Dissertation final copy July 2016

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The effect of mortality salience on implicit nationality bias
British until I die: The effect of mortality salience on implicit nationality bias
By Steven Coll
University of Glasgow
School of Science and Engineering
Department of Psychology
Msc Psychological Science
Supervised by Dr Larissa Szymanek
Submitted Friday 8th
July 2016
Word Count: 10,000

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Table of contents
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................4
Introduction .................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Terror Management Theory ........................................................................................... 7
1.2 Empirical evidence for TMT................................................................................................ 8
1.3 Anxiety Buffer Hypothesis...................................................................................................9
1.4 Mortality Salience Hypothesis............................................................................................ 11
1.4 Mortality salience, prejudice and conflict ............................................................................ 12
1.5 Mortality salience and implicit attitudes.............................................................................. 13
1.6 Hypotheses ....................................................................................................................... 15
Method ...................................................................................................................................... 15
2.1 Design.............................................................................................................................. 15
2.2 Participants ....................................................................................................................... 15
2.3 Materials/Stimuli............................................................................................................... 16
2.4 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.......................................................................................... 16
2.5 Mortality Attitudes Personality Survey. ........................................................................... 16
2.6 Raven’s Progressive Matrices......................................................................................... 16
2.7 Implicit Association Test................................................................................................ 16
2.8 Procedure.......................................................................................................................... 18
Results....................................................................................................................................... 18
3.1 Stimuli Validity................................................................................................................. 18
3.2 Statistical Analysis ........................................................................................................... 18
3.3 Implicit nationality bias.................................................................................................. 19
3.4 Implicit nationality bias and self-esteem.......................................................................... 19
Discussion.................................................................................................................................. 21
References ................................................................................................................................. 28
Appendices ................................................................................................................................ 35
IAT Stimuli............................................................................................................................ 35
“British” images.................................................................................................................. 35
“Non-British” images .......................................................................................................... 36
“Positive” images ................................................................................................................ 37

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“Negative” images............................................................................................................... 38

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Abstract
Research investigating the effects of mortality salience has shown that reminding people of
their own death can elicit, or intensify, negative attitudes and behaviours towards out-group members.
However,the vast majority of this research measures attitudes or behaviours explicitly, with very little
investigation into the effects of mortality salience on implicit attitudes and no studies looking
specifically at mortality salience and implicit attitudes related to nationality. The current study
investigated the effect of mortality salience on implicit nationality bias in 40 British participants using
an Implicit Association Test (IAT) which paired the concepts of “British” and “non-British” with the
concepts of “Positive” and “Negative”. Additionally, the relationship between self-esteem and
implicit bias was investigated. Participant self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg self-esteem
scale before they were randomly assigned to complete either a survey which asked them to describe
thoughts about their own death (mortality salience condition) or a similar survey asking about dental
pain (control condition). They then took part in a distraction task before completing the IAT which
used images as stimuli. The results found a significant implicit nationality bias in all participants
however there was no significant difference between strength of implicit nationality bias in mortality
salient and control participants, and there was no significant correlation between self-esteem and
implicit nationality bias strength in all participants. The implications of these findings are explored in
the discussion with suggestions for future research.

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One night in long bygone times, man awoke and saw himself, he saw that he was naked under
cosmos, homeless in his own body. All things dissolved before his testing thought, wonder
above wonder, horror above horror unfolded in his mind.
(Peter WesselZapffe,1933, pp.1)

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Introduction
Like all animals on earth humans possess an instinctive drive for self-preservation, however
we are uniquely aware that ultimately we will die. Our innate desire for survival conflicts with our
knowledge of death and results in a distinctive cognitive challenge which Cave (2012) calls the
mortality paradox. Death is unimaginable to us, as it is impossible for a conscious mind to envision
non-existence. Miguel De Unamuno (1921) describes the insurmountable difficulty faced when
attempting to picture our own personal extinction:
It is impossible for us, in effect,to conceive of ourselves as not existing, and no effort is
capable of enabling consciousness to realize absolute unconsciousness, its own annihilation.
Try, reader,to imagine to yourself, when you are wide awake,the condition of your soul
when you are in a deep sleep: try to fill your consciousness with the representation of no-
consciousness, and you will see the impossibility of it. (pp.38)
Comprehending non-existence is literally impossible and this lead Freud (1918) to contend that,
unconsciously, we all consider ourselves immortal. Child development studies have shown that there
may be truth behind the Freud’s ruminations, as children’s beliefs in the continuality of psychological
states after death generally decrease over time from pre-school age through to adulthood .This has
been argued as evidence that afterlife beliefs are a cognitive default, rather than exclusively socially
taught (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004, Bering, McLeod & Shackelford, 2005). Furthermore, a
predisposition to believe in some form of continued psychological existence after death is observed in
children across cultures, leading to the inference that beliefs in personal immortality are instinctive
and that cultural exposure determines which specific belief is adhered to (Emmons & Kelemen, 2014,
Bering, Blasi & Bjorklund, 2005, Bering, 2002 & 2006). While we may be cognitively predisposed to
believe in various iterations of immortality, as modern society becomes progressively secular
traditional, promises of heaven or resurrection come under increasing doubt. This leads to the second
half of the mortality paradox, which arises from the fact that it is impossible for people to ignore that
their own death is inevitable. Equally troubling is the realisation that death is capricious and
indiscriminate; it could strike at any moment. An alarming awareness of vulnerability and mortality
has the potential to cause devastating anxiety, so how do humans ameliorate against the harsh reality
of death? How are we able to function without cowering in perpetual fear?
Ernest Becker provides answers in his seminal work The Denial of Death (1973). His thesis is an
interdisciplinary explanation of how we cope with death and proposes that fear of death is the chief
motivator of human activity, asserting that essentially all human behaviour is the result of an intrinsic
attempt to deny the reality of death. Throughout human history members of every society have
displayed two basic needs; a desire for self-esteem and a desire to promote the beliefs and values of

