![some
suspected terrorists were up to-and to do it quickly and
completely
enough for something to be done to head it off. Okay, fim
thought,
I know how to do that kind of thing. If they give us decent data,
we
should have no problem making sense of it.
For Ginny, it was quite a bit different from her regular work as
a
university-based chemist. She had been invited to be a member
of a
group that was going to act like terrorists for the next few days.
Ginny
had not known quite what that might mean, but if her day of
"accul-
turation" into the terrorist mindset was any indication it was
going to
be pretty intense. She had never met any of her teammates, but
she
knew that all of them were specialists in some aspect of science
or
technology. She was eager to learn more about her team and to
see
what they might be able to cook up together.
]im and Ginny were participating in a three-day run of a simula-
tion known as Project Looking Glass (PLG). The brainchild of
Fred
Ambrose, a senior CIA intelligence officer, PLG simulations pit
a
team of intelligence and law enforcement professionals (the
"blue
teern]'l aoeinst a "red team" of savyv adversaries intent on
harming our](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/processestheappropri-ingand3ntofitsshowss-221026040959-aa4f3305/85/processesthe-appropri-ing-and-3-nt-of-itsshows-s-docx-2-320.jpg)
processesthe appropri-ing, and (3)nt of itsshows s.docx
- 1. processes the appropri- ing, and (3) nt of its shows signs ia, a coaching turns out that it is struc- 1n some itions:what to get them Fnou I hllabuahrchtellt"ttnLl: lls,nq6a'm s lz Solvc +lrnd Prabbrm s 'r. t,ehutd iJ"ort*-- il$"il{Pl"f.R 1L Teams That Work and Those That Don't $ t was not all that different from his regular work. |im, an analyst at ff the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), looked around at the other members of his team. He knew two of them-another analyst from DIA and an FBI agent he had once worked with; the rest were strang- ers. The team's job, the organizethad said, was to figure outwhat
- 2. some suspected terrorists were up to-and to do it quickly and completely enough for something to be done to head it off. Okay, fim thought, I know how to do that kind of thing. If they give us decent data, we should have no problem making sense of it. For Ginny, it was quite a bit different from her regular work as a university-based chemist. She had been invited to be a member of a group that was going to act like terrorists for the next few days. Ginny had not known quite what that might mean, but if her day of "accul- turation" into the terrorist mindset was any indication it was going to be pretty intense. She had never met any of her teammates, but she knew that all of them were specialists in some aspect of science or technology. She was eager to learn more about her team and to see what they might be able to cook up together. ]im and Ginny were participating in a three-day run of a simula- tion known as Project Looking Glass (PLG). The brainchild of Fred Ambrose, a senior CIA intelligence officer, PLG simulations pit a team of intelligence and law enforcement professionals (the "blue teern]'l aoeinst a "red team" of savyv adversaries intent on harming our
- 3. country or its interests. A "whits 1s2rn"-2 group of intelligence and content specialists-plays the role of the rest of the intelligence com- munity. The charge to the red team was to use everything members knew or could find out to develop the best possible plan for doing the , 1 $ T E A M S I N I N T E L L I G E N C E greatest possible damage to a target specified by the organizers- in this case, a medium-sized coastal city that was home to a large naval base. Members could supplement their own knowledge by consulting open sources such as the Internet and by seeking counsel from other individuals in their personal or professional networks. But what they came up with was to be entirely the product of team members' own imagination and ingenuity. To help them adopt the perspectives of those who really are intent on doing damage to our country, red team members spent a day of accul- turation. It was like an advanced seminar on terrorism, Ginny thought. Team members heard lectures from both scholars and practitioners on
- 4. everything from the tenets of radical Islamic philosophy to the strategy and tactics of terrorist recruitment. By the end of the day, Ginny was surprised to find herself actually thinking and talking like a terrorist. Her red teammates seemed to be doing the same. Ginny and her teammates were aware that the blue team would have access to a great many of their activities-they would be able to watch video captures of some of the red team's discussions, tap into some of their electronic communications and Internet searches, and actively seek other data that might help them crack whatever plot they were hatching. The blue team also had heard lectures and briefings about terrorists, including specific information on the backgrounds and areas of expertise of red team members. |im found these briefings interesting, but mostly he was eager to get beyond all the warm- up activities and into the actual simulation. And, by the beginning of the second day, the game was afoot. The start-up of the red and blue teams couldhardly have been more different. The red team began by reviewing its purpose and then assessing its members' resources-the expertise, experience, and outside contacts that could be drawn upon in creating a devastating attack on the coastal city. Members then launched into a period
- 5. of brainstorming about ways the team could use those resources to inflict the greatest damage possible and, moreover, do so in a way that would misdirect members of the blue team, who they knew would be watch- ing them closely. The blue team, by contrast, began by going around the room, with each member identifying his or her back-home organization and role. by the organizers-in ; home to a large naval rowledge by consulting ing counsel from other :tworks. But what they rf team members' own who really are intent on rs spent a day ofaccul- iorism, Ginny thought. .rs and practitioners on ilosophy to the strategy of the day, Ginny was talking like a terrorist. l e . the blue team would -they would be able to s discussions, tap into
