Powering up: Perspectives on Indonesia’s energy future

Powering up
Perspectives on
Indonesia’s energy future
A report from The Economist Intelligence Unit

Sponsored by


Contents
Preface

2

1. Indonesia’s energy future: The EIU view
Nick Owen, Contributing Editor, Indonesia, The Economist Intelligence Unit

4

2. Managing risks for future energy security
Lukman Mahfoedz, President, Indonesian Petroleum Association

10

3. Reducing Indonesia’s energy subsidies: A prudent, fair and transformative reform
Ndiame Diop, Lead Economist, Indonesia, World Bank

13

4. Investing in Indonesia’s energy sector: Regulatory risks and the need for reform
Stephen Norris, Senior Analyst, Asia-Pacific, Control Risks

19

5. Rural electrification: The “DC House” solution
Taufik, Director of the Electric Power Institute and Professor of Electrical Engineering,
California Polytechnic State University

23

6. Renewable energy in Indonesia: Present status and prospects
Hanan Nugroho, Senior Planner, National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS)

27

© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2014

1


Preface

This year will be crucial for Indonesia as the
country faces landmark parliamentary and
presidential elections. Slowing economic growth,
infrastructural deficiencies and a longstanding
battle against corruption will continue to pose
problems for the new administration—as will the
all-important issue of managing the country’s
energy needs. Indonesia faces many challenges
common to any developing economy in ensuring
energy security, equitable energy access and the
protection of its environment. Moreover, while
the country is rich in hydrocarbon resources, it
faces a great deal of uncertainty about how to
maximise the benefits from their exploitation.
How will the next administration manage this
uncertainty and ensure Indonesia’s energy
security for future generations?

Nicholas Owen and David
Line of The Economist
Intelligence Unit were the
editors of the paper.

1

2

This question was the starting point for
this paper. The Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU) asked prominent figures from research,
industry and academia to consider Indonesia’s
long-term energy future. Their contributions
tackle the fundamental issues the country
must consider when plotting a sustainable and
secure energy policy. These include: the need
for public and private-sector cooperation in
managing Indonesia’s abundant resources; the
economic side-effects of subsidies and fuel-price
distortions; the regulatory regime facing foreign
investors in the energy sector; the challenge

of rural electrification and the prospects for
renewable energy.
Shell commissioned this project but had no
editorial input into any of the sections below,
which are solely the work of the authors.1 Their
contributions can be summarised as follows:

1. Indonesia’s energy future: The EIU view
Nick Owen, Contributing Editor,
The Economist Intelligence Unit
Indonesia’s demand for energy is expanding
rapidly in line with its fast-rising GDP and
prosperity. The country is rich in energy
resources and historically it has exported oil, gas
and other fuels to the rest of the world. Times are
changing, however. Unless it can significantly
increase its oil and gas production, or do
much more to exploit its extensive renewable
resources, Indonesia will have to get used to
being a net importer of energy. In addition, given
a greater reliance on burning more dirty coal at
home, the government faces a challenge to keep
to its commitment to cut CO2 emissions by 26%
by 2020.
2. Managing risks for future energy security
Lukman Mahfoedz, President,
Indonesian Petroleum Association
With Indonesia’s demand for energy exceeding
supply, the government and the private sector


must work together so that the country can avert
an energy crisis in the future. Indonesia has a lot
of potential in hydrocarbons but to exploit these
resources it needs the supports of an attractive
oil and gas business regime. Amid increasing
domestic energy consumption, the three
principles of clarity, consistency and certainty
will help Indonesia secure its energy future by
discovering and exploiting new resources.

3. Reducing Indonesia’s energy subsidies:
A prudent, fair and transformative reform
Ndiame Diop, Lead Economist, Indonesia,
World Bank
Indonesia’s spending on energy subsidies has
short- and long-term economic consequences.
In 2012, spending on subsidies was equivalent to
the central government’s total capital and social
spending combined. Subsidies represent a huge
opportunity cost: despite strong GDP growth
in recent years, Indonesia’s core infrastructure
stock has not kept up, hitting productivity.
Subsidies also disproportionately benefit
households at the top of the income distribution.
Reducing them—with the appropriate safeguards
in place—is a prudent and fair policy.
4. Investing in Indonesia’s energy sector:
Regulatory risks and the need for reform
Stephen Norris, Senior Analyst, Asia-Pacific,
Control Risks
Foreign investors in Indonesia’s energy sector
must contend with a host of legal and regulatory
challenges. Rising economic nationalism and
uncertainty surrounding production-sharing
contracts, domestic-market obligations, costrecovery procedures and tax obligations are

clouding investor perceptions of the sector. All of
this is undermining the government’s efforts to
attract investment and boost exploration.

5. Rural electrification: The “DC House”
solution
Taufik, Director, Electric Power Institute and
Professor of Electrical Engineering,
It is impossible to overstate the importance
of rural electrification in Indonesia, but the
authorities face serious challenges as they
try to provide more people with access to
reliable electricity. Existing solutions like the
construction of large power plants and the
expansion of the national electricity grid have
been successful in some areas but they are not
well suited to rural electrification. A “DC House”
offers an alternative solution by providing smallscale electrical power supplies to remote, isolated
and sparsely populated areas.
6. Renewable energy in Indonesia: Present
status and prospects
Hanan Nugroho, Senior Planner, National
Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS)
There is considerable scope for Indonesia
to exploit renewable energy. But the share
of renewables in the country’s energy mix
remains low, owing mainly to heavily subsidised
domestic oil prices, the challenges of adapting
to a rapidly evolving legal and regulatory
environment, and the high costs of renewableenergy technologies. However, the prospects for
Indonesia’s development of renewable energy
are bright.
The Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2014


3


1

Indonesia’s energy future:
The EIU view

Nick Owen
Contributing Editor, Indonesia, The Economist Intelligence Unit

Indonesia’s demand for energy is expanding rapidly in line with its fast-rising GDP and
prosperity. The country is rich in energy resources and historically it has exported oil,
gas and other fuels to the rest of the world. Times are changing, however. Unless it can
significantly increase its oil and gas production, or do much more to exploit its extensive
renewable resources, Indonesia will have to get used to being a net importer of energy.
In addition, given a greater reliance on burning more dirty coal at home, the government
faces a challenge to keep to its commitment to cut CO2 emissions by 26% by 2020.
One of the major challenges facing Indonesia
today is finding the energy to power its rapidly
expanding economy. Real GDP growth has

slowed in the past year or so, but The Economist
Intelligence Unit still expects it to average
5.7% a year until 2020 (Figure 1). Factories are

Figure 1: Indonesia’s GDP
Nominal US$bn, left scale
2,000

Real change %, right scale
8

1,500

6

1,000

4

500

2

0
0
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit

4


2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020


producing more goods for the domestic market,
and the authorities would like to see the country
export more to the rest of the world, as well as
undertake more processing locally so that it adds
greater value to those exports.
Meanwhile, Indonesians are becoming richer. On
a purchasing power parity basis, GDP per head
will rise by about 60% to US$8,200 by 2020. More
people will be able to afford motorcars and durable
goods, from air conditioners to refrigerators and
washing machines. Consequently, the state-owned
electricity provider, Perusahaan Listrik Negara
(PLN), is connecting more homes to the national
grid. PLN estimates that the country needs to
add 5.7 gw of additional capacity a year to meet
demand for electricity alone. With domestic
energy prices still heavily subsidised, Indonesia’s
consumers have little incentive to become
more energy-efficient. We expect total energy
consumption to rise by almost 30% to 284,230
kilo tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) by 2020,
mostly owing to a 37% increase in consumption by
industry, to 86,330 ktoe.
How will Indonesia meet this growing demand?
Historically, it has been a major energy exporter.
But times are changing. The country became
a net oil importer in 2004 and five years
later it suspended its membership of OPEC,

the oil producers’ cartel. Indonesia remains
an important exporter of natural gas, but
Pertamina, the state-owned oil and gas firm,
recently concluded the country’s first contract to
import liquefied natural gas (LNG). Without such
an agreement, Indonesia would have struggled
to fulfil its export commitments at a time when
domestic demand is growing. The government
aims to make more use of the country’s rich coal
resources to fire at least 70% of the power plants
being built under two “fast track” programmes
aimed at increasing the country’s generating
capacity by 20 gw. Even so, Indonesia looks
set to retain its position as one of the world’s
leading exporters of thermal coal. For many
other energy sources the outlook remains
equally uncertain.

