Expert Panel Report Examining Additional Sources of Low Cost Abatement

Report of the Expert Panel
examining additional sources
of low cost abatement
14 February 2020

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The Panel
Panel Member Biography
Mr Grant King (Chair)
Mr Grant King is the Chairman of Arventa and runs his own advisory business
specialising in energy markets and technology. He also holds a position as
Professor of Energy Economics at the University of NSW.
Mr King served as President of the Business Council of Australia from
November 2016 to 2019, was a member of the Business Council Board from
November 2011 until November 2015 and chaired the Business Council’s
Infrastructure and Sustainable Growth Committee from 2010 to 2015.
Mr King was Managing Director of Origin Energy Limited for 17 years to
November 2016, and General Manager of AGL Gas Companies where he held
a number of management positions over 17 years.
Mr King has served in a number of senior roles across the Energy sector
including with BHP, Oil Company of Australia, Contact Energy Limited and
Envestra Limited.
Grant has a Degree in Civil Engineering from the University of New South
Wales and a Masters of Management from the University of Wollongong.
Ms Susie Smith
Ms Susie Smith has been the CEO of the Australian Industry Greenhouse
Network (AIGN) since March 2017. Prior to this appointment she was a
Chairperson for the AIGN, representing Santos for over 13 years with the
Association.
She has also held Board positions with Water Polo Australia, and the CRC for
Contamination Assessment and Remediation of the Environment.
Susie has over 20 years of industry experience including strategic planning,
major project approvals, native title, public affairs, and corporate social
responsibility.
Susie has worked with the Department previously through her work on
carbon and sustainability at Santos – publishing Santos first greenhouse and
sustainability reports in 2003.

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Panel Member Biography
Mr David Parker
Mr David Parker was appointed as Chair of the Clean Energy Regulator on 3
July 2017. Prior to joining the agency, David was Deputy Secretary at the
Department of Agriculture and Water Resources.
Mr Parker has been Deputy Secretary at the Department of the Environment
and Energy and the Treasury.
Mr Parker has qualifications in economics and law and was made a Member
of the Order of Australia in 2012.
Professor Andrew Macintosh
Professor Andrew Macintosh was appointed Chair of the Emissions
Reduction Assurance Committee in December 2013. He is an environmental
law and policy expert at The Australian National University (ANU). He is one
of Australia’s preeminent experts on climate policy and carbon markets,
particularly in relation to land use, land-use change and forestry, agriculture
and waste.
Professor Macintosh is currently the Director of Research at the ANU Law
School, Chair of the Emissions Reduction Assurance Committee, and a
director of the Sydney Desalination Plant and Paraway Pastoral Company. He
is also a member of the ANU Climate Change and Energy Change Institutes
and a member of the Expert Panel for the 2020 Review of the Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act. His previous roles include
being the Associate Dean (Research) at the ANU College of Law, an Associate
Member of the Climate Change Authority, a member of the Emissions
Reduction Fund Expert Reference Group and a director of the Port of
Newcastle.

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Contents
Report of the Expert Panel examining additional sources of low cost abatement .............................................1
The Panel.............................................................................................................................................................2
Contents ..............................................................................................................................................................4
Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................................6
Part A – Improving the Emissions Reduction Fund ........................................................................................ 6
Part B – Incentivising voluntary action on a broader scale............................................................................ 9
Part C - Unlocking the technologies needed to transform key sectors........................................................ 11
Glossary .............................................................................................................................................................13
Chapter 1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................14
Chapter 2. Context to the Panel’s work ........................................................................................................18
Chapter 3. The Emissions Reduction Fund....................................................................................................26
Chapter 4. Principles that have guided the Panel in forming its conclusions ...............................................32
Part A Improving the Emissions Reduction Fund..............................................................................................39
Chapter 5. Better aligning the Emissions Reduction Fund’s incentives with when project costs occur .......40
Chapter 6. Achieving further abatement by encouraging increased participation in the Emissions
Reduction Fund .................................................................................................................................................45
6.1. Method development processes and governance......................................................................... 45
6.2. Promoting project uptake............................................................................................................... 50
6.3. New method priorities.................................................................................................................... 53
Part B Incentivising voluntary action on a broader scale .................................................................................59
Chapter 7. Facilitating voluntary carbon market transactions and sources of demand ...............................60
7.1. Developments in Carbon Markets .................................................................................................. 60
7.2. Carbon unit quality and co-benefits ............................................................................................... 63
7.3. The LGC market beyond 2020......................................................................................................... 63
7.4. Facilitating demand from state governments...................................................................................... 65
7.5. Facilitating deeper engagement by the private sector in voluntary market transactions.............. 66
Chapter 8. Enabling markets by improving capability and information........................................................68
8.1. Addressing producer-related information and capacity barriers ................................................... 68
8.2. Rating systems and disclosure for building energy efficiency ........................................................ 70

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Chapter 9. Unlocking abatement from Australia’s largest facilities – Crediting under the Safeguard
Mechanism ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….72
9.1. The Safeguard Mechanism.............................................................................................................. 72
9.2. Incentivising emissions reductions below the Safeguard Mechanism baselines............................ 73
9.3. The general framework for how a crediting mechanism could work ............................................. 75
9.4. Markets for SMCs............................................................................................................................ 80
Part C Unlocking the technologies needed to transform key sectors ..............................................................83
Chapter 10. A goal-oriented technology co-investment program..............................................................84
10.1. Accelerating the technology ‘conveyor belt’ .................................................................................. 84
10.2. A goal-oriented co-investment program ........................................................................................ 85
10.3. High level design features............................................................................................................... 89
Appendix A. Overview of what the Panel has done .........................................................................................92
Appendix B. Work underway by the CER to increase ACCU supply..................................................................93
Appendix C. Emissions Reduction Fund methods.............................................................................................94

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Executive Summary
The Panel was tasked with providing advice to the Minister for Energy and Emissions Reduction on how to
incentivise low cost abatement opportunities from across the economy, with a focus on the industrial,
manufacturing, transport and agriculture sectors, and energy efficiency.
Targeted consultation was undertaken with these sectors and submissions were received from across
industry, research organisations and non-government organisations.
The recommendations outlined in this report are intended to help Australia exceed its current international
commitments and create a pathway for ongoing emissions reductions beyond 2030 to meet future
commitments under the Paris Agreement.
The Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) and Safeguard Mechanism, built on Australia’s globally recognised
emissions measurement and reporting systems, provide a platform that can readily accommodate and
incentivise further action. The Panel identified opportunities to unlock additional abatement by refining
these schemes and introducing new complementary programs.
In preparing its recommendations, the Panel had regard to the broader trends framing Australia’s emissions
reduction task.
The Panel have articulated seven principles that have guided it in forming its conclusions:
1. Projects that reduce the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere should be considered for an
incentive if the actual or potential carbon benefit exceeds the incentive cost.
2. Policy should be designed to favour economically productive activities or activities where there are
co-benefits.
3. Policies and institutions should be technology-neutral and complementary.
4. Participation will be encouraged if solutions are conceptually and administratively simple, with an
emphasis on balanced sharing of risk and minimising transaction costs.
5. Technologies are at different stages of technical and commercial readiness, and incentives/
instruments should be designed to reflect this.
6. Policies should be designed and administered in a participatory and transparent manner.
7. Policy responses should be coordinated between federal, state and territory governments and
undertaken in collaboration, where possible, with state and territory governments
This report presents the Panel’s findings and recommendations, which are divided into three themes:
 improving the Emissions Reduction Fund (Part A);
 incentivising voluntary action on a broader scale (Part B); and
 unlocking the technologies needed to decarbonise the economy (Part C).
The Panel’s recommendations are set out below. Further detail on each of these recommendations is
provided in the report.
Part A – Improving the Emissions Reduction Fund
Part A recommends actions that could drive increased emissions reduction through the ERF. This includes, in
limited circumstances, allowing ERF methods to award Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs) over a
shorter, compressed timeframe and ahead of when abatement is achieved. This would better align the
timing of the ERF incentive with project costs that are often incurred upfront and will help to overcome key
barriers to firms engaging with the scheme. Alongside other proposed operational changes to the ERF, such

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as a streamlined purchasing mechanism for small projects and a standardised framework for risk-sharing,
this change would encourage and enable increased participation in the scheme.
Table A: Recommendations to improve the Emissions Reduction Fund
Improving the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) Ref.
ERF: Crediting
Allow certain ERF methods to award ACCUs on a compressed timeframe.
This would reduce the barriers faced by projects with high upfront capital costs.
The application of compressed crediting should be assessed on a method by method basis,
with the following criteria to apply.
1. Projects must involve significant upfront costs, in the form of resource outlays or foregone
profits, which are not materially offset by carbon revenues and secondary benefits (e.g.
reduced energy costs) in the early years of the project.
2. The likely abatement from the projects must be able to be easily forecast with a
reasonable degree of precision over the crediting period.
3. The realisation of the forecast abatement must not be contingent on the recurrent outlay
of significant resources for the conduct of the abatement activity.
Rules would be needed to ensure the progressive verification of the delivery of abatement to
minimise the risk of credits being issued for abatement that does not subsequently occur.
5.1
Create a fixed priced purchasing desk for small projects under the ERF.
This would encourage project uptake, particularly agriculture and small-scale energy efficiency
projects, by reducing price risks and marketing costs.
Eligibility to access the platform would be limited to proponents of generally small projects
(e.g. based on projects’ forward abatement estimates or another similar metric).
The creation of the fixed priced purchasing desk would ideally be done in tandem with the
work on small-scale methods and method stacking (recommendations 6.7 and 6.9).
6.6
Create tailored small-scale ERF methods for particular types of agriculture projects, including
shelterbelts.
Small-scale methods would have streamlined measurement, reporting and verification
requirements, reducing transaction costs and driving participation from small agriculture
projects.
6.7
The Clean Energy Regulator should continue its work on optional delivery contracts under the
ERF to reduce price uncertainty and risk for proponents by giving them the right (but not the
obligation) to sell ACCUs at a set, pre-determined price during a specified period.
6.8

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Facilitate ‘method stacking’, where multiple ERF projects are taken on the same property
using different methods, by making rule changes to allow:
 proponents of stacked projects to submit a single, aggregated offsets report covering
each individual component of the stacked project; and
 stacked projects’ audits to cover all projects at one time rather than auditing each
individual component at different times.
6.9
ERF: Method development
Establish a new process to provide third parties with the opportunity to propose and prepare
ERF methods.
This would encourage innovation and accelerate method development, thereby helping to
promote greater participation and the realisation of low-cost abatement opportunities.
A multi-stage review, development and approval process would ensure third party methods
are robust, meet the ERF’s offsets integrity standards, and are administratively sound.
6.1
Establish a pilot method program to test new method ideas and expedite method preparation.
This would encourage early action and improve the robustness of methods.
Pilot methods would be developed for activities where there is uncertainty in the
underpinning science or complications with the design of the method. Proponents of pilot
projects would be required to share data and project information to assist in developing the
final method. Further consideration should be given to whether pilot projects would be
awarded ACCUs or an alternative credit type for sale to the Regulator.
6.2
Amend the ERF legislation to enable a method to be developed for carbon capture and storage
and/or carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
6.11
Undertake consultation on amending the water requirements that apply to farm forestry and
plantation projects under the ERF.
There are significant abatement opportunities associated with farm forestry and the expansion
of plantation estate. The water requirements that apply to these project types are acting as a
barrier to the realisation of these opportunities. Consultation would help identify the need for
and impacts of the water requirements, and the best way of addressing the concerns about
the potential adverse hydrological effects of plantations.
6.12
Develop and publish a formal policy governing the prioritisation and development of ERF
methods.
This would provide stakeholders with greater confidence about method development
processes and the opportunities for consultation and collaboration.
6.13

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ERF: Governance
Introduce a formal ‘duty of utmost good faith’ on participants in the ERF.
This would lessen the need for proscriptive project eligibility rules and foster a collective
responsibility for the scheme.
Similar to the implied duty of utmost good faith that applies to insurance contracts under the
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), the duty would require ERF participants to act in the
utmost good faith in their engagements with the scheme, including in relation to
implementing projects, judging whether projects are additional, and measurement, reporting
and verification.
To have its desired effect, the overarching duty would need to be coupled with administrative
mechanisms to reinforce the importance of ethical behaviour. These could include
requirements for project proponents to pledge to act in good faith and to describe how they
have complied with the duty in offsets reports.
6.3
Review the ERF’s governance arrangements to ensure the efficient and effective operation of
the scheme. The review should include the structure and staffing of the Emissions Reduction
Assurance Committee (ERAC), and whether it should be staffed and supported by officers from
the Department, the Clean Energy Regulator, or another agency.
6.4
Establish a scheme to subsidise the costs of directly measuring the abatement associated with
certain types of project activities, particularly the sequestration of carbon in agricultural soils.
The costs of directly measuring abatement is acting as a significant barrier to the uptake of soil
carbon projects and certain other project activities. This barrier is most acute where there are
no model-based methods for the activities or the available modelled methods are highly
conservative because of scientific uncertainty concerning the impact of project activities.
The scheme would provide subsidies for measurement costs on the condition recipients share
data to help resolve scientific uncertainties and improve model-based methods. The scheme
could run on a cost recovery basis (for example, by requiring proponents to sell credits to the
Regulator at a discount).
6.5
The Clean Energy Regulator should continue its efforts to streamline ERF audit requirements at
an administrative level and to explore the potential to use “big data” as an alternative to more
traditional audit processes.
6.10
Part B – Incentivising voluntary action on a broader
scale
Part B recommends measures aimed at incentivising voluntary action on a broader scale. In particular, the
Panel considers there is an opportunity to leverage the architecture of the Safeguard Mechanism to
accelerate the adoption of low emission technology by Australia’s largest facilities, improving the
productivity of these facilities and delivering genuine abatement. This could be achieved by crediting
emissions reductions below baselines and providing for the sale and purchase of these ‘Safeguard
Mechanism Credits’ by the federal, state or territory governments or through voluntary transactions in
carbon markets. The credits could also be used by facilities to meet compliance obligations under the

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Safeguard Mechanism. Further complementary actions are also recommended to enable and facilitate
voluntary transactions in carbon markets by improving capability and information and market effectiveness.
Table B: Recommendations to incentivise voluntary action on a broader scale
Incentivising voluntary action on a broader scale Ref.
Voluntary market transactions: Clean Energy Regulator
Adopt a convention that the implicit carbon content, or “carbon exchange rate”, for a LGC will
be based on either the average grid carbon intensity per MWh or the state-based grid emission
factor for the jurisdiction in which the LGC creating renewable generator is located.
This would assist in the development of voluntary participation in offset markets, ensuring
consistency and transparency in the use of LGCs for offset purposes.
The implications for grid security and reliability associated with additional renewables
deployment driven by voluntary market demand will be managed through the Retailer
Reliability Obligation.
7.1
The Clean Energy Regulator should accelerate its efforts to encourage the emergence of
exchange-traded markets for certificates, and the work already underway to support the
deepening and strengthening of voluntary private markets by improving registry systems to
provide information about the provenance of certificates and support private quality branding
of co-benefits associated with different abatement units.
7.2
The Commonwealth should work with state and territory governments to encourage their use
of the national crediting architecture for the purposes of offsetting emissions from particular
developments. There should also be continued partnership and education between the
Regulator and state and territory officials to build awareness of this architecture.
This will promote simplicity and consistency between jurisdictions, reduce transaction and
compliance costs for proponents and reduce administrative costs for state governments.
7.3
Enabling markets: knowledge sharing
Establish a knowledge sharing and outreach program to address information barriers impeding
the uptake of ERF projects and investment in cost-effective abatement opportunities.
The program would involve the creation of dedicated knowledge sharing hubs for key sectors,
with a focus on energy efficiency in SMEs, agriculture, road freight, the property sector and
industrial facilities.
These knowledge sharing hubs should be developed in consultation with the relevant industry
bodies.
8.1
Enabling markets: energy efficiency
Undertake a review to determine the extent of skills shortages associated with abatement
activities and whether there is a need for additional measures to address relevant training
needs, particularly in regard to the availability of trained energy efficiency experts in the
industry and building sectors.
8.2
Expand the National Australian Built Environment Rating Scheme (NABERS) and the Commercial
Buildings Disclosure (CBD) scheme to a broader range of commercial building types (e.g. hotels).
8.3

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Incentivising voluntary action on a broader scale Ref.
Develop an energy performance rating scheme for new and existing residential buildings based
on the Nationwide House Energy Rating Scheme (NatHERS) as a matter of priority.
8.4
The Commonwealth should work with state and territory governments to introduce mandatory
energy performance disclosure obligations for the residential sector linked to the rating system
(recommendation 8.4).
8.5
Safeguard crediting
Establish a ‘below-baseline crediting arrangement’ for large facilities using the Safeguard
Mechanism architecture. The arrangement would provide credits to facilities who reduce their
emissions below their Safeguard baselines by undertaking ‘transformative’ abatement projects.
The below-baseline crediting mechanism would help realise abatement opportunities in
industrial facilities that are not being accessed by the ERF.
Key design parameters would include the following.
 The crediting mechanism would not be an offset scheme; it would be a low-emission
technology deployment incentive scheme, not unlike the RET.
 Initially the mechanism would operate as a pilot, trial phase.
 Units generated under the scheme should be differentiated from ACCUs and could be
known as Safeguard Mechanism Credits (or SMCs).
 The crediting mechanism would be implemented through the National Greenhouse and
Energy Reporting Act and its subordinate legislation.
 Crediting should be targeted at reductions in emissions intensity to avoid crediting
reduced production or facility closures.
 SMCs could be used to meet compliance obligations under the Safeguard Mechanism,
purchased by the private sector, or purchased by the Government through a new
arrangement under the Climate Solutions Fund.
Firms would be required to submit a transformation statement summarising what specific
investments have been made to reduce their emissions intensity.
9.1
Part C - Unlocking the technologies needed to
transform key sectors
Part C outlines that new technologies across the economy will be needed to position Australia for its long-
term goals. A goal-oriented technology co-investment program is recommended to help bring down the
costs of transformative, high abatement potential technologies. Its objective would be to drive down the
costs of transformative technologies and help facilitate their deployment and commercialisation, including
by reducing the risks faced by early movers and increasing specialised skills and capacity in local markets. To
maximise the effectiveness of this program, existing institutions such as ARENA and the CEFC should be
provided with an expanded, technology-neutral remit so they can support key technologies across all
sectors.

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Table C: Recommendations for unlocking the technologies needed to transform key sectors
Unlocking the technologies needed to transform key sectors Ref.
Establish a goal-oriented technology co-investment program to accelerate the uptake of
transformative, high abatement potential technologies that are not currently cost competitive.
 The program would focus on the ‘hard-to-abate’ sectors, for example heavy industry,
freight transport and aviation, where capital costs are high and progress in driving
down costs has been slow.
 Safeguard and non-Safeguard covered projects would be eligible.
 The program would target novel and ambitious technologies with the potential to
transform key sectors.
 The program would involve co-investment by the Government and industry, with
Government funds provided substantially upfront.
 The program would be undertaken in collaboration, and with co-investment, from
state and territory governments where possible.
 The program’s design should provide assurance that funded projects are technically
and commercially feasible.
10.1
Provide ARENA and the CEFC with an expanded, technology-neutral remit so they can support
key technologies across all sectors and be involved in the delivery of the Goal-oriented co-
investment program (recommendation 10.1).
10.2
Establish a single database to publish funding decisions for low emissions technologies through
the co-investment program, CEFC, ARENA and similar schemes. The published information
could include details of the funding recipients and technologies, a statement of reasons for the
investment support, progress reports on implementation, and an account of project outcomes.
10.3

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Glossary
ACCU Australian Carbon Credit Unit
ANREU Act Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011
ARENA Australian Renewable Energy Agency
CBD scheme Commercial Building Disclosure scheme
CCA Climate Change Authority
CEFC Clean Energy Finance Corporation
CERs Certified Emissions Reductions (a unit established under the Kyoto Protocol)
CFI Act Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011
CO2-e Carbon Dioxide equivalent
CSF Climate Solutions Fund
CSIRO Commonwealth Science and Industrial Research Organisation
Department The Department responsible for the Emissions Reduction Fund, being the
Department of the Environment and Energy (before 1 February 2020) and the
Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources (after 1 February 2020)
ERAC Emissions Reduction Assurance Committee
ERF Emissions Reduction Fund
IEA International Energy Agency
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LGC Large-scale Generation Certificate
MWh Megawatt hour
NABERS National Australian Built Environment Rating System
NGER Act National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007
RDC Regional Development Corporation
Regulator Clean Energy Regulator
RET Renewable Energy Target
SMC Safeguard Mechanism Credit
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
STC Small-scale Technology Certificate

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Chapter 1. Introduction
Key points
The Panel has been tasked with providing advice to the Minister for Energy and Emissions Reduction on
how best to incentivise low cost abatement opportunities from across the economy, with a particular
focus on the industrial, manufacturing, transport and agriculture sectors and energy efficiency.
This report presents the Panel’s findings and recommendations, divided according to three themes:
 Improving the Emissions Reduction Fund (Part A)
 Incentivising voluntary action on a broader scale (Part B)
 Unlocking the technologies needed to reduce the emissions intensity of the economy
(Part C)
In February 2019, the Prime Minister, the Hon Scott Morrison MP, announced the Climate Solutions Package
to support Australia’s achievement of its 2030 target under the Paris Agreement. At the core of the package
was a $2 billion replenishment of the Emissions Reduction Fund (the ERF), through the Climate Solutions
Fund (the CSF).1
The ERF has been the centrepiece of Australia’s climate change policy framework since 2014. It has
contracted 192 million tonnes of abatement to date, of which more than 49 million tonnes has been
delivered. The ERF has principally drawn abatement from the land and waste sectors, with 97 per cent of
contracted abatement being drawn from four abatement activities in these sectors. Some projects credited
under the ERF are not contracted to the Clean Energy Regulator, but will still deliver abatement, and many
ERF projects will continue to deliver abatement beyond the contract period. The total abatement expected
to be delivered from current projects out to 2045 is 250 million tonnes of CO2-e.2
The CSF top-up to the ERF
is scheduled to deliver more than 100 million tonnes CO2-e of additional abatement.
Building on the Prime Minister’s announcement, in September 2019 the Minister for Energy and Emissions
Reduction, the Hon Angus Taylor MP, appointed the Panel to consult industry and other stakeholders and
provide advice on options for unlocking further low cost carbon abatement opportunities from elsewhere in
the economy, with a particular emphasis on the industrial, manufacturing, agriculture and transport sectors
and energy efficiency.
The emphasis on these sectors reflects the widespread view there are considerable untapped abatement
opportunities in these sectors, which can deliver both low cost abatement and other co-benefits, such as
increased employment, lower energy costs and improved agricultural productivity.
1
Throughout this report, the Panel uses the term ‘Emissions Reduction Fund’ to describe the crediting and contracting arrangements
established under the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011, and which have been in operation since 2014. It uses the
term ‘Climate Solutions Fund’ to describe the group of potential measures it recommends be put in place to achieve Australia’s Paris
Agreement targets and goals. The Panel anticipates the Emissions Reduction Fund will continue to be one element of the Climate
Solutions Fund.
2 This estimate is calculated by modelling project start dates, relevant land areas and abatement profiles for each registered project and
does not include abatement that may occur outside the crediting period. As this is a projection, there are inherent uncertainties and
assumptions that will change over time.

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The Minister also asked the Panel to focus on mechanisms and opportunities to use Australian Government
investment to leverage co-investment from the private sector and other levels of government, and whether
there may be opportunities to achieve further abatement by streamlining the ERF’s existing reporting, audit,
compliance and method development processes.
Appendix A summarises how the Panel has approached its task. The Panel acknowledges those organisations
that have made submissions in response to its discussions paper, which have been invaluable in helping
inform the Panel’s conclusions.
Structure of this report
The opening chapters of this report describe the policy and market context of the Panel’s work and the
principles it has applied in developing its recommendations. Chapter 2 outlines how technological
innovation and emerging sources of demand for abatement are increasingly becoming factors in Australia’s
efforts to meet its international commitments. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the ERF and reviews the
reasons why some sectors have dominated the sources of abatement and the barriers to engagement faced
by other sectors. Chapter 4 describes the analytical framework and principles the Panel have applied in
undertaking its task.
The remaining chapters outline the Panel’s views on where there are opportunities to unlock additional
abatement through calibrated incentives and modest adjustments to the operation of the ERF. The
deliberate focus has been on practical next steps that could play a useful role in assisting Australia achieve
its international commitments.
These remaining chapters are divided into three parts.
Part A discusses practical changes to the ERF that could help increase participation in the scheme.
Chapter 5 outlines how, in certain circumstances, the ERF could overcome firms’ capital constraints
and other barriers by compressing the timeframes over which Australian Carbon Credit Units
(ACCUs) are allocated to some abatement activities.
Chapter 6 discusses opportunities to achieve additional abatement through the ERF by improving
the way methods are developed and making other adjustments to the scheme. Many of the options
outlined in this chapter are based on the proposals put forward by stakeholders.
Part B discusses opportunities to incentivise voluntary action on a broader scale.
Chapter 7 notes the powerful trend emerging in the private sector to reduce emissions beyond that
required by regulatory obligations (moving from ’compliance to ambition’) and analyses how
existing policies and possible additional measures could help accommodate this trend.
Chapter 8 discusses additional complementary measures that could help encourage abatement by
enabling firms, farmers and households to engage more effectively with voluntary carbon markets.
Chapter 9 outlines how investment in Australia’s largest facilities could be incentivised to reduce
their emissions intensity below baselines using the Safeguard Mechanism framework.
Part C discusses the need to unlock key technologies to reduce the emissions intensity of the economy.
Chapter 10 proposes a technology-neutral approach for key institutions and a goal-oriented
technology co-investment program to help accelerate the development and deployment of low-
emissions technologies and thereby improve the operation of the ‘technology conveyor belt’.

