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30. Reserve. The country was quite open with no cover at all, and
consisted of grass and stubble fields. The gently undulating ground
was particularly favourable to the Germans, who were past-masters
in the art of fighting rear-guard actions. At 5 A.M. the advance
began. The first bound was to the railway east of the village of
Quiévy, but no halt was made here, as it was found that the
advanced troops of the 1st Guards Brigade had pushed farther on
during the night. When the leading patrols reached the high ground
immediately east of Quiévy, they were met by heavy machine-gun
fire from the orchard north of Fontaine-au-terre Farm, and were
enfiladed by numerous machine-guns along the St. Vaast—Solesmes
road. The leading companies deployed here. The King's and No. 2
Companies, covered by their own fire, continued to advance by
rushes, and captured the orchard, from which the Germans hastily
retired. Captain Simpson halted No. 3 Company on the high ground
west of the farm, while south of the farm touch was gained with the
2nd Battalion Auckland Regiment from the New Zealand Division.
The machine-gun fire from the left flank, where the Scots Guards
were checked, continued to be very severe, and completely held up
No. 2 Company. Captain Spence decided to push forward with the
King's Company to try and outflank the enemy's posts, and sent
forward one platoon down the slope. Although this had the desired
effect, and the German infantry retired, they left their machine-guns,
which kept up a sweeping fire along the crest, and prevented the
Scots Guards from advancing. It was thought that, if a
demonstration was made straight towards them, it might perhaps
force them to retire, but when No. 2 Company attempted this the
German machine-guns never moved. Meanwhile the King's Company,
with that dogged determination which has characterised all its
movements during the war, drove away the Germans from the spur
of the hill south of Solesmes, and working round in the area
occupied by the New Zealand Division, pushed forward, and gained
the spur itself. The ground over which the King's Company passed,
consisted of a deep and broad valley quite devoid of cover, and the
slightest movement could be observed from the opposite slope,
where German field-guns and machine-guns were posted. The
31. Oct. 12.
manner in which Captain Spence directed his company and
surmounted all the difficulties, was specially mentioned by Lieut.-
Colonel Bailey, and this advance undoubtedly made a considerable
difference to the centre of the Guards Division. But the forward
position, which the King's Company had gained, was by no means
easy to retain, for the men were subjected to a heavy machine-gun
fire from the north, whilst the enemy's 5·9 guns registered on them.
These men remained unable to move a muscle until dark, when they
dug themselves in. No. 3 Company was moved up to an orchard in
close support, and, as there seemed no reasonable prospect of
success during daylight without heavy loss, it was not pushed up
into the attack. The German machine-guns were wonderfully well
placed, commanding the flat plateaus on the top of the ridges, with
no possibility of their being approached under cover, and our artillery
was unable to help, as it was practically impossible to locate these
machine-gun nests. The men were anxious to push on, and had to
be restrained. All this time the shelling was heavy but promiscuous,
and several men were hit by fragments. Captain Simpson, Second
Lieutenant Clarke, and Second Lieutenant Osborne were wounded in
this way, but the Battalion was really very fortunate in not having
suffered more than it did. Although patrols were sent out during the
night, they were unable to get very far on account of the enemy's
machine-guns, which had evidently been pushed forward to hinder
reconnaissance.
The next morning it was found that the Germans
had retired, and that the machine-guns had all been
withdrawn, the emplacements being full of empty
cartridge cases. Except for some shelling the morning proved
uneventful, and in the afternoon the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and
1st Battalion Welsh Guards were ordered to attack on the left. Two
platoons from No. 2 Company of the 1st Battalion were ordered to
co-operate with them and guard their right flank. The advance was
successfully carried out with little opposition, although the German
artillery put down a heavy barrage on the west line. The company
runners in this fight behaved with great gallantry, and throughout
32. the day carried their lives in their hands, continually running great
risks. Posts were ordered to be pushed down to the railway, and
small reconnoitring patrols were sent out as soon as it was dark.
Except at the commencement of the operations the Battalion saw
few Germans, and the men realised they were fighting a very
cleverly hidden enemy. Each machine-gun nest had to be located,
and shot out in turn. During that night the King's Company was
relieved by No. 4, and No. 3 by No. 2. Lieutenant Challands, who
took over command of No. 3 Company, was knocked out temporarily
by the bursting of a shell during the relief. The Battalion was the
only one in the Division to reach its objective, and this was entirely
due to the dash displayed by both officers and men in this entirely
new form of open warfare.
The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards
advanced up to the same line, held by the 1st Battalion Grenadiers.
The rest of the day was very trying for all troops in the forward area
on account of the continual shelling, as the Germans had excellent
observation, and were very accurate in their shooting. The line from
Solesmes to St. Python was very strongly held, and the two posts on
the right held by the Battalion were in dangerous proximity to the
enemy. One of these was rushed by a party of eighty Germans under
cover of an intense Minenwerfer barrage, and only one man
escaped. In the evening the Battalion was relieved by the 2nd
Battalion Coldstream Guards, and marched by companies to Quiévy.
The casualties during the three days' operations were 3 officers
wounded, and of other ranks 11 were killed, 3 died of wounds, 45
wounded and 17 missing.
The next day Major Bailey received the following message from
Brigadier-General C. P. Heywood, Commanding the 3rd Guards
Brigade:
I should like to put on record my appreciation of the good work done by
you and your Battalion during the past three days. I was particularly
impressed with the initiative and determined action of the King's Company in
pushing forward on the afternoon of the 11th to the advanced position in D
12 central.
33. On the 15th Major-General T. G. Matheson, Commanding the
Guards Division, addressed the following message to Brigadier-
General Heywood:
I wish to congratulate the Brigadier and all ranks of the 3rd Guards Brigade
on the manner in which they carried out the task assigned to them from
October 11th to 14th.
The advance of the 1st Batt. Grenadier Guards towards Solesmes and of
the 2nd Batt. Scots Guards to St. Python were carried out with very much
gallantry and produced very valuable results in securing us command of the
crossings of the River Selle. The hard fighting of the 1st Batt. Welsh Guards
on the left flank contributed largely to the success of the other two Battalions.
I am much pleased with the performance of the Brigade and should like my
appreciation to be conveyed to all ranks.
