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Vikram Singh Slathia
2011MAI025
Dept. of Computer Science
CONTENTS
 Introduction
 History of Game Theory.

 Elements of games.

 Basic Concepts of Game Theory

 Kinds of Strategies.

 Nash Equilibrium.

 Types of Games.

 Applications of Game Theory.

 Conclusion .

 References .
INTRODUCTION
 Game   theory is the mathematical analysis of a
 conflict of interest to find optimal choices that
 will lead to a desired outcome under given
 conditions. To put it simply, it's a study of ways
 to win in a situation given the conditions of the
 situation. While seemingly trivial in name, it is
 actually becoming a field of major interest in
 fields like economics, sociology, and political
 and military sciences, where game theory can
 be used to predict more important trends.
CONT ….

   In the broadest terms, game theory analyses how
    groups of people interact in social and economic
    situations. An accurate description of game theory
    is the term used by psychologists ? the theory of
    social situations. There are two main branches of
    game theory: co-operative and non-co-operative
    game theory. Most of the research in game theory
    is in the field of non-co-operative games, which
    analyses how intelligent (or rational) people interact
    with others in order to achieve their own goals
HISTORY OF GAME THEORY.

   The ideas underlying game theory have appeared
    throughout history, apparent in the bible, the
    Talmud, the works of Descartes and Sun Tzu, and
    the writings of Chales Darwin. The basis of modern
    game theory, however, can be considered an
    outgrowth of a three seminal works:
       Augustin Cournot’s Researches into the Mathematical
        Principles of the Theory of Wealth in 1838, gives an
        intuitive explanation of what would eventually be
        formalized as the Nash equilibrium, as well as provides
        an evolutionary, or dynamic notion of best-responding to
        the actions of others
CONT…..


     Francis        Ysidro       Edgeworth’s        Mathematical
      Psychics demonstrated the notion of competitive equilibria
      in a two-person (as well as two-type) economy
     Emile Borel, in Algebre et calcul des probabilites, Comptes
      Rendus Academie des Sciences, Vol. 184, 1927, provided
      the first insight into mixed strategies - randomization may
      support a stable outcome.
   A modern analysis began with John von
    Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's book, Theory of
    Games and Economic Behavior and was given its
    modern methodological framework by John Nash
    building on von Neumann and Morgenstern's results.
ELEMENTS OF GAMES
The essential elements of a game are:
  a.    Players: The individuals who make decisions.
  b.    Rules of the game: Who moves when? What can
  they do?
  c.    Outcomes: What do the various combinations of
        actions produce?
  d.    Payoffs: What are the players’ preferences over
       the outcomes?
  e. Information: What do players know when they
       make decisions?
  f.   Chance: Probability distribution over chance
       events, if any.
BASIC CONCEPTS OF GAME THEORY
1.   Game
2.   Move
3.   Information
4.   Strategy
5.   Extensive and Normal Form
6.   Equilibria
1.      GAME
   A conflict in interest among n individuals or groups
    (players). There exists a set of rules that define the
    terms of exchange of information and pieces, the
    conditions under which the game begins, and the
    possible legal exchanges in particular conditions.
    The entirety of the game is defined by all the moves
    to that point, leading to an outcome.
2.      MOVE
   The way in which the game progresses between
    states through exchange of information and pieces.
    Moves are defined by the rules of the game and
    can be made in either alternating fashion, occur
    simultaneously for all players, or continuously for a
    single player until he reaches a certain state or
    declines to move further. Moves may be choice or
    by chance. For example, choosing a card from a
    deck or rolling a die is a chance move with known
    probabilities. On the other hand, asking for cards in
    blackjack is a choice move.
3.   INFORMATION



 A state of perfect information is when all
 moves are known to all players in a game.
 Games without chance elements like chess
 are games of perfect information, while
 games with chance involved like blackjack
 are games of imperfect information.
4.      STRATEGY
                        A strategy is the set of best
    choices for a player for an entire game. It is an
    overlying plan that cannot be upset by occurrences
    in the game itself.