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one’s own specific culture. Becker argues that these desires are crucial in combating the anxiety of
mortality, and that the finality of death is denied through abstract beliefs which assert that valued
aspects of the self survive temporal destruction. He explains that individuals attempt to achieve
immortality in two ways; literally or symbolically. Literal immortality involves beliefs which confide
that the self survives the physical death of the body and includes traditional religious afterlife beliefs
about an elevation to heaven or another etherealplane of existence. These beliefs accept that the
physical body will perish but that the concept of the self is immortal and survives material destruction.
Symbolic immortality differs in that it is achieved when an individual attaches the self to a greater
concept or cause which will outlive the body. An example of symbolic immortality is patriotism
whereby an individual attaches themselves to the concept of a nation which will still exist long after
they have died. Symbolic immortality can also be achieved by producing something lasting, such as a
piece of artwork or literature, which will outlive its creator. Having children is also a form of
symbolic immortality as the individual has ensured that their genes survive into the following
generation and hopefully beyond. Crucial to Becker’s ideas about immortality striving is the concept
of culture as it provides the mechanisms for individuals to achieve symbolic immortality. If an
individual is able to exhibit the customs and beliefs of their specific culture then they ensure that they
are part of a much larger collective which provides structure, order, and a sense control over what is a
chaotic world. This is vitally important in the suppression of death anxiety as it leads to a belief that
unpredictable events,including death, can be controlled. Self-esteem, according to Becker, is the
result of living up to (or exceeding) the expectations of a cultural worldview which provides a sense
of purpose, meaning, and promises of immortality. While Becker’s penetrating ideas are certainly
compelling, they were largely ignored by the scientific community and criticized for being for being
too closely associated with the unempirical ideas of psychoanalysis. However,eventually, social
psychologists formulated Becker’s ideas into a testable theory known as Terror Management Theory
(TMT) which, after decades of empirical evidence, has become a widely accepted idea within the field
of social psychology (Greenberg, Pyszcynski & Solomon, 1986).
1.1 Terror Management Theory
TMT posits that an individual needs to believe that they are meeting (or exceeding) the standards
and values of their cultural worldview in order for the buffer against death anxiety (which culture
provides) to be effective. Cultural worldviews often provide a conception of the world as a just place,
where good or bad things happen for a reason,as well as promising literal or symbolic immortality for
those who adhere to the ascribed customs, rituals and morality. It is important to note that while death
denial is stressed as an especially important function of a cultural worldview is it certainly not
claimed to be the only function. TMT recognises that individuals do not spend every waking minute
consciously thinking about death and how to avoid it. Therefore,death anxiety lies predominately in
the subconscious. Only when death is made salient does the anxiety need to be combated against. This

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is achieved via a dual-defence model comprising of two psychological defences known as proximal
and distal defences (Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 1990, Arndt, Cook & Routledge, 2004).
Proximal defences occur when the anxiety of mortality salience is directly conscious and needs to be
removed immediately. This is often achieved through rationalisations which reject the prospect of
dying by denying physical vulnerability and pushing the prospect of death into the distant future. For
example, somebody reminded of the possibility of developing a terminal illness may alleviate the
death anxiety this causes by telling themselves that they are currently young, healthy and not likely to
die any time soon, therefore successfully pushing the threat of death into the future. Distal defences
occur when mortality salience moves from focal attention but is still present on the edge of
consciousness and involves a reassuring of an individual’s faith in their cultural worldview.
Somebody displaying distal defences will be expected to show an increased alliance to their cultural
worldview. In summary, TMT recognises that humans have an instinctive desire to avoid dying yet
possess unique cognitive abilities which mean that they are aware of the fact that they will die. This
has the potential to cause extreme anxiety and terror which is controlled by a combination of proximal
defences which deny vulnerability, and distal defences whereby an individual immerses themselves in
a cultural worldview which provides a shared concept of reality including meaning, order, and the
promise of death transcendence to those who meet the prescribed standards of value and expected
behaviour. Living up to the standards of a cultural worldview results in a belief that one is an object of
value in a meaningful universe which provides self-esteem and acts as an effective mechanism to
deny the reality of their own death. For a detailed description of the evolution of TMT from its
inception to present day see Greenberg (2012).
1.2 Empirical evidence for TMT
Rosenblatt et al (1989) conducted the first TMT experiments by testing the hypothesis that,
when reminded of death, people will be highly motivated to maintain faith in their cultural worldview.
It was predicted that people would respond positively to those who conform to their cultural
worldview while reactions towards those who challenge or threaten it will be negative. The reasoning
behind this prediction is that when the moral principles of a cultural worldview are ignored or broken
an individual is forced to either question the universal validity of their worldview or conclude that
there must be something inherently bad about the person who does not conform. Accepting that one’s
cultural worldview is not universally valid could have potentially devastating effects on one’s sense of
meaning and worth. Therefore,it is preferable to conclude that there must be something inherently
bad about the transgressor. A series of innovative experiments provided profound results. . Municipal
judges reminded of their own mortality set significantly higher bail bonds for an alleged prostitute in a
fictional legal case in comparison to judges in a control condition. College students who had prior
negative attitudes towards prostitution rated the offence far more negatively when reminded of death

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than students with relatively positive attitudes towards prostitution, demonstrating that the effects of
mortality salience only elicited negative response in those who perceived prostitution as a violation of
their worldview. Furthermore, during mortality salience, participants recommended higher financial
rewards for a fictional assailant who supposedly helped catch a criminal. Additional experiments
found that being reminded of mortality increases preference for in-group members, and the rejection
of out-group members. Mortality salient Christians rated Jews more negatively while similarly
mortality salient students displayed intensified responses of positivity or negativity towards a
magazine article interviewee depending on whether their responses displayed a pro- or anti- USA
sentiment. These results were later replicated in Japanese participants (Greenberg et al, 1990, Heine,
Harihara & Niiya, 2002). These early experiments provided empirical evidence for the assumptions
of TMT and paved the way for an entire field of research which continues today. Current TMT
research follows three general hypotheses; the anxiety buffer hypothesis, the mortality salience
hypothesis, and the death-though accessibility hypothesis. Particular focus will be paid to the first two
hypotheses as they are most relevant to the present study, however it is worth briefly discussing the
death-though accessibility hypothesis. This hypothesis states that threats to the defences used as
anxiety buffers will result in higher accessibility to death related thoughts. Essentially, threats to
psychological defences such as self-worth, religious beliefs, or a belief in the superiority of a nation
will allow thoughts about death to occur in the mind more easily, as the defences which usually block
these thoughts have been jeopardised. For example, creationists display increased death-though
accessibility after being exposed to anti-creationist arguments (Schimel et al, 2007). Haye’s et al.
(2010) provide and extensive review of the death-though accessibility hypothesis.
1.3 Anxiety Buffer Hypothesis
If faith in a cultural worldview and self-esteem provide protection against death anxiety then
bolstering personal belief in that faith, or increasing self-esteem,should reduce anxiety in response to
reminders of mortality. From the perspective of TMT, self-esteem is the perception that one is a
valuable member of society in a meaningful universe and is achieved primarily by meeting or
exceeding the values and expectations of a culture (Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszcynski, 1997). The
anxiety buffer hypothesis predicts that those with higher self-esteem will be less affected by the
anxiety of mortality salience. Initial testing of this hypothesis produced inconsistent results as some
studies have demonstrated that temporarily boosting participants’ self-esteem (by providing positive
feedback in response to personality or intelligence tests) results in lower anxiety in response to a death
related video, however other experiments have elicited the opposite effect (Baldwin & Greenberg et
al., 1992, Wesley, 1996, McGregor et al., 2007). Stronger support for the anxiety buffer hypothesis
comes from research showing that reports of low dispositional self-esteem result in increased
worldview defence,while high-self-esteem reduces the need for worldview defence in mortality
salient participants (Harmon-Jones et al, 1997, Galliot, Schmeichel & Maner, 2007, Greenberg et al,

