Performance Audit on Functioning of Unique Identification Authority of India

MANISH
KUMAR
Digitally signed
by MANISH
KUMAR
Date: 2022.04.06
10:14:19 +05'30'

Report of the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India
on
Functioning of Unique Identification Authority of
India
Union Government
(Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology)
(Performance Audit)
Report No. 24 of 2021

i
CONTENTS
Para Title Pages
Executive Summary v-x
Chapter 1-Introduction 1-6
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Constitutional validity of Aadhaar 2
1.3 UIDAI Authority 3
1.3.1 Powers of the Authority 3
1.3.2 Organizational Set-up 4
1.3.3 Registrars 5
1.3.4 Enrolment Agencies 5
1.4 Legislation, Rules and Regulations 6
1.5 Structure of the Report 6
Chapter 2-Scope of Audit, Audit Objectives and
Methodology
7-10
2.1 Scope of Audit 7
2.2 Audit Objectives 7
2.3 Audit Criteria 7
2.4 Audit Methodology 8
2.5 Good Practices 8
2.6 Acknowledgement and Constraints 9
Chapter-3 Enrolment, Update and Authentication
Ecosystem
11-34
3.1 Enrolment and Update Ecosystem 11
3.1.1 Key Regulations and Amendments 12
3.1.2 Status of Aadhaar Enrolment and Update 14
3.1.3 Aadhaar Saturation Status 16
3.1.4 The Components of Aadhaar Ecosystem 16
3.1.5 De-duplication process 17
3.1.6 Bio-metric Device Certification 18
3.1.7 Managed Service Provider 18
3.1.8 Governance Risk Compliance and Performance – Service
Provider
18
3.2 Audit Observations on Aadhaar Enrolment Ecosystem 18
3.2.1 Verification of the ‘Resident’ status of the applicants 18

ii
3.2.2 Generation of Multiple Aadhaar 19
3.2.3 Enrolment for Aadhaar of Minor Children below age of
five years
21
3.2.4 Management of Aadhaar Documents 23
3.3 Audit Observations on Aadhaar Update Ecosystem 24
3.3.1 Voluntary Biometric Updates 25
3.4 Aadhaar Authentication Ecosystem 26
3.4.1 Aadhaar Authentication Partners 27
3.4.2 Key Regulations and Amendments 27
3.4.3 Status of Authentication Transactions 28
3.5 Audit observations on Monitoring of Ecosystem partners
on compliance to the provisions of Aadhaar
(Authentication) Regulations 2016
29
3.5.1 Incidences of Authentication Errors 29
3.5.2 Non verification of the infrastructure and technical support
of Requesting Entities and Authentication Service
Agencies
30
3.6 Other related Audit Observations 31
3.6.1 Data Archival Policy 32
3.6.2 Delivery of Aadhaar Documents 32
Chapter-4 Management of Finances and Contracts 35-48
4.1 Introduction-Budget and Finance 35
4.2 Audit Observations on Revenue Management 36
4.2.1 Non-Levy of charges for delivery of authentication
services
36
4.3 Contract Management 38
4.3.1 Selection of Contracts 38
4.4 Audit Observations on Contract Management 39
4.4.1 Liquidated damages (LD) for deficient performance of
biometric solutions not levied
40
4.4.2 Deficiencies in monitoring contracts with NISG 41
4.4.2.1 State Resource Personnel (SRP) contract with National
Institute of Smart Governance (NISG) extended beyond
the period envisaged in the ICT guidelines
43
4.4.2.2 Deficiencies in engagement of Field Service Engineers
(FSE)
44
4.4.3 Rebate on Franking Values on dispatch of Aadhaar not
availed
45

iii
4.4.4 Monitoring of Information & Communication Technology
(ICT) Assistance to States
46
Chapter-5 Security of Aadhaar Information System 49-54
5.1 Introduction 49
5.2 Monitoring of the activities of authentication ecosystem
partners of UIDAI
49
5.2.1 Annual Information System audit of the operations of REs
and ASAs
49
5.2.2 Information System Audit of Client Applications’ Systems
storing biometric data not ensured
52
5.2.3 Security and safety of data in Aadhaar vaults 53
Chapter-6 Redressal of Customers Grievances 55-57
6.1 Introduction 55
6.2 Audit Observations 56
6.2.1 Data on complaints and their redressal 56
6.2.2 Grievances received through CRM 56
Chapter-7 Conclusion 59-60
Appendix-I 61-68
Annexure-I 69-71
Abbreviations 72-73

Preface
This Report has been prepared for submission to the President under Article 151 of the
Constitution.
The Report includes matters arising from Performance Audit of Functioning of the
Unique Identification Authority of India for the period from 2014-15 to 2018-19.
Statistical information on generation, update and authentication services of Aadhaar
and financial information referred to in the Report have been updated upto March 2021,
to the extent as furnished by UIDAI.
The audit has been conducted in conformity with the Auditing Standards issued by the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

v
Executive Summary
Identification of the right individuals, especially the targeted beneficiaries, was a major
stumbling block encountered by the Union and State Governments while rolling out
various welfare schemes. Absence of a valid and authenticated identity document was
adversely affecting implementation and delivery of various Government welfare
Schemes. Citizens were required to furnish multiple documents such as passports,
driving licenses and ration cards etc. as identity proofs to various Government as well
as private agencies, making it inconvenient for them and especially those who did not
have any of these identity documents. To overcome the challenge, the Union
Government decided to introduce a unique identity (UID) for the residents of India and
to implement this project, they established Unique Identification Authority of India
(UIDAI) in January 2009. The Authority was mandated to lay out plans and policies to
implement the “Aadhaar” project, which gave UIDAI the mandate to generate and issue
Aadhaar, to the residents of India.
The first UID, a 12-digit unique number that can be authenticated digitally, with the
brand name ‘Aadhaar’ was generated in September 2010. Since then, UIDAI has
generated more than 129 Crore Aadhaars, till the end of March 2021 and Aadhaar is
now established as an important identity document for residents. Various
Ministries/Departments of the Government as well as other entities such as banks,
mobile operators, rely upon Aadhaar for identity of the applicant.
However the Aadhaar scheme was challenged from time to time by several petitioners
in various Courts of law. The five judges Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in a landmark judgment of 26 September 2018, upheld the constitutional validity
of the Aadhaar (Targeted delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies and Benefits) Act
2016 (the Aadhaar Act, 2016). The Court has clearly ruled on the compulsory and
voluntary requirements of Aadhaar for residents for availing benefits of various
schemes and services.
The UIDAI had staff strength of 130 at its Delhi Headquarters and staff strength of 219
at its Regional Headquarters at the end of March 2021. The work was being carried out
by officers and staffs mostly either on deputation or from outsourced agencies. Besides
UIDAI also assisted States with ICT assistance and provided State level personnel
through the National Institute for Smart Governance (NISG), for creating awareness
and issue of Aadhaar. The UIDAI’s budget in 2020-21 was `613 Crore with actual
expenditure of `892.67 Crore (excess expenditure met from unspent balance of 2018-19
and 2019-20) whereas revenue earned was `322.40 Crore on account of various license
fees, charges, penalties etc.
The Performance Audit for the period 2014-15 to 2018-19 examined the functioning of
UIDAI in supporting the Government’s vision to assign, as good governance, unique
identity numbers to individuals residing in India. However, statistical information on
generation, update and authentication services of Aadhaar and financial information
referred to in the Report have been updated upto March 2021, to the extent as furnished
by UIDAI.

vi
Significant audit findings are given below:
The Aadhaar Act stipulates that an individual should reside in India for a period of
182 days or more in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of application
for being eligible to obtain an Aadhaar. In September 2019, this condition was
relaxed for non-resident Indians, holding valid Indian Passport. However, UIDAI
has not prescribed any specific proof/ document or process for confirming whether
an applicant has resided in India for the specified period and takes confirmation of
the residential status through a casual self-declaration from the applicant. There was
no system in place to check the affirmations of the applicant. As such, there is no
assurance that all the Aadhaar holders in the country are ‘Residents’ as defined in
the Aadhaar Act.
UIDAI may prescribe a procedure and required documentation other than
self-declaration, in order to confirm and authenticate the residence status of
applicants, in line with the provisions of the Aadhaar Act.
(Paragraph 3.2.1)
Uniqueness of identity of the Applicant, established through a de-duplication
process is the most important feature of Aadhaar. It was seen that UIDAI had to
cancel more than 4.75 Lakh Aadhaars (November 2019) for being duplicate. There
were instances of issue of Aadhaars with the same biometric data to different
residents indicating flaws in the de-duplication process and issue of Aadhaars on
faulty biometrics and documents. Though UIDAI has taken action to improve the
quality of the biometrics and has also introduced iris based authentication features
for enrolment for Aadhaar, the database continued to have faulty Aadhaars which
were already issued.
UIDAI may tighten the SLA parameters of Biometric Service Providers (BSPs),
devise foolproof mechanisms for capturing unique biometric data and improve
upon their monitoring systems to proactively identify and take action to minimize,
multiple/ duplicate Aadhaar numbers generated. UIDAI may also review a
regular updation of technology. UIDAI also needs to strengthen the Automated
Biometric Identification System so that generation of multiple/duplicate
Aadhaars can be curbed at the initial stage itself.
(Paragraph 3.2.2)
Issue of Aadhaar numbers to minor children below the age of five, based on the bio
metrics of their parents, without confirming uniqueness of biometric identity goes
against the basic tenet of the Aadhaar Act. Apart from being violative of the
statutory provisions, the UIDAI has also incurred avoidable expenditure of
`310 Crore on issue of Bal Aadhaars till 31 March 2019. In Phase- II of ICT
assistance a further sum of `288.11 Crore was released upto the year 2020-21 to
states/ schools primarily for issue of Aadhaars to minor children. The UIDAI needs
to review the issue of Aadhaar to minor children below five years and find alternate

vii
ways to establish their unique identity, especially since the Supreme Court has
stated that no benefit will be denied to any child for want of Aadhaar document.
UIDAI may explore alternate ways to capture uniqueness of biometric identity
for minor children below five years since uniqueness of identity is the most
distinctive feature of Aadhaar established through biometrics of the individual.
(Paragraph 3.2.3)
All Aadhaar numbers were not paired with the documents relating to personal
information of their holders and even after nearly ten years the UIDAI could not
identify the exact extent of mismatch. Though with the introduction of inline
scanning (July 2016) the personal information documents were stored in CIDR,
existence of unpaired biometric data of earlier period indicated deficient data
management.
UIDAI may take proactive steps to identify and fill the missing documents in their
database at the earliest, in order to avoid any legal complications or
inconvenience to holders of Aadhaar issued prior to 2016.
(Paragraph 3.2.4)
During 2018-19 more than 73 per cent of the total 3.04 Crore biometric updates,
were voluntary updates done by residents for faulty biometrics after payment of
charges. Huge volume of voluntary updates indicated that the quality of data
captured to issue initial Aadhaar was not good enough to establish uniqueness of
identity.
UIDAI may review charging of fees for voluntary update of residents’ biometrics,
since they (UIDAI) were not in a position to identify reasons for biometric failures
and residents were not at fault for capture of poor quality of biometrics.
(Paragraph 3.3.1)
UIDAI did not have a system to analyze the factors leading to authentication errors.
UIDAI may make efforts to improve the success rate of authentication
transactions by analysing failure cases.
(Paragraph 3.5.1)
UIDAI did not carry out verification of the infrastructure and technical support of
Requesting Entities and Authentication Service Agencies before their appointment
in the Authentication Ecosystem, despite stipulations in Aadhaar (Authentication)
Regulations.
UIDAI may conduct thorough verification of the documents, infrastructure, and
technological support claimed to be available, before on-boarding the entities
(Requesting Entities and Authentication Service Agencies) in the Aadhaar
ecosystem.
(Paragraph 3.5.2)

viii
UIDAI is maintaining one of the largest biometric databases in the world; but did
not have a data archiving policy, which is considered to be a vital storage
management best practice.
UIDAI may frame a suitable data archival policy to mitigate the risk of
vulnerability to data protection and reduce saturation of valuable data space due
to redundant and unwanted data, by continuous weeding out of unwanted data
(Paragraph 3.6.1)
UIDAI’s arrangements with the Department of Posts were not adequate to guarantee
delivery of Aadhaar letters to the right addressee, as seen from the large number of
Aadhaar letters being returned as undelivered.
UIDAI may address the delivery problems with their logistic partner namely DoP,
by designing a customized delivery model, which will ensure delivery of Aadhaar
letters to the correct addressee.
(Paragraph 3.6.2)
UIDAI provided Authentication services to banks, mobile operators and other
agencies free of charge till March 2019, contrary to the provisions of their own
Regulations, depriving revenue to the Government.
UIDAI needs to be alert and cautious in matters concerning charges for delivery
of services and ensure that decisions for non-levy of charges are taken with due
process and approvals, which are properly documented and available for
verification by any stake holder.
(Paragraph 4.2.1)
UIDAI did not penalise the Managed Service Provider for failure to achieve the
expected service levels in the performance of biometric solutions.
UIDAI may levy penalties on Biometric Service Providers for deficiencies in their
performance in respect of biometric de-duplication (FPIR/ FNIR) and biometric
authentication (FMR/ FNMR). Agreements in this regard should be modified, if
required
(Paragraph 4.4.1)
The support services to States by way of a State Resource Personnel to be provided
by National Institute of Smart Governance (NISG) through the ICT assistance given
to them, was duly approved by the Cabinet Committee for one year only, but the
same continued for years together as approved by UIDAI.
UIDAI have to accept their own responsibility for issue of Aadhaar and
limit/reduce their continued reliance on other agencies for support. They may
partner with State Governments to increase the enrolment functions for issue
ofAadhaar.
(Paragraph 4.4.2.1)

ix
There was deficiency in assessment of the requirements for Field Service Engineers
(FSE) resources to be hired from NISG and in monitoring the payments made to
them.
UIDAI should strictly follow the standards of financial propriety while procuring
services and ensure that advances are not paid for in excess of requirements.
(Paragraph 4.4.2.2)
UIDAI could not avail rebate on franking values worth `30.19 Crore offered by the
Department of Posts due to deficiency in their agreements with Print Service
Providers.
UIDAI may incorporate suitable clauses in their Agreements with all agencies
mentioning clearly that the benefits accruing due to UIDAI’s resources need to
be passed on to them and vendors to indemnify UIDAI towards the loss/ cost
arising due to their actions.
(Paragraph 4.4.3)
UIDAI had not effectively monitored funds released to States as Grants-in-Aid
towards ICT assistance for creating infrastructure.
UIDAI may improve upon its financial management of grants given to State
Authorities by proper monitoring and ensuring regular and timely receipt of
Utilization Certificates from them. It may also discontinue monetary assistance
given to States/schools and other agencies for enrolment of minor children below
five for issue of Aadhaar numbers.
(Paragraph 4.4.4)
Monitoring of the information system operations of authentication ecosystem
partners was deficient to the extent that UIDAI could not confirm compliance to its
own regulations.
UIDAI may ensure that each of the existing REs and ASAs are audited by them
or by the Auditor appointed by it within a cycle of three years so as to provide
adequate assurance about compliance to the Regulations.
UIDAI may consider suspension of the services of REs and ASAs if they fail to
conduct annual audit in time as prescribed by the Regulations 2016.
UIDAI may ensure the implementation of Aadhaar Data Vault process and
institute/carry out periodic audits independently, to enhance the security of
Aadhaar number storage data by user organizations. UIDAI may deal the cases of
non-compliance of directions as per the Act and as per conditions in the agreement
with AUAs/KUAs (Authentication User Agencies and e-KYC User Agencies)
(Paragraphs 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3)

x
The process of capturing of grievances/complaints has not been streamlined and
does not display a clear picture for analysis. Also the complaints lodged at the RO
level did not get the attention of UIDAI HQ, compromising the effectiveness of the
grievance redressal mechanism, besides the delays in settlement of grievances.
UIDAI may explore the possibility of introducing a single centralized system
where grievances/complaints lodged even at ROs are also captured so as to
enhance the quality of customer servicing.
(Paragraphs 6.2.1 and 6.2.2)
UIDAI, in the Exit Conference held on 14 October 2020, has agreed to the audit
recommendations.

Functioning of Unique Identification Authority of India
1
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Prior to issue of a nationally accepted identity document for Indian residents, multiple
documents viz., Driving License, Permanent Account Number (PAN), Voter Identity Card etc.,
were in use as proof of identity and address. The absence of easily verifiable identity documents
was conducive to identity frauds and for leakages in the system of delivery of benefits from
Government sponsored schemes and hence there was a need for having one unique identity for
the residents of the country.
The concept of unique identification was first discussed and worked upon in 2006, when
administrative approval for the project "Unique ID for BPL families" was given on 03 March
2006 by the erstwhile Department of Information Technology (DIT), Ministry of
Communications and Information Technology. Subsequently, a Process Committee was set up
(03 July 2006) to suggest processes for updation, modification, addition and deletion of data
fields from the core database under the Unique ID for BPL families’ project.
DIT submitted a “Strategic Vision – Unique Identification of Residents" to the Process
Committee, which appreciated and approved the need of a UID Authority to be created by an
executive order under the aegis of the then Planning Commission (now NITI Aayog) to ensure
a pan-departmental and neutral identity for the Authority. The Process Committee decided (30
August 2007) to furnish a detailed proposal based on the resource model for seeking its "in
principle" approval to the erstwhile Planning Commission.
Based on the recommendations of the Committee of Secretaries and decision of the Empowered
Group of Ministers (EGoM), Unique Identification Authority of India was created on 28
January 2009 as an attached office of the then Planning Commission (replaced by NITI1
Aayog
in 2015)2
. Prime Minister's Council on UIDAI (substituted by a Cabinet Committee on UIDAI
on 22 October 2009) was constituted on 30 July 2009 to advise UIDAI on the programme,
methodology and implementation to ensure coordination between Ministries/Departments,
stakeholders and partners.
As per Cabinet’s approvals, the work of Aadhaar enrolment was initially geographically
divided between UIDAI and Registrar General of India (RGI). Accordingly, UIDAI was
assigned to do Aadhaar enrolment in 24 States and Union Territories (UTs) and RGI was to do
enrolment in 12 States and UTs.
In September 2015, UIDAI was brought under the Ministry of Electronics and Information
Technology (MeitY) (erstwhile Department of Electronics & Information Technology). For
giving statutory standing to UIDAI, the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other
Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016 was introduced in Parliament as Money bill on
1
NITI (National Institution for Transforming India) Aayog is the premier policy ‘Think Tank’ of the
Government of India, providing both directional and policy inputs.
2
In September 2015, UIDAI was attached to the Department of Electronics & Information Technology (DeitY)
of the then Ministry of Communications and Inform ation Technology (Mo CIT).