Oil
Petroleum products will remain the most
important component of Indonesia’s energy mix,
accounting for about 27% of primary-energy
consumption in 2020, down from an estimated
31% in 2013 (Figure 2). About 60% of the
petroleum consumed in Indonesia is used by the
transport sector, a proportion that we do not
expect to change significantly.
Ownership of motor vehicles is increasing rapidly
in line with the growing prosperity of Indonesia’s

Figure 2: Energy mix by fuel
(% respondents)

2013

2020

Combustible renewables
and waste

25%

Coal

20%

7%

Geothermal

Combustible renewables
and waste

Coal

24%

10%

Geothermal

31%

Hydro, 1%

Natural gas

27%
Hydro, 1%

16%
Petroleum products

20%

18%

Natural gas

Petroleum products


5


middle-class consumers. More than one million
new vehicles were sold in 2012. The launch
recently of new models of low-cost, small-engine
cars is expected to boost sales still further.
Government attempts to convert vehicles to run
on compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied
gas for vehicles (LGV) have so far failed to
have much of an impact. This is mostly because
petroleum prices remain so low. In June 2013
the government raised subsidised petrol and
diesel prices by 44% and 22% respectively, but
prices are still among the lowest in the world.
We expect petroleum consumption to grow
by 1.7% a year on average in 2014-20. Recent
regulations have increased the proportion of
biofuels that must be mixed with petroleum
products but such changes are likely to
accomplish little while subsidies remain in
place. We do not expect fundamental reform
to subsidies and thus demand for petroleum
products will be supported by their low price
relative to other fuels.

Given the huge costs of drilling and enhanced oil
recovery, foreign investment is badly needed. But
foreign investors are fast losing faith in Indonesia
owing to creeping resource nationalism, legal
and regulatory risks, and high-profile corruption
scandals.

Natural gas
Compared with its oil sector, Indonesia’s naturalgas sector appears to be in rude health. Annual
production has risen to about 70,000 ktoe and
significant offshore fields are expected to come
on stream, like the East Natuna Block in the
South China Sea, being developed by Pertamina,
ExxonMobil, Total and Thailand’s PTT Exploration
and Production. Proven reserves are plentiful,
at about 3trn cubic metres. The country also
hopes to develop its unconventional resources,
like shale gas and coal-bed methane. Indonesia
exports about one-half of its annual natural-gas
production, earning US$20.5bn this way in 2012.

Unless Indonesia can reverse a decades-long
decline in oil production, rapid growth in imports
will remain a significant source of economic
stress. The country’s oil import bill has risen to
almost US$40bn a year, a fourfold increase since
it became a net oil importer in the mid-2000s.
This increase in oil imports is placing considerable
pressure on the balance of payments, explaining
in large part why the current account has moved
into deficit for the first time since 1997. This has,
in turn, put pressure on international reserves
and the local currency.
At present, though, there is little sign of any
increase in oil production, which now stands at
860,000 barrels per day, down from a high of 1.6m
bpd in the mid-1990s. A dozen foreign-owned oil
firms have spent nearly US$2bn between them
exploring for new reserves in the past five years
but have found nothing significant. On current
trends, Indonesia’s proven reserves of 4bn barrels
will be exhausted by 2020. Most exploration is
taking place in deep waters in eastern Indonesia.
6

Even here, though, Indonesia faces challenges.
In an attempt to rein in costly oil imports,
Indonesia’s government aims to make more use
of natural gas domestically for power plants,
manufacturing and fertiliser industries. SKK
Migas, the regulator, has predicted that the
country will have to begin importing LNG to
satisfy domestic demand and fulfil existing
export commitments. In early December 2013
Pertamina signed an agreement with Cheniere
Energy, a US producer, to import 800,000 tonnes
of LNG per year, beginning in 2018. It was
Indonesia’s first long-term import contract.
To safeguard domestic supplies, the energy
ministry in 2012 raised the possibility of a
moratorium on new export contracts—a move
that raised concern among its traditional
customers in Japan, South Korea and China until
officials backtracked on the proposal. Exports
have begun to decline. In 2012, for example,
gas receipts fell by 8.9% and they were down
by 19.3% on average in the first nine month of
2013. This partly reflects falling prices, but it is



We expect Indonesia’s consumption of natural
gas to grow by about 5% a year on average in
2014-20. Its share of the country’s energy mix
will increase to 17.8% from 16% in 2013. The
main challenge is overcoming the absence of
well-developed infrastructure to pipe supplies
around the sprawling archipelago. Perusahaan
Gas Negara (PGN), the state-owned gas firm,
presently operates about 5,900 km of pipeline
but distribution infrastructure is largely absent
outside Sumatra and West Java. Some locations
have turned to building LNG import facilities to
access gas. This lack of connectivity will limit the
growth of natural gas.

Coal
Indonesia possesses rich reserves of coal and
is the world’s leading exporter of thermal
coal, used mainly in power plants. At present,
Indonesia consumes only about 20% of the
386m tonnes it produces annually, mostly at
mines in eastern Kalimantan and southern
Sumatra. The rest is exported, mostly to buyers
in China, India, Korea and Japan. Exports
totalled US$26.2bn in 2012 (Figure 3). But coal
is growing in importance in the country’s own
energy mix. During the past decade its share of
the country’s primary energy mix has doubled
to almost 20%. The fuel is set to become more
important still as new coal-fired power plants
come on stream.
All of the power plants being built on Java under
the first phase of the government’s “fast-track”
programme aimed at adding 20 gw to the
country’s power-generating capacity are fuelled
by coal. And coal will also be burnt in at least
40% of the plants being built outside Java under
the second phase of the programme. As in the
oil and gas sector, producers are contractually
obliged to sell a proportion of their output to the
domestic market (at low prices). The government
has also raised the possibility of a moratorium
on exports of low-grade coal, similar to the one

on shipments of mineral ores that is set to come
into force in January 2014.
There are questions about whether Indonesia’s
coal production will continue to grow at its
present, rapid pace. International coal prices
have slumped lately owing to depressed global
demand, and competition among producers is
fierce, causing many smaller mines to suspend
unprofitable operations. Stricter ownership rules
for foreign miners, who must relinquish majority
control of a mine to local firms by reducing their
stake to 49% by the tenth year of operation, may
discourage inward investment at a time when the
costs of production are rising as mining moves to
more remote locations. Nevertheless, Indonesia
looks set to remain the world’s leading exporter
for some time. The main challenge facing the
government is to keep to its commitment to cut
CO2 emissions by 26% by 2020 while burning
more dirty coal at home.

Renewables
Indonesia has extensive yet largely unexploited
renewable-energy resources. Solar, wind and
hydro power all have potential, but geothermal
energy stands out as potentially making the
biggest contribution to the country’s energy

Figure Economic growth
Chart 1: 3: Coal exports
(US$ m)
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
20
05
20 Jan
05
20 Sep
06
-M
ay
20
07
-J
an
20
07
-S
ep
20
08
-M
ay
20
09
-J
an
20
09
-S
ep
20
10
-M
ay
20
11
-J
an
20
11
-S
ep
20
12
-M
ay
20
13
-J
an
20
13
-S
ep

mostly because of lower volumes.

Source: Haver Analytics

7


mix in the future. Owing to its geography, at
the centre the Pacific “ring of fire”, Indonesia is
thought to have the world’s largest geothermal
reserves, estimated at 29 gw. Even though it
presently produces only 1.3 gw from geothermal
plants, it is already the world’s third-largest
producer of electricity from geothermal sources,
behind the US and the Philippines.
The government wants to see 34% of the
additional 10 gw of power being added under
the second phase of its “fast-track” programme
coming from geothermal power plants.
However, the construction of geothermal
plants is progressing slowly. Acquiring land for
development purposes is notoriously difficult in
Indonesia and the costs of geothermal plants are
very high. The vagaries of Indonesia’s business
environment and the market distortions arising
from energy subsidies also deter investment.
We expect geothermal power to rise from an
estimated 6.9% of the country’s energy mix in
2013 to 10.3% by 2020. Overall, renewables will
account for 34.5% of the country’s energy mix by
2020, up from 32.4% in 2013. But this seemingly
large share mostly reflects the significance
of combustible renewables, like firewood.
Excluding these the proportion will stand at

10.9%, representing only a small increase from
7.4% in 2013.
Indonesia’s president, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, won international acclaim in 2009
for pledging to cut CO2 emissions by at least 26%
from “business as usual levels” by 2020. Most of
the country’s emissions are the result of changes
in land use, which is responsible for the loss of
globally significant carbon sinks, like rainforests
and peat wetlands. Nonetheless, we expect CO2
emissions from fuel combustion to increase from
an estimated 496.6m tonnes in 2013 to 547.9m
tonnes by 2020, a rise of 16.6%. Although the
government would like to generate more power
from renewables, fossil fuels will continue to
dominate the country’s energy mix. Coal and
oil will each account for about 40% of carbon
emissions from fuel combustion.