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1993). This is consistent with the predictions of TMT, as those lower in self-esteem need to
strengthen faith in their cultural worldview to alleviate death anxiety. Expanding on these findings,
Juhl & Routledge (2016) explored the anxiety buffer hypothesis in considerable detail by exploring
the impact that specific personality traits have in the protection against increased anxiety and
decreased well-being during mortality salience. Participants who score low in ratings of nostalgia
proneness (a sentimental appreciation for the past), interdependent self-construal (defining the self in
terms of a broader social group) and meaning in life show higher death anxiety under mortality
salience conditions. Furthermore, having a low self-worth also affects participants negatively under
mortality salience as they report a decreased satisfaction with life, a correlation which does not appear
in those with higher ratings of self-worth.
An appreciation of the relationship between self-esteem and death anxiety is particularly
pertinent when attempting to curb maladaptive behaviours. When Ben-Ari et al. (1999) made death
salient to a cohort of the Israeli Defence Force before placing them in a driving simulator, they found
that the average driving speed of these soldiers was higher than soldiers in a control condition. At first
glance these results seem somewhat confusing; surely reminding people of death would motivate
people to engage in more safety conscious behaviour. However,the British Psychological Society
have demonstrated that reminding people of the mortality risks of maladaptive behaviours actually
increases willingness to partake in these behaviours if they are linked to self-esteem enhancement.
Using alcohol consumption as an example, it was found that those who consider binge drinking a self-
esteem boosting behaviour are more likely to be willing drink heavily when reminded of the health
dangers of excessive drinking (Jessop & Wade, 2008). The explanation for this contradictory
behaviour is that reminding people of the health risks of binge drinking makes mortality salient,
which causes a need for increased self-esteem which is provided by the negative behaviour itself. This
explains the behaviour of the speeding soldiers, as further analysis found that excess speed was only
present in the drivers who perceived fast driving as a self-esteem boosting behaviour. Following this
discovery, it has been argued that health campaigns which stress the negative impact of behaviour on
an individual’s health actually have a negative effect by increasing the frequency of the behaviour in
individuals who use it to bolster self-esteem. Research looking into the effectiveness of anti-smoking
campaigns found that social exclusion appeals (messages which state that a behaviour is not in line
with regular in-group behaviour) are more effective than health warnings at reducing intentions to
smoke (Martin & Kamins, 2010). People who base their self-esteem on smoking are no longer
motivated to continue smoking if they believe that it is likely to negatively impact social relationships.
This explains the relative ineffectiveness of campaigns that stress health risks in comparison to social
exclusion campaigns that make mortality salient by reminding smokers that their habit is likely to
cause death. It appears that warning against the potentially destructive impact smoking can have on
social relationships increases motivation to cease the maladaptive behaviour more far efficiently.

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These studies demonstrate the close relationship between self-esteem, anxiety and mortality salience.
1.4 Mortality Salience Hypothesis
Complementing the anxiety buffer hypothesis is the mortality salience hypothesis. This
hypothesis asserts that because a cultural worldview provides protection against the potential terror
which arises from reminders of mortality, a direct reminder of mortality should motivate individuals
to adhere stronger to their cultural worldview. Consequently, individuals are expected to respond
more negatively towards those who challenge or threaten it. The pioneering experiments of Rosenblatt
et al (1989) and Greenberg et al (1990) provide the earliest support for the mortality salience
hypothesis and in the following twenty five years hundreds of experiments have increased its validity.
A meta-analysis of 277 experiments, employing a variety of mortality salience manipulations,
concluded that the mortality salience hypothesis, which demonstrates that awareness of death affects
behaviour without conscious realisation, is robust with moderate to large effects across behavioural,
attitudinal and cognitive dependent variables (Burke, Martens & Faucher,2010). Examples include
studies which show that reminding people of death increases desire to have offspring, increases
willingness to spend higher on luxury items (in line with the urge to maintain high status and engage
in materialistic consumer behaviour which prevails in western society), and intensifies political
attitudes (Fritsche et al., 2007, Burke, Kosloff & Landau, 2013, Chopik & Edelstein, 2014). Mortality
salience has even been shown to influence people’s enjoyment of art and entertainment as mortality
salient participants show an increased interest in law and order themed programs, but a diminished
appreciation for modern art (Taylor, 2012, Landau et al., 2006). TMT explains these behaviours as
direct responses to death anxiety, as an appreciation for law and order can eliminate existential angst
by promising a just and fair world while mortality salient distain for modern art arises from its lack of
structure.
As well as instigating culture specific defences, reminders of death can have a significant
impact on physical and mental health. Negative phobic and compulsive behaviours, such as obsessive
hand washing and avoidance of social interaction, have been shown to be exacerbated by mortality
salience in participants with social anxiety (Strachan et al, 2007). The mortality salience hypothesis
has also been used to explain reactions to traumatic events as TMT posits that post-traumatic stress
disorder results from a disruption in anxiety-buffering mechanisms which leave the sufferer
susceptible to overwhelming anxiety (Pyszczynski & Kesebir, 2011). While anxiety buffer hypothesis
experiments have demonstrated that people are willing to engage in behaviour that is risky to health in
order to boost self-esteem,mortality salience studies have shown that reminders of death can actually
encourage health promoting behaviours, particularly in younger participants (Bozo, Tunca & Simsek,
2009). Dunne, Gallagher & Matthews (2015) report that mortality salience has no impact on
participant willingness to use a point-of-care medical testing device which assesses cardiovascular

