Regan final

193
THREE ARENAS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF
ONLINE PLATFORMS: COMPETITION, PRIVACY, AND
CONTENT
PRISCILLA M. REGAN†
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................193
II. BACKGROUND ON CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.............................198
III. ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MEDIA OVERSIGHT ......................................201
A. Anti-Competitive Behavior......................................................... 201
B. Privacy....................................................................................... 207
C. Content Control ......................................................................... 211
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ......................................................216
APPENDIX ONE: ANTITRUST/NET NEUTRALITY ...................................221
APPENDIX TWO: ONLINE PRIVACY.......................................................225
APPENDIX THREE: CONTENT REGULATION ..........................................230
I. INTRODUCTION
At this time, policy discussions regarding social media companies
center on three primary issues: first, the real or potential anti-competitive
behavior of key internet gatekeepers; second, the commodification of
personal information and ubiquity of privacy intrusions; and third, the
explosion of “fake news” and other inaccurate or biased information on
social media sites. The debate on the first issue was initially focused on
the policy solution of net neutrality and later on anti-trust rules. The debate
on the second issue in the U.S. has focused on rethinking a sectoral
approach of self-regulation of fair information practice principles (FIPPS).
The debate on the third issue raises questions of censorship and First
Amendment conflicts. Each of these issues has been the topic of numerous
recent congressional hearings in both the House and Senate, but, in each
case, agreement on a policy course has not yet been reached.
The first issue involves the real or potential anti-competitive behavior
of key internet gatekeepers. These gatekeeps include internet service
providers (ISPs) and also what are sometimes referred to as “edge
players/platforms,” which include major social media companies like
† Professor, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University. The
author acknowledges the assistance of Caroline Ball, Master of Public Administration
student in the Schar School, in researching and preparing the Appendices.

194 WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:193
Google, Facebook, and Amazon.1
These two sets of actors are currently
regulated by different agencies: the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has jurisdiction over ISPs but not over platforms, and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has jurisdiction over “unfair and deceptive trade
practices” of platforms but not over ISPs.2
Much of the debate about anti-
competitive behavior has focused on the policy solution of “net
neutrality”—the idea that providers of internet content should not be
discriminated against and that users should have equal access to any legal
content they choose.3
Evidence of horizontal and vertical consolidation of
large online platforms and consolidation of internet service providers has
generated concern about possible blocking or discriminating among
customers.4
For example, among ISPs, AT&T and Direct TV merged,
Time Warner Cable merged with Charter Communications, and Verizon
with XO Communications merged.5
Among internet platforms, Google
has acquired YouTube, Doubleclick, ITA Software, Waze, and AdMob;
Facebook acquired Instagram and WhatsApp, among others; and Amazon
has acquired Whole Foods and Zappos.6
As market concentration among
online companies increased and received more public and media attention,
many raised the need for more vigorous enforcement of anti-trust rules as
a policy solution.7
Net neutrality principles require ISPs to charge all content providers
similarly and not to privilege large providers or customers to the detriment
of smaller providers.8
In the U.S., debate over net neutrality has been
contentious and partisan, with the FCC adopting a form of net neutrality
or non-discrimination guidelines in 2005, Congress unsuccessfully
considering a number of net neutrality rules from 2006 to 2009, and a
Circuit Court ruling in 2010 that “the FCC did not have the authority to
1. Clare Y. Cho, Competition on the Edge of the Internet, EVERYCRSREPORT.COM
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R46207.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200201213547/https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R
46207.html].
2. Gigi B. Sohn, A Policy Framework for an Open Internet Ecosystem, 2 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 335, 345–48 (2018).
3. See id. at 344–48 (discussing implications of the FCC’s repeal of net neutrality).
4. See id. at 335–37.
5. Id. at 337 n.5.
6. Id. at 338–39.
7. See id. at 348 (“[C]urrently, the nation’s antitrust laws fall short of what is needed
to address consolidation, vertical integration, and anticompetitive behavior in the []
market and for online platforms”).
8. See generally What Is Net Neutrality?, CONSUMER REP. (July 7, 2017),
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/what-is-net-neutrality/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200601195001/https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/rese
arch/what-is-net-neutrality/].