Conclusion
Indonesia’s rapid economic growth and the
increasing prosperity of its people mean that
energy consumption is set to rise by almost
30% by 2020. Meanwhile, creeping resource
nationalism, legal and regulatory risks and
high-profile corruption scandals are scaring
off investors. Wasteful subsidies for petroleum

Figure 4: CO2 emissions from fuel combustion
Total CO2 emissions, million tonnes, left scale
600

Emissions per head, right scale
2.2

550

2.0

500

1.8

450

1.6

400

1.4

350

1.2

300

1.0
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014


8


2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020


products also distort the market and deter the
development of alternative energy sources.
Unless Indonesian politicians have the courage

to reform the sector and revive the investment
the country needs to exploit its own energy
resources, it will rely increasingly on imports.


9


2

Managing risks for future
energy security

Lukman Mahfoedz
President, Indonesian Petroleum Association

With Indonesia’s demand for energy exceeding supply, the government and the private
sector must work together so that the country can avert an energy crisis in the future.
Indonesia has a lot of potential in hydrocarbons but to exploit these resources it needs the
supports of an attractive oil and gas business regime. Amid increasing domestic energy
consumption, the three principles of clarity, consistency and certainty will help Indonesia
secure its energy future by discovering and exploiting new resources.
As I write, Indonesia’s economy faces renewed
challenges. In early December the currency, the
rupiah, fell to about Rp12,000:US$, the weakest
for four years, after the country recorded a trade
deficit of US$6.4bn in January-October. It is
hard to believe that not so long ago real GDP was
growing by more than 6% per year. Indonesia
was widely expected to take its place alongside
the likes of China, Brazil and India as one of the
world’s strongest economies.

important contributors to the country’s trade
deficit. Once a member of OPEC, the oil producers’
cartel, Indonesia now relies heavily on imported
crude oil and refined petroleum products. Oil
production stands at about 850,000 barrels per
day (bpd), but consumption is much higher. With
oil imports of 340,000 bpd, Indonesia ranks as
one of the world’s largest importers. At least
one think-tank has forecast that it will be the
number-one petroleum importer by 2018.

High consumption, low production

While consumption is rising rapidly, production
is stagnant. At the end of 2012, Indonesia had
3.6bn barrels of proven oil reserves and 104trn
cubic feet of natural-gas reserves. Annual
production in that year was 314m barrels of
oil and 3trn cubic feet of gas. In other words,
Indonesia’s reserves will run out within 12 years
for oil and 33 years for gas.

Oil and gas are important to Indonesia in
many ways. The sector accounts for about 8%
of GDP. In terms of taxes, it contributes about
US$35bn annually, or 28% of the government’s
revenue, the second-largest contribution of
any economic sector. Oil in particular powers
the nation. Indonesia consumes large amounts
of petroleum. Oil imports are one of the most
10



In the past five years, Indonesia’s reserve
replacement ratio for oil has been about 50%
and that for gas about 127%. Compared with
other countries in the region, Indonesia is
underperforming in terms of its discoveries. Of
the 1.9bn barrels of oil equivalent (boe) found in
South-east Asia in 2012, Indonesia’s share was
only 266m barrels, or 14% of the total.

A promising place for hydrocarbons
Still, Indonesia’s complex geology makes it a
promising place to look for hydrocarbons. The
archipelago’s energy potential spreads from
west to east, both onshore and offshore. As a
matter of fact, Indonesia has a number of “giant”
fields, containing more than 500bn boe of
recoverable oil or gas. As well as conventional oil
and gas, Indonesia is also rich in unconventional
resources, like coal-bed methane and shale gas,
estimated at 450trn cubic feet and 570trn cubic
feet, respectively.
Historically, the upstream business has been
centred in the western half of the archipelago. As
fields there have matured, exploration has been
moved east, where targets are older and deeper,
making investment more expensive. Despite these
challenges, however, oil and gas firms are still
confident that exploration will bring rewards.
In fact Indonesia is reckoned to have more
hydrocarbons that anywhere else in East Asia.

Clarity, consistency and certainty
However, Indonesia’s less-than-perfect business
regime means that its promising geology is not
fully exploited. More could be done to attract
upstream investment, especially in exploration
activities that are crucial for securing the
country’s energy security.
At present, oil and gas firms in Indonesia face
a number of issues that are slowing down
investment. These include the unfinished review
of 2001 oil and gas law (22/2001) and the long
length of time it takes firms to obtain permits

from many different ministries before they
can start exploration. A lack of co-ordination
between government agencies has resulted
in many overlapping regulations that hinder
the development of the upstream industry in
Indonesia.
Even so, firms continue to invest in exploration
and production in Indonesia. In 2012, for
example, the industry’s total investment
amounted to US$16.1bn, a solid 15% increase
from the previous year’s US$14bn. However,
85% of this investment was used to fund existing
production and expansion; only 9% was used for
exploration.
Oil and gas investment is long term and
high risk. In Indonesia oil-and-gas firms are
contractors of the government. In other words,
they do not own assets. Only after discovery and
production do firms receive a return on their
investment in the form of cost recovery and a
share of the profits, according to the terms of
their production-sharing contracts (PSCs). This
explains why upstream investors in Indonesia
hope to see clarity, consistency and certainty
to ensure that the returns are similar to those
in their initial business plans. Sometimes,
though, government policies and regulations
contradict the terms of firms’ PSCs. In 2010, for
example, the finance ministry imposed a tax
on the land and buildings within the working
areas covered by exploration PSCs signed in that
year and afterwards. Previously, the holders
of exploration PSCs were exempt from these
taxes—a common practice in PSC systems all
over the world. The new regulation has lessened
investors’ interest in undertaking costly
exploration projects.

Securing energy for the future
Indonesia must implement the “3C” principle of
clarity, consistency and certainty if it is to attract
the investment it needs to overcome energy
shortages in the short and long term.


11


More than 30% of Indonesia’s production of oil
and gas comes from PSCs that are scheduled to
expire in the next five years. More than 60% of
production comes from PSCs that will expire in
the next ten years. Owing to the unpredictable
process of contract extension and renewal,
many firms choose to postpone investment as
the end of their contracts approaches. This puts
production at risk. Indonesia faces the possibility
of losing 635,000 boe per day during the next
five years, and 1.2m boe per day during the
next ten years, as a result of the uncertainties
surrounding the contract-extension process.
Meanwhile, energy demand is predicted to rise
rapidly, in line with Indonesia’s rapid economic
growth and expanding middle class. By 2022, it
is predicted that energy consumption will triple
to 8.3m boe per day. By 2030, the gap between
oil and gas supply and demand could exceed 3m
boe per day. Keeping up with this rapid rise in
demand requires new exploration investment of
US$28bn annually.
Almost all the countries in the world take
their energy security seriously. Indonesia’s
dependence on imported energy makes it
vulnerable. Hence, Indonesia needs to start
building up its strategic petroleum reserves as a
safeguard against possible disruption to supplies
from overseas, where political stability cannot be
taken for granted.
Expanding oil inventories would also create new
investment opportunities, notably the building
of refineries to produce petroleum products.
Meanwhile, lower imports of oil and gas would
help restore Indonesia’s trade surplus and thus
support the rupiah.

12


Indonesia has extensive natural resources, but
to make the most of them it needs investors, who
in turn want clarity, consistency and certainty.
The implementation of the “3Cs” is necessary to
support Indonesia today and tomorrow. The 3Cs
will help with the development of conventional
energy resources and unconventional ones like
shale gas and coal-bed methane.
Successfully exploiting energy resources
will require strong co-ordination among all
stakeholders—the government and investors. In
2012, oil and gas investors were encouraged by
a presidential instruction (2/2012) in which the
president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, called
for co-ordination among national government
ministries and regional administrations to
achieve a production target of 1m boe per
day by 2014. Through this instruction the
government has sent a positive message which
has encouraged oil and gas investors.
The Indonesia Petroleum Association believes
that proper implementation of the presidential
instruction would put Indonesia back on the right
track to achieving sufficiency in oil and gas. Good
co-ordination will help streamline the process
of obtaining permits and minimise overlapping
authorities so that exploration programmes can
be executed on time. Good co-ordination will
also help the government come up with a fiscal
regime that will attract investors to Indonesia,
particularly in eastern parts of the country.
Energy is one of the basic requirements of
economic development. Indonesia needs
investors to produce energy for the nation and
investors need support from the government
in carrying out this task. We all share the
responsibility of providing energy for the nation.


3

Reducing Indonesia’s energy
subsidies: A prudent, fair and
transformative reform

Ndiame Diop
Lead Economist, Indonesia, World Bank

Indonesia’s spending on energy subsidies has short- and long-term economic
consequences. In 2012 spending on subsidies was equivalent to the central government’s
total capital and social spending combined. Subsidies represent a huge opportunity cost:
despite strong GDP growth in recent years, Indonesia’s core infrastructure stock has not
kept up, hitting productivity. Subsidies also disproportionately benefit households at
the top of the income distribution. Reducing them—with the appropriate safeguards in
place—is a prudent and fair policy.

