EAS321 Unit 7 seminar slides
- 1. Last Unit: Japan-US Security Relations • Structure: Post-Cold War sees end to bipolarity, shift to an onset of multi-polarity; More pressure on states to contribute to global security; International events raised the level of threat to Japan and the need for US to maintain a military presence in Asia; • Agency: The US pressure has decreased and Japan has shown greater willingness to boost cooperation with the US military; (despite ‘blip’ under DPJ’s Hatoyama) this is particularly so under post-Cold War LDP premiers; • Norms: A weakening of the anti-militarism norm in shaping the US-Japan bilateral security relationship; Reaffirmation of bilateralism despite Japan’s increased tendency towards independence.
- 2. UNIT 7 JAPAN'S POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH EAST ASIA
- 3. Aim To apply the theoretical approach introduced to Japan’s political relations with East Asia.
- 4. Objectives 1) To identify the relative importance of structure, agency and norms in explaining the bilateral political relationship with East Asia in the post-war and post-Cold War eras; 2) To demonstrate how structure, agency and norms can be used to explain aspects of Japan’s political relationship with East Asia; 3) To illustrate how structure, agency and norms can be used to explain Japan’s political relations with China, the Korean Peninsula, and Southeast Asia.
- 5. The Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere Stamp , dated from 1942, showing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Map of the Japanese Empire in 1942
- 6. Structural Barriers to Japan- East Asia Interaction (1) Legacy of Colonialism: Greater East Asia Co- prosperity Sphere legacy of mistrust and animosity. Particularly in China, Korea. Continues to plague relations today. (2) National Division: After Japan’s defeat, civil war in de-colonised states: China, Korea, Vietnam.
- 7. Structural Barriers to to Japan-East Asia Interaction (3) Cold War Bipolarity: The Cold War order. US and the West vs. USSR and communist states. (4) Fragmentation of the East Asian Regional Political Economy: Communist States divided between ‘orthodox’ Marxist-Leninist and anti-revisionist, e.g. China. Capitalist states included mix of states, stable and unstable, democratic and authoritarian .
- 8. Sino-Japanese relations were normalized during the Cold War PM Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese Communist Party Leader Zhou En Lai at Sino-Japanese Normalization talks (above). Nixon’s recognition of China (PRC) came as a shock to Japan (below).
- 9. Japan-China Relations during the Cold War Early Stage • Efforts at normalization were restrained but did pursue unofficial diplomacy (seikei-bunri); • Efforts by pro-China faction within the LDP and the Socialists at establishing relations with China based on the Asianist norm (and dōbun dōshu); • Japan’s recognition of Taiwan as the legitimate government of China until 1971; • Structural restriction from the U.S. and domestic agency, i.e. pro- Taiwan leaders in Japan.
- 10. Japan-China Relations during the Cold War Later stage/Normalization period • Change in the international structure following Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Normalization of relations & stable development based on norms of Asianism and Developmentalism; • Visit of Tanaka Kakuei to Beijing in 1972 with the signing of the Joint Communiqué; • Peace Treaty signed in 1978; official Development Assistance (ODA) in 1979: improved Sino-Japan economic relations; • Thorny issues remained: textbook controversy; Nakasone’s official visit to Yasukuni Shrine; • Muted response to Tiananmen Incident. Kaifu’s visit to China in 1991 and the Emperor’s visit to China in 1992 (Tennō gaikō).
- 11. Japan-China Relations in the Post-Cold War era • Sino-Japanese relations began to strengthen through greater economic interdependence Factors: – Winding down of the bipolar tensions in East Asia; – Chinese leadership’s commitment to economic development; – US policy under Bush Senior and Clinton to engage China in economic and political terms; – Hosokawa’s visit to China in 1994 and his apology for Japan’s war of aggression in China.
- 12. Morihiro Hosokawa 細川 護煕 •First non-LDP prime minister (Japan New Party) •Called the Pacific War a "war of aggression, a mistaken war" •Introduced electoral reforms •Forced to resign under allegations he had misused funds
- 13. Japan-China Relations in the Post Cold War Era • Triangular Structure Japan-US-China: Japan as watashiyaku OR Japan bypassed OR Japan and US vs. China • Sino-US tensions increased from the late 1990s onwards (e.g. Taiwan Straits Crisis, trade/currency issues); • Japan’s concerns for the rapid increase in China’s military might, e.g. Nuclear tests, Naval modernisation; • Japan’s own continued rise as a political, economic and military power (e.g. Japan’s remilitarization; the rise of revisionist politicians); • Return of historical legacy in defining Sino-Japan relations (textbook controversy; Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, territorial dispute); • DPJ under Hatoyama attempts recalibration of foreign policy. Unsuccessful; • LDP’s Abe reasserts strong stance on territorial issues and close US ties.
- 14. PM Hatoyama vs. PM Abe Where Hatoyama sought to recalibrate foreign policy and regional alignment – leaning more towards China – Abe has reaffirmed the bilateral alliance with the US while still engaging economically with East Asian neighbours.
- 15. Japan’s relations with South Korea • Cold War Relations: Normalization talks from 1952-1965, ending with the Treaty on Basic Relations. No apology or compensation (instead ‘economic cooperation’ ), and lingering territorial dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo not resolved. • Cold War bipolarity pushes the two states together (in contrast to North Korea), though legacy of colonialism prevents the two from becoming full ‘allies’. • Post-Cold War: South Korean democratization frees up nationalist, anti-Japan sentiment (as seen in Takeshima/Dokdo dispute and other historical issues, especially during Koizumi administration). • Conversely, cooperation on North Korea policy, especially on North Korea’s nuclear capacity, has increased cooperation between South Korea and Japan.
- 16. Takeshima/Dokdo President Roh, 2006: Japan’s claims as "justifying its history of crimes committed during the war of aggression”, and the claims deny “Korea's full liberation and independence.“ In that same year, ROK vessels were given orders to ram any Japanese ships which approached the rocks.
- 17. Japan-Southeast Asia Relations • Cold War Period: Balance between Asianist and Developmental Norm (developing economic ties with SEA states), and the bipolarity created by the Cold War and the need to stay close to the US (e.g. support for the Vietnam War, seikei bunri, e.g. with Burma). • ASEAN (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, The Philippines and Thailand) established in 1967. Fear of Japan/US be pushed out of economic and security areas. Response: Fukuda Doctrine, 1977. • Post-Cold War: Japan sends SDF to Cambodia as part of UNPKO in 1992, and develops political and economic links with ASEAN throughout the 1990s, based on Asianist norms. • ASEAN expands to include Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (Brunei had already joined in 1984). ASEAN plus 3: Japan, South Korea and China. Growing Sino-Japanese competition over leadership of East Asia
- 18. Japan and China are now seen as competitors over leadership of the region Left: What kind of regional role can PM, Abe, secure for Japan? Right, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping meets Russian premier, Dimitry Medvedev. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uv_2kQSk3HQ
- 19. Conclusion: • Japan’s behaviour within the context of its relations with East Asia can be understood through the lens of structure, agency and norms; • Asianist and Developmental norms have been at the heart of Japan’s post-war attempts to re-connect with East Asia; • The bipolar structure of the Cold War defined Japan’s pre- 1990 relations. The US-Japan Security Alliance continues to act as an impediment to deepened relations with ASEAN. • The legacy of colonialism continues to define Japan’s relations with its Northeast Asian neighbours, less so with the ASEAN states.