2020] THREE ARENAS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 195
regulate [ISPs].”9
In 2015, the FCC approved net neutrality rules that were
later upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as within
the FCC’s jurisdiction.10
However, in December 2017, the FCC repealed
the 2015 rules.11
On April 10, 2019, the House, on a party-line vote,
reinstated net neutrality rules, but the Senate is unlikely to pass them.12
California passed a net neutrality law in October 2018, which was
challenged by the U.S. Department of Justice.13
The second issue concerns the commodification of personal
information and ubiquity of privacy intrusions. As mentioned above,
policymakers continue to question FIPPS and propose new solutions.14
The European Union, in May 2018, instituted a more active regulatory
stance in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).15
The GDPR
requires all companies processing the personal data of data subjects
residing in the European Union, regardless of the company’s location, to
(1) request consent in an easily accessible and intelligible form, with the
purpose for data processing duly noted; (2) provide notifications of data
breaches without undue delay; (3) supply a free electronic copy of all
personal data held by the controller; and (4) permit the data subject to order
the data controller to erase the subject’s data and cease further
9. Jeffrey A. Hart, The Net Neutrality Debate in the United States, 8 J. OF INF. TECH.
& POLITICS 418, 421–36 (2011).
10. Alina Selyukh, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Net Neutrality Rules in Full, NPR
(June 14, 2016, 10:42 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/06/14/471286113/u-s-appeals-court-holds-up-net-neutrality-rules-in-full
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405161542/https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/06/14/471286113/u-s-appeals-court-holds-up-net-neutrality-rules-in-full].
11. Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Repeals Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/technology/net-neutrality-repeal-vote.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405162020/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/tec
hnology/net-neutrality-repeal-vote.html].
12. Cecilia Kang, Net Neutrality Vote Passes House, Fulfilling Promise by Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/technology/net-
neutrality-vote.html
[https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/technology/net-
neutrality-vote.html].
13. See Camille Reid, Chapter 976: The Battle for the Open Internet: Can California
Salvage Net Neutrality?, 50 U. PAC. L. REV 217, 228 (2019).
14. See generally Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles,
FTC.GOV (2006),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/12/ftc-2018-0098-d-
0036-163372.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190417095551/https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docume
nts/public_comments/2018/12/ftc-2018-0098-d-0036-163372.pdf].
15. See Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).

dissemination and third-party processing of it.16
Additionally, the GDPR
prohibits the use of automated or algorithmic decision-making that
produces “legal effects” or that “similarly significantly affects” the data
subject, unless a human is involved in the process.17
The institution of the
GDPR, continued reports of large-scale data breaches, increased attention
on potentially discriminatory effects of algorithms, and introduction of
new products that are reliant upon the use of personal information, have
generated renewed policy discussions in the U.S. as well. In 2018,
California passed the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which
went into effect in January 2020.18
The CCPA mirrors many of the
requirements of the GDPR and adopts a more regulatory approach than
traditional FIPPSs.19
A number of congressional committees held hearings
and introduced several bills in the 2018–2019 session, but all of the bills
have stalled in committee.20
The third issue involves the explosion of fake news and other
inaccurate information on social media and blog sites. Specifically, the
third issue concerns the influence certain social media and blog sites have
16. See Ben Wolford, A guide to GDPR data privacy requirements, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/data-privacy/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405212544/https://gdpr.eu/data-privacy/] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2020).
17. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
18. Maria Korolov, California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA): What you need to
know to be compliant, CSOONLINE.COM (Oct. 4, 2019, 3:00 AM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3292578/california-consumer-privacy-act-what-you-
need-to-know-to-be-compliant.html
[https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.csoonline.com/article/3292578/california-
consumer-privacy-act-what-you-need-to-know-to-be-compliant.html].
19. For a discussion of the differences between the GDPR and CCPA, see Arupan
Chander et al., Catalyzing Privacy Law, GEO. L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS & OTHER WORKS 2190
(2019).
20. See, e.g., Data Care Act, S. 2961, 116th Cong. (2019); Social Media Privacy
Protection and Consumer Rights Act, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019); CONSENT Act, S. 2639,
115th Cong. (2018); SENATOR RON WYDEN, CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT OF 2018
DISCUSSION DRAFT,
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wyden%20Privacy%20Bill%20one%20p
ager%20Nov%201.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20200127082609/https://www.wyde
n.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wyden%20Privacy%20Bill%20one%20pager%20Nov%201
.pdf] (last visited March 24, 2020); SENATOR MARCO RUBIO, THE AMERICAN DATA
DISSEMINATION ACT, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/afe71d4b-201e-
4273-b136-eb0555623b98/2F5D3F8CBF7E2BF65DB6E0FCF99D2797.add-act-one-
pager.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405165142/https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cac
he/files/afe71d4b-201e-4273-b136-
eb0555623b98/2F5D3F8CBF7E2BF65DB6E0FCF99D2797.add-act-one-pager.pdf] (last
visited Mar. 24, 2020); see also Chander et al., supra note 19, at 34–35 (providing a more
complete list).