2
03 March 2016, which was notified (26 March 2016) as the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of
Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 (18 of 2016) .
UIDAI has responsibility to issue a Unique Identification (UID) to all residents, that was robust
enough to eliminate duplicate or fake identities and could be verified and authenticated
anytime, anywhere. The digital identity platform set up by UIDAI with the brand name
‘Aadhaar’, generated the first UID in September 2010 and the ambitious Aadhaar Scheme was
launched on 29 September 2010 in Tembhli, a village in Nandurbar district of Maharashtra
State in India, from where first Aadhaar was issued. The Aadhaar database has since reached
129.04 Crore by March 2021 and is considered as one of the largest biometric based
identification systems in the world.
1.2 Constitutional validity of Aadhaar
After launch of Aadhaar, Government progressively made the Aadhaar Card mandatory for
numerous welfare schemes. These include subsidised food under the Public Distribution
System, guaranteed wages to labour under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme, linking of PAN Card, telecom subscriber verification etc. However, the
Aadhaar scheme was challenged from time to time by several petitioners in various courts of
law and its constitutional validity was sub- judice since 2010. The five judges Constitution
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its landmark judgment of 26 September 2018, upheld
the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act,
2016, to be constitutional3
.
The salient points of the judgment4
of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India are as follow:
a. The Aadhaar Act, 2016 does not violate fundamental right of privacy. Section 7 of the
Act is constitutional. ‘Benefits’ and ‘services’ should be those which have the colour of
some kind of subsidies namely welfare schemes of the Government whereby Government
is doling out such benefits which are targeted at a particular deprived class.
b. Residents are held entitled to obtain Aadhaar number but such an enrolment was
voluntary in nature. However, it becomes compulsory for those who seek to receive any
subsidy, benefit or services under the welfare schemes of the Government, expenditure
whereof is to be met from the Consolidated Fund of India. As such CBSE, NEET, JEE,
UGC etc. cannot make the requirement of Aadhaar mandatory for the students.
c. No deserving persons would be denied the benefit of a scheme on the failure of
authentication and it would be appropriate to make a suitable provision for establishing an
identity by alternate means.
d. No child shall be denied benefit, of any of the welfare schemes covered under Section
7, if, for some reasons, she/he is not able to produce the Aadhaar number and the benefit
shall be given by verifying the identity on the basis of any other document.
3
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India which also considered several
other writ petitions in its judgment dated 26 September 2018
4
The Bench delivered its 4:1 verdict:-
• Majority opinion of Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice A.M. Khanwilkar
• Concurring opinion of Justice Ashok Bhushan
• Dissenting opinion of Justice D.Y. Chandrachud

3
e. Regulation 27 of Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations 2016 which provides archiving
a data for five years was struck down. Retention of data beyond six months was made
impermissible.
f. Section 57 which enabled body corporate and individuals to seek authentication was held
unconstitutional and void.
g. Section 139AA of Income tax Act 1961 (for seeding of PAN with Aadhaar) held
constitutional.
h. Rule 9 of the amended PMLA Rules, 2017 which mandates linking of Aadhaar with
bank accounts was held unconstitutional.
i. Department of Telecommunications’ Circular dated 23 March 2017 mandating linking of
mobile numbers with Aadhaar was held unconstitutional.
Thus, though Aadhaar is a legal document and mandatory for obtaining benefits of Government
schemes and programmes, residents can furnish it voluntarily for proving identity in case of
other services also. To implement the judgment of the Supreme Court, Government passed the
Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 (notified on 23 July 2019)5
in the Parliament to
incorporate further safeguards to protect privacy of data, foil misuse of personal information
of its citizens and for averting denial of services and benefits to eligible persons. In addition,
to facilitate better services through Aadhaar, voluntary use of Aadhaar authentication was
provided for obtaining SIM cards and for opening bank accounts, with necessary changes in
the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
respectively.
1.3 UIDAI Authority
1.3.1 Powers of the Authority
UIDAI performs functions as defined by the Section 23 and 23A of Aadhaar (Targeted
Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016. It has authority
to develop the policy, procedure and systems for issuing Aadhaar numbers to Individuals and
perform authentication thereof under this Act.
The powers and functions of the Authority, inter alia, include
(a) Specifying, by regulations, demographic information and biometric information
required for enrolment and the processes for collection and verification thereof;
(b) Collecting demographic information and biometric information from any individual
seeking an Aadhaar number in such manner as may be specified by regulations;
(c) Appointing of one or more entities to operate the Central Identities Data Repository;
(d) Generating and assigning Aadhaar numbers to individuals;
(e) Performing authentication of Aadhaar numbers;
5
Government of India introduced “The Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019” on
02 March 2019, notified as an Act on 23 July 2019

4
(f) Maintaining and updating the information of individuals in the Central Identities Data
Repository in such manner as may be specified by regulations;
(g) Omitting and deactivating of an Aadhaar number and information relating thereto in
such manner as may be specified by Regulations;
(h) specifying the manner of use of Aadhaar numbers for the purposes of providing or
availing of various subsidies, benefits, services and other purposes for which Aadhaar
numbers may be used;
(i) Specifying, by regulations, the terms and conditions for appointment of Registrars,
enrolling agencies and service providers and revocation of appointments thereof;
(j) Establishing, operating and maintaining of the Central Identities Data Repository;
(k) Sharing, in such manner as may be specified by regulations, the information of Aadhaar
number holders, subject to the provisions of this Act;
(l) calling for information and records, conducting inspections, inquiries and audit of the
operations for the purposes of this Act of the Central Identities Data Repository,
Registrars, enrolling agencies and other agencies appointed under this Act;
(m) Specifying, by regulations, various processes relating to data management, security
protocols and other technology safeguards under this Act;
(n) levying and collecting the fees or authorising the Registrars, enrolling agencies or other
service providers to collect such fees for the services provided by them under this Act
in such manner as may be specified by regulations;
The Authority may
(a) enter into Memorandum of Understanding or agreement, as the case may be, with the
Central Government or State Governments or Union territories or other agencies for the
purpose of performing any of the functions in relation to collecting, storing, securing or
processing of information or delivery of Aadhaar numbers to individuals or performing
authentication;
(b) by notification, appoint such number of Registrars, engage and authorise such
agencies to collect, store, secure, process information or do authentication or perform
such other functions in relation thereto, as may be necessary for the purposes of this Act.
The Authority may engage consultants, advisors and other persons as may be required for
efficient discharge of its functions under the Act on such allowances or remuneration and terms
and conditions as may be specified by contract.
The Authority may, for the discharge of its functions under this Act, or any rules or regulations
made there under, by order, issue such directions from time to time to any entity in the Aadhaar
ecosystem, as it may consider necessary. Every direction issued shall be complied with by the
entity in the Aadhaar ecosystem to whom such direction is issued.
1.3.2 Organizational Set-up
UIDAI has its headquarters (HQ) in New Delhi and has eight (8) Regional Offices (ROs) across
the country. The locations of ROs and the States/ UTs under their jurisdiction are illustrated

5
in Figure 1.1. UIDAI also operates two Data Centers (DCs), one at Hebbal, Bengaluru,
Karnataka and the other at Manesar, Haryana.
A Chairperson appointed on part-time
basis heads the Authority with two
part-time members and a Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), who is also
the Member-Secretary of UIDAI. The
CEO is the legal representative of the
Authority and is responsible for its
day-to-day administration and
implementation of its work programs
including drawing up of proposals
arising out of the discharge of
functions assigned to UIDAI,
preparation of accounts etc. At the HQ,
the CEO is assisted by Deputy
Directors General (DDGs) who are
Joint Secretary level Officers of
Government of India and are in-charge
of various wings of UIDAI. Each of
the eight ROs of UIDAI is headed by a
DDG. As on 31 March 2021, UIDAI
Headquarters had 130 sanctioned
posts6
in various cadres whereas
person-in-position were 95. In the
eight UIDAI ROs, out of total
sanctioned posts of 219, person-in position were 148 as on 31 March 2021. The Authority
functioned mostly with officers on deputation from various Government Departments.
1.3.3 Registrars
UIDAI authorizes entities as Registrars for the purpose of enrolling residents. Their roles and
responsibilities are defined vide Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) signed by them with
UIDAI. Central and State Government Departments, banks and other Public Sector
organizations can be appointed as Registrars. Registrars have the option to carry out enrolment
either by themselves or through Enrolment Agencies further sub-contracted by them. UIDAI
had authorised 1777
Registrars as on 31 March 2021.
1.3.4 Enrolment Agencies
UIDAI or the Registrars appoint Enrolment Agencies (EAs) for collecting demographic and
biometric information of residents as part of the enrolment process. EAs setup Enrolment
Centers for enrolment of residents and for correction/ updation of resident data. The EAs
employ operators who are responsible for enrolling residents, capture the demographic and
6
Data source: Information furnished by UIDAI.
7
Data source: Information furnished by UIDAI.
Figure 1.1

6
biometric information using the enrolment software, for uploading into the Central Identities
Data Repository (CIDR)8
. The quality of the documents collected by the EAs in respect of the
demographic information of residents is scrutinized through a back-office Quality Check
verification process by a quality control team. There were 436 Enrolment Agencies as on 31
March 2021.
1.4 Legislation, Rules and Regulations
The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act
2016 (hereafter referred to as Aadhaar Act ) and the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment)
Act 2019 provide the statutory basis for the operations of UIDAI. Drawing from the powers
conferred by the Act of 2016, UIDAI notified various regulations for discharge of its mandated
responsibilities. Aadhaar (Enrolment & Update) Regulations 2016, Aadhaar (Authentication)
Regulations 2016, Aadhaar (Data Security) Regulations 2016 and Aadhaar (Sharing of
Information) Regulations 2016 and amendments thereto regulate the activities related to the
functioning and activities of UIDAI. The regulations generally cover all the areas of operation
of UIDAI. Requirements of the Act and corresponding provisions in the various regulations
are mapped in Appendix-I. The UIDAI Procurement Manual 2014 and GFR 2005/2017
regulate purchases and procurement in the organization.
1.5 Structure of the Report
The Performance Audit Report contains seven Chapters. Chapter 1 gives introduction to the
topic. Chapter 2 explains the audit scope, audit objectives, audit criteria and audit
methodology applied along-with the good practices followed by the Authority and the
constraints faced during audit. Chapter 3 describe the audit findings relating to “Enrolment
and Update Ecosystem” and “Authentication Ecosystem” whereas Chapter 4 contains audit
findings on “Management of Finances and Contracts”. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are related
to “Security of Aadhaar information system” and “Redressal of Customer Grievances”
respectively. Finally, Chapter 7 gives the conclusion of the Audit Report.
8
Aadhaar numbers issued along with the demographic and biometric information are secured in the centralized
database viz., CIDR of UIDAI at Bengaluru.

7
Chapter 2 Scope of Audit, Audit Objectives and Methodology
2.1 Scope of Audit
The Performance Audit included assessment of the Enrolment & Update Ecosystems as well
as the Authentication Ecosystems of the UIDAI for the period from 2014-15 to 2018-19. The
figures have been updated wherever received upto March 2021. Audit scrutinised the processes
beginning right from the enrolment, upto delivery of Aadhaar number and subsequent use of
the authentication services. The systems put in place for maintaining security and
confidentiality of data were also subject to audit examination. In addition, audit also examined
selectively, the procurement of infrastructure for the project.
2.2 Audit Objectives
The main audit objectives of the Performance Audit were to ascertain whether:
1. UIDAI has developed comprehensive regulations to comply with the responsibilities
entrusted under the Aadhaar Act.
2. Ecosystem put in place for issue of Aadhaar and Authentication services functioned
efficiently and in compliance with the statutory requirements.
3. UIDAI has put in a system to monitor the performance of the IT systems associated
with its operations.
4. Contract management system in UIDAI for procurement of IT and other services is in
conformity with government regulations and is executed to achieve economy and
efficiency in operations.
5. Complaint redressal mechanism set up by UIDAI for handling Aadhaar related
grievances was effective.
2.3 Audit Criteria
Important criteria adopted for the Performance Audit were:
a. Cabinet Approval on the formation of UIDAI and decisions of Expenditure Finance
Committee (EFC).
b. Provisions of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies,
Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 and subsequent Amendments.
c. Relevant provisions under General Financial Rules (GFR), 2005 and its
revised version GFR 2017, which have elaborately stipulated procedures for
procurement, maintenance of stock and stores, their disposals, etc.
d. The Procurement Manual 2014 (effective from 01 April 2014) issued by
UIDAI, contains the principles and procedure relating to procurement of
goods and services for purposes of UIDAI and is drawn from the Rule 135 of the
GFR 2005.
e. The Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations, 2016.
f. The Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016.

8
g. The Aadhaar (Data Security) Regulations, 2016.
h. Aadhaar (Sharing of Information) Regulations, 2016
i. Subsequent Amendments to the above regulations and any other
instructions/notifications/Regulations issued by Government/UIDAI, which have a
bearing on the project and functioning of UIDAI.
2.4 Audit Methodology
The Performance Audit commenced with an entry conference with the top management of
UIDAI at UIDAI Headquarters at New Delhi in February 2019 where the scope of the audit,
audit objectives etc. were explained to the Management. Files and records, maintained at
UIDAI HQ, its ROs9
and at UIDAI Tech Centre at Bengaluru were reviewed in audit.
We selected contracts for scrutiny based on statistical sampling techniques. Besides,
examination of documents, we obtained information by way of replies to audit questions
furnished by the auditee and through meetings with key personnel of UIDAI involved in its
various operations.
On completion of Audit, we discussed important observations with the UIDAI management in
an Exit Meeting in October 2020. Auditee’s response given during the Exit Meeting and by
way of a written reply has been suitably included in this Report. The statistical information has
been updated to 31 March 2021.
The reply of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) furnished in
June 2021 has also been taken into consideration in finalizing the report.
2.5 Good Practices
UIDAI has provided an identity document to over 125 crore residents of India within a decade
of issue of the first Aadhaar (September 2010) in coordination with a large number of agencies/
entities spread across the country. UIDAI has established the Information Security
Management System and obtained the ISO 27001:2013 by STQC and the National Critical
Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) has declared its CIDR as “Protected
System” adding another layer of IT security assurance.
We noted that UIDAI has a system of imposing financial penalties on its enrolment ecosystem
partners for deficient/ defective quality of work. Complaints of overcharging of residents are
followed up and financial disincentives are imposed on Registrars. It was observed that
payments to Registrars are released only after crosschecking with the list of successful
generation of Aadhaars obtained from UIDAI Tech Center.
Features like the Virtual ID and Biometric Locking facility provides more leeway to Aadhaar
holders while availing Aadhaar related services. The Virtual ID is a temporary and revocable
16-digit random number and is mapped with the Aadhaar so that it can be used in place of
Aadhaar for authentication The Biometric Locking facility helps an Aadhaar holder to
lock/unlock his/ her biometrics whenever he/ she wishes. These initiatives help in enhancing
confidence of Aadhaar holders while using the ID.
9
Except Guwahati RO

9
In 2019, “Aadhaar Seva Kendras” (ASK) were introduced in 41 select locations in the country
to act as a single stop destination for all Aadhaar services for the residents. These ASKs were
in addition to 35,000 already available Aadhaar enrolment and Update Centers.
Image courtesy: UIDAI
The ASKs
offer
dedicated
Aadhaar
enrolment
and update
services to
residents
on all seven
days of the
week.
2.6 Acknowledgement and Constraints
We acknowledge the support and cooperation extended by the Management of UIDAI to the
audit team during the course of audit. A detailed presentation on the functioning of the
Authority was given for understating of the Audit Team. The records/ data requisitioned by
Audit Team were generally furnished but audit witnessed several instances of inordinate delay/
non-supply of records which impeded in the audit exercise. Records, which could not be
accessed included files related to Information Technology-Information System Security,
Aadhaar Document Management System, destruction of documents collected at the time of
enrolment, details of authentications and its accounting, fixation of rates/ charges for
authentication and enrolment & update activities, grievances /complaints of customers, audit
reports of stake holders (e.g. enrolment centres or ASAs/AUAs) etc. We also appreciate the
support provided in updating the statistical and other information till March 2021.
UIDAI expressed difficulties in providing data for period prior to formation of UIDAI
(July 2016) as an Authority under Aadhaar Act. Intermittent supply of data, delayed submission
and partial responses to audit queries had hindered the smooth completion of audit process. We
could not provide reasonable assurances on the selection process of vendors appointed by
UIDAI for managing the vital services in the roles of Managed Service Providers, Data Centre
Development agencies and Aadhaar Documents Management System partners or Government
Risk Compliance and Performance – Service Providers. However, we relied on the UIDAI
write ups and the scrutiny of files to arrive at a conclusion that the service partners for providing
the services10
were selected in competitive manner by following the prescribed rules,
procedures and due diligence. The contracts for supply of professional resources entered into
with NISG were on nomination basis.
10
The services which were selected for audit scrutiny following the decided samples

10
Therefore, in keeping with the scope of the CAG’s Regulations on Audit and Accounts, to the
extent data and information/files were not produced to the audit, we could not derive our
assurance on the areas mentioned above.

11
Chapter 3 Enrolment, Update and Authentication Ecosystem
3.1 Enrolment and Update Ecosystem
Every resident in the country is eligible to obtain an Aadhaar number by submitting his/her
demographic and biometric information. After verification of this information by UIDAI
Aadhaar numbers are issued. UIDAI confirms the uniqueness of the identity of a resident by
way of a de-duplication process where the information submitted by each new enrollee is
matched with that of others in the Aadhaar database to ensure that the applicant is not already
enrolled. After establishing uniqueness of identity, a 12-digit random number is generated and
issued to the applicant. This unique lifetime number cannot be assigned to any other individual.
The demographic and biometric details of Aadhaar holders, however, can be updated to ensure
continued accuracy of the information in the CIDR.
An Aadhaar number subject to its authentication11
, is accepted as a valid proof of identity of
the Aadhaar number holder for receiving specified benefits, subsidies and services for which
expenditure is met from the Consolidated Fund of India/Consolidated Fund of State. However,
Aadhaar does not confer citizenship or domicile to its holder and is only a proof of identity.
The definition of “Resident” gains prime importance as it sets the basic eligibility criteria for
entitlement of Aadhaar number. A “Resident”, as per the Act, is as an individual who has
resided in India for a period or periods amounting in all to 182 days or more in the 12 months
immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment.
The enrolment process begins with a resident submitting his/her demographic and biometric
information to the Enrolment Agency (EA) along with prescribed supporting documents to
establish identity, date of birth and address of the enrollee. The information is submitted to the
CIDR for further processing and generation of Aadhaar number. The UIDAI has adopted a
tiered model consisting of Registrars and EAs for enrolment and updation of Aadhaar numbers.
The information to be provided at the time of enrolment are as follows:
Demographic
information
Name, verified date of birth or declared age, gender, address, mobile number
(optional) and email ID (optional), in case of introducer-based enrolment-
introducer name and introducer’s Aadhaar number, in case of Head of Family
based enrolment- name of Head of Family, relationship and Head of Family’s
Aadhaar number; in case of enrolment of child- enrolment ID or Aadhaar
number of any one parent, proof of relationship (PoR) document.
Biometric
information
Ten fingerprints, two iris scans, and facial photograph
11
Authentication is the process by which the Aadhaar number along with demographic information or biometric
information of an individual is submitted to the Central Identities Data Repository of UIDAI for its verification
and such Repository verifies the correctness, or the lack thereof, on the basis of information available with it.

12
Aadhaar enrolment (and mandatory biometric updates) is done free of cost for residents.
However, for all enrolments and mandatory biometric updates, UIDAI makes payments to the
Registrars at rates fixed by them from time to time12
.
The enrolment process is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Enrolment process
CIDR
ENROLMENTSERVICE
DemoDe-
duplication
(DDC)
Biometric
De-
Duplication
LetterDelivery
&Verification
QC
UID
Assignment
REGISTRAR
LOGISTICS
PARTNER
(INDIAPOST)
CUSTOMERCONTACT
CENTER
Information/
Issue resolution
Enrolment Data
to CIDR
Aadhaar letter or
Rejection letter
Enrolment
Agency
Enrolment
Processing
Automatic Synch
(software/data)
Data Capture
MDD
Disposition
Graphics Courtesy: UIDAI
3.1.1 Key Regulations and Amendments
Enrolment and Update is central to the Aadhaar structure. Registrars and EAs, responsible for
collecting the demographic and biometric information of individuals for the enrolment process,
are core components of this ecosystem. EAs are responsible for adherence to processes
prescribed by UIDAI and to ensure data quality. The Aadhaar (Enrolment & Update)
Regulations 2016 and amendments thereto govern the activities associated with this
ecosystem. Key regulations and amendments thereto governing the Aadhaar enrolment and
update process are given in Table 3.1.
Being the backbone of the Aadhaar system, it is important that the regulations prescribe the
processes and procedures in conformity with the provisions of the Aadhaar Act and UIDAI
establish systems to ensure that Aadhaar numbers generated satisfy all the features and
qualities envisaged in the Act.
12
Effective from January 2019, the rate for every enrolment that has resulted in successful generation of an
Aadhaar number is fixed at `100. Similarly, for all mandatory biometric updates UIDAI pays `100 per request
to the Registrar with effect from January 2019. However, for all voluntary updates of demographic or
biometric information, UIDAI has prescribed a fee of `50 per request (enhanced to `100 per request for
voluntary biometric updates w.e.f. 09 May 2020) and is to be paid by the Aadhaar number holder.

13
Table 3.1: Key Regulations and amendments thereto governing the Aadhaar
Enrolment and Update ecosystem
Key Regulations Key features
Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
Dated 14-Sep-2016
Resident Enrolment Process: Biometric & Demographic
information required, Role of Registrars, Collection of
Information, Equipment, Software used in enrolment etc.
Generation, Rejection & Delivery of Aadhaar numbers.
Update of Resident information: Mandatory update, Modes of
update, Convenience Fee to be charged for update
Appointment of Registrars, Enrolling Agencies & other service
providers
Omission or Deactivation of Aadhaar number
Grievance Redressal Mechanism.
Format of enrolment/ Correction & update form, list of
Documents (POI, POA, POR, DOB etc.), Code of conduct for
Service providers
Aadhaar (E&U))
(Second
Amendment)
Regulations 2017
(No. 2 of 2017)
Dated 07-Jul-2017
Addition of Regulation 12A: Any Central or State department
or agency requiring authentication or possession of Aadhaar for
receipt of any subsidy, benefit or services should ensure
enrolment of such individual who is yet to be enrolled or update
their Aadhaar details, by setting up enrolment centres at their
premises
Aadhaar (E&U))
(Fourth
Amendment)
Regulations 2017
(No. 5 of 2017)
Dated 31-Jul-2017
Immediate suspension of activities or imposition of Financial
Disincentives on Registrar or Enrolment Agency or any
service provider or any other person or Cancellation of the
credential, codes or permission issued to them, for violation of
any regulation, process, standard, guideline or order, by a
Registrar or Enrolment Agency or any service provider or any
other person
Aadhaar (E&U))
(Sixth Amendment)
Regulations 2018.
(No. 2 of 2018)
Dated 31-Jul-2018
New Definition of Incapacitated Person.
Date of Birth of resident can be updated only once. In case the
DoB is to be updated more than once, it can only be done
through an exception handling process which may require the
resident to visit the Regional Office (RO) of the UIDAI.
Amendments in verification of update data, disclosure of
information to parents/ form to be signed by parents in case of
minors.
Introduction of Aadhaar Address update PIN Service for
residents not having acceptable proof of Address.