   Strategy combination
    A strategy profile is a set of strategies for each
    player which fully specifies all actions in a game. A
    strategy profile must include one and only one
    strategy for every player.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

Move                               Strategy


    A Move is a single step      A strategy is a complete
    a player can take during       set of actions, which a
    the game.                      player takes into account
                                   while playing the game
                                   throughout
CONT …..
Example
KINDS OF STRATEGIES

  I.        Pure strategy

  II.       Mixed Strategy

  III. Totally mixed strategy.
I.    PURE STRATEGY

A  pure strategy provides a complete
  definition of how a player will play a game. In
  particular, it determines the move a player
  will make for any situation he or she could
  face.
 A player‘s strategy set is the set of pure
  strategies available to that player.
     select a single action and play it
     Each row or column of a payoff matrix represents
      both an action and a pure strategy
II.   MIXED STRATEGY


A  strategy consisting of possible moves
 and a probability distribution (collection of
 weights) which corresponds to how
 frequently each move is to be played. A
 player would only use a mixed strategy
 when she is indifferent between several
 pure strategies, and when keeping the
 opponent guessing is desirable - that is,
 when the opponent can benefit from
 knowing the next move.
III.   TOTALLY MIXED STRATEGY.

A mixed strategy in which the player assigns
 strictly positive probability to every pure strategy
 In a non-cooperative game, a totally mixed strategy
 of a player is a mixed strategy giving positive
 probability weight to every pure strategy available
 to the player.
5.      PAYOFF



 The  payoff or outcome is the state of the
 game at it's conclusion. In games such as
 chess, payoff is defined as win or a loss. In
 other situations the payoff may be material
 (i.e. money) or a ranking as in a game with
 many players.
5.   EXTENSIVE AND NORMAL FORM
 Extensive Form
 The extensive form of a game is a complete
 description of:
 1. The set of players
 2. Who moves when and what their
     choices are
 3. What players know when they move
 4. The players’ payoffs as a function of the
     choices that are made.
 In simple words we also say it is a graphical
 representation (tree form) of a sequential
 game.
 The   normal form


 The normal form is a matrix representation of
 a simultaneous game. For two players, one is the
 "row" player, and the other, the "column" player. Each
 rows or column represents a strategy and each box
 represents the payoffs to each player for every
 combination of strategies. Generally, such games are
 solved using the concept of a Nash equilibrium. .
6.   EQUILIBRIUM

 Equilibrium is fundamentally very complex and
 subtle. The goal to is to derive the outcome when
 the agents described in a model complete their
 process of maximizing behaviour. Determining
 when that process is complete, in the short run and
 in the long run, is an elusive goal as successive
 generations of economists rethink the strategies
 that agents might pursue.
Gamec Theory
NASH EQUILIBRIUM

   A Nash equilibrium, named after John Nash, is a
    set of strategies, one for each player, such that
    no player has incentive to unilaterally change her
    action. Players are in equilibrium if a change in
    strategies by any one of them would lead that
    player to earn less than if she remained with her
    current strategy. For games in which players
    randomize (mixed strategies), the expected or
    average payoff must be at least as large as that
    obtainable by any other strategy
CONT ……..


   A strategy profile s = (s1, …, sn) is a Nash
    equilibrium if for every i,
       si is a best response to S−i , i.e., no agent can do better
        by unilaterally changing his/her strategy
   Theorem (Nash, 1951): Every game with a finite
    number of agents andaction profiles has at least
    one Nash equilibrium
EXAMPLE
                BATTLE OF THE SEXES
   Two agents need to coordinate their actions, but they
    have different preferences
   Original scenario:
         • husband prefers football
         • wife prefers opera
   Another scenario:
         • Two nations must act together to deal with an
            international crisis
         • They prefer different solutions
   This game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria and
    one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
   How to find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?
Gamec Theory
TYPES OF GAMES