Energy subsidies have a significant impact on
Indonesia’s short-term macroeconomic stability.
In the longer term, they affect its economic
growth and the welfare of its people. The impact
of energy subsidies on the economy has increased
in significance since 2004, when Indonesia
shifted from being a net exporter to a net
importer of both crude oil and refined products at
a time when the international price of crude oil
rose sharply. The country’s shift to net importer
status reflects steadily declining oil production
(from about 1.1m bpd in 2003 to 840,000 in
2012), rising oil consumption and limited
investment in reserve replacement.

The size of energy subsidies
In Indonesia, government subsidies keep
the domestic price of fuel (petrol, diesel and
kerosene) and electricity tariffs below their true

market levels. In effect, this policy suppresses
the transmission of fluctuations in the world
oil price and the rupiah’s exchange rate to the
domestic market; it means that the risk is borne
not by the different consumers that benefit from
the subsidies, but by the government’s budget—
in other words, taxpayers.
Over the past decade, the world experienced
several peaks in global oil prices (in 2005 and
2008), and in February 2011 oil prices again
breached US$100 per barrel and have stayed
above this level ever since (Figure 1). Meanwhile,
the cost of Indonesia’s energy subsidies rose
sharply in 2005 and 2008, and they have
remained above 20% of the government’s total
spending since 2011 (Figure 2).
The peaks in energy prices in 2005, 2008 and
2011 prompted Indonesia’s government to

13


Figure Energy demand in the BRICS
Chart 2: 1: Oil price
(Brent; US$ per barrel)
150

120

90

60

20
05
20 - J
05 an
20 - Ap
05 r
20 Au
05 g
20 De
06 c
20 - Ap
06 r
20 Aug
06
20 - De
07 c
20 - Ap
07 r
20 Au
07 g
20 De
08 c
20 - Ap
08 r
20 Aug
08
20 - De
09 c
20 - Ap
09 r
20 - Au
09 g
20 Dec
10
20 - Ap
10 r
20 Au
10 g
20 De
11 c
-A
20
11 pr
20 Au
11 g
-D
20
12 ec
20 - Ap
12 r
20 Aug
12
20 De
13 c
20 - Ap
13 r
-A
ug

30

Source: Haver Analytics

Figure 2: Energy subsidies
(% of government spending)
25

Fuel subsidies

Electricity subsidies

25

Total energy subsidies

20

20

15

15

10

10

5

5

0

0
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Source: World Bank

increase domestic prices and take additional
measures to reduce the fiscal burden of energy
subsidies. In 2005, the government doubled
the price of diesel and nearly tripled that of
kerosene. In May 2008, it raised the prices of
petrol and diesel by nearly 30% and, in July
2008, it raised the price of liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) by 23%. In a move that later proved
imprudent, the government reduced retail prices
of petrol and diesel in December 2008, following
14


a drop in international oil prices. World oil
prices subsequently rallied and, in 2011-12, the
government tried to undertake another series of
fuel-price hikes but could not implement them.
The latest fuel price adjustment occurred in June
2013, when the government raised subsidised
petrol and diesel prices by 33% on average.
For electricity, subsidies to larger industrial
electricity consumers were abolished in 2008


Figure 3: Fuel price, net oil producing and net oil consuming countries (2011)
(Rupiah per litre)

19,964

Norway

19,579
Germany

Denmark

16,584

13,230
Brazil

Japan

13,134
Australia

16,112

12,951
Chile

15,695

12,453
Thailand

Austria

12,147
Philippines

Singapore

11,621

15,615

11,213

8,558
Kazakhstan

China

8,384

6,637
Angola

United States of America

6,567

5,826
Russia

Mexico

5,753
Malaysia

4,500

UAE 4,300

Indoneisa

Algeria 3,720

Iran 3,630

Iraq 3,477

2,575

1,636
Libya

2,457

1,404
Saudi Arabia

Qatar

1,170
Nigeria

936
Turkmenistan

0

Venezuela 585

5,000

Kuwait

10,000

Canada

15,000

Korea

20,000

23,973

Net oil consuming country
21,686

Net oil producing country

United Kingdom

25,000

Source: World Bank

and, in 2013, the authorities raised electricity
tariffs every quarter for consumers with
connections above 900 volt-amperes (VA).
Despite these successive price adjustments,
Indonesia still has some of the lowest fuel prices
among major economies that are net consumers
of oil (Figure 3).
It is notable that all the recent price or tariff
adjustments were accompanied by compensation
packages to mitigate the impact of higher prices
on the poor. In 2005 and 2008, the government
introduced unconditional cash transfers, with
monthly cash payments distributed to 19m
people on low incomes. In 2008, the government
also introduced other compensation programmes
such as the distribution of rice and control of rice
prices, financial support to pay school fees and
subsidy increases for small-scale credit facilities.
More recently, in June 2013 the government
introduced unconditional cash transfers that it
distributed to 15.5m households through post
offices using newly printed Social Protection

Cards. In addition, it expanded three existing
social assistance programmes: conditional cash
transfers (PKH), scholarships (BSM) and rice for
the poor (RASKIN). For electricity, the current
tariff structure for households is progressive and
the tariff increases in 2013 do not affect lowerinstalled power tiers (below 900 VA).

Impact on fiscal deficits and fiscal
management
Energy subsidies have significant macroeconomic
impacts in Indonesia. First, they weigh heavily
on the country’s fiscal balance. Indonesia has
traditionally adopted a prudent fiscal stance
and, over the past decade, rapid nominal GDP
growth has gone hand in hand with low fiscal
deficits (which averaged 1.2% of GDP in 2001-12)
and rapidly declining public debt (from 100% of
GDP in 1999 to 25% in 2012). By law, the fiscal
deficit has been capped at 3% of GDP since 2003.
This fiscal prudence and the legal cap underpin
the government’s effort to curb fuel subsidies
whenever they threaten to tip the fiscal deficit
above 3% of GDP. This was the case in June 2013.

15


The fuel price adjustment then helped reduce
the fuel subsidy for 2013 and maintained the
projected deficit well below the legal limit.

impact on the budget and have often forced the
government to revise the budget during the fiscal
year in order to keep the deficit below 3% of GDP.

In addition to their fiscal burden, energy
subsidies pose a risk to Indonesia’s budget
management. Spending on fuel subsidies varies
with changes in consumption, the oil price
and the rupiah’s exchange rate. Over the past
few years actual spending on energy subsidies
has systematically overshot allocations in the
budget, creating uncertainty and constraining
fiscal management.

Impact on the trade balance

For example, while the fuel-price hikes in June
2013 have flattened the trajectory of energysubsidy spending, a 10% increase in the oil price
or a 10% depreciation of the rupiah against
the US dollar would increase subsidy spending
compared to a baseline in which the oil price or
the exchange rate remain unchanged (Figure
4). According to World Bank calculations, a 10%
increase in the oil price would add about 0.3-0.4
percentage points of GDP to the baseline fiscal
deficit. A 10% rupiah depreciation would have a
bigger impact of 0.7 percentage points of GDP.
Owing to the large amounts spent on energy
subsidies, changes in the oil price and the
rupiah’s US dollar exchange rate have a large

Figure 4: Energy subsidy costs: baseline and with 10% currency
depreciation/oil price increase
(Rupiah trn)
Energy subsidies (baseline)
Energy subsidies (10% rupiah depreciation)
Energy subsidies (10% oil price increase)

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Source: World Bank

16


Domestic oil consumption and thus imports are
highly sensitive to economic growth, with a 1%
increase in real GDP leading to about 0.83%
increase in domestic consumption. Indonesia’s
strong real GDP growth (5.7% on average in
2003-12) and energy subsidies have supported
a sharp rise in energy consumption. In response
to rising oil demand at a time when domestic
production continues to decline, crude oil
imports have therefore increased. Indonesia’s
limited onshore oil-refining capacity means that
processed oil imports are rising as well. In fact,
70% of oil imports in the first half of 2013 were
refined products, such as petrol (US$13.7bn or
115.2m barrels), which was worth more than
double imports of crude oil ($6.5 billion or 60.6m
barrels). Fuel imports have become a very large
component of Indonesia’s total imports. In 2012,
for example, they accounted for 23% of total
imports compared with 18% in the early 2000s.
Against the backdrop of a sharp decrease in
non-oil and gas exports since 2011, the large
and rising size of oil imports contributed to
pushing Indonesia’s current account into deficit
in 2012, thus increasing the country’s external
financing needs. As Indonesia’s economy is
expected to continue growing above 5% in the
near term, the rise in fuel import demand will be
difficult to curb. In August 2013, the government
increased biodiesel-blending requirements
for domestic fuels with the aim of reducing
reliance on imported, fossil fuel-based diesel.
However, this measure is longer term in nature;
the implementing regulation sets out annual
increases in biodiesel in the fuel mix until 2025.

