Misinfosec frameworks Cansecwest 2019
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The document discusses frameworks for analyzing misinformation from an information security perspective. It begins by describing the problem of misinformation and how it has evolved, then introduces a misinformation-focused version of the ATT&CK framework for mapping misinformation techniques. The framework is populated with real-world examples and analytical approaches. The goal is to establish common languages and methods for understanding, tracking, and responding to misinformation across different communities.
![MISINFORMATION VIEWED ASβ¦
β’ Information security (Gordon, Grugq, Rogers)
β’ Information operations / influence operations (Lin)
β’ A form of conflict (Singer, Gerasimov)
β’ [A social problem]
β’ [News source pollution]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/terpbreuermisinfosecframeworkscansecwest2019-190321014759/85/Misinfosec-frameworks-Cansecwest-2019-17-320.jpg)
Misinfosec frameworks Cansecwest 2019
- 1. INFOSEC FRAMEWORKS FOR MISINFORMATION SARA βSJβ TERP AND PABLO BREUER CANSECWEST 2019
- 2. TALK OBJECTIVES β’ Describe the problem β’ Establish a common language β’ Introduce a framework β’ Talk about what we can do with the framework
- 4. SOCIAL ENGINEERING AT SCALE Facebook Group Shares Interactions Blacktivists 103,767,792 6,182,835 Txrebels 102,950,151 3,453,143 MuslimAmerica 71,355,895 2,128,875 Patriototus 51,139,860 4,438,745 Secured.Borders 5,600,136 1,592,771 Lgbtun 5,187,494 1,262,386
- 5. INTENT TO DECEIVE Force adversary to make decision or take action based on information that I: β’ Hide β’ Give β’ Change (or change the context on) β’ Deny/degrade β’ Destroy Enable my decisions based upon knowing yours βOperations to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objectives reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individualsβ
- 6. ARTEFACTS
- 7. ARTEFACTS
- 8. Describing the problem Why misinformation is different now
- 9. INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER β¦and how to influence other nation-states. Diplomatic Informational Military Economic Resources available in pursuit of national objectivesβ¦
- 10. NATIONSTATE MISINFORMATION From To Brazil Brazil China China, Taiwan, US Iran India, Pakistan Russia Armenia, France, Germany, Netherlands, Philippines, Serbia, UK, USA, Ukraine, World Saudi Qatar Unknown France, Germany, USA
- 13. OTHER ACTORS AND THEIR MOTIVATIONS β’ State and non-state actors β’ Entrepreneurs β’ Grassroots groups β’ Private influencers
- 14. RESPONSE: NOT JUST ADMIRING THE PROBLEM
- 16. MISINFOSEC: MISINFORMATION + INFOSEC All cyberspace operations are based on influence. - Pablo Breuer
- 17. MISINFORMATION VIEWED AS⦠⒠Information security (Gordon, Grugq, Rogers) ⒠Information operations / influence operations (Lin) ⒠A form of conflict (Singer, Gerasimov) ⒠[A social problem] ⒠[News source pollution]
- 18. ATTACK. DEFEND. NETWORKS. LOOKED FAMILIAR.
- 19. MAYBE THERE WERE THINGS WE COULD USE
- 20. ADDING MISINFORMATION TO INFOSEC βPrevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiationβ - NSPD-54
- 21. INFOSEC ALREADY INCLUDES COGNITIVE
- 22. PSYOPS AND INFOSEC ARENβT JOINED UP Information Operations PSYOPS Computer Network Operations
- 23. INFOSEC SUPPORT TO MISINFORMATION TRACKING
- 24. THEREβS NO COMMON LANGUAGE βWe use misinformation attack (and misinformation campaign) to refer to the deliberate promotion of false, misleading or mis-attributed information. Whilst these attacks occur in many venues (print, radio, etc), we focus on the creation, propagation and consumption of misinformation online. We are especially interested in misinformation designed to change beliefs in a large number of people.β
- 25. MISINFOSEC COMMUNITIES β Industry β Academia β Media β Community β Government
- 26. FIRST OUTPUT: MISINFOSEC FRAMEWORK STANDARDS
- 28. STAGE-BASED MODELS ARE USEFUL RECON WEAPONIZE DELIVER EXPLOIT CONTROL EXECUTE MAINTAIN Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Execution Collection Exfiltration Command and Control
- 29. WE CHOSE THE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK
- 30. AND STARTED MAPPING MISINFORMATION ONTO IT Initial Access Create Artefacts Insert Theme Amplify Message Command And Control Account takeover Steal existing artefacts Create fake emergency Repeat messaging with bots Create fake real-life events Create fake group Deepfake Create fake argument Parody account Buy friends Deep cover
- 31. POPULATING THE FRAMEWORK β’ Campaigns β’ e.g. Internet Research Agency, 2016 US elections β’ Incidents β’ e.g. Columbia Chemicals β’ Failed attempts β’ e.g. Russia - France campaigns
- 33. HISTORICAL CATALOG: DATASHEET β’ Summary: Early Russian (IRA) βfake newsβ stories. Completely fabricated; very short lifespan. β’ Actor: probably IRA (source: recordedfuture) β’ Timeframe: Sept 11 2014 (1 day) β’ Presumed goals: test deployment β’ Artefacts: text messages, images, video β’ Related attacks: These were all well-produced fake news stories, promoted on Twitter to influencers through a single dominant hashtag -- #BPoilspilltsunami, #shockingmurderinatlanta, β’ Method: 1. Create messages. e.g. βA powerful explosion heard from miles away happened at a chemical plant in Centerville, Louisiana #ColumbianChemicalsβ 2. Post messages from fake twitter accounts; include handles of local and global influencers (journalists, media, politicians, e.g. @senjeffmerkley) 3. Amplify, by repeating messages on twitter via fake twitter accounts β’ Result: limited traction β’ Counters: None seen. Fake stories were debunked very quickly.