Two days, the 14th and 15th, were spent at Quiévy cleaning up
and reorganising, but on the evening of the second day the enemy
bombarded the billeting area with 8-inch shells, when two men were
killed and nine were wounded. On the 17th the Battalion marched to
Carmières, where Major Bailey attended a Brigade conference. On
the 19th the Battalion marched by companies with intervals of 200
yards to St. Vaast, and sheltered in houses and cellars until 10.15
P.M., when they moved up to the assembly area, directed by guides
from the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards.
List of Officers who took Part in the Operations October 20-22
Major the Hon. W. R. Bailey, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
2nd Lieut. J. C. Blunt Acting Adjutant.
Lieut. R. F. W. Echlin Transport Officer.
Lieut. R. G. Buchanan Act.-Quartermaster.
Capt. P. M. Spence, M.C. King's Company.
Lieut. A. M. Brown " "
2nd Lieut. L. E. G. Wall " "
Lieut. C. G. Kennaway No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. B. Osborne " "
2nd Lieut. M. G. Farquharson " "
34. Oct. 20.
Capt. J. H. C. Simpson No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. G. S. Lamont " "
2nd Lieut. L. F. A. d'Erlanger " "
2nd Lieut. N. P. Andrews " "
Lieut. A. E. D. Bliss No. 4 Company.
Lieut. R. S. Challands " "
2nd Lieut. C. B. Hall " "
Capt. W. Lindsay, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. C. Venables Chaplain.
The night was dark and it was pouring with rain, when the
Battalion formed up along the line of railway between Haussy and
St. Vaast. It is impossible adequately to describe the absolute
wretchedness of forming up on a pitch-dark night in pouring rain. An
operation seemed hopeless, and was only possible by giving careful
instructions to every single man in the Battalion. Plenty of time was
allowed to prepare for this fight, but the Battalion was only just
ready when the time came to advance. No. 4 Company, under
Lieutenant Bliss, was on the left; No. 3 Company, under Lieutenant
Challands, in the centre; and No. 2 Company, under Lieutenant
Kennaway, on the right. Touch was obtained with the 8th Battalion
Gloucester Regiment in the Nineteenth Division on the left, and with
the Irish Guards on the right. The Royal Engineeers had arranged to
lay tapes from the railway to the eight temporary bridges, which
they had put over the River Selle, but these tapes were not laid until
shortly before zero hour, and one tape did not lead to a bridge, with
the result that the platoon which followed it had to wade across the
river.
From the very start everything went well, and the
barrage moved with perfect precision. Chasing the
Germans in the dark in this way was not without
excitement, as no one knew whether they would remain and fight,
or retire as soon as they were threatened. It was a great relief to
Major Bailey to find that the enemy had no intention of disputing the
crossing of the river, as this would have entailed the loss of a
number of men at the start. As it was, the Battalion proceeded in
35. Oct. 21.
Oct. 22.
artillery formation as far as the Haussy—Solesmes road, passing
over five or six lines of rifle-pits wonderfully well made in concrete.
When the creeping barrage began to move forward, the Battalion
moved with it, but there was little or no opposition, and the
objective was gained according to scheduled time. The few prisoners
that were captured said that the garrisons of their posts had fled as
soon as the barrage began. Direction was admirably kept, and the
men advanced close up to the barrage, in spite of the heavy plough
on the side of the hill on which they had to advance. The 2nd
Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards then came
through, and continued the advance. In the evening the German
artillery put down a very heavy barrage on the railway, shifting it
later to the road, and then covering the objective and the reverse
slope of the hill, but in spite of the shelling the casualties were not
heavy.
The shelling continued all the next day, but the
3rd Guards Brigade was not required. In the
evening the Battalion took over the whole Brigade
front from the Scots Guards and Welsh Guards; the King's and No. 3
Companies were placed in the outpost line; and Nos. 2 and 4
Companies took over the main line of resistance on the high ground
east of the Solesmes—Vendegies road.
The line of the Solesmes road was shelled all day,
but the Battalion was very lucky, although No. 4
Company was rather seriously gassed. Lieutenant E.
A. D. Bliss and Second Lieutenant C. B. Hall and ten men were all
gassed. In the evening the Highland Light Infantry relieved the
Battalion, which marched back to billets in St. Vaast. These
operations on the whole had been easy, as the Germans had put up
very little resistance, but the rain and mud had made everything
very miserable, and the men were soaked to the skin before the
attack commenced.
In all the villages round about civilians emerged from cellars,
having hidden there for five days in order to avoid being evacuated
36. by the Germans. Among the German prisoners, who had been
captured during the advance, were several regimental commanders
of the true Prussian type, with florid faces and bristling moustaches.
They presented a sorry spectacle in the cages, and seemed to feel
their position acutely.
37. Langfier Ltd photographers Emery Walker ph. sc.
Brigadier-General Lord Henry Seymour, D.S.O.
On the 23rd the following special order was issued:
38. 2nd Batt.
The Commanding Officer congratulates all ranks on the way in which the
attack of the 20th was carried out. The difficulties of a night attack are always
great, but in this case they were almost entirely eliminated by the obvious
care with which the officers and N.C.O.'s had made their preparations and
explained the scheme of attack to their men. No one lost direction, and the
orders given out beforehand were carried out almost to the letter.
The conditions have been very bad, but as always you have made the best
of things and have kept up the Grenadier tradition of invariable cheerfulness
under hardships. You are now out for a short time to reorganise and refit. In a
day's time the Battalion will be as keen and smart as it was before, and I am
confident that that spirit which has carried you through this attack so well will
be as good and keen in any other operation which you may be called upon to
perform in future.
I congratulate all ranks, and I sympathise with you for not having found
more Germans to kill, which would have made up in some small degree for all
the worry and anxiety of the preliminary preparations.
(Signed) W. R. Bailey, Lt.-Col.
Commanding 1st Batt. Gren. Gds.
While the Second Division continued the attack, the 3rd Guards
Brigade remained in billets in St. Vaast. On the 25th Lieutenant H.
Freeman-Greene and Lieutenant W. A. Pembroke joined the
Battalion.
The 2nd Battalion
After the operations at the end of September the
Battalion bivouacked close to the village of
Demicourt for ten days' training. Meanwhile Lieut.-
Colonel Rasch, having been appointed to command the 1st
Provisional Battalion at Aldershot, left for England, and Major C. F. A.
Walker, M.C., took over the 2nd Battalion.
The following officers took part in the fighting on October 9:
Major C. F. A. Walker, M.C. Commanding Officer.
Capt. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. Adjutant.
