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XSS Countermeasures in
Grails
Rafael Luque @rafael_luque — OSOCO
José San Leandro @rydnr — Ventura24
http://goo.gl/UGdJ0I
XSS Intro
XSS concepts
• What’s a XSS
• XSS Types: Reflected, stored, DOM-based.
• Famous XSS attacks: Samy worm, MrBean defacement, ...
XSS threats
• Interface defacement
• Session hijacking
• Click hijacking
• Malware infection
• Your PC may be joined to the horde of zombies in a BotNet.
Following
the
white
rabbit. . .
Something more than a joke. . .
Hooking your browser
Hooked browsers with BeEF
Exploiting your system
Exploiting the browser
1. Preparing the exploit server. . .
Exploiting the browser
2. Injecting an invisible frame pointing to the exploit server. . .
Exploiting the browser
3. Exploit works and executes the payload. . .
Exploiting the browser
4. Spawning notepad.exe process to migrate to. . .
Fun with
post-exploitation
Post-exploitation phase
Run a remote shell
Post-exploitation phase
Keylogging
Post-exploitation phase
Run VNC session
Post-exploitation phase
Run VNC session
Welcome to the
horde of
zombies
Joining to a botnet
1. Install the malware. . .
Joining to a botnet
2. Welcome to my botnet C&C. . .
Responsibilities: Why is
this still an issue?
Commercial software
• XSS is not known for business stakeholders
Commercial software
• XSS is not known for business stakeholders
• For most people, security means attacking your servers
Commercial software
• XSS is not known for business stakeholders
• For most people, security means attacking your servers
• Developers don’t pay enough attention
Do your homework
• Raise awareness
Do your homework
• Raise awareness
• Practice with security tools
Do your homework
• Raise awareness
• Practice with security tools
• Promote defensive coding
Do your homework
• Raise awareness
• Practice with security tools
• Promote defensive coding
• Improve monitoring
Understanding Grails
Encoding
Grails Pre-2.3 Gotchas
#1: Built-in default codec
#1: Built-in default codec
grails.views.default.codec
#1: Built-in default codec
is none!
grails.views.default.codec = ’’none’’
#1: Built-in default codec
is none!
Problems
You have to escape explicitly every untrusted
data:
encodeAsHTML()
encodeAsJavaScript()
encodeAsURL()
#1: Built-in default codec
is none!
Problems
High likelihood of XSS vulnerabilities in
production.
E.g. Grails.org website.
#1: Built-in default codec
is none!
Problems
Double-encoding prevention over Security by
default.
#1: Built-in default codec
is none!
Solution
Change default codec to HTML:
grails.views.default.codec = ’’html’’
#2: Inconsistent behaviour
Apply codec Does not apply codec
• GSP EL: ${...}
#2: Inconsistent behaviour
Apply codec Does not apply codec
• GSP EL: ${...}
• Tag: <g:tag .../>
#2: Inconsistent behaviour
Apply codec Does not apply codec
• GSP EL: ${...}
• Tag: <g:tag .../>
• GSP EL in tag attribute: <g:tag a="${...}"/>
#2: Inconsistent behaviour
Apply codec Does not apply codec
• GSP EL: ${...}
• Tag: <g:tag .../>
• GSP EL in tag attribute: <g:tag a="${...}"/>
• Tag as a method: ${g.tag(...)}
#2: Inconsistent behaviour
Apply codec Does not apply codec
• GSP EL: ${...}
• Tag: <g:tag .../>
• GSP EL in tag attribute: <g:tag a="${...}"/>
• Tag as a method: ${g.tag(...)}
• Scriptlets: <%= ... %>
#2: Inconsistent behaviour
Apply codec Does not apply codec
• GSP EL: ${...}
• Tag: <g:tag .../>
• GSP EL in tag attribute: <g:tag a="${...}"/>
• Tag as a method: ${g.tag(...)}
• Scriptlets: <%= ... %>
#3: Tag output is not
escaped
Problems
Review the tags you use to make sure they
encode their output or have options for this (e.g.
encodeAs attribute).
#3: Tag output is not
escaped
Problems
Review the tags from plugins you use.
#3: Tag output is not
escaped
Problems
Review the tags you invoke as methods in
Controllers.