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Scope of this report
In undertaking this work, the Panel has focussed principally on those sectors for which the Minister has
sought advice – the industrial, manufacturing, transport and agriculture sectors and energy efficiency.
While the Minister did not seek explicit advice on unlocking further abatement from the land sector, many
submissions flagged opportunities to achieve further abatement in this area through improving the ERF’s
operation. Further, the Panel included this sector in its consideration of compressed crediting (Chapter 5)
because of the linkages associated with the proposal.
The Panel notes, as outlined in Chapter 2, a transformation is already underway in the electricity generation
sector that is delivering rapid and substantial emissions reductions, and there is considerable existing policy
and institutional focus trained on managing the implications of this transformation. Nonetheless, some of
the recommendations aimed at increasing participation in the ERF may complement these policies and
institutions and help enable further emissions reductions in this sector. The agreement reached between
the Commonwealth and New South Wales governments to support projects to deliver additional, genuine
abatement while improving grid security is a strong sign for the industry. Future agreements between the
Commonwealth and states and territories could follow a similar template.
The Panel has specifically not addressed the setting of Australia’s international commitments under the Paris
Agreement or matters related to international trade in emissions reduction units, as these are central policy
matters for the Government and outside the request from the Minister.
Climate adaptation is also beyond the scope of the Panel’s work. The Panel anticipates additional focus will
be given to these important adaptation issues following the severe bushfire season, which has now afflicted
many Australian communities.The Panel notes a number of mitigation actions—including carbon
sequestration in soil, forest management, savanna fire management, and improved energy performance of
building designs—can deliver valuable adaptation co-benefits in the form of improved agricultural
productivity, positive biodiversity outcomes, additional income streams for farmers and employment and
autonomy for Indigenous communities, and lower energy costs. These will be encouraged by the proposals
outlined in this report.
The Panel has focussed on the potential opportunities and policy levers that could enable Australia to meet
its emissions reduction policy objectives, and provides views on some major features and design elements.
The Panel acknowledges further detailed policy work and consultation with industry would be required to
fully develop these policy options and to assess the feasibility and implications of various design elements.

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Box 1.1 Work underway by the Clean Energy Regulator and the Department of Environment and
Energy to improve the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF)
In undertaking this work, the Panel acknowledges that considerable work is already underway by the
Commonwealth to encourage participation in the ERF and improve its operation. Some of this work has
followed from the detailed consultation and policy work undertaken by the Climate Change Authority
(CCA) for its 2017 statutory review of the ERF. The Panel’s recommendations are intended to
complement this existing body of work.
The Regulator has acknowledged that renewed demand for ACCUs under the Climate Solutions Fund and
emerging demand from the states and the private sector needs a proactive effort to boost ACCU supply.
Building on recent innovations to its auctions, it is pivoting to a more commercially focussed marketing
approach and is seeking opportunities to reduce cost and encourage new participation. It has established
three pillars of work – extension and outreach to participants, market development, and market
innovation. The actions being undertaken against these pillars are detailed further in Appendix C. On 20
December 2019, the Regulator announced a consultation process to seek industry views on an
innovation for the next ACCU auction to include optional delivery contracts as well as the existing firm
delivery contracts.
The Department is also progressing a range of ways to improve the ERF and promote participation. It is
exploring ways for ERF method development to better involve stakeholders, including through pilots and
trials, and will be hosting a workshop with stakeholders in early 2020 to inform method development
priorities. It is also progressing a package of legislative amendments to improve administration of the ERF
and implement changes recommended by the CCA.

18
Chapter 2. Context to the Panel’s work
Key points
Australia is making progress against its 2030 target. The existing policy framework built around the
Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) and Safeguard Mechanism provides a platform that can accommodate
and incentivise further action, but ongoing support of low emission technology deployment and
commercialisation is required to facilitate the transition to a net zero economy in line with Australia’s
long-term commitments
Further innovations in technology and an emerging trend of voluntary emission reductions by the private
sector, state and territory governments and the community mean there are good prospects this task will
continue to become more achievable over time.
However, key sectors are not projected to have begun significantly reducing emissions by 2030 and
concerted effort is needed to unlock the critical, transformative technologies these sectors need.
Australia’s Paris goals will require ongoing and sustained effort, and
progress is being made
Australia’s 2030 commitment under the Paris Agreement is to reduce emissions to 26 to 28 per cent below 2005
levels. This builds on Australia’s previous target to reduce emissions to five per cent below 2000 levels by 2020.
Australia’s emissions reduction task does not end in 2030. Like other signatories to the Paris Agreement,
Australia has agreed to adopt progressively more ambitious targets beyond 2030 and has endorsed the
Agreement’s overarching long-term goals, namely to limit the global temperature rise to well below 2o
C – and
if possible below 1.5o
C – by achieving net zero emissions as soon as possible in the second half of the century.
Meeting these long-term goals will require ongoing and sustained effort by Australia and new
transformative technologies will need to be adopted across all sectors.
Australia is making progress towards its 2030 target. Updated projections prepared by the Department of
the Environment and Energy describe a substantial downward revision in Australia’s abatement task from
the 2018 projections.3
The estimated abatement task over the period to 2030 has fallen by 300 million
tonnes and projected emissions in 2030 has fallen by 52 million tonnes, continuing the trend established
across previous iterations of Australia’s emissions projections (Figure 2.1). The 2019 update reflects the
ongoing high levels of renewables investment across the nation, and takes into account the substantial
pipeline of projects and existence of state-based incentives. It also reflects the contribution of
Commonwealth measures, including the Climate Solutions Package, Renewable Energy Target (RET) and
energy efficiency measures. A conservative estimate by the Clean Energy Regulator finds abatement from
RET eligible renewables and ERF credits now totals over 50 million tonnes for 2019 alone and is expected to
grow significantly in the coming years.4
There are good prospects the path to achieving Australia’s abatement task, both to 2030 and beyond, will
continue to become clearer and less costly over time. Two factors are notable in this regard.
3 Department of the Environment and Energy 2019 Emissions Projections, accessed 16 December 2019 from
http://environment.gov.au/climate-change/publications/emissions-projections-2019
4 CER Quarterly Carbon Market Report – September Quarter 2019 accessed on 16 December 2019 from
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/DocumentAssets/Documents/Quarterly%20Carbon%20Market%20Report%20–
%20September%20Quarter%202019.pdf

19
Figure 2.1. Emissions in 2030 estimated across successive iterations of Australia’s emissions projections
Figure 2.2 – Technology experience curves for solar PV modules (left), wind turbines (top right) and lithium
ion battery packs (bottom right) (Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance)

20
Technology developments are helping emissions to fall, at a lower cost
First, investments by governments and the private sector in low emissions technologies are resulting in
dramatic cost reductions and growing deployment. Solar, wind and batteries are clear examples where costs
have fallen to the point that renewables investment is now driving a rapid transformation of the electricity
industry, which has historically accounted for around a third of Australia’s emissions.5
The progressively
smaller abatement task illustrated in Figure 2.1 can in part be explained by lower costs for these
technologies.
Further technology development can be expected in other sectors. The experience in the electricity sector
has reinforced that the learning curve for new technologies is not linear, with new innovations building on
past innovations, and cost reductions being realised as economies of scale in production and deployment
are achieved (Figure 2.2).6
Globally, government spending on energy research, development and
demonstration has grown over recent decades to US$26 billion in 2018, with the growth in government
spending on clean energy innovation outpacing traditional forms of energy.7
In Australia, ARENA has invested $1.4 billion in grants to early stage technologies since 2012, funding 478
projects with a total value of $5.5 billion. The CEFC has provided $7.2 billion in finance between 2013 and
2019 to over 140 projects with a total value of $24 billion. The private sector is also investing heavily in clean
energy innovation, with 2018 a record year globally for venture capital investment in the sector, focussed
largely on clean transport technologies.8
As a result of these investments, transformative technologies that only recently were seen as distant
possibilities, like ultra-fast charging for electric vehicles and industrial heat based on electrification or
hydrogen, are now commercially available or in the process of becoming so.9
Momentum is building across all levels of government and the private
sector to reduce emissions.
Second, there is clear and growing appetite across the private sector and other levels of government to
reduce emissions voluntarily beyond the point required for regulatory compliance.
Both globally and in Australia, there is an emerging shift in corporate attitudes to climate change to move from
‘compliance’ to ‘ambition’. These actions will deliver abatement and contribute towards Australia’s target.
5 The deployment of renewables and falling carbon intensity of the electricity grid brings some operational challenges due to the unique
need to balance the electricity system in real time. The need to manage these operational issues has triggered a further wave of
investment in new technologies by institutions like ARENA. New technologies in other sectors are less likely to raise the kind of
operational challenges seen in the electricity sector.
6 Bloomberg New Energy Finance New Energy Outlook 2019 viewed at https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/#toc-download;
X Wang and A Barnett (2019) The Evolving Value of Photovoltaic Module Efficiency Appl. Sci. 9(6), 1227; and L Goldie-Scot A Behind the
Scenes Take on Lithium-ion Battery Prices at https://about.bnef.com/blog/behind -the-scenes-take-lithium-ion-battery-prices; and
M Kurosaki.Presentation to the RE-Users Summit 2019 viewed at https://www.renewable-ei.org/pdfdownload/activities/4-
1_Kurosaki_RE-Users%20Summit%202019_EN.pdf
7 International Energy Agency World Energy Investment 2019 viewed on 18 December 2019 at https://www.iea.org/reports/world-
energy-investment-2019
8 International Energy Agency World Energy Investment 2019 viewed on 18 December 2019 at https://www.iea.org/reports/world-
energy-investment-2019
9 See for example, ARENA 2019, Renewable Energy Options for Industrial Process Heat, ARENA, Canberra, accessed 13 December 2019
<https://arena.gov.au/knowledge-bank/renewable-energy-options-for-industrial-process-heat>; McKinsey 2018, Decarbonization of
Industrial Sectors: the next frontier, McKinsey and Company, accessed 13 December 2019 <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/sustainability/our-insights/how-industry-can-move-toward-a-low-carbon-future>; and Columbia University 2019, Low-carbon
Heat Solutions for Heavy Industry: Sources, Options and Costs Today, accessed 13 December 2019
<https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/report/low-carbon-heat-solutions-heavy-industry-sources-options-and-costs-today>

21
Many firms increasingly see acting on climate change and adopting a lower emissions investment footprint
as ‘smart business’ and fundamental to their strategies to attract and retain customers. Major companies
such as Qantas, Rio Tinto and Woolworths have adopted and are actively implementing long-term climate
change strategies. As of December 2019, 88 businesses have certified 130 business operations, products,
services, buildings, precincts and events as net zero emissions under the Australian Government’s Climate
Active program10, with certification numbers having doubled in the last two years, and there is a strong
pipeline of firms seeking to be certified under the program. Almost half of Australia’s largest property
companies have pledged to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 or are on a pathway aligned with this
goal.11 The National Farmers Federation’s plan is for Australia’s farm sector to be on a pathway towards
carbon neutrality by 2030.12
Further, it is clear firms are responding to a marked shift in their business-operating environment. Investors,
consumers, and regulators (such as the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Australian
Securities and Investment Commission) are increasingly signalling their expectation that firms take action to
understand and manage climate risks potentially affecting their operations. Many pension funds, insurers,
banks, and institutional investors (like Black Rock and Vanguard) now factor climate change into how they
allocate risk and direct capital. To cite a couple of notable developments:
 The Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure established by the G20’s Financial Stability Board
has now given businesses consistent and accessible guidance on climate risk.13
Around 900
organisations have endorsed the Taskforce’s recommendations, including BHP, the big four banks,
Wesfarmers and BlueScope.14
 Over 600 global investors with more than US$37 trillion in assets under management have signed onto
an initiative to improve governance on climate change, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
strengthen climate-related financial disclosures.15
 Moody’s16
and Standard and Poor’s17
are integrating climate risks and opportunities into their corporate
and sovereign credit ratings assessment, and the ASX Corporate Governance Council has updated its
Corporate Governance Principles to include climate risk.
Voluntary carbon markets (that is, markets for ‘offsets’ for use beyond mandatory RET liabilities and
Safeguard Mechanism obligations) are now emerging in Australia. The voluntary market now represents 12
per cent of the total carbon and renewable energy certificate market, and the Regulator expects it will grow
10
Previously known as Carbon Neutral Program and the National Carbon Offset Standard (NCOS).
11 ClimateWorks Australia, Net Zero Emissions Tracker: Property Sector, September 2019, viewed 18 December at
https://www.climateworksaustralia.org/net-zero-momentum-tracker
12 National Farmers Federation, 2030 Roadmap – Australian Agriculture’s Plan for a $100 billion Industry, viewed 13 December 2019
from https://www.nff.org.au/get/news/6187-0.pdf
13 Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures 2017, Final Report: Recommendations of the Taskforce on Climate-Related
Financial Disclosures, viewed on 13 December 2019 from https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-
Report-11052018.pdf
14 TCFD supporters, accessed on 13 December 2019 from https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/tcfd-supporters/
15 Global Investor Statement to Governments on Climate Change, viewed on 9 December 2019 from http://theinvestoragenda.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/191201-GISGCC-FINAL-for-COP25.pdf
16
Moody’s 2016, Climate Change and Sovereign Credit Risk, accessed 17 December from
https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/ProductAttachments/Climate_trends_infographic_moodys.pdf
17 Standard & Poor’s 2017, How Environmental and Climate Risks and Opportunities Factor Into Global Corporate Ratings - An Update,
viewed on 13 December 2019 from https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/environmental-and-climate-risks-factor-
into-ratings

22
strongly in the years ahead.18
If domestic supply could be increased to the point it could completely meet
this demand, this would deliver considerable abatement and other co-benefits for Australian communities
(for example, through projects that provide additional income streams for farmers, and employment and
autonomy for Indigenous communities).
Initial indications from the voluntary market demonstrate that some customers are
willing to spend more for projects with demonstrable co-benefits.
NRM Regions Australia
There is also a growing appetite for voluntary action by Australian households. Take-up of household solar
systems continues to grow, with around one- fifth of Australian households now having a system on their
roofs. Australia is on track for a record 2.2 GW of small-scale solar installations in 2019, which would easily
exceed the previous record of 1.6 GW installed in 2018.19
Similarly, major airlines are seeing growth in passenger uptake of voluntary carbon offsets programs.
Qantas, which operates the largest offset program in the world, has seen a reported 15 per cent increase in
passengers opting to offset emissions from their flights in 2019.20
The ABC’s Australia Talks National Survey
found Australians are, on average, prepared to pay $200 per year towards actions that reduce emissions to
address climate change.21
State and territory governments have also adopted ambitious climate change policies, and their efforts and
investments will make a contribution towards Australia’s national goals and beyond. All states and
territories have committed to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. Their actions are driven both by
environmental and economic motivations, and to help address some operational challenges arising from the
rapid introduction of variable renewables into the electricity grid.22
They recognise the growing global
demand for low emissions products, services and commodities presents economic opportunities for their
communities, including in regional areas.
For example, NSW’s $75 million Emerging Energy Program is supporting the development of innovative,
large-scale electricity and storage projects in that state, while Queensland’s $500 million Land Restoration
Fund aims to expand carbon farming by supporting land-sector projects that deliver clear environmental,
social and economic co-benefits. NSW is the first state to reach a bilateral agreement with the
Commonwealth to secure co-funding for additional emissions reductions through, among other elements,
greater use of low emissions fuel, a pilot renewable energy zone in the state’s central west region, and a
range of emissions reduction initiatives.
18 CER Quarterly Carbon Market Report – September Quarter 2019 accessed on 16 December 2019 from
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/DocumentAssets/Documents/Quarterly%20Carbon%20Market%20Report%20–
%20September%20Quarter%202019.pdf
19 Clean Energy Regulator Small-scale technology certificate market update - October 2019, viewed on 13 December 2019 from
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/RET/About-the-Renewable-Energy-Target/small-scale-technology-certificate-market-updates
20 The Sydney Morning Herald Qantas points push sees green flyers take off 28 July 2019 viewed 17 December 2019 from
https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/qantas-points-push-sees-green-flyers-take-off-20190726-p52b8a.html, Airline Ratings
QANTAS POINTS SPUR CARBON OFFSET ACTION 29 July 2019, viewed 17 December 2019 https://www.airlineratings.com/news/qantas-
points-spur-carbon-offset-action/
21 The Australia Talks National Survey was fielded between 20-29 July 2019 and had a total of 54,970 respondents. When asked the
question how much more they’d be personally willing to spend to help prevent climate change, the average response was $200 each
year. Information about the survey and data relating to this question is at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-17/what-youd-
spend-to-halt-climate-change-and-what-you-could-get/11784704 (viewed on 18 December 2019)
22 In this context, the Panel is encouraged by recent progress in terms of actioning the Australian Energy Market Operator’s Integrated
System Plan, including agreements to progress transmission links and renewable energy zones and the deployment of the first large
unsubsidised batteries.

23
There is scope for Australia to do more, particularly in areas where
relatively little abatement has been realised to date
While the 2019 projections show progress toward our 2030 target is being made, they make clear the scale
of the task ahead in terms of our longer-term goals.
Australia’s emissions are projected to fall from 532 million tonnes in 2019 to 511 million tonnes in 2030,
even as Australia’s economy is projected to grow by around a third over the same period (Figure 2.3).
Deeper emissions reductions, at a faster rate, will be needed after 2030. Further, the projections show that
for sectors apart from electricity, waste and ‘land use, land use change and forestry’ (LULUCF), emissions will
remain either flat or will have not yet begun to fall by 2030.
Untapped opportunities exist across these sectors. Various expert bodies, including the International Energy
Agency23
and the CSIRO24
, have identified low cost technologies and practices that could help to both reduce
emissions and sequester carbon in the landscape. For example, modelling by RepuTex Energy25
(Figure 2.4)
has identified potential opportunities totalling over 200 million tonnes of abatement that could be delivered
in 2030 at a net cost of less than $15 per tonne, of which around 160 million tonnes could be delivered at
net negative cost (that is, save money for households or businesses).26
Figure 2.3 – Projected sectoral emissions to 2030 (Source: Department of the Environment and Energy)
23 IEA 2017, Energy Technology Perspectives 2017, IEA, Paris, viewed 12 December 2019 https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-
technology-perspectives-2017
24 CSIRO 2017, Low Emissions Technology Roadmap, CSIRO, Canberra, viewed 12 December 2019 <https://www.csiro.au/en/Do-
business/Futures/Reports/Low-Emissions-Technology-Roadmap>.
25 RepuTex Energy, The cost of net-zero emissions under Paris: A Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve for Australia, July 2019
26 In preparing Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves, analysts collate and rank, according to cost of abatement, a range of emissions
reduction activities available across the economy. Each activity in the MAC curve reflects assumptions for the lifetime costs (e.g. capital
and operational) and benefits (e.g. energy and fuel savings), annualised for a particular year and compared against a business as usual
scenario. MAC curves focus on technical costs and benefits, and analysts usually acknowledge the range of non-technical costs that can
impede real-world take-up, such as transaction costs, institutional barriers and non-monetary costs
(e.g. investment appraisal, procurement and legal costs, regulatory compliance costs, administrative costs of finance).

24
Figure 2.4 – Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for Australia in 2030 (Source: RepuTex Energy)
Many of these technologies would also deliver valuable co-benefits, such as lower energy bills and positive
employment and biodiversity outcomes.
Further, given Australia’s vast geography, there are likely to be considerable opportunities for carbon to be
stored in its forests, soils, coastal ecosystems (like mangroves and seagrasses) and subsurface geology.
Biological and geological sequestration can play an important role in offsetting emissions from sectors
where abatement technologies remain costly or do not yet exist.
In this way, our natural endowments could be a distinct competitive advantage for Australia as we,
alongside other countries, strive to achieve net zero emissions in the decades ahead. Biological
sequestration has already been a major source of abatement under the ERF under some methods but there
is scope for this to be increased.
The existing policy framework provides a strong foundation
The policy objective for Australia should be to unlock these technologies and practices. This would enable a
transformation of these sectors that would help position them, and Australia, for deeper emissions
reduction goals over the long term.

25
A range of policy instruments are available to government to help achieve this objective. These include
financial incentives and grants, loans and investment, economic and market-based instruments, regulatory
instruments (like standards and obligations), and information and guidance. The relative merits of different
instruments depends on the context in which they are deployed. In some instances, regulatory instruments
will be superior to the alternatives, in others voluntary, economic or information instruments may offer the
best way forward. Each instrument is more or less effective in particular circumstances and contexts, and
there is a fundamental policy insight that multiple objectives require multiple instruments. Part of the
Panel’s work has been to consider which instruments are best suited to achieving the desired objectives.
The Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) and Safeguard Mechanism, built on Australia’s globally recognised
emissions measurement and reporting systems, provide a platform that can readily accommodate and
incentivise further action. Given the context outlined above, the Panel believes there are opportunities to
refine the existing policies, including the ERF, and to build complementary measures to drive further
abatement. The Panel’s recommended changes include an evolution of current policy settings, building on
the achievements to date and laying a platform for future action – nevertheless, the Panel thinks there are
reasonable grounds to expect the proposed changes will yield material levels of additional low cost
abatement. In the context of Australia’s international commitments, the implementation of incentive
programs will facilitate the early adoption of low emission technology, as evidenced by the large scale
deployment of rooftop PVs, and will drive the transition in the targeted sectors, better positioning the
Australian economy for a net zero future.
There are considerable strengths and advantages in Australia’s existing arrangements. The legislative
framework underpinning the ERF and Safeguard Mechanism ensures emissions reductions activities
undertaken within Australia are nested within Australia’s national and international accounting frameworks.
This provides confidence to domestic and international markets that those activities have credibility and
integrity. Further, the existing framework represents a national platform that can, over the years ahead,
facilitate voluntary action by the private sector and state and territory governments. The view that
Australia’s accounting and offsets crediting frameworks are fundamentally sound aligns with prior reviews
by the Climate Change Authority.27
The Paris Agreement envisaged countries would progressively increase the degree of ambition in their
nationally determined emissions reduction targets to bring the global mitigation effort in line with efforts to
limit global temperature increases. The Government has indicated it will review its climate policy settings by
2025 as part of the process for considering its 2035 target under the Agreement.28
The Panel notes the
proposals in this report could help meet higher emissions reduction targets beyond 2030 and could support
any future evolution of existing policies.
27 Climate Change Authority 2017, Review of the Emissions Reduction Fund, Climate Change Authority, Canberra, viewed on 13
December 2019, <http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/review-emissions-reduction-fund>; Climate Change Authority 2018, Review of
the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Legislation: Final Report, Climate Change Authority, Canberra, viewed on 13 December
2019 <http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/review-national-greenhouse-and-energy-reporting-legislation-final-report>
28 Department of the Environment and Energy 2017, 2017 Review of Climate Change Policies, Department of the Environment and
Energy, Canberra, viewed on 10 January 2020, < https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/publications/final-report-review-of-
climate-change-policies-2017>

26
Chapter 3. The Emissions Reduction Fund
Key points
The Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) has been effective in unlocking abatement and is making an
important contribution towards Australia meeting its 2020 and 2030 targets. However, this abatement
has been drawn from a narrow set of project types that are commercial and scalable under current
settings.
Low cost abatement opportunities exist elsewhere in the economy, but the ERF has not been able to
realise them because of a range of institutional, financial and non-financial (or behavioural) barriers.
Information from stakeholders suggests these barriers include:
 the restrictive nature of the ERF’s additionality and accounting rules;
 the incentives offered by the ERF are often not aligned with when firms incur their costs;
 high transaction costs and uneven risk-sharing arrangements between proponents and government;
and
 a lack of awareness and information, and the existence of split incentives, amongst potential market
participants.
The Emissions Reduction Fund has been effective, but it has drawn
abatement from a narrow set of sectors
Since being established in 2014, the ERF has contracted over 190 million tonnes of abatement, with more
than 48 million tonnes already delivered. Around 790 projects are registered across all states and territories.
Of these, 470 projects are involved in contracts with the Regulator at an average price of
$12 per tonne. These projects are contributing towards Australia’s 2020 and 2030 emissions reduction
targets.
An overview of how the ERF works is presented in Box 3.1.
The ERF offers the opportunity for firms and landholders to undertake projects under 36 methods covering
all sectors of the economy (listed at Appendix C). To date, most Australian Carbon Credit Unit (ACCU) supply
has been from four project types: the human-induced regeneration of native forests in semi-arid regions;
the avoidance of deforestation in western New South Wales; improved savanna fire management in
northern Australia; and the capture and combustion of landfill gas. Together, these projects account for 97
per cent of ACCUs issued (Figure 3.1).
Three main factors have contributed to the relatively high levels of uptake of these activities in the
competitive reverse auction process under the ERF:
 they are relatively cheap to undertake;
 they involve relatively well-known and understood abatement technologies; and
 they are easily accommodated within existing business models and operations.