on the democratic process—not just in one country, but globally—through
messages circulated to impressionable populations.21
Concern about this
issue intensified following the 2016 elections in the U.S. and Europe and
the rise of more radical right-wing thinking around the world.22
Policy
discussions have focused on the knotty and unpopular question of
censorship—a policy that is abhorred under the First Amendment but is
equally concerning in Europe.23
One critical issue, if any form of
censorship is entertained, is who should make decisions about taking down
internet content—the government, the platform, or an objective third-
party?
Indeed, the key policy question seems not to be whether the powerful
players on the internet should be regulated but instead how best to regulate
them.24
This sentiment was expressed by Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg,
who, in answering a question posed by Senator Lindsey Graham before
the Senate Judiciary and Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committees, stated, “I think the real question, as the internet becomes
more important in people’s lives . . . is what’s the right regulation?”25
Part
of the difficulty in answering this question is the need to classify these
21. See generally Samidh Chakrabarti, Hard Questions: What Effect Does Social
Media Have on Democracy?, ABOUT.FB.COM (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/01/effect-social-media-democracy/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200602014750/https://about.fb.com/news/2018/01/effect-
social-media-democracy/] (discussing the effect social media has on democracy).
22. See Glenn C. Altschuler & Sidney Tarrow, Combatting fake news on social media
will take a village, THE HILL (Oct. 20, 2019, 10:20 AM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/466612-combatting-fake-news-on-social-media-
will-take-a-village
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405165916/https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/46
6612-combatting-fake-news-on-social-media-will-take-a-village] (noting how sinking
trust in “establishment” media gives “para-party groups, white nationalists, and hackers
out for a thrill a platform on which to spread lies, fake news or deep fakes”).
23. See generally Daniela C. Manzi, Managing the Misinformation Marketplace: The
First Amendment and the Fight Against Fake News, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623 (2019)
(discussing the First Amendment difficulties of misinformation regulation).
24. See generally Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media,
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/how-to-
regulate-and-not-regulate-social-media
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200510202925/https://knightcolumbia.org/content/how-
to-regulate-and-not-regulate-social-media] (arguing that social media sites are key in the
public sphere, which does not work properly without professional norms guiding
trustworthy institutions).
25. Aja Romano, Don’t Ask Whether Facebook Can Be Regulated, Ask Which
Facebook to Regulate, VOX (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/4/12/17224096/regulating-facebook-problems
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405171244/https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/4/
12/17224096/regulating-facebook-problems].