#3: Tag output is not
escaped
Problems
Don’t trust Grails core tags, they have
inconsistent behaviour. E.g:
<g:fieldValue /> // HTML-encoded
<g:message /> // NO HTML-encoded
#3: Tag output is not
escaped
Solutions
If tag implementation doesn’t encode, add it
explicitly or invoke it as a method inside a GSP
expression:
<g:message ... encodeAs=’’HTML’’/>
${g.message(...)}
g.message(...).encodeAsHTML()
#4: g:message doesn’t
escape arguments
Problems
With default codec set to HTML the following
XSS attack vector works:
<g:message code=’welcome’ args=’[params.user]’/>
where:
welcome = Hi {0}!
params.user = <script>alert(’pwnd’)</script>
#4: g:message doesn’t
escape arguments
Solutions
Upgrade to a Grails version with the issue
(GRAILS-7170) fixed:
2.0.5, 2.1.5, 2.2.2, 2.3-M1
#4: g:message doesn’t
escape arguments
Solutions
Escape explicitly or invoke the tag inside a GSP
expression:
<g:message code=’welcome’ args=’[params.user]’
encodeAs=’HTML’/>
${g.message(code:’welcome’, args:[params.user])}
#5: One codec is not
enough
You MUST use the escape syntax for the context of the HTML
document you’re putting untrusted data into:
• HTML
• JavaScript
• URL
• CSS
#5: One codec is not
enough
HTML entity encoding doesn’t work if you’re using untrusted
data inside a <script>, or an event handler attribute like
onmouseover, or inside CSS, or in a URL.
#5: One codec is not
enough
Problems
You can override the default codec for a page,
but not to switch the codec for each context:
<%@page defaultCodec=’CODEC’ %>
#5: One codec is not
enough
Problems
How to manage GSPs with mixed encoding
requirements?
#5: One codec is not
enough
Solutions
Turn off default codec for that page and use
encodeAsJavaScript() and
encodeAsHTML() explicitly everywhere.
#5: One codec is not
enough
Solutions
Extract the JavaScript fragment to a GSP tag
encoding as JavaScript.
Grails 2.3 Encoding
Enhancements
#1: New configuration more
secure by default
#1: New configuration more
security by default
grails {
views {
gsp {
encoding = ’UTF-8’
htmlcodec = ’xml’ // use xml escaping instead of HTML4
codecs {
expression = ’html’ // escapes values inside ${}
scriptlet = ’html’ // escapes output from scriptlets in GSPs
taglib = ’none’ // escapes output from taglibs
staticparts = ’none’ // escapes output from static templates
}
}
// escapes all not-encoded output at final stage of outputting
filteringCodecForContentType {
//’text/html’ = ’html’
}
}
}
#2: Finer-grained control of
codecs
Control the codecs used per plugin:
pluginName.grails.views.gsp.codecs.expression = ’CODEC’
#2: Finer-grained control of
codecs
Control the codecs used per page:
<%@ expressionCodec=’CODEC’ %>
#2: Finer-grained control of
codecs
Control the default codec used by a tag library:
static defaultEncodeAs = ’HTML’
Or on a per tag basis:
static encodeAsForTags = [tagName: ’HTML’]
#2: Finer-grained control of
codecs
Add support for an optional encodeAs attribute to all tags
automatically:
<my:tag arg=’foo.bar’ encodeAs=’JavaScript’/>
#3: Context-sensitive
encoding switching
Tag withCodec(’CODEC’, Closure) to switch the current
default codec, pushing and popping a default codec stack.
out.println ’<script type=’’text/javascript’’>’
withCodec(‘‘JavaScript’’) {
out << body()
}
out.println()
out.println ’</script>’
#3: Context-sensitive
encoding switching
Core tags like <g:javascript/> and <r:script/>
automatically set an appropriate codec.
#4: Raw output
When you do not wish to encode a value, you can use the
raw() method.
${raw(book.title)}
It’s available in GSPs, controllers and tag libraries.
#5: Default encoding for all
output
You can configure Grails to encode all output at the end of a
response.
#5: Default encoding for all
output
grails {
views {
gsp {
codecs {
...
staticparts = ’raw’ // escapes output from static templates
}
}
// escapes all not-encoded output at final stage of outputting
filteringCodecForContentType {
’text/html’ = ’html’
}
}
}
If activated, the staticparts codec needs to be set to raw so
that static markup is not encoded.
Check your Plugins
security
Plugins are also part of your application
• Grails plugins are not security audited
Plugins are also part of your application
• Grails plugins are not security audited
• Grails plugins are part of your application’s attack surface
Plugins are also part of your application
• Grails plugins are not security audited
• Grails plugins are part of your application’s attack surface
• Review plugins to make sure they encode, and if they don’t
you should JIRA the authors immediately, and fork and
patch to fix your app quickly.