A.   One-Person Games
B.   Zero-Sum Games
C    Non zero sum game
D.   Two-Person Games
E.   Repeated Games
A.      ONE-PERSON GAMES
   A one-person games has no real conflict of interest.
    Only the interest of the player in achieving a
    particular state of the game exists. Single-person
    games are not interesting from a game-theory
    perspective because there is no adversary making
    conscious choices that the player must deal with.
    However, they can be interesting from a
    probabilistic point of view in terms of their internal
    complexity.
B.       ZERO-SUM GAMES
   A zero-sum game is one in which no wealth is created or
    destroyed. So, in a two-player zero-sum game,
    whatever one player wins, the other loses. Therefore,
    the player share no common interests. There are two
    general types of zero-sum games: those with perfect
    information and those without.
   If the total gains of the participants are added up, and
    the total losses are subtracted, they will sum to zero
   Example
    a.    Rock, Paper, Scissors
    b.    Poker game
EXAMPLE OF POKER GAME
 Let’s there are three players, Rajesh, Suresh and
  Varun each starting with Rs100, a total of Rs300.
 They meet at Rajesh’s house and play for a couple
  of hours. At the end of the evening Rajesh has
  Rs200, Suresh has Rs60 and Varun has Rs40. The
  total amount of money between them is still Rs300.
 Rajesh is up Rs100, Suresh is down Rs40 and
  Varun is down Rs60.
 The total of these three numbers is zero (100-40-
  60), so it is a zero-sum game.
EXAMPLE
   In non-zero-sum games, one player's gain needn't
    be bad news for the other(s). Indeed, in highly non-
    zero-sum games the players' interests overlap
    entirely. In 1970, when the three Apollo
    13 astronauts were trying to figure out how to get
    their stranded spaceship back to earth, they were
    playing an utterly non-zero-sum game, because the
    outcome would be either equally good for all of
    them or equally bad.
C.      NON ZERO SUM GAME

 In    game      theory,  situation    where
  one decision maker's gain (or loss) does not
  necessarily result in the other decision
  makers' loss (or gain). In other words,
  where the winnings and losses of all players
  do not add up to zero and everyone can
  gain: a win-win game.
 Example
      Prisoner's dilemma
C.       TWO-PERSON GAMES
   Two-person games are the largest category of
    familiar games. A more complicated game derived
    from 2-person games is the n-person game. These
    games are extensively analyzed by game theorists.
    However, in extending these theories to n-person
    games a difficulty arises in predicting the interaction
    possible among players since opportunities arise
    for cooperation and collusion.
D.     REPEATED GAMES
   In repeated games, some               Examples
    game G is played multiple
    times by the same set of               1. Iterated Prisoner’s
    agents                                    Dilemma
     G is called the stage game           2. Repeated
     Each occurrence of G is called          Ultimatum Game
      an iteration or a round              3. Repeated
 Usually each agent knows                    Matching Pennies
  what all the agents did in the
  previous iterations, but not             4. Repeated Stag
  what they’re doing in the                   Hunt
  current iteration                        6. Roshambo
 Usually each agent’s payoff
  function is additive
E.    SEQUENTIAL GAMES
 A sequential game is a game where one player
  chooses his action before the others choose theirs.
  Importantly, the later players must have some
  information of the first's choice, otherwise the
  difference in time would have no strategic
  effect. Extensive form representations are usually
  used for sequential games, since they explicitly
  illustrate the sequential aspects of a game.
 Combinatorial games are usually sequential games.
 Sequential games are often solved by backward
  induction.
F.     SIMULTANEOUS GAMES
A simultaneous game is a game where
 each player chooses his action without
 knowledge of the actions chosen by other
 players. Normal form representations are
 usually used for simultaneous games.