27
Box 3.1 Overview of the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF)
The ERF has three components: an offset certification scheme; a purchasing mechanism; and the
Safeguard mechanism.
The offset certification scheme is a statutory-based scheme that provides for the certification of carbon
offset projects and issuance of certified credits, known as ‘Australian carbon credit units’ (ACCUs). The
scheme is voluntary and is intended to provide incentives for businesses, land owners, state and local
governments and community organisations to adopt new abatement technologies and practices. Project
participants join the scheme by registering a project, under one of the approved methods, with the
Regulator. Participants run their project according to the method they have chosen to use, report on it
and ensure it is audited when required. The projects then receive Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs)
for the emissions reductions they have achieved.
The Purchasing Mechanism is a facility run by the Regulator that purchases ACCUs. The facility consists
of periodic reverse auctions, whereby the Regulator contracts with parties to deliver ACCUs at specified
intervals at a set price. In addition to selling ACCUs to the Regulator, they can also be sold to facilities
with liabilities under the Safeguard Mechanism and in the voluntary market to other parties wanting to
offset their emissions (or to meet contractual obligations to the Regulator).
The Safeguard Mechanism is designed to ensure emissions do not increase above historic levels and that
purchased abatement is not displaced by significant emissions increases elsewhere in the economy. It
applies emissions baselines to facilities that emit more than 100,000 tonnes CO2-e per year. The
mechanism covered 211 industrial facilities in 2017-18, which were responsible for 138.4 Mt CO2-e
(around a quarter of Australia’s emissions). Each facility must keep their emissions below their baseline
or surrender ACCUs to make up the difference.

28
Outside the land and waste sectors, the take up of abatement projects has been relatively limited. Around
88 per cent of currently contracted abatement is being delivered under five methods, while there are six
methods with no registered projects. Despite the existence of 12 methods across the energy efficiency,
industrial, and transport sectors, current contracted abatement across these methods is only around four
per cent of the total contracted abatement. The proportion of ACCU supply from ‘agricultural methods’
(those involving the reduction of methane and nitrous oxide from enteric fermentation, animal effluent and
soils) to date is less than 1 per cent.
There is potential elsewhere in the economy, but it is obstructed by
financial and non-financial barriers
In some cases, the ERF has had limited take-up due to the absence or immaturity of abatement technologies
(for example, technologies for reducing livestock emissions), or where the upfront or ongoing costs of
abatement are simply too high compared with the prevailing auction price and cannot compete on a ‘least
cost’ basis. In this sense, the ERF can be considered a substantial success – in effect, the contract process has
selected the lowest cost abatement on offer. Indeed, the ERF has contracted substantially more abatement
and at a lower cost than envisaged at the outset.29
However, the ERF has also had limited take-up in sectors where many experts, including the CSIRO30
and the
International Energy Agency31
, agree low cost, technically and commercially proven abatement technologies
exist (see Figure 2.5, above). They have identified a wide range of technologies that can help businesses and
households reduce their emissions while delivering co-benefits such as lower energy costs and higher
29 Australian Government 2014, Emissions Reduction Fund White Paper, Department of the Environment and Energy, Canberra,
accessed on 12 December 2019 https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/government/emissions-reduction-
fund/publications/erf-white-paper
30
CSIRO 2017, Low Emissions Technology Roadmap, CSIRO, Canberra, viewed 12 December 2019 <https://www.csiro.au/en/Do-
business/Futures/Reports/Low-Emissions-Technology-Roadmap>.
31 IEA 2017, Energy Technology Perspectives 2017, IEA, Paris, viewed 12 December 2019 https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-
technology-perspectives-2017.
Figure 3.1. ACCUs issued and contracted by project family

29
employment. Many of these technologies, particularly those that improve energy or resource efficiency,
entail financial savings over their lifetimes that exceed their installation and running costs.
There is a wide and compelling body of evidence that such technologies are often not adopted by firms and
households, despite being financially attractive, and even where incentives are available.32
The reasons for
this vary. In some cases, investment in new technologies face financial barriers, like high risk premiums
being applied to new technologies in capital markets, high system costs (e.g. the costs of integrating new
technology into an old production line), and competition for capital and other resources within the firm. In
other cases, technologies can face non-financial or behavioural barriers, like split incentives between
property owners and tenants, a lack of trusted information or integrated advice, or a reluctance or lack of
capacity to alter existing business or farming practices.
In their submissions to the Panel, stakeholders reinforced that these barriers are real and material, and are
obstacles to the take-up of low-cost technologies in Australia that could deliver emissions reductions and
many other co-benefits.
There are persistent barriers to the uptake of energy efficiency, fuel switching and
distributed generation. Experience from Australia and overseas has shown that
addressing these barriers require strong, long term and targeted policy and programs…
Barriers to action are by no means isolated to financial considerations. In fact there is
clear evidence that the strongest barriers are behavioural and awareness-raising.
Joint submission by the PCA, GBCA, ASBEC and EEC
Making ‘step-change’ reductions (20-30%) in greenhouse emissions … requires much
larger projects with more significant capital costs and risks…. In iron and steelmaking,
off-the-shelf technologies are limited. In some cases major plant cannot just be ‘swapped
out’ in a major industrial site, and requires years of planning and design to provide a
successful cut-over after commissioning.
GFG Alliance Australia
While abatement opportunities exist from a technical perspective (i.e. a lower emissions
technology is available) they either can't make the business case work (i.e. fails to meet
IRR benchmark) or are a less attractive use of capital compared to other opportunities.
Energy Users Association of Australia
The Emissions Reduction Fund – in its current form – may not be the best
instrument for unlocking some opportunities
The ERF has secured a large volume of abatement at low cost and has exceeded early expectations.
However, its design does not lend itself to all abatement opportunities in all circumstances.
Stakeholders outlined their perspectives for why the ERF has been ineffective in overcoming some barriers.
In some cases, opportunities were identified where additional abatement could be realised by making
relatively straightforward changes, such as improving the coverage of methods and the method
32 IEA 2018, Perspectives for the Energy Transition: The role of energy efficiency, IEA <webstore.iea.org/perspectives-for-the-energy-
transition-the-role-of-energy-efficiency; IEA 2017, Accelerating Energy Efficiency in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 2017, IEA,
accessed on 12 December 2019 <https://www.iea.org/reports/policy-pathways-brief-accelerating-energy-efficiency-in-small-and-
medium-sized-enterprises-2017>; IEA and IIP 2017, Energy Management Programs for Industry, IEA, accessed on 12 December 2019
<https://webstore.iea.org/policy-pathway-energy-management-programmes-for-industry>

30
development process. However, stakeholders also identified deeper challenges presented by fundamental
and essential elements of the ERF’s design. These included the following issues.
 The ERF’s additionality rules are restrictive. The ERF was designed to ensure ACCUs are only provided
for additional abatement – i.e. abatement that would not occur in the absence of the incentive provided
under the scheme. The need for credits to represent additional abatement is a fundamental feature of
all offset schemes. While an essential feature of the scheme, it is difficult to design additionality rules
that do not have the unintended consequence of excluding some low-cost abatement activities.33
This
was reflected in the feedback from stakeholders, many of who argued the ERF’s rules have discouraged
participation. The challenges presented by additionality are most acute for activities involving the
deployment of technologies that are financially viable without government support, particularly where
there are no material non-financial barriers (e.g. projects involving the early replacement of energy
consuming equipment). In these cases, it is difficult to devise method-level rules that are able to
distinguish between additional and non-additional activities.
 The incentives offered by the ERF are not aligned with the time when firms incur their costs. The ERF
credits and pays for abatement on delivery, while many project development and capital costs are
incurred upfront. Stakeholders have argued this mismatch in the timing of costs and revenues make ERF
projects unattractive, particularly for capital-constrained firms or where there are competing demands
internally on capital and other resources. At the most simple level, the mismatch in timing between
costs and revenues increases project risks, exposing firms to material downsides if the abatement
delivered by their projects is lower than projected or the price of ACCUs declines.
 High transaction costs and uneven risk sharing are a disincentive to participation. Stakeholders have
argued transaction costs associated with the ERF – including project design, registration, brokerage,
auction participation, and measurement, reporting and verification – are too high, particularly given the
price uncertainty associated with ACCUs. Many stakeholders also argued there was an uneven
allocation of project and scheme risks, with proponents often left carrying risks that would be better
borne by government. For example, the property sector has argued the lack of flexibility in contract
terms and the ERF’s make-good provisions disincentivise their participation as they put the delivery risk
onto building owners (who do not always control the building’s energy consumption) and may limit
their ability to sell buildings during the contract period.
 The ERF has not unlocked abatement where information is hard to find or too complex, or split
incentives exist. Many abatement activities are highly technical, and beyond the skills and capabilities
of many businesses and landholders, particularly small businesses and farms. While the ERF allows third
parties to advise on and aggregate abatement opportunities, few advisory firms have emerged in key
sectors such as agriculture and transport to fill this gap so lack of capability remains a substantial
barrier. Split incentives, such as between property owners and tenants in the building sector, can be a
barrier where the person paying for the emissions reduction investments may not directly benefit from
the investment. Under current arrangements, the incentives from the ERF are not sufficiently high to
motivate property owners to engage.
Stakeholders included in their submissions case studies of various abatement projects, which the ERF has
been unable to incentivise effectively. Some of these are described in Box 3.2.
The Panel agrees changes can be made to the ERF to achieve further abatement by streamlining its
operations. Following the announcement of the Climate Solutions Fund, the Regulator and the Department
33 It is a well-known paradox of offset schemes that the most cost-effective activities are often the least additional (what is sometimes
called ‘Grubb’s paradox’). See M Grubb, C Vrolijk & D Brack. The Kyoto Protocol (Earthscan, London, 1998).

31
initiated detailed work designed to boost the supply of abatement projects (see Box 1.1 and Appendix B),
and additional measures are discussed further in Chapter 6.
However, in the Panel’s view, the ERF is not the most suitable instrument for realising abatement in some
sectors. Chapters 5 to 10 describe where the Panel considers incremental changes to the ERF or different,
better-calibrated incentives could be more effective.
Box 3.2 Stakeholder case studies – Where ERF design has failed to incentivise abatement projects
Caltex has explored whether the ERF could support several projects to increase its operational efficiency
and reduce emissions. These included large projects (such as co-generation) and targeted equipment
modifications.
As with most businesses, Caltex noted the internal allocation of capital is highly competitive and projects
with long and uncertain paybacks are considered unviable in comparison with other projects. It
considered the incentive provided by the ERF was not sufficient to boost the business cases for its
projects, particularly when weighed against the effort and detail required to put forward a project and
the ongoing monitoring and reporting requirements. In addition, it considered the uncertainty regarding
when an auction will be held, and whether its project would be successful, introduced considerable risk
for the business cases.
The Business Council of Australia described the experience of Jemena, one of its members, which had
identified an opportunity to reduce emissions and increase efficiency through fuel switching to
biomethane. Made from biodegradable organic matter and a zero carbon alternative for natural gas,
biomethane is injected into gas distribution networks overseas but is not produced at scale in Australia.
Jemena and its customers are seeking to establish markets for biomethane in Australia, however are
currently unable to attract support through the ERF because biomethane injection is not recognised in
current methods and a certification process is not yet available.
BlueScope Steel has explored the opportunity to reduce electricity use from one of its sites through
‘behind the meter’ reuse of waste energy. This project had the potential to reduce both emissions and
grid electricity demand, but would require support to overcome the company’s CAPEX hurdles.
While this project is eligible for support under the ERF’s Industrial Electricity and Fuel Efficiency
methodology, BlueScope found the requirements for calculating abatement were inflexible and
unsuitable for a project that lies within a significantly larger facility boundary. The method’s
requirements are intended to ensure abatement credited through the ERF is genuine, but some
stakeholders have argued they are too prescriptive and can be a barrier to projects proceeding
(especially for small businesses without the necessary expert knowledge and capabilities).
The CEFC and the Cattle Council of Australia noted improving soil carbon could achieve potentially large
abatement and other co-benefits. Despite this, the ERF has supported relatively few projects to date with
57 registered projects at the end of 2019.
The ERF offers two soil carbon methods – one that estimates soil carbon using a fully modelled-based
approach and another involving direct measurement. The modelled-based method has had no uptake,
which stakeholders report is due to the conservative nature of the model and the method’s eligibility
restrictions. There are currently 45 registered projects under the direct measurement method.
Stakeholders argue uptake of this method has been obstructed by high measurement costs. Lower
measurement costs and improved modelling capabilities could increase the uptake of soil carbon
opportunities.

32
Chapter 4. Principles that have guided the
Panel in forming its conclusions
Key points
In light of the context presented in chapters 2 and 3, and the views put by stakeholders in their
submissions, the Panel has articulated seven principles that have guided it in forming its conclusions:
1. Projects that reduce the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere should be considered for an
incentive if the actual or potential carbon benefit exceeds the incentive cost.
2. Policy should be designed to favour economically productive activities or activities where there are
co-benefits.
3. Policies and institutions should be technology-neutral and complementary.
4. Participation will be encouraged if solutions are conceptually and administratively simple, with an
emphasis on balanced sharing of risk and minimising transaction costs.
5. Technologies are at different stages of technical and commercial readiness, and incentives/
instruments should be designed to reflect this.
6. Policies should be designed and administered in a participatory and transparent manner.
7. Policy responses should be coordinated between federal, state and territory governments and
undertaken in collaboration, where possible, with state and territory governments
Principle 1. Projects that reduce the stock of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere should be considered for an incentive if the actual or
potential carbon benefit exceeds the incentive cost
Climate change is being driven by the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It follows that
any activity that can reduce the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is desirable and should be
considered for an incentive if the whole-of-economy benefit (including the carbon value) is greater than the
whole-of–economy cost. Achieving net emissions reductions will require both sequestration and abatement
technologies, noting that for some sectors it will be most cost-effective to offset their emissions. That should
include both new abatement projects and projects that bring forward the timing of planned or likely
upgrades.34
For example, a firm could be incentivised to bring forward a planned efficiency upgrade by five
years, if the result is lower emissions over those five years.
In articulating this principle, the Panel is aware this will present challenges in ensuring taxpayer funds secure
new and additional abatement. Programs like the ERF have strong assurance of additionality through tightly
defined eligibility criteria, but with the result participation has not been effectively incentivised across key
sectors and substantial abatement has remained untapped. New, less restrictive approaches should be
developed to provide assurance projects go beyond business-as-usual.
34 Bringing forward any emissions avoidance activity will result in better climate outcomes because it results in a permanent reduction
in the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The same principle does not apply to sequestration activities. Bringing forward a
sequestration activity results in a temporary climate benefit that is not equivalent to the avoidance of an emission from another source.

33
Adjust the offset integrity standards to better reflect likely circumstances within industrial
operations – a common situation would be for a project to be brought forward in time,
increased in scale or made more certain or a higher priority by the incentive provided by
the scheme.
Australian Aluminium Council
Applying this principle will reward firms that take early action to reduce emissions. In so doing, care should
also be taken to avoid unintended consequences that penalise firms that have made investments under the
existing framework or that reduce the cost-effectiveness of existing policies. For example, the ERF is
underpinned by robust legislative and governance frameworks, which ensure the integrity of ACCUs created
under its methods. Relaxing the ERF’s integrity rules could adversely affect the cost-effectiveness of the
scheme by prompting the diversion of resources to activities that would occur without the incentive
provided by the ability to generate and sell ACCUs. Changes to the ERF’s rules could also adversely affect the
value the market ascribes to ACCUs, resulting in proponents of genuinely additional activities being
penalised by the entry of non-additional projects. Due to this, in some cases, it would be preferable to use
alternative instruments to incentivise abatement rather than seeking to modify the ERF framework.
Principle 2. Policy should be designed to favour economically productive
activities or activities where there are co-benefits
An objective of Australia’s climate policy should be to achieve step-change transformation in key sectors by
incentivising the adoption of new technology or practices. Emissions reductions should be achieved from
economically productive activities, such as by improving efficiency and productivity, or by making new or
accelerated investments in facilities, buildings or farms. A focus on incentivising technology adoption will
reduce emissions, create jobs and boost productivity.
In principle, policies should favour actions that lead to reductions in emissions-intensity, rather than
reductions in production. For this reason, the Panel considers credits should not be issued for reductions in
production through the proposed crediting arrangements under the Safeguard Mechanism that are
discussed below in Chapter 9.
Policy should also aim to encourage technologies and practices that deliver social and environmental co-
benefits, such as providing lower energy bills for low income or vulnerable households, creating employment
opportunities, cultural benefits or autonomy for Indigenous communities, and restoring the natural capital of
degraded land and local ecosystems. It is not the role of the Regulator to assess or determine the worth or
merit of co-benefits but there are options to assist the market make such valuations.

34
Principle 3. Policies and institutions should be technology-neutral and
complementary
Australia’s international commitments are governed by international accounting rules. These rules dictate
which greenhouse gases and sectors are covered in Australia’s national greenhouse inventory and the
approach to accounting for relevant emissions and removals against Australia’s targets.
Relevantly, the international accounting rules require Australia to report emissions and removals of seven
types of greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons
(PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3).35
Emissions of
the non-CO2 gases are reported as carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2-e) using internationally agreed 100-year
global warming potentials (GWPs). 100-year GWPs are metrics (similar to exchange rates) that convert
1 tonne of a given greenhouse gas into its equivalent in CO2 based on its contribution to global warming
over a 100-year period. The GWPs encapsulate the different radiative efficiencies and atmospheric lifetimes
of the gases. Once converted into CO2-e, the international accounting rules treat all gases as equal. One
tonne of CO2-e abated is treated the same as any other, regardless of the activity or gases involved.
Given these rules, to the extent possible, no form of abatement that can be counted towards Australia’s
targets should be seen as less desirable than another. Consistent with this, government policy should be
focussed on supporting abatement that can be counted towards Australia’s targets.
In a similar vein, government policy should be technology neutral. If a technology has the potential to make
a material contribution towards Australia’s target, it should in-principle be eligible for support, alongside
other technologies, through Australia’s policies and institutions. For example, the Panel does not think it is
appropriate to exclude carbon capture and storage technologies where other sequestration methods are
permitted. It is reasonable for governments to support innovative or emerging emissions reduction
technologies because reducing emissions is a public policy objective and technology development can lower
the cost of achieving this objective.
Further, policies and institutions should align with and complement each other in achieving Australia’s
emissions reduction goals. The technologies Australia will need over the long-term require support across
the full innovation chain, from early and applied research and development through to commercialisation,
deployment and diffusion. Where there are gaps in support, key technologies or sectors may fail to reach
the point where they can be deployed at scale.
35 Removals are only reported for CO2.

35
Principle 4. Participation will be encouraged if policies are conceptually
and administratively simple, with an emphasis on balanced sharing of
risk and minimising transaction costs
Policies should have clear and transparent rules to keep administrative costs low and ensure businesses,
landholders, and other proponents can easily participate in emissions reduction programs. This will
maximise the take-up of lowest-cost emissions reduction opportunities.
The chronic problem with this kind of work is the burdensome bureaucracy involved in
securing relatively small amounts of money for relatively straightforward projects.
Australian Alliance for Energy Productivity
A considerable amount of effort and detail is required to develop a project eligible for
participation in the ERF process
Chemistry Australia
High transaction cost and uneven sharing of risk can disincentivise participation, particularly by firms and
landholders for whom undertaking abatement is not core business. This is especially the case for small and
medium-sized firms who may not have the internal capacity to readily identify and deploy new technologies
or participate in government programs. In designing policy, risk should be allocated towards those most able
to manage it.
Unlocking material abatement from the agriculture sector and from energy efficiency requires participation
by many individual firms, farms and households. A focus must be on reducing impediments to, and
encouraging their participation. This may include providing simple and readily accessible platforms through
which incentives can be offered, or by establishing arrangements with trusted and verified third party
‘aggregators’ to drive the take-up of small projects and minimise costs associated with project registration,
monitoring, verification and reporting.
There is a role for a carbon aggregator to bundle small parcels of carbon credits to
marketable size or for a regional approach to support landholders to work together to
develop projects of sufficient size. Aggregation provides risk management for suppliers
and increases financial viability.
Principle 5. Technologies are at different stages of technical and
commercial readiness, and incentives should be designed to reflect this
Reducing emissions is contingent on the availability of commercially viable abatement technologies across all
sectors. The Panel has defined four technology ‘states’ to reflect the availability and technical and commercial
readiness of abatement technologies, and to clarify where offset schemes like the ERF can play a role in their
deployment and diffusion within relevant markets. This conceptual framework is outlined in Box 4.1.
In forming its conclusions, the Panel has adopted the principle that abatement incentives must be tailored
to reflect the drivers and barriers characteristic of these technology states.

36
Box 4.1 – Four states of abatement technologies – the Panel’s conceptual framework
Category 1: Instances where abatement technologies do not exist or remain immature.
Examples of technologies at this state include advanced livestock feed supplements, advanced biofuels
and negative emissions technologies.
For this category, the realisation of abatement opportunities is dependent on research, development and
demonstration of suitable abatement technologies. Deployment and commercialisation can occur only
after the technologies have reached a sufficient degree of maturity and commerciality (Chapter 10).
Category 2: Instances where there are commercially viable abatement technologies that are being
deployed, or are likely to be deployed in the near future, without government policy support.
Examples of technologies at this state include variable renewable electricity generation, electric vehicles,
energy efficiency related to asset replacement, energy efficiency related to asset maintenance, and
mode shifting
For technologies in this state, Government can secure additional abatement by encouraging firms to
bring forward their investment decisions, upgrade planned investments to more efficient, or lower
emitting technologies. It is difficult to use an offset scheme like the ERF to realise these abatement
opportunities because of the challenges posed by the need for additionality. By definition, technologies
in this state are commercially viable, making it hard to separate additional from non-additional actions.
For example, one of the easiest ways to reduce emissions from road freight is to replace and upgrade the
truck fleet. However, it is hard to differentiate between standard vehicle replacements and those that
have been brought forward and/or upgraded. While offsets are ill-suited to capturing these
opportunities, other policies could achieve this, like those outlined in Chapter 9.
Category 3: Instances where there are existing abatement technologies but, in the absence of regulations
or other government policy support, a financial case for the technologies are unlikely to be made and
they will not be deployed at scale.
Examples of technologies at this state include reforestation, early dry season burning in savannas, and
capture/combustion of landfill gas, coal mine waste gas and methane from piggeries and diaries.
Offset schemes like the ERF are generally well suited to capturing the abatement associated with
technologies in this state because of the ease of demonstrating additionality. Due to the absence of a
financial driver, the deployment of these technologies is largely contingent on government support.
Additional abatement from technologies in this category could be achieved by streamlining the ERF to
lower transaction costs and encourage participation (Chapter 6).
Category 4: Instances where there are existing abatement technologies that, on a financial basis alone,
should be deployed but their uptake is impeded by non-financial barriers (e.g. cultural and behavioural
barriers and split incentives).
Examples of technologies at this state include residential and commercial energy efficiency retrofits and
shelterbelts in pastoral businesses.
For some technologies in this state, governments may be able to encourage uptake by offering financial
incentives. However, other technologies in this state will require targeted policy interventions that seek
to address the causes of the barriers. The ERF, in its current form, is often ill-suited to incentivising
uptake because it seeks to address non-financial barriers by offering a relatively small financial incentive
at a time disconnected from the time of initial investment. The ERF could play a more effective role by
bringing payments forward (Chapter 5). Complementary enabling measures could also help – minimum
standards, disclosure to buyers/tenants for appliances, buildings and vehicles, and information and
capacity-building (Chapter 6).