E.g. Javamelody vulnerability
• CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported.
E.g. Javamelody vulnerability
• CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported.
• Allows blind XSS attack via X-Forwarded-For header
spoofing.
E.g. Javamelody vulnerability
• CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported.
• Allows blind XSS attack via X-Forwarded-For header
spoofing.
• The attack target is the admin’s browser.
E.g. Javamelody vulnerability
• CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported.
• Allows blind XSS attack via X-Forwarded-For header
spoofing.
• The attack target is the admin’s browser.
• Fixed in the last release (1.47).
E.g. Javamelody vulnerability
• CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported.
• Allows blind XSS attack via X-Forwarded-For header
spoofing.
• The attack target is the admin’s browser.
• Fixed in the last release (1.47).
• You should upgrade ASAP.
Demo: Javamelody XSSed
Solutions: What options
do we have?
Think like an attacker
• According to your grails version
Think like an attacker
• According to your grails version
• Find unescaped values
Think like an attacker
• According to your grails version
• Find unescaped values
• Use fuzzers
Think like an attacker
• According to your grails version
• Find unescaped values
• Use fuzzers
• Read and understand Samy code
Think like an attacker
• According to your grails version
• Find unescaped values
• Use fuzzers
• Read and understand Samy code
• Review OWASP XSS cheatsheets
Be aware
• Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic
content gets escaped
Be aware
• Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic
content gets escaped
• Monitor for suspicious traffic
Be aware
• Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic
content gets escaped
• Monitor for suspicious traffic
• Spread the knowledge
Be aware
• Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic
content gets escaped
• Monitor for suspicious traffic
• Spread the knowledge
• Adopt ZAP or similar fuzzers in your CI process
Be aware
• Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic
content gets escaped
• Monitor for suspicious traffic
• Spread the knowledge
• Adopt ZAP or similar fuzzers in your CI process
• Review available security plugins for Grails
Application firewalls
• Enable common, safe rules
Application firewalls
• Enable common, safe rules
• Log unexpected traffic
Application firewalls
• Enable common, safe rules
• Log unexpected traffic
• Don’t fool yourself
Early-adopt CSP
• CSP: Content Security Policy
Early-adopt CSP
• CSP: Content Security Policy
• Adds headers to disable default behavior
Early-adopt CSP
• CSP: Content Security Policy
• Adds headers to disable default behavior
• inline Javascript
Early-adopt CSP
• CSP: Content Security Policy
• Adds headers to disable default behavior
• inline Javascript
• dynamic code evaluation
Early-adopt CSP
• CSP: Content Security Policy
• Adds headers to disable default behavior
• inline Javascript
• dynamic code evaluation
• Still a Candidate Recommendation of W3C
Conclusions: Grails can
defeat XSS
Grails
• Is able to defend our application from XSS attacks
Grails
• Is able to defend our application from XSS attacks
• But we need to pay attention to the details
Grails
• Is able to defend our application from XSS attacks
• But we need to pay attention to the details
• Upgrade to 2.3 ASAP
Grails
• Is able to defend our application from XSS attacks
• But we need to pay attention to the details
• Upgrade to 2.3 ASAP
• Pay attention to XSS
XSS
• Is much more dangerous than defacement jokes
XSS
• Is much more dangerous than defacement jokes
• The browsers are the actual target
XSS
• Is much more dangerous than defacement jokes
• The browsers are the actual target
• Difficult to monitor
XSS
• Is much more dangerous than defacement jokes
• The browsers are the actual target
• Difficult to monitor
• Unconfortable counter-measures in the browser: NoScript,
Request Policy
Wake up
• Write secure applications by default
Wake up
• Write secure applications by default
• Get yourself used with Metasploit, Burp, ZAP
Wake up
• Write secure applications by default
• Get yourself used with Metasploit, Burp, ZAP
• Spread the word both horizontally and vertically
Picture credits
• Cover:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/
CC by-nc
• White rabbit:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/alles-banane/5849593440
CC by-sa-nc
• Hieroglyphs:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/59372146@N00
CC by-sa-nc
• Zombies:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/aeviin/4986897433
CC by-sa-nc
XSS Countermeasures in
Grails
Rafael Luque @rafael_luque — OSOCO
José San Leandro @rydnr — Ventura24

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XSS Countermeasures in Grails

  • 1. XSS Countermeasures in Grails Rafael Luque @rafael_luque — OSOCO José San Leandro @rydnr — Ventura24
  • 4. XSS concepts • What’s a XSS • XSS Types: Reflected, stored, DOM-based. • Famous XSS attacks: Samy worm, MrBean defacement, ...