 Example
    Prisoner dilemma .
APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY


 Philosophy

 Resource     Allocation and Networking
 Biology

 Artificial
           Intelligence
 Economics

 Politics
CONCLUSION
 Byusing simple methods of game theory,
 we can solve for what would be a confusing
 array of outcomes in a real-world situation.
 Using game theory as a tool for financial
 analysis can be very helpful in sorting out
 potentially messy real-world situations,
 from mergers to product releases.
REFERENCES
   Books ;
     Game theory: analysis of conflict ,Roger B. Myerson,
      Harvard University Press
     Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction, K. G.
      Binmore- 2008, Oxford University Press.
   Links :
     http://library.thinkquest.org/26408/math/prisoner.shtml
     http://www.gametheory.net
Gamec Theory

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Gamec Theory

  • 2. CONTENTS  Introduction  History of Game Theory.  Elements of games.  Basic Concepts of Game Theory  Kinds of Strategies.  Nash Equilibrium.  Types of Games.  Applications of Game Theory.  Conclusion .  References .
  • 3. INTRODUCTION  Game theory is the mathematical analysis of a conflict of interest to find optimal choices that will lead to a desired outcome under given conditions. To put it simply, it's a study of ways to win in a situation given the conditions of the situation. While seemingly trivial in name, it is actually becoming a field of major interest in fields like economics, sociology, and political and military sciences, where game theory can be used to predict more important trends.
  • 4. CONT ….  In the broadest terms, game theory analyses how groups of people interact in social and economic situations. An accurate description of game theory is the term used by psychologists ? the theory of social situations. There are two main branches of game theory: co-operative and non-co-operative game theory. Most of the research in game theory is in the field of non-co-operative games, which analyses how intelligent (or rational) people interact with others in order to achieve their own goals
  • 5. HISTORY OF GAME THEORY.  The ideas underlying game theory have appeared throughout history, apparent in the bible, the Talmud, the works of Descartes and Sun Tzu, and the writings of Chales Darwin. The basis of modern game theory, however, can be considered an outgrowth of a three seminal works:  Augustin Cournot’s Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth in 1838, gives an intuitive explanation of what would eventually be formalized as the Nash equilibrium, as well as provides an evolutionary, or dynamic notion of best-responding to the actions of others
  • 6. CONT…..  Francis Ysidro Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics demonstrated the notion of competitive equilibria in a two-person (as well as two-type) economy  Emile Borel, in Algebre et calcul des probabilites, Comptes Rendus Academie des Sciences, Vol. 184, 1927, provided the first insight into mixed strategies - randomization may support a stable outcome.  A modern analysis began with John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior and was given its modern methodological framework by John Nash building on von Neumann and Morgenstern's results.
  • 7. ELEMENTS OF GAMES The essential elements of a game are: a. Players: The individuals who make decisions. b. Rules of the game: Who moves when? What can they do? c. Outcomes: What do the various combinations of actions produce? d. Payoffs: What are the players’ preferences over the outcomes? e. Information: What do players know when they make decisions? f. Chance: Probability distribution over chance events, if any.
  • 8. BASIC CONCEPTS OF GAME THEORY 1. Game 2. Move 3. Information 4. Strategy 5. Extensive and Normal Form 6. Equilibria
  • 9. 1. GAME  A conflict in interest among n individuals or groups (players). There exists a set of rules that define the terms of exchange of information and pieces, the conditions under which the game begins, and the possible legal exchanges in particular conditions. The entirety of the game is defined by all the moves to that point, leading to an outcome.
  • 10. 2. MOVE  The way in which the game progresses between states through exchange of information and pieces. Moves are defined by the rules of the game and can be made in either alternating fashion, occur simultaneously for all players, or continuously for a single player until he reaches a certain state or declines to move further. Moves may be choice or by chance. For example, choosing a card from a deck or rolling a die is a chance move with known probabilities. On the other hand, asking for cards in blackjack is a choice move.