14
Aadhaar (E&U))
(Seventh
Amendment)
Regulations 2019.
(No. 3 of 2019)
Dated 05-Sep-2019
Enhancement in list of POI, POA, POR & DOB under
Schedule II of E&U Regulations, 2016 [Regulation 10(2)]
3.1.2 Status of Aadhaar Enrolment and Update
UIDAI had generated 129.04 Crore Aadhaar numbers as of March 2021 for the residents in the
country, which is approximately 94 per cent of the projected population. The number of
Aadhaar generated and updated during 2012-13 to 2020-21 are given in Chart 3.1 and Chart
3.2 respectively.
(Data Source: UIDAI)
Chart 3.1 shows that growth of Aadhaar generated in 2013-14 was 95.67 per cent as compared
to previous year and gradually it reached the plateau after 2017-18 wherein it grew less than 3
per cent as compared to previous year.
15.17
29.83
19.46
19.45
13.37
7.42
2.86
2.22
3.25
31.18
61.01
80.47
99.92
113.29
120.71
123.57
125.79
129.04
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
2017-18
2018-19
2019-20
2020-21
Year
Chart 3.1: Generation of Aadhaar (in Crore)
No. of Cumulative Aadhaar Generated (in Crore) No. of Aadhaar Generated (in Crore)

15
(Data Source: UIDAI)
Chart 3.2 shows that growth of Aadhaar update had picked up pace from 2015-16 onwards.
The total updates at the end of 2014-15 standing at 75.67 Lakh has multiplied around 12 times
in five years to reach at 901.94 Lakh at the end of 2020-21.
66.97
234
416.97
643.82
547.4
540.93
554.33
8.7
59.4
155.4
268.5
296.69
352.35
347.61
75.67
293.4
572.37
912.32
844.09
893.28
901.94
0 200 400 600 800 1000
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
2017-18
2018-19
2019-20
2020-21
Number of updates
Year Chart 3.2: Aadhaar Update (in Lakh)
Total Biometric updates Demographic updates

16
3.1.3 Aadhaar Saturation Status
Figure 3.2 depicts the
Aadhaar saturation status
across the States and Union
Territories as on 31 March
2021. UIDAI had issued
more than 124.67 Crore
(live) Aadhaar till 31 March
202113
and in 23 States/
Union Territories more than
90 per cent saturation levels
were achieved whereas
eight States/ Union
Territories had saturation of
around 80 to 90 per cent. In
two States/ Union
Territories (Arunachal
Pradesh and Ladakh) the
saturation level is between
70 to 80 per cent whereas in
other two States (Assam and
Nagaland) the saturation
status was above 50 per cent
but less than 70 per cent.
However, one State (Meghalaya) has not reached the saturation level of 50 per cent. There was
overall saturation of 91 per cent in issue of Aadhaar across India.
Thus, the UIDAI needed to continue with its efforts to enroll Aadhaar eligible residents and
increase the enrolment in States which have not achieved 90 per cent benchmark.
3.1.4 The Components of Aadhaar Ecosystem
The various components of the ecosystem, external as well as internal, involved in the
enrolment to authentication, printing to delivery of Aadhaar card and the customer support is
depicted in the Figure 3.3.
13
Source: Aadhaar Saturation Report of UIDAI as on 31 March 2021.
Figure 3.2 Aadhaar Saturation Status
(31-03-2021)

17
Figure 3.3: The Aadhaar Ecosystem
3.1.5 De-duplication process
UIDAI has employed a two-step process for identifying duplicate enrolments. In the first stage,
demographic data match is done and in the second stage biometric matching of fingerprints
and iris with the database of all others enrolled in the Aadhaar database is done to identify
duplicates and establish uniqueness of the enrollee. After successful clearance at the de-
duplication stage, a 12-digit Aadhaar number is generated which is communicated to the
resident through UIDAI’s logistics partner India Post. Residents who have submitted their
mobile numbers during enrolment can also download e-Aadhaar14
.
UIDAI has agreements with three vendors for providing Automatic Biometric Identification
Systems (ABIS). These vendors were selected by the Managed Service Provider (MSP). If one
ABIS identifies a duplicate, it will be subject to verification by another ABIS for enhancing
accuracy. Further, UIDAI has a manual adjudication system also where duplicates identified
are subject to a further verification before rejection. UIDAI also undertakes demographic
de-duplication to identify errors in the demographic data submitted by a resident at the time of
enrolment.
Details of de-duplication carried out by UIDAI as on 31 March 2019 are given below:
A. Biometric Residents
Aadhaar generated through Biometric De-duplication through
(i) ABIS: 111,11,40,041
(ii) Manual De-duplication: 89,45,010
B. Non-Biometric Residents:
Aadhaar generated without Biometric
(i) Children below five years: 11,48,27,267
14
An e-Aadhaar is an electronic form of Aadhaar letter downloadable from e-Aadhaar portal of UIDAI’s
website. Resident can download e-Aadhaar in pdf format by visiting https://eaadhaar.uidai.gov.in . They can
use either 28-digit enrolment no. received at the time of enrolment or 12-digit Aadhaar Number.

18
(ii) Residents with 100 per cent Biometric exception category: 5,69,196
Issues of large member of de-duplications done and Aadhaar issued to minor children are
commented in Report.
3.1.6 Bio-metric Device Certification
Standardization, Testing and Quality Certification (STQC) Directorate, an attached office of
MeitY, is the nodal agency appointed to carry out specifications as well as certification activity
for enrolment and authentication devices requirements for the UIDAI.
3.1.7 Managed Service Provider
The entire end-to-end technology infrastructure of UIDAI including data center operations,
management of IT systems of UIDAI ROs, technical helpdesk etc., is managed by the
Managed Service Provider (MSP) viz M/s HCL Infosystems Ltd. The MSP was appointed in
August 2012 through Expression of Interest and Request for Proposal method for a period of
seven years. At present (March 2021), the MSP is functioning under extension period. The total
value of contract with the MSP was `1,978.62 Crore.
3.1.8 Governance Risk Compliance and Performance – Service Provider
Government Risk Compliance and Performance – Service Provider (GRCP-SP) is an
independent monitoring agency on behalf of UIDAI, deployed by the Authority to ensure
compliance and security of the UIDAI ecosystem. The role of GRCP-SP is to facilitate creation
of a robust, comprehensive, secure environment for UIDAI to operate. (including external
agencies such as a Registrars, Enrolment Agencies, Aadhaar Seva Kendra’s, ASAs, AUA/
KUA/ Sub-KUAs, Contact Center, SMS Service Provider and Logistics Service Providers
etc.), in terms of Visibility, Effectiveness and Control.
Service level monitoring of all contracts is one of the important works of the GRCP-SP, which
helps the UIDAI in having a financial control. All the data pertaining payments is to subjected
to GRCP Audit and processed for payments on the basis of their reports.
3.2 Audit Observations on Aadhaar Enrolment Ecosystem
Audit observations on the Aadhaar Enrolment vis-à-vis provisions of the Aadhaar Act 2016
are given in succeeding paragraphs:
3.2.1 Verification of the ‘Resident’ status of the applicants
UIDAI relied on self-declaration made by the residents regarding their ‘Resident’ status at
the time of Aadhaar enrolments and thus status of Resident or non-Resident remained
unverified.
As per the provisions of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, every resident in the country is entitled to
obtain an Aadhaar number by submitting his demographic and biometric information by
undergoing the process of enrolment. A “Resident” as per the Act, is as an individual who has
resided in India for a period or periods amounting in all to 182 days or more in the 12 months
immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment. The definition of “Resident” sets
the basic eligibility criteria to be fulfilled by each individual for obtaining Aadhaar.
The Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations 2016 prescribes the nature of documents a
resident should submit as proof of identity (PoI), proof of address (PoA), date of birth (DoB),

19
proof of relationship (PoR) etc. to the EAs. Whenever a resident applies for enrolment/
correction/ updation, a standard form containing demographic details of self along with ticking
the residential status, has to be filled
It was however, noted that UIDAI had not specified any proof/document in the regulation for
confirming the “Resident” condition, to qualify as a resident. No procedure has been prescribed
to check the veracity of the applicant’s testimony. Thus UIDAI had not put in place a system
for fulfilling the fundamental requirement of identifying residents. Audit is of the view that
non-verification of status of residence may lead to issue of Aadhaar to non-bona fide residents.
UIDAI stated (September 2019) that the validity of the documents provided by individual
applicants in support of identity, address, date of birth etc., are confirmed during enrolment
and cases appearing as fraudulent are dealt in accordance with provisions of Aadhaar
(Enrolment & Update) Regulations 2016. UIDAI (October 2020) asserted that self-declaration
in conjunction with the prescribed documents was the only practical means to ascertain the
resident status of applicants. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY)
agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the audit observations.
The replies of UIDAI/ MeitY are not tenable as Aadhaar (Enrolment & Update) Regulations
2016 stipulates actions to be taken against fraudulent cases only after generation of Aadhaar
numbers, whereas the issue here is of conducting prior checks to ascertain residential status of
an applicant, as one of the condition for issue of Aadhaar, as provided in the Aadhaar Act 2016.
UIDAI should explore a workable system of verification of residence status based on the
criteria prescribed under the Act. A review of the definition of a resident for this purpose has
gained more importance in light of the fact that non-resident Indians holding a valid Indian
passport were also entitled for an Aadhaar number after their arrival in India bypassing the 182
days residency criteria as per the Gazette notification dated 20 September 2019.
Recommendation: UIDAI may prescribe a procedure and required documentation other
than self-declaration, in order to confirm and authenticate the residence status of
applicants in line with the provisions of the Aadhaar Act.
3.2.2 Generation of Multiple Aadhaar
De-duplication process remained vulnerable for generating multiple Aadhaar numbers and
manual interventions had to be done to resolve the problem.
De-duplication process ensures that the Aadhaar numbers generated are unique and no second
number is assigned to the same resident by comparing the resident’s demographic and
biometric information collected during the process of enrolment, with the records in the
UIDAI database. It also ensures that a data with an already assigned Aadhaar number cannot
be used to generate a new number to another resident.
As per information provided by UIDAI Tech Centre, nearly 4.75 Lakh duplicate Aadhaar
numbers were cancelled as of November 2019. This data indicated that on an average no less
than 145 Aadhaars generated in a day during the period of nine years since 2010 were duplicate
numbers requiring cancellation.

20
Besides this, verification of records at the UIDAI Regional Office Bengaluru showed that
residents reported 5,38815
cases of issue of multiple Aadhaars during the period 2015-16 to
2019-20 forcing UIDAI to cancel the second Aadhaar issued, based on complaints received.
We could not ascertain the number of multiple Aadhaars reported at other ROs as access to the
related documents was not given to us. UIDAI HQ also could not provide RO wise data on the
number of multiple Aadhaars and stated (September 2019) that such data was not available
with them. Apart from issue of multiple Aadhaars to the same resident, instances of issue of
Aadhaars with the same biometric data to different residents were also seen reported in RO
Bengaluru.
Further, information like the date of issue of first Aadhaar, the date of issue of subsequent
Aadhaars and the time taken to identify and cancel them were also not provided to Audit
limiting our scope for further scrutiny on the issue.
UIDAI stated (September 2019) that the biometric de-duplication ensures uniqueness with
accuracy of 99.9 per cent, but in cases where residents with poor biometrics enroll, their
accuracy could be slightly poor which could lead to generation of multiple Aadhaars. It was
also informed that UIDAI has deployed self-cleaning system (an automated process) to identify
duplicate Aadhaars and for taking corrective actions. However, no details on the frequency of
the deployment of the self- cleaning system, the number of duplicates detected through the
process etc., were provided to audit as of July 2020. The fact that residents reported 860 cases
of multiple Aadhaars in Bengaluru RO alone during 2018-19 suggested that the self- cleaning
system employed by UIDAI was not effective enough in detecting the leakages and plugging
them. Though the number of cases reported could be termed as miniscule when compared with
the total number of Aadhaars generated.
UIDAI later, (October 2020) explained the “whitelisting process” invoked in case a genuine
person is denied Aadhaar through the de-duplication process. It claimed significant
improvements in detecting duplicate and fraudulent enrollment after application of Service
Level Agreement (SLA) parameters independently for each of the three Biometric Service
Providers (BSPs) and incorporation of other SLA parameters like FNIRA16
, attack presentation
classification error rate etc. in the new contract. UIDAI also informed that a project with IIIT
Hyderabad in the field of biometric was going on to develop indigenous technology to achieve
“atmanirbharta”. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the Audit Observations.
It is evident that UIDAI was aware of generation of multiple Aadhaar which had remained
unidentified/detected by it unless brought to their notice. It was also noted that to ensure
provision of unique identities to residents, UIDAI has even resorted to Manual De-duplication
(MDD) processes in cases where biometric data was rejected by BSPs. The cancellation of
duplicate Aadhaars or generation of Aadhaars through MDD indicated flaws in the functioning
of BSPs appointed by UIDAI. The failure in De-duplication resulting in denial of Aadhaar can
be negated by invoking the whitelisting process for the aggrieved residents. As a result,
UIDAI/MeitY needs to devise foolproof mechanisms for capturing unique biometric data.
15
The total 5,388 cases of multiple Aadhaar reported comprises of 1,131, 2,339, 330, 860 & 728 cases during
the years 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19 & 2019-20 respectively.
16
FNIRA: False Negative Identification Rate for Anomalous matches

21
UIDAI also needs to strengthen the Automated Biometric Identification System so that
generation of multiple Aadhaars can be curbed at the initial stage itself.
Recommendation: UIDAI may tighten the SLA parameters of Biometric Service
Providers (BSPs), devise foolproof mechanisms for capturing unique biometric data and
improve upon their monitoring systems to proactively identify and take action to minimize,
multiple/duplicate Aadhaar numbers generated. UIDAI may also review a regular
updation of technology. UIDAI also needs to strengthen the Automated Biometric
Identification System so that generation of multiple/duplicate Aadhaars can be curbed at
the initial stage itself.
3.2.3 Enrolment for Aadhaar of Minor Children below age of five years
The uniqueness of identity, one of the distinctive attributes of Aadhaar, was not ensured
while issuing Aadhaar to minor children below the age of five years.
As per the provisions of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, every resident in the country is entitled to
obtain an Aadhaar number by submitting his demographic and biometric information by as part
of the enrolment process. However, as per Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations 2016,
biometrics are not captured for Aadhaar generation in respect of minor children below five
years of age. Their UID is processed as per Section 5 (1) of these Regulations on the basis of
demographic information and facial photograph by linking with the UID of any one of the
parents. These children are required subsequently, to update their biometrics (ten fingers, iris
and facial photograph), when they turn five and then again on attaining fifteen years of age.
(Image courtesy: UIDAI)
UIDAI regulations state that
if a child having attained the
age of five or fifteen years
of age, fails to update his/
her biometric information
within two years of
attaining such age, his/ her
Aadhaar number would be
deactivated. In cases where
such update had not been
carried out at the expiry of
one year after deactivation
the Aadhaar number would
be omitted.
Further, UIDAI notified (September 2018) that if the current age of an Aadhaar holder enrolled
as a child had crossed 15 years and if his/ her biometrics are not updated such Aadhaar would
be cancelled.
Audit observed that since UIDAI does not capture biometrics of minor children below five
years for generating Aadhaar, the basic condition for issue of Aadhaar i.e. uniqueness of
identity was not being met. As per information furnished, UIDAI had generated approximately

22
11.48 Crore Aadhaars for children below five years till March 2019. The assistance provided
to the Registrars/ Enrolment agencies for enrolment @ `27 per child along with related costs
worked out to `310 Crore.
UIDAI informed, that they had deactivated about 40.91 Lakh Aadhaar for want of Biometric
Update as on 01 November 2019. With the increase in saturation level, there remains always a
possibility that children whose Aadhaar has been deactivated as mentioned above might have
enrolled themselves afresh after crossing the age of five, with their biometrics.
Based on the Hon’ble
Supreme Court’s
judgment17
, that no
subsidy, benefits, or
services could be denied to
a child to whom no Aadhaar
number was assigned, we
are of the view that, the
issue of cards, devoid of
biometric authentications to
children below five years
served limited purpose
considering the costs
involved.
UIDAI stated (June 2020) that it is mandated to issue Aadhaar number to all the residents,
including children. Even though, biometrics of children are not collected, child Aadhaar is
issued based on authentication of a parent. It added that the chances of creation of duplicate
Aadhaar were very low even in the absence of biometric data, and the number of duplicate
numbers found/ reported was insignificant. They claimed that issuing an identity to a child, led
to monetary savings for the exchequer as it helped eliminate ineligible beneficiaries, and was
hence beneficial. They were of the view that the cost incurred was insignificant.
In its subsequent reply (October 2020), UIDAI accepted that the de-duplication done based on
the demographic data and photograph may not be as robust as the automated biometric
identification system (ABIS). They issue SMS and letters to all the parents/ guardians whose
children were due for mandatory update for bringing them back in the Aadhaar ecosystem.
MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the audit observations.
We are of the view that the UIDAI’s mandate was to issue Aadhaar number to a resident after
establishing uniqueness of the applicant through his/her biometrics. Therefore, issue of
Aadhaar numbers to children without biometric data did not meet the criteria of establishing
the uniqueness of the holder and could not be justified on the grounds of the mandate to issue
ID to all residents including children. Moreover, as per judgment of the Supreme Court on
17
Five bench Supreme Court Judgement dated 26 September 2018 on writ petition (civil) No. 494 of 2012 &
connected matters

23
Aadhar, no subsidy, benefits or services cannot be denied to a child for want of an Aadhar
number.
Issue of Bal Aadhar to minor children below five years, without capturing their unique identity
could not be justified on basis of unquantified advantages as suggested by UIDAI. The fact
that an individual is required to apply for regular Aadhar cards for at two stages after crossing
five years, UIDAI requires to review the issue of non- mandatory Aadhar to minor children
below five years. They may explore alternate ways to capture unique identity of minor children
below five years, in keeping with its mandate.
Recommendation: UIDAI may explore alternate ways to capture uniqueness of
biometric identity for minor children below five years since uniqueness of identity is the
most distinctive feature of Aadhaar established through biometrics of the individual.
3.2.4 Management of Aadhaar Documents
All the Aadhaar numbers stored in the UIDAI database were not supported with documents
on the demographic information of the resident, causing doubts about the correctness and
completeness of resident’s data collected and stored by UIDAI prior to 2016.
Upto July 2016, it was the responsibility of the Aadhaar Document Management System
(ADMS) (M/s Hewlett Packard Sales India Private Ltd. (HP)) to store the physical sets of
records provided by individuals at the time of enrolment, both in electronic as well as physical
form in a secured manner. The documents18
collected by the Enrolment Agencies (EAs) during
enrolment/ update were picked up by the ADMS agency on a regular basis from EAs for
scanning and uploading into a portal. With effect from July 2016, UIDAI mandated inline
scanning19
of residents’ documents20
bringing an end to pick-up of the documents by the
ADMS Agency in June 2017.
As significant gaps were noted in the enrolments done and documents submitted by the
Registrars/EAs to the DMS Agency, UIDAI issued (December 2015) a set of instructions with
the aim of minimizing the gaps and to reconstruct missing documents, for compliance by the
DMS agency, the Tech Centre, ROs and Registrars/ EAs. Accordingly, the Tech Centre was to
compare the list of Enrolment Identity (EID21
) received from the DMS agency and generate
State/ Registrar/ EA wise list of such EIDs against which Aadhaar has been generated but data
prepared by the Agency was missing. The Registrars were to forward the information received
from Tech Centre to its EAs for collection of missing documents. The ROs in their turn, were
to guide the Registrars/ EAs for reconstruction of data and monitor this activity. The ROs were
to furnish monthly progress report (State/ Registrar/ EA wise) to UIDAI HQ showing the
number of EIDs requiring reconstruction, number of EIDs for which reconstruction completed
and the number of EIDs for which reconstruction was not completed.
18
Enrolment Identification Documents collected from the residents as their proof of identification, proof of
address, proof of date of birth or relationship etc., along with the copy of enrolment/ update form.
19
Inline scanning is the process where the original documents are scanned and uploaded with the enrolment/
update form to the CIDR at the time of enrolment/ update itself and hence no physical copy is retained/
collected by the operators.
20
Proof of identification, proof of address, proof of date of birth or relationship etc.
21
EID- means a 28-digit Enrolment Identification Number allocated to residents at the time of enrolment.

