the unique characteristics of the concept.
In the general grammar stage,
Gene Odening presented a definition of existence, which is
every substance, action, attribute, and
relationship that is, was, or ever will be. This definition relates
to the concepts of existence;

substance is every noun and pronoun, actions are verbs,
attributes are adjectives and adverbs, and
relationships are prepositions and conjunctions. An apple is a
round fruit with red, yellow, or
green skin and firm white flesh. Now, as you continue to break
concepts down, by definition, to
include all of the real, perceivable aspects a thing or entity
might have in existence, you end up
with Aristotle’s ten categories of being. An example would be
the concept of an apple. The apple
is a fruit, but what’s a fruit? A fruit is a seed-bearing structure
that develops from the ovary of a
flowering plant. But what’s a plant? Plants are multicellular
eukaryotes. As you continue to ask
more questions about what something is, you lose
comprehension but gain extension; in other
words the terms have less meaning but apply to more and more
things in reality. Aristotle was the
first to abstract to the most general categories that represent all
real things that exist – abstracted
from sense perception and understood and communicated
through language.
If we go back to the apple example, we can apply the definition
of an apple to the general

categories of being, or the definition of existence. An apple is a
fruit-(substance) with-
(relationship) red-(attribute), yellow-(attribute), or-
(relationship) green-(attribute) skin-
(substance) and-(relationship) firm-(attribute) white-(attribute)
flesh-(substance). This simple
example can be extrapolated to all types of definitions and be
shown to relate to the categories of
reality and the definition of existence.
We have a clear line from how our minds interpret stimulus, to
developing concepts using
abstractions to identify universal essences in things, to
formulating definitions and relating the
most general categories of reality to which all real things
belong and showing how language
relates to those basic categories. This is the total subject of
general grammar. The long, arduous
terminology can be summed up by saying our mind compares
and contrasts information it has
perceived from our five senses, and makes a judgment, through
language, as to what something is
or not. Now, in the general grammar stage your listeners will
be familiar with the 5 W’s + How.

Who, what, where, when, why, and how. These questions
effectively answer to the concepts of
existence by identifying one of the main constituent categories
implied in existence. Similar to the
physicist metaphor, we’re doing the same thing here with logic.
I broke down what the general
grammar stage is based on how we develop and define a
concept, which leads up to the five
simple questions we ask to start gathering and categorizing
data. This is how the mind works.
As a last note, the history of philosophy is basically a history of
man’s ability to abstract and create
universal concepts. There is a philosophic war about the reality
of universals that has been going
on since the beginnings of philosophy. This is effectually what
was destroyed towards the end of
the 19
th
and the beginning of the 20
th
centuries with the new psychology and radical empiricism
that denied metaphysics for a mechanized viewpoint of the
human being, which continues today
through philosophies and scientific endeavors such as

cybernetics, and transhumanism. If people
are interested in understanding the “war on universals” I will
refer them to the contents in the
beginning of this document and follow the link to “The Problem
of Universals”.
Section 3. The two logics (P)
(This section can be omitted without losing anything you will
need later on in the
book. It's here both to satisfy the advanced student's
curiosity and to sell the
approach of this book to prospective teachers who may question
its emphasis on
Aristotelian rather than symbolic logic, by justifying this choice
philosophically.)
16
INTRODUCTION
Almost four hundred years before Christ, Aristotle wrote the
world's first logic
textbook. Actually it was six short books, which collectively
came to be
known as the Organon, or "instrument." From then until 1913,
when Bertrand

Russell and Alfred North Whitehead published Principia
Mathematica, the
firstclassic of mathematical or symbolic logic, all students
learned Aristotelian
logic, the logic taught in this book.
The only other "new logic" for twenty-four centuries was an
improvement on
the principles of inductive logic by Francis Bacon's Novum
Organum ("New Or-
ganon"), in the 17th century, and another by John Stuart Mill, in
the 19th century.
(Inductive reasoning could be very roughly and
inadequately defined as
reasoning from concrete particular instances, known by
experience, while
deduction reasons from general principles. Induction yields
only probability,
while deduction yields certainty. "Socrates, Plato and Aristotle
are mortal, there•
fore probably all men are mortal" is an example of inductive
reasoning; "All
men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is
mortal" is an exam•

ple of deductive reasoning.)
Today nearly all logic textbooks use the new mathematical, or
symbolic,
logic as a kind of new language system for deductive logic. (It
is not a new logic;
logical principles are unchangeable, like the principles of
algebra. It is more like
changing from Roman numerals to Arabic numerals.) There are
at least three
reasons for this change:
(1) The first and most important one is that the new logic really
is superior
to the old in efficiency for expressing many long and
complex arguments, as Arabic
numerals are to Roman numerals, or a digital computer to an
analog computer, or writing in
shorthand to writing in longhand.
However, longhand is superior to shorthand in other ways: e.g.
it has more
beauty and elegance, it is intelligible to more people, and it
gives a more per•
sonal touch. That is why most people prefer longhand most of
the time - as most

beginners prefer simpler computers (or even pens). It is
somewhat similar in
logic: most people "argue in longhand," i.e. ordinary language;
and Aristotelian
logic stays close to ordinary language. That is why Aristotelian
logic is more
practical for beginners.
Even though symbolic language is superior in sophistication, it
depends on
commonsense logic as its foundation and root. Thus you will
have a firmer foun•
dation for all advanced logics if you first master this most basic
logic. Strong
roots are the key to healthy branches and leaves for any tree.
Any farmer knows
that the way to get better fruit is to tend the roots, not the fruits.
(This is only an
analogy. Analogies do not prove anything - that is a common
fallacy - they only
illuminate and illustrate. But it is an illuminating analogy.)
Modern symbolic logic is mathematical logic. "Modern
symbolic logic has
been developed primarily by mathematicians with mathematical
applications in

mind." This from one of its defenders, not one of its critics
(Henry C. Bayerly,
in A Primer of Logic. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1973, p.4).
Mathematics is a wonderful invention for saving time and
empowering sci•
ence, but it is not very useful in most ordinary conversations,
especially philo•
sophical conversations. The more important the subject matter,
the less relevant
The two logics
17
mathematics seems. Its forte is quantity, not quality.
Mathematics is the only
totally clear, utterly unambiguous language in the world; yet it
cannot say any•
thing very interesting about anything very important. Compare
the exercises in
a symbolic logic text with those in this text. How many are
taken from the Great
Books? How many are from conversations you could have had
in real life?
(2) A second reason for the popularity of symbolic logic is

probably its
more scientific and exact form. The very artificiality of its
language is a plus for
its defenders. But it is a minus for ordinary people. In fact,
Ludwig Wittgenstein,
probably the most influential philosophical logician of the 20th
century, admit•
ted, in Philosophical Investigations, that "because of the basic
differences
between natural and artificial languages, often such translations
[between natu•
ral-language sentences and artificial symbolic language] are not
even possible
in principle." "Many logicians now agree that the methods of
symbolic logic are
of little practical usefulness in dealing with much reasoning
encountered in real-
life situations" (Stephen N. Thomas, Practical Reasoning in
Natural Language,
Prentice-Hall, 1973).
- And in philosophy! "However helpful symbolic logic may be
as a tool of
the . . . sciences, it is [relatively] useless as a tool of
philosophy. Philosophy aims

at insight into principles and into the relationship of
conclusions to the princi•
ples from which they are derived. Symbolic logic, however,
does not aim at giv•
ing such insight" (Andrew Bachhuber, Introduction to Logic
(New York: Appleton-
Cenrury Crofts, 1957), p. 318).
(3) But there is a third reason for the popularity of symbolic
logic among
philosophers, which is more substantial, for it involves a very
important differ•
ence in philosophical belief. The old, Aristotelian logic was
often scorned by
20th century philosophers because it rests on two
commonsensical but unfash•
ionable philosophical presuppositions. The technical names for
them are "epis-
temological realism" and "metaphysical realism." These two
positions were held
by the vast majority of all philosophers for over 2000 years
(roughly, from
Socrates to the 18th century) and are still held by most ordinary
people today,

since they seem so commonsensical, but they were not held by
many of the
influential philosophers of the past three centuries.
(The following summary should not scare off beginners; it is
much more
abstract and theoretical than most of the rest of this book.)
The first of these two presuppositions, "epistemological
realism," is the
belief that the object of human reason, when reason is working
naturally and
rightly, is objective reality as it really is; that human reason can
know objective
reality, and can sometimes know it with certainty; that when we
say "two apples
plus two apples must always be four apples," or that "apples
grow on trees," we
are saying something true about the universe, not just about how
we think or
about how we choose to use symbols and words. Today many
philosophers are
18
INTRODUCTION

skeptical of this belief, and call it naive, largely because of
two 18th century
"Enlightenment" philosophers, Hume and Kant.
Hume inherited from his predecessor Locke the fatal assumption
that the
immediate object of human knowledge is our own ideas rather
than objective
reality. Locke naively assumed that we could know that these
ideas "corre•
sponded" to objective reality, somewhat like photographs; but
it is difficult to
see how we can be sure any photograph accurately corresponds
to the real object
of which it is a photograph if the only things we can ever know
directly are pho•
tographs and not real objects. Hume drew the logical conclusion
of skepticism
from Locke's premise.
Once he limited the objects of knowledge to our own ideas,
Hume then dis•
tinguished two kinds of propositions expressing these ideas:
what he called
"matters of fact" and "relations of ideas."