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disease risk and suggest that mortality reminders do not necessarily lead to risky decisions regarding
all forms of health behaviours.
1.4 Mortality salience,prejudice and conflict
While the specific social norms and values of individual cultures differ (and may even be
transient within the cultures themselves), reminders of death motivates individuals to adhere to
whichever norms are most salient (Gailiot et al., 2008, Ma-Kellams & Blascovich, 2011, Jonas &
Fritsche, 2012). Bolstering a cultural worldview in response to death anxiety also requires derogating,
or in extreme cases actively trying to eliminate, those who directly challenge it. A large body of
literature has demonstrated some worrying responses towards perceived out-group members in
mortality salient participants. Mortality salience has been shown to intensify negative reactions to
immigrants, homosexuals, and different races,while white Americans are more sympathetic towards
explicit racists (Bassett,2010, Bassett & Connelly, 2011, Webster & Saucier, 2011, Greenberg et al.,
2001). Mortality salience not only increases negative attitudinal responses towards out-group
members, but can actually precipitate physical harm. Physical retaliation towards an out-group was
demonstrated by McGregor et al (1998), who showed that mortality salient participants allocated an
increased quantity of painfully hot salsa to critics of their political views. One of the most disturbing
revelations concerns the findings of Pyszczynski et al. (2005) who found that mortality salient Iranian
males are more sympathetic towards a student who supports martyrdom, even demonstrating
increased willingness consider such actions themselves, while mortality salient conservative
Americans are more likely to support extreme military action against the Middle East, even if this
meant that innocent civilians were likely to be killed. These findings are particularly worrying when
combined with case-studies which show that, contrary to stereotypes,suicide bombers are can be
psychologically well-adjusted, well-educated ,and financially well off (Lifton, 1999 & Ignatieff,
1993). Mortality salience, it would appear, has the potential to contribute towards the motivation of
seemingly ordinary people to commit acts of extreme devastation. Mortality salience not only has the
potential to cause war,but it also has the potential to keep it going by hampering the peace process of
on-going conflicts. The violence and death present in a war zone makes mortality perpetually salient
for those involved and, as mortality salience increases stereotypical thinking and in-group favouritism,
results in increased attention towards “hawks” (out-group members who work towards conflict
continuation) while reducing appreciation for “doves” (out-group members who actively seek to
resolve conflict) (Niesta et al, 2008). The result is a self-perpetuating cycle of conflict whereby the
mortality salience of conflict strengthens the negative stereotypes of the out-group, which in turn
continues the violence, thus maintaining mortality salience.
Studies focusing on attitudes and conflict in relation to mortality salience paint a
disappointing picture; however, a more promising message can be found in studies which identify its
positive effects. As previous literature has shown, mortality salience motivates individuals to meet the

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behaviour and social norms of their cultural worldview. While this can result in conflict, it can also
have the opposite effect providing that the worldview promotes positive behaviour. If an individual’s
cultural worldview promotes peace,tolerance, or pacifism, then mortality salience will increase that
person’s willingness to engage in these benevolent behaviours. Hui et al. (2014) found that Christians,
in line with their beliefs, are less accepting of material goals when presented with a life event which
carries an existential threat, demonstrating that mortality salience encourages the behaviours valued
by a religious worldview. Interestingly, despite some studies tentatively concluding that general
religiosity tends to result in prejudice and intolerance (Rowatt et al, 2009), others have found that
those who practice personal prayer (as opposed to attending organised religious service) do not
support out-group violence and religious affiliation can actually mitigate the negative impact towards
out-group members elicited by mortality salience (Ginges et al, 2009, Newheiser et al, 2015). Zavala
et al. (2012) differentiate between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, where the former describes those
who internalise and actually live out religious beliefs and guidance, while the latter describes those
who use religion as a means of social differentiation, support, status and prestige. Those high in
intrinsic religiosity have reduced support for hostile counter-terrorism activity and a reduced negative
attitude towards out-group members in a mortality salience condition. The duration of mortality
salience can also influence goals, as short-term confrontations with death lead to defensiveness while
persistent exposure to mortality salience can lead to a shift towards intrinsic goals, as opposed to
conflict with out-group members (Lykins at al, 2007). Recent research by Cox & Kersten (2016) has
shown that while the threat of death can make people hostile towards an out-group, it can also bring
them together as demonstrated by mortality salient participants who showed greater propensity to
replicate the language of others than control participants. This challenges the suggestions presented by
Neista et al (2008) in regards to peace processes.
1.5 Mortality salience and implicit attitudes
Despite some promising results, it is important to investigate the derogation towards out-
group members which is widely reported. Understanding the mechanisms behind negative behaviours
allows to the implementation of interventions to eradicate or reduce the undesired effects of mortality
salience. A key observation is that a vast amount of TMT research relies on explicit measurements of
dependent variables. In a prototypical mortality salience experiment, as described by Burke et al,
(2010), participants are primed with mortality salience before an explicit measurement about attitudes
towards an out-group are recorded,often using a questionnaire. While these questionnaires are often
indirect and subtle, they allow participants time to deliberate, resulting in a response which has been
manipulated by social desirability and demand characteristics (Fazio & Olson, 2003). This is
particularly relevant to mortality salience experiments which investigate sensitive topics such as
attitudes towards race and sexuality. In contrast,implicit responses are automatic or spontaneous

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which do not allow time for introspection. Implicit biases are particularly challenging because
individuals may not be aware that they hold them, even though implicit attitudes impact explicit
behaviours. Jong, Halberstadt & Bluenmke (2012) highlighted the discrepancy between explicit and
implicit attitudes by showing that explicitly, under mortality salience conditions, atheists expressed
increased confidence in the non-existence of supernatural entities despite implicit measurements
showing that belief in supernatural entities actually increased after death priming. Other studies
looking into implicit bias have found that while males demonstrate double standard ageism (stronger
ageism towards the opposite sex) after mortality is made salient, ageism increases but the double
standard disappears (Boudjemadi & Gana, 2012). TMT explains these results as a proximal defence
whereby the individual wishes to disassociate himself from an elderly face of the same sex as this is
closer to how he will look himself when he is older, and therefore closer to death. Similar dissociative
responses are displayed by mortality salient participants towards terminal cancer patients (Smith &
Kasser,2014).
A standard measure of implicit attitude is the Implicit Association Task (IAT) (Greenwald,
McGhee & Schwartz, 1998), which circumvents the distortion of explicit measurements by ensuring
that participants are unaware of the purpose of the test while recording the response times of a
category pairing task. The IAT is a useful measurement of attitudes, as it has been shown to hold
stronger predictive validity on socially sensitive areas than explicit measurements (Greenwald et al.,
2009). While it is a popular paradigm used in the field of social psychology, very few TMT studies
have used an IAT to investigate the impact of mortality salience. Of the limited studies which have
implemented an IAT, Fritsche, Jonas & Frankhanel (2008) show that mortality salience increases and
individuals’ desire for a generalized sense of control in the world. One of the only studies
investigating implicit in-group bias is that of Bradley et al (2012) who found an implicit racial bias in
Caucasian participants against an out-group of African Americans. Bradley et al’s study exposes a
large gap in the TMT literature because racialbias has been demonstrated both implicitly and
explicitly using the mortality salience paradigm but no studies have investigated the effect of
mortality salience on implicit bias towards nationality. This appears as a striking omission to TMT
research as explicit nationally bias has been observed in the work of Nelson et al (1997), who reported
findings which show that in the event of a car crash mortality salient Americans are more likely to
blame the manufacturer than the driver if they were informed that the car was made in Japan, or the
driver if they thought that the car was made in America and the driver was Japanese. Furthermore,
implicit bias towards nationality has been demonstrated in participants from multiple countries in
experiments unrelated to TMT (Carter & Ferguson, 2011, Hassin et al, 2009). So it is known that
mortality salience impacts explicit attitudes towards nationality and that implicit nationality bias is
common in general populations, but what is the impact of mortality on implicit nationality bias? To
investigate this question the current study will adopt the design of Bradley et al (2012) but implement