37
Principle 6. Policies should be designed and administered in a
participatory and transparent manner
It is widely recognised that open policymaking is an essential ingredient of good governance. In this context,
there are two key dimensions of openness: consultation and cooperation with affected and interested
stakeholders in the design and administration of policies; and transparency in the operation of relevant
government programs.
Participatory approaches to policymaking improve the information available to government decision-makers
on the options to address policy issues and their likely impacts. In doing so, participation promotes better
decision-making and policy outcomes. A further benefit of consultation and collaboration is it can improve
the legitimacy of policy decisions and promote buy-in by relevant stakeholders. The importance of public
participation in policymaking is emphasised in The Australian Government Guide to Regulation, which lists as
one of its ten principles that:
Policy makers should consult in a genuine and timely way with affected businesses, community
organisations and individuals.36
Transparency involves the ready disclosure of information on government decision-making processes and
the impacts and effects of government policies. The provision of information on processes and impacts is
necessary to build confidence in, and support for, government policies and to ensure relevant markets are
properly informed. This is particularly important in climate policy, which has historically experienced high
levels of instability, and in the context of the government’s policy framework, which relies on voluntary
markets and cooperative abatement programs. For these markets and programs to operate efficiently,
participants and other stakeholders need to be well informed. A lack of transparency can undermine
confidence and impede the efficient operation of relevant markets and processes, thereby increasing the
costs associated with the transformation of the economy. A further benefit of transparency is it exposes
government decision-making to monitoring and scrutiny by external parties. This promotes accountability
and helps ensure policies are administered in a way that aligns with the interests of taxpayers. Again, The
Australian Government Guide to Regulation stresses the importance of transparency, stating simply that
‘transparency and accountability are not optional’.37
The governance arrangements that underpin Australia’s climate policies generally promote both
participation and transparency. Relevant government agencies and committees are subject to general
freedom of information, disclosure and consultation requirements, including under the Freedom of
Information Act 1982, Legislation Act 2003 and Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act
2013. Relevant empowering Acts also impose specific disclosure and consultation obligations on
government decision-makers. In addition, over the past 30 years, the Australian Government has built a
world-leading framework for the collection and reporting of information on Australia’s greenhouse gas
emissions. The two main pillars of this framework are the National Greenhouse and Energy Report Scheme
(NGERS) and the National Inventory Report. NGERS requires facilities and corporate groups that meet
defined thresholds to submit annual reports on their emissions and energy use to the Regulator. These data
are a key input into the National Inventory Report, which provides annual estimates of Australia’s emissions
and removals. The National Inventory Report is compiled in accordance with international greenhouse gas
accounting rules and submitted annually under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). Australia has played a central role in the development of international accounting rules
and methods for the estimation of emissions and removals, particularly for the agriculture and land sectors.
The robustness and accessibility of NGERS and National Inventory Report data provide an important
platform for transparency and accountability concerning Australia’s climate policies.
36 Australian Government (2014) The Australian Government Guide to Regulation. Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 2.
37 Ibid, p. 7.

38
While guided by the principle that policies should be participatory and transparent, the Panel notes there
are practical and other limits on the extent of public participation and transparency. Participation processes
can involve significant costs, both to government agencies and external stakeholders through direct outlays,
labour time and program delays. Similarly, the full disclosure of information on government programs can
have adverse effects, including discouraging the open and robust consideration of policy options and
deterring participation by entities who fear the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Care needs
to be taken to ensure the pursuit of openness does not obstruct the achievement of the government’s
substantive policy objectives or have other unintended consequences.
Principle 7. Policy responses should be coordinated between federal,
state and territory governments and undertaken in collaboration where
possible
As discussed, all state and territory governments have committed to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 and
have adopted a range of policies to help progress towards this objective. These initiatives present an
opportunity for collaboration between federal, state and territory governments to achieve shared
objectives, reduce costs and leverage their respective strengths.
The recently announced Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Australian and New South Wales
Governments provides a model for this type of arrangement. The MoU aims to provide a long-term pathway to
decarbonise the New South Wales economy, starting with a $2 billion co-investment in a range of measures to
mitigate emissions, increase gas and electricity supply and improve transmission networks. The proposed
initiatives include undertakings to invest in mitigation projects in New South Wales through the CSF and other
federal and state programs and to jointly assess the viability of new initiatives to support innovative mitigation
technologies, including hydrogen, electric vehicles and agriculture-related abatement measures.
The Queensland Government’s Land Restoration Fund provides another example of the benefits of
collaboration and coordination. The $500 million Fund will be used to support agriculture and forestry-
related projects in Queensland reduce emissions or increase sequestration, while also providing other
environmental, social and economic co-benefits. The Queensland Government will use the ERF’s
certification scheme as the cornerstone of the program, with project proponents being paid for the delivery
of ACCUs at set dates from ERF projects that are assessed as providing designated co-benefits. Proponents
will receive additional payments above the ACCU price if they are able to demonstrate the co-benefits have
been achieved.
These types of initiatives demonstrate how collaboration between governments, either on a bilateral or
multilateral basis, can generate positive results. Collaboration enables governments to utilise and leverage
their different capabilities to reduce the cost of achieving climate and other policy objectives. It can also
avoid the unnecessary duplication and complication that arises from uncoordinated efforts being taken by
different governments and government agencies.

39
Part A
Improving the Emissions Reduction Fund

40
Chapter 5. Better aligning the Emissions
Reduction Fund’s incentives with when
project costs occur
Key points
The timing of the financial incentives available under the Emissions Reduction Fund is not aligned with
when many projects incur capital costs. Abatement is generally credited after it occurs and government
payments are only made on the delivery of credits. These requirements reduce the commercial viability of
capital-intensive projects. The majority of costs are generally incurred upfront, while the revenues from
credits are spread over a 7-25 year crediting period. This means that the majority of the risks associated
with capital-intensive projects are borne by the investor rather than the government. This reduces their
net present value and will lower participation. Given the public policy objectives of reducing emissions
this risk assignment may not be optimal.
The Panel considers these arrangements should be revisited, and suggests that, in some circumstances,
ACCUs could be awarded to projects over a shorter timeframe and ahead of when abatement is actually
achieved. This ‘compressed crediting’ approach should only be applied where there is a reasonable
degree of certainty of the future abatement projects will deliver. Appropriate rules would be needed to
minimise the risk that credits are issued for abatement that does not occur.
The ERF’s ‘ex post crediting’ arrangements result in a high level of
assurance about environmental integrity but have been a barrier to
participation
The primary objective of the ERF is to reduce emissions at least cost. In achieving this objective, the ERF is
intended to be guided by the principle that credited and purchased abatement should have high
environmental integrity. This principle is embodied in the ‘offsets integrity standards’ found in section 133 of
the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (‘the CFI Act’), which, amongst other things, requires
that methods only credit abatement that is real, additional and able to be counted towards Australia’s
international emission reduction commitments. Similarly, the Regulator is under a statutory obligation to
minimise the cost of abatement that is contracted. This underlies the ‘pay-as-bid’ reverse auction process
and the payment on delivery contract model. As noted in previous chapters, the ERF has been successful in
delivering more abatement at a lower cost than expected.
While conceptually clear, the offsets integrity standards are difficult to implement in a way that is always
consistent with the objective of reducing emissions at least cost. The rules and procedures necessary to
maintain integrity often have the unintended effect of excluding the lowest-cost sources of abatement. This
is one of the main reasons for the relative lack of participation from the energy, manufacturing, industrial,
transport, and mining sectors in the ERF. The rules designed to maintain the integrity of relevant methods
have made it difficult for these sectors to participate in the scheme.
When the ERF was created in 2014, consideration was given to whether credits should be issued before or
after the relevant abatement has been achieved. The issuance of credits before the abatement has been
realised (known as ex-ante or compressed crediting) is used in state energy efficiency schemes, the federal
Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme, and in some private carbon offset certification schemes.
Notwithstanding this, the Government decided credits under the ERF should only be issued after the
abatement has been achieved (known as ‘ex-post crediting’). The rationale for this approach was provided in
the ERF White Paper:

41
On balance, the Government remains of the view that the Emissions Reduction Fund
should provide payment for all emissions reductions as they occur. This will ensure that
public funds are always tied to real emissions reductions and that projects are competing
on the same basis.38
While this was a reasonable starting point when the scheme was first created, the experience with the
implementation of the ERF suggests there is a need to revisit ex-post crediting.
Due to technical issues, compressed crediting has already been adopted in at least three methods:
alternative waste treatment, commercial plantations, and farm forestry. This adoption of compressed
creating for these activities was driven by their abatement characteristics and the desire to reduce
complexity and encourage uptake. For similar reasons, the Panel believes compressed crediting should be
extended to projects with high upfront capital costs.
To date, there has also been limited uptake of projects with high upfront costs. This is likely to be
attributable to a combination of factors, including:
 the misalignment between outlays and revenues, with the costs being incurred upfront and the carbon
revenues spread over the crediting period;
 relatively short crediting periods (7 and 25 years for emissions avoidance and sequestration projects
respectively)39
;
 relatively short contract periods (a maximum of 7 and 10 years for emissions avoidance and
sequestration projects respectively); and
 price uncertainty in relevant carbon and non-carbon markets extending beyond the contract period.
Multiple stakeholders raised the misalignment between project outlays and ACCU revenues, and the
business risks associated with offset projects, during the Panel’s consultations. For example:
In short, capital outlays at each stage of project consideration can be significant, but with
potentially no reward for that investment.
Australian Institute of Petroleum
ACCU value volatility – The value of contracted ACCU’s are unknown until completion of
the auction process. The financial viability of a project could be jeopardised if the value of
the contracted ACCU’s is less than forecast.
Energy Users Association of Australia
38 Australian Government 2014, Emissions Reduction Fund White Paper, Department of the Environment and Energy, Canberra,
accessed on 12 December 2019 <https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/government/emissions-reduction-
fund/publications/erf-white-paper>
39 The impacts of crediting periods are most acute for emissions avoidance projects. However, even for sequestration projects, the
25-year crediting period can result in projects being denied credits for genuine abatement, which can render projects unviable. For
example, reforestation projects are only likely to have reached approximately 60 per cent of their 100-year carbon carrying capacity at
year 25. This means for a project with a 100-year permanence period, there is the prospect 40 per cent of the sequestration from the
project will not be credited. While this uncredited abatement occurs after 25 years, in some circumstances, it can affect the financial
viability of projects.

42
Payments are currently made year on year based on measured abatement, but this
means they are made well after the company needs to find the capital for investment If
the project generates a reliable cashflow, some of this could be front-loaded to
encourage investments that otherwise would not take place.
An alternative to higher prices would be upfront crediting based on a deeming or
modelled approach, such as is used in existing white certificate schemes, such as those
operating in Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales. Whilst this would more
naturally apply to energy efficiency projects, it could also be explored for a range of
project types with high upfront capital expenditure, which would further incentivise
investment (including some landscape and agricultural-based activities).
Carbon Market Institute
An ex ante crediting approach could help overcome barriers to
participation, but would only be suitable for some project types
Introducing a form of compressed crediting for projects with high upfront capital costs could provide an
administratively simple way of improving the returns, and reducing the risks, associated with these projects.
Under this proposal, all or a proportion of the credits likely to be generated from projects over their
crediting period would be issued in equal portions over a specified shorter period (e.g. 1-2 years for
emissions avoidance projects, and 15 years for sequestration projects). This would have the effect of
bringing forward some of the crediting but not change the total number of credits issued to the projects. An
illustration of how compressed crediting would work for relevant vegetation projects is provided in Figure
5.1 below.
Figure 5.1. Illustration of ex-post vs compressed crediting for vegetation projects
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Abatement(tCO2-e)
Project year
Ex-post crediting Compressed crediting

43
The Panel believes that introducing compressed crediting could go a long way to improving the uptake of
projects under a number of the key methods. It could also provide a simple and effective way to better
share the risk of investing in emission reduction projects between government and business by improving
the alignment of crediting with the upfront establishment costs of projects.
Compressed crediting would only be suitable for certain project types. Three principles are proposed to
guide the selection of these projects.
1. Projects must involve significant upfront costs, in the form of resource outlays or foregone profits,
which are not materially offset by carbon revenues and secondary benefits (e.g. reduced energy costs)
in the early years of the project.
2. The likely abatement from the projects must be able to be easily forecast with a reasonable degree of
precision over the crediting period.
3. The realisation of the forecast abatement must not be contingent on the recurrent outlay of significant
resources for the conduct of the abatement activity.
Examples of the types of projects that would meet these criteria include industrial, commercial and
residential energy efficiency projects involving retrofits and asset replacements, the pre-drainage of coal
seams, and planting-based afforestation and reforestation projects.
Maintaining the integrity of credited abatement
The main arguments that could be made against compressed crediting are that it could reduce the integrity
of credited abatement and distort the carbon market by giving preferential treatment to the selected
project types.
With any form of ex-ante crediting, there is a risk credits could be issued for abatement that ultimately does
not occur. Under this proposal, the risk of over-crediting would be mitigated through the use of three main
mechanisms:
 the confinement of compressed crediting to methods that satisfy the above criteria;
 dictating that eligible activities use conservative estimates of future abatement in calculating crediting
entitlements; and
 where necessary, requiring projects to satisfy ‘gateway rules’ to demonstrate the forecast abatement is
being achieved.
Gateway rules require projects to satisfy specified requirements at prescribed dates in order to be eligible to
continue to receive credits. The requirements provide assurance that the credited abatement has occurred
or is likely to occur in the foreseeable future. These types of arrangements are already in use in the Human-
induced Regeneration and Native Forest from Managed Regrowth methods and could be replicated in other
relevant methods.
Where issues arise with underperforming projects, the Regulator could require credits to be relinquished or
made-good to prevent over-crediting. There are a range of such existing regulatory mechanisms in the
Regulations that could apply to this situation. It would be desirable for the application of these rules to be
further articulated.
Compressed crediting would correct market distortions not cause them
It could be argued that compressed crediting would cause market distortions by giving preferential
treatment to the selected project types. This argument overlooks the fact that the scheme’s existing rules
are causing distortions. As noted above, the existing rules and procedures effectively exclude projects
involving the deployment of technologies with high upfront capital costs. There are also already methods
that provide for compressed crediting. Given this, the Panel considers that the extension of compressed

44
crediting to a broader range of methods that meet the above criteria would reduce distortions and improve
the cost-effectiveness of the scheme.
If applied judiciously, the benefits of compressed crediting are likely to
outweigh the risks
Ex-post crediting provide a high degree of assurance about the delivery of abatement. However, it increases
the risks and reduces the financial viability of projects with high upfront costs. By deterring participation by
projects with high upfront costs, ex post crediting reduces the cost-effectiveness of the scheme and
increases the economic cost of achieving Australia’s abatement objectives.
Due to this, the Panel recommends that compressed crediting be adopted for methods that are assessed as
satisfying the above criteria. The Panel notes that this would involve the acceptance of a slightly higher
degree of risk around the delivery of credited abatement. However, in the Panel’s view, these risks can be
appropriately managed using the mechanisms described above.
The Panel notes that changes may need to be made to the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act
2011 to facilitate the effective implementation of compressed crediting across all relevant methods.
Table 5.1 Recommendation for Chapter 5
Allow certain ERF methods to award ACCUs on a compressed timeframe.
This would reduce the barriers faced by projects with high upfront capital costs.
The application of compressed crediting should be assessed on a method by method basis,
with the following criteria to apply.
1. Projects must involve significant upfront costs, in the form of resource outlays or foregone
profits, which are not materially offset by carbon revenues and secondary benefits (e.g.
reduced energy costs) in the early years of the project.
2. The likely abatement from the projects must be able to be easily forecast with a
reasonable degree of precision over the crediting period.
3. The realisation of the forecast abatement must not be contingent on the recurrent outlay
of significant resources for the conduct of the abatement activity.
Rules would be needed to ensure the progressive verification of the delivery of abatement to
minimise the risk of credits being issued for abatement that does not subsequently occur.
5.1

45
Chapter 6. Achieving further abatement by
encouraging increased participation in the
Emissions Reduction Fund
Key points
Opportunities exist to improve the development of ERF methods, governance and operational processes
that could reduce transaction costs and promote project uptake. The main suggested changes are as
follows.
Method development processes and governance
 Creating greater opportunities for third parties to contribute to the development of methods.
 Establishing a pilot method program to enable new method ideas to be tested and expedite method
preparation.
 Introducing a statutory duty of utmost good faith for all participants to lessen the need for highly
proscriptive rules.
 Considering a review of the ERF’s governance to ensure arrangements are fit-for-purpose and
effective.
Promoting project uptake
 Subsidising measurement costs to reduce participation barriers and improve the data underpinning
modelled methods.
 Establishing a streamlined purchasing mechanism to make it simpler and easier for small projects to
engage with the scheme.
 Allowing ‘method stacking’ to promote the take-up of multiple abatement activities at a single
property.
 Establishing a standardised framework so the risks associated with method improvements are shared
fairly between proponent and government.
6.1. Method development processes
and governance
6.1.1. Creating greater opportunities for third parties
to develop methods
Participation in carbon markets is contingent on the availability of applicable methods. In the absence of
methods, projects cannot be registered and generate ACCUs. There are currently approximately
36 operational methods, which cover most economic sectors. However, the coverage of these sectors is
incomplete. No applicable ERF methods exist for a number of abatement activities.

46
The absence of methods can be a product of a number of factors, including:
 the absence of proven abatement technologies, where there is insufficient evidence of the effectiveness
of the activity in reducing emissions or increasing sequestration;
 the absence of cost-effective abatement technologies, where there is sufficient evidence the activity
reduces emissions or increases sequestration but investment in a method is unjustified because the
activity is uneconomic at current and likely future carbon prices;
 technical barriers to measuring emissions or removals, or estimating abatement, which make method
development complex or costly and/or abatement estimates unreliable; and
 the absence of resources for method development.
When the Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) was originally created in 2011, there was a formal process for third
parties to propose and prepare methods. The methods proposed by third parties were required to be
assessed by the independent Domestic Offsets Integrity Committee. If they were endorsed by the
Committee as meeting the offsets integrity standards, the Department would convert them into a statutory
instrument, after which the Minister would formally make the method under the scheme.
When the ERF commenced in 2014, and associated changes were made to the CFI Act, the third party
method development process was abandoned and method development was left exclusively to the
Department. The reasons for this change included:
 narrow method design – privately developed methods were often narrow in scope and designed around
specific business models, which was a product of carbon service providers seeking to design methods
around their areas of competitive advantage;
 extent of departmental resources invested to get methods up to standard – the Department found it
had to invest considerable resources to ensure methods met the offset integrity standards and were
capable of being implemented; and
 diversion of scarce departmental resources to methods with relatively low potential for uptake –
allowing private entities to develop and submit methods diminished the Department’s control over the
allocation of its resources, which often resulted in effort being devoted to methods that were unlikely
to attract significant market interest.
Removing the opportunity for third party method development was intended to ensure government
resources were efficiently allocated to methods with the greatest prospect of uptake. It was also intended to
ensure methods were designed in a manner accessible to all market participants, rather than being designed
around the business model of the method proponent.
While the change in approach has brought benefits, it has limited private investment in method
development. Third party involvement is now largely confined to participation in method-related technical
working groups, contract research undertaken on behalf of the Department and the making of submissions
during the consultation process. The reduction in opportunities for third parties has limited the pool of
resources available for method development and potentially stifled innovation. The success of the
government-control model is also dependent on the budgetary resources made available to the Department
and its capacity to identify relevant market opportunities and develop suitable methods to exploit them.
Information asymmetries and resource limitations has undermined the Department’s capacity to perform
these functions. As a result, the Department has not been able to steer a program of promising method
development with input from the private sector as envisaged when the third party method development
process was abandoned.
It is recommended greater opportunity be provided for third parties to develop methods, only in a way that
avoids the negatives associated with the original CFI method development model. This could be achieved
through a five-stage review, development and approval process consisting of the following.

47
 Stage 1: Proposal approval. The process would be initiated by a proponent submitting a method
proposal to the Emissions Reduction Assurance Committee (ERAC) for approval. Approval by ERAC
would be based on the environmental integrity, scope and potential uptake of the proposal. Where
method proposals were judged to be lacking integrity, to overlap other methods or potential
method proposals, to be unduly narrow, or to have limited prospect of uptake, the ERAC could
reject the application. This initial approval process would provide method proponents with rapid
feedback, thereby avoiding resource wastage in methods unlikely to be ultimately approved or
taken up. Consistent with this, the method proposals would not have to be highly detailed at this
initial stage, nor would they lock in the scope and design of the final method. The process would
need to provide a degree of flexibility to facilitate effective method development.
 Stage 2: Development. Where a method proposal received initial approval, a method steering group
would be formed, consisting of an ERAC member, representatives from the Department and
Regulator, an independent industry representative, and a representative from the method
proponent. The steering group would oversee the development of the method by the proponent
and provide guidance on the resolution of integrity and administrative issues.
 Step 3: Concept approval. At the third stage, a detailed method design proposal would be provided
to the ERAC for concept approval. The method would not necessarily be presented as a draft
statutory instrument. The emphasis at this stage would be on ensuring the ERAC is comfortable
with the approach taken to manage the main integrity risks associated with the method.
 Stage 4: Conversion into statutory instrument. Once a concept approval has been granted, the
Department in consultation with the proponent and steering committee would convert the method
into a statutory instrument.
 Stage 5: Recommendation and approval. The recommendation decision would follow current ERAC
procedures. The ERAC would assess the method against the offsets integrity standards and advise
on its suitability, including whether it is unnecessarily duplicative or narrow. The Minister would
then be responsible for deciding whether to make the method on the advice of the ERAC,
Department and Regulator.
6.1.2. Pilot method program
The development of new methods and variation of existing methods is a resource-intensive process that
generally takes more than 12 months and, at times, in excess of three years. The magnitude of the
investment means new methods are generally not developed unless:
 there is a consensus on the robustness of the supporting science; and
 the Department is confident there will be reasonable uptake.
This is a prudent approach. However, it can lead to prolonged delays in the development of new methods.
Given available opportunities for new methods, consideration should be given to the development of a pilot
method program that facilitates the testing of new method ideas and expedites method preparation. Under
the program, pilot methods could be developed for proposed activities where there is uncertainty in the
underpinning science or complications with the design of the method. Pilot projects could then be
registered under the pilot methods on the condition projects openly share data and project information to
assist in the development of the final method. If a pilot method was subsequently converted into a final
method, the pilot projects would be required to transition onto the final method within a prescribed period.
If a pilot method was found to be unviable, the projects would be deregistered after a designated period,
which would be shorter than normal crediting periods. Pilot projects could be given standard ACCUs or an
alternative credit type for sale to the private market or Regulator.
This piloting process would:
 enable innovative methods to be properly tested prior to full implementation;

48
 save time by allowing methods to be developed while the underlying science is being settled;
 facilitate the underlying science by enabling researchers to have access to ‘live’ trials and their data;
 focus research towards the needs of methods; and
 provide an additional source of data for the national greenhouse accounts.
6.1.3. A statutory duty of utmost good faith for all participants
All carbon offset schemes, including the ERF, suffer from information gaps and asymmetries. There are gaps in the
information and technology available to evaluate the abatement outcomes from various activities, meaning
scheme administrators often must make methods without full information on likely outcomes. Typically, the
greatest uncertainties are associated with additionality, but there can also be material uncertainties associated
with the undertaking of abatement activities and the measurement of emissions and removals. In most cases,
proponents are in a better position than scheme administrators to evaluate the relevant uncertainties at the
project-scale. Generally, compared to scheme administrators, they will have better information on what would
have occurred in the counterfactual, what abatement activities have been undertaken and how they were
undertaken, and the magnitude of the emissions and removals from the project.
In order to uphold requisite standards of environmental integrity, scheme administrators create rules to
manage information gaps and uncertainties. How stringent these rules need to be depend, to some extent,
on the norms governing proponent behaviour. If proponents can be relied upon to uphold the integrity of
the scheme, there is less need for stringent, and often costly, rules.
To lessen the need for highly proscriptive rules, a formal duty of utmost good faith could be imposed on
proponents and other scheme participants. This duty would require all scheme participants to act in the
utmost good faith in their engagements with the program, including in relation to implementing projects,
judging whether projects are additional, and measurement, reporting and verification. For example,
proponents would have a duty not to claim ACCUs for abatement they know has not occurred (with due
allowance for approved compressed crediting).
A similar requirement is imposed under section 13 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). The section
creates an implied provision in all insurance contracts requiring the parties to the contract to ‘act towards
the other party, in respect of any matter arising under or in relation to it, with the utmost good faith’. This
implied duty is intended to address the information asymmetries inherent in insurance contracts,
particularly the fact policyholders (the insured party) generally holds superior information on relevant facts
to the insurer. If a party is found to have breached the implied duty of utmost good faith, the other party is
entitled to terminate the contract unilaterally.
The information asymmetries associated with carbon offset schemes are similar to those encountered in
insurance contracts; proponents generally have better information than scheme administrators on relevant
facts. Moreover, like insurance contracts, the imposition of a duty of utmost good faith would reduce the
need for detailed and costly requirements to reduce the scope for gaming behaviour by proponents and
other scheme participants.
The proposed duty is not intended to be strictly enforced through a command-and-control style regulatory
posture. There would be penalties for non-compliance with the duty of utmost good faith, including the
revocation of projects and relinquishment of ACCUs. However, the aim in creating the duty would be to
foster a collective responsibility for the reputation and durability of the scheme and to encourage the
internalisation of norms regarding participating in good faith. To do this, the overarching statutory duty