What Hume called "relations of ideas" are essentially what Kant
later called
"analytic propositions" and what logicians now call
"tautologies": propositions
that are true by definition, true only because their predicate
merely repeats all or
part of their subject (e.g. "Trees are trees" or "Unicorns are not
non-unicorns"
or "Unmarried men are men").
What Hume called "matters of fact" are essentially what Kant
called "syn•
thetic propositions," propositions whose predicate adds some
new information
to the subject (like "No Englishman is 25 feet tall" or "Some
trees never shed
their leaves"); and these "matters of fact," according to Hume,
could be known
only by sense observation. Thus they were always particular
(e.g. "These two
men are bald") rather than universal (e.g. "All men are mortal"),
for we do not
sense universals (like "all men"), only particulars (like "these
two men").
Common sense says that we can be certain of some universal

truths, e.g.,
that all men are mortal, and therefore that Socrates is mortal
because he is a
man. But according to Hume we cannot be certain of universal
truths like "all
men are mortal" because the only way we can come to know
them is by gener•
alizing from particular sense experiences (this man is mortal,
and that man is
mortal, etc.); and we cannot sense all men, only some, so our
generalization can
only be probable. Hume argued that particular facts deduced
from these only-
probable general principles could never be known or predicted
with certainty. If
it is only probably true that all men are mortal, then it is only
probably true that
Socrates is mortal. The fact that we have seen the sun rise
millions of times does
not prove that it will necessarily rise tomorrow.
Hume's "bottom line" conclusion from this analysis is
skepticism: there is
no certain knowledge of objective reality ("matters of fact"),
only of our own

ideas ("relations of ideas"). We have only probable knowledge
of objective real•
ity. Even scientific knowledge, Hume thought, was only
probable, not certain,
because science assumes the principle of causality, and this
principle, according
to Hume, is only a subjective association of ideas in our minds.
Because we have
seen a "constant conjunction" of birds and eggs, because
we have seen eggs
The two logics
19
follow birds so often, we naturally assume that the bird is the
cause of the egg.
But we do not see causality itself, the causal relation itself
between the bird and
the egg. And we certainly do not see (with our eyes) the
universal "principle of
causality." So Hume concluded that we do not really have the
knowledge of
objective reality that we naturally think we have. We must be
skeptics, if we are

only Humean beings.
Kant accepted most of Hume's analysis but said, in effect, "I
Kant accept
your skeptical conclusion." He avoided this conclusion by
claiming that human
knowledge does not fail to do its job because its job is not to
conform to objec•
tive reality (or "things-in-themselves," as he called it), i.e. to
correspond to it or
copy it. Rather, knowledge constructs or forms reality as an
artist constructs or
forms a work of art. The knowing subject determines the
known object rather
than vice versa. Human knowledge does its job very well, but
its job is not to
learn what is, but to make what is, to form it and structure it
and impose mean•
ings on it. (Kant distinguished three such levels of imposed
meanings: the two
"forms of apperception": time and space; twelve abstract
logical "categories"
such as causality, necessity, and relation; and the three "ideas
of pure reason":
God, self, and world.) Thus the world of experience is formed

by our knowing it
rather than our knowledge being formed by the world. Kant
called this idea his
"Copernican Revolution in philosophy." It is sometimes called
"epistemological
idealism" or "Kantian idealism," to distinguish it from
epistemological realism.
("Epistemology" is that division of philosophy which studies
human know•
ing. The term "epistemological idealism" is sometimes is used
in a different way,
to mean the belief that ideas rather than objective reality are the
objects of our
knowledge; in that sense, Locke and Hume are epistemological
idealists too. But
if we use "epistemological idealism" to mean the belief that the
human idea (or
knowing, or consciousness) determines its object rather than
being determined
by it, then Kant is the first epistemological idealist.)
The "bottom line" for logic is that if you agree with either
Hume or Kant,
logic becomes the mere manipulation of our symbols, not the
principles for a

true orderly knowledge of an ordered world. For instance,
according to episte•
mological idealism, general "categories" like "relation" or
"quality" or "cause"
or "time" are only mental classifications we make, not real
features of the world
that we discover.
In such a logic, "genus" and "species" mean something very
different than
in Aristotelian logic: they mean only any larger class and
smaller sub-class that
we mentally construct. But for Aristotle a "genus" is the general
or common part
of a thing's real essential nature (e.g. "animal" is man's genus),
and a "species"
is the whole essence (e.g. "rational animal" is man's species).
(See Chapter III,
Sections 2 and 3.)
Another place where modern symbolic logic merely
manipulates mental
symbols while traditional Aristotelian logic expresses insight
into objective real•
ity is the interpretation of a conditional (or "hypothetical")

proposition such as
20
INTRODUCTION
"If it rains, I will get wet." Aristotelian logic, like common
sense, interprets this
proposition as an insight into real causality: the rain causes me
to get wet. I am
predicting the effect from the cause. But symbolic logic does
not allow this com-
monsensical, realistic interpretation. It is skeptical of the
"naive" assumption of
epistemological realism, that we can know real things like real
causality; and
this produces the radically anti-commonsensical (or, as they say
so euphemisti•
cally, "counter-intuitive") "problem of material implication"
(see page 23).
Besides epistemological realism, Aristotelian logic also
implicitly assumes
metaphysical realism. (Metaphysics is that division of
philosophy which inves•
tigates what reality is; epistemology is that division of
philosophy which inves•

tigates what knowing is.) Epistemological realism contends that
the object of
intelligence is reality. Metaphysical realism contends that
reality is intelligible;
that it includes a real order; that when we say "man is a rational
animal," e.g.,
we are not imposing an order on a reality that is really random
or chaotic or
unknowable; that we are expressing our discovery of order, not
our creation of
order; that "categories" like "man" or "animal" or "thing" or
"attribute" are
taken from reality into our language and thought, not imposed
on reality from
our language and thought.
Metaphysical realism naturally goes with epistemological
realism.
Technically, metaphysical realism is the belief that universal
concepts corre•
spond to reality; that things really have common natures; that
"universals" such
as "human nature" are real and that we can know them.
There are two forms of metaphysical realism: Plato thought that

these uni•
versals were real things in themselves, while Aristotle thought,
more common-
sensically, that they were real aspects of things which we
mentally abstracted
from things. (See Chapter II, Section 3, "The Problem of
Universals.")
The opposite of realism is "nominalism," the belief that
universals are only
man-made nomini (names). William of Ockham (1285-1349) is
the philosopher
who is usually credited (or debited) with being the founder of
nominalism.
Aristotelian logic assumes both epistemological realism and
metaphysical
realism because it begins with the "first act of the mind," the act
of understand•
ing a universal, or a nature, or an essence (such as the nature of
"apple" or
"man"). These universals, or essences, are known by concepts
and expressed by
what logic calls "terms." Then two of these universal terms are
related as sub•
jects and predicates of propositions (e.g. "Apples are fruits," or

"Man is mor•
tal").
"Aristotle never intended his logic to be a merely formal
calculus [like
mathematics]. He tied logic to his ontology [metaphysics]:
thinking in concepts
presupposes that the world is formed of stable species" (J.
Lenoble, La notion de
I'experience, Paris, 1930, p. 35).
Symbolic logic is a set of symbols and rules for manipulating
them, with•
out needing to know their meaning and content, or their
relationship to the real
world, their "truth" in the traditional, commonsensical
sense of "truth." A
The two logics
21
computer can do symbolic logic. It is quantitative (digital), not
qualitative. It is
reducible to mathematics.
The new logic is sometimes called "propositional logic" as well
as "mathe•

matical logic" or "symbolic logic" because it begins with
propositions, not
terms. For terms (like "man" or "apple") express universals, or
essences, or
natures; and this implicitly assumes metaphysical realism (that
universals are
real) and epistemological realism (that we can know them as
they really are).
Typically modern philosophers criticize this assumption as
naive, but it
seems to me that this is a very reasonable assumption, and not
naive at all. Is it
too naive to assume that we know what an apple is? The new
logic has no means
of saying, and even prevents us from saying, what anything is!
And if we cease to say it, we will soon cease to think it, for
there will be no
holding-places in our language for the thought. Language is the
house of
thought, and homelessness is as life-threatening for thoughts as
it is for people.
If we should begin to speak and think only in nominalist terms,
this would be a

monumental historic change. It would reverse the evolutionary
event by which
man rose above the animal in gaining the ability to know
abstract universals. It
would be the mental equivalent of going naked on all fours,
living in trees, and
eating bugs and bananas. (Could monkeys have evolved by
natural selection
from nominalists?)
While it may be "extremist" to suggest it, such a mental
"devolution" is not
intrinsically impossible. And changes in logic are not wholly
unrelated to it.
Already, "internet logic," or the logic of spontaneous
association by "keywords,"
is replacing "genus and species logic," or the logic of an
ordered hierarchy of
objectively real categories. To most modern minds, those last
seven words sound
almost as archaic as alchemy or feudalism. Many criticize them
as ideological•
ly dangerous. These critics dislike categories because they "feel
that" (that
phrase is a category confusion, by the way) classifications, and

universal state•
ments about classes such as "Hittites could not read Hebrew,"
constitute "preju•
dice," "judgmentalism," "oppression," or even "hate speech."
Logic and social change are not unrelated. Not only our
logicians but also
our society no longer thinks primarily about the fundamental
metaphysical ques•
tion, the question of what things are, the question of the nature
of things.
Instead, we think about how we feel about things, about how we
can use them,
how we see them behave, how they work, how we can change
them, or how we
can predict and control their behavior by technology. But all
this does not raise
us above the animal level in kind, only in degree. The higher
animals too have
feelings, and things to use, and sight, and action, and even a
kind of technology
of behavior prediction and control. For the art of hunting is an
art of predicting
and controlling the behavior of other animals. What do we have
that no mere ani•

mal has? The thing that many modern philosophers vilify:
abstraction. We have
the power to abstract and understand universals. This is the
thing traditional
logic is founded on, and this is the thing symbolic logic ignores
or denies.
22
INTRODUCTION
Logic is deeply related to moral and ethical changes in both
thought and
practice. All previous societies had a strong, nearly universal,
and rarely ques•
tioned consensus about at least some basic aspects of a "natural
moral law,"
about what was "natural" and what was "unnatural." There may
not have been a
greater obedience to this law, but there was a much greater
knowledge of it, or
agreement about it. Today, especially in the realm of sex (by far
the most radi•
cally changed area of human life in both belief and practice),
our more