Impact on long-term growth and
welfare
Indonesia’s large energy subsidies represent a


huge opportunity cost for the economy. Spending
on fuel subsidies totalled Rp212trn in 2012. That
was equivalent to the central government’s total
capital spending (Rp140trn) and social spending
(Rp75trn) combined. It was three times the
budget for infrastructure spending by the central
government in that year. Indonesia’s growth and
development objectives would be much better
served by redirecting spending on fuel subsidies
toward social sectors (health, social assistance
and community development) and infrastructure.
Despite rising government spending in recent
years, Indonesia’s core infrastructure stock
(roads, ports, electricity and water networks)
has not kept pace with economic growth. In real
terms the infrastructure capital stock grew by
only 3% annually in 2001-11, compared with
GDP growth of 5.3%. The slow growth in the
infrastructure stock, along with the rapid growth
of the number of motor vehicles, has led to
serious capacity gaps, congestion problems and
high logistics costs.
All this has undermined productivity,
competitiveness and poverty reduction.
According to household and village surveys, onequarter of the urban population and more than
one-half of the rural population have poor access
to transport services. World Bank calculations
show that Indonesia’s economic growth in 200111 would have been much higher had the country
devoted a larger share of GDP to infrastructure.1
Similarly, Indonesia spends only 0.5% of GDP on
social assistance, compared with 1-1.5% of GDP
in emerging economies such as Brazil, Turkey and
Thailand.

Who benefits from energy subsidies?
Energy subsidies were introduced during the rule
of former president Soeharto for social reasons:
to make energy (a basic need) affordable to
the people. Since then they have been taken
for granted , perhaps as a tangible government
policy to ease people’s daily lives. The evidence
suggests that fuel subsidies do help the poor by

keeping the prices of essential items lower than
they would otherwise be. World Bank calculations
suggest that in 2011 total fuel subsidies were
equivalent to giving each poor Indonesian
Rp6,000 per month.
However, expenditure on fuel subsidies
disproportionately benefits households at
the top of the income distribution: 84 % of all
benefits go to the top half of households by
consumption and only 16% to the bottom half.
Forty percent of benefits go to the richest 10% of
households, and less than 1% go to the poorest
10%. Moreover, about two-thirds of poor and
near-poor households do not consume any petrol
at all, although the likelihood of them consuming
petrol, and the actual volume that they would
consume, would rise if their incomes increased.
With respect to diesel, few households report
any consumption. Therefore commercial and
other users are estimated to account for virtually
all (98%) consumption of subsidised diesel.
In addition, not only do the poor receive fewer
benefits from fuel subsidies, they also are
likely to suffer more from the poor provision of
infrastructure that is an indirect consequence of
large subsidies: they live in the most flood-prone
areas and often have the most difficulty accessing
basic services.

Reducing subsidies is prudent and fair
Reforming energy subsidies is a prudent and fair
thing to do—so long as vulnerable households
are cushioned from the immediate adverse
impacts of higher energy prices, and the fiscal
savings are redirected towards investments
in Indonesia’s people and its infrastructure.
Assuming a realistic scenario in which the
government maintains a low level of spending on
energy subsidies, an improved framework would
offer a more predictable and transparent priceadjustment mechanism, along with an automatic
convergence towards market prices.
Indeed, for fuel products, the current approach of

Assuming a causal
relationship between
changes in infrastructure
capital stock and changes
in output, had the growth
rate in infrastructure capital
stock stood at 5% instead of
3%, real GDP growth would
have been 5.8% instead of
5.3%—a difference of 0.5
percentage points. Real GDP
growth would have reached
7% if real infrastructure
growth had been 10%.
See World Bank Quarterly
Economic Update, October
2013.

1

17


politically charged negotiations whenever global
oil prices spike is not always effective. In 2012,
for example, the legislature attached strings to
reform, authorising the government to raise fuel
prices only if world oil prices reached US$120 per
barrel. In the event oil prices remained below
this threshold and the government did not raise
fuel prices. The current approach’s subsidyreducing effect may always be short-lived due

18


to changes in global oil prices and fluctuations
in the rupiah’s exchange rate. As Indonesia
expands and strengthens its social safety net,
all poor and vulnerable households will receive
comprehensive assistance that protects them
from life-cycle shocks and provides them with
opportunities to lift themselves out of poverty.
Such a safety net is desirable with or without
reform of energy subsidies.


4

Investing in Indonesia’s energy
sector: Regulatory risks and the need
for reform

Stephen Norris
Senior Analyst, Asia-Pacific, Control Risks

Foreign investors in Indonesia’s energy sector must contend with a host of legal and
regulatory challenges. Rising economic nationalism and uncertainty surrounding
production-sharing contracts, domestic-market obligations, cost-recovery procedures
and tax obligations are clouding investor perceptions of the sector. All of this is
undermining the government’s efforts to attract investment and boost exploration.
Indonesia’s energy sector is at a point of
transition. Domestic firms, both public and
private, have increasing amounts of capital and
technical expertise. But for the most part they
are not yet able to compete with the largest
foreign-owned firms. Even so, local politicians
and executives are impatient to see domestic
firms play a much bigger role in the oil and gas
sector. Expiring production-sharing contracts
(PSCs) held by foreign firms have become the
prizes in unseemly scrambles between competing
domestic political and business interests. This
has stripped away the long-term certainty
that contractors require if they are to continue
investing to maximise production. This trend
goes far beyond “resource nationalism” linked
to the 2014 elections; it looks set to continue for
years—regardless of the result of the election.
A ruling in late 2012 by the Constitutional Court
set an uncomfortable precedent for foreign

resources firms. In the court’s interpretation
of Article 33 of the Indonesian constitution,
the government’s creation of an independent
regulator for upstream activities, BP Migas,
meant it had neglected its obligation to ensure
all natural resources would be “controlled by
the state to be exploited to the greatest benefit
of the people”. BP Migas was subsequently
dissolved. Though no contracts were affected,
the precedent raises questions about the
potential for further legal challenges to the
constitutionality of private—and especially
foreign—investment in Indonesia’s naturalresources sector.

Production and image problems
For years now, operators in Indonesia have
grappled with more routine commercial issues
and regulatory risks such as tax rules, cost
recovery, domestic-market obligation (DMO),
pricing rates, land rights and cabotage1

Cabotage refers to the
transport of goods or
passengers between
domestic ports or to and
from offshore facilities by a
foreign operator.

1

19


requirements. The cumulative effect of these
issues—along with perceived rising anti-foreign
sentiment resulting from multiple calls from
domestic parties for the reallocation of key
energy assets to Indonesian interests, the related
contractual uncertainty and falling international
oil prices—has been a steady decline in
investment in new exploration.
In January 2013, the minister for energy and
mineral resources, Jero Wacik, said that only
10% of the estimated US$26.2bn earmarked
for oil and gas investment in that year was for
new exploration. The bulk of expenditure was
devoted to maintaining existing operations and
production. Indonesia discovered fewer new wells
in 2012 than targeted (80 versus 250), according
to Wood Mackenzie, a consultancy. Oil production
also came in below expectations (870,000 bpd
against 930,000 bpd).
Many foreign resources firms have a poor opinion
of Indonesia’s investment environment, as
shown by a recent survey of industry perceptions
by the Fraser Institute, a Canadian think-tank.
Indonesia ranked 133rd out of 157 countries,
recording a score of 74.36, down from 59.66 in
2009 (with 0 the optimum). It scored poorly in
the categories for policy perception, transition to
best practice, fiscal terms, taxation, regulatory
uncertainty, compliance costs, trade barriers,
geological data availability, land and labour
issues, and the legal system. Among the Fraser
Institute’s “tier-one” producers, Indonesia
ranked 17th out of 27 countries, between Algeria
at 16th and Nigeria at 18th.
One of the most striking comparisons was
between Indonesia and neighbouring Malaysia,
which came 11th in the tier-one list with a
score of 43.55, the highest in South-east Asia.
Elsewhere in the region, the Philippines has
attracted increasing interest from foreign
firms, which view the present government more
favourably than its predecessors in terms of
transparency and fiscal terms.
20


In the past 18 months or so a number of large oil
firms, such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips,
have chosen to return their concessions in
Indonesia to the government. Although these
withdrawals were not solely due to the poor
regulatory climate, they were widely interpreted
as such and so added to negative perceptions of
Indonesia’s energy sector. More notable were
indications in May 2013 from Total’s Indonesian
subsidiary that it would halt a planned US$7.3bn
expansion of its Mahakam gasfield in East
Kalimantan unless the authorities resolved the
future of its contract, which is up for renewal in
2017. At the time of writing in early January 2014,
government ministries, local politicians, the stateowned oil firm Pertamina, and various business
groups continue to tussle over the reallocation
of shares in Mahakam, which is currently coadministered by Total and Inpex of Japan.
Mahakam and other examples of conflict before
it, such as the negotiations over the Cepu and
West Madura blocks, have exposed one of the
major risks inherent in the 2001 oil and gas
law (22/2001): the lack of clear, timetabled
processes for handling PSC renewals, extensions
or divestments.
Without this certainty, firms spend months
or even years unsure of and unable to plan
their long-term production and investment
schedules. They must wait for multiple competing
interest groups, notably local administrations
empowered under post-1999 decentralisation
laws, to reconcile their conflicting claims on
a newly available PSC and decide whether the
foreign PSC-holder has a role to play at all.
The impact on the industry of such contractual
uncertainty is reduced capital investment, fewer
discoveries and below-target production. This,
in turn, means lower resource revenues for the
government and higher energy imports.