  • 5. XSS threats • Interface defacement • Session hijacking • Click hijacking • Malware infection • Your PC may be joined to the horde of zombies in a BotNet.
  • 7. Something more than a joke. . .
  • 11. Exploiting the browser 1. Preparing the exploit server. . .
  • 12. Exploiting the browser 2. Injecting an invisible frame pointing to the exploit server. . .
  • 13. Exploiting the browser 3. Exploit works and executes the payload. . .
  • 14. Exploiting the browser 4. Spawning notepad.exe process to migrate to. . .
  • 20. Welcome to the horde of zombies
  • 21. Joining to a botnet 1. Install the malware. . .
  • 22. Joining to a botnet 2. Welcome to my botnet C&C. . .
  • 23. Responsibilities: Why is this still an issue?
  • 24. Commercial software • XSS is not known for business stakeholders
  • 25. Commercial software • XSS is not known for business stakeholders • For most people, security means attacking your servers
  • 26. Commercial software • XSS is not known for business stakeholders • For most people, security means attacking your servers • Developers don’t pay enough attention
  • 27. Do your homework • Raise awareness
  • 28. Do your homework • Raise awareness • Practice with security tools
  • 29. Do your homework • Raise awareness • Practice with security tools • Promote defensive coding
  • 30. Do your homework • Raise awareness • Practice with security tools • Promote defensive coding • Improve monitoring
  • 34. #1: Built-in default codec grails.views.default.codec
  • 35. #1: Built-in default codec is none! grails.views.default.codec = ’’none’’
  • 36. #1: Built-in default codec is none! Problems You have to escape explicitly every untrusted data: encodeAsHTML() encodeAsJavaScript() encodeAsURL()
  • 37. #1: Built-in default codec is none! Problems High likelihood of XSS vulnerabilities in production. E.g. Grails.org website.
  • 38. #1: Built-in default codec is none! Problems Double-encoding prevention over Security by default.
  • 39. #1: Built-in default codec is none! Solution Change default codec to HTML: grails.views.default.codec = ’’html’’
  • 40. #2: Inconsistent behaviour Apply codec Does not apply codec • GSP EL: ${...}
  • 41. #2: Inconsistent behaviour Apply codec Does not apply codec • GSP EL: ${...} • Tag: <g:tag .../>
  • 42. #2: Inconsistent behaviour Apply codec Does not apply codec • GSP EL: ${...} • Tag: <g:tag .../> • GSP EL in tag attribute: <g:tag a="${...}"/>
  • 43. #2: Inconsistent behaviour Apply codec Does not apply codec • GSP EL: ${...} • Tag: <g:tag .../> • GSP EL in tag attribute: <g:tag a="${...}"/> • Tag as a method: ${g.tag(...)}
  • 44. #2: Inconsistent behaviour Apply codec Does not apply codec • GSP EL: ${...} • Tag: <g:tag .../> • GSP EL in tag attribute: <g:tag a="${...}"/> • Tag as a method: ${g.tag(...)} • Scriptlets: <%= ... %>
  • 45. #2: Inconsistent behaviour Apply codec Does not apply codec • GSP EL: ${...} • Tag: <g:tag .../> • GSP EL in tag attribute: <g:tag a="${...}"/> • Tag as a method: ${g.tag(...)} • Scriptlets: <%= ... %>
  • 46. #3: Tag output is not escaped Problems Review the tags you use to make sure they encode their output or have options for this (e.g. encodeAs attribute).
  • 47. #3: Tag output is not escaped Problems Review the tags from plugins you use.
  • 48. #3: Tag output is not escaped Problems Review the tags you invoke as methods in Controllers.