Lieut. W. H. S. Dent. Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. L. Holbech, M.C. No. 1 Company.
39. Oct. 9.
Lieut. C. L. F. Boughey " "
2nd Lieut. E. M. Neill " "
Capt. G. B. Wilson No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. D. L. King " "
2nd Lieut. C. J. N. Adams " "
Capt. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. K. B. Bibby " "
2nd Lieut. E. G. Harcourt-Vernon " "
Lieut. R. H. R. Palmer No. 4 Company.
Lieut. C. C. Cubitt " "
2nd Lieut. B. R. Osborne " "
Lieut. E. L. Coffin Medical Officer.
During the night of the 7th the Battalion moved into some
trenches near Marcoing, and next morning it crossed the St. Quentin
Canal at Masnières. The canal was being shelled at the time, but the
Battalion escaped without any casualties. Orders were now received
for the Battalion to take part in an attack, the first objective being
the La Targette—Forenville road, and the second the railway running
north-east of Wambaix. In view of the possibility of the enemy being
forced to retire, the instructions were that the leading companies
were to push on in the general direction of Cattenières.
Zero was 6 o'clock on the morning of October 9,
and the assembly area for the 1st Guards Brigade
was on the line of old German trenches, south-west
of Seranvillers. Taking up its position on the left of the line, the
Battalion had the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on its right, with
the 1st Battalion Irish Guards in reserve. In conjunction with this
force, the 2nd Guards Brigade was to advance on the left and the
New Zealand Division on the right, and the boundary between the
two leading battalions was the main road through Seranvillers and
Wambaix.
It had been arranged for the barrage to descend on the first
objective, and so the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion
Coldstream were able to start moving slowly forward ten minutes
40. before zero hour. No. 3 Company of the Battalion, under Captain
Cornforth, was on the right and No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant
Palmer, on the left, while No. 2 Company, under Captain Wilson, was
in support, and No. 1 Company, under Lieutenant Holbech, in
reserve. The foremost companies advanced in waves, and the
supports and reserves in artillery formation, preceded by strong
patrols, Captain Wilson's company being responsible for clearing the
village of Seranvillers. Two howitzers, a field-gun, several machine-
guns, and a few prisoners were captured without any real
opposition, and the Battalion pushed on very rapidly to within a
short distance of Cattenières, where the patrols were sent ahead
through the village.
But as soon as they emerged from Cattenières, and came on to
the ridge to the north they were held up by heavy machine-gun fire
from the wood surrounding the factory at Ignies-le-Petit. There was
a considerable stretch of open ground in front of the wood, and
progress became very difficult. Lieutenant Palmer, commanding No.
4 Company, ordered Second Lieutenant Osborne to try and advance
with his platoon on the left in order to enfilade the enemy in the
south-east corner of the wood. A certain amount of ground was
gained by sectional rushes under extremely heavy machine-gun fire,
but the complete lack of "dead" ground made real success
impossible, and Major Walker decided to postpone any farther move
until it could be made under cover of darkness.
A wonderfully gallant piece of work during this part of the fighting
was done by No. 16796 Private Edgar Holmes, and won for him the
Victoria Cross, which unfortunately he did not live to receive. He was
acting as a stretcher-bearer, and calmly and fearlessly went on with
his errands of mercy to the wounded under a withering machine-gun
fire. He succeeded in getting two men in, and, quite regardless of
the intense fire at close range, was attending to a third when he was
himself hit in the stomach. He did not falter for a moment, and,
paying no attention to his own wound, went forward once more to
rescue yet another of the fallen. He had covered thirty yards in the
direction of the enemy when he was hit again, this time fatally.
41. At 1 A.M. on October 10 Major Walker brought up the support and
reserve companies, and directed them to attack the wood and
factory at Ignies-le-Petit. They rushed the factory, encountering little
resistance, and then took up a line and dug in on the farther edge of
the wood, beyond the main road. The whole advance was a
complete success, and the casualties of the Battalion were only one
man killed and 12 wounded. Four hours after the attack began, the
1st Battalion Irish Guards passed through the Battalion, and went in
pursuit of the retreating Germans.
For the week that followed the Battalion was in Brigade Reserve,
and moved slowly forward through Fresnoy Farm, Bévillers, Quiévy,
Boussières to St. Hilaire, when it prepared for the forthcoming
attack.
In the operations on the 20th the officers engaged were:
Major C. F. A. Walker, M.C. Commanding Officer.
Lieut. S. T. S. Clarke, M.C. Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. A. F. Alington Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. L. Holbech, M.C. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. C. L. F. Boughey " "
2nd Lieut. E. M. Neill " "
Capt. G. B. Wilson No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. D. L. King " "
2nd Lieut. C. J. N. Adams " "
Capt. L. St. L. Hermon-Hodge No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. K. B. Bibby " "
2nd Lieut. E. G. Harcourt-Vernon " "
Lieut. H. B. G. Morgan, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. C. C. Cubitt " "
2nd Lieut. B. R. Osborne " "
Lieut. E. L. Coffin Medical Officer.
This attack was only part of a very extensive movement on the
whole of the Third Army front. The Sixty-first Division was ordered to
advance on the right of the Guards Division, and the Nineteenth
Division, under Major-General Jefferies, on the left. Acting as the
42. Oct. 19.
Oct. 20.
leading battalion on the right of the Guards Division, the 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards had the Valenciennes—Solesmes road as
its first objective, and, for its second, a line about a quarter of a mile
west of the villages of Vertain and Romeries. The capture of
Solesmes, which was known to be full of civilians, and strongly held
by the enemy, was entrusted to the Sixty-first Division, while the
Guards Division was to push right on to its final objective. This gave
the Battalion the delicate and dangerous task of advancing the
whole way with an exposed flank. Two other features added to the
difficulty of the manœuvre. The long distance to the final objective
had to be traversed under cover of darkness, and before it could
reach the outskirts of Solesmes, known as St. Python, the Battalion
had to cross the River Selle.
Leaving St. Hilaire at 9.30 P.M. on the 19th inst.,
the Battalion followed the 1st Battalion Irish Guards
until it reached its assembly position, which was the
railway running from Haussy to Solesmes. No. 1 Company under
Lieutenant Holbech was on the right, No. 2 Company on the left
under Captain Wilson, No. 3 under Captain Hermon-Hodge in
support, and No. 4 under Lieutenant Morgan in reserve. A drizzling
rain fell incessantly, and though the moon was full it was a very dark
night.