Commercial considerations
Clearer regulation on extending or exiting PSCs
is a priority for investors. Another concern is


that long-mooted amendments to the oil and
gas law will seek to reduce state expenditures
by tightening cost-recovery provisions. These
provisions, under which the government covers
the cost of things like exploration, production,
equipment and supplies that subsequently
become state property, and other capital
expenditure specified in pre-approved work
plans, are already a point of contention.
The government issued a regulation in 2010
(GR 79) setting out what contractors can claim
from the government. Overall, the regulation
made things clearer but increased the number
of items that firms could claim for to include
environmental and community development
costs incurred during exploitation. The 2008
budget stipulated that government expenditure
on cost recovery must be included in each annual
budget, meaning that each year an effective cap
is imposed: firms unable to recover full claims
in a single year see the balance carried over to
subsequent years.
Oil firms sometimes complain about this, citing
more favourable regulations in other countries,
such as Angola and Azerbaijan, where costrecovery arrangements are used to encourage
investment. A former BP Migas chairman, R
Priyono, has said that the annual cap deters
firms from investing in non-essential areas,
and that this has contributed to below-target
production figures.
The biggest problem, however, is the general
mistrust that exists between regulators and firms
in setting cost-recovery sums. Long disputes
over the amounts that companies receive are
common. Abandonment costs for PSCs that do
not enter an exploitation phase, and securing
approval for recovering general administrative
costs associated with supportive functions such
as running an office in-country, are frequently
cited as points of friction. Regulators can scarcely
be blamed for playing hardball in a country where
corruption is prevalent. However, executives

are concerned that regulators’ suspicions about
inflated claims could be used as the basis for
making legitimate cost recovery even more
problematic under future regulations.
The 2001 law also stipulates that the DMO (25%
of output for both oil and gas) is taken out of
the contractors’ share of profit-generating
oil and gas (the split is typically 85% for the
government and 15% for the contractor).
Since DMO allocations are compensated at the
below-market prices that consumers pay in
Indonesia, the contractor’s take from its 15% is
diluted. Mechanisms allow DMO compensation at
weighted average international prices, but only
for the first 60 months of production.
A future regulatory issue is the vulnerability of
DMO clauses to politicisation. Disagreements
over the expected output at the Donggi Senoro
gas plant in Central Sulawesi led eventually to a
formalised DMO regulation for the gas industry
as a whole. But before the 25% standard was set
several senior politicians called for 100% of the
yield to be allocated domestically. The possibility
of attempts in the future to amend existing PSCs,
so as to increase the DMO for oil and gas, along
with attempts to revise gas-export contracts
in pursuit of higher sales prices from overseas
buyers, are weighing on the minds of industry
executives.

Coal concerns
All of this raises questions about contract
sanctity—amplified by recent developments
involving the attempted recasting of longstanding agreements in the mining industry on
legally shaky grounds. This brings us to the coal
sector. The most significant regulatory theme
here is the government’s intention to align
long-standing coal contracts of work (CCOW)
with the 2009 mineral and coal mining law
(4/2009). This has placed considerable pressure
on CCOW-holders to consent to revised and
considerably inferior terms in a host of important
aspects (including mandatory divestment, taxes,

21


royalties, and concession sizes among other
things). Since CCOWs can be amended only with
the holders’ consent, the renegotiations have
made little progress. But, when their existing
arrangements expire, CCOW-holders are likely to
be able to continue operating only under the far
weaker legal protection provided by the mining
business licence (Izin Usaha Pertambangan, or
IUP) regime, established by the 2009 law.
Also of serious concern for the coal sector is
the possibility that the government will impose
a tax on coal exports and increase the royalty
rate for the coal sector from 3-7% to 10-13% of
net sales. These measures would only apply to
IUP-holding coal miners (changes to CCOW terms
cannot be made unilaterally by the government;
moves to do so would likely result in international
arbitration). Both the proposed export tax and
higher royalties would have serious financial
implications for a majority of the country’s small
and mid-sized coal firms operating under the
IUP system. As with royalties, the coal sector’s
dominant heavyweights would claim sanctuary
under long-standing CCOWs in the event of
an export tax on coal. Government efforts to
extract higher returns from the country’s natural
resources are being felt beyond the coal industry.
Oil and gas firms also express concerns about
ad-hoc taxes that can come with little warning,
especially from local administrations.

The need to reform
Resolving these sorts of complaints will also
be essential if renewable energy is to play the
increasing role the government envisages by
contributing 17% of the country’s energy needs
by 2025. Its development will be constrained as
long as the government continues to subsidise
petroleum products so that they sell at artificially

22


low prices. More immediately, fiscal and other
policy measures are needed for renewable-energy
industries to get off the ground. These include
feed-in tariffs and import-duty exemptions for
the solar sector and an end to the classification
of geothermal activity as mining to make it easier
to obtain forestry licenses and other permits.
For hydropower, a mapping and reallocation of
overlapping or unused concessions would help
accelerate progress in a sector where pricing
issues are more settled.
For fossil fuels and for renewables it is also vital
that the government addresses land issues. A
2012 land acquisition law (2/2012) has been
heavily criticised for the long phase-in period
before it can be applied to facilitate acquisitions
for projects underway before the law’s
implementing regulations were enacted in August
2012. Once operational after the phase-in period
ends in December 2014, the law offers hope that
the often-intractable land disputes afflicting
energy and other infrastructure projects can
be resolved in line with its fixed, timetabled
procedures.
Indonesia’s desire to attract private investment
is genuine. But energy regulators must manage
a difficult mix of sometimes-conflicting
government priorities and competition among
domestic interest groups. This means that
sector-specific incentives, such as tax breaks
and other incentives for oil and gas producers,
can be lost in a wider context of rising political
and regulatory risk. Complex social conditions
and a decentralised political system further
complicate matters. Reconciling these challenges
and generating more from the energy sector is
a tall order. It should be a priority for the next
administration that takes office in October 2014.


5

Rural electrification: The “DC House”
solution

Taufik
Director, Electric Power Institute and Professor of Electrical Engineering,

It is impossible to understate the importance of rural electrification in Indonesia, but
the authorities face serious challenges as they try to provide more people with access to
reliable electricity. Existing solutions like the construction of large power plants and the
expansion of the national electricity grid have been successful in some areas but they
are not well suited to rural electrification. A “DC House” offers an alternative solution by
providing small-scale electrical power supplies to remote, isolated and sparsely populated
areas.
As the fourth most populous country in the
world, Indonesia faces a unique challenge in
providing electricity to its citizens who live across
the thousands of islands. The Pacific “ring of
fire” of seismic activity, which passes through
much of Indonesia’s archipelago, poses an even
greater challenge to building the necessary
infrastructure to generate, transmit and
distribute electrical power. With its population
of about 240m, Indonesia must keep up with
its drive to electrify the country to maintain its
presence in the global economy.

The state of rural electrification
While the government’s target of increasing the
national electrification ratio (the proportion
of houses with electricity) to 80% by the end
of 2014 is welcome, the problem of providing

reliable electricity access still remains. Loadshedding is common in regions outside of Java,
where about 40% of the population lives. The
government has a higher target for electrified
villages, with a goal of increasing the ratio from
97.8% in 2013 to 98.9% by the end of 2014.
However, the actual number of people getting
electricity may be much lower than these ratios
suggest. This is because the state electricity firm,
Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), defines an
“electrified village” as one that has at least one
low-voltage distribution connection to the power
grid. This means that an “electrified” village may
still have a number of houses without access to
electricity, and the number gets worse in a village
with a widely dispersed population or one that is
located in challenging terrain. The percentage of
people living in villages with access to electricity

23


is therefore less than the reported. More accurate
data should be gathered to give a better picture
of rural electrification. The same data could
also be a useful self-assessment tool to evaluate
whether the country’s current policy to support
rural electrification is working or if it needs
further adjustment.