24
These instructions further suggested that not all the Aadhaar numbers stored in the UIDAI
database were supported with documents on the demographic information of the resident,
raising questions on the correctness and completeness of resident’s data collected and stored
by UIDAI.
Data on the number of EIDs against which Aadhaar has been generated but documents were
missing and the nature of document(s) identified as missing along with the status of their
reconstruction was sought from UIDAI. UIDAI informed (June 2020) that the MSP (Managed
Service Provider) had been given the responsibility to map EID-UID linkage for which
software development was under progress. It was also informed that with effect from
01 July 2016, inline scanning and upload of Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
documents along with enrolment and update packets have been made mandatory and hence all
new Aadhaar numbers generated and updated after 01 July 2016 are presumed to have their PII
documents. It was further added that since update of Aadhaar numbers by residents is a regular
activity, the reconstruction of PII documents was a continuous process and the documents
collected from Registrars and EAs were being uploaded/ reconciled, the exact position of
deficiency of PII documents had not been worked out.
The response of UIDAI suggested that the enrolments were carried out without confirming
availability of all required documents. UIDAI, despite being aware of the fact that not all
Aadhaar numbers were paired with the personal information of their holders, was yet to identify
the exact extent of mismatch though nearly ten years have elapsed since the issue of first
Aadhaar. Non pairing of biometric data in the system with demographic information was not
in consonance with the instructions issued by UIDAI and non availability of PII documents
with the Authority, for those already collected from the residents, impacts the reliability of the
Aadhaar database. Further, any quality check of demographic data by UIDAI post issue of
Aadhaar will lead to deactivation of these Aadhaar numbers as stipulated by the Regulations.
As a matter of fact, till 01 November 2019, 37,551 Aadhaar numbers were deactivated due to
disputed PII documents.
Therefore, UIDAI may identify and fill the missing documents by taking proactive steps at the
earliest in order to avoid any legal complications or inconvenience to Aadhaar holder due to
suspension/ deactivation of Aadhaar for want of paired PII documents.
UIDAI agreed (October 2020) with the audit recommendation and assured to explore the
possibility to fill the gaps in documentation without causing avoidable inconvenience to
Aadhaar holders. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the Audit Observations.
Recommendation: UIDAI may take proactive steps to identify and fill the missing
documents in their database at the earliest, in order to avoid any legal complications or
inconvenience to holders of Aadhaar issued prior to 2016.
3.3 Audit Observations on Aadhaar Update Ecosystem
Audit observations on the Aadhaar Update Ecosystem is given below:

25
3.3.1 Voluntary Biometric Updates
High numbers of voluntary biometric updates indicated deficient capture of biometric during
enrolments resulting in Authentication failures resulting in residents having to update their
biometrics.
Biometric updates fall into two categories viz., mandatory updates and voluntary updates.
A. Mandatory updates usually arise in the following situations:
a. A child with age less than five years at the time of initial enrolment should provide
biometric information on attaining the age of five years and this initial capture is treated
as a mandatory update of an existing Aadhaar.
b. Children aged between five and 15 years at the time of enrolment should furnish all
biometrics for updates when turns 15 years.
B. Voluntary updates may arise in following situations:
a. Age more than 15 years at the time of enrolment – Residents are recommended to
update their biometric data every ten years.
b. Events like accidents or diseases leading to biometric exception
c. Biometric updates arising out of authentication failures (False Rejects – where
authentication attempts of a resident with valid Aadhaar number is rejected) resulting
from incorrect biometric capture or poor biometric quality captured at the time of
enrolment.
While mandatory updates are free for the residents, voluntary updates are chargeable for the
residents at rates prescribed by UIDAI.
An analysis of data on biometric updates for the year 2018-19 revealed that during the year,
UIDAI updated 3.04 Crore biometrics data successfully. Out of the successful updates,
0.81 Crore (26.55 per cent) were mandatory and the remaining 2.23 Crore (73.45 per cent)
were voluntary updates.
According to UIDAI, the need for biometric update could arise on account of authentication
failures (called “false rejects”- where a correct resident with a valid Aadhaar Number is
incorrectly rejected) due to incorrect biometric capture or poor biometric quality captured at
the time of enrollment. Thus, a significantly high percentage of voluntary biometric updates
indicated occurrence of a high volume of authentication failures, which compel Aadhaar
number holders to update their biometrics. This was also a reflection on the quality of biometric
data stored in CIDR for establishing the uniqueness of the Aadhaar number holder. It was
observed that the UIDAI takes no responsibility for deficient biometric capture and the onus
of updating biometric is passed on to the Aadhaar number holders and they are also required
to pay for such updates.
UIDAI stated (July 2020) that it was not possible to ascertain reasons for authentication failures
or attribute it to incorrect/poor quality biometrics at the backend. It however, confirmed that
biometric mismatch could happen due to reasons such as poor quality of biometric capture at
the time of enrollment, improper placement of finger at the time of authentication, entering of
incorrect Aadhaar number and device quality issues. UIDAI also stated that as per the approved

26
procedure for enrollment, operators could complete the enrollment even with poor quality
biometrics through “forced capture” after four unsuccessful attempts to capture biometric data.
It was reported that this procedure was adopted to improve inclusiveness of residents under the
Aadhaar programme.
UIDAI agreed (October 2020) with audit observations and explained that most authentication
was based on fingerprints which do change in adults with time based on their job profiles.
Further, the two other modes of authentication viz “Iris” and “Face” could also be utilized but
the devices for Iris checks were comparatively more expensive than the fingerprint
authentication devices and efforts were on to introduce more technically certified devices for
Iris checks. It also added that it was requesting their ecosystem partners to deploy Iris
authentication devices. UIDAI had also developed a model for face authentication which was
under trial phase, and that it planned to utilize all the three modes of authentication to overcome
the lacunae faced in fingerprint authentications. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of
UIDAI to the Audit Observations.
While noting the action taken/ proposed by UIDAI to improve upon the capture of biometrics,
we are of the view that acceptance of poor-quality biometrics at the time of enrolment showed
that UIDAI had not ensured the quality of biometric data included in the CIDR, adversely
impacting the programme’s objective of establishing the uniqueness of the Aadhaar number
holder. Further, acceptance of poor-quality biometrics on the plea of expanding the enrollment
under the programme and then passing the burden of the updation of biometrics cost to Aadhaar
holders did not seem appropriate. Since UIDAI is not in a position to identify reasons for
authentication failures of biometrics, it is felt that charging residents a fee for voluntary update
of their biometrics was not in order, for no fault of them.
Recommendation: UIDAI may review charging of fees for voluntary update of residents’
biometrics, since they (UIDAI) were not in a position to identify reasons for biometric
failures and residents were not at fault for capture of poor quality of biometrics.
3.4 Aadhaar Authentication Ecosystem
Entities engaged in providing Aadhaar enabled services can avail the authentication services
of UIDAI. The authentication facility allows verification of the identity information of an
Aadhaar number holder by providing a Yes/ No response or e-KYC data.
Authentication services are provided online and in real-time basis through its Data centers and
are offered through the following modes:
a. Demographic authentication: Aadhaar number and demographic data submitted for
authentication is matched with the corresponding data in the CIDR.
b. One Time Pin (OTP) based authentication: OTP is sent to the mobile number or e-
mail address of the Aadhaar holder registered with the Authority and the Aadhaar
number and OTP is matched with the OTP sent by UIDAI.
c. Biometric based authentication: The Aadhaar number and biometric information
submitted by the Aadhaar holder is matched against the biometric data of said Aadhaar
number stored in CIDR.

27
d. Multi-factor authentication: A combination of two or more of the above modes.
3.4.1 Aadhaar Authentication partners
The main players in authentication eco-system are the Authentication User Agencies22
(AUAs)/
e-KYC User Agency23
(KUA) or the Requesting Entity (RE)24
and the Authentication Service
Agencies25
(ASAs). A requesting entity submits the Aadhaar number and demographic
information or biometric information of an individual through an ASA, to the CIDR for
authentication. The ASA provides the infrastructure for connectivity and related services for
enabling a requesting entity to undertake authentication. There were 164 AUAs, 162 KUAs
and 22 ASAs entities active as on 31 March 2021. The Aadhaar authentication process is
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Aadhaar Authentication Process
3.4.2 Key Regulations and Amendments
Key regulations relating to Aadhaar authentication are given in Table 3.2.
22
UIDAI provides Yes/ No authentication services through requesting entities called Authentication User
Agency (AUA). AUA is any government/ public legal entity registered in India that uses Aadhaar
authentication for providing its services to the residents/customers. An AUA is connected to the UIDAI Data
Centre/ Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) through an ASA.
23
KUA is a requesting entity which, in addition to being an AUA, uses e-KYC authentication facility.
24
Requesting Entities are Authentication User Agencies (AUAs) and e-KYC User Agencies (KUAs).
25
ASA is an agency that has secured leased line connectivity with CIDR. They play the role of enabling
intermediaries through secure connection established with the CIDR. ASAs transmit authentication requests
of AUAs to the CIDR and transmit back the CIDR’s response to the AUAs.

28
Table 3.2: Key regulations and amendments thereto governing Aadhaar Authentication
System
Key Regulations Key features
Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulations 2016
(No. 03 of 2016)
Dated 14-Sep-2016
Authentication Framework- Types/ Modes of Authentication,
capturing of biometric information, Consent of/ Notification to
holder, Devices, Client applications used, Biometric Locking etc.
Appointment of Requesting Entities & Authentication Service
Agencies- (Procedures, Eligibility Criteria, Roles &
Responsibilities, Obligations, Code of Conduct, maintenance of
logs, Audit, Data Security, Surrender, Liabilities & Action in case
of Default etc.)
Use of Yes/No & e-KYC authentication
Authentication Transaction Data & its Records- Storage&
Maintenance of Transaction Data, Duration of Storage, Access by
Aadhaar holder
Aadhaar (Pricing
of Aadhaar
Authentication
Services)
Regulation 2019
Dated 06-Mar-2019
Aadhaar Authentication Services to be charged (including taxes)
@ `20 for each e-KYC transactions and @ `0.50 for each Yes/No
authentication transaction by requesting entities.
Exemption to Government entities and Department of Posts and
conditional exemptions to Scheduled Commercial Banks engaged
in Aadhaar enrolment & update facilities
3.4.3 Status of Authentication Transactions
Aadhaar authentication is the process by which the CIDR, based on the information available
with it, verifies the correctness of the Aadhaar number submitted to it along with the
demographic and biometric information for verification. UIDAI provides two types of
authentication services viz. “Yes/ No26
” authentication facility and “e-KYC27
” authentication
facility using Aadhaar.
As of March 2021, UIDAI has performed more than 5,400 Crore authentication transactions
and above 900 Crore e-KYC transactions. The year wise authentication and e-KYC
transactions are as in Chart 3.3.
26
“Yes/ No” Authentication: UIDAI started Yes/ No Authentication facility in February 2012 under which
requesting entity sends Aadhaar and necessary demographic and/ or OTP and/ or biometric information of the
Aadhaar number holder in an encrypted format. UIDAI validates the input parameters against the data stored
in CIDR and authenticates in a ‘Yes or No’ response.
27
e-KYC Authentication: UIDAI started e-KYC Authentication facility in May 2013 under which a requesting
entity sends Aadhaar and necessary biometric information and/ or OTP from the Aadhaar number holder in
encrypted format. UIDAI validates the input parameters against the data stored in CIDR therein and returns
authentication response as an encrypted digitally signed e-KYC.

29
3.5 Audit observations on Monitoring of Ecosystem partners on compliance to the
provisions of Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations 2016
Aadhaar authentication framework comprises of REs and ASAs. These entities collect the
biometric information of the Aadhaar holder for validation purposes. Their interaction with
Aadhaar number holders and UIDAI is through the digital mode. Aadhaar (Authentication)
Regulation 2016 and other directions of UIDAI notified from time to time, contain instructions
on the arrangements which all the entities involved in the authentication ecosystem should
follow for ensuring the security of data of the residents. The regulation also specifies the
responsibilities of UIDAI in monitoring e-compliance with its instructions by the ecosystem
partners’ viz. ASA, AUA, KUA etc.
Audit observations on compliance with provisions of the Regulation and the processes put in
place by UIDAI to monitor the activities of the REs and ASAs are given in the succeeding
paragraphs.
3.5.1 Incidences of Authentication Errors
Aadhaar was conceived to provide for, as a good governance, efficient, transparent, and
targeted delivery of subsidies, benefits and services to Aadhaar number holders by means of
successful authentication. The fingerprint authentication transaction success rate remained
a cause of dissatisfaction among the users due to biometric authentication failures.
Authentication services of UIDAI is a tool relied upon by government departments to confirm
the genuineness of recipients of various benefits from government schemes and programmes.
Inaccurate authentication therefore, would lead to errors in identification with consequent
implications for effective delivery of services and benefits. In addition, authentication errors
compel an Aadhaar number holder to update his/her biometric data. As per a Government of
India Report28
Aadhaar authentication failures in certain States were as high as 49 per cent in
2016-17.
28
The Economic Survey 2016-17 (Refer 9.76) published by the Ministry of Finance: “While Aadhaar coverage
speed has been exemplary, with over a billion Aadhaar cards being distributed, some states report
authentication failures: estimates include 49 per cent failure rates for Jharkhand, six per cent for Gujarat, five
per cent for Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh and 37 per cent for Rajasthan”
0.24 6.45 34.04
109.81
403.64
1261.92
1080.47 1113.54
1413.4
0.01 2.98 5.43
108.6
384.96
205.99
89.41 111.25
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21
Chart 3.3: Authentication and e-KYC Transactions (in Crore)
Authentication Transactions e-KYC Transactions

30
On the subject of authentication errors, UIDAI informed (July 2020) that it does not receive
location data during authentication, and in the absence of State-wise information on
authentication failures reasons for the same have not been analyzed.
UIDAI further explained (October 2020) that there might be failure of fingerprint
authentication in the first attempt due to various reasons, but subsequent attempts may succeed.
It claimed that there had been improvement in transaction wise fingerprint authentication
success rate from 70-72 per cent in 2016-17 to 74-76 per cent in 2019-20. It mentioned that to
address connectivity issues, buffer authentication had been allowed to REs and in addition,
efforts were underway to promote iris authentication and launch face authentication on pilot
basis. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the audit observations.
While there may be various reasons
for fingerprint authentication
requiring multiple attempts for
authentication, this may result in
dissatisfaction to Aadhaar holders for
repeated biometric authentication
failures. The promotion or launch of
other forms of biometric
authentication might improve the
success rate of transactions but their
performance has not yet been tested
on large scale.
Image 3.1: Illustrative image of authentication success.
Image courtesy: www.basunivesh.com
Also Audit has not been provided any basis on which UIDAI has claimed the success rate
mentioned here as improvement in failure rates.
Audit is of the view that since Aadhaar as an instrument facilitates good governance through
authentication, UIDAI may make efforts to improve the success rate of authentication and also
take action to analyze failure cases.
Recommendation: UIDAI may make efforts to improve the success rate of authentication
transactions by analysing failure cases.
3.5.2 Non verification of the infrastructure and technical support of Requesting Entities
and Authentication Service Agencies
UIDAI did not verify the infrastructure and technological support claimed by the REs and
ASAs independently before onboarding the entities in the Aadhaar authentication
ecosystem.
The Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations 2016 stipulate that agencies seeking to become REs
and ASAs should fulfill the criteria laid down by UIDAI. Regulation 12 of the Aadhaar
(Authentication) Regulation, details the conditions for appointment of REs and ASAs. The
regulation authorizes UIDAI to verify the information furnished by the applicants in support
of their eligibility through physical verification of documents, infrastructure and technological
support, before approval of the applications.

31
In this context, data on systems put in place for physical verification of the infrastructure and
technological support claimed by the applicants for appointment as REs, and details of audit
undertaken of infrastructure and technical systems of the REs prior to their appointment were
sought (July 2019) from UIDAI. In response UIDAI informed (June 2020) that they had not
felt the need so far for conducting physical verification of the infrastructure and technical
systems of the applicants prior to signing agreements with them. It was further informed that
the REs while moving from pre-production to production environment, were required to submit
an IS Audit Report from a CERT-IN empaneled Auditor which was scrutinized by UIDAI.
As of March 2021, 326 REs (164 AUAs and 162 KUAs) and 22 ASAs were active in
production environment of the CIDR. Out of these 326 REs, 43 AUAs and 41 KUAs were
Government entities whereas out of 22 ASAs, 12 ASAs were Government entities. Further six
Government REs (three AUAs & three KUAs) and 44 other than Government REs (22 AUAs
& 22 KUAs) had permission in pre-production environment as of March 2021. UIDAI had not
verified information furnished by any of the applicants independently (October 2020).
UIDAI accepted (October 2020) the audit observation and assured that it would conduct
thorough verification of the documents, infrastructure and technological support before
on-boarding the entities (REs and ASAs) in Aadhaar ecosystem. It added that such verification
would however, be conducted at the discretion of UIDAI keeping in view the nature of AUA/
KUA and the urgency of implementing authentication service. UIDAI will initiate measures to
implement it to the extent possible also keeping in view the constraints posed due to the
ongoing Covid- 19 pandemic. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the Audit
Observations.
Therefore, UIDAI should institute a mechanism for physical verification of the documents,
infrastructure, and technological support before on-boarding the entities (REs and ASAs) to
ensure high standards of IS security across the Aadhaar authentication ecosystem. Audit
appreciates UIDAI’s decision to conduct physical verification of the documents, infrastructure
and technological support before on boarding the entities (REs and ASAs) in Aadhaar
ecosystem. However, use of discretionary power to not conduct any verification should be
governed by a well-defined criteria/ benchmarks and exemptions from physical verification of
the entities, may be granted in exceptional cases only, in interest of IS concerns.
Recommendation: UIDAI may conduct thorough verification of the documents,
infrastructure, and technological support claimed to be available, before on-boarding the
entities (Requesting Entity and Authentication Service Agencies SAs) in the Aadhaar
ecosystem.
3.6 Other related Audit Observations
place by UIDAI related to the Aadhaar Enrolment, Update and Authentication ecosystem has
already been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. The other important and related
observations are discussed in the following paragraphs:

32
3.6.1 Data Archival Policy
UIDAI is maintaining one of the largest biometric databases in the world; but did not have
a data archiving policy, which is considered to be a vital storage management best practice.
Data archiving is the process of moving data that is no longer actively used to a separate storage
device for long-term retention. Archive data consists of older data that remains important to
the organization for future reference or regulatory compliance reasons. It is a storage
management best practice for efficient use of storage space and performance enhancement.
UIDAI is maintaining one of the largest biometric databases in the world and hence it is vital
for the Organization to have a policy on archiving the data collected.
It was seen in audit that during the Aadhaar enrolment process, data packets containing
demographic and biometric information of the residents are subjected to various processes like
Quality Checks (QC), Demographic de-duplication, Biometric de-duplication, Manual
de-duplication (MDD) etc., to identify and weed out erroneous/ duplicate/ junk packets. Audit
observed that packets rejected at QC stage remained present in the UIDAI database along with
the accepted packets. So even where packets are rejected on account of de-duplication, UIDAI
apparently will have more than one set of biometric data of the same resident - one with an
Aadhaar number attached and others with all details except an Aadhaar number (new enrolment
request) and all the data are retained in the CIDR. Retaining any data requires valuable
resources, hence valid and necessary data should be only archived. In absence of a data
archiving policy, UIDAI retains and preserves large volumes of redundant/ excess data for
longer periods.
With a sound data archival policy, an organization like UIDAI, can not only have access to all
classes of data whenever the need arises but also reduce the size of storage by disposing off
redundant data regularly. It is therefore vital that UIDAI frames a Data Archival Policy and
implements it strictly. UIDAI agreed (October 2020) with the audit recommendation and
assured to work towards framing a suitable Data Archiving Policy. MeitY agreed (June 2021)
with replies of UIDAI to the audit observations.
Recommendation: UIDAI may frame a suitable data archival policy to mitigate the risk
of vulnerability to data protection and reduce saturation of valuable data space due to
redundant and unwanted data, by continuous weeding out of unwanted data .
3.6.2 Delivery of Aadhaar Documents
UIDAI did not work out a customized delivery solution with DoP to ensure last mile
successful delivery of Aadhaar letters.
Aadhaar cards in laminated form are printed and dispatched by UIDAI in all the cases of
successful enrolments and updates. DoP is the logistic partner for delivery of Aadhaar letters
as First-Class Mail (Ordinary Post). The ordinary post services of India Post do not provide
any individual dispatch number or tracking facility.
As more than 250 welfare schemes of the Government require identification through Aadhaar,
possession of Aadhaar assumes importance for residents to avail benefits from these schemes.
An effective delivery mechanism is thus vital to ensure that Aadhaar letters are delivered to the
intended individuals. Also as per the Aadhaar Act 2016, UIDAI is responsible for the security

33
of the identity information of the Aadhaar holder. In cases of non-receipt of Aadhaar letters by
post, an individual can receive the original Aadhaar letter by approaching the Grievance Cell
of UIDAI or by downloading e-Aadhaar. UIDAI also introduced an “Order Aadhaar Reprint”
(OAR) service in December 2018.
Audit observed that
UIDAI received back
50 Lakh Aadhaar
letters at its Bengaluru
Centre till March 2019
due to non-delivery to
residents. Residents
also made complaints
about non-delivery of
Aadhaar letters at
UIDAI Grievance Cell
and through RTI
requests.
Further, dumping/ abandoning of Aadhaar letters in bulk without delivering to the residents
had been highlighted in various news media also.
As UIDAI has availed Ordinary Post Services from DoP, it was not in a position to track the
receipt of the physical Aadhaar card by the addressee. In absence of any formal agreement or
MoU as regards manner of delivery of Aadhaar letters with India Post, UIDAI had not ensured
the confidentiality aspect of Aadhaar cards issued.
UIDAI informed (July 2020) that more than 122 Crore Aadhaar letters have been successfully
delivered and DoP is regularly being addressed to ensure and strengthen the delivery of
Aadhaar letters.
UIDAI further informed (October 2020) that it has requested DoP to develop a customized
tracking system for Aadhaar letters to monitor their delivery and to sensitize their personnel/
staff in ensuring proper delivery to the residents. In addition, UIDAI has facilitated residents
with an option to download their ‘e-Aadhaar’ or use official mobile app ‘m-Aadhaar’. Besides,
UIDAI started (December 2018) Order Aadhaar Re-print (OAR) Service for residents by using
which any Aadhaar holder could order online Aadhaar letter by paying `50 per order and get
it through Speed Post service of DoP. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the
audit observations.
In this regard, Audit noted the action taken by UIDAI but they could have negotiated with India
Post for a customized delivery solution for delivery of Aadhaar letters. The options like
‘e-Aadhaar’, ‘m-Aadhaar’ and ‘OAR’ have several limitations requiring the residents to have
additional resources and efforts, whereas a doorstep delivery of laminated Aadhaar letters has
its own advantage for residents from all walks. Since a large number of Aadhaar cards/ letters
were not actually delivered to residents, it raises doubts on the number of Aadhaar cards shown

34
as issued. Thus UIDAI should strengthen its last mile delivery mechanism to ensure effective
delivery of the cards issued coupled with security of the identity information.
Recommendation: UIDAI may address the delivery problems with their logistic partner
namely DoP, by designing a customized delivery model, which will ensure delivery of
Aadhaar letters to the correct addressee.