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two key areas of improvement. Firstly, Bradley et al. did not use a gap between the mortality priming
and the IAT task. As in-group bias is a distal response to mortality salience (when the anxiety of death
lies at the fringes of consciousness), it is unusual not to include a distraction task between mortality
manipulation and dependent variable testing. Burke et al. (2010) report that delay tasks in mortality
salience experiments are commonly used and average between 2 to 6 minutes before going on to
recommend that future research should consider a slightly longer duration. They suggest that a gap of
up to 15 minutes or longer as distal defences may be actually be stronger by this point. Secondly,
Bradley et al (2012) used words as stimuli in their IAT, however Meissner & Rothermund (2015)
propose that images make for better stimuli as they produce more prominent implicit attitudes due to
the stronger associative connection between concepts and images. Therefore,to investigate implicit
nationality bias, the current study will inclusion a distraction task between the priming condition and
the IAT and will use images as stimuli.
1.6 Hypotheses
Based on the literature concerning implicit attitudes and TMT, three hypotheses have been
developed. The first hypothesis states that participants will display an implicit bias towards their own
nationality, which will be demonstrated by an IAT. The second hypothesis states that reminding
participants of their own death will cause a stronger implicit bias towards nationality than those in a
control condition. The third hypothesis states that the strength of implicit bias towards nationality will
correlate with self-esteem. More specifically, it is predicted that implicit bias will be weaker in those
with higher self-esteem and stronger in those with lower self-esteem.
Method
2.1 Design
The experiment used an independent group design where the independent variable was the
condition of the participant (mortality salient or control) and the dependant variable was implicit
attitude towards nationality. Implicit bias towards nationality was assessed using an IAT. All
questionnaires and tests used in the experiment are established methods of collecting data and are
included in Burke et al’s (2010) description of the archetypical mortality salience experimental design.
2.2 Participants
43 participants took part in the experiment. The majority were students at the University of
Glasgow (n= 41) with a small number of participants from the generalpublic (n= 2). The majority of

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participants were British nationals but three Participants identified themselves as nationalities outside
of the United Kingdom (Italian, German and Czech) and were excluded from the final analysis. Of the
remaining participants (N= 40), there were 16 females, 23 males, and 1 participant who identified as
Non-Binary. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 46 with a mean age of 23.1 (SD =5.4).
2.3 Materials/Stimuli
2.4 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. The Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg,1965) is a
self-report measure of self-esteem which has demonstrated high reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha
of .81 (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). The questionnaire contains 10 questions which are answered using a 4
point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. Responses were tallied to
produce a self-esteem score between 0 and 30.
2.5 Mortality Attitudes Personality Survey. The Mortality Attitudes Personality Survey
(MAPS) is a survey which is used as a mortality salience priming tool (Rosenblatt et al, 1989). The
MAPS contains two open ended questions: “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of
your own death arouses in you” and “jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen
to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead”. In order to concealthe true purpose of
the survey, participants were informed that it is a recently developed questionnaire used to assess
personality. Participants were given as much time as they needed to complete the task and were
encouraged to think deeply and contemplatively about their answers. A modified version of the survey
was given to control participants in which the questions were about dental pain instead of death.
2.6 Raven’s Progressive Matrices. The Raven’s progressive matrices (1936) are a series of
puzzles where participants have to identify which image, from a selection of options, completes a
pattern which has a section missing. This task was used a distraction task between independent
variable priming and dependant variable measurement. Participants were given 10 minutes to
complete as many of the puzzles as they could.
2.7 Implicit Association Test. The IAT was run on a PC using the software package Eprime and
consisted of 3 practice blocks (Blocks 1,2 and 4) of 20 trials and 2 test blocks (Blocks 3 and 5) of 40
trials from which results were taken. The IAT is counterbalanced, meaning that some participants
were presented with the order of blocks 3 and 5 switched. The IAT used images obtained from the
website http://www.freeimages.com/ as stimuli to represent the concepts of “British”, “Non-British”,
“Positive” and “Negative” (See appendix for images). The images used to represent “British” and
“Non-British” were as unambiguous as possible and included pictures of flags, passports, currency,
and famous landmarks. The images used to represent “positive” and “negative” are universal symbols
of positivity and negativity such as smiley faces,hand signals and love hearts. The majority of images

17
were comparative between concepts meaning that, for example; the “British” images contained a
picture of a British passport while the “Non-British” images contained a picture of a passport from the
United Arab Emirates. Participants were informed that the task measures reaction time and were told
to work as quickly as they can. The aim of the task is to assign images to a category based on labels
present at the top of screen. Participants did this by pressing the “Q” key if an image belonged to the
category on the left hand side of the screen,or the “P” key if it belonged to the category on the right
hand side of the screen. Participants were in control of when the IAT began by pressing the spacebar
to commence the first block of trials. Once the IAT began images were presented in the centre of the
screen,one at a time, in a random order which was unique for each participant. The image was
replaced with the next image as soon as the participant registered a response. Participants were
instructed not to attempt to re-answer incorrect responses. Once the participant had completed all of
the trials in a block they were presented with another instruction screen which asked them to press the
spacebar when they were ready to proceed to the next block. Participants chose when to begin a new
block but once it had started they could not pause. Blocks 1,2 and 4 asked participants to assign
images to one of two separate categories labels at the top of the screen (one on the left and the other
on the right) containing a single concept each (eg. Q key for a British image and P key for a Non-
British image). Blocks 3 and 5 asked participants to assign images to one of two categories which
contained a pairing of concepts each (eg. Q key for British OR Negative and P key for Non-British
OR Positive image). See table 1 for full IAT design.
Table 1. IAT design (blocks 3 and 5 are switched in counterbalanced condition).
Block No. of Trials Function Left Category Right Category
1 20 Practice British Non-British
2 20 Practice Positive Negative
3 40 Test British OR
Positive
Non-British OR
Negative
4 20 Practice Non-British British
5 40 Test Non-British OR
Positive
British OR
Negative