- 6. lnternet searches, and ack whatever plot they lectures and briefings r on the backgrounds r found these briefings yond all the warm-up y the beginning of the Teams That Work and Those That Don't i l Once that was done, it was not clear what to do next. Members chatted about why they had chosen to attend the simulation, discussed some interesting issues that had come up in the previous day's lectures, and had some desultory conversations about what it was that they were sup- posed to be doing. There were neither serious disagreements nor signs ofa struggle for leadership, but also no discernable forward movement. Then the first video capture ofthe red team at work arrived. The video made little sense. It showed the team exchanging information about each member's special expertise and experience, but nothing they said was about what they were actually planning to do. Assured that nothing specific was "up," at least not yet, blue team members reiaxed a little. But it was frustrating not to have any hard data in hand that they could assess and interpret using their analytic skills and experience.
- 7. As blue team members' frustrations mounted, they turned to the white team-the broader intelligence community. To obtain data needed for their analytic work, including information about some of the activities of the red team they had seen on the video, blue team members were allowed to submit requests for information (RFIs) to the white team. Some RFIs were answered, sometimes immediately and sometimes after a delay; others were ignored. It was, fim thought, just like being back at work. By early in the second day of the simulation, the red team had turned the corner and gone from exploring alternatives to generating specific plans for a multipronged attack on the coastal city and its environs. Now blue team members were getting worried. They finally realized ' that they had no idea what the red team was up to, and they became more and more frustrated and impatient-with each other, certainly, but especially with the unhelpfulness of the white team. So the team did what intelligence analysts often do when frustrated: they sought more data,lots and lots of it. Eventually the number of RFIs became so large that a member of the white team, experiencing his own frustra-
- 8. tion, walked into the blue team conference room and told members that they were acting like "data junkies" and that they ought to slow down and figure out what they actually needed to know to make sense of the red team's behavior. That did not help. Indeed, as accurate as the accusation may have been, it served mainly to increase blue team members' impatience. As l could hardly have been more ewing its purpose and then e expertise, experience, and pon in creating a devastating en launched into a period of d use those resources to inflict rver, do so in a way that would ro they knew would be watch- going around the room, with k-home organization and role. 1 ? . T E A M S I N I N T E L L I G E N E E tension escalated, both negative emotions and reliance on stereotypes also increased-stereotypes of their red team adversaries, to be sure ("How could that weird set of people possibly come up with any kind of serious threat)"), but also stereotypes of other blue team
- 9. members. Law enforcement and intelligence professionals, for example, fell into a pattern of conflict that nearly incapacitated the team: When a member of one group would offer a hypothesis about what might be going on, some- one from the other group would immediately find a reason to dismiss it. Things finally got so difficult for the blue team that members could agree on only one thing-namely, that they should replace their assigned leader, who was both younger and less experienced than the other members, with someone more seasoned. They settled on a navy officer who was acceptable to both the law enforcement and the intel- ligence contingents, and she helped the group prepare a briefing that described the blue team's inferences about the red team's plans. The briefing would be presented the next day when everyone reconvened to hear first the blue team's analysis, and then a presentation by the red team describing what they actually intended to do. The blue team's briefing showed that members had indeed identi- fied some aspects of the red team's plan. But blue team members had gotten so caught up in certain specifics of that plan that they had failed to see their adversaries' elegant two-stage strategy. First there
- 10. would be a feint intended to misdirect first responders' attention, followed by a technology-driven attack that would devastate the coastal city, its people, and its institutions. The blue team had completely missed what actually was coming down. Participants were noticeably shaken as they reflected together on their three-day experience, a feeling perhaps best expressed during the debriefing by one blue team member who worked in law enforcement: "What we saw here," he said, "is almost exactly the kind of behavior that we've observed among some people we are tracking back home. It's pretty scary." ide dir ist The scenario DEt descrtVO r" typyll of may/vtG s{tulationyahat have been /nducted 16, recent.fearc. Fre{ Ambrg{e develofid the ver as mi lic; m( wk ad,
- 11. inl wl irr. ist w H r p€ de iti (z b c m 4 l o o a( ol si fc w ir tl Question 3: “Project Looking Glass” (50 pts) Review the document “RA3_ProjectLookingGlass.pdf and address the following questions: (a) Provide a 1 paragraph summary (for this one only, no bullet points) (b) Compare the start-up of the Red Team and the Blue team from the perspective of Tuckman’s model of group development: Describe which stages each group went through.