Where renewable energy fits in
Indonesia is keen to exploit its renewable-energy
resources to lessen its dependence on fossil
fuels. Several renewable energy sources, most
notably hydro and geothermal, could make
significant contributions to the future energy
mix. The government wants to increase the share
of renewable energy to at least 25% by 2025 and
40% by 2050. The need for alternatives to fossil
fuels is urgent because the country’s energy
demand is projected to exceed energy supply by
2019. In addition, the construction to production
lead time of 1-5 years for renewable energy power
plants is attractive compared with that of oil or
gas development, which typically requires 10-15
years.
On a smaller scale, renewable-energy sources are
ideal for rural electrification, especially for hardto-reach areas or islands where renewables are
plentiful and installing an electricity grid does
not make sense. Thus, in retrospect these newly
found renewable energy sources will be the key to
providing access to electricity in rural areas and
to increasing the country’s electrification ratio.

Pitfalls and problems
Despite their steady growth, the development
of renewable-energy sources for electricity is
not without its shortcomings and challenges.
For rural electrification, there have been reports
that renewable-energy projects have failed. The
causes of these failures vary: high initial costs,
a lack of sustainable financing and financial
intermediaries, too much focus on physical
infrastructure at the expense of institutional
arrangements, a lack of incentives for both
24


consumers and producers, a lack of skilled
operators and acts of vandalism (generators
being stolen or broken). These issues, if not
addressed, will have substantial consequences
as existing electrified villages lose power, setting
back the country’s rural electrification effort.
Another potential problem is that the present
strategies for renewable-energy development
may not be suitable for people living in remote
areas, or in areas where renewable-energy
resources exist but are not large enough to
warrant the construction of a centralised power
plant. A different strategy is therefore needed to
utilise renewable-energy sources for electricity
that can be accessible in rural areas. This further
implies that the alternative strategy must
incorporate a method for electricity production
from renewable energy that is affordable, easily
scalable and adoptable, and simple to operate.
One method of using renewable-energy sources
for rural electrification is by building a largescale, off-the-grid renewable-energy power
plant. However, this is often impractical for
rural communities. Another strategy that has
gained popularity is the small-scale, communitybased renewable-energy power plant, where
every member in the community has a certain
responsibility for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the plant. But this strategy also
inherits some of the drawbacks associated with a
large centralised power plant (as demonstrated
by the failure of some community-based micro
hydropower plants).
One obstacle is that it is not easy to expand a
community-based power plant to accommodate
population growth or an increase in electricity
demand. Since the power plant is centralised
for the entire village, it still requires a local
electrical network to distribute the electricity
to the community. With the community-based
strategy, the response of existing businesses in
the community to rival businesses made possible
by increased electrification must be carefully


considered. This would also help to prevent
vandalism. A community-based power plant also
depends on having many skilled operators to
ensure its sustainable use.

Localised distributed generation
The obstacles and at times failures associated
with current strategies in exploiting renewableenergy sources in rural areas suggest that an
alternative strategy should be considered. The
new strategy should be viewed as a complement
to, rather than a replacement of, any existing
ones because there is truly no “one size fits
all” solution for rural electrification. One such
strategy is localised distributed generation
(LDG), a collection of technologies that enables
small-scale, stand-alone power generation from
renewable energy sources. With LDG, ownership
of the electrical power supply and responsibility
for its maintenance are shifted from the
community to the family. Accordingly, the power
capacity requirement falls significantly. More
specifically, the amount of power needed will
vary because electricity use will be different from
one home to another. In rural areas, the main
need for electricity is for lighting. The power
requirement is therefore likely to range from tens
to low hundreds of watts per house.
The family-based strategy used in LDG is similar
to that used in bioenergy production from cattle
manure developed in many rural areas around
the world, including Indonesia. There are many
advantages to such an approach. For rural
electrification, having a centralised communitybased power plant may not make sense for some
families, especially if all they need is simple
lighting. With LDG, each family can have its own
small electrical power supply, tailored to its own
needs. In fact, with LDG each family can still have
access to electricity for lighting without a home
electrical power supply. This can be done, for
example, by using a small solar-powered lightbulb that can be recharged simply by placing it in
the sun.

The low power requirement in LDG power supply
means the cost of equipment and maintenance
will be low. Since each house operates its own
supply, there is no need to build a local electrical
network for the village. Further cost reductions
come from LDG’s low-voltage operation, which
avoids the use of expensive high-voltage
equipment and the costs associated with
transporting it. The low-cost aspect of LDG is
important: many people in rural areas live below
the poverty line. In the remote eastern islands of
Indonesia, 95% of people in rural areas are poor.
Another benefit of a low-wattage system is its
ease of use. In fact, its implementation is similar
to what we find in grid-connected homes and
so operating the system is as simple as using
wall-plugs and circuit breakers. An additional
technical merit of the LDG is its flexibility and
scalability. It is flexible because the system
can use any type of renewable-energy source,
even water streams that are too small to use for
micro hydro. It is easy to expand, too, because
as the need for electricity increases additional
renewable-energy sources can be incorporated
into an existing system without imposing much
change in the system.

The DC House
But there is one catch with LDG: its development
depends heavily on direct current (DC)
technology. This may actually be viewed as a
technical improvement since most renewableenergy sources, especially at low power levels,
already produce DC power at low voltage.
To illustrate the potential of using DC, gridconnected homes in contrast run on alternating
current (AC) electricity at relatively high voltage.
This means the DC power produced by solar panels
will have to be converted first into AC. Once
obtained, the AC will then have to be converted
back to DC, since consumer electronics and many
other household devices operate primarily on
DC. The resulting losses from such conversion
processes are quite significant, at an estimated
17-35% for the AC to DC conversion, and 23-28%

25


from DC to AC conversion. With LDG each house
may use the DC power from renewable energy
source directly, without the wasteful conversion
processes.
One effort to develop a house that operates fully
on DC power is known, appropriately, as the DC
House project. This started in 2010 with the
aim of developing the necessary technologies
for a DC house by using renewable-energy and
human-powered energy sources. Presently a DC
house may employ up to four different sources,
one of which must be from a human-powered
source to overcome the intermittency problem
associated with renewable energy sources (Figure
1). The human-powered source may be generated
in many ways, such as from a bicycle generator
or play-park power generator where children
can have fun while producing electricity for the
family. Consequently, appliances in a DC House
must also operate on DC. This should not be a
problem as commercially available automobile
and camping equipment are already DC based.

A new DC appliance, if needed, should be
relatively easy to develop owing to the maturity
of DC-DC conversion technology. A low-cost,
dual-function dimmable DC lightbulb provides
an example of such a new DC device. By 2015,
several DC House demonstration sites will
be constructed in Indonesia to showcase its
potential for rural electrification. As this is a
relatively new concept, the potential of which
has only recently been realised, its technological
development has attracted considerable interest,
including from the industrial sector and the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE).
A significant portion of future electricity
generation in rural areas is expected to be based
on DC technology. The DC House is a way of using
this efficient and fast-improving technology
to expand rural electrification in developing
countries like Indonesia without depleting fossil
fuels.

Figure 1: A DC house system
DC hydropower
Voltage
regulator

DC
wind
power

Voltage
regulator

DC House

DC loads
Power
combiner

DC bus

Feeder
box
DC loads

PV

Human powered
generator

Voltage
regulator

Battery

Voltage
regulator

Source: California Polytechnic State University

26


DC loads


6

Renewable energy in Indonesia:
Present status and prospects

Hanan Nugroho
Senior Planner, National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS)

There is considerable scope for Indonesia to exploit renewable energy. But the share of
renewables in the country’s energy mix remains low, owing mainly to heavily subsidised
domestic oil prices, the challenges of adapting to a rapidly evolving legal and regulatory
environment, and the high costs of renewable-energy technologies. However, the
prospects for Indonesia’s development of renewable energy are bright.
Situated in the sunny tropics, and within
the Pacific “Ring of Fire” of volcanic activity,
Indonesia has considerable renewable-energy
potential. Several renewable-energy resources
could be exploited, including solar power,
hydropower, biofuels, biomass, wind, wave
and, most notably, geothermal energy. But
today only about 7,400 mw of renewable-energy
technologies have been installed, representing
about 17% of the country’s totalled electricitygenerating capacity and less than 3% of the
estimated potential.
Despite year-round sunshine, and the country’s
long experience of using off-grid solar panels,
the application of solar power in the archipelago
is still limited. At present, only about 22.5 mw of
solar photovoltaic systems have been installed,
mostly for home lighting, refrigeration, battery
charging, and more recently for street lamps and
traffic lights. The Solar Home System programme

began in the mid-1990s and so far some 150,000
systems (about 7.5 mw) have been installed
across the country under the scheme. Most of
the solar panels that have been installed are part
of a rural electrification programme carried out
by the government. In tropical Indonesia, solar
power is rarely used for heating.
Indonesia’s potential for hydropower is large,
too. Hydropower potential is estimated at about
75,000 mw, but total installed hydropower
capacity is only 6,850 mw, or 9% of its potential.
Geographical mismatch is one of the reasons why
hydropower has not been harnessed effectively:
many load centres are situated on the main
island of Java, while the country’s greatest hydro
potential is found in outer islands, such as in
Papua. Small-scale hydropower plants, meaning
those with a generating capacity of less than 1
mw, could play a significant role in meeting rural
electricity demand in Indonesia.