49
would need to be coupled with additional mechanisms to reinforce the importance of ethical behaviour at
key points of engagement with the scheme.40
These mechanisms could include:
 a requirement for project proponents to pledge to act in good faith when registering projects and
submitting offsets reports;
 a requirement for project proponents to describe how they have complied with the duty in their
reports; and
 the publication of reminders of the duty and its function in scheme documents and online platforms.
These additional mechanisms would complement the Regulator’s existing risk-based approach to
compliance and enforcement, which prioritises, wherever possible, supporting participants to understand
and comply with their obligations.41
An added benefit of the proposed duty is it would give the Regulator
greater capacity to utilise its compliance and enforcement powers in situations where it suspects
proponents are not adhering to scheme rules.
6.1.4. Review of the Emissions Reduction Fund governance
arrangements
Governance responsibilities related to the ERF’s offset certification scheme are divided between the
Minister, the Department, the Regulator and the ERAC.
The Minister is responsible for making new methods, varying and revoking existing methods, and
determining method development priorities. The Department, as a delegate of the Minister, is responsible
for proposing new methods and method variations, and assisting in the development of method priorities.
The ERAC is responsible for advising on new methods and variations, and proposals to revoke methods. It
also undertakes periodic method reviews and crediting period extension reviews. The Regulator is
responsible for registration and crediting of projects and compliance and enforcement of scheme
requirements.
In the course of the administration of the ERF, some issues have arisen over the division of roles and
responsibilities between the Department, the Regulator and ERAC. Information has not always been openly
shared between the entities and the extent of collaboration has not always been optimal. There are a
number of reasons for this, including statutory restrictions on the sharing of ‘protected information’. A
further contributing factor is the part-time status of ERAC members, which makes the ERAC dependent on
the Department to perform its functions. As identified in the CCA 2017 ERF report, the Departmental officers
servicing the ERAC have a potential conflict of interest. They are generally the officers responsible for the
preparation of methods and variations, and oversee the making and operation of methods. This makes it
difficult for them to serve the ERAC independently and impartially, when to do so may involve critiquing
their own work when separately advising the Minister.
A review should be undertaken on the governance arrangements for the ERF’s offset certification scheme.
Amongst other things, the review should explore the structure of the ERAC and whether it should be staffed by
officers from the Department, Regulator or another agency. An option that should be considered in the review
is to move the responsibility for the ERAC secretariat to the Regulator and for Departmental staff to be
seconded to the Regulator where their expertise is needed for ERAC reviews and method variation processes.
40 N Mazar and D Ariely (2006) Dishonesty in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 25(1), 117–
126; L Shu et al. (2012) Signing at the beginning makes ethics salient and decreases dishonest self-reports in comparison to signing at
the end. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 109(38), 15197–15200; S Ayal et al. (2015) Three Principles to REVISE People’s
Unethical Behavior. Perspectives on Psychological Science 10(6) 738–741.
41 Clean Energy Regulator (2019) Compliance policy for education, monitoring and enforcement activities. Accessed 20 January 2020 at
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/About/Policies-and-publications/Compliance-policy-for-education-monitoring-and-
enforcement-activities

50
This is similar to the staffing arrangements used for the National Competition Council, where staff from the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission are seconded to the Council on an as-needed basis.
6.2. Promoting project uptake
6.2.1. Subsidising measurement costs
The costs associated with directly measuring emissions are often prohibitively high. In these circumstances,
insistence on requiring proponents to directly measure emissions often renders projects uneconomic, even
when the underlying activity offers a cheap source of abatement. To overcome this, methods can rely on
fully model-based approaches to estimate emissions.
Model-based approaches can substantially reduce transaction costs but their application is dependent on
robust underlying data and appropriate rules to ensure the model is correctly applied. In many cases, there
is insufficient data to build and calibrate models, leading to an impasse. A fully modelled approach is not
possible without improved data, meaning the only way to incentivise the abatement activity is through a
measurement-based method. However, any such method will have relatively low uptake because of the
costs of measurement.
The standard solution to this situation is to commission scientific research to provide the data necessary to
construct a model. The downsides of this approach are the costs and delay. The abatement activity is
effectively excluded from the scheme until the science is settled and the model-based method is made.
An alternative approach is to proceed with a measurement-based method and subsidise proponents’
measurement costs on the proviso all data are shared to help resolve relevant scientific uncertainties and
support the construction of suitable models. This lowers the costs associated with obtaining the relevant
scientific data needed to construct the model-based method. It also reduces the delay in the uptake of the
abatement activity by lowering the measurement costs borne by proponents.
This type of approach has ready application to soil carbon. Under the ERF, there are two soil carbon
methods: a measurement-based method, and a modelled based method. Owing to uncertainties about the
impact of relevant abatement activities on soil carbon sequestration, the modelled-based approach is highly
conservative, limiting the returns to proponents. This, combined with other requirements in the method
have meant there have been no projects registered under the method to date.
The ability to measure soil carbon and associated potential gains under grazing land
management (and crop management for broader ag) needs to be a focus as well as
extension and adoption of on farm techniques to increase carbon sequestration.
Cattle Council of Australia
There are currently around 50 measurement-based soil carbon projects. While the uptake of the methods is
positive, it is likely to be less than what is feasible. One of the primary reasons for this is likely to be the costs
of measurement. A subsidy scheme that assists with the costs of measurement could help lower the barriers
to the uptake of the measurement-based method, thereby providing the data necessary to help improve the
model-based method. This approach would also facilitate improvements in the national greenhouse gas
inventory. If necessary, the costs of the grants could be recouped, for example, by requiring proponents to
sell credits to the Regulator at a discount.
It is generally accepted that improving soil carbon has substantial benefits directly to soil health and
productivity that accrue to farmers and the environment. Accordingly, there is growing interest in
regenerative agriculture and this could be assisted if access to soil carbon credits became a low cost
standard farming practice.

51
6.2.2. Streamlined purchasing mechanism for small projects
The ERF has largely uniform requirements for the auditing of projects and marketing of ACCUs. All projects,
regardless of their size, must undergo similar measurement, reporting and verification processes, and
market their credits through similar channels in accordance with the same regulatory requirements. For
example, entities selling ACCUs outside the ERF purchasing mechanism generally hold an Australian Financial
Services Licence. The relative uniformity in the requirements, and the costs of complying with them, results
in economies of scale. Small projects incur high transaction costs relative to larger projects, which puts them
at a competitive disadvantage. The net effect is to deter participation by smaller projects, a fact aggravated
by the minimum bid sizes that apply to ERF contracts.42
To help reduce transaction costs and the price risks faced by proponents of small projects, a fixed priced
purchasing window to acquire ACCUs from small projects could be considered. The price could be set at
regular intervals and benchmarked against the most recent ERF auction price (e.g. related to the average
price from the preceding auction). The proposed window would perform a similar function to the STC
clearing house, which purchases small-scale technology certificates generated under the Small-scale
Renewable Energy Scheme at a set price since spot process tend to be higher than long term auction prices.
A risk associated with the creation of a fixed priced purchasing window is it could reduce competition in ERF
auctions, reducing their efficacy as a means of price discovery. This could be avoided through the use of
well-designed eligibility requirements. Eligibility to access the platform would need to be limited to
proponents of genuinely small projects. This could be achieved by using projects’ forward abatement
estimates or another similar metric.
The creation of the fixed priced purchasing window would ideally be done in tandem with the work on
method stacking (see section 6.2.4 below). Consideration should also be given to the creation of tailored
small-scale methods for particular types of agriculture projects, including shelterbelts. These methods would
have streamlined measurement, reporting and verification requirements, which reduce transaction costs
and help increase participation from small projects in the agriculture sector.
6.2.3. Optional delivery contracts to reduce price uncertainty
and risk
Price uncertainty is a material barrier to participation in ERF auctions for many project types, particularly
sequestration projects. For most emissions avoidance projects, ERF contracts can be offered for the full
extent of the crediting period (i.e. seven years). In contrast, for sequestration projects and savanna burning
emissions avoidance projects, crediting periods are a minimum of 25 years but the maximum contract length
is 10 years. Beyond the contract period, there is significant uncertainty about the sources and magnitude for
demand for ACCUs. Proponents of both emissions avoidance and sequestration projects face a similar
uncertainty in relation to ACCUs not contracted under the ERF purchasing mechanism.
Optional delivery contracts could reduce the price uncertainty and risk faced by project proponents. These
would give project proponents the right (but not the obligation) to sell ACCUs to the Regulator at a pre-
determined price during a specified period. Options are widely used in other markets to manage risk and
they could play a similar role in the ACCU market. On 20 December 2019, the Regulator announced a
consultation process with industry about the merits of holding auctions for optional delivery contracts as
well as its existing form delivery contracts. The Panel supports this approach.
42 For standard and short-term contracts, the minimum is an average of 2,000 ACCUs per year over the delivery period. For immediate
delivery contracts, the minimum is the lower of 10 per cent of the submitted projects’ aggregate forward abatement estimate or 15,000
ACCUs.

52
6.2.4. Method stacking
Method stacking refers to the application of multiple ERF methods to a single property. At present, where
this occurs, proponents must comply with the measurement, reporting and auditing procedures in each
method, which increases the transaction costs and complexity faced by proponents.
To encourage method stacking, rule changes could be made that relieve proponents of stacked projects of
some of the requirements under the applicable methods. This is difficult to do with measurement
requirements without sacrificing environmental integrity, but there are opportunities to reduce costs
relating to reporting and auditing requirements. For example, it would be possible to make rule changes to
enable proponents of stacked projects to submit a single, aggregated offsets report covering each individual
component of the stacked project.
The most significant savings could be realised by relaxing the audit requirements. At present, the Carbon
Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) (Audit Thresholds) Instrument 2015 specifies:
 a project whose average annual abatement is equal to or less than 50,000 tonnes CO2-e must be subject
to at least three audits over their crediting period;
 a project whose average annual abatement is between 50,001-150,000 tonnes CO2-e yr-1
must be
subject to at least four audits over their crediting period; and
 a project whose average annual abatement is greater than 150,000 tonnes CO2-e yr-1
must be subject to
at least six audits over their crediting period.
These audit requirements could be relaxed for stacked methods to reduce costs. Rules changes could also be
made to ensure stacked projects were subject to aggregated audits covering all projects in the stacked
project at one time rather than auditing each individual component at different times.
The argument against this proposal is it would reduce verification and thereby lower the reliability of the
claims made for credits. There are two main counterarguments. First, these changes ideally would be made
in conjunction with the imposition of a legislated duty of utmost good faith. Second, additional deterrents
could be included in the CFI Act to promote adherence to the letter and spirit of the rules. These could
include legislative changes to allow the Regulator to treat stacked projects as a single project when
exercising compliance and enforcement powers.
In addition to the above recommendations, the Panel notes the Regulator is currently looking to streamline
audit requirements at an administrative level as part of the implementation of the CSF. The Regulator is also
looking at the potential to use “big data” to verify carbon abatement rather than more traditional audit
processes. A work program in this area has been agreed with the industry, including for co-design of some
proposals. The Panel supports continuation of these efforts.
6.2.5. A standardised framework to share the risks associated
with method improvements
A significant barrier to the uptake of projects and increasing ACCU supply is the risk of unforeseen method
and other rule changes that adversely affect project returns. Aggregators and proponents fear the rules
governing eligibility and crediting could be changed after they initiate projects, reducing their returns and
potentially rendering projects uneconomic.
The CFI Act contains provisions that are intended to protect existing projects from retrospective rule
changes. These provisions provide that, where a method is varied or revoked, the previous method
continues to apply to projects registered under the method prior to the variation or revocation taking effect.
However, existing projects can be subject to retrospective rule changes in other ways. These include
changes to the CFI Act itself, changes to the CFI Rules governing crediting and changes to ‘incorporated
documents’ (documents referred to in methods for the purposes of eligibility or crediting that can be varied
without varying the formal method). An example of the latter risk is some methods reference external

53
modelling tools (such as the FullCAM model used to estimate abatement in forest regeneration projects) so
changes to the model can effect pre-existing projects.
A simple solution to the uncertainty associated with rule changes would be to prevent any retrospective
changes to rules governing crediting for existing projects. This would provide certainty to proponents but it
would transfer all method-related risks onto the government. If there were errors found in methods, or
developments in the science rendering past approaches obsolete, the government would bear the
consequences.
At the other end of the spectrum, in its 2017 review of the ERF, the CCA recommended changes be made to
the CFI Act to force proponents to transition onto new methods within two years of a method being varied.
The CCA argued this approach was warranted to provide a more equitable and sustainable division of the
risks associated with method errors and improvements.
By creating a standardised process for the forced transition of existing projects onto new methods, the
CCA’s proposal would reduce the integrity risks associated with method errors and science improvements.
However, it would exacerbate the concerns surrounding retrospective rule changes. Under the CFI Act, all
methods must satisfy the offsets integrity standards, including those varied in response to the identification
of errors and science improvements, meaning there is minimal scope for the inclusion of transitional
arrangements to minimise impacts on grandfathered projects. Due to this, there is the potential for the
CCA’s proposal to have acute impacts on some projects. This could deter participation in the scheme, while
also potentially acting as a barrier to method improvements, as proponents and aggregators of existing
projects would be likely to oppose any variations.
A solution is required that strikes a balance between the need to provide certainty for proponents and
flexibility for the Government. This could consist of the following.
 Amend the CFI Act to require proponents to transition onto new methods within two years of a method
being varied.
 Amend the CFI Act to enable the inclusion of transitional arrangements in varied methods (those
transition arrangements would need to strike a balance between meeting the offsets integrity standards
at every point in time and preserving commerciality for projects entered into in good faith). The
transitional arrangements could stagger the introduction of new requirements to existing projects or
shield them completely from any changes.
 Establish a risk sharing framework in the Regulations to govern the development of transitional
arrangements for the application of new methods to pre-existing projects. The framework would seek
to ensure consistency in the treatment of methods. The framework could (but would not need to)
differentiate between method changes prompted by design errors and those prompted by
improvements in the underlying science concerning the abatement and emissions associated with the
project activities.
6.3. New method priorities
GEA considers that there is significant scope to increase abatement through effective
reviews of the different methodologies under the ERF and CSF, to target abatement in
sectors other agriculture, particularly transport and industrial.
Gas Energy Australia
During the consultation process, the Panel received numerous suggestions for new methods, method
variations and rule changes. Examples of these are provided in Table 6.1. A number of the proposals are
worthy of consideration and can be advanced through the standard ERF method development process.
Indeed, some are already being considered in ERAC method reviews and method variation processes (e.g.

54
the proposal to amend the statement of activity intent under the Facilities Method). In contrast, there are
several proposals that are difficult to accommodate within the ERF framework. Some give rise to material
integrity issues and may not satisfy the ERF’s offsets integrity standards. An example is the proposal to
reduce the discounting in the Measured Soil Carbon Method. The relevant discounts are applied to address
the high levels of uncertainty associated with the impacts of land management changes on soil carbon
stocks in the early sampling rounds. The reduction of these discounts would raise material integrity issues
and would be difficult to accommodate within the ERF’s integrity framework.
Table 6.1. Method suggestions received from stakeholders
No. Proposed new method or method variation
1. Development of a method for carbon capture, utilisation and storage
2. Development of a method for ‘blue carbon’ (i.e. the sequestration of carbon in coastal and marine
ecosystems, including mangroves)
3. Development of a method to provide more complete coverage of livestock feed supplements
4. Development of a new method for hydrogen-related fuel and energy activities
5. Removal of the average rainfall restrictions applying to plantations
6. Amalgamation and simplification of energy efficiency methods
7. Changing the statement of activity intent requirements under the Facilities Method to ensure they
are better aligned with the offset integrity standards
8. Reducing the discounting applying under the Measured Soil Carbon Method
9. Removing or improving the baseline decay factors applying under the Land & Sea Transport
Method
10. Amending the Waste Coal Mine Gas Method to allow for the inclusion of abatement from open cut
coal mines (e.g. through pre-drainage of methane from coal seams)
There are two other prospective proposals that could be pursued but, in order to do so, changes would need
to be made to the legislation or regulations. These are the creation of a method to support carbon capture,
utilisation and storage (CCUS) and the removal of the average rainfall restrictions that apply to plantations.
Legislative amendments should be pursued to enable a method for
carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS)
CCUS encompasses two broad technologies: carbon capture and storage; and carbon capture and utilisation.
Carbon capture and storage involves the capture of CO2 from the air or industrial facilities, followed by the
long-term sequestration of the CO2, in geological formations or in the form of mineral carbonates. Carbon
capture and utilisation involves the capture of CO2 from the air or industrial facilities, followed by the reuse
of the CO2 in other processes, including to make fuels, fertilisers, plastics and to support enhanced oil
recovery. There is a wide variety of CCUS technologies in different states of market readiness or use. For
example, enhanced oil recovery is a mature technology that is already widely used in the oil and gas
industry, although it does not tend to reduce emissions. Most mitigation-related CCUS technologies are less
developed and require further support before they will be able to be commercially deployed. Even then,
many (if not most) of these technologies are only likely to be deployed if they have ongoing government
policy support, either in the form of regulatory mandates or financial assistance.
Mitigation-related CCUS technologies have the potential to play a transformative role in the decarbonisation
of the global economy. In many of the hard to abate industrial sectors, CCUS offers a possible solution that
can be retrofitted onto existing production processes. There are also CCUS technologies that could be used
to directly drawdown CO2 from the atmosphere (so-called ‘negative emissions’ technologies). The potential

55
benefits has drawn significant public and private investment into mitigation-related CCUS technologies.
While further investment in RD&D is still required to drive down the costs of these technologies, in Australia,
a key gap is the absence of an effective incentive to support commercial deployment.
An obvious solution to this issue is to create an ERF method to provide ACCUs for abatement from suitable
CCUS activities. While logical, at present, this is effectively prohibited under the CFI Act. The CFI Act was
designed to support activities that avoid emissions or sequester emissions in vegetation and soils. It was not
designed to accommodate the capture and sequestration of CO2 in geological formations and mineral
carbonates, or the capture and reuse of CO2 in a way that either sequesters the carbon or displaces
emissions from other sources. To ensure the ERF is technology neutral, the CFI Act should be amended to
enable the creation of a method to support suitable CCUS technologies.
Consultation should be undertaken on amending the water
requirements that apply to farm forestry and plantation projects
Plantation forestry can provide a low cost source of abatement that simultaneously supports jobs and other
economic opportunities in regional areas. The abatement associated with plantations arises by increasing
the average carbon stock on the land and by sequestering carbon in wood and paper products. The
abatement benefits associated with plantation forestry have been demonstrated under the Kyoto Protocol.
Since the commencement of the Protocol’s first commitment period in 2008, plantations have been
responsible for providing in excess of 20 million tonnes CO2-e of removals per annum. These abatement
benefits are largely attributable to short-rotation hardwood plantations established with government
support over the period 1996-2009.
Following the onset of the global financial crisis in the late 2000s, plantation establishment in Australia
effectively ceased. Over the past 10 years, the hardwood estate has also shrunk, falling from almost 1
million ha to less than 900,000 ha. The loss of these plantations is a form of deforestation that has resulted
in the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Encouraging the reversal of these losses and further
expansion of the estate can provide a cheap and effective form of abatement.
On a long-term average basis, short-rotation hardwood plantations can sequester in the order of
200-500 tCO2 per hectare in live tree biomass and debris.43
This suggests that approximately 30 MtCO2 could
be sequestered on a long-term average basis by simply establishing 100,000 ha of short-rotation plantations
to replace those lost since 2010.
The ERF contains two methods that support plantation-related abatement projects: the Plantation Forestry
method and the Farm Forestry method. The two main abatement activities supported under these methods
are the establishment of new plantations and the conversion of short-rotation plantations to long-rotations.
There are currently only 19 projects registered under these two methods, 11 of which are ‘conversion
projects’ (short- to long-rotations). The limited uptake of the method is likely attributable to a combination
of factors, including prices in relevant carbon and wood markets. However, the Panel received evidence that
one of the most material barriers to the uptake of new projects was the water requirements that apply to
projects under the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Regulations 2011 (CFI regulations) (what is
otherwise known as the ‘600 mm rainfall rule’).
The CFI regulations contains a ‘negative list’ that is intended to prevent the registration of offset projects
that could give rise to significant negative social and environmental impacts. Amongst other things, the
negative list currently excludes projects involving the planting of trees in areas that receive more than 600
mm long-term average annual rainfall, unless they meet prescribed requirements. In many cases, the effect
of the regulations is to require proponents of plantation projects to obtain high security water entitlements
to offset the water intercepted by the plantation. However, a water entitlement is not required if the project
43 The long-term average sequestration in plantations depends on a number of factors, including soil type, rainfall, species type,
rotation lengths and management regime. This indicative range assumes the planting of suitable Eucalypt species in southern Australia
with rotation lengths of between 10-23 years, with long-term averages calculated over a 100-year period.

56
is in a region where the relevant state/territory government has implemented the commitments under the
National Water Initiative to manage water interceptions by plantations. Projects may also be able to go
ahead if they are in a region where it is not possible to obtain a water entitlement and can demonstrate
there would not be a material impact on water availability or other water access entitlements.
The 600 mm rainfall rule is likely to apply to a substantial proportion of potential plantation projects. This is
a product of three main factors. First, plantations need to be located in productive areas, most of which
receive more than 600 mm of average rainfall. Second, plantations need to be located in reasonable
proximity to wood processing plants, most of which are located in regions that receive more than 600 mm of
average rainfall. Finally, the Plantation Forestry method requires plantation projects to be located in
National Plantation Inventory regions; again, most of which receive more than 600 mm of average rainfall.
While the rule does not prohibit projects from being undertaken, it can add significantly to project costs.
High security water entitlements in the southern Murray-Darling Basin have been trading at or above $3,000
per ML. Given current prices in relevant carbon and wood markets, water costs of this magnitude are likely
to render most projects unviable if they need to obtain water entitlements.
The provision of support for plantations is an issue that falls outside of the scope of the Panel’s inquiry.
While noting this, given the evidence received, the Panel believes the Government should undertake
consultation on amending the water requirements to help realise the abatement opportunities associated
with plantation projects.
Engagement and collaboration would be aided by publishing a formal
written policy on arrangements for method development arrangements
In addition to method suggestions, stakeholders raised concerns about a perceived lack of meaningful
opportunities for engagement and collaboration in the setting of ERF method development priorities. Similar
issues have been raised in other processes, including the CCA’s 2017 review of the ERF, which recommended
a more transparent and participatory approach for method prioritisation and more regular announcements
of method priorities.
The Department has made a number of changes in response to these concerns, including:
 creating a process to enable third parties to propose new methods; and
 the establishment of collaborative working groups, where representatives from industry, academia and
state and territory agencies will collaborate in the development of new methods and method variations.
The Department is also planning to hold a method prioritisation and co-development workshop in early
2020 with ERF stakeholders, including representatives from industry, ERAC members and the Regulator.
The Panel supports the changes to the method prioritisation and development processes. The adoption of a
more collaborative approach will provide avenues for the ideas and insights of external stakeholders to feed
into the method development process, without individuals having to prepare their own methods. Noting the
2014 ERF White Paper contained a similar commitment to collaboration, the Panel recommends the new
arrangements, and guidance on when different processes will apply, be committed to a formal written policy
published on the Department’s ERF website, and updated annually to cover:
 a work plan for new methods, endorsed by ERAC, including the operation of agreed collaborative
working groups,
 simple method guides for proposed new methods being developed in tandem with new methods with
the intent to keep the focus on desired outcomes, and key problems that need to be solved,
 focusing proposed method reviews on solving key issues that have arisen rather than on all methods,
and
 a commitment to deploy necessary resources.