18
2.8 Procedure
All procedures were approved by the University of Glasgow ethics committee. Upon entering
the lab, participants signed a consent form to confirm that they were happy to take part in the
experiment. They were informed that their identity will remain anonymous and that they had no
obligation to complete experiment as well as the right to withdraw their data at any time. They were
then given an information sheet which described the tasks which they would be completing and filled
out a demographics questionnaire asking for age, gender and nationality. To ensure that participants
remained naive to the true purpose of the experiment, the information sheet explained that the tasks
explore personal identity and beliefs. They then completed the Rosenberg self-esteem questionnaire
before being taken into an isolated booth designed eliminate distractions and ensure full attention. At
this point, participants were randomly assigned to the experimental or the control group. Participants
in the experimental group were given the MAPS to complete while participants in the control group
were given the alternative survey containing questions about dental pain. They were left alone in the
booths and given as much time as they needed to complete the survey. Upon completion participants
were then asked to complete as many of the Raven’s progressive matrices as they could in 10 minutes
before immediately preceding onto the IAT task. Instructions for the IAT were provided both verbally
by the experimenter and on the computer screen. Upon completion of the IAT, participants were
handed a debriefing sheet explaining the true purpose of the study and given the opportunity to ask the
researcher any questions.
Results
3.1 Stimuli Validity
To see if the images clearly represented the concepts they were supposed to, the accuracy of
responses from Blocks 1 and 2, across all participants, were calculated. No outliers were found in
Block 1 where the accuracy of response towards all 20 images had a range of 95% to 100%. In Block
2, for 19 out of 20 images the accuracy of response ranged from 95% to 100% with a mean accuracy
of 97.7% (SD=1.8), however a single outlier was identified which contained an error rate of 12.5%.
All trials containing this image as stimuli were removed from further analysis.
3.2 Statistical Analysis
Following the guidelines set out by Greenwald et al (1998), the first two trials of each block
were removed. Of the remaining data, incorrect responses were removed along with responses faster
than 300ms or slower than 3000ms to ensure that only accurate responses,indicative of implicit

19
association, were analysed. Greenwald et al. also recommend removing any participants who have
response times consistently above 2000ms, however no participants with this trend were identified.
3.3 Implicit nationality bias. To test the first two hypotheses, which predicted that there will
be an implicit bias towards nationality in all participants and that implicit nationality bias would be
stronger in mortality salient participants, a 2 x 2 mixed analysis of variance was conducted with group
(mortality salience vs. control) as between subject factors, and block (congruent, block 3 vs.
incongruent, block 5) as within subject factors. As predicted, the 2x2 mixed ANOVA revealed a
significant difference between mean response times of block parings (Block 3 v Block 5), F(1,38)=
51.51, p<.001, with a mean response time in block 3 (British paired with Positive) of 717.11ms (SD=
148.11) compared to 899.13± 182.30ms in block 5 (British paired with Negative), demonstrating an
implicit bias towards the pairings in block 3. The main effect of experimental condition (mortality
salience v control) was explored and revealed a non-significant result of F(1,38) =0.946, p=.337,
indicating that there was no significant difference in strength of implicit bias between groups.
Figure 1. A bar chart of showing that mean response times in block 5 (British paired with negative)
were significantly slower than mean response times in block 3 (British paired with positive),
indicating an implicit biastowardsthe pairings in block 3.
3.4 Implicit nationality bias and self-esteem. To test the third hypothesis, which predicted that
implicit bias in mortality salient participants would be mediated by self-esteem,a self-esteem score
and an IAT score were calculated for each participant. Self-esteem scores for mortality salient
participants were calculated based on the responses given in the Rosenberg self-esteem questionnaire.

20
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
-200 -100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Self-Esteem
Score
IAT score (in milliseconds)
Self-esteemand mortality salient implicit nationality bias
For mortality salient participants, (N= 21) the mean self-esteem score was 19.9 (SD = 4.5) with a
range of 11 to 30. Scores between ≥15 and ≤ 25 are considered in the normal range while scores <15
are considered low and score >25 are considered high (Rosenberg, 1965).
Table 2. Distribution of Rosenberg self-esteemscores in mortality salient participants.
Low Normal High
No. of Participants 2 17 2
An IAT score was calculated for each participant by subtracting the mean response time in Block 3
from the mean response time in Block 5. In mortality salient participants, the mean IAT score was
217.47 (SD=185.31), demonstrating the implicit bias towards the pairings in block 3 identified in the
2x2 mixed ANOVA. A Pearson product-moment correlation was run to explore the relationship
between self-esteem and strength of implicit bias. No significant relationship was found (r = .717, n =
21, p < .084).
Figure 2. A scatter graph showing no significant correlation between self-esteemscore and implicit
nationality bias in mortality salient participants.
A second Person product-moment correlation was conducted and also failed to find a significant
relationship between self-esteem and IAT in control participants (r = .127, n = 19, p < .060).

21
Discussion
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the effect that mortality salience has on
implicit nationality bias. Based on the existing literature concerning TMT, three hypotheses were
devised and tested in an experimental design which utilised an IAT. This discussion will interpret
these results, compare them to existing literature, assess the strengths and weakness of the current
study, and offer suggestions for future research before acknowledging the criticisms of TMT as a
whole. Starting with the first hypothesis, which predicted that all participants would display an
implicit bias towards their own nationality, a 2x2 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant difference in
mean reaction times between blocks as responses to stimuli in block 3 of the IAT (“British” paired
with “Positive”) were faster than reaction times to stimuli in block 5 (“British” paired with
“Negative”). This indicates that there was an implicit nationality bias present in all participants. This
finding is consistent with existing literature from outside of TMT research, as Hassin et al (2009) used
an IAT to show that subliminal nationalistic primes increased prejudice towards out-groups. Results
from the first hypothesis add to the existing literature by demonstrating that British participants have a
stronger implicit association towards the concept “British” being paired with “positive” than when it
is paired with the concept of “negative”, as demonstrated by the significant difference in mean IAT
reaction times between blocks. The implications of this finding are important when considering group
conflict in everyday behaviour, as previous IAT experiments have demonstrated how implicit
attitudes influence explicit behaviours towards out-groups (Rudman & Ashmore, 2007). For example,
participants who demonstrate implicit racial bias are more likely to express negative racial stereotypes
and avoid contact with individuals of a different race (Amodio & Devine, 2006). While the current
findings do not show that that the participants who took part in the experiment would necessarily
display negative explicit social behaviours towards non-British individuals, they do demonstrate there
is an implicit nationality bias present which could potentially influence explicit behaviours. As
implicit racial bias has been shown to effect explicit social behaviours, further research should
investigate whether the implicit nationality bias identified in the current study has the same effect.
Carter et al (2011) argue that implicit nationality bias is the result of System Justification
Theory, which states that individuals have a motive to support the cultural system of which they
belong in order to assert that the status quo is legitimate and good; however, the current study
proposed that a more comprehensive explanation behind implicit nationality bias is offered by TMT,
which asserts that individuals are motivated to defend their cultural worldview when presented with
reminders of their death. This proposition was tested in the second hypothesis which predicted that