major internet players by entity type.26
Are they media companies,
technology companies, financial companies, publishing companies, or
some new hybrid?27
How this question is answered will determine whether
major internet players come under the rules and oversight of the Federal
Elections Commission (FEC), FTC, FCC, or some other regulatory
agency—or if a new entity will be designed to address the complications
of their business models and activities.28
This paper identifies the primary congressional committees that
oversee the three issues discussed above and analyzes the relevant
oversight hearings from 2015 through 2019. In order to provide a context
and framework for the analysis of the hearing, Part II briefly reviews
recent scholarship on congressional oversight in general and oversight of
technology in particular. Part III describes and analyzes the congressional
hearings in each of the three areas. Part IV compares the substance,
dynamics, and outcomes of the congressional hearings on the three issues.
II. BACKGROUND ON CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Much of the literature on congressional oversight focuses on
congressional efforts to identify and address executive branch violations
of policy goals.29
Importantly, though, congressional oversight also
extends to private sector activities, allowing Congress to determine the
scope and the nature of new policy problems, whether existing agency
powers need to be extended or changed, and whether new laws may be
needed.30
As former Senator Abraham Ribicoff, writing in 1976 as Chair
of the Senate Government Operations Committee, pointed out:
“[O]versight is more than simple hindsight. It involves using the
legislative process so that the legislation may be administered properly in
the first place. There is, thus, an element of foresight in the congressional
oversight function.”31
Current congressional hearings on social media are
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Sohn, supra note 2, at 345–48 (differentiating between the FCC’s jurisdiction
over telecommunication service and the FTC’s jurisdiction over unfair competition and
trade practices).
29. See generally Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 165
(1984).
30. See generally Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, Defining Congressional Oversight and
Measuring its Effectiveness, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (2018).
31. Abraham Ribicoff, Congressional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 ADMIN. L.
REV. 415, 418 (1976). Senator Ribicoff went on to note that while the complexity of
government activities has heightened the need for congressional oversight, at least three
factors hinder effective oversight: the fragmented committee structure, the absence of

largely focused on this latter element, with attention devoted to whether
the existing laws and regulatory regimes are adequate to address the issues
being raised today.32
In this sense, congressional oversight hearings
respond to “fire-alarms” raised by the media, constituents, interest groups,
and advocates.33
Steven J. Balla and Christopher J. Deering posit that fire-alarm
committee hearings will more likely be conducted by policy committees
than by constituency committees and also suggest that witnesses “who
[are] specifically called to task or who offered particular grievances are
indicators of event-driven oversight.”34
Robert J. McGrath further points
out that congressional oversight for policy purposes is more likely to occur
when legislators and agencies have divergent policy preferences, which
may more often be the case in periods of divided government.35
Subsequent research by Jason A. MacDonald and McGrath revisits the
question of oversight during divided and unified government, finding that
“oversight taking place during unified government is most likely to be
related to substantive policymaking, as opposed to being purely political”
and that there is likely to be “bursts” of oversight during periods of new
unified control.36
Oversight of technological innovations and the social implications of
such changes has been a particularly challenging area for congressional
committees and for Congress as a whole. Congress itself recognized this
in 1972 with the establishment of the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) as a nonpartisan staff agency of Congress.37
OTA, for largely
political reasons, was abolished by Congress in 1995.38
In 2019, Congress
coordination and cooperation among committees, and the lack of adequate staff. Id. at 419–
21.
32. Evelyn Douek, Senate Hearing on Social Media and Foreign Influence
Operations: Progress, But There’s A Long Way to Go, LAWFARE (Sept. 6, 2018, 2:38
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/senate-hearing-social-media-and-foreign-influence-
operations-progress-theres-long-way-go
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200602035526/https://www.lawfareblog.com/senate-
hearing-social-media-and-foreign-influence-operations-progress-theres-long-way-go].
33. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 29, at 166.
34. Steven J. Balla & Christopher J. Deering, Police Patrols and Fire Alarms: An
Empirical Examination of the Legislative Preference for Oversight, 40 CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENCY 27, 31–32 (2013).
35. Robert J. McGrath, Congressional Oversight Hearings and Policy Control, 38
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 376, 369 (2013).
36. Jason A. MacDonald & Robert J. McGrath, Retrospective Congressional Oversight
and the Dynamics of Legislative Influence over the Bureaucracy, 41 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 899,
923 (2016).
37. See BRUCE ALLEN BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN CONGRESS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 8–9 (1996).
38. Id. at 69–77.