- 12. Provide supporting rationale. (~1 paragraph each) (c) Analyze the Blue Team using the 5 Dysfunctions of a Team pyramid: Provide an overall assessment (1-2 sentences). Provide supporting rationale for each level (Bullet points for each level of the pyramid) (d) Describe an event on one of the teams that suggests a faultline had erupted. Provide supporting rationale. (1-2 paragraphs) (e) Evaluate the Red Team from the perspective of the 12 Elements of Great Management: Pick two elements and show how they apply to the Red Team. (~1 paragraph each) Grading Rubric 3: Project Looking Glass (50 pts) Review the document “RA3_ProjectLookingGlass.pdf and address the following questions: (f) Provide a 1 paragraph summary (for this one only, no bullet points) (g) Compare the start-up of the Red Team and the Blue team from the perspective of Tuckman’s model of group development: Describe which stages each group went through. Provide supporting rationale. (~1 paragraph each) (h) Analyze the Blue Team using the 5 Dysfunctions of a Team pyramid: Provide an overall assessment (1-2 sentences). Provide supporting rationale for each level (Bullet points for each level of the pyramid) (i) Describe an event on one of the teams that suggests a faultline had erupted. Provide supporting rationale. (1-2 paragraphs) (j) Evaluate the Red Team from the perspective of the 12 Elements of Great Management: Pick two elements and show how they apply to the Red Team. Deductions Baseline “B” Grade
- 13. (42 pts) Additional Points (a) · Mistakes in basic understanding · >1 paragraph · Uses bullet points · Reasonable summary · 1 paragraph · No bullets · Provides special insight · Especially clear, concise, rich description within 1 paragraph limit (b) · Fails to identify Tuckman stages in general · Incorrectly identifies Tuckman stages for either team · Missing or weak rationale · Clearly & explicitly identifies Tuckman Model · Accurately assesses development of Red Team · Accurately assesses development of Blue team · Provides reasonable supporting rationale and examples · Insightful analysis · Strong justifications · Good supporting evidence (c) · Fails to identify 5 Dysfunctions in general · Incorrectly identifies Dysfunction for team · Missing or weak rationale · Clearly & explicitly identifies the 5 Dysfunctions · Accurately assesses Blue Team relative to the 5 Dysfunctions · Provides reasonable supporting rationale and examples · Especially insightful description · Strong rationale · Good supporting evidence · Connects to team experiences
- 14. (d) · Mistakes in basic understanding of “faultline” · Incorrectly identifies faultline for team · Missing or weak rationale · Demonstrates understanding of what a “faultline” is · Accurately identifies potential faultline in team · Provides reasonable supporting rationale · Particularly insightful analysis · Strong rationale · Connects to relevant class concepts · Connects to relevant team experiences (e) · Answer not explicitly stated · Fails to identify 2 elements · 2 Elements are not relevant · Faulty logic in rationale · Evidence doesn’t support choice · Identifies 2 (and only 2) relevant elements from the 12 Elements · Accurately applies these two elements to the Red Team · Provides reasonable supporting rationale · Insightful analysis · Strong justifications · Good supporting evidence · Connects to relevant class concepts · Connects to relevant team experiences