Keylogging resistant visual authentication Protocols
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The document proposes two visual authentication protocols that aim to resist keylogging attacks: 1) A password-based protocol where the server encrypts a random OTP for the user to decrypt and enter on their terminal. 2) A protocol where the server randomizes a keyboard layout and encrypts it for the user to view on their phone to enter their password on the terminal's blank keyboard. The protocols aim to prevent keyloggers by removing the need for users to type passwords or view decrypted content on compromised terminals. Security analyses argue the protocols would be resistant to keylogging and malware by distributing tasks between devices and users.
![[1] —. Google authenticator. http://code.google.com/p/
google-authenticator/.
[2] —. Rsa securid. http://www.emc.com/security/rsa-securid.htm.
[3] Cronto. http://www.cronto.com/.
[4] —. BS ISO/IEC 18004:2006. information technology. automatic identification
and data capture techniques. ISO/IEC, 2006.
[5] —. ZXing. http://code.google.com/p/zxing/, 2011.
[6] D. Boneh and X. Boyen. Short signatures without random oracles. In
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[7] J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P. C. Van Oorschot, and F. Stajano. The quest
to replace passwords: A framework for comparative evaluation of web
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Keylogging resistant visual authentication Protocols
- 1. Keylogging-resistant Visual Authentication Protocols Vishnu U Roll :58 S7CSE
- 2. Contents Introduction System and threat model Protocols Handling issues related to this protocol Security analysis Conclusion
- 3. Introduction • A keylogger is a software designed to capture all of a user’s keyboard strokes, and then make use of them to impersonate a user in financial transactions. • For example whenever a user types in her password in a bank’s sign in box, the keylogger intercepts the password. The threat of such keyloggers is pervasive and can be present both in personal computers and public kiosks. • Human user’s involvement in the security protocol is sometimes necessary to prevent this type of attacks
- 4. Contd.. • visualization can enhance not only security but also usability by proposing two visual authentication protocols. One for password-based authentication and other for one-time- password based authentication.
- 5. System and Threat Model • In this system model it consists of four different entities which are a user, a smartphone, a user’s terminal and a server. The user is an ordinary human, user’s terminal is a desktop computer or a laptop. • The third system entity is a smartphone which is equipped with a camera and stores a public key certificate of the server for digital signature verification
- 6. Password based authentication protocol 1)The user connects to the server and sends her ID. 2) The server checks the ID to retrieve the user’s public key (PKID) from the database. The server then picks a fresh random string OTP and encrypts it with the public key to obtain EOTP = EncrPKID (OTP). 3) In the terminal, a QR code QREOTP is displayed prompting the user to type in the string.
- 7. Contd.. 4) The user decodes the QR code with EOTP =QRDec(QREOTP ). Because the random string is encrypted with user’s public key (PKID), the user can read the OTP string only through the smartphone by OTP = Decrk(EOTP ) and type in the OTP in the terminal with a physical keyboard. 5) The server checks the result and if it matches what the server has sent earlier, the user is authenticated Otherwise, the user is denied. In this protocol, OTP is any combination of alphabets or numbers whose length is 4 or more depending on the security level required.
- 9. An Authentication Protocol with Password and Randomized Onscreen Keyboard 1) The user connects to the server and sends user’s ID. 2) The server checks the received ID to retrieve the user’s public key (PKID) from the database. The server prepares , a random permutation of a keyboard arrangement, and encrypts it with the public key to obtain EKBD=EncrPKID (). 3)Then, it encodes the cipher text with QR encoder to obtain QREKBD =QREnc(EkID ()). The server sends the result with a blank keyboard.
- 10. 3) In the user’s terminal, a QR code (QREKBD) is displayed together with a blank keyboard. Now, the user executes her smartphone application which first decodes the QR code by applying QRDec(QREKBD) to get the cipher text (EKBD). 4) The cipher text is then decrypted by the smartphone application with the private key of the user to display the result (=DecrSKID(EKBD)) on the smartphone’s screen. Contd..