"advanced" minds find the old language about "unnatural acts"
not only "polit•
ically incorrect" but literally incomprehensible, because they no
longer accept
the legitimacy of the very question of the "nature" of a thing.
Issues like homo•
sexuality, contraception, masturbation, pedophilia, incest,
divorce, adultery,
abortion, and even bestiality are increasingly debated in other
terms than the
"nature" of sexuality, or the "nature" of femininity and
masculinity. It is not an
unthinkable suspicion that one of the most powerful forces
driving the new logic
is more social than philosophical, and more sexual than logical.
Symbolic logic naturally fosters utilitarian ethics, which is
essentially an
ethic of consequences. The fundamental principle of
utilitarianism is that an act
is good if its probable consequences result in "the greatest
happiness for the
greatest number" of people. It is an "if. . . then . . ." ethics of
calculating con•
sequences - essentially, "the end justifies the means" (though

that formula is
somewhat ambiguous). Symbolic logic fits this perfectly
because it is essential•
ly an "if. . . then . . . " logic, a calculation of logical
consequences. Its basic unit
is the proposition (p or q) and its basic judgment is "if p then
q." In contrast,
Aristotelian logic naturally fosters a "natural law ethic," an
ethic of universal
principles, based on the nature of things, especially the nature
of man. For its
basic unit is the term, a subject (S) or a predicate (P) within a
proposition (p);
and its basic judgment is "all S is P" - a statement of universal
truth about the
nature of S and P.
The very nature of reason itself is understood differently by the
new sym•
bolic logic than it was by the traditional Aristotelian logic.
"Reason" used to
mean essentially "all that distinguishes man from the beasts,"
including intu•
ition, understanding, wisdom, moral conscience, and aesthetic
appreciation, as

well as calculation. "Reason" now usually means only the last
of those powers.
That is why many thinkers today who seem at first quite sane in
other ways actu•
ally believe that there is no fundamental difference between
"natural intelli•
gence" and "artificial intelligence" - in other words, you are
nothing but a com•
puter plus an ape. (Having met some of these people at MIT, I
must admit that
their self-description sometimes seems quite accurate.)
Aristotelian logic is not exact enough for the nominalistic
mathematical logi•
cian, and it is too exact for the pop psychology subjectivist or
New Age mystic.
Out at sea there between Scylla and Charybdis, it reveals by
contrast the double
tragedy of modern thought in its alienation between form and
matter, structure
The two logics
23
and content, validity and meaning. This alienated mind was

described memo•
rably by C.S. Lewis: "the two hemispheres of my brain stood in
sharpest con•
trast. On the one hand, a glib and shallow rationalism. On the
other, a many-
islanded sea of myth and poetry. Nearly all that I loved, I
believed subjective.
Nearly all that was real, I thought grim and meaningless"
(Surprised by Joy).
Neither mathematical logic nor "experience" can heal this gap;
but Aristotelian
logic can. It is thought's soul and body together, yet not
confused. Mathematical
logic alone is abstract and "angelistic," and sense experience
and feeling alone
is concrete and "animalistic," but Aristotelian logic is a human
instrument for
human beings.
Aristotelian logic is also easier, simpler, and therefore time-
saving. For
example, in a logic text book misleadingly entitled Practical
Reasoning in
Natural Language, the author takes six full pages of symbolic
logic to analyze a

simple syllogism from Plato's Republic that proves that justice
is not rightly
defined as "telling the truth and paying back what is owed"
because returning a
weapon to a madman is no? justice but it is telling the truth and
paying back what
is owed. (pp. 224-30). Another single syllogism of Hume's takes
eight pages to
analyze (pp. 278-86).
I have found that students who are well trained in Aristotelian
logic are
much better at arguing, and at understanding arguments, than
students who are
trained only in symbolic logic. For Aristotelian logic is the
logic of the four most
basic verbal communication arts: reading, writing, listening,
and speaking. It is
the logic of Socrates. If you want to be a Socrates, this is the
logic you should
begin with.
The old logic is like the old classic movies: strong on substance
rather than
sophistication. The new logic is like typically modern movies:

strong on "spe•
cial effects" but weak on substance (theme, character, plot);
strong on the tech•
nological "bells and whistles" but weak on the human side. But
logic should be
a human instrument; logic was made for man, not man for logic.
26
INTRODUCTION
Section 4. All of logic in two pages: an overview (B)
This is one of the shortest and simplest sections in this book,
but it is also one of the most
important, for it is the foundation for everything else in logic. If
you do not understand it clearly,
you will be hopelessly confused later on. (It is explained in
more detail in the next section,
Section 5.)
The ancient philosophers defined Man as the "rational animal."
To be human is (among other
things) to reason, to give reasons for believing things to be true.
We can see common forms, or structures, in all human
reasoning, no mat• ter what the

contents, or objects, that we reason about. Logic studies those
structures.
The fundamental structure of all reasoning is the movement of
the mind from premises to a
conclusion. The conclusion is what you are trying to prove to be
true; the premises are the
reasons or evidence for the truth of the conclu• sion.
The two basic kinds of reasoning are inductive and deductive.
Inductive reasoning reasons from
particular premises (e.g. "I' m mortal" and "You're mortal" and
"He's mortal" and "She's
mortal"), usually to a more general or universal conclusion (e.g.
"All men are mortal").
Deductive reasoning reasons from at least one general, or
universal premise (e.g. "All men are
mortal") usu• ally to a more particular conclusion (e.g. "I am
mortal"). Inductive reasoning
yields only probability, not certainty. (It is not certain that all
men are mortal merely on the
basis that four men, or 4 million, are.) Deductive reasoning,
when correct, yields certainty. (It
is certain that if all men are mortal, and if I am a man, then I am
mortal.)
A deductive argument succeeds in proving its conclusion to be

true if and only if three
conditions are met. These are the three check points of any
deductive argument.
(1) First, all the terms must be clear and unambiguous. If a term
is
ambiguous, it should be defined, to make it clear. Otherwise,
the two parties to the argument
may think they are talking about the same thing when they are
not.
(2) Second, all the premises must be true. You can (seem to)
"prove" any•
thing from false premises: e.g. "All Martians are infallible, and
I am a Martian,
therefore I am infallible."
(3) Third, the argument must be logically valid. That is, the
conclusion
must necessarily follow from the premises, so that if 'the
premises are true, then
the conclusion must be true.
All of logic in two pages: an overview
27
(1) A "term" in logic is the subject or the predicate of a

proposition (a
declarative sentence). Terms are either clear or unclear. Terms
cannot be either true or false. E.g.
"mortal" is neither true nor false. The proposition "All men are
mortal" is true, and the
proposition "Some men are not mortal" is false.
(2) Propositions are declarative sentences. They are either true
or false.
"True," in commonsense usage, means "corresponding to
reality," and "false" means the
opposite. There is no one simple and infallible way of telling
whether any proposition is true or
false.
(3 ) There is, however, a fairly simple and truly infallible way
of telling whether an argument is
valid or invalid: the laws of logic, which you will learn in this
book.
A deductive argument is logically valid if its conclusion
necessarily fol• lows from its
premises, invalid if it does not. There are various forms of argu•
ment, and each form has its
own inherent rules for validity.
All the rules for each form of argument are natural to that form

of argu• ment and to the
human mind. If at any point in this book you think that any of
its logical laws contradict what
you already implicitly know by innate common sense, please
stop and check; for you must be
misunderstanding either the laws of logic or what you think
common sense tells you, for logic
does nothing more than make explicit the rules everyone
knows innately by common sense.
Arguments are made up of propositions (premises and a
conclusion), and propositions are
made up of terms (subject and predicate). Terms are either
clear or unclear. Propositions
(whether premises or the conclusion) are either true or false.
Arguments are either logically
valid or invalid. Only terms can be clear or unclear; only
propositions can be true or false;
only arguments can be logically valid or invalid.
So the three questions you should habitually ask of yourself
when writ• ing or speaking,
and of others when you are reading or listening to them, are:
(1) Are the terms all clear and unambiguous?
(2) Are the premises all true?