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Table 6.2. Recommendations for Chapter 6
Establish a new process to provide third parties with the opportunity to propose and prepare
ERF methods.
This would encourage innovation and accelerate method development, thereby helping to
promote greater participation and the realisation of low-cost abatement opportunities.
A multi-stage review, development and approval process would ensure third party methods are
robust, meet the ERF’s offsets integrity standards, and are administratively sound.
6.1
Establish a pilot method program to test new method ideas and expedite method preparation.
This would encourage early action and improve the robustness of methods.
Pilot methods would be developed for activities where there is uncertainty in the underpinning
science or complications with the design of the method. Proponents of pilot projects would be
required to share data and project information to assist in developing the final method. Further
consideration should be given to whether pilot projects would be awarded ACCUs or an
alternative credit type for sale to the Regulator.
6.2
Introduce a formal ‘duty of utmost good faith’ on participants in the ERF.
This would lessen the need for proscriptive project eligibility rules and foster a collective
responsibility for the scheme.
Similar to the implied duty of utmost good faith that applies to insurance contracts under the
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), the duty would require ERF participants to act in the utmost
good faith in their engagements with the scheme, including in relation to implementing
projects, judging whether projects are additional, and measurement, reporting and verification.
To have its desired effect, the overarching duty would need to be coupled with administrative
mechanisms to reinforce the importance of ethical behaviour. These could include
requirements for project proponents to pledge to act in good faith and to describe how they
have complied with the duty in offsets reports.
6.3
Review the ERF’s governance arrangements to ensure the efficient and effective operation of
the scheme. The review should include the structure and staffing of the Emissions Reduction
Assurance Committee (ERAC), and whether it should be staffed and supported by officers from
the Department, the Clean Energy Regulator, or another agency.
6.4
Establish a scheme to subsidise the costs of directly measuring the abatement associated with
certain types of project activities, particularly the sequestration of carbon in agricultural soils.
The costs of directly measuring abatement is acting as a significant barrier to the uptake of soil
carbon projects and certain other project activities. This barrier is most acute where there are
no model-based methods for the activities or the available modelled methods are highly
conservative because of scientific uncertainty concerning the impact of project activities.
The scheme would provide subsidies for measurement costs on the condition recipients share
data to help resolve scientific uncertainties and improve model-based methods. The scheme
could run on a cost recovery basis (for example, by requiring proponents to sell credits to the
Regulator at a discount).
6.5

58
Create a fixed priced purchasing desk for small projects under the ERF.
This would encourage project uptake, particularly agriculture and small-scale energy efficiency
projects, by reducing price risks and marketing costs.
Eligibility to access the platform would be limited to proponents of generally small projects (e.g.
based on projects’ forward abatement estimates or another similar metric).
The creation of the fixed priced purchasing desk would ideally be done in tandem with the work
on small-scale methods and method stacking (recommendations 6.7 and 6.9).
6.6
Create tailored small-scale ERF methods for particular types of agriculture projects, including
shelterbelts.
Small-scale methods would have streamlined measurement, reporting and verification
requirements, reducing transaction costs and driving participation from small agriculture
projects.
6.7
The Clean Energy Regulator should continue its work on optional delivery contracts under the
ERF to reduce price uncertainty and risk for proponents by giving them the right (but not the
obligation) to sell ACCUs at a set, pre-determined price during a specified period.
6.8
Facilitate ‘method stacking’, where multiple ERF projects are taken on the same property using
different methods, by making rule changes to allow:
proponents of stacked projects to submit a single, aggregated offsets report covering each
individual component of the stacked project; and
stacked projects’ audits to cover all projects at one time rather than auditing each individual
component at different times.
6.9
The Clean Energy Regulator should continue its efforts to streamline ERF audit requirements at
an administrative level and to explore the potential to use “big data” as an alternative to more
traditional audit processes.
6.10
Amend the ERF legislation to enable a method to be developed for carbon capture and storage
and/or carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
6.11
Undertake consultation on amending the water requirements that apply to farm forestry and
plantation projects under the ERF.
There are significant abatement opportunities associated with farm forestry and the expansion
of plantation estate. The water requirements that apply to these project types are acting as a
barrier to the realisation of these opportunities. Consultation would help identify the need for
and impacts of the water requirements, and the best way of addressing the concerns about the
potential adverse hydrological effects of plantations.
6.12
Develop and publish a formal policy governing the prioritisation and development of ERF
methods.
This would provide stakeholders with greater confidence about method development processes
and the opportunities for consultation and collaboration.
6.13

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Part B
Incentivising voluntary action on a broader
scale

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Chapter 7. Facilitating voluntary carbon
market transactions and sources of demand
Key points
The Panel expects voluntary demand for abatement to continue to grow and this will lead to an increase
in the demand for and supply of real abatement credits, intermediated through carbon markets.
This demand is arising from states setting emissions reduction targets and private agents voluntarily
adopting lower emissions footprint objectives.
The current carbon accounting and unit registry arrangements are fit for purpose to track and verify that
voluntary surrender is in fact taking place in a way consistent with claimed abatement outcomes.
Nevertheless, some enhancements to these arrangements should be contemplated.
Carbon markets will deepen and innovate and will likely further differentiate between the quality
differences of different carbon units and the associated co-benefits of some projects. Large-scale
Generation Certificates (LGCs) may increasingly be surrendered voluntarily to reflect their implicit carbon
abatement value.
7.1. Developments in Carbon Markets
Carbon markets in Australia are relatively immature compared to other securities markets. Nevertheless,
they have undergone significant development in recent years, with a broader range of participants being
active on both the supply and demand side. Prices are more transparent and bid/offer spreads have
narrowed with the emergence of market making participants, but it presently remains largely an over-the-
counter market. Exchange traded platforms could be expected to emerge over time.
The Regulator provides the registry services underpinning the domestic market and international
transactions in carbon and carbon-related units.44
The basic transactions associated with these markets are
as follows.
 Crediting of ACCUs under the ERF and the delivery of ACCUs under a carbon abatement contract (either
to the Regulator or other parties) or to meet regulated Safeguard Mechanism obligations. Emerging
areas of demand are from state governments to offset emissions from government operations, and
from private agents intending to surrender ACCUs to reduce their emissions footprint voluntarily.
Interparty trade, currently mainly through spot transactions, is also deepening with the emergence of
longer term contracting and project sponsorship, particularly by larger corporations that may expect to
have a Safeguard Mechanism obligation in the future.45
 Crediting of certificates under the RET, separately for LGCs and small-scale technology certificates (STCs)
(supply), and the surrender of certificates to meet regulated obligations of retailers and large loads
(demand). There will often be a transaction in certificates between generation and load. The small-scale
scheme is “closed” – meaning regulated demand is set to follow whatever supply is generated by
installations and prices are generally stable. The large-scale scheme is “open” – meaning regulated
44 Under the Kyoto Protocol, Australia is required to maintain a registry of prescribed international units (often called ‘Kyoto units’). The
relevant units are Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), Removal Units (RMUs) and Assigned Amount
Units (AAUs).
45 The ACCU is currently not an internationalised unit, meaning that ACCUs cannot be formally traded to meet carbon unit surrender
obligations in other countries. There has been some interest in this possibility from large exporters of fossil fuels.

61
demand for LGCs is set according to the statutory target and market prices rise and fall to incentivise
supply to meet demand. There is also growing private LGC demand for voluntary surrender over and
above regulated demand.
 Transactions involving international aspects including the purchase of units generated in other countries
under the Kyoto Protocol (mainly Certified Emissions Reductions units) and the voluntary surrender of
those units.
The Australian Government also has in place arrangements to help firms engage with voluntary markets. The
Climate Active program (Box 7.1) is a certification scheme that enables firms and other entities to certify
that a particular organization, product, service or event is carbon neutral. Through a robust accreditation
framework, it enables companies to demonstrate how they are reducing emissions, including by accessing
voluntary carbon markets. Climate Active provides guidance on how they can reduce their emissions in a
way that is transparent, credible and trusted, and thereby meet the expectations of their customers and
shareholders. In the years ahead, Climate Active will provide a framework capable of accommodating
growing engagement by the private sector in voluntary carbon markets and their expectations for better
information and transparency in these markets.
Box 7.1 Climate Active
Carbon neutral certification against the Climate Active Carbon Neutral Standard (formerly the National
Carbon Offset Standard) has been available to Australian businesses since 2010. Climate Active is a
partnership between the Australian Government and businesses to drive voluntary climate action.
There is an increasing interest in the Climate Active brand. As of December 2019, 88 businesses have
certified 130 business operations, products, services, buildings, precincts and events as net zero
emissions under the Climate Active program. Certification numbers having doubled in the last two years,
and there is a strong pipeline of firms seeking to be certified under the program.
The certification reflects the role that government, business and community have to play in working
together to address climate change. The Climate Active program and Climate Active Carbon Neutral
Standard supports and guides businesses as they account for and actively seek to reduce emissions. The
Climate Active certification helps the community take action by making it easier to identify and choose
brands that are reducing their emissions.
Climate Active certification is awarded to businesses and organisations that have credibly achieved net
zero emissions, or carbon neutrality. To become carbon neutral, businesses and organisations calculate
the greenhouse gas emissions generated by their activity, such as fuel or electricity use and travel. They
reduce these emissions as much as possible by investing in new technology or changing the way they
operate or surrendering large-scale generation certificates (LGCs), Any remaining emissions can be offset
by purchasing and surrendering carbon offset units, for example ACCUs.
Australia’s carbon neutral certification is one of the most rigorous in the world and has been recognised
by the European Union Commission and the World Bank as a mature and effective model to help
businesses and incentivise emission reductions.

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Figure 7.1 illustrates the different components of the demand side of the market for delivery or surrender of
ACCUs, LGCs and international units. In 2018, some 4.9 million tonnes of abatement, accounting for around
12 per cent of the market, was voluntarily surrendered, up from 10 per cent in 2016. The current voluntary
market is dominated by the voluntary surrender of international Certified Emissions Reduction units. In large
part, this is because these units trade at relatively low prices compared to domestic offsets. The
international rules underpinning trade in these units under the Paris Agreement have not yet been settled.
This matter is generally not within the remit of this report, but it can be expected the availability of cheap
international units will eventually be more limited because several countries have indicated their intent to
leverage international markets to achieve their Paris targets. This may shift demand within Australia’s
carbon markets to domestic abatement units, which would have implications for the current arrangement of
prices.
Beyond the market for ACCUs, LGCs, STCs and international units from the Kyoto Protocol, there are also a
range of traded carbon units credited under private offset certification schemes – such as the Gold Standard
and Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) – and used in the voluntary offset market. There is also a range of
environmental benefit units (primarily for biodiversity) that exist for state-based environmental offset
arrangements that can be mandated under state environmental approval mechanisms. These units can also
have incidental carbon benefits associated with the offset projects.
Figure 7.1 – Australian carbon offset market composition, 2018 (Source: Clean Energy Regulator)

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7.2. Carbon unit quality and co-benefits
The market differentiates between carbon credits by offering a price premium according to different carbon
quality characteristics, including perceived additionality and environmental integrity, and the co-benefits
associated with project activities. For example, some carbon units from savanna burning projects can earn
significant premiums in the market, reflecting the benefits associated with supporting traditional Indigenous
burning activities that reduce wildfire risk, provide employment on country and support community
autonomy. Savana burning credits currently dominate voluntary surrender of ACCUs.
The identification, measurement and valuation of co-benefits can be done in a number of ways. In some
cases, the mere description of the type or location of the project, or the characteristics of the proponent,
may be enough (e.g. savanna burning projects undertaken by an Aboriginal corporation or land trust). In
other instances, more detailed information generated through the application of a measurement standard
may be required (e.g. to measure the composition of the native vegetation in a regeneration project).
Regardless of the approach used, for the market for offsets with co-benefits to function efficiently, there is a
need for the market to be properly informed. Otherwise, there is a risk of a “quality market failure” where
good units may not earn a sufficient premium to justify the effort required to create them.
To this end, the Panel supports current work by the Regulator to enhance the ACCU registry to make it
easier to trace the provenance of units to originating projects and to support private quality branding of co-
benefits associated with different units. For this approach to work well it is important the market for supply
and demand for units is competitive. The growing emergence of private demand is a positive development
that will help the market to differentiate and place a value premium on units with substantial co-benefits. A
number of other developments are also likely to support a deepening of co-benefit markets in the period
ahead, including the Queensland Government Land Restoration Fund, which is intending to pay a premium
for carbon units with specified co-benefits.
7.3. The LGC market beyond 2020
LGCs are denominated in megawatt hours (MWh), as one LGC is credited for each MWh of eligible
renewable generation. The RET target is similarly denominated in MWh and the liability of retailers and
other large loads is calculated by applying the Renewable Power Percentage set each year by the Minister,
so that demand will broadly accord with the legislated path to the RET target. The market price of LGCs
varies according to whether supply is running ahead of or behind demand.
The statutory RET target plateaus at 33,000 MWh per year between 2020 and 2030. More than enough
generation capacity has already been accredited to generate sufficient LGCs to meet the 2020 target and
there remains a large pipeline of projects that will push generation beyond the RET target. Accordingly,
there is downward pressure on LGC prices. The RET remains open to new generation accreditation beyond
2020, so supply can grow further beyond the statutory target if new eligible power stations continue to be
built (grid constraints permitting) and register for LGC crediting. The potential for LGC supply to grow well
beyond statutory demand has led many in the market to think LGC prices will fall to zero or near zero in the
period beyond 2020.
That view of future prices is likely to be wrong if voluntary demand, on top of the statutory target, continues
to grow at a sufficient pace to absorb additions to supply. There are a number of sources of potential
voluntary46
demand:
46 “Voluntary” surrender is used here to describe surrender that is not mandated for the purposes of the legislation that establishes the
RET. Voluntary surrenders may be mandated through other requirements or subject to an obligation or desire to attain a particular
status.

64
 Voluntary surrender for Greenpower: This is a product available from electricity retailers by which
consumers, mainly households, can elect to pay a premium on their electricity bills to source their
power from renewable generation. Retailers voluntarily surrender47
additional LGCs to cover this
additional demand for renewable generation beyond their statutory RET obligations. The popularity of
100% Greenpower products fell significantly when electricity prices rose substantially and LGC prices
were high. The cost of Greenpower rose beyond the levels that increasingly price sensitive consumers
were willing to pay. This market response is likely to reverse in the period ahead as both electricity and
LGC prices are expected to fall. If so, there will be additional demand for renewable generation through
Greenpower and, other things equal, this will reduce the amount of thermal generation and reduce
emissions.
 Voluntary surrender to account for electricity usage under Climate Active: To achieve carbon neutrality
under Climate Active, many firms use ACCUs, Certified Emissions Reductions units and LGCs,
surrendering the units through the Regulator registries. As LGC prices fall, LGCs are likely to become
more popular amongst firms wanting to reduce their carbon footprint, thereby increasing the demand
for LGCs and ameliorating the downward pressure on prices.
 Voluntary surrender by governments: Some governments are using Greenpower or direct surrender of
LGCs to offset their own Scope 2 emissions or to meet broader emissions reduction objectives. For
example, the ACT government has a zero emissions electricity target for 2020 and has acquired LGCs
from renewables projects commissioned to supply renewable electricity. It is understood the ACT
government intends to surrender LGCs voluntarily after 2020 to verify compliance with the ACT target.
 Voluntary surrender by large companies: Large electricity consumers are increasingly using Power
Purchase Agreements with renewable generators to hedge exposures to wholesale electricity market
prices. Some PPAs also include the sale of LGCs to the electricity consumer. Some of these companies
have indicated an intention to surrender these LGCs voluntarily to help meet their companies’ emissions
footprint objectives. This type of arrangement could also be transacted by large companies acquiring
LGCs on market for the purpose of voluntary surrender. Such surrenders may, but do not necessarily
need to, engage with branding arrangements such as Climate Active because voluntary surrenders can
be directly verified from registry transactions. For example, such direct verification could support a
claim a company has offset a particular percentage of its Scope 2 emissions.48
 Voluntary surrender of LGCs (or ACCUs) by individual consumers wishing to reduce or offset emissions
from their own consumption activities.
All of these transactions are variations on the basic idea that voluntary surrenders, which can be verified by
registry transactions, will add to demand for LGCs over and above the statutory RET target. In turn, this will
lead to additional renewables generation being built. It is indicative of a theme in this Report that voluntary
action can drive real emissions outcomes and governments do not need to drive all outcomes with
deliberate policy actions.
The drive from firms to move beyond compliance to ambition in recent years has significantly changed the
policy landscape. An ongoing shift to deeper renewables penetration is now inevitable, subject to needed
network augmentation and additional storage capacity. This outlook is consistent with the recent emissions
projections released by the Department incorporating a stronger outlook for renewables investment beyond
2020, without additional policy support. These projections imply renewables will provide around half of
electricity demand by 2030.
47 The legal underpinning of this arrangement is a branding system run by the states with verification of surrender of LGCs provided by
the CER. If surrender was insufficient to match Greenpower sales by a retailer this may amount to a breach of consumer protection
laws.
48 State planning approvals require a number of desalination plants to surrender LGCs to cover their Scope 2 emissions. State
governments are currently considering commissioning several new desalination plants. This could significantly increase demand for
LGCs or other equivalent units, including ACCUs.

65
It is difficult to predict the future and the strength of the trends outlined above. Nevertheless, the Panel
does not expect LGC prices to fall to zero after 2020, including because, as prices fall, it is highly likely that a
significant positive demand response will occur in the voluntary offset market.
At the point where LGC prices fall to levels comparable with ACCU prices (perhaps around 2021-22), it is
likely demand for LGCs will become motivated by the implicit carbon abatement embedded in LGCs, even
though LGCs are denominated in MWh rather than tonnes of CO2-e. Carbon abatement is implicitly
embedded in LGCs because additional renewables generation generally displaces thermal generation at any
given level of demand and emissions are consequently reduced. If this market innovation occurs, it will
effectively transform the RET to a carbon denominated scheme driving renewables investment to whatever
level is consistent with voluntary demand.
It is not proposed, at this stage, to allow a formal arrangement to trade LGCs for ACCUs. Rather, it would be
preferable for the market to determine the price of LGCs and a key issue for the market to determine will be
the implicit carbon content of a LGC. This is a technical matter and is conceptually related to the ideas lying
behind the offset integrity standards for the ERF, particularly those concerning conservatism and
additionality. The Panel is of the view these issues would be adequately addressed if a convention were
adopted for the implicit carbon content, or “carbon exchange rate”, of a LGC was either the average grid
carbon intensity per MWh or the state-based grid average emission factor for the jurisdiction in which the
generator is located. A state based approach would necessarily bring with it some practical and conceptual
complexities. A state based grid intensity calculation would require certain assumptions about the intensity
of electricity transacted over interstate connectors to be factored in. Further, as a practical matter, it would
require the LGC registry to tag and track the jurisdictional provenance of the LGC.
Using a grid average or state average is in preference to an implicit carbon intensity based on the emissions
intensity of thermal generation. While it is true renewable generation often displaces thermal generation, it
need not in all circumstances—for example, where electricity demand was growing.
Using the grid or state average carbon intensity would ensure the ‘exchange rate’ adjusts to reflect the
changing intensity of grid generation over time. As the grid intensity falls, so the amount of implicit carbon
content per LGC will also decline as renewables become more business-as-usual. Conceptually, in a fully
renewables electricity system, a LGC would have zero implicit carbon content because there would be no
more electricity emissions to abate.
Additional variable renewables driven by voluntary demand for LGCs could, in the absence of appropriate
energy market settings, have implications for grid security and reliability through its impact on investment in
dispatchable capacity. However the Panel notes National Electricity Market settings have been updated in
recent years by the Commonwealth and other jurisdictions through the COAG Energy Council, including by
introducing the Retailer Reliability Obligation (RRO). The RRO supports reliability in the NEM by incentivising
retailers and some large energy users to contract or invest in dispatchable and ‘on demand’ resources and
would account for any market impacts of new voluntary demand for LGCs. The COAG Energy Council has
sought advice from the Energy Security Board on any further interim reliability and security measures
needed to preserve reliability and security in the NEM, including reviewing the reliability standard. Changes
to the reliability standard could impact when AEMO can activate reliability measures, such as the RRO. The
ESB is also preparing advice on a long-term, fit-for-purpose market framework to support reliability that
could apply from the mid-2020s.
The declining implicit carbon content of LGCs points to the opportunity and desirability of having other
forms of credits in the market, including credits with a higher carbon abatement potential, such as the
Safeguard Mechanism Credits discussed in chapter 9.
7.4. Facilitating demand from state governments
As mentioned in chapter 2, state and territory governments are adopting ambitious climate change targets
and, are increasingly looking for opportunities to reduce emissions and increase abatement. With all states

66
adopting net zero emissions targets by 2050, their efforts and investments will make an important
contribution towards Australia’s national goals and beyond. State government demand for emissions units,
including ACCUs and LGCs, is a growing part of Australia’s voluntary carbon markets. For example, the
voluntary surrender of ACCUs is an important element of the Queensland Government’s $500 million Land
Restoration Fund to expand carbon farming in that state.
It is noted some state governments use ACCUs and LGCs to offset emissions from particular developments,
such as for desalination plants. The use of the national crediting architecture promotes simplicity and
consistency between jurisdictions, reduces transaction and compliance costs for proponents and can reduce
administrative costs for state governments. The alternative approach, where state and territory
governments develop bespoke solutions, can result in unnecessary duplication and increase costs, without
improving environmental outcomes. Due to this, the Panel recommends the Commonwealth works with
state and territory governments to encourage their use of the national crediting architecture. There should
also be continued partnership and education between the Regulator and state and territory officials to build
awareness of this architecture.
A welcome development in this area is the recent bilateral agreement between the Commonwealth and
NSW governments. This $2 billion co-funded agreement covering energy, gas, grid security and emissions
will strengthen the grid and reduce emissions throughout the state through the use of lower emissions fuels,
establishment of a renewable energy zone, and a range of emissions reduction initiatives. This agreement
could be a template for future collaboration and co-investment opportunities between Commonwealth and
state governments. Ideally, these agreements would be used as a way for the Commonwealth to leverage its
programs, such as the CSF, to unlock additional low cost abatement by securing matched funding from
states.
7.5. Facilitating deeper engagement by the private
sector in voluntary market transactions
There is increasing desire from businesses and households to act in an environmentally conscientious
manner. Reducing and offsetting individual carbon footprints is becoming increasingly important for
consumers. Understanding how this can be achieved has historically been a challenge. Even for well-
informed consumers, sourcing units for voluntary surrender is difficult and time consuming, and the current
“over-the-counter” market has disadvantages that may be a barrier to the growth of private sector
engagement with voluntary markets.
To help overcome this challenge, and facilitate greater access to voluntary markets, the Regulator is
encouraging exchange-traded markets to be voluntarily established by third parties. This has the potential to
encourage greater depth in the market, and provide a clearer pathway for voluntary action from individuals
and other businesses. Exchange traded markets have advantages over over-the-counter markets, such as
being more effective at price discovery and lowering transaction costs. To progress this work, the Regulator
will need to consider upgrades to existing registry systems to better integrate with third party trading of
certificates, for example to enable private exchange trading systems to be automatically integrated with the
registry system. The Panel supports the preliminary work undertaken by the Regulator and believes this
work should be accelerated.