  • 11. 3. INFORMATION A state of perfect information is when all moves are known to all players in a game. Games without chance elements like chess are games of perfect information, while games with chance involved like blackjack are games of imperfect information.
  • 12. 4. STRATEGY A strategy is the set of best choices for a player for an entire game. It is an overlying plan that cannot be upset by occurrences in the game itself.  Strategy combination A strategy profile is a set of strategies for each player which fully specifies all actions in a game. A strategy profile must include one and only one strategy for every player.
  • 13. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN Move Strategy  A Move is a single step  A strategy is a complete a player can take during set of actions, which a the game. player takes into account while playing the game throughout
  • 15. KINDS OF STRATEGIES I. Pure strategy II. Mixed Strategy III. Totally mixed strategy.
  • 16. I. PURE STRATEGY A pure strategy provides a complete definition of how a player will play a game. In particular, it determines the move a player will make for any situation he or she could face.  A player‘s strategy set is the set of pure strategies available to that player.  select a single action and play it  Each row or column of a payoff matrix represents both an action and a pure strategy
  • 17. II. MIXED STRATEGY A strategy consisting of possible moves and a probability distribution (collection of weights) which corresponds to how frequently each move is to be played. A player would only use a mixed strategy when she is indifferent between several pure strategies, and when keeping the opponent guessing is desirable - that is, when the opponent can benefit from knowing the next move.
  • 18. III. TOTALLY MIXED STRATEGY. A mixed strategy in which the player assigns strictly positive probability to every pure strategy  In a non-cooperative game, a totally mixed strategy of a player is a mixed strategy giving positive probability weight to every pure strategy available to the player.
  • 19. 5. PAYOFF  The payoff or outcome is the state of the game at it's conclusion. In games such as chess, payoff is defined as win or a loss. In other situations the payoff may be material (i.e. money) or a ranking as in a game with many players.
  • 20. 5. EXTENSIVE AND NORMAL FORM  Extensive Form The extensive form of a game is a complete description of: 1. The set of players 2. Who moves when and what their choices are 3. What players know when they move 4. The players’ payoffs as a function of the choices that are made. In simple words we also say it is a graphical representation (tree form) of a sequential game.
  • 21.  The normal form The normal form is a matrix representation of a simultaneous game. For two players, one is the "row" player, and the other, the "column" player. Each rows or column represents a strategy and each box represents the payoffs to each player for every combination of strategies. Generally, such games are solved using the concept of a Nash equilibrium. .
  • 22. 6. EQUILIBRIUM Equilibrium is fundamentally very complex and subtle. The goal to is to derive the outcome when the agents described in a model complete their process of maximizing behaviour. Determining when that process is complete, in the short run and in the long run, is an elusive goal as successive generations of economists rethink the strategies that agents might pursue.
  • 24. NASH EQUILIBRIUM  A Nash equilibrium, named after John Nash, is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has incentive to unilaterally change her action. Players are in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead that player to earn less than if she remained with her current strategy. For games in which players randomize (mixed strategies), the expected or average payoff must be at least as large as that obtainable by any other strategy
  • 25. CONT ……..  A strategy profile s = (s1, …, sn) is a Nash equilibrium if for every i,  si is a best response to S−i , i.e., no agent can do better by unilaterally changing his/her strategy  Theorem (Nash, 1951): Every game with a finite number of agents andaction profiles has at least one Nash equilibrium
  • 26. EXAMPLE BATTLE OF THE SEXES  Two agents need to coordinate their actions, but they have different preferences  Original scenario: • husband prefers football • wife prefers opera  Another scenario: • Two nations must act together to deal with an international crisis • They prefer different solutions  This game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium  How to find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?