27


Table 1: Indonesia’s renewable energy: potential
and installed capacity (mw)
RE Sources

Potential Installed capacity

Hydro
Mini hydro

6,243 mw
75,000 mw

419 mw

Solar

4.8 kWh/m2/day

22.4 mw

Wind

3-6 m/s

1.87 mw

Micro hydro

187 mw

Biomass

49,810 mw

500 mw

Ocean

49,000 mw

0.01 mw

Geothermal

29,215 mw

1,341 mw

Source: Ministry of Energy Mineral Resources

Indonesia possesses many sources of biofuels,
including palm, cassava, molasses, jatropha
curcas, “nyamplung” (calophyllum inophyllum),
and corn. Recent increases in the international
price of crude oil, and a decrease in domestic
oil production, have encouraged Indonesia
to experiment in developing biofuels. Biofuel
development is also seen as a means of creating
employment and reducing poverty in rural areas.
Many programmes have been launched by the
government to promote biofuels, including the
“Energy Self-Sufficient Village”. While production
of biodiesel has increased recently, the targets
the government has set for its use have still not
been achieved.
Wind energy potential in Indonesia is small,
owing to slow wind speeds of only 3-6 metres
per second. But research on wind electricity is
being carried out by the National Institute of
Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN), among others.
Installed wind energy systems are mostly off-grid
turbines in remote areas that each produce about
1.5-30 kw of power.
Although Indonesia has vast territorial waters,
the potential of wave energy has not been well
identified yet, although the National Energy
Council has estimated that wave energy could
generate up to 49,000 mw of power. Research on
ocean energy is being carried out by the Agency
for the Assessment and Application of Technology
(BPPT).
28


Indonesians, particularly those who live in rural
areas, still use traditional biomass like firewood
for cooking. It is estimated that Indonesia
produces about 150 tonnes of biomass every
year, including rice husks, sugar residues, palm
oil residues, coconut residues, and rubber-wood.
There are experiments in using palm-oil biomass
to generate electricity, for instance in Riau and
Central Kalimantan. Another source of biomass is
organic municipal waste from Indonesia’s large
cities. So far, however, only one electricity plant
from biomass has been built; it is powered by
waste from Jakarta.
But of all the renewable-energy resources
geothermal stands out as having the greatest
potential and being the closest to actually
producing power. Indonesia is estimated to hold
about 40% of the world’s geothermal reserves,
equivalent to about 29 gw of power. The reserves
are distributed across 276 locations, but most of
the largest ones are found in Java and Bali (9,250
mw) and Sumatra (13,800 mw), which also have
the country’s largest demand for electricity.
Presently only 1,341 mw of geothermal power
plants have been installed in Indonesia, or less
than 5% of potential. Indonesia ranks number
three in the world for installed geothermal
power, behind the US and the Philippines.

Barriers to renewable energy
development
Despite the potential of renewable energy,
Indonesia is still overwhelmingly dependent on
fossil fuels, which account for more than 95% of
its final energy consumption. This reflects the
fact that Indonesia used to be a net oil exporter
and that it is still a large exporter of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) and coal. For decades the
government has subsidised the price of energy,
especially petroleum products. The removal
of subsidies might lead to social and political
unrest, but they undermine the country’s efforts
to develop renewable energy and also to become
more energy-efficient. Subsidies impose a heavy
burden on the state budget. Things will only get


Following Indonesia’s political and economic
crises in 1998, the number of laws and
regulations has mushroomed. Among the new
laws passed during this period are those on
decentralisation, state-owned enterprises,
business competition, anti-corruption, the oil
and gas sector, the forestry sector, environmental
protection, and so on. Among the new laws was
one on geothermal energy (Law No. 27/2003).
Developers of geothermal energy have had to
adjust to all these new laws—which has not been
easy.

worse because the country’s production of oil is
declining even as consumption is increasing. In
addition, global oil prices have risen in recent
years. If these trends continue, the government
will face no choice but to reduce the oil subsidy
gradually.
The rapidly changing legal and regulatory
environment is another challenge. At present,
Indonesia’s renewable-energy industry is still
adapting to many new laws and regulations that
have been introduced as a result of the country’s
transition to a more democratic country 15 years
ago. This transition has been characterised
by its slow pace, weak co-ordination and even
conflicting rules and regulations.

The other significant barrier is the high up-front
cost of renewable-energy technology. The main
source of finance is the government, through
national, provincial and district budgets, often
supplemented by foreign grants and loans.
In practice, this tends to limit private-sector
involvement in the development of renewable
energy in Indonesia.

Take the development of geothermal power
plants as an example. Most of the current
installed capacity of 1,341 mw is the result of
three presidential decrees (PD 16/1974, PD
22/1981 and PD 45/1991). The 1974 decree
instructed the state-owned oil and gas firm,
Pertamina, to enter into geothermal exploration.
That decree was followed by one in 1981 that
instructed Pertamina and the state electricity
firm, PLN, to develop Indonesia’s geothermal
power plants. Then, in 1991, another decree
liberalised the market by inviting independent
power producers (IPP) to develop geothermal
power and sell it to PLN under sales contracts.

Prospects for Indonesia’s renewable
energy
Although conditions are not encouraging
yet, renewable energy has a bright future in
Indonesia for several reasons. First, Indonesia
can no longer maintain its oil subsidy policy.
Indonesia is already a net oil importer and the
energy subsidy (including fuel and electricity)

Figure 1: National primary energy supply by 2025
(% respondents)

Coal

33%

20%

17%
30%
Gas

5%
5%

Geothermal

5%

Biomass, nuclear,
hydro, solar, wind

2%

NRE

Biofuel

Coal liquefation

Source: Ministry of Energy Mineral Resources


29


accounts for almost one-third of spending by
the central government. In the near future,
the government will have to reform subsidies
so that regulated price of petroleum products
approaches the market value. The reduction and
eventual withdrawal of the oil subsidy would
provide space for renewable energy to flourish.
Second, Indonesia’s government is committed
to developing renewable-energy resources.
In 2006, the president, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, issued a regulation (No. 5/2006)
to provide guidance on securing sustainable
energy supplies. Under the regulation, “new and
renewable energy” is projected to have a 17%
share of the country’s energy mix by 2025, up
from about 5% today. A new organisation within
the government, namely the Directorate General
of New Renewable Energy Energy Conservation
(EBTKE), was established in 2011 with the main
responsibility for developing renewable energy.
As well as having its own dedicated champion
within government, Indonesia’s renewableenergy sector is also fortunate because it is
supported by strong professional associations
and stakeholders. The Indonesian Renewable
Energy Society (METI) works hand in hand with
the government to promote renewable-energy
businesses. METI has some 40 members from
the private sector, universities and research
institutions, including the Micro Hydro
Association, Solar Cell Entrepreneur Association,
Indonesia Biodiesel Forum, Wind Energy
Entrepreneur Association, Biomass Association,
and Indonesian Geothermal Association.
Third, even in an environment where domestic
oil prices are subsidised and national energy
policy still promotes fossil fuels, the government
has formulated a number of sound policies and

30


programmes to develop renewable energy.
Among the policies that have been developed
are those on small-scale power generation, the
promotion of green energy and the introduction
of feed-in tariffs that will increase the
competitiveness of electricity from renewables
relative to fossil fuels. So far the most successful
programmes have been the Energy Self-Sufficient
Village, Solar Home System and Micro Hydro.
Such programmes will work better as domestic
energy prices are adjusted so that they reflect
market prices and the reform of the regulatory
environment takes place.
Fourth, Indonesia has made a strong
commitment to combating global warming. At the
G20 summit in Pittsburgh in 2009, Mr Yudhoyono
pledged a 26% reduction in Indonesia’s carbon
emissions by 2020 (and 41% if foreign assistance
is available). The pledge has led to the enactment
of a presidential regulation (No. 61/2011) on a
National Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission
Reduction (RAN-GRK). It has been complemented
by another presidential regulation (No. 71/2011)
on the Implementation of a National Greenhouse
Gases Inventory. The two plans require renewable
energy to play an important role in meeting the
country’s energy demand, as well as mitigating
climate change.
Fifth, and finally, the development of renewable
energy in Indonesia is not only the concern of the
government. Given Indonesia’s large potential
for renewable energy, many private entities,
including foreign investors, are waiting for the
right moment to enter the renewable-energy
business. As the investment climate improves,
and the commercial advantages become more
apparent with a move away from subsidised
prices, renewable-energy businesses will expand
further in Indonesia.

While every effort has been taken to verify the accuracy
of this information, The Economist Intelligence Unit
Ltd. cannot accept any responsibility or liability
for reliance by any person on this report or any of
the information, opinions or conclusions set out
in this report.

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