again recognized its shortcomings in keeping pace with technology issues
and funded a study by the National Academy of Public Administration
(NAPA) to recommend options to enhance science and technology
resource support to Congress.39
The NAPA report recommended that
Congress both enhance the technological expertise and capacity of
existing entities, such as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and create a new advisory
office to increase the capacity of Congress itself.40
Creating this new office
would entail recruiting and hiring science and technology advisors for
House and Senate committees with relevant oversight responsibilities.41
Outside groups and studies reached similar conclusions and offered
similar recommendations regarding congressional capacity.42
The Belfer
Center on Science and Technology issued a major study in September
2019 that concluded that Congress had simply not given itself the
resources needed to efficiently and effectively absorb new information.43
The study explained that “in legislation and high profile hearings,
Congress has appeared unprepared to reckon with emerging technologies
and their effects on society. In recent years, Congress has failed to produce
substantive legislation on emerging [science and technology] issues of
national import, like personal data privacy and protections.”44
The study
identified a number of causes for Congress’s shortcomings, including
congressional members not being subject matter experts, technology
experts skirting responsibility by playing into Congress’s limited
knowledge of technology, and inaction resulting from political gridlock.45
Similar to the NAPA report, the Belfer study recommended that Congress
create a legislative support body focused on science and technology
issues.46
39. See NAT. ACAD. PUB. ADMIN., SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY ASSESSMENT: A
CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED REVIEW (2019),
https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Academy_Studies/NAPA_FinalReport_forCRS_1101
19.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405173323/https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Acade
my_Studies/NAPA_FinalReport_forCRS_110119.pdf].
40. Id. at 51–55.
41. Id. at 54–55.
42. See, e.g., MIKE MIESEN ET AL., BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY CONGRESS: IMPROVING
CONGRESS’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EXPERTISE 9–12 (2019),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-
09/ST/Building21stCenturyCongress.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405174107/https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/
files/2019-09/ST/Building21stCenturyCongress.pdf].
43. Id. at 7–9.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 9–10.

Similar to other scholars who have examined science and technology
policymaking, L. B. Moses identified four potential problems that may
result from the failure of law to keep pace with technology, including (1)
the failure to impose appropriate legal restrictions and precautions to
control the risks of new technologies, (2) uncertainties in the application
of existing legal frameworks to new technologies, (3) the potential for
existing rules to either under- or over-regulate new technologies, and (4)
the potential for technology to make existing rules obsolete.47
Part III will describe the congressional oversight hearings for the three
major social media issues—anti-competitive behavior, privacy, and
content control—and provide analysis of those hearings, with particular
attention to whether the hearings were provoked by a particular event or
fire-alarm, explicitly designed to formulate or amend legislation, or
involved traditional oversight of agencies.48
Before delving into this
discussion, it is important to place the hearings in their political context.
The 114th Congress met from January 3, 2015, to January 3, 2017, with
Republicans in control of both houses of Congress and Democrats in
control of the executive branch with President Obama.49
The 115th
Congress met from January 3, 2017, to January 3, 2019, with Republicans
once again in control of both houses of Congress as well as the White
House with President Trump.50
The 116th Congress began in January 3,
2019, with Democrats in control of the House and with Republicans
holding both the Senate and Presidency.51
III. ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MEDIA OVERSIGHT
A. Anti-Competitive Behavior
Since 2015, there have been at least sixteen congressional hearings
discussing the question of online platforms and marketplace competition.52
Congress held eight in 2019, four in 2018, one in 2017, one in 2016, and
47. L. B. Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with Technological
Change, 2 U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y 239, 248 (2007).
48. See infra Part III.
49. Past Days in Session of the U.S. Congress, CONGRESS,
https://www.congress.gov/past-days-in-session
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405174825/https://www.congress.gov/past-days-in-
session] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See infra Appendix 1. Although the goal has been to identify all hearings on each
issue, it is likely that some hearings have not been identified. The number of hearings for
each issue, therefore, is likely to be an undercount.