(3) Is the reasoning all logically valid?
If the answer to all three of these questions is Yes, then the
conclusion of the argument must
be true.
So in order to disagree with any conclusion, you must show that
there is either (1) an
ambiguous term, or (2) a false premise, or (3) a logical fal• lacy
in the argument such that
the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises.
(You will soon learn the rules
for judging that.) If you cannot do any of these three things,
then honesty demands that you
admit that the con• clusion has been proved to be true. (All this
applies to deductive
arguments only; inductive arguments do not claim certainty.)
28
INTRODUCITON
Section 5. The three acts of the mind (B)
This section gives you the outline for all of logic. It is an
expansion of the pre• vious section
(Section 4) and a summary of the rest of the book.

The basis for the science and art of logic is two facts: the fact
that human beings think, and
the fact that thought has a structure. That structure can be clas•
sified from various points of
view and for various purposes. For instance, a physiologist or
physician might distinguish brain
activity of the autonomic nerv• ous system (e.g. breathing) from
activity of the frontal lobes
(self-conscious thought). A moralist might distinguish thoughts
that are voluntary, and under our
control, from those that are involuntary, since we are
responsible only for what is under our
control. A Marxist would distinguish thoughts supposedly
produced by a Capitalist system from
those produced by a Communist system. But from the viewpoint
of logic, we distinguish three
kinds of thoughts, three "acts of the mind":
1. Simple apprehension
2. Judging
3. Reasoning
"Simple apprehension" is a technical term. It means basically
"conceiving," "understanding," or
"comprehending" one object of thought, one concept, such as

'mortal' or 'man' or 'triangle' or
'triangle with unequal angles.' Animals apparently cannot
perform this act of understanding; if
they can, they do not express it in words. Computers certainly
cannot do this; a computer no
more understands what you program into it than a library
building understands the
information in the books you put into it.
Judging is more complex than simple apprehension. Instead of
just thinking one concept, like
'man,' it relates two concepts, like "man" and "mortal," to each
other by predicating one term
(the predicate) of the other (the subject) in judg• ing that, e.g.,
"Man is mortal" or "Man is not
a triangle."
As judging is more complex than simple apprehension,
reasoning is more complex than
judging. As judging moves from one act of simple apprehension
(the subject) to another (the
predicate), reasoning moves from two or more judg• ments (the
premises, or assumptions) to
another (the conclusion) in arguing that if the premises are true,
then the conclusion must be

true. E.g. "All men are mor• tal, and I am a man, therefore I am
mortal," or "A man is not a
triangle, and that is a triangle, therefore that is not a man."
The mental products produced in the mind by the three acts of
the mind are:
1. Concepts (the products of conceiving)
2. Judgments (the products of judging)
3. Arguments (the products of reasoning, or arguing)
Distinguishing between the acts and their objects is not crucial
for logic.
What is crucial is distinguishing the three acts, and the three
objects.
The three acts of the mind
29
These three mental entities (concepts, judgments, and
arguments) are expressed in logic as:
1. Terms
2. Propositions
3. Arguments (the most usual form of which is the syllogism)
They are expressed in language as:

1. Words or phrases (less than a complete sentence)
2. Declarative sentences
3. Paragraphs, or at least two or more declarative sentences
connected by
a word like 'therefore' which indicates an argument
Examples:
l ."Man"
2. "Socrates is a man."
3. "All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, therefore
Socrates is mortal."
(Logic does not deal with interrogative sentences (questions,
like "What time is it?"), imperative
sentences (commands or requests, like "Pass the mus• tard,
please"), exclamatory sentences
(like "Oh! Wow! What a hit!"), or perfor• mative sentences (like
"I dub thee knight"), but only
with declarative sentences, sentences that claim to state a truth.)
Non-declarative sentences are
not proposi• tions.
The difference between logic and language is (1) that languages
are man- made artifices and
therefore (2) there are many languages that are different in

place and time, while (1) logic is
not made but discovered, and (2) there is only one logic. There
is no "Chinese logic" or
"American logic," no "19th century logic" or "20th century
logic," or even "masculine
logic"«or "feminine logic," just logic. (What is often called
"feminine logic" is intuition rather
than logic: a formidable and invaluable power of the mind but
not teachable by textbooks.)
Like mathematics, logic is objective, universal, and
unchangeable in its basic laws or
principles. But the forms in which these unchangeable laws of
logic are expressed are
linguistic forms, and these forms are changing and varied.
A term has no structural parts. It is a basic unit of meaning, like
the num• ber one in math or
like an atom in the old atomic theory (when they believed atoms
were unsplittable and had
no parts).
A proposition has two structural parts: the subject term and
the predicate term. The subject
term is what you 're talking about. The predicate term is what
you say about the subject. The word

"subject" and "predicate" mean the same thing in logic as in
grammar.
An argument has two structural parts: the premises and the
conclusion. The premises are the
propositions that are assumed. They are the reasons or evidence
for the conclusion. The
conclusion is the proposition that you are trying to prove.
30
INTRODUCTION
For instance, in the classic example "All men are mortal, and I
am a man, therefore I am
mortal," the argument is everything inside the quotation marks.
The two premises are (a) "All
men are mortal" and (b) "I am a man." The con• clusion is "I am
mortal." The subject of the
first premise is "men" and the pred• icate is "mortal;" the
subject of the second premise is "I"
and the predicate is "a man;" and the subject of the conclusion
is "I" and the predicate is
"mortal."
Structural parts of a term: none
Structural parts of a proposition: subject term & predicate term

Structural parts of an
argument: premises & conclusion
We can think of the subject and predicate terms as two rooms
which togeth• er make up one
floor of a building (say, a town house). Each floor is a proposi•
tion. A syllogism is a building
with three floors. The rooms are the parts of the floors, and the
floors are the parts of the
building.
1 st premise
2nd premise y. argument
conclusion
These three logical entities answer three different questions, the
three most fundamental
questions we can ask about anything:
1. A term answers the question what it is.
2. A proposition answers the question whether it is.
3. An argument answers the question why it is.
1. "What are we talking about? "Man."
2. "What are we saying about it?" "That man is mortal."

3. "Why is it mortal?" "Because man is an animal, and all
animals are mor•
tal, therefore man is mortal."
Terms, propositions, and arguments reveal three different
aspects of reality:
1. Terms reveal essences (what a thing is).
2. Propositions reveal existence (whether it is).
3. Arguments reveal causes (why it is).
This (above) is the theoretical basis for the practical art of
logic. The prac• tical art consists in
discriminating between clear and unclear (ambiguous) terms,
true and false propositions, and
logically valid and invalid arguments.
Logic is a (practical) art as well as a (theoretical) science.
Therefore it does not only tell us
what is but also what should be; it not only reveals these three
fundamental logical structures
but also judges and tries to improve them. For all three can be
either logically good or logically
bad:
1. Terms are either clear or unclear (ambiguous).
2. Propositions are either true or false.

3. Arguments are either valid or invalid
31
You will be hopelessly confused for the rest of this book if you
do not clear• ly understand this.
Terms are never true or false in themselves; the propositions
they are in are true or false.
Terms are never valid or invalid. Only arguments are valid or
invalid. Terms are only either
clear or unclear.
Propositions are never clear or unclear; the terms in them
are clear or unclear.
Propositions are never valid or invalid in themselves; the
arguments they are parts of are either
valid or invalid.
Propositions are only either true or false.
Arguments are never clear or unclear; each of the terms in an
argument is clear or unclear.
Arguments are never true or false. Each of the propositions in
an argument is true or false.
Arguments are only either valid or invalid.

Most (but not all) of logic consists of deciding when arguments
are valid. "Valid" is a
technical term in logic. It does not mean just "acceptable." An
argu• ment is logically valid
when its conclusion necessarily follows from its premis• es.
That is, "if the premises are all true,
then the conclusion must be true" - that is the definition of a
valid argument. An invalid
argument is one in which the conclusion does not necessarily
follow even if the premises are
true.
For instance, this argument is valid:
All men are mortal. And I am a man.
Therefore I am mortal.
But this argument is not valid: All men are
mortal.
And all pigs are mortal. Therefore all pigs are
men.
It is invalid not just because the conclusion is false but because
the conclu• sion does not
follow from the premises. The following argument is also

invalid, even though the conclusion
(and also each premise) is true:
All men are mortal. And Socrates is
mortal.
Therefore Socrates is a man.
For this argument has the same logical form as the one above it;
it merely replaces "pigs"
with "Socrates."
An argument may have nothing but true propositions in it, yet
be invalid. E.g.:
32
INTRODUCTION
I exist.
And grass is green. Therefore Antarctica is cold.
An argument may have false propositions in it and yet be
logically valid. E.g.:
I am a cat.
And all cats are gods. Therefore I am a
god.