At zero hour, 2 A.M., under a heavy and very
effective barrage, the Battalion advanced to the
river in artillery formation, guided by tapes. Very
indifferent bridges had been erected by the Royal Engineers and the
Pioneer Battalion of the Coldstream Guards, and it was no easy
matter getting all the men across in single file on two extremely
narrow planks. However, there were very few casualties, and the
leading companies deployed into waves, and went forward, followed
by the supports and reserves in artillery formation. Very soon after
the start No. 1 Company got to St. Python, but as it was entering it
came under heavy machine-gun fire from the houses. Some useful
bombing work was carried out at this juncture, especially by No. 1
platoon, led by Corporal Hunter. As the barrage was moving forward,
43. Lieutenant Holbech decided to leave one platoon to complete the
capture of St. Python, supported by No. 3 Company, while the rest
of the leading companies went on to their first objective, which they
reached almost to schedule time. About 50 prisoners and several
machine-guns were captured in this stage of the attack.
There was an hour's halt at this point, in the course of which the
remaining platoon of No. 1 Company joined up with the leading
troops. It had been uphill work all the way, with a good deal of wire
to get through, and it had been found necessary to constitute No. 3
Company a defensive flank. Just before another move was due, a
party of the enemy was seen on the right rear of the Battalion, firing
lights towards Solesmes. One platoon under Lieutenant Holbech
wheeled about, and charged it from the rear, "getting home" with
the bayonet and capturing several machine-guns.
The final objective was reached soon after 4 o'clock. But the
Germans were inclined to hold on to their positions, and all the way
the two leading companies met with resistance. This was partly
owing to machine-gun fire from the right flank, as up to this time
Solesmes had not yet been cleared by the Sixty-first Division. On the
line of the final objective No. 1 Company took a field-gun with its
garrison of one officer and 25 men—which brought the total
captures of the Battalion in the attack up to 200 prisoners, two field-
guns, and a large number of machine-guns and trench mortars.
By daylight the leading companies had consolidated their line of
outposts, and in order to protect the right rear of the Battalion, No.
3 Company dug in in échelon to the right flank, with No. 4 Company
in rear of it. About 9 A.M. the Sixty-first Division continued its
advance from Solesmes, and came up into line with the Battalion.
Soon after dawn heavy enemy machine-gun fire had been brought
to bear upon the leading companies, and continued for several
hours, while the German artillery, which up to this time had taken
little part in the operations, began to assert itself, and shells of every
sort fell round the battalion. Lieutenant E. M. Neill, who had been
conspicuous for his work and bravery during the advance, was
44. 3rd Batt.
wounded by shell-fire, and the total casualties were one officer and
52 other ranks. On the evening of the 22nd the Battalion was
relieved by the 24th Royal Fusiliers, and marched back to St. Vaast,
where it "embussed" for Carnières. There it remained until the end
of the month, when it moved on to St. Hilaire, proceeding the
following day to Capelle.
The 3rd Battalion
In the first week in October the Battalion
remained at Doignies, where during a practice
attack a barrage from a smoke rifle grenade was
tried, and on the 8th moved to Premy Chapel. An attack was being
made by the Sixty-second Division, and the Battalion, which was not
called upon, moved on later to Masnières. Cambrai could be seen in
the distance burning fiercely throughout the night.
On the 9th the orders were not received until the Battalion was in
its assembly position.
The following officers took part in these operations:
Lieut.-Colonel the Viscount Lascelles, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. E. G. A. Fitzgerald, D.S.O. Adjutant.
Lieut. R. C. G. de Reuter Intelligence Officer.
Capt. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. K. A. Campbell, D.S.O. " "
2nd Lieut. G. R. Gunther, M.C. " "
Capt. A. H. S. Adair, M.C. No. 2 Company.
Lieut. S. G. Fairbairn, M.C. " "
Lieut. C. B. Hollins " "
Lieut. F. Anson, M.C. No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. H. J. Gibbon, M.C. " "
Capt. E. J. Bunbury, M.C. No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. A. E. F. F. Strangways-Rogers " "
2nd Lieut. H. I'B. Smith " "
2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon " "
45. Oct. 9.
Capt. J. H. Graff, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore, M.C. Chaplain.
In the early part of the attack one of our guns
appears to have been badly laid, with the result that
it continued to shoot short, causing several casualties among the
leading companies of the Battalion. This was particularly irritating,
since only a short time before these companies had been mistaken
for the enemy, and had been fired at by one of our own aeroplanes.
The first objective was taken by 6.30, and no Germans were
encountered, the only casualties being caused by our barrage.
The Battalion started off with No. 1 Company under Captain Fryer
on the right, No. 2 under Captain Adair on the left, No. 3 under
Lieutenant Anson in support, and No. 4 under Captain Bunbury in
reserve. As there seemed every possibility of the Germans retiring
rapidly, the scheme of attack was ambitious, with a large extent of
ground to be covered. The first objective was a trench running from
Niergnies to Seranvillers; the second objective the road running from
Cambrai to La Targette; and after that there were four "bounds,"
ending up with the Cambrai—Beauvois road. There was no sign of
the enemy, not even any hostile shelling at first, and no difficulty
was experienced in securing the objectives. In the second bound,
Wambaix Copse, which might possibly have been held by the enemy,
was also taken without opposition. At 10.30 the capture of
Estourmel was effected, and still the enemy had shown no sign of
fighting. Lord Lascelles decided that the dinners should be eaten
now, and as the 1st Guards Brigade had not come up there was
plenty of time for the men to dine before resuming the advance. It
was not until the Battalion reached the Cambrai—Beauvois road and
Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes that the enemy's resistance stiffened, and it
suffered casualties. Captain Adair with No. 2 Company occupied
Igniel, but reported that casualties were occurring from machine-gun
fire on his right, and from the enemy's heavy guns at long range.