35
Chapter 4 Management of Finances and Contracts
4.1 Introduction-Budget and Finance
Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act,
2016, stipulates that the expenditure of UIDAI is to be met out of the Grants from the Central
Government. The fees or revenue collected by the Authority is to be credited in the
Consolidated Fund of India till the creation of separate UIDAI Fund. The expenditure of UIDAI
is furnished below in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Budget (Revised) Estimates and Expenditure of UIDAI
(`
`
`
` in Crore)
Year Budget (Revised) Estimates Expenditure
2009-14 4,400.18 4,365.28
2014-15 1,617.73 1,615.34
2015-16 1,880.93 1,680.44
2016-17 1,135.27 1,132.84
2017-18 1,150.00 1,149.38
2018-19 1,344.99 1,181.86
2019-20 836.78 856.1229
2020-21 613.00 892.6730
(Data Source: Information Supplied by UIDAI and UIDAI website)
The expenditure of UIDAI is mainly on establishment and operational expenses. The budget
and expenditure of UIDAI has reduced from 2009-14 to till date. As per Aadhaar (Amendment)
Act 2019, a separate UIDAI Fund31
was created to which all grants, fees and charges received
by the Authority were to be credited. The Fund so created was to be applied for meeting salaries
and allowances and operations. Balance in this fund as on 31 March 2021 was `322.40 Crore.
Year-wise revenue earned, deposited in Consolidated Fund of India (CFI) and the balance
utilised or lying with the UIDAI is shown below in Table 4.2:
29
Excess expenditure met from unspent balance of 2018-19.
30
Excess expenditure met from unspent balance of 2018-19 & 2019-20 and UIDAI Fund
31
The Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Ordinance 2019 (No.9 of 2019) (dated 02 March 2019) which
become the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act (dated 23 July 2019)

36
Table 4.2: Statement showing Revenue earned and its utilisation
(`
`
`
` in Crore)
Year Revenue earned
Deposited in
Consolidated Fund of
India32
Balance33
2009-17
The amount is not separately available as the UIDAI was working under
Planning Commission and as an attached Office under MeitY.
2017-18 160.76 160.76 0.00
2018-19 65.38 22.09 43.30
2019-20 224.59 21.82 202.77
2020-21 331.65 9.25 322.40
(Data Source: Information Supplied by UIDAI)
All the earnings of UIDAI including the interest and the unspent Grant-in-Aid were deposited
in the CFI till 2017-18. From 2018-19 onwards, the entire revenue was deposited in UIDAI
Fund and since then, they have deposited only the interest earned on Grants in Aid in the CFI.
4.2 Audit Observations on Revenue Management
The major source of Revenue for UIDAI comprises License Fee recoverable from ASAs and
AUAs, Authentication Charges for biometric verifications in the shape of OTP, eKYC and
financial disincentives levied on contractors/ partners etc for deficiencies in services. The audit
observation on Revenue Resources is given below:
4.2.1 Non-Levy of charges for delivery of authentication services
UIDAI took three years from the enactment of the Aadhaar Act 2016 to decide the applicable
fees for authentication services and allowed a large number of authentication transactions
without charging any fees, in violation of their own Regulations, resulting in loss of revenue
to the Government.
Section 8(1) of The Aadhaar Act 2016 and Section 12(7) of Aadhaar (Authentication)
Regulations 2016 authorizes UIDAI to perform authentication of the Aadhaar number of an
Aadhaar holder on payment of a fee. The conditions for providing the service and the fee
applicable should be decided by UIDAI. Accordingly, UIDAI notified (March 2019), the
Aadhaar (Pricing of Aadhaar Authentication Services) Regulations, 2019 wherein, the charge
for Aadhaar authentication services was fixed @ `20 (including taxes) for each e-KYC
transaction and `0.50 (including taxes) for each Yes/ No authentication transaction from
requesting entities. Government entities and the Department of Posts were exempted from
authentication transaction charges. Levy of authentication transaction charges was to
commence from 07 March 2019.
Audit observed that UIDAI took almost three years from the enactment of the Aadhaar Act
2016 to decide the applicable fees for authentication services. In the meantime, the Department
of Telecommunication (DoT) permitted (March 2017) Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) to
32
From the year 2018-19 onwards only the amount of interest earned on the Grants-in-Aids received by UIDAI
has been deposited in CFI.
33
The balance amount includes the amount utilised by the UIDAI as well as the amount deposited in the UIDAI
Fund

37
re-verify all their mobile subscribers through Aadhaar based e-KYC process and the Central
Government in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India made (October 2017) linkage of
Aadhaar number to bank account mandatory under the Prevention of Money-Laundering
(Maintenance of Records) Second Amendment Rules, 2017. As such, the TSPs and banks
updated their databases using the e-KYC services of UIDAI. Data on e-KYC and authentication
showed that UIDAI performed nearly 63734
Crore e-KYC transactions until March 2019, of
which 598 Crore transactions (94 per cent) were for TSPs and banks alone. Besides, the
increased acceptance of Aadhaar as a valid identity document led to an increase in the
authentication transactions also and UIDAI performed 2,491 Crore authentication transactions
(Yes/ No) during the same period. The belated decision of leving Fee for authentication
services resulted in free services to parties even though the Aadhaar Act stipulated a fee to be
charged for such services.
UIDAI stated (October 2019) that Aadhaar authentication was conceived as an enabler of good
governance and not as a revenue generation measure and charging for authentication services
would have “stifled government’s good governance efforts”. Further, since writ petitions
challenging the constitutionality of the Aadhaar Act were being heard in the Apex Court, the
Authority waited for clarity and stabilization of the policy framework before introducing
authentication charges. As such, it was a conscious decision to introduce user fees in a
staggered manner as the priority was to promote the usage of Aadhaar. UIDAI Management
also took the view that they were the sole competent authority to decide on pricing for services
and took a considered policy decision on charging of the requisite fees only when the statutory
and legal landscape was mature enough.
Explaining the free e-KYC service to TSPs, it was stated that re-verification of mobile
subscribers was mandated by Government policy and law, UIDAI was expected to enable re-
verification by provisioning of e-KYC services and therefore levying any kind of fee for it
would have been wrong and not in public interest. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of
UIDAI to the audit observations.
Audit does not agree with the views of UIDAI since in terms of the Aadhaar Act, UIDAI was
mandated to specify fees for the service, and it was never the intention of the Government to
provide free services for authentication facilities. Holding back levy of fees on the plea of the
pending matter in the Court is also not acceptable as UIDAI had continued with the enrolment
process and authentication services and had also prescribed a licence fee for the services
utilised by REs and ASAs during the pendency of the Court case whereas only fees for
authentication services were not levied. The response that the Competent Authority exercised
its discretionary powers to levy the fees, is also not acceptable as it cannot override express
provisions of an Act passed by Parliament. Besides the UIDAI did not produce any file or
records to the audit in order to substantiate their statement that it was a “conscious decision”
of the Organization to defer/not charge any fees for the authentication services rendered to
TSPs and others.
34
The e-KYC figure of 637 Crore represents the data from 12 September 2016 (date of effect of the Aadhaar
Act 2016) to 06 March 2019 (Prior to the date of effect of Pricing of Aadhaar Authentication Service
Regulations, 2019) with proportionate data for the respective years. The Authentication (Yes/ No) figures of
2,491 Crore have similarly been arrived.

38
The argument that levy of fee for e-KYC services given to TSPs was not in public interest, is
not sound as verification of the credentials of a subscriber is compulsory for TSPs which in
any case was incurring expenditure on the same by using other KYC methods. By offering free
e-KYC service, UIDAI violated their own Regulations by facilitating the TSPs and banks an
easy access to the Aadhaar database set up by the Government at considerable cost. In the
process, a delayed decision has also resulted in a loss of revenue to the Government.
Recommendation: UIDAI needs to be alert and cautious in matters concerning charges
for delivery of services and ensure that decisions for non-levy of charges are taken with
due process and approvals, which are properly documented and available for verification
by any stake holder.
4.3 Contract Management
The entire end-to-end technology infrastructure of UIDAI including data center operations,
management of IT systems of UIDAI ROs, technical helpdesk etc., is managed by the Managed
Service Provider (MSP) namely M/s HCL Infosystems Ltd.
Apart from the MSP contract, UIDAI has agreements for Project Management Unit (PMU)
functions, supply of resources for offering handholding support to State Governments for roll
out of Aadhaar, technical assignments, document management, printing and dispatch of
Aadhaar letters etc.
4.3.1 Selection of Contracts
The contracts and agreements entered by the UIDAI were selected for scrutiny based on a
statistical sampling technique. The 25 per cent of contracts valuing less than `100 Crore were
selected by following random sampling. However, all the contracts of `100 Crore and above
were selected for scrutiny. The brief description of the selected Contracts is placed as
Annexure-I. Major contracts placed in a nutshell are as below:
Table 4.3: Statement showing brief description of Major Contracts
Contracts Vendor and
Cost of
Contracts
Description
Managed
Service
Provider
(MSP)
M/s HCL
Infosystems Ltd
(HCLI)
`
`
`
`1,978.62 Crore
Expression of Interest (EoI) for selection of MSP was floated in June
2010 (Twelve Companies submitted EOI) and after evaluation
Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued on 24 January 2011 to nine
Companies.
Six bidders submitted their bids and finally two bidders qualified on
Technical Evaluation and Due diligence. M/s HCLI emerged
successful after all sorts of evaluation35
and a contract with a validity
of seven years was entered on 07 August 2012.
The contract was extended for nine months, from 07 August 2019 to
06 May 2020. The vendor moved to Arbitration Tribunal and under
the directions of Tribunal the contract was extended for eleven
months till 06 April 2021. Both the extensions were with the same
terms and conditions of original contract.
35
Technical Evaluation, Due Diligence, Commercial Evaluation and Quality and Cost Based Selection (QCBS)
Evaluation

39
The Contract extensions were managed from the unspent balance of
the initial contract
The arbitration proceedings were still under progress
(September 2021)
Data Centre
Development
Agency
(DCDA)
M/s Wipro Ltd
(WIPRO)
The total cost
involved,
including the
extension was
`
`
`
`238.11 Crore
(`118.51 Crore
for Bengaluru
DC and `119.61
Crore for
Manesar DC).
Request for Quotation (RFQ) in respect of Selection of DCDA for
the Bengaluru and Manesar Data centres was issued on 16
September 2011. Nine bidders participated and five bidders were
shortlisted in the Request for Proposal (RFP) floated in April 2012.
M/s Wipro Ltd emerged as the lowest bidder (L1) and the contract
was made effective from 6 December 2012.
The Capex contract was valid till 12 August 2014 for Bengaluru DC
and till 30 September 2014 for Manesar DC.
The OPEX contract was valid from 13 August 2014 to 14 August
2019 for Bengaluru DC and from 01 October 2014 to 30 September
2019 for Manesar DC.
The OPEX contract was extended for six month each and the new
validity was till 14 February 2020 and 31 March 2020 for the
Bengaluru and Manesar Data centres respectively.
Governance
Risk
Compliance
and
Performance-
Service
Provider
(GRCP)
M/s Price
Waterhouse
Coopers
(PwC)
`
`
`
`17.53 Crore
RFP was issued on 03 November 2014 to six bidders. After Pre-
qualification/ Technical and Financial Evaluation M/s PwC was
awarded the contract on 06 October 2015 till 28 February 2018.
The Contract was extended four times-
• 1st
extension for one year till 28 February 2019
• 2nd
, 3rd
and 4th
extension each for three months till 31 May
2019, 31 August 2019 & 30 November 2019 respectively.
• 5th
extension was for one month and the contract was closed
on 31 December 2019.
The total amount released to the vendor including the extensions was
`20.59 Crore.
Aadhaar
Document
Management
System
(ADMS)
M/s HP India
sales Private Ltd
(HPISP)
The cost of
services for five
years for 95.22
Crore EIDs was
`
`
`
`278.61 Crore.
RFP was issued on 15 January 2011. Pre-bid conference held with
thirty organisations on 27 January 2011 and seven bids were
submitted.
Six bidders became eligible for opening of commercial bids after
evaluation of technical Committee and M/s HPISP emerged
successful after completion of the tender evaluation process.
The contract was signed on 07 June 2011 and was valid for five
years. The cost of services will change annually depending on the
number of Enrolment IDs (EIDs) to be picked up.
The contract was given an extension on 16 September 2016 for
further EIDs of 15 Crore for `49.37 Crore. Total cost for 110.22
Crore documents was `327.98 Crore.The contract was successfully
closed on 07 June 2021.
4.4 Audit Observations on Contract Management
Since the complete files relating to award of contract of the above were not made available,
audit could not provide a reasonable assurance on these contracts. However, audit observations
on the management of the various contracts by UIDAI are brought out in the succeeding
paragraphs:

40
4.4.1 Liquidated damages (LD) for deficient performance of biometric solutions not
levied
UIDAI did not penalize deficient Biometric Service Providers (BSPs) despite shortcomings
in their services.
The Service Level Agreement (SLA) conditions of the MSP contract prescribe the expected
service levels to be provided by the service provider including the performance of the biometric
solutions. Wrong decisions by the biometric solutions would lead to issue of multiple Aadhaars
(FNIR36
) to the same resident or denial of Aadhaar to a genuine applicant (FPIR)37
. Similarly,
wrong outcomes of authentication transactions, will result either in a genuine person not getting
the intended benefit (FNMR)38
or a wrong person is availing the undue benefit (FMR)39
. Thus,
it was imperative that the biometric solution related levels are maintained as close to the defined
threshold levels as possible. Non-compliance with the performance benchmarks would attract
liquidated damages (LD), as per the Agreements depending on the severity level. The
cumulative LD i.e. LD applicable of all the SLAs was limited to 20 per cent of the fee payable
for each quarter and the quarterly payments comprised of the amortized cost of cell40
payable
in that quarter and the cost of managed services for that quarter.
As per the contract, the MSP was responsible for selection and evaluation of biometric
solutions meeting UIDAI’s requirements and implementation of three biometric solutions41
.
Audit observed that there were regular breaches of FMR and FNMR targets in the
authentication transactions to levels that attracted LD of two per cent in every quarter.
Accordingly, the Technical Centre, Bengaluru had recommended imposition of LD amounting
to `13.29 Crore on the MSP for the period up to January 2019. However, UIDAI finally did
not impose any LD on the MSP for deficient performance.
UIDAI stated (February 2020) that as per the MSP contract, biometric payments do not form
part of the quarterly payment on which LD could be applied. Further, it was indicated that
deviations in biometric SLA are factored in the LD computed for a quarter, by including the
LD per cent for biometric track SLAs in the overall LD per cent calculated for the quarter and
the maximum rate of 20 per cent is being imposed on the vendor every quarter.
36
FNIR- False negative identification is an incorrect decision of the biometric system that an applicant for a
UID, making no attempt to avoid recognition, has not previously enrolled in the system, when in fact he/ she
has. FNIR is the ratio of the number of false negative identification decisions to the total number of enrolment
transactions by enrolled individuals.
37
FPIR-False positive identification is an incorrect decision of the biometric system that an applicant has already
enrolled in to Aadhaar when he/ she has not. FPIR is the ratio of the number of false positive identification
decisions to the total number of enrolment transactions by unenrolled individuals.
38
FNMR-The ratio of the number of authentication transactions conducted by data subjects resulting in a false
non-match to the total number of transactions.
39
FMR-The ratio of number of authentication transactions conducted by authentication subjects resulting in false
match to the total number of transactions.
40
Cell means any set of technology and physical components which collectively hosts the software programs
that performs/enables the set of UIDAI’s business requirements. As per MSP agreement with M/s HCL, one
cell denotes two Crore Aadhaar enrolment. ‘Amortized cost of Cell’ has been considered as balance 30 per cent
cost of cell components which is being paid to MSP in equal installments in every quarter.
41
The biometric solution is primarily comprised of the multi modal “Automatic Biometric Identification
Subsystem (ABIS) for De-duplication and the software Development Kit (SDK). Multiple multi-modal
solutions from three vendors (known as BSP-Biometric service Provider) are being used to ensure a vendor
independent & technology Neutral solution.

41
The response was not acceptable, because there was a capping of 20 per cent for LD to be
imposed which had already reached the maximum due to the failure to meet other SLA
parameters. In fact, the LD recommended by the Tech Center in respect of deviation in
Biometric SLAs never came to reckoning as evident from the fact that the quantum of LD to
be applied was only on the sum of Amortised cost of ‘Cell Payable’ & ‘Cost of Managed
Services’ in a quarter. The Cost of Biometric Solution was never considered for levying the
LD based on agreement. Success of Aadhaar hinges upon the efficiency of the biometric de-
duplication services and hence it was important to ensure that the biometric service providers
(BSPs) are accountable for any deficiency in service. When the payments for biometric services
are kept out of the purview of LD, the shortcomings in the services provided by BSP were not
adequately covered in the MSP contract.
We further observed that as per the agreement (June 2013) between the MSP and the BSPs, the
MSP could levy LD on the BSPs for deficient performance of biometric solutions. However,
the said condition was amended (November 2016), with the consent of UIDAI to the effect that
the MSP will waive off all SLAs, if the same were waived off by UIDAI for the MSP under
the MSP contract. With UIDAI keeping payments for biometric services out of the purview of
its quarterly payments to the MSP, the MSP waived off the LD due from BSPs for deficiencies
in the performance of biometric services. Thus, breaches in the performance benchmarks for
biometric services were never penalized either by UIDAI or by the MSP, which gave undue
advantages to the MSP/ BSPs.
UIDAI further intimated (October 2020) that the matter was under arbitration and counter
claims including the LDs to be recovered from the biometrics’ payments was submitted in
September 2020 to the Tribunal. UIDAI further submitted that it has engaged three new BSPs
through exclusive contracts signed directly between UIDAI and BSPs, having provision of
biometric SLAs and LD which would be levied on BSPs for any breach of these SLAs. MeitY
Recommendation: UIDAI may levy penalties on Biometric Service Providers for
deficiencies in their performance in respect of biometric de-duplication (FPIR/ FNIR)
and biometric authentication (FMR/ FNMR). Agreements in this regard should be
modified, if required
4.4.2 Deficiencies in monitoring contracts with NISG
UIDAI had partnered with the National Institute for Smart Governance (NISG)42
for setting up
a professionally managed team for project management, operations management, technology
support, handholding support to State Governments for implementation of Aadhaar project etc.
Details of assignments handled by NISG for UIDAI are in Table 4.4.
42
NISG is a non-profit company setup in PPP in 2002 with 51 per cent equity contributed by the private sector
and 49 per cent by the public sector. It assists Central and State Governments in e-governance initiatives to
improve services to citizens, businesses and all sections of society.