For if both those premises were true (that I am a cat and that all
cats are gods) it would
necessarily follow that I was a god.
An argument that has nothing but true propositions and also is
logically valid is the only kind
of argument that is worth anything, the only kind that con•
vinces us that its conclusion is true,
and the only kind that we can use to con• vince others that its
conclusion is true.
If an argument has nothing but clear terms, true premises, and
valid logic, its conclusion must
be true. If any one or more of these three things is lacking, we
do not know whether the
conclusion is true or false. It is uncertain.
If the terms are
Clear Clear Clear Clear
Unclear Unclear Unclear
and the premises are
true true
false false
true true

false
and the logic is
valid
invalid ,
valid
invalid
valid
invalid
valid
then the conclusion is
true uncertain .
uncertain
uncertain
uncertain
uncertain
uncertain
(See also p. 194 for more on the relation between truth and
validity.)
Logic gives us rules for deciding when an argument is valid or

invalid. It also gives us ways
of defining terms so as to make them clear and unambigu• ous.
Unfortunately, logic cannot
give us any one way to tell whether any propo• sition is true.
There are many ways of finding
truth: sensation, intuition, reason• ing, experimentation,
authority, experience, etc.
(By the way, "what is truth?" is a very easy question to answer,
as we shall see in Chapter VI,
Section 2. We all know what the word means: it means know•
ing or saying what is. Aristotle
defined truth in words of one syllable: "If a man says of what is
that it is, or of what is not that
it is not, he speaks the truth; if he says of what is that it is not,
or of what is not that it is, he
does not speak the truth." Defining truth is easy, finding it is
harder.)
Because there are three acts of the mind and three
corresponding logical entities (terms,
propositions, and arguments), there are three basic questions we
should habitually ask in each
of the four basic language arts of reading, writing, listening,
and speaking. The more we
habitually ask these three questions, of ourselves (when

speaking or writing) and of others
(when listening or reading), the more critical and logical our
thinking is. The questions are:
33
1.What do you mean? (Define your terms.)
2. What's the point? (What's your conclusion?)
3. Why? (Prove it.)
When you want to make an unanswerable argument, you must be
sure of three things:
1. Be sure your terms are clear.
2. Be sure your premises are true.
3. Be sure your logic is valid.
If you fulfill all three conditions, you have proved your
conclusion.
If you want to answer someone else's argument, you must find
in it one of the three following
errors:
1. a term used ambiguously
2. a false premise

3. a logical fallacy, an invalid argument, a conclusion that does
not neces•
sarily follow from the premises
If you cannot find any one of these three, you must admit that
the conclu• sion is true. For
this is the power of logic: if the terms are unambiguous and the
premises are true and the logic
is valid, then the conclusion really is true and has been proved
to be true.
1 ST ACT OF MIND 2N D ACT OF MIND 3R D ACT OF
MIND
NAME OF ACT Understanding Judging Reasoning
LOGICAL EXPRESSION Term Proposition Argument
(usually syllogism)
LINGUISTIC Word or Phrase Declarative Paragraph
EXPRESSION Sentence
EXAMPLE OF EACH "Man " "Mortal" "Socrates is a All men
are mortal.
man." And Socrates is a man.
Thus Socrates is mortal.
STRUCTURAL None Subject Term & Premises and

PARTS Predicate Term Conclusion
QUESTION What it is Whether it is Why it is
ANSWERED
ASPECT OF Essence Existence Cause
REALITY
GOOD WHEN Clear or True Valid
unambiguous
HOW ACHIEVED Definition of No one way Rules of Logic
terms
BAD WHEN Unclear or False Invalid
ambiguous
QUESTION TO What do you What is your point? Why? (Prove
it.)
HABITUALLY ASK mean? (Define
your terms.)
(State your
conclusion.)

I: The First Act of the Mind: Understanding
Section 1. Understanding: the thing that distinguishes man from
both
beast and computer (P)
(This section is more philosophical than logical, but it is
important because it fleshes out the
positive alternative to nominalism and provides the essential
philosophical foundation for
Aristotelian logic.)
As we have already reported, a new species of human has
appeared: one that does not know the
difference between a human mind and a computer, between
"natural intelligence" and
"artificial intelligence." Some of these people even teach
philosophy!
For centuries there have also been some people - many of them
philoso• phers - who say they
do not know what the difference is between a human being and
an ape. After all, apes seem to
reason quite well sometimes. If you put an ape in a pit with a
dozen wooden crates, he might
figure out how to get out by piling up the crates against a wall
in the form of a stairway, whereas

some humans would not figure that out.
But there is one simple, observable behavior that clearly
distinguishes humans from both
computers and animals: asking questions. Computers never
question their programming
(unless they have been programmed to do so); com• puters
never disobey. They have no will,
therefore no will to know. And animals, though curious, cannot
ask formulated questions; their
language is too primitive.
There is a story that Aristotle, after one of his lectures, was
disappointed that his students
had no questions afterwards, so he said, "My lecture was about
levels of intelligence in the
universe, and I distinguished three such levels: gods, men, and
brutes. Men are distinguished
from both gods and brutes by question• ing, for the gods know
too much to ask questions and
the brutes know too little. So if you have no questions, shall I
congratulate you for having risen
to the level of the gods, or insult you for having sunk to the
level of the brutes?"
Logic specializes in questioning. The three most basic
questions humans

36
I. THE FIRST ACT OF THE MIND: UNDERSTANDING
ask are: What, Whether, and Why, i.e. What is it? Is it? and
Why is it? These are dealt with in the
three parts of logic.
The part that most clearly distinguishes humans from computers
is the first: understanding a
"what," an "essence," the nature of a thing. Computers under•
stand nothing; they merely
store, process, relate, and regurgitate data. You don't really
think there is a little spirit
somewhere inside your hand-held calculator, do you? But the
world's most complex computer
has nothing qualitatively more in it than that, only
quantitatively more. An amoeba is closer to
understanding than a computer, for it has some rudimentary
sensation of feeling (e.g. it detects
food).
A baby often goes around pointing to everything he1 sees,
asking "What's that?" The baby is
a philosopher. "What's that" is philosophy's first question.
(Look at any Socratic dialogue to

see that.)
The act of understanding, or "simple apprehension" as it is
technically called, produces in our
minds a concept. (Sometimes we use the word "idea" as
synonymous with "concept," but at
other times we use the word "idea" more broadly, to include
judgments and arguments as
well as concepts.)
We do not merely understand concepts, we understand reality by
means of concepts. Our
concept of a house is our means of understanding the real
house. The real house is physical,
but our concept is not. The house is independent of our mind,
but the concept of it is not: it is
in our mind. If all we understood was our own concepts, we
would not understand objective
reality.
Concepts are amazing things. They can do what no material
thing in the uni• verse can do. They
can transcend space and time. No body can be in two places
1 The use of the traditional inclusive generic pronoun "he"
is a decision of language, not of gender justice.

There are only six alternatives. (1) We could use the
grammatically mis• leading and numerically incorrect
"they." But when we say "one baby was healthier than the others
because they didn't drink that milk," we do
not know whether the antecedent of "they" is "one" or "others,"
so we don't know whether to give or take
away the milk. Such language codes could be dangerous to
baby's health. (2) Another alternative is the
politically intrusive "in-your-face" generic "she," which I
would probably use if I were an angry, politically
intrusive, in-your-face woman, but I am not any of those things.
(3) Changing "he" to "he or she" refutes itself
in such comically clumsy and ugly revisions as the following:
"What does it profit a man or woman if he or she
gains the whole world but loses his or her own soul? Or what
shall a man or woman give in exchange for his or
her soul?" The answer is: he or she will give up his or her
linguistic sanity. (4) We could also be both intrusive
and clumsy by saying "she or he." (5) Or we could use the
neuter "it," which is both dehumanizing and
inaccurate. (6) Or we could combine all the lin• guistic garbage
together and use "she or he or it," which,
abbreviated, would sound like "sh . . . it."
1 believe in the equal intelligence and value of women, but not

in the intelligence or value of "political
correctness," linguistic ugliness, grammatical inaccuracy,
conceptual confusion, or dehumanizing pronouns.
Understanding
37
at the same time, but a concept can. Suppose someone asks
you whether you think San
Francisco or Boston is a more beautiful city. You understand
the ques• tion, and you answer it.
Your mind compared (and therefore was present to) two cities
3000 miles apart - at once!
Your concepts did what your body cannot do. Though your body
is unimaginably tiny
compared with the universe, your concept of the universe is
greater than the universe! For
if you understood the word "universe," your thought
'surrounded' the universe - the same
universe
that surrounds your body. You did that by having a concept of
the universe.
Concepts have at least five characteristics that material things
do not have. They are spiritual

(or immaterial), abstract, universal, necessary, and unchanging.
1. Concepts are spiritual (immaterial, non-material). Compare
the con•
cept of an apple with an apple. The apple has size, weight,
mass, color, kinetic energy,
molecules, shape, and takes up space. The concept does not. It
is "in" your mind, not your
body. It is not in your brain, for your brain is part of your body.
It has no size, so it cannot
fit there. (If you say that it does have size, the size of an apple,
then you must say that your
brain must get as big as an elephant when you think of an
elephant.) It has no weight, for
when you stand on a scale and suddenly think the concept
"tree," you do not gain the
slightest amount of weight.
In contrast to the concept "apple," the word "apple" is just as
physical as an apple. It takes up
space on the page, and it is made of molecules. The spoken
word also is made of
molecules: wave-vibrations of sound of a certain size and shape.
But between these two
material things - the apple and the word "apple"