This village was in a clump of trees on the crest of a hill on the
farther side of the Cambrai—Beauvois road, and was approached by
a sunken road, on each side of which the ground rose in a gentle
46. Oct. 10.
slope, and formed an ideal position for machine-guns. Captain Adair
advanced up the sunken road, and as soon as his company
appeared on the hill it was subjected to a harassing machine-gun
fire. He at first ordered his men to dig themselves in, but later he
decided to move up into Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes. When No. 2
Company moved into the trees and buildings, it was so heavily
shelled that Lord Lascelles, who had come up to see how the
situation was developing, told him his men would be safer out in the
open. There seems little doubt that the German ammunition was
already deteriorating, for when their shells burst the pieces did not
scatter so well as before. But for this the casualties would certainly
have been very heavy, and in all probability it would have been
found necessary to retire from the hill altogether. At 4.30 P.M. Lord
Lascelles received instructions to support a cavalry patrol of the
Oxfordshire Hussars, which had been sent out through the 1st
Battalion Coldstream on the left. He was surprised at this message,
for he knew that no cavalry patrol could possibly go out in the face
of this machine-gun fire, and when the officer commanding the
patrol appeared at the Battalion Headquarters to say that it had
been unable to go forward at all, he was able to disregard the order,
and send in a report asking for confirmation of his action. In the
evening orders were received to establish an outpost line with two
companies over the Cambrai—Beauvois road, with two companies in
support near Estourmel. That night a warning order was received for
a farther advance the next morning, and the Battalion Headquarters
moved up to Grand Chanfemel.
The next morning the 1st Battalion Scots Guards
passed through the outpost line, and continued the
advance by bounds, while the Battalion moved
forward in support. No. 3 Company on the right, under Lieutenant
Anson, and No. 4, under Captain Bunbury, formed the support, with
the other two companies in reserve. In the afternoon the Scots
Guards were held up west of St. Hilaire, and were ordered to
establish an outpost line for the night. Nos. 3 and 4 Companies were
placed under the orders of the Officer Commanding the 1st Battalion
47. Scots Guards, while two companies of the 1st Battalion Coldstream
were sent up to take their place.
On the 11th the 1st Guards Brigade passed through the outpost
line, and continued the advance, while the Battalion went into very
comfortable billets in St. Hilaire, where the German baths were used.
On the 13th the 2nd Guards Brigade passed through with the 3rd
Battalion Grenadiers on the right, the 1st Battalion Coldstream on
the left, and the 1st Battalion Scots Guards in reserve. These
Battalions were ordered to be at immediate notice to move in case
the 3rd Guards Brigade, which was crossing the Selle River, should
require assistance, but the warning orders were later cancelled; and
that night the Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards in
the front line along the Selle River. Second Lieutenant Gunther with
a patrol of eight men crossed the river, and surprised a German
whom he gagged and brought back. He reported that the enemy
seemed in a sleepy and disorganised state, and Lord Lascelles
accordingly asked for permission to push a company across the river
that night, but was told instead to establish a bridgehead on the
following night north of St. Python.
The erection of a bridgehead so near to so many houses was a
matter of some difficulty, since it was obvious that the crossing could
not be held if the enemy occupied houses within 300 yards of it.
Lord Lascelles therefore ordered Lieutenant H. I'B. Smith to occupy
the nearest house to the bridgehead and Lieutenant F. Donnison to
search the four or five houses near it and make sure they were
empty. Second Lieutenant Smith had no difficulty in occupying the
house, but found that the walls on the enemy's side were so full of
large holes that the house was untenable. Lieutenant Donnison
moved forward to reconnoitre but ran into the Germans in some
force in the streets beyond, and was forced by machine-gun fire and
bombs to fall back on Lieutenant Smith's party, leaving behind two
men who were too badly wounded to move.
The alternatives open to Lord Lascelles were first, to hold the
bridge with trenches dug practically on it, but this was dismissed as
48. being strategically unsound; secondly, to dig trenches beyond the
bridge, which was difficult, because the men would have to be on
the top of the river bank, and overlooked by the houses 300 yards
away; thirdly, to occupy one house and strongly fortify it. This
seemed at first to be the best solution of the difficulty, but when
Second Lieutenant Smith and Second Lieutenant Donnison, who had
behaved with great gallantry and coolness, reported that it was
impossible to hold the nearest house, and that all the neighbouring
houses would have to be cleared of the enemy, Lord Lascelles came
to the conclusion that this would involve him in endless operations in
the town. He therefore decided to have the bridgehead dug in on
the banks of the river.
Captain Bunbury, who commanded No. 4 Company, from which
the two platoons had been sent to secure the houses on the farther
side of the river, was placed in a difficult position. He brought up the
remainder of his company, and held a quarter of the village of St.
Python, the houses on the other side of the stream being held
entirely by the Germans. It was impossible to get to him in daylight,
and by night all the streets were swept with machine-gun fire. He
handled his men under circumstances of exceptional difficulty with
some skill during the days he was there. Throughout these
operations some five hundred civilians lived in the cellars and
performed many acts of kindness to the men of the Battalion who
visited them. It was impossible for them to move out of their retreat
without being shot at. One little girl, eleven years old, quite
unconscious of the danger she ran, walked out in the streets in
broad daylight, and was brutally shot by a German; at great risk one
of the men of the Battalion went out and carried her back, but she
died.
49. Operations
October 20th, 1918
Emery Walker Ltd.
This was the beginning of the period when the Germans seemed
to spare all the buildings, and to concentrate their fire chiefly on the
50. exits from villages.
On the 16th the enemy was reported to be massing men on the
St. Python—Haussy road, and our artillery shelled the area indicated
for two hours, but no counter-attack developed. The following day
the Battalion was relieved, and went into billets at St. Vaast. On the
20th the 1st and 3rd Guards Brigades attacked, and captured the
high ground east of Solesmes and St. Python, but the 2nd Guards
Brigade was not wanted. On the 22nd the whole of the Guards
Division was taken out of the line for a week's rest.
52. Nov. 1918.
The Guards
Division.
CHAPTER XXXV
NOVEMBER
Diary of the War
The Versailles Conference opened. A mutiny
among the German sailors at Kiel broke out, and
had far-reaching effects. In France the Allied Armies
continued to press forward, and the German retreat became more
rapid. In reply to overtures made by the Germans, the Allies replied
that if Germany wished for an armistice she must apply to General
Foch, in the usual military form, for the conditions under which an
armistice would be granted. On the 8th the German Envoys were
received by General Foch, and were given the conditions drawn up
by the Allies. A revolution broke out in Berlin, and the abdication of
the Kaiser was announced. On the 11th the Armistice was signed.
At the beginning of November Austria surrendered
unconditionally.
The Guards Division
The advance in November, culminating in the
capture of Maubeuge, was so rapid, the extent of
ground covered in so short a time so great, and the
number of prisoners and guns taken so large, that there was little
doubt that an Armistice on any conditions was the only thing that
could save the German army from absolute disaster.
