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Red Teaming and
Energy Grid Security
SC PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY
LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
10th Annual EnergySec Summit
21 AUG 2014
Austin, TX
Presented by
Mike Frederick
CIP HAPPENS.
STAY ALERT…
Red Teaming and Energy Grid Security
How does kidney
theft relate to
securing the
American energy
grid?!
We Su©k at Processing Info
J FKFB
INAT OUP
SNA SAI
RS
We Su©k at Processing Info
JFK FBI
NATO UPS
NASA IRS
What Is Red Teaming...
...and What It IS NOT.
Overview
RED
CELL
Introduction to Red Cell concepts
Benefits & Capabilities
Limitations & Drawbacks
Red Teaming and the
American Energy Grid
Case Studies & Examples
Methodology
The Concept
• Assessment of Threats, Plans,
Operations, or Adversaries
• Viewed from the Adversarial
Perspective (Alternative Assessment)
• Structured, Iterative Process
• Trained Team Members
• Independent
• Continuous
“The firmly inculcated doctrine that an admiral’s opinion
was more likely to be right than a captain’s, and a
captain’s more than a commander’s, did not hold good
when questions entirely novel in character, requiring
keen and bold minds unhampered by long routine, were
under debate.”
-Winston Churchill
“To kill an error is as good a service as, and sometimes
even better than, the establishing of a new truth or fact.”
-Charles Darwin
“We do not believe any group of men adequate enough
or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without
criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to
detect it, and that the only way to detect it is to be free to
inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will
flourish and subvert.”
-J. Robert Oppenheimer
Security Posture Extremes
GROUND TRUTH / REALITY
Red Cell History
Richard “Dick” Marcinko,
CDR, USN (ret)
Red Cell History
• Military OPFOR / Red Teams
• “Tiger Teams” (1964)
• Navy’s “Red Cell”
• Cyber Pen-testing
• DARPA / NSCT
• Spread into many gov’t and corporate
organizations...
Related Concepts
• Threat Assessment
• Complicated vs. Complex
• Asking the right questions
• OODA Loops, Contextual
Awareness, and Information
Speed
OODA
OBSERVE
ORIENTACT
DECIDE
OODA Loops
in the NFL
Red Teaming Expands
Red Cell Types
Full physical attack
simulation on
PREPARED target.
LEVEL 1
RED CELL
LEVEL 2
RED CELL
Social engineering,
limited penetration
testing, etc.
Tabletop (intellectual)
exercise only.
LEVEL 3
RED CELL
A
C
T
I
V
E
P
A
S
S
I
V
E
Why Red Cell?
• Black Swans (hedge against “5σ” surprise)
• Complacency Killer
• Breaks Silos
• Teaches institutional recognition of
suspicious behavior
• Teaches institutional recognition of flawed
thinking and constructs
• “Sense Making” – Collective application of
individual intuition to identify changes in
patterns (or new patterns)
Why Not?
• Situational / Conditional Issues
- Scenario Problems; Poor
Exercise Design
• Organizational Issues
- Team Relation; Political
Restraints; Misunderstanding
Results
What Red Cells Can’t Do
• Detect every Black Swan (never enough
info to predict all possible scenarios)
• No “checklist” can replace logical thought
• Only one way to confirm enemy intentions
(wait for the attack)
• Serve as fault-finding expedition
Red Cell
Methodology
What do our
adversaries want?
How will they try to
achieve their goals?
How do we stop
them?
ID/Train
Participants
EXERCISE
Document/evaluate
results
IMPROVEMENTS
Red Cell = Cycles, not Steps
Red Cell Guidelines
• Access to background information
• Subject matter experts
• Adhere to protocol / decision making
system
• Think creatively (requires effort)
• Don’t obsess on failure (past, present, or
anticipated)
• Work the problems (don’t let them work
you)
Assessment Techniques
• Pre-mortem
• Red Cell / Physical
Pen testing
• SWOT
• WRAP
• Dilbert?! Six Filters…
• A Team / B Team
• Argument
Deconstruction
• Contrarian
Analysis
• Devil’s Advocacy
• Occam’s Razor
“What would have to be true to allow or
make this happen?”