- there is the concept. That is the only reason why we can use
the word "apple" to mean the
physical apple we eat. We use one physical thing (the word
"apple") as a symbol of another
physical thing (the apple we eat), and that mental act, or mental
relation, that we set up, is
not a third physical thing. It is a concept, and its meaning is the
real apple even though its
being is not the being of an apple. (It is not in space, has no
molecules, etc.) The concept's
meaning is "a physical fruit that grows on apple trees, has red
or green skin, etc.," but the
concept's being is not physical (material), but spiritual
(immaterial).
Our having the concept of an apple is dependent on our having a
physical body, of course:
it is dependent both on the eye, which perceives the apple, and
on the brain, which works
whenever we have a concept. If we had never seen an apple, we
would never have a
concept of one, and if we had no brain we could not think the
concept of an apple. But the
concept is not just the physical apple or the visible word or
even the sense image, which is

somewhere between a physical and a spiritual thing. (We will
see the difference between a
concept and a sense image more clearly in the next few
paragraphs.) The sense image is
like a scouting report sent out by the intellect. The intellect is
like a king who stays in a soul-
castle and sends out scouts (the senses) to report to him what's
going on in his kingdom.
Or, to change the image, the intellect is like a para• lytic in a
wheelchair who directs a
blind man where to push him. (In this image,
38
I. THE FIRST ACT OF THE MIND: UNDERSTANDING
the intellect is symbolized, paradoxically, by the physically
sighted paralytic and the senses by
the blind pusher.) The two are interdependent.
When a thing is known, it acquires a second existence, a mental
existence; the thing becomes a
thought. If familiarity did not dull us, we would find this utterly
remarkable, unparalleled in all
the universe. No galaxy, no physical ener• gy, no cell, no
animal can do this; only a mind can

give a thing a second life.
Every language speaks of the human mind, or intellect, as doing
something more than the
(animal) senses do: as going "deeper" or "below the surface" or
"penetrating" what is sensed,
like an X-ray; as going beyond appearances to reality, beyond
seeing to understanding. (Thus
the irony in a blind poet or "seer" like Homer, John Milton, or
Helen Keller "seeing" more
than sighted people.) Only because we distinguish between
appearance and reality do we ask
ques• tions. There would be no philosophy and no science
without this distinction.
2. Concepts are abstract. The English word "abstract" comes
from the
Latin abstraho, "to draw (traho) from {ab(s))" or "to drag
out of." Our mind
extricates, or separates, something from something else. What is
this something?
When we form a concept, we abstract one aspect of a concrete
thing from all its other aspects
- e.g. the size of a flower (when we measure it), or its color
(when we paint it). No one can
physically or chemically separate the size from the color, or

either one from the whole flower;
but anyone can do it mentally.
We can abstract, or mentally separate, adjectives from nouns.
Animals sim• ply perceive "green-
grass," but even the most primitive men mentally distin•
guished the green from the grass; and
this enabled them to imagine green skin, or red grass, even
though they had never seen it. And
once they imagined these things, they set about making them,
e.g. by dying their skin green
from the juice of grasses, or painting pictures of red grass with
dye made from beet juice.
(When he was two, my son made the thrilling discovery that he
could make "pur• ple doo-doo"
by mixing up blue and red Play-Doh® in the shape of a hot
dog.) Technology and art both flow
from this human power of abstraction.
The most important act of abstraction is the one by which we
abstract the essential from the
accidental. By having a concept we can focus on the essence
and abstract from the accidents.
Some people are reluctant to do this. Their con• versation is
utterly concrete - and utterly

boring. You want to scream at them, "Come to the point!" These
people have few friends, for
to have friends you must learn to abstract, i.e. select, set apart,
or pick out, the things that
interest both them and you. Abstraction fosters friendship - a
concrete payoff!
Abstractions have received bad press in the modern world. Too
bad. The next time you hear
someone say "I' m a concrete, practical person, and I hate
abstractions," remind them that
babies are very concrete - and uncivilized.
Abstract ideas do not move us as much as concrete things do.
Intellectuals, who live with
abstractions, are often practically ineffective dreamers and
rarely "movers and shakers" of men,
because men will not usually live and die for abstractions that
move only our mind - even
stirring abstractions like "liberty,
Understanding
39
equality, fraternity" or "democracy" or "freedom" - but for
concrete things that move their

loves, like their families or their buddies next to them in the
trenches.
3. Concepts are universal. Ask a child what he wants and he
may answer,
"Everything!" He has formed a universal concept. (Most
concepts are only rel•
atively universal, not absolutely universal like "everything" or
"something" or
"being.")
E.g. "tree" is a universal concept because it is a concept of not
only that one tree in your yard,
but of all trees. "Beauty" is a universal concept, and when we
judge whether San Francisco
or Boston is more beautiful, we judge both cities by the
universal concept "beauty" (or
"beautiful city").
The literal meaning of "universal" is "one with respect to many"
(unum ver• sus alia). This
means that a concept, while remaining one - one essence, one
meaning - nevertheless is true
of many things, predicable (sayable) of many things, applicable
to many things. This oak and
that oak and that maple are all "trees." We can truly apply the
concept "tree" to any and

every possible and actual tree that ever was, is, or will be.
The concept signifies something common to many different
things. This oak and that oak are
different in size, and oaks and maples are different in shape of
leaves and taste of sap, but all
are trees. All share the same common essence, or essential
nature. That is what we are
seeking to know when we ask "What is that?"
Only the concept gets at this one-in-many, this common essence
in many different things. It
is not in sense perception that we see this universal. We per•
ceive only individual men and
women, who are either tall or short, either old or young, but
"human being" is neither male
nor female, neither tall nor short, nei• ther old nor young.
"Human nature" does not look male
or female, tall or short, old or young. It does not "look" at all; it
"means." Appearances are
particular; but essences, or meanings, or the natures of things,
are universal. You cannot touch
them or feel them; you can only understand them. They are
known by concepts.

Section 3. The "problem of universals" (P)
The fact that most terms are universal (predicable of many
things) has given rise to one of the
classic problems in the history of philosophy, the so-called
"prob• lem of universals." First
raised by the ancient Greek logician Porphyry, the prob• lem
arises when we ask this question:
What is there in reality that universal terms refer to - especially
abstract universal terms like
"beauty" or "humanity"? It is clear that concrete singular terms
like "Socrates" or "the
moon" refer to concrete individual entities that exist in a
particular space and time; but
where
42 I. THE FIRST ACT OF THE MIND: UNDERSTANDING
and when do we find beauty or humanity, as distinct from this
beautiful thing or that human
being?
We have said that terms express concepts, that concepts are
universal, and that concepts refer
to the essences or natures of things. Are these essences uni•
versal, like the concepts we have of

them?
If they are not, then it seems that our concepts of them are not
accurate, for they do not
correspond to their objects. And in that case, our concepts
would dis• tort rather than reveal the
true nature of things.
But are universals then real things? Is beauty real as well as
beautiful things? Does humanity or
human nature or the human species really exist in addition to
the 6+ billion human beings that
have the same essential human nature?
Plato thought they did. He called these universals "Forms" or
"Ideas" - not ideas in minds but
Ideas outside minds, objective Truths; not thoughts but the
objects of thoughts. He believed
there were two kinds of reality, two "worlds": a world of
concrete, material individual things in
space and time that we know by our bodily senses, and another
world of immaterial universal
Forms that we know with our minds through concepts.
The "two worlds theory" seems fantastic to common sense and
an example of what one

philosopher (Alfred North Whitehead) calls "the fallacy of mis•
placed concreteness," treating an
abstracted aspect of a thing (its essential nature) as if it were
another concrete thing. This
theory of Plato's is sometimes called "Extreme Realism"
because it claims that universals are
"extremely real," so to speak - just as real as individual things,
in fact more real since they
are timeless and immortal and unchangeable. A beautiful face
changes with age, but beauty does
not.
The theory most totally opposed to Plato's is called
Nominalism. The four• teenth century
medieval philosopher William of Ockham is usually credited for
inventing the theory, and
modern philosophies such as Empiricism, Pragmatism, Marxism,
and Positivism have embraced
it and made it popular. Nominalism claims that universals are
only names (nomini) that we use
as a kind of short• hand. Instead of giving each individual tree a
separate proper name, we
group together, for our own convenience, under the one vague
name "tree," all those things
that resemble each other in certain ways (e.g. having trunks and

branch• es and leaves). But in
reality, all trees are different, not the same; not one-in- many
("uni-versal"), but only many.
Nominalism seems logically self-contradictory, for if all trees
are different, how can it be true
to call them all "trees"? The very sentence that says all trees are
not really the same presupposes
that they are! If universals are only our names for individuals
that resemble each other in
certain ways, those "certain ways" must be really universal (e.g.
all have trunks, branches, and
leaves); so we have eliminated one universal ("tree") only by
appealing to three others ("trunk,"
"branches," and "leaves"). Something in trees must justify our
use of a universal
The extension and comprehension of terms
43
term "tree." What is this? Is it their "resemblance" or
"similarity"? But they must resemble each
other in something. What could this be but their nature, their
essence, their treeness, what-trees-really-
are?