42
Table 4.4: Assignments handled by NISG
Agreement Date of
Agreement
Agreement
period
Contract
value
(`
`
`
` Crore)
Amount
released
(`
`
`
` Crore)
Amount
utilized
(`
`
`
` Crore)
1. Establishment
of Project
Management
Unit (PMU)
30 Nov 2009 Up to Nov 2014 47.91
110.20 107.74
Addendum-I
18 Dec 2013
Up to Mar 2017 40.68
Addendum-II
01 Apr 2017
Up to Mar 2020 28.10
2. Project
management
resource (SRP)
for assisting
State Registrars
22 Nov 2010 Up to Nov 2013
Value of
contract not
specified in
the agreement
17.23 17.23
Addendum-I Up to Nov 2016
Addendum-II Up to Mar 2017
Addendum-III
01 Apr 2017
Up to Mar 2020
3. Aadhaar
Enabled
Applications
Group (AEAG)
18 Apr 2011 Up to Mar 2016 28.50
22.71 22.71
Addendum-I
08 July 2015
Up to Mar 2017 *
Addendum-II
01 Apr 2017
Up to Mar 2020 16.50
4. Establishment
of Technology
Services Unit
(TSU) for UIDAI
22 May 2013
Up to May
2018
62.30
31.20 30.47
Addendum-I
01 Apr 2017
Up to Mar 2020 *
5. Establishment
of Field Support
Engineer PMU
for UIDAI
31 Aug 2012 Up to Aug 2014 5.43
23.34 23.34
28 Aug 2014 Up to Mar 2017 19.21
Addendum-I
01 Apr 2017
Up to Mar 2020 9.90
(* The amount of contract of Addendum -I to the original Contract was met from the savings of Original Contract)
(Data Source: Copies of agreement and fund utilisation statements of UIDAI)
Thus, till the end of March 2020, UIDAI had released payment amounting to `204.68 Crore to
the NISG out of which NISG utilised a sum of `201.49 Crore.
This is pertinent to mention here that UIDAI does not has its own personnel resources. While
it employed Government staff on deputation to manage the works that are mostly
administrative and financial in nature, the technical support resources were hired from NISG.
UIDAI has not made any serious attempt to have its own dedicated staff especially in technical
cadre. A notification for appointment of officers and employees was issued in recent past only
(January 2020) but no selection of resources could be finalised till March 2021. It is a cause of
concern that UIDAI has continuously relied on outsourced people at the cost of building their
own expertise and competence in the designated areas.
Audit observations on the management of the agreements with NISG by UIDAI are in
succeeding paragraphs:

43
4.4.2.1 State Resource Personnel (SRP) contract with National Institute of Smart
Governance (NISG) extended beyond the period envisaged in the ICT guidelines
The support services to States by way of a State Resource Personnel to be provided by NISG
through the ICT assistance given to them, was duly approved by the Cabinet Committee for
one year only, but the same continued for years together as approved by UIDAI.
The services from NISG for providing skilled project management resource persons (SRP) to
the states seeking for such resources was part of the financial assistance for Information &
Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure to states. As per the agreement with NISG,
each SRP would be engaged at a consolidated remuneration of `1 Lakh per month on a one-year
contract with an option for extension. NISG would be paid 15 per cent of actual manpower
cost over and above the resource cost as fees for their services. All costs related to the
recruitment process, such as travel costs of candidates, panel members and cost of
advertisements, if any required, would be met by UIDAI at actuals. It was seen that indicative
cost of SRP, which was important for exercising control over expenditure, was not estimated
for the services provided by NISG.
The agreement, which was initially for a period of three years, was extended initially for three
years i.e. up to November 2016 and again up to March 2017 and finally up to March 2020.
Thus, an assistance that was envisaged for only one year as per the guidelines for ICT
infrastructure assistance, continued for more than nine years by which time Aadhaar saturation
had crossed 98 per cent of the adult population in the country or in terms of numbers, more
than 125 Crore (March 2020) Aadhaar letters were issued. The agreement which was initially
envisaged for only one year was repeatedly extended for years together.
UIDAI intimated (October 2020) that SRPs were deployed in the states mainly to assist state
departments/ agencies for implementing their schemes with Aadhaar authentication. It justified
the continued engagement of SRP for laisioning with state/ UT departments/ agencies based
on project requirement as UIDAI did not have its own office in all the states/ UTs. Eventually
the SRPs were made part of PMU which could not be foreseen. It added that the cost for this
service depended on progress made by the State Governments in integrating their schemes with
Aadhaar and the cost of SRP was subsumed in the overall ICT assistance to the state. MeitY
The reply is not convincing as the ICT guidelines envisaged this support only for a one-year
period to be met out of ICT assistance provided to the state. The contract value was not
mentioned as it depended on the requisitions placed by the respective states/ UTs. No separate
approval for funding was sought apparently on the plea that the assistance for ICT was
approved by the Cabinet Committee on UIDAI. It was observed that UIDAI was keen on
utilizing the resources for various additional works other than the intended handholding and
now the resources have been made part of PMU which clearly supports the view that SRP
services were being continued for one reason or another. UIDAI had not even made any
amendment related to resource persons despite releasing subsequent guidelines on ICT.
In light of the fact that Aadhaar numbers are nearing saturation limits for the country as a
whole, continued assistance to the States by way of State Resource Personnel and consequential
payments to NISG on this count including their service charges needs to be reviewed. The

44
UIDAI have to accept their own responsibility for issue of Aadhaar and limit their continued
reliance on other agencies for support.
Recommendation: UIDAI have to accept their own responsibility for issue of Aadhaar
and limit/reduce their continued reliance on other agencies for support. They may partner
with State Governments to increase the enrolment functions for issue ofAadhaar.
4.4.2.2 Deficiencies in engagement of Field Service Engineers (FSE)
Deficiency in assessment of the requirements for Field Service Engineers (FSE) resources
to be hired from NISG and in monitoring the payments made to them.
UIDAI added an addendum to the PMU Agreement (August 2012) for engagement of Field
Service Engineers (FSEs) team at UIDAI ROs for a period of two years with an additional
indicative value of `5.43 Crore. On completion of the two years period (August 2014) a fresh
agreement was signed for the period up to March 2017 for an indicative cost of `19.21 Crore
which was further extended up to March 2020 at an additional cost of `9.90 Crore taking the
total cost to `29.11 Crore.
We noticed that UIDAI released (May 2014) `1.5 Crore to NISG as advance for the last quarter
of the agreement while the utilization for FSE never exceeded `34 Lakh in any of the previous
quarters leading to an unspent balance of `1.28 Crore available with NISG at the end of the
agreement period in August 2014. Instead of refunding the unspent balance to the Government,
NISG was allowed to utilize it against a fresh agreement signed in August 2014. We also
noticed that the sanctioned cost for FSE agreements was always on the higher side than the
actual expenditure throughout the period as indicated in the Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Details of utilization for Field Service Engineers
Agreement type & Effective Period Amount (`
`
`
` in Crore)
Sanctioned Released Utilised
Old Addendum
31 August 2012 to 30 August 2014
5.43 3.02 1.75
Fresh Agreement
31 August 2014 to 31 March 2017
19.21 7.43 7.03
Addendum to fresh agreement
01 April 2017 to 31 March 2020
9.9043
12.89 14.57
The above indicated deficiency in assessing the requirements for resources to be hired from
NISG and in monitoring the payments made to them.
UIDAI replied (June 2020) that funds were sanctioned to NISG on the basis of estimates
provided by NISG and are indicative values depicting the maximum allowable expenditure.
Further, it was added that the actual expenditure depends on the actual deployment of
resources. The differences in the actual expenditure and amount utilized were on account of
proactive polices taken by UIDAI for regulating the CTC of outsourced resources. It was
further stated that UIDAI’s endeavor is to reduce costs and promote propriety in expenditure.
UIDAI further informed (October 2020) that deficiency pointed out by the audit has already
been taken into cognizance and accordingly they were in a better position to assess the
43
Cumulative total from 31 August 2014 is `29.11 Crore (`29.10- `19.21= `9.90)

45
requirements of PMUs and TSUs. The estimates provided by the NISG at the time of latest
extension of agreement have already been rationalized. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies
of UIDAI to the audit observations.
The response was not convincing because there was consistent release of excess funds to a
service vendor despite being aware of the fact that the actual expenditure was constantly below
the funds released. This was against financial propriety and tantamount to parking of funds
with agencies. Moreover, as discussed in para 4.4.2.1 above, there was continuous dependence
on the outsourced personnel without any corresponding creation of expertise within the
organization.
Recommendation: UIDAI should strictly follow the standards of financial propriety
while procuring services and ensure that advances are not paid for in excess of
requirements.
4.4.3 Rebate on Franking Values on dispatch of Aadhaar not availed
Deficiency in the contract with the DoP for delivery of Aadhaar Letters, deprived UIDAI of
rebate on postage charges loaded in franking machines, despite UIDAI meeting the cost for
franking.
Aadhaar letters, in respect of new enrolments and update or modification of resident details are
dispatched and delivered to the residents in the form of laminated document through the
Department of Posts (DoP) as First-Class Mail44
. UIDAI has agreements with three Print
Service Providers45
(PSPs) located at Manipal, Mumbai and Sangareddy (Telangana) for
printing Aadhaar documents. As per the agreements, the PSPs were to bundle and bag Aadhaar
documents on pin code basis after digitally franking them with the required postage. The
postage charges are borne by UIDAI by loading the franking machines with the required funds.
The bundled and bagged documents were then to be presented to the DoP for dispatch. For
franking operations, PSPs were required to hold a valid commercial license issued by DoP.
DoP allowed a rebate of three per cent on the franked value, whenever the meter is reset i.e.
credit is uploaded in the machine. Further, an additional two per cent rebate was also available
on presentation of pin-code wise sorted mails. UIDAI released `648 Crore from the year
2012-13 to 2018-19 to Karnataka (Manipal), Maharashtra (Mumbai) and Andhra
Pradesh/Telangana (Sangareddy) Postal Circles to replenish the postage loaded in franking
machines for delivery of Aadhaar letters, of which the Circles utilized `603.84 Crore.
The rebate available as refund on the franked value for the above period @ three per cent
amounted to `18.12 Crore and as Aadhaar documents capture pin-code and present them sorted
on pincode wise to DoP, an additional two per cent rebate amounting to `12.08 Crore was also
available. Thus, the total rebate available on the franked value was `30.19 Crore.
We observed that since UIDAI had signed Agreements with the PSPs, which did not contain
any clause binding the PSPs to pass on the benefits to them, the deficient contracts deprived
44
First class mail is a service offered by DoP with free air transmission within India for letters, post cards and
letter cards.
45
M/s Manipal Technologies Ltd, Manipal, M/s Seshaasai Business Forms (P) Limited, Mumbai and M/s K.L.
Hi-tech Secure Print Limited, Sangareddy, Telangana.

46
UIDAI of rebate amounting to `30.19 Crore during the years 2012-13 to 2018-19 despite
meeting the entire franking cost.
Responding to our observation, UIDAI management stated (March 2020) that the matter was
referred to the DoP authorities for getting the admissible discount/rebate retrospectively and
for future. However, DoP has clearly stated (July 2020) that the rebates were given to the PSPs
as they were the license holder of franking machines.
UIDAI accepted (October 2020) its ignorance about the rebate being utilized by the print
partners. The recommendation of audit was noted for compliance in future agreements and the
matter was being followed up in accordance to the provisions of the existing contract with the
print partners to pass on the rebates availed by them to UIDAI. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with
replies of UIDAI to the audit observations.
Recommendation: UIDAI may incorporate suitable clauses in their Agreements with all
agencies mentioning clearly that the benefits accruing due to UIDAI’s resources need to
be passed on to them and vendors to indemnify UIDAI towards the loss/cost arising due
to their actions.
4.4.4 Monitoring of Information & Communication Technology (ICT) Assistance to
States
Improper management of Grants-in-Aid and utilizing ICT assistance for creating
infrastructure.
The Cabinet Committee on UIDAI approved (September 2010) ` 350 Crore as assistance to
the Registrars/other departments in the states and union territories for setting up Information &
Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure for making their systems UID compliant.
Guidelines for regulating the assistance for ICT infrastructure was developed (September 2010)
by UIDAI. Initially a normative amount of ` 10 Crore was approved as assistance to each state
which would be released in five tranches. The quantum of each tranche was linked to the
deliverables/ milestones to be achieved by states.
Under Phase-I of the assistance, Grants-in-Aid (GIA) amounting to `147.80 Crore was released
to 38 agencies (States/ Departments/ Ministries) for ICT infrastructure during the years from
2010-11 to 2018-19. Subsequently ten more agencies were granted the ICT assistance
amounting to `19.50 Crore during the years 2019-20 to 2020-2021.
It was seen in audit that, once the Aadhaar generation crossed the 100-Crore mark and the
saturation of adult population reached 98 per cent, a new stream of ICT assistance was
introduced (September 2016) by modifying the existing Phase-I guidelines of September 2010.
The unspent amount from the normative amount of `10 Crore was given as additional support
for procurement of enrolment kits. These kits were to be primarily used for targeted enrolments
especially of new born and school going children covering their enrolment and mandatory
biometric update at age five and 15 years. In addition, the kits were to be used for enrolment
of adult beneficiaries of direct benefit programs who had not been earlier enrolled into the
Aadhaar database. The quantum of the ICT assistance was fixed at a maximum 50 per cent of
the total ICT assistance of the State viz., `5 Crore which were to be released in two tranches
of `2.5 Crore each. Other than procurement of equipment from the assistance, the ancillary

47
costs like infrastructure, deployment of personnel, operating expenses, maintenance etc. were
to be borne by the States.
Subsequently, (August 2018) UIDAI considered that the requirement of enrolment of newborn
or children between the age 0-5 years and mandatory requirement of biometric updates at ages
five & 15 years would be continuous. As such new ICT guidelines (Phase-II) were issued
(September 2018) for providing assistance to State Governments, Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sangathan (KVS) and Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti (NVS) for provisioning of Aadhaar
Enrolment Kits (AEKs) to be deployed dedicatedly for this category of residents. These revised
guidelines also provided for assistance to BSNL to set up two AEKs in each of its Customer
Service Centers to provide enrolment and update services. The total support on this account
was estimated at `315 Crore. Financial assistance under the scheme was `1.5 Lakh per kit.
Accordingly, UIDAI released `280.31 Crore to 33 agencies during 2018-19 for procurement
of AEKs. A further sum of `0.3 Crore and `7.5 Crore was released to one more agency in each
years of 2019-20 and 2020-21 respectively. These funds were over and above the assistance
provided to states under Phase-I. The Phase II guidelines envisaged that savings if any, after
procurement of two kits per block, were to be refunded.
A review of the release and utilization of the ICT assistance to various entities by UIDAI under
different phases revealed the following:
a. General Financial Rules 2005 stipulates that in respect of non-recurring Grants to an
Institution or Organization, the authority sanctioning the Grants-in-Aid should insist
upon a certificate in the prescribed form, of actual utilization of the Grants for the
purpose for which it was sanctioned. The Institution/ Organization should submit the
Utilization Certificate (UC) within twelve months of the closure of the financial year.
It was seen that UIDAI had released grants of `147.80 Crore till 2018-19 and an
additional GIA of `19.50 Crore in 2019-20 under Phase I, of which UCs for
`25.34 Crore were pending from States till 31 March 2021.
b. It was also seen that UCs for grants released as far back as February 2014 were pending
submission. Seven (7) agencies, out of the 38 agencies had not even submitted partial
UCs including for assistance released in the years 2013-14 and 2014-15.
c. As per GFR conditions interest earned on unutilized funds should also be made part of
the assistance. However, accrued interest earned on the ICT grants were accounted for
in the UCs only by the States of Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh. The other
States neither had shown the interest earned nor had UIDAI taken review of the same.
d. In the Phase–II ICT guidelines the entire fund was released in one lump sum to the
entities instead of in installments based on submission of UCs. Audit noted that the
grantee entities were erratic/ inconsistent in furnishing UCs or in refunding unspent
balances. In this scenario, the possibility of the fund remaining parked or being diverted
for other use cannot be ruled out. As an example, it is pointed out that the NVS Regional
Office, Pune had procured 20 AEKs @ `1,19,068 per AEK while the assistance
provided to them was @ `1.5 Lakh per AEK. This shows that this entity had unspent
balances/ excess funds with it.

48
e. The prime intention of providing ICT assistance under Phase-II guidelines was to
capture the un-enrolled population belonging to the age group of less than five years.
The assistance however was issued to the schools or to the State Registrars with an
instruction to utilize the AEKs in Schools. As the age of school-going children is above
five years the decision of funding purchase of AEKs in schools for enrolment of
new-born or children between 0-5 years of age was ab-initio flawed.
Further, as mentioned in Para 3.2.3 of this Report, the issue of Baal Aadhaar without biometrics
of the child, itself is not in keeping with the basic conditions of uniqueness of the identity
envisaged under the Aadhaar Act. Therefore, the expenditure by way of grants for ICT
assistance (Phase-II) given to States to enroll children below five years was avoidable.
UIDAI justified the release of Phase II ICT assistance in one tranche on the grounds that this
was a one- time assistance as also the decision to provide AEKs to schools in view of less
saturation in age groups 0-5 years and 5-18 years. They further stated (July 2020) in response
that efforts were underway to obtain UCs from the nodal agencies and the non-submission of
UCs have been raised with Chief Secretaries of defaulting states. It also stated that it was
obtaining inputs on interest accrued on funds parked by states /UTs. MeitY agreed (June 2021)
with replies of UIDAI to the Audit Observations.
The replies relating to UCs shows that UIDAI has not monitored utilization of the funds
released as ICT assistance to States regularly and needs to take remedial action in financial
management issues.
Recommendation: UIDAI may improve upon its financial management of grants given
to State Authorities by proper monitoring and ensuring regular and timely receipt of
Utilization Certificates from them. It may also discontinue monetary assistance given to
States/schools and other agencies for enrolment of minor children below five for issue of
Aadhaar numbers.

49
Chapter 5 Security of Aadhaar Information System
5.1 Introduction
Aadhaar authentication framework comprises of REs and ASAs. These entities collect the
biometric information of the Aadhaar holder for validation purposes. Their interaction with
Aadhaar number holders and UIDAI is through the digital mode. Aadhaar (Authentication)
Regulation 2016 and other directions of UIDAI notified from time to time, contain instructions
on the arrangements which all the entities involved in the authentication ecosystem should
follow for ensuring the security of data of the residents. The regulation also specifies the
responsibilities of UIDAI in monitoring e-compliance with its instructions by the ecosystem
partners’ viz. ASA, AUA, KUA etc.
place by UIDAI to monitor the activities of the REs and ASAs are given in the succeeding
paragraphs.
5.2 Monitoring of the activities of authentication ecosystem partners of UIDAI
Aadhaar enabled services are provided to the Aadhaar holders through the Authentication User
Agencies (AUAs) or the e-KYC User Agencies (KUAs). In addition to AUAs/ KUAs, there
are sub-AUAs who use Aadhaar authentication to enable their services through an existing
Requesting Entity (RE). The Aadhaar Act 2016, Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016,
Aadhaar (Data Security) Regulations 2016 and other instructions/ directions issued by UIDAI
govern the responsibilities and activities of these entities. Since the authentication facility uses
the demographic and biometric information of the Aadhaar holder, it was imperative to put in
place a strong and effective monitoring mechanism to ensure that these entities comply with
the standards prescribed by UIDAI while operating and maintaining their information systems.
Audit comments on the monitoring of the activities of the authentication ecosystem partners
by UIDAI are in the following paragraphs.
5.2.1 Annual Information System audit of the operations of REs and ASAs
UIDAI was neither able to derive required assurance that the entities involved in the
authentication ecosystem had maintained their information systems which were compliant
with the prescribed standards nor did it ensure compliance of Information Systems Audit by
the appointed entities.
As per UIDAI Regulations on Authentication, REs and ASAs should ensure that their
operations and systems are audited by an Information Systems Auditor duly certified by a
recognized body, on an annual basis to ensure compliance with UIDAI’s standards and
specifications. The report of these auditors should be on request, shared with the Authority.
Further, the REs will be responsible for the authentication operations of their sub-contractors
and would be responsible for ensuring that the authentication related operations of such third-
party entities comply with standards and specifications set by UIDAI. The operations of all the
entities are to be regularly audited by approved independent audit agencies.
Important Information System (IS) audit requirements are summarized in Table 5.1.

50
Table 5.1: Information System Audit requirements
RE ASA UIDAI
• Ensure audit of its operations and
systems by information systems
auditor certified by a recognized body
on an annual basis.
• Share the audit report with the
Authority upon request.
• Responsible for the authentication
operations and results of its sub-
contract by third parties.
• Ensure the authentication related
operations of such third-party entities
comply with Authority standards and
specifications and they are regularly
audited by approved independent
audit agencies.
• Ensure that an
information
systems
auditor
certified by a
recognized
body audits its
operations
annually.
• Audit of the operations, infrastructure,
systems and procedures of requesting
entities, including the agencies or
entities with whom they have shared a
license key or the entities on whose
behalf they performed authentication,
and authentication Service Agencies,
either by itself or through audit
agencies appointed by it.
• The Authority may conduct the above
either by itself or through an auditor
appointed by the Authority and the
cost of audits shall be borne by the
concerned entity.
Certified audit reports are to be submitted to the Authority upon request or at time-periods
specified by the Authority. In addition to the above audits, the Regulation empowers the
Authority to conduct audits of the operations and systems of such entities or persons, either by
itself or through an auditor appointed by the Authority.
Thus, the Regulation mandates all the entities, involved in the authentication ecosystem, to
keep their information systems in complete compliance with UIDAI standards and UIDAI in
its turn should monitor the conformity through independent audits.
Further, Aadhaar (Data Security) Regulations stipulates that UIDAI should specify the security
measures to be adopted by the Registrars, EAs, REs, and ASAs and should monitor compliance
of security requirements through internal audits or through independent agencies. UIDAI
empaneled (April 2018) M/s Deloitte Touché Tohmatsu India LLP (DTTILLP) as the agency
to perform Information Security Assessment of all UIDAI Authentication Ecosystem Partners
for a period of three years. As per the arrangement, the Authentication Ecosystem Partners
would reach out to DTTILLP individually to initiate Information Security Assessment
stipulated in the Aadhaar Authentication Regulations 2016. The agency will perform the
Information Security Assessment once in a year and submit its Audit Report to the entity
concerned. DTTILLP was to communicate to UIDAI at the end of every month the names of
the audited partner.
Details of the audit of the REs and ASAs conducted during the five years of audit coverage are
in Table 5.2.