- 34. FEEDS INTO TECHNIQUES LIST β’ Behavior: two groups meeting in same place at same time β’ Intended effect: IRL tension / conflict β’ Requirements: access to groups, group trust β’ Detection: β’ Handling: β’ Examples: Title Description Short_Description Intended_Effect Behavior Resources Victim_Targeting Exploit_Targets Related_TTPs Kill_chain_Phases Information_Source Klil_Chains Handling
- 35. THIS IS WHAT A FINISHED FRAMEWORK LOOKS LIKE
- 37. INCIDENT ANALYSIS Top-down (strategic): info ops β What are misinformation creators likely to do? What, where, when, how, who, why? β What do we expect to see? β What responses and impediments to responses were there? Bottom-up (tactical): data science βUnusual hashtag, trend, topic, platform activity? βContent from βknownβ trollbots, 8/4chan, r/thedonald, RussiaToday etc βWhat are trackers getting excited about today?
- 38. Top-down analysis Means of implementing influence strategies
- 40. DISTORTION TECHNIQUES β’ Distort facts: match intended outcome β’ Exaggerate: rhetoric & misrepresent facts β’ Generate: realistic false artifacts β’ Mismatch: links, images, and claims to change context of information
- 41. DISTRACTION TECHNIQUES β’ String along: respond to anyone who engages to waste time β’ Play dumb: pretend to be naive, gullible, stupid β’ Redirect: draw engagement to your thread β’ Dilute: add other accounts to dilute threads β’ Threadjack: change narrative in existing thread
- 42. DIVISION TECHNIQUES β’ Provoke: create conflicts and confusion among community members β’ Dehumanize: demean and denigrate target group β’ Hate speech: attack protected characteristics or classes β’ Play victim: claim victim status β’ Dog-whistle: use coded language to indicate insider status β’ Hit and run: attack and delete after short time interval β’ Call to arms: make open calls for action
- 43. DISMAY TECHNIQUES β’ Ad hominem: make personal attacks, insults & accusations β’ Assign threats: name and personalize enemy β’ Good old-fashioned tradecraft
- 44. DISMISSAL TECHNIQUES β’ Last word: respond to hostile commenters then block them so they canβt reply β’ Brigading: coordinate mass attacks or reporting of targeted accounts or tweets β’ Shit list: add target account(s) to insultingly named list(s)
- 45. Bottom-up analysis Collecting Artefacts to find incidents
- 47. RESOURCES Trollbot lists: β’ https://botsentinel.com/ Tools: β’ APIs / python libraries / Pandas β’ https://github.com/IHJpc2V1cCAK/socint β’ https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2018/02/16/searching-twitter-with-twarc/ Existing datasets β’ https://github.com/bodacea/misinfolinks
- 50. ARTEFACTS: TEXT (WORDS, HASHTAGS, URLS ETC)
- 52. MOVING UP: CONTENT AND CONTEXT ANALYSIS β’ Metadata analysis β’ Social network analysis β’ Text analysis (frequency, sentiment etc) β’ Time series analysis β’ Visual inspection (Bokeh, Gephi etc) β’ Correlation β’ Models, e.g. clustering and classification β’ Narrative analysis
- 55. EXPERT TRACKERS @katestarbird #digitalsherlocks @josh_emerson @conspirator0 @r0zetta@fs0c131y
- 56. WHY BUILD FRAMEWORKS? β¦ what do we do with them?
- 57. COMPONENTWISE UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONSE β’ Lingua Franca across communities β’ Defend/countermove against reused techniques, identify gaps in attacks β’ Assess defence tools & techniques β’ Plan for large-scale adaptive threats (hello, Machine Learning!) β’ Build an alert structure (e.g. ISAC, US-CERT, Interpol)
- 58. WE NEED TO DESIGN AND SHARE RESPONSES
- 59. WE NEED TO BUILD COMMUNITIES β Industry β Academia β Media β Community β Government
- 60. WE NEED INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND COORDINATION
- 63. THANK YOU Sara βSJβ Terp Bodacea Light Industries sarajterp@gmail.com @bodaceacat CDR Pablo C. Breuer U.S. Special Operations Command / SOFWERX Pablo.Breuer@sofwerx.org @Ngree_H0bit
- 64. Community β’ Parody-based counter-campaigns (e.g. riffs on βQβ) β’ SEO-hack misinformation sites β’ Dogpile onto misinformation hashtags β’ Divert followers (typosquat trolls, spoof messaging etc) β’ Identify and engage with affected individuals β’ Educate, verify, bring into the light 64
- 65. Offense: Potentials for Next β’ Algorithms + humans attack algorithms + humans β’ Shift from trolls to βnudgingβ existing human communities (βuseful idiotsβ) β’ Subtle attacks, e.g. βlow-and-slowsβ, βpop-upβ, etc β’ Massively multi-channel attacks β’ More commercial targets β’ A well-established part of hybrid warfare 65
- 66. Defence: Potential for next β’ Strategic and tactical collaboration β’ Trusted third-party sharing on fake news sites / botnets β’ Misinformation version of ATT&CK, SANS20 frameworks β’ Algorithms + humans counter algorithms + humans β’ Thinking the unthinkable β’ βCountermeasures and self-defense actionsβ 66