Red Teamer Skill Levels
• APPRENTICE: Can think like the attacker.
• JOURNEYMAN: Can think like the attacker
and defender.
• MASTER: Able to think like the attacker
and defender thinking about each other.
Hire an apprentice to model an
unsophisticated adversary; a journeyman to
model a sophisticated one. Hire masters to
model the entire system...
Mumbai, India 2008
• 26 NOV 2008
• 11 Coordinated
assaults
• Low-tech (“guys
with guns”)
• Porous border
Low-Tech
Coordinated Assault
Low-Tech Coordinated Assaults
Against US?
• 30 Operatives (minimal training)
• Porous border? Docs?
• $75,000 for housing, rifles, ammo
• Pre-raid surveillance / planning
• Phase I – Malls
• Phase II – Grocery Stores / Wal-Marts
• Phase III – Elementary Schools
• Phase IV – Houses of Worship
• Results? Retail, food shopping, culture, and
education systems?
Low-Tech Coordinated Assaults
Against US?
Beltway Snipers (3 weeks – OCT 2002)
John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo
Beslan School
1 – 3 SEP 2004
~1100 hostages (~775 kids)
~334 killed (including 186
children)
Dam Sabotage
Insider Threats (not new)
• WWII B-17 “Tondelayo” (as related in “The
Fall of Fortresses” by Elmer Bendiner)
• Bomb run over Kassell, Germany
• Piloted by Bohn Fawkes; story told by
Bendiner
• Eleven 20mm explosive shells in aircraft...
Energy Grid Attacks
The general who attempts to
protect everything, protects
nothing.
Those generals who have had but little
experience attempt to protect every
point, while those who are better
acquainted with their profession, having
only the capital object in view, guard
against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in
small misfortunes to avoid greater.
Frederick the Great
Santee Cooper Red Cell
So, what?
A newspaper is better than a magazine. A
seashore is a better place than the street. At first
it is better to run than to walk. You may have to
try several times. It takes some skill, but it is easy
to learn. Even young children can enjoy it. Once
successful, complications are minimal. Birds
seldom get too close. Rain, however, soaks in
very fast. Too many people doing the same thing
can cause problems. One needs lots of room. If
there are no complications, it can be very
peaceful. A rock will serve as an anchor. If
things break loose from it, however, you will not
get a second chance.
Red Teaming and
Energy Grid Security
SC PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY
LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
QUESTIONS?
Presented by
Mike Frederick

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Red Teaming and Energy Grid Security

  • 1. Red Teaming and Energy Grid Security SC PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION 10th Annual EnergySec Summit 21 AUG 2014 Austin, TX Presented by Mike Frederick
  • 4. How does kidney theft relate to securing the American energy grid?!
  • 5. We Su©k at Processing Info J FKFB INAT OUP SNA SAI RS
  • 6. We Su©k at Processing Info JFK FBI NATO UPS NASA IRS
  • 7. What Is Red Teaming... ...and What It IS NOT.
  • 8. Overview RED CELL Introduction to Red Cell concepts Benefits & Capabilities Limitations & Drawbacks Red Teaming and the American Energy Grid Case Studies & Examples Methodology
  • 9. The Concept • Assessment of Threats, Plans, Operations, or Adversaries • Viewed from the Adversarial Perspective (Alternative Assessment) • Structured, Iterative Process • Trained Team Members • Independent • Continuous
  • 10. “The firmly inculcated doctrine that an admiral’s opinion was more likely to be right than a captain’s, and a captain’s more than a commander’s, did not hold good when questions entirely novel in character, requiring keen and bold minds unhampered by long routine, were under debate.” -Winston Churchill “To kill an error is as good a service as, and sometimes even better than, the establishing of a new truth or fact.” -Charles Darwin “We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, and that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert.” -J. Robert Oppenheimer
  • 12. Red Cell History Richard “Dick” Marcinko, CDR, USN (ret)
  • 13. Red Cell History • Military OPFOR / Red Teams • “Tiger Teams” (1964) • Navy’s “Red Cell” • Cyber Pen-testing • DARPA / NSCT • Spread into many gov’t and corporate organizations...