Aristotle, as usual, takes a middle position between these two
extremes, and his view accords best
with common sense. His position was developed by the Arabic
philosopher Avicenna and by St.
Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages. It is called "Moderate
Realism," and it holds that essences
are objec• tively real (contrary to Nominalism) but not real
things (contrary to Extreme Realism).
They are the essential "forms" or natures of things. Forms exist
in the world only in individual
material things, but they exist in our minds as uni• versal
concepts when our minds abstract them
from things. It is the very same nature (e.g. humanness) that
exists in both states; otherwise our
concept of it would not be accurate, would not be a concept of
it, of what really is in the things. A
universal form such as humanness exists in the world only
individu• ally, but the same form or
nature exists in the mind universally, by "abstrac• tion" from
individuals.
So according to Aristotle the Nominalist is right to say that
universality is only in the mind, not in
things, but wrong to say that there is nothing in reality that is
the object of universal concepts. And

the Extreme Realist is right to affirm that universals are
objectively real and not just names, but
wrong to think they are "substances." (Aristotle's technical term
for concrete individual things was
"substances.") They are the "forms" of substances (e.g. the
treeness of trees, the humanness of
humans, the beauty of beautiful things, the redness of red
things). Some are essential forms (like
"humanness") which a thing must have in order to be what it is,
others are accidental forms (like
"redness") which a thing can gain or lose and still remain what
it is, as when a tomato changes from
green to red.
This apparently very technical, abstract, logical dispute has
great practical consequences. If
universals are more real than individuals, then individuals, and
human individuals too, are not
primarily important - a convenient philosophy for totalitarians!
And if individual things are less real
than universals, then the senses do not reveal anything very
important, and only the few "brains" who
can think very abstractly are wise. On the other hand, if
universals are not real at all, then we have
the even more radical consequence of skepticism: reality is an

unknowable chaos, and all so-called
universal truths are merely subjective and man-made, including
all principles of science and ethics.
DISCUSSION ON CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION
(Definition of Consciousness - the mental faculty in living
beings which grasps and/or reacts to
existence. Or, the faculty which is aware of its surroundings
[its environs]).
The Three Levels of Consciousness
1. The primary level is simple sensation or direct-sense
experience involving one
stimulus and one automatic response, or reflex, with no
attendant memory of the event.
This level is shared by all living entities, plant and animal.
This is actually a pre-
consciousness level as the living entities which possess this
faculty only, and none of the
additional levels listed below, have no mentality as such.
Mentality is a rudimentary
nervous system rather than having only the store of data present
in protein chains, RNA,
and DNA.

2. The second level, that of the percept, involves the addition of
memory, which does
reside in a mentality (a nervous system including a brain). The
memory is of two or
more connected-sense-experiences (several discrete beams of
light, several discrete
waves of sound, several discrete quantities of pressure, and so
on; acting on an
appropriately receptive sense organ) that form an automatic unit
of cognition or
impression such as sight, hearing, touch, taste, or smell.
a. The perceptual faculty characteristically leads to the
awareness of things or
entities. All things that are perceived have concrete existence
(exist in the
physical universe - the realm of extension) rather than abstract
existence (exist
only in human consciousness as an idea which does not have the
quality of
extension). The perceptual is an automatic function. For
example: open your
eyes and you see, a noise is made and you cannot help but hear,
or a pressure
on your body is involuntarily felt, and so on. Because
"memory" is a primary
constituent of perception, rudimentary learning, or the
integration of past
experiences (through trial and error), is present at this stage.

This level is shared
by the so called higher animals with man.
3. The third level is conceptual, or forming an abstract idea
generalized from the memory
of two or more perceptual instances which have been retained in
memory as similar in
one aspect or another (our ability to identify universals). These
are the ideas having
abstract existence which are mentioned in the previous
paragraph. For example: a lily
pad in a pond, a frog sitting on it, and other items of foliage in
the area are all seen to
display the same outer color; so, one aspect in which they have
similarity (universality) is
green – man pointedly conceives of "green or greenness". He
forms a concept of the
color green by connecting it with a symbol (a word) which can
be spoken, written, or held
as a thought. As a conceptual being can discern universals, he
can also distinguish
particulars, opposites, corollaries, and contrasts.
Another example: we have observed that the predatory animals,
which have been man's
companions through his tenure on earth, always have and still
do hunt for their food. Man, who

previously hunted and gathered exclusively, has, over that
period of time, discovered the
controlled means to raise his food by having the capacity to
establish and act upon the complex
concept of “agriculture“. A concept is not simply a word, but
the corollary representative of
every thing, attribute, action, and relationship for which it
stands. Said another way but in the
same sequence, a word/concept is either a noun, adjective, verb,
or a prepositional phrase
(along with other parts of speech which indicate further details).
The "basic" power in this attribute is to abstractly integrate
from percepts, such as fashioning
the primary tools of the mind: descriptive word/concepts (e.g.,
green) without which reasoned
thinking cannot occur - that is, we identify an observed thing,
attribute, etc., etc., with symbols
like letters, numbers, hieroglyphs, gestures, organized sounds,
and so forth. It must be
emphasized that words are used not only for communication, but
also for the process of rational
thought. Conceptual thinking requires words.
The "greater" power is the ability to build other concepts from

previously established concepts.
In other words, to garner further abstractions from abstractions
themselves - such as forming
the high level abstraction of "agriculture" as including the lower
level constituents of raising
food, namely agronomy and animal husbandry. This is the same
process in which the higher
level concept of "furniture" encompasses the lower level
concepts of chairs, tables, beds, etc.
Another way this greater power is applied is in connecting
concepts to form sentences,
sentences to form paragraphs, and paragraphs to form fully
integrated literary or mathematical
discourses.
Said alternatively, we form a hierarchical thought edifice built
upon a foundation of observation
(percepts), to the "idea" of connecting those observations with
low-level abstract symbols like
words (concepts), and, lastly, to grammatically combine a
number of concepts to form high-
level, complete thoughts (sentences and propositions).
Through concentrated mental imagery, it is possible for actions
and relationships to be modeled
before they happen. This level requires the exercise of free-will

or volitional effort (often a great
amount of effort !) . . . it must be focused upon . . . it is non-
automatic. Conceptual
consciousness is pro-active rather than reactive, as are direct-
sense and perceptual
consciousness'. This "pro-activity" is the engine which propels
human development forward at
an ever increasing rate.
The conceptual faculty characteristically leads to self-
awareness, or consciousness of one’s
own consciousness. The name for humans in the discipline of
Anthropology is homo-sapien-
sapiens. The 'sapien-sapiens' in the classification refers to 'a
being' aware of itself, that is, self-
awareness. In some circles this is termed the Fourth Level
Consciousness which evolves from
the following process: [1] Mineral Consciousness; [2] Vegetable
(Plant) Consciousness; [3]
Animal and Bicameral Consciousness and, presently, to [4] Self
Consciousness. Speculation is
that the level yet to come is [5] Unitary/Cosmic Consciousness,
or, at times, in the Western
Tradition - Christ Consciousness.
(The lack of awareness, differentiation, and definition of these
three modes of cognition,

especially that of the conceptual, is what has led man to
virtually all of his confused states of
being.)
These are elusive, abstract topics to comprehend. Here are
some restatements of what was
presented above which might help bring clarification.
Perception (observation; the use of our five instruments of
knowledge, our senses), is the basic
state of human cognition; the memory of several instances of
awareness constituting
experience and, finally, the ability to learn or associate through
memory from experience.
Conception involves thinking or creating associations
themselves by symbolizing experiences
and consolidating or integrating these associations in various
novel combinations which have
never been experienced as such.
Reason (Rationality): the faculty which integrates our
perceptions (data provided by our
senses) by means of forming conceptions. This raises our
knowledge from the perceptual
level, which we share with the animals, to the conceptual
(abstractive) level which we alone
have been observed to have attained. The method which reason
employs in this process is the
integrated Trivium.

1. Through sense observation, form concepts and complete
propositions from raw data in a
discursive or grammatical manner to form a factual body-of-
knowledge.
2. Subject that organized, factual body to the rules of logic for
the elimination of all
contradictions within its content and; thus, yield valid
understanding.
3. Test this validity through cogent expression (forceful
conviction) to one's self or, better
yet, persuade another party as to one's conclusion via the rules
of rhetoric.
Since each of these elements is based on the facts of reality, the
conclusions reached by a
process of reason are objective and consistent with reality;
hence, accessible to all men, the
rational animals.
Finding the root of the concept rational - ratio - might offer
additional clarification. Man is
literally the animal that can discern, identify and use ratios or
proportions. This is the a most
concise definition of “man“, his reasoning ability, and all this
implies. It speaks eloquently to the
refined subtlety of which we are capable. The first realization
of ratio was in identifying causality

- or the Law of Cause and Effect. For every cause there is
exactly one effect, for every effect
there is exactly one cause . . . this is the Prime Ratio, the ratio
of 1:1. From this beginning,
observations led to all of the other ratios which we use: the
octave and its various divisions in
music and astronomy; the ratios of Pi and Phi (the Golden
Ratio); the Pythagorean Theorum
and Fibbonacci Sequence in science, engineering, and the
plastic arts and so on. Birds fly, fish
swim, men discover and use ratio.
From the Western, Abrahamic Traditions:
In the time before Eve, when Adam was alone in the Garden of
Eden except for the animals and
vegetation, God is said to have tested him with a question.
“What impressions do you have of
your companions in the Garden, Adam?” Adam replied, “I see
all about that which is like me,
but I see nothing about which is anything like me.” The test
was successfully answered
because Adam recognized the living entities, like himself, all
around, but that he was the only
entity he could observe which was aware of itself and, by
implication, of the great magnitude

and proportion of that difference. He had expressed the wider
scale of awareness, not only of
kind, but also of degree. Thus, as the story goes, God granted
him the company of Eve to help
spread this quality in the Garden. This is the quality of Grace,
the quality of conceptual thought,
that all persons have inherited; and, it is important to add, of
which each is free to cultivate and
use... or not.
The Three Levels of Cognition
There are three distinctive modes of human cognition:
1. The Mythopoeic Mode (a contraction of mythic and poetic),
which is the first
development of these modes, uses analogical methods (or,
comparisons) in attempting
to illuminate phenomena. For example, an earthquake had been
said to be caused by
the anger of a super-natural god/being like Neptune. Anger and
earthquake are
compared as signifying tumult in a well plotted, narrative story
which, in the final
analysis, is a human mental construct -- a fiction -- a fantasy.