two in 2015.53
Clearly, there was a “burst” of activity in 2019, with seven
of the eight hearings that year being held by House committees under new
Democratic leadership.54
The two hearings in 2015 were responses to the
FCC’s actions regarding net neutrality, with the Senate considering a bill
to revise FCC authority and the House examining FCC rulemaking actions
to protect internet neutrality.55
In contrast, the 2017 and 2018 hearings do
not seem to have been in response to any particular event or action but
generally addressed broadband access and the competitiveness of the
international environment.56
The 2019 hearings were in response to
increasing public concern, press coverage, and presidential candidate
discussions about the possible need to break up large internet players.57
Committee activity on the issue of online platforms and anti-
competitive behavior has been similarly situated in judiciary and
commerce committees in both houses, with the Senate having one hearing
(September 8, 2016) in the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and
Federal Management.58
On the Senate side, the full Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation held two hearings (January 30,
2018, and January 21, 2015), while the Subcommittee on Antitrust of the
Judiciary Committee (September 24, 2019) and the Subcommittee on
Communications, Technology, Innovation, and the Internet (July 31,
2018) each held one.59
On the House side, the full Committee on the
Judiciary held one hearing (March 25, 2015) and its Subcommittee on
Antitrust held five hearings (January 17, 2020; November 13, 2019;
October 18, 2019; July 16, 2019; and June 11, 2019), while the
Subcommittee on Communication and Technology of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce held five hearings (March 12, 2019; February 7,
2019; May 16, 2018; April 17, 2018; and March 21, 2017).60
The
committee oversight for this issue is thus fairly concentrated and not
overly fragmented.
Of the seventy witnesses that appeared at congressional hearings on
the issue of anti-competitive behavior and internet actors, half were from
industry, with twenty-five representing companies and ten representing
industry-related groups.61
In contrast, eleven of the witnesses represented
public interest groups, seven were academics, and six were from think
53. See infra Appendix 1.
54. See infra Appendix 1, pp. 41–43.
55. See infra Appendix 1, p. 45.

tanks.62
Only nine witnesses were from government, and two were
attorneys.63
In order to provide a sense of the dynamics of congressional oversight
for this issue, the activities of the House Subcommittee on Antitrust should
be described in some detail. This subcommittee has thirteen members,
with David N. Cicilline (D-RI) as chair and James Sensenbrenner (R-WI)
as ranking member.64
The four hearings of the House Subcommittee on
Antitrust were all directed at examining the impact of dominant digital
platforms on innovation, business, and digital marketplace competition, as
well as reviewing FTC and DOJ antitrust enforcement issues.65
On June 3,
2019, the House Judiciary Committee revealed plans to conduct a
bipartisan investigation of competition in digital markets.66
The
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law then
held hearings regarding the rise of online market power and requests for
relevant information from Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Apple.67
The
Committee’s investigation focused on three key areas: “[d]ocumenting
competition problems in digital markets; [e]xamining whether dominant
firms are engaging in anti-competitive conduct; and [a]ssessing whether
existing antitrust laws, competition policies, and current enforcement
levels are adequate to address these issues.”68
The first hearing focused on the effects on the news industry, with
witnesses reflecting traditional media, digital media, and industry
associations.69
A witness statement, provided by a nonprofit trade
association representing newspapers that publish both in print and online,
sums up a main concern of witnesses:
The platforms’ and news organizations’ mutual reliance upon one
another would not be a problem if not for the fact that
concentration among the platforms means a small cadre of tech
64. Subcommittees, U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
https://judiciary.house.gov/subcommittees/antitrust-commercial-and-administrative-law-
116th-congress/
[http://web.archive.org/web/20200406235818/https://judiciary.house.gov/subcommittees/
antitrust-commercial-and-administrative-law-116th-congress/] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
66. Digital Markets Investigation, U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
https://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=14921
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405175640/https://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issue/?I
ssueID=14921] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
67. Id.
68. Id.