  • 49. #3: Tag output is not escaped Problems Don’t trust Grails core tags, they have inconsistent behaviour. E.g: <g:fieldValue /> // HTML-encoded <g:message /> // NO HTML-encoded
  • 50. #3: Tag output is not escaped Solutions If tag implementation doesn’t encode, add it explicitly or invoke it as a method inside a GSP expression: <g:message ... encodeAs=’’HTML’’/> ${g.message(...)} g.message(...).encodeAsHTML()
  • 51. #4: g:message doesn’t escape arguments Problems With default codec set to HTML the following XSS attack vector works: <g:message code=’welcome’ args=’[params.user]’/> where: welcome = Hi {0}! params.user = <script>alert(’pwnd’)</script>
  • 52. #4: g:message doesn’t escape arguments Solutions Upgrade to a Grails version with the issue (GRAILS-7170) fixed: 2.0.5, 2.1.5, 2.2.2, 2.3-M1
  • 53. #4: g:message doesn’t escape arguments Solutions Escape explicitly or invoke the tag inside a GSP expression: <g:message code=’welcome’ args=’[params.user]’ encodeAs=’HTML’/> ${g.message(code:’welcome’, args:[params.user])}
  • 54. #5: One codec is not enough You MUST use the escape syntax for the context of the HTML document you’re putting untrusted data into: • HTML • JavaScript • URL • CSS
  • 55. #5: One codec is not enough HTML entity encoding doesn’t work if you’re using untrusted data inside a <script>, or an event handler attribute like onmouseover, or inside CSS, or in a URL.
  • 56. #5: One codec is not enough Problems You can override the default codec for a page, but not to switch the codec for each context: <%@page defaultCodec=’CODEC’ %>
  • 57. #5: One codec is not enough Problems How to manage GSPs with mixed encoding requirements?
  • 58. #5: One codec is not enough Solutions Turn off default codec for that page and use encodeAsJavaScript() and encodeAsHTML() explicitly everywhere.
  • 59. #5: One codec is not enough Solutions Extract the JavaScript fragment to a GSP tag encoding as JavaScript.
  • 61. #1: New configuration more secure by default
  • 62. #1: New configuration more security by default grails { views { gsp { encoding = ’UTF-8’ htmlcodec = ’xml’ // use xml escaping instead of HTML4 codecs { expression = ’html’ // escapes values inside ${} scriptlet = ’html’ // escapes output from scriptlets in GSPs taglib = ’none’ // escapes output from taglibs staticparts = ’none’ // escapes output from static templates } } // escapes all not-encoded output at final stage of outputting filteringCodecForContentType { //’text/html’ = ’html’ } } }
  • 63. #2: Finer-grained control of codecs Control the codecs used per plugin: pluginName.grails.views.gsp.codecs.expression = ’CODEC’
  • 64. #2: Finer-grained control of codecs Control the codecs used per page: <%@ expressionCodec=’CODEC’ %>
  • 65. #2: Finer-grained control of codecs Control the default codec used by a tag library: static defaultEncodeAs = ’HTML’ Or on a per tag basis: static encodeAsForTags = [tagName: ’HTML’]
  • 66. #2: Finer-grained control of codecs Add support for an optional encodeAs attribute to all tags automatically: <my:tag arg=’foo.bar’ encodeAs=’JavaScript’/>
  • 67. #3: Context-sensitive encoding switching Tag withCodec(’CODEC’, Closure) to switch the current default codec, pushing and popping a default codec stack. out.println ’<script type=’’text/javascript’’>’ withCodec(‘‘JavaScript’’) { out << body() } out.println() out.println ’</script>’
  • 68. #3: Context-sensitive encoding switching Core tags like <g:javascript/> and <r:script/> automatically set an appropriate codec.
  • 69. #4: Raw output When you do not wish to encode a value, you can use the raw() method. ${raw(book.title)} It’s available in GSPs, controllers and tag libraries.
  • 70. #5: Default encoding for all output You can configure Grails to encode all output at the end of a response.
  • 71. #5: Default encoding for all output grails { views { gsp { codecs { ... staticparts = ’raw’ // escapes output from static templates } } // escapes all not-encoded output at final stage of outputting filteringCodecForContentType { ’text/html’ = ’html’ } } } If activated, the staticparts codec needs to be set to raw so that static markup is not encoded.
  • 73. Plugins are also part of your application • Grails plugins are not security audited
  • 74. Plugins are also part of your application • Grails plugins are not security audited • Grails plugins are part of your application’s attack surface
  • 75. Plugins are also part of your application • Grails plugins are not security audited • Grails plugins are part of your application’s attack surface • Review plugins to make sure they encode, and if they don’t you should JIRA the authors immediately, and fork and patch to fix your app quickly.
  • 76. E.g. Javamelody vulnerability • CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported.