The Guards Division moved up on the 2nd from Escarmain
towards Villers Pol. The objectives or bounds were no longer
measured in yards but in miles, and the ambitious programme
produced by the Divisional Staff would have been considered beyond
the bounds of possibility, even six months before.
53. It was known that the Germans must now stand and fight, if they
were to gain time for the withdrawal of their armies elsewhere, and
a final attack was ordered for November 4 in order to break through
their resistance, and complete the victory of the Allied Armies.
Preparations for the attack were somewhat disorganised by a partial
withdrawal of the enemy during the afternoon of the 3rd.
General Sergison-Brooke and General de Crespigny felt their way
forward, and Villers Pol was occupied during the night, but it was
impossible to notify the artillery of the exact position of the leading
companies by the time the attacks started on the 4th, and in order
to allow a margin of safety the barrage had to start some way east
of the village, with the result that some of our troops never caught
it. Up to mid-day the Germans fought very stubbornly, but they were
everywhere driven back, and by the evening Preux-au-Sart was in
our hands, an advance of nearly four miles. So fierce had been the
fighting that the losses on both sides were exceptionally heavy, the
Germans in particular leaving a large number of dead upon the
ground.
During the two following days Heywood's Brigade drove back the
enemy's rear-guards another five miles, and patrols of the 1st
Battalion Welsh Guards entered Bavai, an important town, and the
junction of no less than eleven roads. Bavai was not on the front
allotted to the Guards Division, but during the whole of this advance
the line on the left of the Division was very much thrown back,
which caused great inconvenience, since it enabled the enemy to
enfilade the troops from the north, for the Germans were now
prodigal in the expenditure of shells, which they knew they could
never carry away with them. The troops billeted in villages in rear
suffered considerably, and as the left flank of the Division was
thrown back the back areas were all within easy range from the
north. In particular the village of Amfroipret was heavily punished,
and General Heywood was severely wounded by a shell, which
exploded in his headquarters just west of that village. Once more
the 3rd Guards Brigade was without a commander. Brigadier-General
Campbell, V.C., was sent for to take command, and in the meantime
54. the Brigade was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling, Scots
Guards.
On the 7th Sergison-Brooke's Brigade, passing through the 3rd
Guards Brigade, continued to drive the enemy back, but the
following day the advance was checked owing to enfilade fire from
the north. That afternoon a German orderly carrying an important
message was captured. The message was at once sent by special
despatch rider to Divisional Headquarters, and on being translated
proved to be an urgent order to the rear-guard commander, telling
him to hold on to his present position at all costs, and cover the
withdrawal of the main body to a line east of Maubeuge. The
resistance of the rear-guard, the message added, must be such as to
gain time for the consolidation of this new line and thus save the
rest of the army. General Matheson at once ordered General
Sergison-Brooke to push forward his reserve Battalion (the 3rd
Battalion Grenadiers) directly it was dark, with instructions to force
its way through the enemy's rear-guard and straight on down the
road to Maubeuge.
The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers moved forward at 10 P.M., and
reached the citadel of Maubeuge at 2 A.M., but it was just too late to
cut off the enemy's rear-guard. De Crespigny's Brigade was ordered
to consolidate a line on the high ground east of the city; this was
many miles east of any point reached by the remainder of the British
Army. With the capture of Maubeuge the advance of the Guards
Division ended, and at 11 A.M. on the 11th the Armistice was
signed.
The final rapid advance had been made under circumstances of
exceptional difficulty, since the systematic destruction of the railways
by the Germans had necessitated the supply of ammunition and
rations being brought up by road. The country was closely
intersected by streams, and as all road bridges were destroyed, it
was necessary to erect temporary bridges with deviations through
the fields leading to them, while the original bridges were being
repaired. Constant rain and the continuous stream of transport soon
55. 1st Batt.
turned these deviations into a quagmire, through which the horses,
often up to their bellies in mud, had to pull their heavy load: only
the persistent determination of the transport officers and men to get
through at all hazards, and the fine condition of the horses made the
task of supplying the troops possible.
Even then these efforts would have been of no avail, but for the
work of the Royal Engineers in repairing the innumerable bridges to
carry lorry traffic: day and night, without rest and with scarcely time
for food, they worked, and never failed to do what was asked of
them.
But the finest part of the advance, without which victory could not
have been enforced in 1918, was the dash and courage of the
infantry in face of the insidious knowledge that peace was within
sight. Every officer and man who went into those attacks in
November knew that it might be the last engagement of the war,
and that if he avoided unnecessary risk he would probably get
through safely; if he took it, he might be throwing away his life on
the last day of the war. That knowledge had not the smallest effect
upon the conduct of the troops, and the attack on November 4 was
carried out with a dash and reckless courage that had never been
surpassed in the war.
The result cannot be over-estimated: instead of a half-hearted
Armistice with the Germans still under the impression they were, as
far as the army was concerned, virtually the victors, the last attacks
had shown them that it was merely a matter of estimating how far
their defeat had been completed, and had made them understand
that their safest course lay in bringing about an Armistice as speedily
as possible, to save the reputation of their army.
The 1st Battalion
After ten days' rest spent in billets at St. Vaast
the Battalion went in pursuit of the retreating
Germans, and marched to Escarmain, which was
being shelled by the enemy. On the 4th the 1st and 2nd Guards
56. Nov. 5.
Brigades attacked, while the 3rd Guards Brigade was in Divisional
Reserve. The Battalion moved by companies at 200-yards intervals
to Mortre Farm, where it bivouacked in the orchard, moving on again
in the afternoon to Villers Pol. Here orders were received that the
Battalion was to go through the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards and
to continue the advance.
List of Officers who took part in the Operations from November 4 to 7
Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. W. R. Bailey, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Major C. H. Greville, D.S.O. Second in Command.
Lieut. J. A. Lloyd Acting Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. J. C. Blunt Intelligence Officer.
Capt. J. Teece, M.C. Quartermaster.
Capt. P. M. Spence, M.C. King's Company.
Lieut. R. G. Buchanan " "
2nd Lieut. A. D. Anderson " "
Lieut. C. G. Kennaway No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. M. G. Farquharson " "
2nd Lieut. G. S. Lamont, D.S.O. " "
Lieut. R. S. Challands No. 3 Company.