giants exercise an extreme level of control over news. At the same
time, those same platforms also control the digital advertising
technologies that news organizations use to monetize traffic. This
has proven to be a dangerous combination.70
In terms of solutions, the witness from Public Knowledge noted that
“we cannot rely on antitrust alone to address the problems of platform
power. We need a sector-specific regulator with expertise in how digital
platforms operate and authority to affirmatively promote competition.”71
However, industry representatives were less enthusiastic about the use of
antitrust laws and were more supportive of incentives to encourage
competition among smaller players.72
The witnesses also noted overlaps between the problem of market
concentration and other social media policy issues. Public Knowledge
specifically pointed out the overlap between market concentration and
misinformation, noting that “[a]ny solution focused on news must address
the concerns of misinformation and lack of trust in the news. The new
expert regulator can set up systems of content moderation for platforms to
pay for various mechanisms of information reliability.”73
A statement for
the record submitted by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
pointed out a similar overlap with privacy: “[A]n absence of privacy
regulation has led to a growing concentration of internet services. Privacy
rules could help level the playing field.”74
The second set of hearings on July 16, 2019, tackled the question of
innovation and entrepreneurship with a first panel of witnesses from the
key players—Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Apple.75
Not surprisingly,
all four touted the benefits they had created for new entrants to the online
market and for consumers.76
The second panel took a more skeptical view.
70. Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 1: The Free and Diverse Press: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of David Chavren, President and CEO of
News Media Alliance).
71. Id. (statement of Gene Kimmelman, President and CEO of Public Knowledge).
72. See, e.g., id. (statement of Matt Schruers, Vice President for Law and Policy
Computer & Communications Industry Association).
73. Id. (testimony of Gene Kimmelman, President and CEO of Public Knowledge).
74. Id. (statement of EPIC).
76. See Online Platforms and Market Power Part 2: Innovation and Entrepreneurship:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (statements of Adam Cohen, Director of
Economic Policy, Google; Matt Perault, Head of Global Policy Development, Facebook;
Nate Sutton, Associate General Counsel, Competition, Amazon; and Kyle Andeer, Vice
President, Corporate Law, Apple).

For example, Stacy F. Mitchell, witness for the public interest group
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, testified that Amazon’s platform
dominance was harming entrepreneurship and innovation, threatening
economic liberty, “eroding the economic capacity” of communities and
regions, and furthering the concentration of wealth.77
Other, more
industry-centered witnesses, such as The App Association and NetChoice,
however, advised that an antitrust approach needed to be based on
evidence that it was necessary and would be effective, as well as that it
should be used cautiously.78
In addition to witness testimony, fifteen
organizations submitted statements for the record.79
The third set of hearings addressed the role that data and privacy play
with competition.80
In her statement before the subcommittee, FTC
Commissioner Rohit Chopra emphasized the economic value of personal
data in contributing to the market power of key players and took the
position that “remedies should not be directed at the data itself, but rather
the structural incentives that are leading to the problems in the first
place.”81
In other words, the solution should not be targeted at privacy per
se but at market forces.82
A witness familiar with European solutions made
a similar point: “Limited data protection can therefore lead to both
exploitative and exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms.”83
Not
surprisingly, this point was challenged by the witness from the American
Enterprise Institute.84
In addition to the two panels of witnesses, ten
statements for the record were submitted.85
77. See id. (statement of Stacy F. Mitchell, Co-Director, Institute for Local Self-
Reliance).
78. See id. (statements of Carl Szabo, Vice President and General Counsel, NetChoice;
and Morgan Reed, Executive Director, The App Association).
79. Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 2: Innovation and Entrepreneurship,
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (July 16, 2019),
https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2258
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405183903/https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/event
single.aspx?EventID=2258] (listing statements submitted for the record).
81. Online Platforms and Market Power Part 3: The Role of Data and Privacy in
Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Rohit Chopra,
Commissioner, FTC).
82. Id.
83. Id. (statement of Tommaso Valletti, Ph.D., Professor of Economics, Imperial
College Business School at Imperial College London).
84. See id. (statement of Roslyn Layton, Ph.D., Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute).
85. Hearing: Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 3: The Role of Data and
Privacy in Competition, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE REPOSITORY (Oct.
18, 2019, 9:00 AM),