51
Table 5.2: Details of IS audit of REs and ASAs
Year Requesting Entities Authentication Service Agencies
Agencies Agencies
whose
audit was
done by IS
auditor
Agencies
whose
audit was
done by
UIDAI
Agencies Agencies
whose
audit was
done by IS
auditor
Agencies
whose
audit was
done by
UIDAI
2014-15 92 NA46
NA 16 NA NA
2015-16 223 2 NA 23 NA NA
2016-17 355 121 8 27 3 1
2017-18 308 110 29 26 3 3
2018-19 204 106 8 27 9 1
Analysis of the above data showed that no REs or ASAs had their operations audited annually
either by themselves through a certified Information Systems auditor or by UIDAI.
Thus, it was evident that while UIDAI regulations stipulated annual audit of the operations and
systems of both REs and ASAs by Information Systems auditor, compliance was very poor.
UIDAI also failed to invoke its prerogative to audit the operations, infrastructure, systems and
procedures of the REs and ASAs, either by itself or through audit agencies appointed by it. As
such it was unable to derive required assurance that the entities involved in the authentication
ecosystem, are maintaining their information systems in complete compliance with UIDAI
standards.
UIDAI informed (January 2020) that the MoUs between UIDAI and Registrars contain
provisions for periodic audit of enrolment processes. It stated that the ROs carry out audit and
inspection of enrolment operation of Registrars, EAs and audit of the Self-Service Update
Portal (SSUP) and back end services rendered by BPO. The reply was not relevant to the
observation as it deals with MoUs between UIDAI and Registrars and relates to the adherence
to enrolment processes whereas, the audit observation relate to requirement for IS audits under
the Authentication Regulations, of authentication related operations of the REs and ASAs.
UIDAI further intimated (October 2020) that there had been a steady increase in submission of
IS Audit Reports by AUAs i.e., from about 35 per cent in 2016-17 and 2017-18 to 52 per cent
in 2018-19 and that it was pursuing this aspect with the REs and sensitizing them about the
significance of the audits through training sessions.
UIDAI accepted the recommendation for conducting audit of existing REs and ASAs by the
auditor appointed by it within a cycle of three years subject to the present constraints posed by
Covid-19 pandemic. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the audit observations.
Recommendation: UIDAI may ensure that each of the existing REs & ASAs are audited
by UIDAI or by the Auditor appointed by it within a cycle of three years so as to provide
adequate assurance about compliance to its Regulations.
46
NA means- Data not available at UIDAI.

52
5.2.2 Information System Audit of Client Applications’ Systems storing biometric data
not ensured
UIDAI could not provide adequate assurance that REs & ASAs accessing and storing the
personal information of Aadhaar holders through the Non-Registered Biometric Devices,
used prior to April 2018, had been addressed by them despite issue of directions (June 2017)
mandating IS audits of client systems.
UIDAI directed (January 2017) all AUAs/ASAs that with effect from 1 June 2017,
authentication requests would be accepted only through “Registered Devices47
” certified by
STQC (Standardization Testing and Quality Certification). An important feature of the
Registered Device was that it could encapsulate activities like biometric capture, signing and
encryption of biometrics etc. within it. Hence, use of Non-Registered Devices will be putting
resident’s privacy at risk. UIDAI further instructed (February 2017) that all AUAs/ KUAs
should ensure that the client applications used by sub-AUAs or other entities providing
authentication services, are not capable of storing biometric data of the Aadhaar holder and the
biometrics/PID block is encrypted at the frontend device/client level. The AUAs/ KUAs were
to ensure that the client application does not replay any authentication request with stored
biometric data under any circumstance and an information systems auditor(s), certified by
STQC/ CERT-IN48
should audit the client application. The compliance audit report was to be
submitted to UIDAI and the sub-AUAs would access authentication services only through duly
audited client applications. The AUAs/ KUAs were to ensure compliance to the directions and
submit audit report along with a certificate duly signed by their Chief Executive Officer to
UIDAI by 31 March 2017. Ensuring adherence to these directions was critical because use of
Non-Registered Devices would be putting resident’s privacy at risk. The timeline to complete
the upgrade of applications to Registered Device for AUAs/ KUAs was initially up to
May 2017 and further extensions were granted till April 2018 when all the Non-Registered
Devices were deactivated.
Audit was informed (July 2020) that UIDAI had not received any audit reports from any AUAs/
ASAs within the stipulated date, in compliance of their instructions of February 2017 Further,
to our query on how UIDAI ensured that the front-end devices used for e-KYC were not
capable of storing biometric/PID, Audit was informed that Aadhaar (Authentication)
Regulation stipulates that the client application should package and encrypt the input
parameters (Aadhaar number or any other identifiers provided by the requesting agency), into
PID block before transmission. Therefore, it was mandatory for the requesting agencies to
ensure compliance to the provisions of the Aadhaar Act and associated regulations and
instructions issued by UIDAI.
47
Public devices are biometric capture devices that provide Aadhaar compliant biometric data to the application,
which, in turn encrypts the data before using for authentication purposes. A registered Device is a public device
with additional features compared to public device like Device identification, eliminating use of stored
biometrics and having a standardized RD service. Registered devices MUST ensure that; i.) there should be
no mechanism for any external program to provide stored biometrics and get it signed and encrypted and ii.)
There should be no mechanism for external program/probe to obtain device private key used for signing the
biometrics.
48
Indian Computer Emergency Response Team is a functional organization of the Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology. Apart from the objective of securing the Indian cyber space CERT-In provides
Security Quality Management service also.

53
UIDAI further stated (October 2020) that implementing a significant technical change across
the country without disrupting ongoing services required a calibrated approach and could take
longer time than envisaged initially. UIDAI completed implementation of biometric registered
devices for the authentication system by April 2018 thereby ensuring that the biometrics were
encrypted at the device itself before sending it to client application. No RE could perform
authentication using non-registered device. Thus, there was no risk of the client application
storing biometric data, thereafter. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the audit
observations.
Audit noted that during the period April 2017 to March 2018, nearly 385 Crore e-KYC
transactions were undertaken by UIDAI. This was more than 76 per cent of the cumulative
e-KYC transactions done since the year 2013-14. There is no assurance that many of these
transactions were done using client applications that were capable of storing biometric data of
residents.
Though UIDAI had claimed that it had completed implementation of biometric registered
devices for the authentication system by April 2018, there was no system to confirm that the
client applications used by authentication ecosystem partners for providing authentication
services prior to April 2018, were not capable of storing biometric data of the Aadhaar number
holders. As such, there was inadequate assurance that the risk of ASA/ AUAs/ sub-AUAs
accessing and storing the personal information of Aadhaar holders through the earlier
Non-Registered Devices, was addressed by UIDAI despite issuing directions in June 2017
mandating IS audits of client systems.
Recommendation: UIDAI may consider suspension of the services of REs and ASAs if
they fail to conduct annual audit in time as prescribed by the Regulations 2016.
5.2.3 Security and safety of data in Aadhaar vaults
Aadhaar numbers and any connected Aadhaar data were to be stored mandatorily on a
separate Aadhaar Data Vault. UIDAI could not provide reasonable assurance that the
entities involved adhered to the procedures.
Security of CIDR information requires highest importance for safeguarding resident data. The
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information should be in controlled manner.
UIDAI has obtained ISO 27001:2013 certification from STQC by establishment of Information
Security Management System. UIDAI-CIDR has also been declared as “Protected System” by
National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) adding another layer
of IT security assurance. However, safeguarding the Aadhaar data with the same level of
security measures has to be maintained throughout the Aadhaar Ecosystem, including the
authentication partners.
With a view to enhance the security level for storing the Aadhaar numbers, UIDAI mandated
(July 2017) all AUAs/KUAs/Sub-AUAs and other entities who are collecting and storing the
Aadhaar numbers for specific purposes, to implement Aadhaar vaults49
. UIDAI also prescribed
49
Aadhaar Data Vault is a centralized storage for all the Aadhaar numbers collected by the AUAs/ KUAs/
Sub-AUAs/ or any other agency for specific purposes under Aadhaar Act and Regulations, 2016. It is a secure
system inside the respective agency’s infrastructure accessible only on need-to-know basis.

54
the procedure for implementation of Aadhaar vaults and non-compliance would attract general
penalty provisions of the Aadhaar Act. In addition, UIDAI could also levy financial
disincentives as per the conditions provided in the AUA/ KUA agreement. Since the entities
were permitted to store Aadhaar numbers along with the demographic information and photo
of the Aadhaar holder, UIDAI had stipulated security and safety measures, which the entities
were required to comply with while implementing Aadhaar vaults.
For verification of compliance to the above mentioned requirements and systems put in place
to monitor compliance with directions by user agencies/ entities on implementing Aadhaar
Data Vaults, UIDAI informed Audit (July 2020) that REs were to ensure that the objective of
secure storage of Aadhaar numbers is met. UIDAI has not specified any encryption algorithm
or key strength for the encryption of Aadhaar Data Vault. It further mentioned (October 2020)
that Aadhaar Data Vault (ADV) was not a specific product but a process and a concept for
storage of Aadhaar numbers in a secure manner and its implementation was monitored through
Audit Reports submitted by the REs. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the
audit observations.
The above position indicated that UIDAI had not established any measures /systems to confirm
that the entities involved adhered to procedures and was largely dependent on Audit Reports
submitted to them. They had not independently conducted any verification of compliance to
the process to derive a satisfactory assurance.
Aadhaar number is a lifetime identity for Indians and is used to avail various services involving
financial transactions, as such unauthorized access to Aadhaar number can be misused in many
ways. Hence UIDAI may ensure the implementation of Aadhaar Data Vault by instituting
periodic audit to enhance the security for the data stored by user organizations. It should deal
with non-compliance strictly as per the Act and as per conditions in the agreement with AUAs/
KUAs
Recommendation: UIDAI may ensure the implementation of Aadhaar Data Vault
process and institute/carry out periodic audits independently, to enhance the security of
Aadhaar number storage data by user organizations. UIDAI may deal the cases of non-
compliance of directions as per the Act and as per conditions in the agreement with AUAs/
KUAs (Authentication User Agencies and e-KYC User Agencies)

55
Chapter 6 Redressal of Customer Grievances
6.1 Introduction
UIDAI caters to the entire population of India and hence Customer Relationship Management
(CRM) is an important aspect of its functioning. Aadhaar (Enrolment & Update) Regulation
2016 provides for setting up of contact centre to act as a central point for resolution of queries
and grievances of residents. The contract centre should be accessible to residents through toll
free number(s) and/ or e-mail. Accordingly, UIDAI has set up a grievance redressal mechanism
centrally to receive grievances through the following channels:
Image courtesy: UIDAI
a. Through Contact
Centre: UIDAI has set
up a contact centre with
a toll-free number and
email id being 1947 and
help@uidai.gov.in
respectively.
b. By Post: Grievances are
received at the UIDAI
HQ through Post/
hardcopy.
c. Through Public Grievance Portal of GoI: Grievances which are lodged at
the Public Grievance Portal of Government of India (pgportal.gov.in) are
received from Government agencies for redressal.
d. Other Channels: Sometimes grievances are received by UIDAI officials
through emails, walk-in residents, phone, website, RTI etc.
The CRM partners50
handle the grievances received at the Contact Centre (CRM Channel). The
grievances received through other than CRM mode are examined and forwarded to the
concerned Regional Offices/ Sections for redressal. The Regional Office/ Section concerned
dispose the grievances by replying directly to the complainants under intimation to the
grievance cell of UIDAI HQ. Apart from the central CRM system, the Regional Offices of
UIDAI also have a system of receiving complaints/ grievances directly.
Total number of complaints registered in CRM channel during the period 2014-15 to 2018-19
is shown in Table 6.1.
50
M/s Tata Business Support Services Ltd and M/s Strategic Marketing Pvt Ltd were the CRM partners till June
2018 and M/s CBSL & M/s Tech M are the current CRM partners.

56
Table 6.1: Year-wise and category-wise complaints received by CRM
Year Complaints received –category wise Complaints resolved-category wise
Enrolment Update Authentication Enrolment Update Authentication
OB New OB New OB New Resolved Resolved Resolved
2014-15 20,315 4,03,014 0 1,94,629 17 1,965 3,05,665 1,93,831 1,133
2015-16 1,17,664 6,08,553 798 9,79,695 849 20,981 7,24,133 9,79,045 21,710
2016-17 2,084 5,78,855 1,448 7,82,502 120 20,684 5,79,494 7,71,400 20,525
2017-18 1,445 10,59,107 12,550 19,51,611 279 48,041 10,57,171 19,54,305 47,002
2018-19 3,381 9,66,975 9,856 56,66,501 1,318 4,46,269 9,66,975 56,66,501 4,46,269
(Data Source: Information furnished by UIDAI)
Audit observation on the complaint redressal mechanism of UIDAI in succeeding paragraphs.
6.2 Audit Observations
6.2.1 Data on complaints and their redressal
Capture of grievances/ complaints have not been streamlined and does not display a clear
picture for analysis.
UIDAI ROs apart from the centrally available CRM channels, have their own arrangements/
additional channels for receiving Grievances/complaints through phone and email. ROs also
entertain complaints through Post, e-mail, phone, in person and through RTI applications.
Grievances/ complaints received at the ROs of UIDAI are not captured by the CRM system
and are thus, not centrally recorded and monitored. It was observed that number of grievances
received at the ROs and not captured through its CRM mechanism, was significantly high. The
present system does not escalate the complaints not resolved at the RO level to the next level
for redressal thereby compelling the complainants to register a new complaint. As a result,
UIDAI cannot track the history of complaints and assess the efficiency of the grievance
redressal system.
UIDAI stated (October 2020) that up-gradation/ replacement of the existing old system was
under process. The new CRM system has been designed as a single centralized system with
state-of-the-art technology available for effective and comprehensive disposal and monitoring
of grievances as centralized system. MeitY agreed (June 2021) with replies of UIDAI to the
audit observations.
6.2.2 Grievances received through CRM
The complaints lodged at the RO level did not get the attention of UIDAI HQ, compromising
the effectiveness of the grievance redressal mechanism, besides the delays in settlement of
grievances.
An age wise pendency report is auto generated daily in respect of the cases lodged through
CRM. On analysis of such pendency report for 31 December 2019, it was noticed that 58,697
grievances were pending for disposal at the various ROs/ Divisions. Of these 6,326 cases were
pending for more than 30 days for redressal of which 960 cases were pending for more than 90
days.

57
We observed that a majority of pending cases related to Technical Support. Out of a total of
28,276 grievances relating to Technical Support 23,426 cases (82.85 per cent) were pending at
CIDR. Further, 26,247 cases (92.82 per cent) had a pendency of more than one month and 202
cases were pending for more than nine months.
UIDAI stated (October 2020) that resolution/ redressal of grievances was an ongoing process
and efforts had been made to bring down pendency from 58,697 cases to 27,654 cases (as on
14 September 2020). Further, pendency of 6,326 cases beyond 30 days including 960 cases
beyond 90 days has been brought down to 2,609 cases and 442 cases respectively (as on 14
September 2020). There are some cases which require proper enquiry/ investigation on account
of corruption and fraud, and these need adequate time for resolution. MeitY agreed (June 2021)
with replies of UIDAI to the Audit Observations.
The pendency Report as on 31 March 2021, however reveals 48,000 cases were pending for
resolution. Out of these total pending cases, 7,020 cases were pending for more than 30 days
for redressal of which 496 cases were pending for more than 90 days.
It emerges from the above facts that the time taken for grievance redressal was high and since
complaints lodged at the RO level, do not get the attention of UIDAI HQ, this compromises
the effectiveness of the grievance redressal mechanism.
Recommendation: UIDAI may explore the possibility of introducing a single centralized
system where grievances/ complaints lodged even at ROs are also captured so as to
enhance the quality of customer servicing.

59
Chapter 7 Conclusion
Aadhaar, the unique ID programme for India was conceived as a voluntary identity system for
the residents of the country and UIDAI was formed to pilot the project with mandate to develop
appropriate strategies and plans. Till March 2021, UIDAI had generated more than 129 Crore
Aadhaar cards since the issue of the first Aadhaar in September 2010. The project uses a
complex state-of-the-art technology for its operations and runs on one of the largest biometric
databases in the world. The technology is based on biometrics to establish unique identity of
the resident applicant. Authentication of the biometric identity of the resident, using Aadhaar
helps the government to position it and utilise it as a major tool in its efforts to plug leakages
in the delivery of government services to beneficiaries. Voluntary use of Aadhar identity also
enables other Agencies such as banks and telecom operators to verify the identity of the
applicants for delivery of services to them.
The Performance Audit of UIDAI of the selected Enrolment and Authentication system
revealed certain deficiencies in their functioning and delivery of services and several areas
where there is scope for improvement in the functioning of the Authority.
It was seen that UIDAI had generated Aadhaar numbers with incomplete information/
documents of the holder, non-establishment of residence status of applicants with proper
documents, non-review/ matching of documents of the resident with the Aadhar database and
acceptance of poor-quality biometrics resulting in multiple/ duplicate Aadhar numbers to the
same individual. Aadhaar numbers with poor quality biometrics induces authentication errors.
UIDAI takes no responsibility for it and transfers the onus of updating the biometrics to the
resident and also charges fees for it. Issue of Bal Aadhar to minor children below five years
was largely focused towards expanding the Aadhaar footprint, without establishing uniqueness
of identity of the children. Costs to the Government for issue of these Bal Aadhar numbers
were at best avoidable
The control mechanism instituted by UIDAI to ensure that all the authentication ecosystem
partners adhere to the prescribed standards in the maintenance of their IT infrastructure, needed
strengthening as it was seen that Information System Audit of the operations of a large
percentage of REs and ASAs was never done despite UIDAI regulations prescribing annual IS
audits. Moreover, UIDAI had not ensured that the client applications used by its authentication
ecosystem partners were not capable of storing the personal information of the residents, which
put the privacy of residents at risk. The Authority had not ensured security and safety of data
in Aadhaar vaults. They had not independently conducted any verification of compliance to the
process involved.
UIDAI’s compliance to its own Regulations were found wanting due to belated levy of fees for
authentication services, which deprived the government of its due revenues upto March 2019,
though the Aadhaar database was used extensively by Banks and Mobile operators for
authentication of identity of the applicants. The fees chargeable were determined thereafter.
There were flaws in the management of various contracts entered into by UIDAI. The decision
to waive off penalties for biometric solution providers was not in the interest of the Authority
giving undue advantage to the solution providers, sending out an incorrect message of
acceptance of poor quality of biometrics captured by them.