22
implicit nationality bias would be stronger in participants who had been made mortality salient than
those in a control group. Although mean reaction times were slower in block 5 (“British” paired with
“Negative”) for mortality salient subjects, the 2x2 mixed ANOVA found no significant difference of
mean reaction times between groups. This is inconsistent with the predictions of TMT, and with
existing literature which has identified differences in explicit nationality bias (Nelson et al, 1997). The
current study was an advancement of Bradley et al. (2012), who used an IAT to find a mortality
salient implicit racial bias, however these findings have not been repeated for implicit nationality bias
in the current results. There are a couple of methodological differences between the two studies which
could have contributed to this contrast in findings. Firstly, Bradley et al (2012) created groups based
on race with an in-group of “white” and an out-group of “black”, whereas the current study created
groups based on nationality with and in-group of “British” and an out-group of “Non-British”. This
distinction is important because identification based on race is far more rigid than identification based
on nationality, as it is easier to recognise oneself as “white” than it is to define what it is to be
“British”. This is particularly pertinent in relation to the participants used in the current study.
Although all participants were British nationals, a selection of the current participant population listed
their nationality as “Scottish” while a small number of other participants identified themselves as dual
nationality.This poses the question as to how strongly, if at all, these participants actually identified as
“British”. Previous research (Halloran & Kashima, 2004) has highlighted the importance of self-
identification on mortality salience effects,so if a selection of participants from the current study did
not perceive “British” as an in-group of which they belong to then, under the worldview defence
assumptions of TMT, they would not be expected to show a negative reaction towards an out-group of
“Non-British”, either explicitly or implicitly. This could account for the lack of significant difference
in implicit nationality bias between groups. It would be interesting to investigate how specific the in-
group as to be, in relation to self-identification, to elicit mortality salience effects. Would the
participants who identified themselves as Scottish have registered a stronger mortality salient implicit
nationality bias if the in-group had been “Scottish” as opposed to “British”? Future studies should
look to identify if the specificity of the in-group has an impact on implicit bias. Additionally, it is
worth noting that studies have shown that mortality salience effects can be strengthened by priming
participants with the norms and expectations a specific cultural worldviews prior to mortality being
made salient (Zavala et al, 2012, Jonas & Fritsche, 2012). Therefore,had the current study primed
participants with the social norms of a “British” cultural worldview the difference in nationality bias
between groups may have been stronger.
Another difference between the methodology of Bradley et al. (2012) and the current study
was the inclusion of a distraction task. This task was added at the suggestion of Burke et al. (2010)
who describe a distraction task of between 2 to 6 minutes between mortality salience priming and

23
dependant variable measurement as a key component of mortality salience experimentation. The
reasoning behind the inclusion of a distraction task is that the dual-defence model of TMT
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 1990) states that distal defences, such as worldview defence,
occur when mortality salience is no longer in focal attention but remains on the fringes of
consciousness. Previous research has supported this theory, as Burke et al (2010) report that longer
delay tasks of 7 to 20 minutes often produce stronger mortality salience effects than shorter tasks of 2
to 6 minutes. As the implicit racial bias identified in the Bradly et al.’s (2012) study occurred in the
absence of a delay, it was predicted that the delay task in the current study would illicit stronger distal
worldview defences,but statistical analysis revealed that this was not the case. As no significant
difference of implicit bias between groups was found, it is hard to draw conclusions about the
effectiveness of a distraction task; however the findings from the current study do add to the questions
of Burke et al. (2010) who ask how long the effects of mortality salience last. The lack of significant
difference between groups after a distraction task in the current study may provide evidence against
their suggestion that mortality effects last longer than previously expected,or at least that may be the
case with implicit bias. It could be that implicit bias is affected differently from explicit bias and
actually decreases faster.Future research could potentially establish if there is a difference in how
long mortality salience effects persist in implicit and explicit attitudes by comparing three groups: a
control group, a mortality salient group with no distraction task, and a mortality salient group with a
distraction task.
A further area of consideration, in relation to the current findings, is the use of the MAPS
(Rosenblatt et al., 1989) as a mortality salience prime. Greenberg et al. (1995) argue that the MAPS
demonstrates that mortality salience effects are exclusive to thoughts about death and not just anxious
situations in general. This is because the death related questions tend to illicit mortality salience
effects that are not present in modified control questions which ask about dental pain. While the
MAPS is a widely accepted and regularly implemented in TMT research,it contains a crucial design
flaw which has yet to be addressed in any TMT literature. The flaw lies in the open ended nature of
the MAPS whereby participants write freely about what they think will happen to them while they die
and what happens after they are physically dead. While this is an extremely effective way of initiating
death thoughts, it also allows for participants to engage in proximal and distal defences while
completing the task. There is nothing to stop participants from engaging in successful psychological
defences against mortality salience while writing their answers. In fact,a participant is able to include
examples of proximal or distal defences within their answers. For example, a participant writing about
what they think happens to them after they die could write an answer that demonstrates a belief in
some form of continued existence of the self after death, which is a psychological defence against
death anxiety itself. Basically, while there is no doubt that the MAPS encourages participants to think
about death, it is not guaranteed to actually illicit lasting death anxiety. Previous research has shown