Lieut. W. A. Pembroke " "
2nd Lieut. N. P. Andrews " "
Lieut. H. Freeman-Greene No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. L. F. A. d'Erlanger " "
2nd Lieut. C. A. Fitch " "
Capt. W. Lindsay, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. C. Venables Chaplain.
At 2.15 A.M. the Battalion moved out from Villers
Pol with intervals of thirty yards between platoons,
and marched to La Buvette cross-roads, where a halt was made, and
the Lewis guns were taken off the limbers. Directed by two guides
from the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, the Battalion made its way
across country to a bridge, where a long halt was made to find the
Headquarters of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers—no easy matter in the
dark. The Battalion eventually managed to get into position close
57. behind the front line posts. No. 2 Company, under Lieutenant
Kennaway, was on the right and in touch with the 2/20th London
Regiment from the Sixty-second Division; No. 3 Company, under
Lieutenant Challands, on the left in touch with the 2nd Battalion
Scots Guards; No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant Freeman-Greene,
was in support; and the King's Company, under Captain Spence, was
in reserve.
At 6 A.M. the advance began. Rain fell and continued
intermittently during the three days' operations. The advance was
much hampered, especially in the initial stages, by a creeping
barrage put down by the Sixty-second Division, without any warning
having been given to the Battalion. The going was very heavy, and
the very enclosed country, intersected by thick hedges and wire
fences, made it difficult for the companies to keep their directions.
Little opposition was encountered, until the leading platoons reached
Amfroipret, when one German officer and five men were taken
prisoners in the village. Immediately east of the village and in the
wooded country south of the railway, the Battalion began to
encounter the enemy's rear-guard, but after driving it in some way
the advance came to a standstill about the line of the road from
Bout la Haut to Cambron Farm. The extraordinary difficulty of
locating a hidden enemy in such an enclosed country made the
advance hazardous, and the Germans appeared to be holding very
strongly with machine-guns a line some five hundred yards east of
this road. Lieutenant Kennaway, with No. 2 Company, attempted to
secure the cross-roads in front of him, and failed to make any
headway against the enemy's machine-guns. During this gallant
attempt Lieutenant Lamont, who was with the leading platoon, was
killed, in addition to many men.
The situation was not without anxiety, for on neither flank could
any British troops be seen. It looked as if the Battalion had been
going on too fast for the rest of the line, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Bailey decided to wait until the situation on the right developed. No.
2 Company accordingly dug in where it was, and the King's Company
was moved to Cambron Farm to fill up the gap there was between
58. Nov. 6.
the right of the line and the Sixty-second Division. The situation on
the left required some adjustment, for the 2nd Battalion Scots
Guards had been apparently held up, and No. 3 Company had to be
responsible for that flank of the Battalion. About mid-day a company
of the Scots Guards came up through the village, and occupied
Bermeries without opposition, making the left flank once more
secure. This enabled No. 4 Company to push forward through the
orchards and drive out an enemy's post, but again the enemy's
machine-guns prevented any farther advance. The difficulties in this
action were that, when once a company or platoon had been sent
off anywhere, it could not be found again owing to the enclosed
nature of the country. No communication between the various
parties was possible, and the operations therefore developed into
small isolated parties fighting independently of each other. The
Germans began to shell the village with heavy shell during the
afternoon, and the front line posts were fired on at close range by
field artillery. During the evening No. 3 Company took over the
outpost line from No. 4 Company, which was withdrawn to cellars in
the eastern end of the village.
Lieut.-Colonel Bailey received orders for a farther advance next
day, and the King's and No. 2 Companies were to secure the cross-
roads, if possible during the night. It was, however, so dark, and the
enemy was in so great strength, that the operation was not
attempted that night. Brigadier-General Heywood, commanding the
3rd Guards Brigade, was wounded in the evening, and the command
devolved upon Lieut.-Colonel Stirling, commanding the 2nd Scots
Guards.
It poured with rain all night. The Battalion formed
up south of the railway on the line of the forward
posts, with the King's Company, under Captain
Spence, on the right; No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant Freeman-
Greene, on the left; No. 3 Company, under Lieutenant Challands, in
support (their position north of the railway being taken over by the
Welsh Guards), and No. 2 Company, under Lieutenant Kennaway, in
reserve. The King's Company and No. 2 Company were ordered to
59. make good the line of the Bavai—Queve-au-loup road, where Nos. 2
and 3 Companies would advance through them, and secure the last
two objectives. The King's and No. 4 Companies were comparatively
fresh, as they had had some hours' rest in barns and cellars during
the night, but Nos. 2 and 3 Companies were soaked through by the
rain, and tired out after a hard day constantly on the move and a
night spent in digging in on the outpost line. At 6 A.M. the advance
began, and was again most difficult, on account of the enclosed
country. The Battalion met no opposition until it reached some high
ground, when the leading platoons came under a very heavy
machine-gun fire from the far side of the valley, and a harassing fire
from field-guns. No. 4 Company was temporarily checked, but the
King's Company, under cover of the houses and hedges along the
Mecquignies road, seized the crossing over the river, and worked up
till it got in touch with a company from the Sixty-second Division on
the right. This advance through houses was well carried out, and the
Lewis gunners performed wonders in getting their guns into houses.
One party of German machine-gunners was shot down in the church
tower. No. 3 Company was halted on the road, and No. 2 Company
in reserve moved up to the cross-roads at Bavisiaux. The grounds of
Mecquignies Château were strongly held by machine-guns, but after
a sharp fight the King's Company drove out the enemy and seized
the Château. In this fighting Second Lieutenant A. D. Anderson was
killed, while gallantly leading his men to the attack. Lieutenant
Freeman-Greene, seeing the King's Company advance up the farther
slope, at once began to push on with No. 4 Company, and in spite of
a hail of machine-gun bullets reached the line of the river with little
loss, and gained touch with the left of the King's Company. After this
the fighting became very promiscuous, and platoons became
scattered among the orchards and fields of the Château. Touch was
established with the Welsh Guards, who had been temporarily
checked in Buvigny, and who were now moving on, and the enemy
seemed to be retiring all along the line. Lieut.-Colonel Bailey was
ordered to push on and try and seize the line on the Bavai road
before night, and he accordingly moved up No. 2 Company to the
Château grounds. The King's and No. 4 Companies had in the
60. Nov. 7.
meantime made good the high ground north of the Château, driving
out some advanced posts of the enemy. No. 3 Company was ordered
to move through Mecquignies village and to seize the orchards
north-east of the village. This it succeeded in doing, meeting with
little opposition. The King's and No. 4 Companies at once prolonged
the line to the left, and pushed out patrols to the east. This line was
consolidated, and as the night was very dark no farther advance was
considered advisable.