60
The logistics arrangements with the Department of Posts were not effective for ensuring actual
delivery of Aadhaar letters to the correct addressee pointing to the need for fine-tuning the last
mile management of enrolment process for improving the efficiency of the Aadhaar delivery
mechanism.
The grievance redressal system at the UIDAI Hqrs and Regional Offices was ineffective and
was plagued with delays in redressal of grievances.
Observations emanating out of the Performance Audit show that UIDAI was successful in
issuing a large majority of residents with an identity document, based on unique identity
established through biometrics. This has undoubtedly helped Government as well as private
Agencies in establishing identity of the residents before delivery of services.
The issue of Aadhar to residents is an ongoing project and the UIDAI would do well to
proactively accept its role and responsibility bestowed upon them by the Government by
various statutory enactments and reduce its continued dependence on outsourced Agencies and
instead partner with State Governments for the enrolment process.
The audit observations and Recommendations could assist the UIDAI Management to identify
areas that require fine-tuning, improvements in its functions, reviewing the existing systems
for ensuring compliance to its own regulations and securing the information in the Aadhar
database maintained by them.
New Delhi
Dated:
(MANISH KUMAR)
Director General of Audit
Finance & Communication
Countersigned
New Delhi
Dated:
(GIRISH CHANDRA MURMU)
Comptroller and Auditor General of India

61
Appendix-I
Provisions of Aadhaar Act, 2016
(Refer Paragraph no. 1.4)
Sl.
No.
Section
no. of
Aadhaar
Act 2016
Act particulars Whether
regulation
exists?
Regulation
Particulars
Ecosystem
1 2(aa)* “Aadhaar ecosystem” includes enrolling
agencies, Registrars, requesting entities,
offline verification-seeking entities and any
other entity or group of entities as may be
specified by regulations;
Partial Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
& Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulation 2016
No amendments in
Regulation for
offline verification
Enrolment&
Update (E&U)
and
Authentication
2 2(pa)* “Offline verification” means the process of
verifying the identity of the Aadhaar number
holder without authentication, through such
offline modes as may be specified by
regulations
No No amendments in
Regulation for
Authentication
3 2(g)
54(2)(a)
“biometric information” means photograph,
finger print, Iris scan, or such other biological
attributes of an individual as may be specified
by regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
E&U
4 2(j) core biometric information” means finger
print, Iris scan, or such other biological
attribute of an individual as may be specified
by regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
E&U
5 2(k)
54(2)(a)
demographic information” includes
information relating to the name, date of birth,
address and other relevant information of an
individual, as may be specified by regulations
for the purpose of issuing an Aadhaar number,
but shall not include race, religion, caste, tribe,
ethnicity, language, records of entitlement,
income or medical history
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
E&U
6 2(m)
54(2)(a)
“enrolment” means the process, as may be
specified by regulations, to collect
demographic and biometric information from
individuals by the enrolling agencies for the
purpose of issuing Aadhaar numbers to such
individuals under this Act
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
E&U

62
Sl.
No.
Section
no. of
Aadhaar
Act 2016
regulation
exists?
Regulation
Particulars
Ecosystem
7 3(2) The enrolling agency shall, at the time of
enrolment, inform the individual undergoing
enrolment of the following details in such
manner as may be specified by regulations,
namely: — (a) the manner in which the
information shall be used
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
E&U
8 3(3)
54(2)(b)
On receipt of the demographic information and
biometric information under sub-section (1),
the Authority shall, after verifying the
information, in such manner as may be
specified by regulations, issue an Aadhaar
number to such individual
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
[Clause 10&13(2)]
& 6th
Amendments
E&U
9 3(4) *
54(2) (be)
The Aadhaar number issued to an individual
under sub-section (3) shall be a twelve-digit
identification number and any alternative
virtual identity as an alternative to the actual
Aadhaar number of an individual that shall be
generated by the Authority in such manner as
may be specified by regulations.
Yes The term Aadhaar
number to include
virtual id also
Aadhaar
10 3A (2) *
54(2) (bb)
A child who is an Aadhaar number holder may,
within a period of six months of attaining the
eighteen years of age, make an application to
the Authority for cancellation of his Aadhaar
number, in such manner as may be specified by
regulations and the Authority shall cancel his
Aadhaar number
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update) (eighth
Amendment
Regulations 2020.
(3 of 2020 dated
30th June 2020)
E & U
11 4(3)
54(2)(c)
An Aadhaar number, in physical or electronic
form subject to authentication and other
conditions, as may be specified by regulations,
may be accepted as proof of identity of the
Aadhaar number holder for any purpose
*Substituted as
Every Aadhaar number holder to establish his
identity, may voluntarily use his Aadhaar
number in physical or electronic form by way
of authentication or offline verification, or in
such other form as may be notified, in such
manner as may be specified by regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulation 2016
(No. 03 of 2016
(12/09/16)
No amendments in
Regulation for
Authentication
12 4(4) *
54(2) (ca)
An entity may be allowed to perform
authentication, if the Authority is satisfied that
the requesting entity is— (a) compliant with
such standards of privacy and security as may
be specified by regulations;
Yes Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulation 2016
(No. 03 of 2016
(12/09/16)
Authentication

63
Sl.
No.
Section
no. of
Aadhaar
Act 2016
regulation
exists?
Regulation
Particulars
Ecosystem
13 4(5) *
54(2)
(cob)
The Authority may, by regulations, decide
whether a requesting entity shall be permitted
the use of the actual Aadhaar number during
authentication or only an alternative virtual
identity
Yes No regulation for
use of only an
alternate virtual
number. However,
use of Aadhaar no
allowed under
authentication
regulations &
Aadhaar no include
virtual no (as per
amendments)
Authentication
14 5
54(2)(d)
The Authority shall take special measures to
issue Aadhaar number to women, children,
senior citizens, persons with disability,
unskilled and unorganized workers, nomadic
tribes or to such other persons who do not have
any permanent dwelling house and such other
categories of individuals as may be specified
by regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
E&U
15 6
54(2)(e)
The Authority may require Aadhaar number
holders to update their demographic
information and biometric information, from
time to time, in such manner as may be
specified by regulations, so as to ensure
continued accuracy of their information in the
Central Identities Data Repository.
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
only bio of
children
E&U
16 8(1)
54(2)(f)
The Authority shall perform authentication of
the Aadhaar number of an Aadhaar number
holder submitted by any requesting entity, in
relation to his biometric information or
demographic information, subject to such
conditions and on payment of such fees and in
such manner as may be specified by regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulation 2016
(No. 03 of 2016)
(Clause 12(7))
Authentication
17 8(2)(a)
54(2)(f) *
A requesting entity shall—unless otherwise
provided in this Act, obtain the consent of an
individual or in the case of a child obtain the
consent of his parent or guardian before
collecting his identity information for the
purposes of authentication in such manner as
may be specified by regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulation 2016
(No. 03 of 2016)
(Clause 16)
Authentication

64
Sl.
No.
Section
no. of
Aadhaar
Act 2016
regulation
exists?
Regulation
Particulars
Ecosystem
18 8(2)(b) *
54(2) (fa)
“Provided that the requesting entity shall, in
case of failure to authenticate due to illness,
injury or infirmity owing to old age or
otherwise or any technical or other reasons,
provide such alternate and viable means of
identification of the individual, as may be
specified by regulations
No No amendment in
regulations found
to provide for
alternate and viable
means of
identification of an
individual
Authentication
19 8(3)
54(2)(f)
A requesting entity shall inform, in such
manner as may be specified by regulations, the
individual submitting his identity information
for authentication, the following details with
respect to authentication, namely:— (a) the
nature of information that may be shared upon
authentication; (b) the uses to which the
information received during authentication
may be put by the requesting entity; and (c)
alternatives to submission of identity
information to the requesting entity
Yes Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulation 2016
(No. 03 of 2016)
Authentication
20 8A(2)(a)
*
Every offline verification-seeking entity shall,
— (a) before performing offline verification,
obtain the consent of an individual, or in the
case of a child, his parent or guardian, in such
Partial No amendments in
Regulation for
however in other
cases it is available
in Authentication
Regulation
Authentication
21 8A (3) * An offline verification-seeking entity shall
inform the individual undergoing offline
verification, or in the case of a child, his parent
or guardian, the following details with respect
to offline verification, in such manner as may
be specified by regulations,
Regulation for
however in other
cases it is available
in Authentication
Regulation
Authentication
22 8A(4)(c)
*
No offline verification-seeking entity shall—
(c) take any action contrary to any obligation
on it as may be specified by regulations.
No No amendments in
Regulation for
Authentication
23 10
54(2)(g)
The Authority may engage one or more entities
to establish and maintain the Central Identities
Data Repository and to perform any other
functions as may be specified by regulations.
Yes Aadhaar (Data
Security)
Regulations, 2016
(No. 04 of 2016)
IS /Tech
24 18(2)(e) The chief executive officer shall be the legal
representative of the Authority and shall be
responsible for— (e) performing such other
functions, or exercising such other powers, as
Yes UIDAI
(Transaction of
Business at
Meetings of the
Authority)
Regulations, 2016
(No. 1 of 2016)
Administration

65
Sl.
No.
Section
no. of
Aadhaar
Act 2016
regulation
exists?
Regulation
Particulars
Ecosystem
25 19(1)
54(2)(h)
The Authority shall meet at such times and
places and shall observe such rules of
procedure in regard to the transaction of
business at its meetings, including quorum at
such meetings, as may be specified by
regulations
Yes UIDAI
(Transaction of
Business at
Meetings of the
Authority)
Regulations, 2016
(No. 1 of 2016)
[ Clause 3]
Administration
26 21(2)
54(2)(i)
21(1) *
54(2)(x)
The salaries and allowances payable to, and the
other terms and conditions of service of, the
chief executive officer and other officers and
other employees of the Authority shall be such
as may be specified by regulations with the
approval of the Central Government.
*Substituted as
(1) The Authority shall appoint such officers
and employees as may be required for the
discharge of its functions under this Act. (2)
The salaries and allowances payable to, and
the other terms and conditions of service of, the
officers and employees of the Authority shall be
such as may be specified by regulations.”
No
Yes
UIDAI
(Appointment of
Officers and
Employees)
Regulations, 2020
(No. 1 of 2020)
dated 21-01-2020
& UIDAI (Salary,
Allowances and
other Terms and
Conditions of
Service of
Employees)
Regulations, 2020
(No. 2 of 2020)
dated 21-01-2020
Administration
27 23(2)(a) * Without prejudice to sub-section (1), the
powers and functions of the Authority, inter
alia, include— (a) specifying, by regulations,
demographic information and biometric
information required for enrolment and the
processes for collection and verification
thereof;
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016.
(Clause 3,4,5,10)
and 6th
, 7th
Amendments
E & U
28 23(2)(b) * Without prejudice to sub-section (1), the
alia, include—(b) collecting demographic
information and biometric information from
any individual seeking an Aadhaar number in
such manner as may be specified by regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
(Clause 3,4,5,10)
and 6th
, 7th
Amendments
E & U
29 23(2)(f) *
54(2)(k)
Without prejudice to sub-section (1), the
alia, include—((f) maintaining and updating
the information of individuals in the Central
Identities Data Repository in such manner as
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
E & U

66
Sl.
No.
Section
no. of
Aadhaar
Act 2016
regulation
exists?
Regulation
Particulars
Ecosystem
30 23(2)(g)
54(2)(l)
alia, include— (g) omitting and deactivating of
an Aadhaar number and information relating
thereto in such manner as may be specified by
regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
(Clause 27, 28)
E&U
31 23(2)(i)
54(2)(n)
alia, include—(i) specifying, by regulations,
the terms and conditions for appointment of
Registrars, enrolling agencies and service
providers and revocation of appointments
thereof
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
and 2nd
& 4th
Amendments
E&U
32 23(2)(k)
54(2)(o)
alia, include—sharing, in such manner as may
be specified by regulations, the information of
Aadhaar number holders, subject to the
provisions of this Act
Yes Aadhaar (Sharing
of Information)
Regulations, 2016
(No. 05 of 2016)
IS
33 23(2)(m)
54(2)(p)
alia, include— (m) specifying, by regulations,
various processes relating to data management,
security protocols and other technology
safeguards under this Act
Yes Aadhaar (Data
Security)
Regulations, 2016
(No. 04 of 2016)
IS
34 23(2)(n)
54(2)(q)
alia, include— (n) specifying, by regulations,
the conditions and procedures for issuance of
new Aadhaar number to existing Aadhaar
number holder
No The enrolment and
update division of
UIDAI informed
that the purpose of
the provision in
the Act was not
known to them
E&U
35 23(2)(o)
54(2)(r)
alia, include—(o) levying and collecting the
fees or authorising the Registrars, enrolling
agencies or other service providers to collect
such fees for the services provided by them
under this Act in such manner as may be
specified by regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
E&U
36 23(2)(r)
54(2)(s)
alia, include—(r) evolving of, and specifying,
by regulations, policies and practices for
Registrars, enrolling agencies and other service
providers
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)-
E&U

67
Sl.
No.
Section
no. of
Aadhaar
Act 2016
regulation
exists?
Regulation
Particulars
Ecosystem
37 28(3) The Authority shall take all necessary
measures to ensure that the information in the
possession or control of the Authority,
including information stored in the Central
Identities Data Repository, is secured and
protected against access, use or disclosure not
permitted under this Act or regulations made
thereunder, and against accidental or
intentional destruction, loss or damage
Yes Aadhaar (Data
Security)
Regulations, 2016
(No. 04 of 2016)
IS
38 28(5) *
54(2)(t)
Provided that an Aadhaar number holder may
request the Authority to provide access to his
identity information excluding his core
biometric information in such manner as may
be specified by regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulation 2016
(No. 03 of 2016)
[clause 28]
Authentication
39 29(2)
54(2)(u)
The identity information, other than core
biometric information, collected or created
under this Act may be shared only in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and
in such manner as may be specified by
regulations.
of Information)
Regulations, 2016
(No. 05 of 2016)
IS
40 29(4) No Aadhaar number or core biometric
information collected or created under this Act
in respect of an Aadhaar number holder shall
be published, displayed or posted publicly,
except for the purposes as may be specified by
regulations.
of Information)
Regulations, 2016
(No. 05 of 2016)
[Clause 6}
IS
41 31 (1)
54(2)(v)
In case any demographic information of an
Aadhaar number holder is found incorrect or
changes subsequently, the Aadhaar number
holder shall request the Authority to alter such
demographic information in his record in the
Central Identities Data Repository in such
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
and Amendments
(7th
,6th
)
E&U
42 31(2)
54(2)(v)
In case any biometric information of Aadhaar
number holder is lost or changes subsequently
for any reason, the Aadhaar number holder
shall request the Authority to make necessary
alteration in his record in the Central Identities
Data Repository in such manner as may be
specified by regulations.
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
(No. 02 of 2016)
and Amendments
(7th
,6th
)
E&U
43 31(4) No identity information in the Central
Identities Data Repository shall be altered
except in the manner provided in this Act or
regulations made in this behalf
Authentication
Regulations (cl 26)
found to include
the change.
Authentication

68
Sl.
No.
Section
no. of
Aadhaar
Act 2016
regulation
exists?
Regulation
Particulars
Ecosystem
44 32 (1)
54(2)(w)
The Authority shall maintain authentication
records in such manner and for such period as
Yes Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulation 2016
(No. 03 of 2016)
Authentication
45 32 (2)
54(2)(w)
Every Aadhaar number holder shall be entitled
to obtain his authentication record in such
Yes Aadhaar
(Authentication)
Regulation 2016
(No. 03 of 2016)
Authentication
46 37 Whoever, intentionally discloses, transmits,
copies or otherwise disseminates any identity
information collected in the course of
enrolment or authentication to any person not
authorised under this Act or regulations made
there under or in contravention of any
agreement or arrangement entered into
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years or with a fine which
may extend to ten thousand rupees or, in the
case of a company, with a fine which may
extend to one Lakh rupees or with both.
Yes Part of the act and
covered in
Authentication
Regulations, Data
Sharing
Regulations and
Sharing of
Information
Regulations
IS
47 54(2)(x) any other matter which is required to be, or
may be, specified, or in respect of which
provision is to be or may be made by
regulations
Yes Aadhaar
(Enrolment and
Update)
Regulations 2016
Regulation no
10(2) and 7th
Amendments
E & U
Appendix-I shows the requirements of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies,
Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, (“Aadhaar Act 2016”) including the Aadhaar and Other Laws
(Amendment) Act (dated 23 July 2019)51
and corresponding provisions in the various Regulations issued by
the UIDAI as on 31 March 2020.
* denotes the requirement of regulations as per the amendment to the Aadhaar Act 2016 by The Aadhaar
and Other Laws (Amendment) Ordinance 2019 (No. 9 of 2019) (dated 02 March 2019) which become the
Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act (dated 23 July 2019)
51
The Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Ordinance 2019 (No.9 of 2019) (dated 02 March 2019)

69
Annexure-I
(Refer Paragraph no. 4.3.1)
Based on the decided sample size six out of six contracts having value of `
`
`
`100 Crore and above
and seven out of twenty-six contracts having value less than `
`
`
`100 Crore were selected for scrutiny.
The selected list of contracts is furnished below:
A. Contracts > `
`
`
`100 Crores entered by UIDAI
Sl.
No.
Particulars
Name of
the firm
Period
Value
(`
`
`
` in
Crore)
Remarks
I II III IV V VI
1
Agreement with Data
Centre Development
Agency (DCDA),
Bengaluru
M/s Wipro
Ltd,
06-12-2012
to
05-12-2017
116.06
The file related to AMC part
was only provided for
scrutiny. The file related to
selection process of the
vendor was not made
available. Since the contract
involved technical issues, the
same was out of the scope of
the Audit for scrutiny.
2
Agreement with
DCDA, Manesar
117.18
3
Managed Service
Provider (MSP)
M/s HCL
Infosystems
Ltd
20-6-2012
to
19-6-2019
1,978.62
The tender/contract files
related to MSP was denied
citing confidentiality. The
file related to invoices and
payments were subsequently
provided for scrutiny. The
file related to selection
process of the vendor was not
made available. The same
was also out of audit
coverage period. Further the
detailed scrutiny was not
done as the issues of
technical nature was kept out
of scope of audit. The
observations made by audit
is presented in the Chapter-4
of the Report.
A 1 Cost of 35 Cells -
Value-1
585.91
A 2 Cost of Non-Cell
Comp. - Value-2 325.49
B 1 Staff cost for
managed service -
Value-3
347.38
B 2 AMC for Cell
comp - Value-3
210.85
B 3 AMC for Non-
Cell comp - Value-3 144.86
B 4 N/work
connectivity cost -
Value-3
21.22
C Software
development - Value-4
27.91
D Cost of Biometric
solution - Value-5 315.00
4
Aadhaar Document
Management System
(ADMS)
M/s
Hewlett-
Packard
India Sales
Pvt. Ltd.
7-06-2011
to
6-06-2016
327.98
The management did not
produce the file for audit
scrutiny during the presence
of audit team in the premises.
Observations were made
based on the reports of ROs
and information collected
through replied memos.
However, they agreed to
provide the same later on.

70
5
Professionals
Recruitment (NISG)
M/s
National
Institute of
Smart
Governance
(NISG),
Hyderabad
up to 31-03-2020
The files were furnished to
audit for scrutiny. The
observations made on the
contracts related to supply of
executives by NISG has been
brought out in the Report.
The finance cost of SRP was
to be met from the ICT
assistance paid to the States.
Field Support
Engineers (FSE) 30-11-2009 5.43
Project Management
Unit (PMU)
30-11-2009
&
18-12-2013
40.68
Aadhaar Enabled
Applications Group
(AEAG)
18-04-2011 28.50
Project Management
Resources (SRP)
22-11-2013
Technology Services
Unit (TSU)
22-05-2013 62.30
6
Hiring of
accommodation on
rent at Jeevan Bharti
Building, Connaught
Circus, New Delhi
M/s Life
Insurance
Corporation
of India
(LIC)
01-11-2009
to
31-10-2014
&
01-11-2014
to
31-10-2019
No file was made available to
PA Team during their
presence at the premises.
However, the files were
subsequently provided to the
Compliance Audit Team/
LAP during December 2020.
B. Contracts < `
`
`
` 100 Crores entered by UIDAI
Sl.
No.
Particulars
Name of
the firm
Period
Value
(`
`
`
` in
Crore)
Remarks
I II III IV V VI
1
Governance Risk
Compliance and
Performance
(GRCP) Service
Provider
M/s Price Water
House - Cooper
06-10-2015
to
05-10-2018
17.53
The file was not provided to
audit. GRCP reports on for
few periods shared under
their watch and ward in
separate chamber.
2
Processing of
update requests
of the residents,
back-end work of
self-service
update, etc.
M/s Karvy Data
Management
Services Ltd.
28-05-2017
to
02-07-2018
16.52
The RFP file was provided
but nothing substantial worth
reporting was found.
3
Operating of
Contact Centre
Services of
UIDAI
M/s TATA
Business Support
Services Ltd.
06-04-2016
to
05-04-2017
&
06-04-2017
to
05-04-2018
24.93
The files related to selection
process and correspondences
was made available to audit
4
Augmentation of
outbound SMS
capabilities at
UIDAI HQrs
M/s Value First
Digital Media
Pvt. Ltd.
23-03-2013
to
22-03-2016
&
23-03-2016
to
22-03-2017
4.86
The RFP file was provided

71
5
Printing and
Franking of
Aadhaar
documents
M/s Manipal
Technologies
Ltd., Manipal
01-07-2013
to
31-10-2016
&
15-12-2016
to
14-12-2018
74.29
50.47
The RFP files was provided.
The invoices along with
GRCP reports on meeting the
SLA parameters and sanction
for payments were provided.
The observations emanating
from it has been brought out
in the report.
6
Printing and
Franking of
Aadhaar
documents
M/s Seshaasai
Business Forms
(P) Ltd., Wadala,
Mumbai
21-06-2013
to
21-10-2016
&
20-12-2016
to
19-12-2018
44.57
25.24
7
De-duplication
of Data
Monitoring
Services
M/s HCL
Infosystems Ltd.
01-11-2017
to
31-10-2018
22.63 The files were not supplied.

72
Abbreviations
List Description
ABIS Automatic Biometric Identification Systems
ADMS Aadhaar Document Management System
AEAG Aadhaar Enabled Applications Group
AEK Aadhaar Enrolment Kit
ASA Authentication Service Agency
ASK Aadhaar Seva Kendra
AUA Authentication User Agency
BSP Biometric Service Provider
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CERT-IN Indian Computer Emergency Response Team
CIDR Central Identities Data Repository
CRM Customer Relationship Management
DC Data Center
DDG Deputy Director General
DEITY Department of Electronics & Information Technology
DMS Document Management System
DoB Date of Birth
DoP Department of Posts
EA Enrolment Agency
EFC Expenditure Finance Committee
EID Enrolment ID
e-KYC Electronic Know Your Customer
FMR False Match Rate
FNIRA False Negative Identification Rate for Anomalous matches
FNMR False Non-Match Rate
FPIR False Positive Identification Rate
FSE Field Service Engineer
GFR General Financial Rules
GRCP Governance Risk Compliance and Performance
HQ Head Quarters
ICT Information & Communication Technology
ID Identity Document
IS Information Security
IT Information Technology
KUA e-KYC User Agency
LD Liquidated Damages
LLP Limited Liability Partnership
MDD Manual De-duplication

73
MEITY Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MSP Managed Service Provider
NISG National Institute for Smart Governance
NVS Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti
OAE Other Administrative Expense
OAR Order Aadhaar Reprint
OTP One Time Pin
PAN Permanent Account Number
PII Personally, Identifiable Information
PID Personal Identity Data
PMU Project Management Unit
PoA Proof of Address
PoI Proof of Identity
PoR Proof of Relationship
PSP Print Service Provider
QC Quality Check
RE Requesting Entity
RO Regional Office
RTI Right To Information
SLA Service Level Agreement
SRP State Resource Person
STQC Standardization Testing and Quality Certification
TSP Telecom Service Providers
TSU Technology Service Unit
UC Utilization Certificate
UID Unique Identification
UIDAI Unique Identification Authority of India
UT Union Territories

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