  • 28. TYPES OF GAMES A. One-Person Games B. Zero-Sum Games C Non zero sum game D. Two-Person Games E. Repeated Games
  • 29. A. ONE-PERSON GAMES  A one-person games has no real conflict of interest. Only the interest of the player in achieving a particular state of the game exists. Single-person games are not interesting from a game-theory perspective because there is no adversary making conscious choices that the player must deal with. However, they can be interesting from a probabilistic point of view in terms of their internal complexity.
  • 30. B. ZERO-SUM GAMES  A zero-sum game is one in which no wealth is created or destroyed. So, in a two-player zero-sum game, whatever one player wins, the other loses. Therefore, the player share no common interests. There are two general types of zero-sum games: those with perfect information and those without.  If the total gains of the participants are added up, and the total losses are subtracted, they will sum to zero  Example a. Rock, Paper, Scissors b. Poker game
  • 31. EXAMPLE OF POKER GAME  Let’s there are three players, Rajesh, Suresh and Varun each starting with Rs100, a total of Rs300.  They meet at Rajesh’s house and play for a couple of hours. At the end of the evening Rajesh has Rs200, Suresh has Rs60 and Varun has Rs40. The total amount of money between them is still Rs300.  Rajesh is up Rs100, Suresh is down Rs40 and Varun is down Rs60.  The total of these three numbers is zero (100-40- 60), so it is a zero-sum game.
  • 32. EXAMPLE  In non-zero-sum games, one player's gain needn't be bad news for the other(s). Indeed, in highly non- zero-sum games the players' interests overlap entirely. In 1970, when the three Apollo 13 astronauts were trying to figure out how to get their stranded spaceship back to earth, they were playing an utterly non-zero-sum game, because the outcome would be either equally good for all of them or equally bad.
  • 33. C. NON ZERO SUM GAME  In game theory, situation where one decision maker's gain (or loss) does not necessarily result in the other decision makers' loss (or gain). In other words, where the winnings and losses of all players do not add up to zero and everyone can gain: a win-win game.  Example  Prisoner's dilemma
  • 34. C. TWO-PERSON GAMES  Two-person games are the largest category of familiar games. A more complicated game derived from 2-person games is the n-person game. These games are extensively analyzed by game theorists. However, in extending these theories to n-person games a difficulty arises in predicting the interaction possible among players since opportunities arise for cooperation and collusion.
  • 35. D. REPEATED GAMES  In repeated games, some  Examples game G is played multiple times by the same set of 1. Iterated Prisoner’s agents Dilemma  G is called the stage game 2. Repeated  Each occurrence of G is called Ultimatum Game an iteration or a round 3. Repeated  Usually each agent knows Matching Pennies what all the agents did in the previous iterations, but not 4. Repeated Stag what they’re doing in the Hunt current iteration 6. Roshambo  Usually each agent’s payoff function is additive
  • 36. E. SEQUENTIAL GAMES  A sequential game is a game where one player chooses his action before the others choose theirs. Importantly, the later players must have some information of the first's choice, otherwise the difference in time would have no strategic effect. Extensive form representations are usually used for sequential games, since they explicitly illustrate the sequential aspects of a game.  Combinatorial games are usually sequential games.  Sequential games are often solved by backward induction.
  • 37. F. SIMULTANEOUS GAMES A simultaneous game is a game where each player chooses his action without knowledge of the actions chosen by other players. Normal form representations are usually used for simultaneous games.  Example  Prisoner dilemma .
  • 38. APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY  Philosophy  Resource Allocation and Networking  Biology  Artificial Intelligence  Economics  Politics
  • 39. CONCLUSION  Byusing simple methods of game theory, we can solve for what would be a confusing array of outcomes in a real-world situation. Using game theory as a tool for financial analysis can be very helpful in sorting out potentially messy real-world situations, from mergers to product releases.
  • 40. REFERENCES  Books ;  Game theory: analysis of conflict ,Roger B. Myerson, Harvard University Press  Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction, K. G. Binmore- 2008, Oxford University Press.  Links :  http://library.thinkquest.org/26408/math/prisoner.shtml  http://www.gametheory.net