The 466th German Regiment which opposed the advance fought
extremely well, and was cleverly handled by its commander, who
thoroughly understood how to fight a rear-guard action. The wet
weather and the mud made these operations peculiarly trying to
men who had had little training in close country fighting, but the
discipline in the Battalion was so good that each platoon, however
isolated, could be relied on to act intelligently. The scenes in the
various villages were most touching, for the civilians who emerged
from cellars and underground dug-outs all acclaimed the men as
their deliverers, and were highly excited in their joy.
Early on the 7th the 1st Battalion Scots Guards
advanced through the Battalion, which was
withdrawn to Amfroipret. Lieut.-Colonel Bailey
issued the following message to the Company Commanders:
Please let all ranks know that I consider the advance on the 5th and 6th to
have been carried out excellently in spite of very heavy going and the
difficulties of keeping direction. On the 5th Nos. 2 and 3 Companies, though
they had little fighting, had a thoroughly miserable and uncomfortable time,
which as usual was borne with the greatest cheerfulness. The King's Company
and No. 4 Company were better off, as they got a few hours' rest under cover.
On the 6th, in spite of very heavy machine-gun fire from front and flank
and most difficult country, the King's Company and No. 4 pushed ahead and
drove in the rear troops of the enemy, thus making good the passage of the
river Du Moulin de Bavai. The greatest credit is due not only to the fine
fighting powers of the men but also to the good leading and forethought of
the leaders.
The two days' fighting were unsatisfactory as far as the killing of Germans
was concerned, and the conditions miserable from the start to finish, but the
61. 2nd Batt.
Battalion, as always, went quicker and farther than any other Battalion in the
Brigade, and the distance you went undoubtedly helped the 24th Division by
threatening the communications of the enemy, holding the ground north-west
of Bavai, and causing them to retire. You have well kept up the traditions of
the Regiment and maintained the Grenadier spirit—the most magnificent in
the world. I congratulate officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, and I
know that you will never fail.
W. R. Bailey, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards.
On the 9th the Battalion marched to La Longueville, and the 1st
Guards Brigade entered Maubeuge. On the following day it reached
Douzies, where the news arrived that the Armistice had been signed.
On the morning of the 11th the Battalion paraded, and the
Commanding Officer read out the official telegram declaring the
Armistice to be in force.
Operations
November 1-11, 1918
Emery Walker Ltd.
The 2nd Battalion
62. Nov. 4.
In the fighting on November 4 the following officers took part:
Lieut.-Colonel C. F. A. Walker, M.C. Commanding Officer.
Capt. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. Adjutant.
Lieut. L. Holbech, M.C. Intelligence Officer.
Capt. L. St. L. Hermon-Hodge No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. D. L. King " "
Lieut. W. H. S. Dent No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. C. J. N. Adams " "
Lieut. R. H. R. Palmer No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. K. B. Bibby " "
2nd Lieut. E. G. Harcourt-Vernon " "
Lieut. C. C. Cubitt No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. B. R. Osborne " "
Lieut. E. L. Coffin Medical Officer.
The Battalion marched from Capelle through La
Croisette and Villers Pol to its assembly area, which
was a line 100 yards east of the Jenlain—Le Quesnoy road. Villers
Pol was being heavily shelled at the time, and a good number of
casualties resulted. Lieut.-Colonel Walker was ordered to advance in
support of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, until the capture of
the first objective, the Fresnay—Wargnies-le-Petit road, had been
completed, then to pass through and secure the second objective, a
line some 3000 yards farther east. Zero hour was fixed for 7.20 a.m.
The rain ceased early, but a very heavy mist hung low over the
ground and made it impossible for troops to see more than 200
yards ahead. No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant Cubitt, was on the
left of the line; No. 3 Company, under Lieutenant Palmer, on the
right; No. 2 Company, under Lieutenant Dent, in support; and No. 1
Company, under Captain Hermon-Hodge, in reserve.
The 2nd Guards Brigade under Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke
went forward on the right of the Battalion. Owing to mist the
Coldstream lost their direction, and proceeded at a right incline.
Seeing troops ahead moving along close to the barrage, the
foremost companies of the Battalion imagined that they were
63. Nov. 5.
Coldstream Guards making for the first objective. It was only
discovered later that these were really the Germans in retirement. As
No. 4 Company passed over the high ground near the wood south-
west of Wargnies-le-Petit, the mist suddenly lifted, and they came
under heavy machine-gun fire from the north. Lieutenant Cubitt was
wounded, and the company had a considerable number of
casualties. Second Lieutenant Osborne, who now took command, led
two platoons a bit farther by short rushes, but was eventually
stopped by a sweeping machine-gun fire, which made farther
progress impossible. German field-guns were also firing at a short
range, and the Battalion lost a good many men. Lieutenant Osborne
therefore took it upon himself to make a personal reconnaissance of
the enemy's positions, and see whether there was not a better line
of advance. With almost reckless gallantry he went out, and carefully
examined the German line, but the result of his scrutiny was never
known, as he was shot through the heart by a machine-gun bullet
on the way back. As No. 4 Company was now without an officer,
Sergeant E. Carter took command.
Meanwhile No. 3 Company under Lieutenant
Palmer had made its way through the southern part
of the wood near Wargnies-le-Petit. On leaving the
wood along the eastern edge, they came under machine-gun and
rifle fire from the enemy, who was barely 200 yards away. Lieutenant
Palmer advanced by short rushes, and not only took the position, but
captured or killed the whole garrison. It was found impossible to
proceed, and the company dug in a line of outposts. During this
attack the field-guns of the Guards Divisional Artillery were brought
up at a gallop to within a very short distance behind the leading
troops—a daring and difficult achievement that is worthy of record.
As soon as these guns opened fire on the village of Wargnies-le-
Petit, the companies on the left were able to continue their progress.
Touch was then gained with the 3rd Grenadier Guards on the right,
and with the Forty-second Division on the left. Nothing more could
be done that afternoon, and the Battalion consolidated its position.
Early on the morning of the 5th the 1st Battalion Irish Guards passed
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