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Table 7.1 Recommendations for Chapter 7
Adopt a convention that the implicit carbon content, or “carbon exchange rate”, for a LGC will
be based on either the average grid carbon intensity per MWh or the state-based grid emission
factor for the jurisdiction in which the LGC creating renewable generator is located.
This would assist in the development of voluntary offset markets, ensuring consistency and
transparency in the use of LGCs for offset purposes.
The implications for grid security and reliability associated with additional renewables
deployment driven by voluntary market demand will be managed through the Retailer
Reliability Obligation.
7.1
The Clean Energy Regulator should accelerate its efforts to encourage the emergence of
exchange-traded markets for certificates, and the work already underway to support the
deepening and strengthening of voluntary private markets by improving registry systems to
provide information about the provenance of certificates and support private quality branding
of co-benefits associated with different abatement units.
7.2
The Commonwealth should work with state and territory governments to encourage their use
of the national crediting architecture for the purposes of offsetting emissions from particular
developments. There should also be continued partnership and education between the
Regulator and state and territory officials to build awareness of this architecture.
This will promote simplicity and consistency between jurisdictions, reduce transaction and
compliance costs for proponents and reduce administrative costs for state governments.
7.3

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Chapter 8. Enabling markets by improving
capability and information
Key points
A new knowledge sharing and outreach program should be established to address information barriers
impeding investment in cost-effective abatement opportunities and participation in the Emissions
Reduction Fund (ERF). The program would involve the creation of dedicated knowledge sharing hubs for
key sectors, with a focus on energy efficiency in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the property
sector, agriculture, road freight and industrial facilities. This would address information barriers impeding
the realisation of cost-effective abatement opportunities and participation in the ERF.
A more comprehensive energy rating system for the building sector is needed to address information
asymmetries that exist in the market and help overcome non-financial barriers, such as split incentives
between buyers and sellers or landlords and tenants. Consideration should be given to:
 expanding the National Built Environment Rating System (NABERS) and the Commercial Building
Disclosure (CBD) scheme to a broader range of commercial buildings, such as hotels;
 prioritising the development of a comparable rating system applicable to new and existing
residential buildings; and
 working with the states and territories on mandatory energy efficiency disclosure obligations for the
residential sector that are linked to the rating system.
8.1. Addressing producer-related information and
capacity barriers
Information deficiencies and gaps in organisational capacity impede the uptake of many abatement
opportunities in the energy efficiency, industrial and agricultural sectors. Businesses in these sectors can
face three distinct information, and capacity, related barriers that obstruct the realisation of cost-effective
abatement opportunities:
 lack of knowledge about abatement activities and their costs and benefits;
 lack of knowledge of carbon markets, covering offset certification processes, prices and the markets in
which credits can be sold; and
 lack of trust in the parties offering information on abatement and carbon market opportunities.
Part of the reason for the existence and severity of these barriers relates to changes in relevant industries that
has seen the decline of previous information and outreach networks. Possibly the best example of this is in the
agricultural sector, which has experienced significant changes in outreach services over the past 20 years.
Historically, farmers relied on state and territory agricultural departments for information on new and
emerging technologies and markets. In recent decades, this approach has been replaced with a fee-for-
service model, where extension services are largely provided by contract agronomists. The demise of
government outreach services has reduced the flow of information to farm businesses on new technologies.
Most relevantly, it has meant there are no timely channels for the distribution of independent information
about abatement activities and carbon markets to farm businesses. Farmers interested in undertaking

69
carbon farming activities will generally have to engage private contractors to provide information on
opportunities and the associated cost and benefits. The costs of obtaining private advice deters uptake, a
situation aggravated by the fact most consultant agronomists lack detailed information on carbon
abatement technologies and markets. Typically, for farmers to access advice on abatement activities and
carbon markets, they need to engage specialist carbon service providers, who have varying levels of trust in
agricultural communities. A recent positive development has been the emergence of a number of not-for-
profit organisations who are helping to disseminate information to farmers on carbon farming and carbon
markets. Notwithstanding this, there remain significant information-related barriers that are hindering the
realisation of abatement opportunities in the agriculture sector.
The provision of dedicated independent support mechanism for landholders to engage in
the carbon market is required … Building informed capacity will increase participation in
the market and strengthen the reliability of the outcomes.
BlueScope is supportive of the Government providing resources to assist with identifying
and implementing emissions reduction projects, particularly for business that do not have
the in-house resources to do so
BlueScope Steel
Similar issues exist in relation to energy efficiency. There have been various federal, state and territory, and
local government programs that have provided outreach services to businesses on energy efficiency
opportunities. A number of these have sought to facilitate information sharing between businesses as a way
of overcoming information deficiencies and improving organisational capacity. While there is a record of
achievement in this area, the services are not universally available across the jurisdictions and have often
lacked consistency and longevity.
The barriers posed by information deficiencies are most acute in SMEs. These firms often lack the internal
capacity to identify energy savings and other abatement measures, and may not have the information or
expertise to access available government support.
The Panel believes the Government should consider establishing a new knowledge sharing and outreach
program to address the information barriers impeding the realisation of cost-effective abatement
opportunities and participation in the ERF. The proposed program would involve the creation of dedicated
knowledge sharing hubs for key industries, with a focus on energy efficiency in SMEs, agriculture, road
freight, the property sector and industrial facilities. The hubs would provide access to experts to help
businesses identify energy efficiency and other abatement opportunities and provide information on how to
access relevant government support, including through the ERF. The hubs would also provide a forum for
information sharing between businesses and could work with particular businesses to develop
demonstration projects.
In the agricultural sector, ideally, the hubs could be developed in collaboration with or through the Rural
Research and Development Corporations. There is also scope for the agricultural hubs to involve Natural
Resource Management groups and farmer representative bodies to increase their capacity to provide
information to landholders on abatement opportunities and carbon markets. A similar partnership model
should be used in other sectors to leverage existing organisational frameworks and networks.
In some sectors, the information barriers faced by businesses are exacerbated by skills shortages and the
relative absence of qualified personnel. For example, stakeholders have raised concerns about the
availability of trained energy efficiency experts in the industry and building sectors. The Panel believes a
review should be undertaken to determine the extent of relevant skills shortages and whether there is a
need for additional measures to address training needs.

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The gaps that can most quickly be addressed, and are essential to the de-risking task, are
associated with demonstration and engagement. In parallel there is a significant task to
be undertaken in mapping requirements for training and education to support the mid-
and long-term needs of the energy transition.
8.2. Rating systems and disclosure for building
energy efficiency
In addition to producer-related information deficiencies, information asymmetries are preventing price
signals from being utilised to incentivise the realisation of abatement opportunities in some sectors. By
improving access to information, governments can help resolve these asymmetries, thereby unlocking low-
cost sources of abatement.
Energy rating systems for buildings are an example of where information tools have been used to facilitate
voluntary abatement effectively. The National Australian Building Energy Rating System (NABERS) is a well-
established rating system that applies to certain types of commercial buildings and underpins the
Commercial Building Disclosure (CBD) scheme. Stakeholders from the built environment sector report that,
by enabling better decision-making by prospective buyers and tenants, the scheme has driven a
transformation in some building classes, especially new office buildings. Research on rating schemes in other
countries has found similar effects, with the ratings being associated with material improvements in building
energy efficiency.49
Existing residential buildings are particularly challenging to drive abatement at scale,
given highly fragmented ownership structures, and an absence of policies that allow for
the measurement and disclosure of their energy and emissions performance.
Joint submission from PCA, GBCA, ASBEC and EEC
Building energy efficiency is likely to be one of the lowest cost methods for realising
Australia’s abatement goals
CSIRO
Some rating tools and systems exist for Australia’s residential building stock, but these do not have full
coverage across all building types. The Nationwide House Energy Rating Scheme (NatHERS) is the most
widely established system and is used by around 70 per cent of new homes. However, it does not apply to
existing residential buildings.
The Panel believes the Government should consider:
 expanding NABERS and the CBD scheme to a broader range of commercial buildings, such as hotels; and
 prioritising the development of a comparable national rating system applicable to both new and existing
residential buildings, based on the existing arrangements under NatHERS.
49 Australian Sustainable Built Environment Council (2016) LOW CARBON, HIGH PERFORMANCE How buildings can make a major
contribution to Australia’s emissions and productivity goals. Accessed on 30 January at https://www.asbec.asn.au/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/160509-ASBEC-Low-Carbon-High-Performance-Full-Report.pdf

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The Australian Government could also work with the states and territories on introducing mandatory energy
efficiency disclosure obligations for the residential sector linked to the rating system.
Jurisdictions already collaborate on building energy efficiency policy through the COAG Energy Council and
have recently agreed a series of measures that will encourage better energy efficiency in Australia’s
residential and commercial building stock.50
The Panel supports this body of work and considers its
implementation should be prioritised.
The creation of a more comprehensive energy rating system for the building sector would help to address
the information asymmetries that exist in the market and help overcome non-financial barriers, such as split
incentives between buyers and sellers or property owners and tenants. It could also deliver a range of co-
benefits, particularly to low income and disadvantaged people who are often tenants in buildings with poor
energy performance.
Establish a knowledge sharing and outreach program to address information barriers impeding
the uptake of ERF projects and investment in cost-effective abatement opportunities.
The program would involve the creation of dedicated knowledge sharing hubs for key sectors,
with a focus on energy efficiency in SMEs, agriculture, road freight, the property sector and
industrial facilities.
These knowledge sharing hubs should be developed in consultation with the relevant industry
bodies.
8.1
Undertake a review to determine the extent of skills shortages associated with abatement
activities and whether there is a need for additional measures to address relevant training
needs, particularly in regard to the availability of trained energy efficiency experts in the
industry and building sectors.
8.2
Expand the National Australian Built Environment Rating Scheme (NABERS) and the Commercial
Buildings Disclosure (CBD) scheme to a broader range of commercial building types (e.g. hotels).
8.3
Develop an energy performance rating scheme for new and existing residential buildings based
on the Nationwide House Energy Rating Scheme (NatHERS) as a matter of priority.
8.4
The Commonwealth should work with state and territory governments to introduce mandatory
energy performance disclosure obligations for the residential sector linked to the rating system
(recommendation 8.4).
8.5
50 COAG Energy Council (2019) Trajectory for Low Energy Buildings (and addendum). Accessed on 20 January at
http://coagenergycouncil.gov.au/publications/trajectory-low-energy-buildings

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Chapter 9. Unlocking abatement from
Australia’s largest facilities –Crediting under
the Safeguard Mechanism
Key points
There is an opportunity to leverage the architecture of the Safeguard Mechanism to accelerate the
adoption of low emission technology by Australia’s largest facilities, improving the productivity of these
facilities. This could be achieved by crediting emissions reductions below baselines and providing for the
sale and purchase of these credits. These credits could be sold to the Regulator or third parties or used to
meet liabilities under the Safeguard Mechanism.
A pilot program with a narrow focus could be used to test the market appetite for these units and to
refine the program administration. It is intended that this would be short-term measure to accelerate the
uptake of low emission technology within these targeted sectors.
There are a range of design options regarding the development of this program and further detailed
policy work and consultation with industry would be required to assess the feasibility and implications of
various design elements.
A crediting mechanism should target genuine abatement in order to provide value for money to the
purchaser of the credit, but avoid creating barriers that would make it less effective at leveraging
abatement. The essential design challenge is to strike a balance between measuring and crediting only
genuine abatement while still encouraging commercial participation.
9.1. The Safeguard Mechanism
The Safeguard Mechanism applies to Australia’s largest electricity, resources and industrial emitters. The
Mechanism was established to avoid significant increases in emissions above business as usual, rather than
to reduce emissions.
It achieves this by placing an emissions limit (known as a baseline) on Australia’s largest emitters. This gives
covered businesses a legislated obligation to keep net emissions below their baseline. Facilities that exceed
their baseline must ultimately surrender sufficient ACCUs to bring their net emissions below their baseline.
Most Safeguard facilities were originally on a type of baseline called a ‘reported baseline’, which is equal to
the high point of a facility’s emissions between 2009-10 and 2013-14.
Table 9.1 summarises the operation of the Safeguard Mechanism so far. In excess of 700,000 ACCUs have
been surrendered to the Regulator over the first two years of operation of the scheme. There has been a
strong commitment to compliance and no substantive breaches have occurred since the inception of the
scheme.

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Table 9.1. Summary of the Safeguard Mechanism for the first two years of its operation
Safeguard mechanism facilities 2017-18 2016-17
Covered facilities 211 203
Aggregate emissions 138 Mt CO2-e 131 Mt CO2-e
Aggregate emissions above baseline 0.49 Mt CO2-e 0.51 Mt CO2-e
ACCUs surrendered* 259,528 448, 097
Note liable entities have the option to surrender ACCUs in the corresponding compliance period or upon
approval of application by CER, in aggregate over a three-year (multi-year compliance) period.
The Safeguard Mechanism was amended in March 2019 to move facilities to emissions intensity baselines
that generally update annually to reflect actual production. Setting baselines on an emissions intensity basis
accommodates businesses increasing their production. By incentivising businesses not to increase their
emissions intensity, the Safeguard Mechanism encourages businesses to invest in their facilities, and new
technology.
9.2. Incentivising emissions reductions below the
Safeguard Mechanism baselines
Facilities covered by the Safeguard Mechanism account for approximately one quarter of Australia’s
emissions. Despite their emissions profile, only a small number of ERF projects have been undertaken by
entities with Safeguard obligations. There are three main ERF methods that can be used by Safeguard
facilities: Facilities; Industrial Electricity and Fuel Efficiency; and Industrial Equipment Upgrades. To date,
only 37 projects have been registered under these three methods, with 34 of these registered under the
Industrial Electricity and Fuel Efficiency Method. Only 777,642 ACCUs have been issued under these
methods to eight projects, all under the Industrial Electricity and Fuel Efficiency Method. Of the 37
registered projects, approximately 14 have been undertaken by entities with Safeguard obligations.
The limited uptake of projects suggests the ERF is not serving as an effective mechanism to capture the
abatement opportunities associated with Safeguard facilities. This is consistent with the information
received from stakeholders.
There are several reasons for the lack of participation by Safeguard entities, most of which stem from the
design features of the ERF, including the ex post crediting arrangements, relatively short crediting and
contract periods for emissions avoidance projects and the eligibility and accounting restrictions in methods.
The apparent incompatibility between the ERF’s design features and industrial-related offset projects stems
from the nature of the relevant abatement activities. In many cases, the most viable abatement
opportunities involve the early replacement and/or upgrading of industrial or energy-related equipment. As
explained in Chapter 4 (Box 4.1, Category 2), it is difficult to use an offset scheme like the ERF to realise
these abatement opportunities because of the challenges posed by additionality. All industrial and energy-
related equipment eventually needs to be replaced. Due to this, it is challenging to separate asset
replacements that would not ordinarily occur from those that are business as usual. This necessitates the
inclusion of restrictive rules in methods, which makes it difficult for facilities to undertake offset projects.

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Similar issues arise with other industrial-related abatement opportunities involving improving the energy
efficiency of existing equipment and fuel switching. In both cases, there is often a financial case for the
deployment of the relevant technologies or activities without government support, meaning restrictions
must be included in the methods to ensure they satisfy the ERF’s offsets integrity standards. While these
restrictions are important to maintain the integrity of the ERF, they are hindering the uptake of cost-
effective abatement opportunities in the industrial sector.
To address this issue, a crediting mechanism could be established within the Safeguard compliance
framework to provide an opportunity for firms to accelerate emissions reduction projects. In broad terms,
the proposed mechanism would provide credits to facilities who reduce their emissions below their
Safeguard baselines by undertaking ‘transformative’ abatement projects. The process would streamline the
arrangements that apply to facilities, offering an incentive to pursue cost-effective abatement projects that
are not currently eligible or feasible under the ERF. Similar to ACCUs generated under the ERF, the credits
generated under the proposed mechanism could be:
 used to meet compliance obligations under the Safeguard Mechanism;
 purchased by third parties to support claims they are helping the transition to a low-carbon economy; or
 potentially purchased through a new arrangement under the CSF.
Ultimately, this arrangement could help competitively position the Australian economy for the long-term
transition to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
There was broad support for consideration of this type of below-baseline crediting in submissions from
business stakeholders:
The concept of crediting abatement actions that go “beyond business as usual” to
provide an incentive for emissions reduction has been discussed in various ways since the
ERF and associated Safeguard Mechanism were first announced. Providing credits for
actions to reduce emissions could be an important way to “unlock” a wide range of
abatement opportunities that are not well recognised under the existing policy
framework or to improve the incentives to investigate, and potentially implement, further
abatement actions.
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association
There is currently no recognition of internally created offsets, when a facility’s emissions
are below the baseline. The Council is supportive of Option 1 as outlined in the discussion
paper, where the Safeguard Mechanism is used to incentivise emissions reduction by
crediting abatement actions that go beyond business as usual.
The Panel is of the view a carefully designed below-baseline crediting arrangement would be a useful
addition to the current policy set. Substantial genuine abatement opportunities, which may not otherwise
be feasible under the current policy suite, could be incentivised by such an arrangement.

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9.3. The general framework for how a crediting
mechanism could work
The objective of the crediting mechanism would be to facilitate the transformation of the industrial sector. It
would leverage the framework set out through the Safeguard Mechanism and National Greenhouse and
Energy Reporting Act 2007 (NGER Act). The Panel regards the emphasis on transformation as being
important – specifically the intent is not to provide credits for incremental change or for ‘headspace’ where
a facility’s baseline is substantially above its current typical emissions, either for historical or other reasons.
The arrangement would need to avoid crediting for business as usual reductions in emissions resulting from
scheduled replacement of plant and equipment. However, if such upgrades were brought forward as part of
a broader transformational project at a facility, it would be reasonable to provide a credit for the
acceleration in abatement.
The crediting mechanism would not be an offset scheme; it would be a low-emission technology
deployment incentive scheme, not unlike the RET. The main point of difference with the RET is that, while
the RET imposes mandatory obligations on retailers to purchase and surrender LGCs, the proposed below-
baseline crediting arrangement would be voluntary and rely exclusively on incentives.
Because the mechanism would not be an offset scheme, the units generated by participating facilities would
need to be differentiated from ACCUs issued under the ERF. While the units would still represent one tonne
CO2-e of emissions reductions, they would have a different name to ACCUs and be distinguished from ACCUs
in the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units. The Panel suggests the units be referred to as
Safeguard Mechanism Credits (or SMCs).
This would provide transparency and enable market participants to differentiate the value of the two types
of units.
Crediting could be legislated through a change to the NGER Act to provide for a power to issue units.
Consequential changes would also need to be made to the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units
Act 2011 (ANREU Act) to enable SMCs to be recorded in the Registry. Details of when and how SMCs would
be issued could then be set out in a secondary instrument such as the Safeguard Rule.
Scope and coverage
To utilise the Safeguard Mechanism framework effectively, it is appropriate that during a pilot phase only
facilities covered by the Safeguard Mechanism would be eligible. These are facilities whose emissions
exceed 100,000 tonnes CO2-e per year, excluding grid connected electricity generators who are subject to a
separate ‘sectoral baseline’ system. This would mean sub-threshold facilities (i.e. NGER Act reporters whose
emissions are less than 100,000 tonnes CO2-e per year) would not be eligible. Sub-threshold industrial
facilities are responsible for around 7 per cent of Australia’s emissions while Safeguard facilities are
responsible for around 26 per cent of Australia’s emissions (in 2017-18). Other frameworks examined by the
Panel could be used to incentivise abatement for sub-threshold facilities (such as those outlined in chapters
5, 6 and 10).

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Moving beyond business as usual
A crediting mechanism should target genuine abatement in order to provide value for money to the purchaser of
the credit, but avoid creating barriers that would make it less effective at leveraging abatement or prevent it from
being used. As the Australian Industry Group emphasised, an approach is needed to deal with additionality and
integrity issues that does not simply replicate the complexities associated with the ERF.
Trying to ensure greater additionality with further tests or scrutiny before crediting would
increase the cost and complexity of participation, weakening the incentive to respond.
Much of the point of crediting below baselines is to avoid the complexity that has
diminished participation in the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF).
The Australian Industry Group
The desire for integrity must be balanced with the need for simplicity. There are a number of ways this could
be achieved, including:
 basing crediting on changes in emissions intensity rather than absolute emissions;
 ensuring crediting baselines are conservative;
 limiting the period over which credits are issued;
 imposing time limits on the life of credits; and
 requiring proponents to explain publicly what actions they have taken to reduce emissions and how
they were additional and transformative.
Emissions intensity vs absolute emissions
An approach that credits reductions in emissions intensity would encourage emissions reductions from
improvements in production processes and efficiency. In contrast, if absolute emissions are used as the basis
for crediting, there is a risk facilities could be credited for reductions in production (and, in extreme cases,
plant closures). The aim of the scheme is to incentivise the transformation of the economy through the
adoption of new technologies and practices. Rewarding reductions in production runs counter to this
objective. Due to this, the Panel prefers emissions intensity based crediting.
Conservative baselines
With emissions intensity based crediting, the SMCs issued to a participating facility would be calculated by
comparing its actual emissions intensity for a specified production variable in the reporting period with a
reference level (or baseline) level of emissions intensity for the same variable. If the emissions intensity is
less than the reference level, the difference would be multiplied by the output of the facility to provide the
abatement estimate on which the number of SMCs is determined.
There are different options for how the reference levels could be set. The simplest approach would be to
use the emissions intensity baselines under the Safeguard Mechanism. Under this approach, SMCs would be
issued to facilities if their emissions intensity is reduced below their Safeguard Mechanism baselines. Under
the new Safeguard Mechanism rules, emissions intensity baselines can be set using one of two broad
approaches:
 site-specific, where the baselines are based on three-year forecasts of production at the relevant
facility; and
 sector-based defaults, where the baselines are based on the median emission-intensity of production in
the relevant industry sector.

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Facilities are also allowed to use a combination of these approaches. Where this occurs, facilities are
subdivided into different production processes and separate emission intensity baselines are calculated for
each process. The facility-wide baseline is then calculated as the aggregate of the baseline emission-
intensity levels determined for each production process.
Although allowing facilities to use their Safeguard Mechanism emission intensity baselines would be simple,
it would give rise to significant additionality risks and potentially result in the issuance of a large number of
SMCs that do not represent additional abatement. The nature and magnitude of this risk would depend on
the type of baseline that is used. Table 9.2 provides a summary of the issues associated with the different
baseline approaches.
Table 9.2. Risks associated with using Safeguard Mechanism baselines for crediting
Option Comments
Credit below site-specific  Risk of crediting business as usual activities (asset
replacements and upgrades, improvements in energy
efficiency and fuel switching).
 Does not reward early action.
Credit below sector-based defaults  Would result in issuance of credits for non-additional
abatement at facilities whose emissions-intensity is
below the sector default. This would reward early
action but undermine the integrity of the scheme.
 Facilities with relatively high emissions intensities
would have little incentive to participate (i.e. they
would have to make substantial reductions prior to
receiving any credits).
Due to the difficulties associated with the use of the Safeguard Mechanism baselines, it is likely to be
necessary to have separate reference levels for the purposes of crediting. Figure 9.1 illustrates this
approach.
Figure 9.1. Example crediting for emissions reduction below baseline emissions intensity

78
The Panel’s preference is to have separate reference levels for crediting. Beyond this, there are a number of
options that would need to be considered on how to determine and apply reference levels. A number of the
main options are summarised in Table 9.3.
Table 9.3.Design options for calculation of crediting reference levels
Option Comments
Base reference level on historical
extrapolation
Reference levels would be calculated on the basis of historical
emission intensity levels at the facility. This would be simple
and verifiable. However, historical extrapolation is not always
the most reliable way of estimating business as usual emission
intensity levels and could lead to over- and under-estimates.
Use audited forecasts to estimate
emissions intensities
Reference levels would be calculated on the basis of the same
audited forecasts that are used to calculate site-specific
baselines. This would be simple for facilities with site-specific
baselines and ensure consistency across the scheme. However,
it would also provide an additional incentive for facilities to
over-estimate their future emission intensities.
Incorporate a buffer in calculating
reference levels
To ensure reference levels are conservative, a buffer could be
included in the calculation process. Under this approach,
reference levels would be calculated using a two-step process:
an initial reference level would be calculated using historical
extrapolation or audited forecasts; and then a percentage
buffer would be applied to the initial level to make the final
reference level more conservative. For example, the final
reference level could be 85-95% of the initial level.
Declining reference levels To account for business as usual improvements and incentivise
more rapid change, the reference levels could be made to
decline over time. This could be done on an annual basis or at
set intervals.
Use of fixed production variables Under the Safeguard Mechanism, facilities that adopt site-
specific emission intensity baselines are able to ‘lock in’ fixed
production variables after a three-year period. If this was
allowed under the crediting mechanism, facilities could receive
SMCs for reductions in production (i.e. production falls leading
to lower absolute emissions, resulting in a reduction in
emission intensity due to the fixed production variable). A
mechanism will be needed to address this to prevent over-
crediting.
The Panel’s preference is for the crediting approach to be as simple as possible, while ensuring abatement
represents genuine reductions in emissions. Given the number of options and the complexity, the Panel
recommends further consultation be undertaken before final design choices are made.