Here, there is no basis for
a rational argument or for the advancement of another
possibility in explanation.
Therefore, the refinements which are focused upon in this mode
are those of poetic or
literary style rather than in efforts of uncovering truth.
2. The Philosophic Mode, developed next, dispensed with
extraneous entities and
motivations. It makes observations of the phenomenon itself
through the filter of logic (to
methodically detect and eliminate propositional contradictions).
Thales of Miletus, the
ancient Greek 'Father of Western Philosophy', proposed that an
earthquake was the last
event in a chain of natural occurrences; that the immediately
preceding link was the
violent disruption of the surface of the earthly ocean which was
itself effected by the
agitation of the larger cosmic ocean. This was an erroneous
explanation, but it tried to
delimit itself to the observable, natural world rather than
involving the fantasies of an
additional super-natural dimension. The value here is in the
consistent manner in which

a phenomenon is explained within the natural, knowable realm
itself (that which is
apparent to our five senses). If an error is present, as it is in the
given example, a
correction is possible by repeatedly applying the principles of
the trivium, and particularly
rules of logic, as a greater amount of knowledge -- gained over
time -- is focused upon
the question of truth.
3. The Scientific Mode, the latest development, uses physical
demonstration; that is,
controlled experimentation in explaining phenomena. The aim
of a controlled experiment
is the successful practical demonstration in the execution of a
statement of theory. If the
full understanding of Nature is not present, or if there is an
error in that theoretical
statement, the designed experiment will not go to completion
and the statement will have
remained a hypothetical one. If the understanding is sufficient
and; therefore true, any
number of such experiments will go to completion and all
witnesses to the events will
have perceived exactly the same actions and relationships in the

process of those
completed cycles. The proof of a successful scientific
demonstration is self-evident, in
other words, to all observers; as are the geometric shapes of a
circle, a square, and a
triangle to all human observers with unimpaired physical
senses.
In the authorship of a scientific theory, which has been
successfully demonstrated by
experiment, the qualifications and quantification necessary for
that demonstration will be
included in the theoretical statement of explanation. As time has
progressed into the more
modern era, a sufficient amount of quantifiable data has been
discovered about the pertinent
conditions for producing the effects of an earthquake. The
discovery is that very specific
volcanic and/or geological conditions (not hydrodynamic
conditions as Thales had assumed) in
very specific geographical locations, will produce earthquakes.
These may be influenced by the
gravitational effects of the Moon, but enough information along
those lines has not yet been
analyzed. Rather than being a controlled experiment, a natural
earthquake possesses all of the

quantifiable criteria that has been gathered over time, and can
be accurately correlated after the
fact. The point to be made here is that both earthquakes and
successful experiments are
objective events which are perceivable to all witnesses in like
fashion. Discoveries of the laws of
objective nature and demonstrations of those laws in objective
nature are what form the
discipline of delineation in the scientific mode.
The following is an excerpt from another letter which may
better clarify The Seven Liberal Arts
& Sciences. Liberal is used here not in the modern, but in the
classical sense: it is literally -
liberating or setting individual minds free from ignorance
through the understanding of reality. As
regards contemporary society, this understanding would liberate
us from task masters of all
sorts - despots in schools and in the workplace; unscrupulous
professionals; and self-serving
propagandists in government, media, and advertising - by giving
us the freedom to competently
explore reality for ourselves. Refer to Jan’s definition of
liberal.

DISCUSSION ON GRAMMAR - Primary Organization of
Thoughts
GRAMMAR - not only the rules developed and applied to the
ordering of word/concepts for
verbal expression and communication in the form of a sentence,
but our first contact with
thinking systematically about reality. Put simply, this is the
initial, self-conscious technique used
in properly (that is, discursively and sequentially) organizing
factual data into a coherent body of
knowledge on a particular subject. This includes a broader
definition of grammar which targets
any and all topics, not only that of language.
Grammar usually connotes the rules of language to express
thought. This suggests the
primacy of language in grammar. It is called "special grammar"
which properly relates words to
other words within a particular language like English, German,
or Latin. The grammar to be
described is intended to establish the primacy of thought; that
is, using grammar to initially
organize our thoughts. This is called "general grammar" which
properly relates thought to
reality or to that which exists (these are the primary rules of
existence as processed by
humans).

Single words by themselves have no meaning beyond what they
denote. A word is not a
complete thought. "Slow", "green", "above", "bird", only point
out phenomena like actions,
attributes, relations, and things - they are not complete
thoughts. A sentence, a series of words
containing a subject and a predicate, is the first representation
of a complete thought which has
meaning.
At times, a thought needs more than a word representing a thing
(a substantive - noun or
pronoun), and another word stating something about the subject
upon which the thought is
predicated (a verb), but also a word or words standing for
something to complete the thought,
something which completes the meaning of the predicate, a
complement or an object. (Note the
spelling of compl-e-ment which refers to being completed. It is
different from the more
commonly used term referring to admiration, spelled compl-i-
ment.) This is the basic structure of
conceptual thought: subject, predicate, and complement; or
subject, verb, and object. In so
called progressive schools, this is stated as a thing (a
substantive) which performs an action or

describes a state of being (a verb) upon another thing which is
acted upon (an object, which is
also a substantive). Grammar can be used for efficiently
organizing a number of such similar
basic thoughts into a more complex composition for subjection
to analysis and/or synthesis
(these last two concepts will be discussed in #3 - On Logic).
The type of sentence which
declares something - something which can be affirmed or denied
- is the one which will be
discussed. Sentences which ask questions, state commands, or
make an exclamation cannot
be subject to opinion (i.e., affirmed or denied). Declarative
sentences are the only ones which
can be called propositions. A series of simple propositions and
propositional arguments
constitute complete, integrated bodies of knowledge; or, they
can stand and be judged on their
own.
Example - Definition / Sentence
Existence is every substance, action, attribute, and relationship
that is, was, or
ever will be.
Concepts of Existence:

1. Substance- a person, a place, or any substantial thing
perceived through the five
2. "Instruments of Knowledge"; the five senses: Pronouns and
Nouns
3. Action- those things that nouns do, as in motion or states of
being: and Verbs
4. Attribute- property of an entity like color, dimension,
quantity or quality of force, traits of
life/sentience, etc.: Adjectives (noun modifiers) and Adverbs
(verb modifiers)
5. Relationship- comparisons among existents, usually spatial
and/or temporal:
6. Prepositions - Words which connect other words to show the
7. relationship among the things those words represent.
8. The words or, and, but, etc., are words and concepts to show
relationships among
thoughts and are used for unit economy in communication:
Conjunctions
Concepts of Consciousness:
These are seven of the nine essential components in the study of
grammar, presented in the
logical order, if not the chronological order, in which they were

probably developed for
expression and communication. The other two are articles (a or
an and the) placed before a
noun to show whether it is general or particular, and
exclamatory interjections (words which can
stand alone as a sentence, like - Wow! or Yea!). All other
grammatical structures are details
within them.
The words as used are not necessarily the identifying parts of
speech in the example-
definitional sentence, but it is meant to illustrate that the order
in grammar refers to items and
events in reality; to the universe around us and not just to some
arbitrary rules of mere writing or
speech as prescribed by authorities or social conventions such
as was unsuccessfully
attempted when the rules of Latin were applied to English?
This is the way the human mind
begins to interact with its environment, its surrounding natural
existence, in its uniquely
conceptual capacity.
(General) Grammar, as mentioned initially, can be applied to all
subjects and propositions, not
just those that deal with language. The data comprising any
topic can be ordered by defining

what is acting or relating, the subject ([pro-]nouns and
modifiers); the names of the actions or
relationships themselves (verbs / prepositions and modifiers);
and that which is being acted
upon or related to - the object. This primary-level organization
is now ready to be understood
(scrutinized or proven) by subjection to the rules of logic. In
logic, for example, entire phrases
or sometimes paragraphs within a proposition need be identified
as subject, predicate, and
complement (technically this is termed "subject" and "theme")
so as to be analyzed deductively
(see #3, On Logic).
SUMMARY
The work of grammar is to identify, gather, and discursively
arrange raw, factual data of a similar
nature into a specific body-of-knowledge. Alternatively stated,
the work of grammar is to convert
raw data into coherent information.
The effect of grammar is to produce primary, or first-order,
knowledge of a subject.

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