24
that even self-proclaimed atheists are prone to holding implicit or unconscious beliefs about the
immortality of the self, so priming deep existential anxiety may be harder than simply asking a couple
of open ended questions (Halberstadt & Bluemke, 2012). Some may argue that while this could be
true for proximal defences,it shouldn’t impact distal defences; however,research by Wojtkowiak &
Rutjens (2011) has demonstrated that reflection of personal continuity after death eliminates the
effects of mortality salience. This is particularly relevant in light of the current findings, which failed
to identify significance in implicit bias between groups, as it could be that participants in the mortality
salience group had already successfully combatted against death anxiety while completing the MAPS
and are therefore unlikely that demonstrate cultural worldview defence during the IAT. Future
research should look to devise new ways to prime mortality salience which eliminate the option for
participants to engage in defence mechanisms before the dependant variable is measured.
The third hypothesis predicted that strength of implicit nationality bias would be mediated by
self-esteem. Specifically, in line with the anxiety buffer hypothesis of TMT (Greenberg, Solomon &
Pyszcynski, 1997), it was predicted that there would be a negative correlation between self-esteem
and implicit bias, however no statistically significant correlation was found. This was consistent
across all participants as no correlation between self-esteem and implicit bias was found in control
participants either. A possible explanation for this lack of correlation is that previous studies have
identified self-esteem effects only when participant self-esteem is either especially low or especially
high (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997, Galliot, Schmeichel & Maner, 2007, Greenberg et al., 1993). As the
vast majority of mortality salient participants in the current study registered normal self-esteem scores
of between 15 and 25, it could be that the impact of self-esteem on implicit bias would be less
noticeable in these participants than those at the extreme ends of the self-esteem spectrum, in line with
previous research. TMT only predicts that those low in self-esteem will feel a need to bolster their
world view so it may be that this type of distal defence is not required by participants with normal
self-esteem. It is also worth noting that the Rosenberg self-esteem scale is an explicit measurement
and recent developments in anxiety buffer testing, which differentiate between explicit self-esteem (a
conscious evaluation of the self) and implicit self-esteem (inaccessible to conscious awareness),have
found that measurements of implicit self-esteem provide more accurate results when assessing
participant resilience against death anxiety (Schmeichel et al., 2009). As implicit self-esteem
represents a more automatic and spontaneous measurement of self-esteem, as opposed to explicit self-
esteem which is measured via self-report, it is argued that implicit self-esteem is a more accurate
measurement and, consequently, provides more accurate results. A discrepancy between participants’
explicit self-esteem and their implicit self-esteem could result in unexpected non-significant results,
like those of the current experiment, as explicit self-esteem may not be a particularly accurate
measurement, and therefore not a true reflection of participant self-esteem. Future studies should look

25
to employ implicit measurements of self-esteem to ensure that the relationship between self-esteem
and dependant variable accurate.
When considering the current results, it is important to acknowledge criticisms of TMT as a
whole. The strongest critique is provided by Kirkpatrick & Navarrete (2006) who claim that TMT is
based on misconceptions about evolutionary psychology and natural selection. They begin by
challenging the two main assumptions of TMT, arguing that humans do not possess an innate desire
for personal survival at all costs before questioning why TMT postulates that fear of death is
especially incapacitating. From an evolutionary perspective it would be maladaptive and serve no
functional value for an individual for have an innate desire to survive at all costs,as personal survival
is just one of many routes to ensure that genes are passed into the next generation. While death
anxiety can be useful to avoid dangerous situations, is extremely unlikely that it could have developed
to the point where it became paralyzing enough to require the evolution of a separate psychological
defence mechanism to buffer its effects. Furthermore,even if death anxiety had developed to
paralyzing levels, it is even more implausible to suggest that a separate psychological system of
anxiety buffering could have evolved alongside it. A terror management system which artificially
reduces anxiety would undermine the initial adaptive function of the anxiety in the first place so it is
extremely unlikely that is could have developed alongside the existing death anxiety. Kirkpatrik &
Navarrete’s (2012) argument concludes by offering an alternate explanation for the findings of
mortality salience research. They claim that in-group bias is not the result of worldview defence,but
is an attempt to increase coalition and alliance in the face of danger, a well-documented survival tactic.
This alternative explanation is supported by studies which show that mortality salient in-group
preference exists even when groups are arbitrarily chosen, and that a desire to be close to others is
stronger than worldview defence in mortality salient participants. People have demonstrated that they
still prefer to have an affiliation with group members even if the same members has previously
threatened or challenged the participants’ worldview (Harmon-Jones et al, 1996, Wisman & Koole,
2003). In light of this alternative theory, the findings of the current study are less surprising. If
mortality salient in-group preferences are simply the result of an indiscriminate desire to be part of a
group, and are not influenced specifically by worldview defence,then there is no expectation that
implicit nationality bias should be stronger in mortality salient participants. Although participants in
both groups displayed an implicit nationality bias, it was not stronger in participants who were in the
mortality salience group, indicating that while death anxiety may increase desire to be part of an in-
group the nationality of the in-group itself is actually irrelevant. Therefore the current study provides
further evidence for Kirkpatrick & Navarrete’s (2012) critique against TMT, as implicit nationality
bias present in all participants was not strengthened by mortality salience, which is what is predicted
by TMT.

26
The strengths and the limitations of the current study lie predominantly in the experiment
design, particularly the use of an IAT. The use of images as IAT stimuli is an improvement on
previous research investigating mortality salience and implicit bias which used words as stimuli
(Bradley et al., 2012), as images have been shown to elicit stronger implicit responses and thus
provide a more accurate measurement of implicit bias (Meissner & Rothermund, 2015). However,the
IAT as a paradigm has received various criticisms which apply as limitations to the current study. The
most pressing limitation highlights that while the IAT claims to eliminate social desirability
manipulation in participant responses,it is unclear as to whether it actually achieves this goal. While a
participant isn’t asked explicitly to express a preference for the category which associates “British”
with “Positive”, it is likely that they become aware of this trend while taking part in the IAT. As the
participant knows that they are taking part in an experiment, social desirability effects may still
impact their response times, as they do not want to be seen to place images into the “British or
Positive” and “Non-British or Negative” categories with more ease than when these pairs are reversed.
As there are a large number of trials in each block, it is possible that participants have enough time to
recognise what is being measured by the IAT and alter responses so to not appear to associate “Non-
British” with “Negative” (Fiedler, Messner & Bluemke, 2006). This is an extremely difficult
limitation to overcome, however modifications of the IAT which measure responses to a target object
without requiring the simultaneous evaluation of a counter-category claim to provide a valuable
measurement of implicit target evaluation and should be considered for future TMT research
investigating implicit biases (Bluemke & Friese, 2008).
In conclusion, the current study identified an implicit nationality bias which was not
strengthened by mortality salience, contrary to the predictions of TMT. Furthermore, implicit bias did
not correlate with participant self-esteem,again conflicting with the predictions of TMT. These
findings add to the currently under-investigated relationship between mortality salience and implicit
attitudes and can also complement existing studies which identify the robust effects of mortality
salience on explicit attitudes. These findings also hint at a potentially different relationship between
how long the effects of mortality salience impact implicit and explicit attitudes, however further
comparative research is required to draw any definitive conclusions. Finally, issues concerning the
commonly used MAPS method of mortality salience priming have been discussed and, hopefully, will
encourage future TMT researches to consider more penetrating methods of eliciting death anxiety. As
death is a problem which will never go away, the impact that mortality salience has on human
behaviour should continue to be investigated empirically. An improved mortality salience priming
tool will ensure that more robust findings are discovered, which is particularly important when
investigating inter-group conflict in relation to TMT.

27

28
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Appendices
IAT Stimuli
Images appeared larger in experiment.
“British” images

36
“Non-British” images

37
“Positive” images

38
“Negative” images

Dissertation final copy July 2016

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