- 11. 4) When the user sees the blank keyboard with the QR code through an application on the smartphone that has a private key, alphanumeric appear on the blank keyboard and the user can click the proper button for the password. 5)Then the user types in her password on the terminal’s screen while seeing the keyboard layout through the smartphone. The terminal Identities of the buttons clicked by the user are sent to the server by the terminal. Contd..
- 15. High level description • 01: user::user.send(server, id) • 02: server::__upon_id_arrival: • 03: if(server.verify(id) == true): • 04: pkid = server.db.find(id) • 05: pi = server.generate_random_kb() • 06: ekbd = server.encrypt(pkid, pi) • 07: qrekbd = server.qrencode(ekbd) • 08: server.send(user, qrekbd) • 09: terminal::__upon_qrekbd_arrival: • 10: terminal.view(qrekbd)
- 16. • 11: terminal.view_blank_kb(pi) • 12: smartphone::__upon_qrekbd_view: • 13: qrekbd = smartphone.capture(qrekbd) • 14: ekbd = smartphone.qrdecode(qrekbd) • 15: pi = smartphone.decrypt(skid, ekbd) • 16: smartphone.view(pi) • 17: user::__upon_pi_view: • 18: pw = user.inputpassword(terminal) • 19: terminal::upon_pw_input: • 20: terminal.send(server, pw) Contd..
- 17. • 21: server::__upon_pw_arrival: • 22: if(server.verify(id, pw) == true): • 23: server.authenticate(user) • 24: else: • 25: server.deny(user) Contd..
- 18. How to handle several issues related to this protocols Password Hashing Passwords are usually stored in a hashed form with a salt to prevent server attacks. In Protocol 2, we can easily support this password hashing by making the server compare the password hash computed from the stored salt value and the transferred password after decrypting it with the stored password hash value.
- 19. Message signing To prevent the terminal from misrepresenting the contents generated by the server, one can establish the authenticity of the server and the contents generated by it by adding the following verification process. When the server sends the random permutation to the user, it signs the permutation using the server’s private key and the resulting signature is encoded in a QR code. Before decrypting the contents, the user establishes the authenticity of the contents verifying the signature against the server’s public key
- 20. Theft of Smartphone In Protocol 1, theft of smartphone means that the attacker has total control over user’s account if the attacker knows the user’s ID. Protocol1 can be regarded as an authentication protocol requiring only one security token (a smaprtphone) and focusing on user convenience. in Protocol 2, it is not easy to sign in or to make valid transaction requests successfully because it requires not only the smartphone but also the password.
- 21. SECURITY ANALYSIS Protocol 1 Authentication in this protocol is solely based on a random string generated by the server. The random string is encrypted by the public key of the user, and verified against her private key.
- 22. Protocol 2 A blank keyboard is posted on the terminal whereas a randomized keyboard with the alphanumeric on it is posted on the smartphone. Because the protocol does not require the user to do any keyboard input on the smartphone side, the protocol is immune against the key logger attack.
- 23. The user just checks the keyboard layout on the phone and there is no input from a user. Obviously, the terminal might be compromised, but the keylogger will be able to only capture what keystrokes are used on the blank keyboard. Thus, the keylogger will not be able to know which alphanumeric characters are being clicked.
- 24. CONCLUSION In this protocols that not only improve the user experience but also resist challenging attacks, such as the keylogger and malware attack. Using user driven visualization improves security and user friendliness These protocols utilize simple technologies available in most out-of-the-box smartphone devices.
- 25. [1] —. Google authenticator. http://code.google.com/p/ google-authenticator/. [2] —. Rsa securid. http://www.emc.com/security/rsa-securid.htm. [3] Cronto. http://www.cronto.com/. [4] —. BS ISO/IEC 18004:2006. information technology. automatic identification and data capture techniques. ISO/IEC, 2006. [5] —. ZXing. http://code.google.com/p/zxing/, 2011. [6] D. Boneh and X. Boyen. Short signatures without random oracles. In Proc. of EUROCRYPT, pages 56–73, 2004. [7] J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P. C. Van Oorschot, and F. Stajano. The quest to replace passwords: A framework for comparative evaluation of web authentication schemes. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2012 IEEE Symposium on, pages 553–567. IEEE, 2012 REFERENCES