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Limiting crediting periods
Under the ERF, projects have one crediting period of seven or 25 years (for emissions avoidance and
sequestration projects respectively) that can be extended once on the advice of the ERAC. At the end of the
crediting period, the projects are no longer eligible to receive ACCUs.
Placing time limits on crediting periods is an important way of managing additionality risks. It reflects the
fact that, in many cases, the additionality of abatement activities declines over time due to market and
technological developments.
The proposed below-baseline crediting scheme could be designed so that participating facilities are eligible
to receive SMCs indefinitely if their emissions intensity remains below their crediting reference level.
Alternatively, like the ERF, time limits could be placed on the period over which credits can be issued to a
participating facility. The benefit of having crediting periods is it would reduce additionality risks. The
downside is it would reduce the incentive to participate, particularly for facilities whose abatement
opportunities require significant upfront capital investments. Another option is to have declining reference
levels, which would reduce and ultimately eliminate the credits issued for initial investments.
As with the other elements of design associated with the approach to crediting, the Panel recommends that
further consultation be undertaken before a final decision is made on whether time limits should be
imposed on the crediting and in what form.
Limiting the life of credits
A further way of managing the integrity risks associated with the proposed crediting mechanism is to impose
time limits on the life of credits. To do this, credits would be assigned a ‘vintage’, corresponding to the date
in which they are issued. Once credits reach a prescribed age, they would become ineligible for surrender
and could be automatically removed from the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units. An alternative
model would be to only make SMCs over the prescribed age ineligible for certain uses; for example, they
could not be sold to the Regulator or surrendered for compliance purposes. Ideally, the time limit would
align with the monitoring periods used in the Safeguard Mechanism (i.e. 1-3 years).
While imposing time limits on the life of credits would not prevent the issuance of SMCs for non-additional
abatement, it would minimise the associated impacts. Facilities that receive credits would need to use them
before they reach the prescribed age; they could not bank them to meet future liabilities. Preventing credits
from being ‘bankable’ in this way would give some more value to ACCUs, which can be used indefinitely. The
downside of imposing age limits on credits is it would reduce their value and, in doing so, reduce the
effectiveness of the scheme in incentivising new investment.
Stakeholder views should be sought on whether SMCs should be time limited. An option would be to time limit
the credits issued during the early (pilot) phases of the scheme and to phase it out as the mechanism matures.
Transformation statement
To better target crediting at facilities undertaking significant and additional emissions reductions, there
could be a requirement for facilities to submit a ‘transformation statement’ summarising the actions they
have taken to reduce their emissions intensity and explaining why they are additional and transformative.
This would help avoid crediting incremental actions and “noise” that arises from year-to-year variation in
emissions intensity due to, for example, variation in capacity factors or changes in inputs to an industrial
process. It would also promote a responsible attitude towards engagement with the crediting arrangements
by exposing participants to external scrutiny and accountability.
Under the Panel’s preferred model, the issuance of credits would be contingent in the submission of a
transformation statement. All of these statements would be published on the Regulator's website and the
websites of participating facilities. In making the statements, participating facilities could be subject to a
duty of utmost good faith, similar to that proposed in Chapter 6. Further consultation should be undertaken

80
on the level of scrutiny applied to the statements by the Regulator and the associated compliance and
enforcement arrangements.
9.4. Markets for SMCs
In addition to being used to meet Safeguard Mechanism obligations, SMCs could be sold:
 to the Regulator under a new designated area of the CSF;
 to state governments to help them meet their climate policy objectives; and
 to private parties wanting to support claims they are helping the transition to a low-carbon economy.
The opportunity to sell the credits into different markets would increase potential demand and provide
facilities with greater capacity to manage price and other market-related risks.
While the opportunities to sell SMCs into these markets would provide benefits, it could have an impact on the
ACCU market. The potential impact on existing providers of offsets was raised in submissions to the Panel:
In considering this option, thought would need to be given to ensuring the integrity of the
ERF and that existing providers of offsets are not destabilised by an influx of increased
offset opportunities, so that the market doesn’t experience boom-bust conditions.
Minerals Council of Australia
As can be seen from Table 9.1 and Figure 9.2, demand for ACCUs from the Safeguard Mechanism is currently
modest. However, in time, with economic growth, demand for units is likely to grow. A significant amount of
trading of ACCUs is to meet delivery obligations, including from contracts whose projects have fewer ACCUs
issued than are required to meet their delivery schedule.
One reason why the demand for ACCUs from the Safeguard Mechanism has been relatively low is facilities
have made use of multi-year monitoring periods. These will start to expire from 2018-19, which could lead
to more demand. The amendments to the Safeguard Rule updating baseline setting could also increase
demand because more facilities will have emissions close to their baselines. In addition, the Panel expects
private demand for ACCUs to increase for the reasons outlined in Chapter 7.

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Figure 9.2 ACCU market profile. Source: Clean Energy Regulator, October 2019
SMCs and Safeguard Mechanism compliance
The potential use of credits for Safeguard compliance would be a source of demand that could make them
valuable. Under the NGER Act, ACCUs can be surrendered by Safeguard facilities in order to bring down their
‘net emissions number’ for emitters to comply with their obligations. The NGER Act also provides for other
types of unit to be ‘prescribed’ in the Safeguard Rule, so they also can be surrendered by responsible
emitters. A natural question is whether SMCs should also be prescribed.
Allowing SMCs to be surrendered could make it easier for responsible emitters to manage their liability,
especially in situations where the liquidity of ACCU markets could be an issue. This could mean there would
be a source of demand for these credits other than the Government, which would provide facilities with
more assurance SMCs will have value.
Setting the price for purchased abatement
Alongside demand from Safeguard facilities, the voluntary market, and state and territory governments,
SMCs could be purchased by the Australian Government through a new arrangement under the CSF. A range
of detailed design matters would need to be considered. Credits could be purchased at a price set by the
market (through, for example, reverse auctions like in the ERF), or at a fixed price. The price could be
influenced by the price of ACCUs, budget allocations and government estimates of likely volumes. Auctions
could also be for spot purchase rather than a forward contract. Another approach for setting the price
would be a discount to the prevailing ACCU price to reflect that SMCs are not bankable and are intended to
incentivise transformation (rather than ensuring strict additionality).
The approach for setting the price would depend on what else SMCs can be used for. If there is strong
demand for SMCs from the Safeguard Mechanism or the voluntary market, the role of Government
purchasing could be limited.

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Establish a ‘below-baseline crediting arrangement’ for large facilities using the Safeguard
Mechanism architecture. The arrangement would provide credits to facilities who reduce their
emissions below their Safeguard baselines by undertaking ‘transformative’ abatement projects.
The below-baseline crediting mechanism would help realise abatement opportunities in
industrial facilities that are not being accessed by the ERF.
 The crediting mechanism would not be an offset scheme; it would be a low-emission
technology deployment incentive scheme, not unlike the RET.
 Initially the mechanism would operate as a pilot, trial phase.
 Units generated under the scheme should be differentiated from ACCUs and could be
known as Safeguard Mechanism Credits (or SMCs).
 The crediting mechanism would be implemented through the National Greenhouse and
Energy Reporting Act and its subordinate legislation.
 Crediting should be targeted at reductions in emissions intensity to avoid crediting reduced
production or facility closures.
 SMCs could be used to meet compliance obligations under the Safeguard Mechanism,
purchased by the private sector, or purchased by the Government through a new
arrangement under the Climate Solutions Fund.
 Firms would be required to submit a transformation statement summarising what specific
investments have been made to reduce their emissions intensity.
9.1

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Part C
Unlocking the technologies needed to
transform key sectors

84
Chapter 10. A goal-oriented technology
co-investment program
Key points
The Panel proposes a goal-oriented technology co-investment program which would aim to bring down
the costs of transformative, high abatement potential technologies and activities.
Its goal would be to drive down the costs of transformative technologies and help facilitate their
deployment and commercialisation, including by reducing the risks faced by early movers and increasing
specialised skills and capacity in local markets.
The focus of the program would be on the ‘hard-to-abate’ sectors, for example heavy industry, freight
transport and aviation, where capital costs are high and progress in driving down costs has been slow.
To broaden uptake, the program would seek to incentivise investments in collaboration with state and
territory governments.
To maximise the effectiveness of this program, existing institutions, for example ARENA and the CEFC,
should be provided with an expanded, technology neutral remit so they can support key technologies
across all sectors.
Whilst it is a matter for government to determine their spending priorities, options could include
examining the apportionment of Climate Solutions Fund, ARENA, and CEFC funding to achieve the right
balance in pursuit of Australia’s climate change goals.
The Government should ensure the administration of, and distribution of public funds under, the
proposed technology co-investment program, CEFC, ARENA and other similar schemes is transparent.
This would be aided by the creation of a single database that records funding decisions and provides
information on the progress and outcomes of program activities.
10.1. Accelerating the technology ‘conveyor belt’
As discussed in Chapter 2, the projections show that for sectors apart from electricity, waste, and ‘land use,
land use change and forestry’ (LULUCF), emissions will remain either flat or will have not yet begun to fall by
2030. Therefore, there is a strong role for increased technology uptake to achieve emissions reductions in
these sectors to 2030 and beyond.
Australia will not be able to rely exclusively on the technologies currently competitive under the ERF if it is to
meet its longer-term emissions reduction goals. New technologies will need to be commercialised so viable
emissions reduction pathways are available for all sectors.
Innovation is central to the delivery of viable low-, zero- and negative-emissions
pathways for currently emissions-intensive activities, products and sectors. Innovation is
also needed to further reduce the costs and increase the opportunities of abatement and
sequestration.
Australian Industry Group.

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The emergence of new technologies, and the rate at which they are adopted, will be key factors in
determining Australia’s ability to reduce emissions in line with the long-term Paris goals. For technology to
move along the ‘conveyor belt’ from research to mature diffusion through the market, it must navigate each
of the points of the innovation cycle (see Figure 10.1). Historically, institutions such as the CSIRO, ARENA,
CEFC and Regional Development Corporations (RDCs) have provided targeted support for low emissions
technologies to overcome the risks associated with key points in the cycle.
However, there are critical gaps in Australia’s support for key technologies and sectors, particularly at the
demonstration, deployment and commercialisation stage. For instance, technologies like carbon capture
and storage technologies received considerable support at the research and development stage, however
there is limited support to move this technology to the point where it can be deployed at scale in Australia.
10.2. A goal-oriented co-investment program
To address these gaps, the Panel proposes a program be introduced with the goal of increasing the
deployment of novel and ambitious technologies with the potential to transform key sectors. This could
include carbon capture and storage, and hydrogen fuels for heavy vehicles.
A focussed goal-oriented technology co-investment program would provide financial incentives for firms to
adopt transformative, high abatement potential technologies. The focus of the program would be on the
‘hard-to-abate’ sectors, for example, heavy industry, freight transport and aviation, where abatement costs
are high and progress in driving down costs has been slow. The emphasis on transformative technologies
would be a defining element of the program. It would not support the deployment of technologies that offer
Figure 10.1. Institutions providing support across the innovation cycle. The technologies above the chart are
representative examples of technologies at the different points in the cycle.

86
incremental improvements in efficiency or emissions intensity. The program would target technologies that
have the potential to bring about a step change in emissions performance.
The goal of the program would be to drive down the costs of these transformative technologies and help
facilitate their deployment and commercialisation, including by reducing the risks faced by early movers and
increasing specialised skills and capacity in local markets. Such a program would work to accelerate the
progress of these technologies along their learning curves, thereby bringing forward their uptake and
market diffusion. Examples of such technologies could include carbon capture and storage (see Box 10.1),
industrial process heating, and hydrogen fuels for heavy vehicles.
The program could also adopt a sectoral transformation focus, targeting technologies to deliver long-term
abatement and other co-benefits. For example, it could run targeted funding rounds focussed on
technologies such as electrification or hydrogen for industrial process heating. Such a focus could support
that sector to be more competitive and resilient to longer-term carbon risks, while also delivering near-term
co-benefits such as lower domestic gas demand and gas prices and greater ability to get benefits from high-
value exports.
The program would complement the ERF by bringing down the costs of transformative technologies to the
point where they are competitive with other proven abatement options in the ERF’s auctions. The ERF works
as a demand (or market) pull policy, helping to accelerate the accumulation of technologies before the point
at which they become cost competitive in their own right. Once they are cost competitive, they no longer
need government support.
Clear principles, such as the scale of potential abatement or the ability to position a sector for deeper future
emissions reductions, will need to be established to guide decisions about which technologies should be
targeted. In this way, the program could fit well with the Government’s forthcoming Technology Investment
Roadmap, which the Panel understands will aim to establish a clear pathway for government to invest in
emissions reducing and low emissions technologies, including across transport, industry, manufacturing and
the built environment. The proposed co-investment program could utilise the Roadmap to identify priorities
for investment and become a key mechanism for the achievement of the Roadmap’s long-term objectives.
Where possible, investments under the program would be undertaken in collaboration with state and
territory governments. This would allow the program to leverage additional funding and ensure greater
coordination and consistency of programs between federal, state and territory programs. It would also
ensure the program is able to utilise the capacities and expertise of relevant state and territory agencies.
Relatively small but well-directed investments in demonstration and deployment projects
can generate powerful insights and signals, and can illustrate pathways for
implementation.
Box 10.1 – The role of ‘negative emissions’ technologies, including carbon capture and storage, in
achieving the Paris Agreement’s goals (source: P. Canadell, Global Carbon Project, pers. comm.)
Global institutions such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International
Energy Agency have concluded the Paris goals cannot be achieved without carbon sequestration
deployed at scale. Over 90 per cent of the IPCC’s scenarios consistent with a 66 per cent chance of
avoiding 2o
C rely on negative emissions technologies, including bioenergy coupled with carbon capture
and storage (BECCS) and afforestation/reforestation. 100 per cent of scenarios consistent with a 50 per
cent chance of keeping temperatures within 1.5o
C require negative emissions in addition to deep
emission reductions.

87
There are significant opportunities within the Australian minerals sector to deploy
technology abatement solutions. There are pre-commercial and potentially commercially-
scalable abatement technologies at various stages of the innovation cycle that could
benefit from early public financial support to address well-known market failures.
Minerals Council of Australia
Benefits of competitive grants
Targeted, competitive grants programs have proven effective in overcoming private sector project risk
barriers and stimulating the transformation of key sectors and markets. For example, ARENA (supported by
the CEFC) used targeted grants to drive down the cost and facilitate the commercialisation of large-scale
solar technology (Box 10.2).
A grants program is more suitable than the ERF for incentivising technologies that firms perceive as novel,
disruptive or risky. Unlike the ERF, a grants program has the advantage it would largely align the timing of
the financial incentive with the firm’s upfront capital investment. Grants can also be tailored to account for
the development stage and risk profile of the technologies. This would enable the program to target the
specific barriers faced by firms in investing in transformative technologies.
Projects of a more innovative nature are harder to fit to ERF methods and become
registered projects due to the lower certainty of results and abatement… Without some
incentive to assist in overcoming CAPEX hurdles or other financial barriers associated
with new technologies, it can be difficult for these projects to be approved.
A program based on competitive, co-funded capital grants has a range of other advantages, including:
 grants programs are familiar to governments and business and are generally relatively straightforward
to administer;
 a grants model is less likely to be perceived as complex, administratively onerous or risky for businesses,
and is therefore likely to encourage participation; and
 when well-designed, grants programs can deliver important co-benefits to the firm and broader
economy (see Box 10.3).
An additional benefit of a grants program is it can be designed in a way that offers assurance to the
government and public that genuine and additional abatement will be delivered and value for money will be
achieved. Transparency is essential to achieving this. The Government should ensure the administration of,
and distribution of public funds under the proposed program, CEFC, ARENA and other similar schemes is
transparent. This would be aided by the creation of a single database that records funding decisions and
provides information on the progress and outcomes of program activities.

88
Box 10.2 – Market transformation for large scale solar technologies by ARENA and the CEFC
In 2016, ARENA completed a competitive funding round for large scale solar technology with an objective
of reducing technology costs and providing a clear path to become competitive in the market. ARENA
provided $92 million in funding to 12 projects with combined generation capacity of 507 MW, with an
investment leverage of around 1:10. The program far exceeded expectations, having initially sought to
fund between 4 and 10 projects and add 200 MW of capacity to the grid.
ARENA’s funding round delivered significant cost reductions and market competition in the large-scale
solar sector. Construction costs halved, from $2.50 per watt before the round to $1.25 per watt after. It
also helped develop local supply chains, with the number of developers of accredited solar farms
increasing around 2.5 times, from 12 before the round to 30 after. In these ways, the round helped
transform the market for large scale solar – 4 solar farms had been built before the round (all with grant
support), but 43 have been built in Australia since the round without ARENA support.
ARENA undertook the round with complementary support from the CEFC. The CEFC provided debt
finance to eight of the 12 successful projects, and supported a further two projects that did not receive a
grant but were able to proceed regardless. In total, the CEFC committed $350 million in primarily senior
debt to these projects and acted as either the sole financier or as a co-financier.
CEFC’s support for the round demonstrated its effectiveness in enabling novel, high risk projects to
overcome barriers to finance. The projects the CEFC supported typically did not have an offtake
agreement with a tier one counterparty or were exposed to market risk (i.e. they had not secured a
power purchase agreement). In these instances, there was no market for debt, beyond the CEFC. In this
way, the CEFC’s involvement as a first or early mover assisted in de-risking solar technologies by signaling
that solar projects are 'bankable' and commercially ready in Australia.
51 Bakhtiari S (2016) Clean Technology, Regulation and Government Intervention: The Australian Experience, Department of Industry,
Innovation, and Science, and Bakhtiari S (2016) Business Dynamics of a Clean Energy Policy, Department of Industry, Innovation, and
Science
Box 10.3 – Co-benefits delivered by the Clean Technology Investment Program (CTIP)
The CTIP was a grants program established in 2012 to help manufacturers (including food manufacturers)
manage their energy costs. Around $315 million in grants were awarded to around 600 projects over this
period, with grants ranging from $25,000 to around $21 million.
The program helped businesses reduce energy costs and, as a result, carbon emissions, but it also
delivered valuable co-benefits for the firm and broader economy. An evaluation by the Office of the Chief
Economist51
found the CTIP helped firms not only to increase capital expenditure and maintain their
operation levels, but also to expand faster. Both employment and turnover among firms that received
CTIP grants grew about 25 per cent faster than similar firms without grants. For exporting firms, exports
grew about 50 per cent faster.
Firms that received CTIP grants were more likely to create full-time jobs compared to similar firms
without grants. Further, these effects were most pronounced among firms that experienced job losses
before the CTIP was introduced. With the help of CTIP, these firms started creating jobs and seeing their
turnover increase. In other words, CTIP helped turn around businesses that had been struggling.

89
10.3. High level design features
Scope, eligibility and institutional arrangements
The program should incentivise the integration of transformative low-emission technology into existing
facilities (retrofit) and incentivise investment in new low-emission technology facilities (new build). It should
be available to large-scale and smaller, dispersed projects, and cover both scope 1 and scope 2 emissions. It
could be open to non-Safeguard facilities or to Safeguard facilities that wish to upgrade a process within a
facility, rather than the whole facility.
The program should have broad sectoral coverage. However, its focus would be on the ‘hard-to-abate’
industry and transport sectors. In determining which agency is best placed to administer the program, the
Panel notes ARENA, the CEFC, and the Regulator all have complementary skills, knowledge and programs
highly relevant to the goals of the program. The Panel is firmly of the view the program will be most
effective if all agencies have the ability to contribute their expertise in delivering the program.
We suggest that looking to ARENA, as an existing institution with established processes
and solid base of intellectual property, to be a vehicle for a new funding stream directed
at the modernisation of heavy industry should be considered.
Energy Users Association of Australia.
Industrial abatement projects, particularly those of a more innovative nature, are not a
good fit for any one current policy or agency. For these large or innovative projects, a
‘one stop shop’ could be beneficial…
This program should be partnered with a broader, technology-neutral remit for ARENA and the CEFC, so
these institutions can provide support for low emissions technologies in any sector. These organisations are
currently constrained in their ability to support certain low-emission technologies. For instance, ARENA
cannot support energy efficiency unless there is a clear link with renewables, and neither organisation can
support carbon capture and storage. Meeting our long-term emissions reduction goals requires new
technologies to be adopted across all sectors, and there are no compelling reasons why these organisations
should be preventing from supporting any prospective low-emission technology. Noting that, if the
mandates of ARENA and the CEFC are broadened, these organisations would need to build their capacity
and expertise in non-energy related technologies.
The Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) has played an important role in
bridging funding gaps within the innovation chain for sustainable energy projects.
Emissions reduction projects have similar funding gaps, especially those projects
deploying innovative technologies to deliver abatement outcomes. … The Clean Energy
Finance Corporation provides an important role in catalysing funding for energy projects.
This role could be expanded to include emissions reduction projects, which would further
assist in the uptake and deployment of non-energy related carbon offsets projects.
Corporate Carbon

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Co-investment model
The program should be designed to ensure investments by the federal government leverage co-
contributions by the private sector, and facilitate collaboration and co-investment where possible, from
state and territory governments. State-based energy efficiency schemes have shown it is possible to use
well-designed financial incentives to transform the market for key technologies (e.g. through residential and
commercial lighting).
A co-investment model would increase the number and scale of projects undertaken (and therefore the
abatement achieved) and deliver the greatest value for money from taxpayer funding. It would also ensure
all parties have ‘skin in the game’, which would provide some assurance regarding the quality and delivery
of projects supported. The required level of private sector co-investment could vary depending on project
size.
The program should employ a model similar to the model used to drive the transformation of the large-scale
solar market (Box 10.2). This approach brought together complementary co-investments by the private
sector, ARENA and the CEFC, as well as their respective skills and knowledge of the market.
Risk sharing
Whilst it is a matter for government to determine their spending priorities, options could include examining
the apportionment of the CSF, ARENA, and CEFC funding to achieve the right balance in pursuit of Australia’s
climate change goals.
The Government’s co-investment would occur substantially upfront, aligned with when firms’ capital
expenses are incurred. While this would help firms overcome a range of investment barriers and CAPEX
hurdles, it may increase risk for the Government.
The Government (and public) will need some assurance projects funded by the program are technically and
commercially feasible, and the level of abatement delivered by funded projects will approximate that which
is forecast. There are a number of design mechanisms that could be considered during the detailed program
design to de-risk project failure / delivery incompletion, including:
 Detailed application criteria.
 Competitive screening and project selection process.
 Phased schedule of payments and verification of the abatement.
 Make good or similar cost / abatement recovery provision.
Transparency
The government should ensure the administration of, and distribution of public funds under, the proposed
program, CEFC, ARENA and other similar schemes is transparent. This is necessary to assist in the
dissemination of information on relevant technologies, to ensure markets are properly informed and to help
build confidence in and support for the Government’s policy framework. Transparency also promotes
accountability and helps ensure investment programs are appropriately administered.
The transparency of the Government’s climate and technology policies would be aided by the creation of a
single database that records funding decisions and provides information on the progress and outcomes of
program activities. The published information could include details of the funding recipients and
technologies, a statement of reasons for the investment support, progress reports on implementation, and
an account of project outcomes.

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Establish a goal-oriented technology co-investment program to accelerate the uptake of
transformative, high abatement potential technologies that are not currently cost competitive.
 The program would focus on the ‘hard-to-abate’ sectors, for example heavy industry,
freight transport and aviation, where capital costs are high and progress in driving down
costs has been slow.
 Safeguard and non-Safeguard covered projects would be eligible.
 The program would target novel and ambitious technologies with the potential to
transform key sectors.
 The program would involve co-investment by the Government and industry, with
Government funds provided substantially upfront.
 The program would be undertaken in collaboration, and with co-investment, from state and
territory governments where possible.
 The program’s design should provide assurance that funded projects are technically and
commercially feasible.
10.1
Provide ARENA and the CEFC with an expanded, technology-neutral remit so they can support
key technologies across all sectors and be involved in the delivery of the Goal-oriented co-
investment program (recommendation 10.1).
10.2
Establish a single database to publish funding decisions for low emissions technologies through
the co-investment program, CEFC, ARENA and similar schemes. The published information could
include details of the funding recipients and technologies, a statement of reasons for the
investment support, progress reports on implementation, and an account of project outcomes.
10.3

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Appendix A.
Overview of what the Panel has done
The Panel has circulated a discussion paper with a range of stakeholders across the industrial, transport,
energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, property and investor sectors, as well as expert scientific and
innovation organisations including the CSIRO and Clean Energy Finance Corporation. The discussion paper
was targeted at organisations with technical or commercial expertise in the sectors being examined.
The discussion paper sought feedback on five concepts: below-baseline crediting using the Safeguard
Mechanism; technology co-investment; energy efficiency and outreach; innovation and knowledge; and
streamlining the Safeguard Mechanism.
Written submissions were received from more than 50 peak organisations, firms, research organisations and
government agencies.
The Panel has also undertaken targeted conversations with a range of stakeholders, including peak
organisation, firms and environmental non-governmental organisations.

93
Appendix B.
Work underway by the CER to increase ACCU supply

94
Appendix C.
Emissions Reduction Fund methods
Facilities method
Energy efficiency methods
 Aggregated small energy users
 Commercial buildings
 Commercial and public lighting
 High efficiency commercial appliances
 Industrial electricity and fuel efficiency
 Refrigeration and ventilation fans
 Industrial equipment upgrade
Landfill and alternative waste treatment methods
 Landfill gas
 Alternative waste treatment
 Source-separated organic waste
 Wastewater treatment method
Mining, oil and gas methods
 Coal mine waste gas
 Oil and gas fugitives
Transport methods
 Aviation transport
 Land and sea transport
Agricultural methods
 Animal effluent management method
 Beef cattle herd management
 Destruction of methane generated from dairy manure in covered anaerobic ponds

95
 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by feeding dietary additives to milking cows
 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from fertiliser in irrigated cotton
 Measurement of soil carbon sequestration in agricultural systems
 Estimating sequestration of carbon in soil using default values (model-based soil carbon)
Savanna fire management methods
 Savanna fire management 2018—emissions avoidance
 Savanna fire management 2018—sequestration and emissions avoidance
Vegetation methods
 Human-Induced regeneration of a permanent even-aged native forest V1.1
 Avoided clearing of native regrowth
 Native forest from managed regrowth
 Plantation forestry
 Measurement based methods for new farm forestry plantations
 Avoided deforestation V1.1
 Reforestation and afforestation V2.0
 Reforestation by Environmental or Mallee Plantings – FullCAM
 Verified carbon standard project

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