  • 77. E.g. Javamelody vulnerability • CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported. • Allows blind XSS attack via X-Forwarded-For header spoofing.
  • 78. E.g. Javamelody vulnerability • CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported. • Allows blind XSS attack via X-Forwarded-For header spoofing. • The attack target is the admin’s browser.
  • 79. E.g. Javamelody vulnerability • CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported. • Allows blind XSS attack via X-Forwarded-For header spoofing. • The attack target is the admin’s browser. • Fixed in the last release (1.47).
  • 80. E.g. Javamelody vulnerability • CVE-2013-4378 vulnerability reported. • Allows blind XSS attack via X-Forwarded-For header spoofing. • The attack target is the admin’s browser. • Fixed in the last release (1.47). • You should upgrade ASAP.
  • 83. Think like an attacker • According to your grails version
  • 84. Think like an attacker • According to your grails version • Find unescaped values
  • 85. Think like an attacker • According to your grails version • Find unescaped values • Use fuzzers
  • 86. Think like an attacker • According to your grails version • Find unescaped values • Use fuzzers • Read and understand Samy code
  • 87. Think like an attacker • According to your grails version • Find unescaped values • Use fuzzers • Read and understand Samy code • Review OWASP XSS cheatsheets
  • 88. Be aware • Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic content gets escaped
  • 89. Be aware • Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic content gets escaped • Monitor for suspicious traffic
  • 90. Be aware • Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic content gets escaped • Monitor for suspicious traffic • Spread the knowledge
  • 91. Be aware • Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic content gets escaped • Monitor for suspicious traffic • Spread the knowledge • Adopt ZAP or similar fuzzers in your CI process
  • 92. Be aware • Review your Grails app to double-check how all dynamic content gets escaped • Monitor for suspicious traffic • Spread the knowledge • Adopt ZAP or similar fuzzers in your CI process • Review available security plugins for Grails
  • 93. Application firewalls • Enable common, safe rules
  • 94. Application firewalls • Enable common, safe rules • Log unexpected traffic
  • 95. Application firewalls • Enable common, safe rules • Log unexpected traffic • Don’t fool yourself
  • 96. Early-adopt CSP • CSP: Content Security Policy
  • 97. Early-adopt CSP • CSP: Content Security Policy • Adds headers to disable default behavior
  • 98. Early-adopt CSP • CSP: Content Security Policy • Adds headers to disable default behavior • inline Javascript
  • 99. Early-adopt CSP • CSP: Content Security Policy • Adds headers to disable default behavior • inline Javascript • dynamic code evaluation
  • 100. Early-adopt CSP • CSP: Content Security Policy • Adds headers to disable default behavior • inline Javascript • dynamic code evaluation • Still a Candidate Recommendation of W3C
  • 102. Grails • Is able to defend our application from XSS attacks
  • 103. Grails • Is able to defend our application from XSS attacks • But we need to pay attention to the details
  • 104. Grails • Is able to defend our application from XSS attacks • But we need to pay attention to the details • Upgrade to 2.3 ASAP
  • 105. Grails • Is able to defend our application from XSS attacks • But we need to pay attention to the details • Upgrade to 2.3 ASAP • Pay attention to XSS
  • 106. XSS • Is much more dangerous than defacement jokes
  • 107. XSS • Is much more dangerous than defacement jokes • The browsers are the actual target
  • 108. XSS • Is much more dangerous than defacement jokes • The browsers are the actual target • Difficult to monitor
  • 109. XSS • Is much more dangerous than defacement jokes • The browsers are the actual target • Difficult to monitor • Unconfortable counter-measures in the browser: NoScript, Request Policy
  • 110. Wake up • Write secure applications by default
  • 111. Wake up • Write secure applications by default • Get yourself used with Metasploit, Burp, ZAP
  • 112. Wake up • Write secure applications by default • Get yourself used with Metasploit, Burp, ZAP • Spread the word both horizontally and vertically
  • 113. Picture credits • Cover: http://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/ CC by-nc • White rabbit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/alles-banane/5849593440 CC by-sa-nc • Hieroglyphs: http://www.flickr.com/photos/59372146@N00 CC by-sa-nc • Zombies: http://www.flickr.com/photos/aeviin/4986897433 CC by-sa-nc
  • 114. XSS Countermeasures in Grails Rafael Luque @rafael_luque — OSOCO José San Leandro @rydnr — Ventura24