  • 14. Related Concepts • Threat Assessment • Complicated vs. Complex • Asking the right questions • OODA Loops, Contextual Awareness, and Information Speed
  • 18. Red Cell Types Full physical attack simulation on PREPARED target. LEVEL 1 RED CELL LEVEL 2 RED CELL Social engineering, limited penetration testing, etc. Tabletop (intellectual) exercise only. LEVEL 3 RED CELL A C T I V E P A S S I V E
  • 19. Why Red Cell? • Black Swans (hedge against “5σ” surprise) • Complacency Killer • Breaks Silos • Teaches institutional recognition of suspicious behavior • Teaches institutional recognition of flawed thinking and constructs • “Sense Making” – Collective application of individual intuition to identify changes in patterns (or new patterns)
  • 20. Why Not? • Situational / Conditional Issues - Scenario Problems; Poor Exercise Design • Organizational Issues - Team Relation; Political Restraints; Misunderstanding Results
  • 21. What Red Cells Can’t Do • Detect every Black Swan (never enough info to predict all possible scenarios) • No “checklist” can replace logical thought • Only one way to confirm enemy intentions (wait for the attack) • Serve as fault-finding expedition
  • 22. Red Cell Methodology What do our adversaries want? How will they try to achieve their goals? How do we stop them?
  • 24. Red Cell Guidelines • Access to background information • Subject matter experts • Adhere to protocol / decision making system • Think creatively (requires effort) • Don’t obsess on failure (past, present, or anticipated) • Work the problems (don’t let them work you)
  • 25. Assessment Techniques • Pre-mortem • Red Cell / Physical Pen testing • SWOT • WRAP • Dilbert?! Six Filters… • A Team / B Team • Argument Deconstruction • Contrarian Analysis • Devil’s Advocacy • Occam’s Razor “What would have to be true to allow or make this happen?”
  • 26. Red Teamer Skill Levels • APPRENTICE: Can think like the attacker. • JOURNEYMAN: Can think like the attacker and defender. • MASTER: Able to think like the attacker and defender thinking about each other. Hire an apprentice to model an unsophisticated adversary; a journeyman to model a sophisticated one. Hire masters to model the entire system...
  • 27. Mumbai, India 2008 • 26 NOV 2008 • 11 Coordinated assaults • Low-tech (“guys with guns”) • Porous border Low-Tech Coordinated Assault
  • 28. Low-Tech Coordinated Assaults Against US? • 30 Operatives (minimal training) • Porous border? Docs? • $75,000 for housing, rifles, ammo • Pre-raid surveillance / planning • Phase I – Malls • Phase II – Grocery Stores / Wal-Marts • Phase III – Elementary Schools • Phase IV – Houses of Worship • Results? Retail, food shopping, culture, and education systems?
  • 29. Low-Tech Coordinated Assaults Against US? Beltway Snipers (3 weeks – OCT 2002) John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo
  • 30. Beslan School 1 – 3 SEP 2004 ~1100 hostages (~775 kids) ~334 killed (including 186 children)
  • 32. Insider Threats (not new) • WWII B-17 “Tondelayo” (as related in “The Fall of Fortresses” by Elmer Bendiner) • Bomb run over Kassell, Germany • Piloted by Bohn Fawkes; story told by Bendiner • Eleven 20mm explosive shells in aircraft...
  • 34. The general who attempts to protect everything, protects nothing.
  • 35. Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater. Frederick the Great
  • 37. So, what? A newspaper is better than a magazine. A seashore is a better place than the street. At first it is better to run than to walk. You may have to try several times. It takes some skill, but it is easy to learn. Even young children can enjoy it. Once successful, complications are minimal. Birds seldom get too close. Rain, however, soaks in very fast. Too many people doing the same thing can cause problems. One needs lots of room. If there are no complications, it can be very peaceful. A rock will serve as an anchor. If things break loose from it, however, you will not get a second chance.
  • 38. Red Teaming and Energy Grid Security SC PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION QUESTIONS? Presented by Mike Frederick