The fourth hearing gave the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ
an opportunity to present their enforcement activities and policies.86
The
final hearing in this series focused on the views of some of the newer
competitors in the digital economy. PopSockets, for example, described
“the strong-arming and bullying” of Amazon Retail, which led it to end its
relationship with Amazon, causing it to lose an estimated ten million
dollars in revenue.87
Similarly, a representative from Sonos noted that his
company was “strong enough and successful enough to say what goes
largely unspoken, but remains very much on the minds of countless tech
entrepreneurs at smaller firms and people thinking about starting new
businesses.”88
He further added that “[o]ne reason [smaller firms] do not
speak up is that they’re afraid of how dominant platforms could retaliate
against their businesses.”89
In addition to these congressional hearings, the
DOJ is reviewing the power of internet platforms and large players, the
FTC is opening antitrust investigations into some large internet players,
including Facebook, and several state attorneys general are investigating
Facebook and Google.90
https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=110098
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405184438/https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calend
ar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=110098] (listing statements submitted for the record).
86. See Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 4: Perspectives of the Antitrust
Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (statements of Makan Delrahim,
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division; and Joseph Simons,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).
87. Online Platforms and Market Power Part 5: Competitors in the Digital Economy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of David Barnett, CEO and
Founder, PopSockets LLC).
88. Id. (statement of Patrick Spence, CEO, Sonos, Inc.).
89. Id.
90. Tony Romm et al., Justice Department announces broad antitrust review of Big
Tech, WASH. POST (July 23, 2019, 7:34 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/23/justice-department-announces-
antitrust-review-big-tech-threatening-facebook-google-with-more-scrutiny/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325123823/https://www.washingtonpost.com/technol
ogy/2019/07/23/justice-department-announces-antitrust-review-big-tech-threatening-
facebook-google-with-more-scrutiny/]; John D. McKinnon & Deepa Seetharaman, FTC
Expands Antitrust Investigation Into Big Tech, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-plans-to-examine-past-acquisitions-by-big-tech-
companies-11581440270
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325123903/https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-plans-to-
examine-past-acquisitions-by-big-tech-companies-11581440270]; Annie Palmer, 47
Attorneys General Are Investigating Facebook for Antitrust Violations, CNBC (Oct. 22,
2019, 11:07 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/22/47-attorneys-general-are-
investigating-facebook-for-antitrust-violations.html

B. Privacy
In comparison to the sixteen hearings on anti-competitive behavior of
large internet players, there have been nineteen hearings on online privacy
from 2015 to 2019, with the Senate holding twelve hearings and the House
holding seven hearings.91
On the Senate side, the Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee held two hearings (July 16, 2019, and May 7,
2019)92
while the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
held five hearings (December 4, 2019; May 1, 2019; February 27, 2019;
September 26, 2018; and February 11, 2015)93
and its Subcommittee on
Consumer Protection held three hearings (March 26, 2019; June 19, 2018;
and February 6, 2018).94
Additionally, the Senate Commerce and Judiciary
Committees held a joint hearing (April 10, 2018) that received
considerable media coverage.95
On the House side, the Energy and
Commerce Committee held three hearings (May 8, 2019; February 26,
2019; and April 11, 2018) and its Subcommittee on Communication and
Technology held two hearings (June 14, 2016, and July 28, 2015).96
The
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Internet held one hearing (July 29, 2015),97
and the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on Information
Technology held one hearing (April 29, 2015).98
As with the anti-
competitive hearings, there was a “burst” of activity in 2019 with eight
hearings held, but this burst was greater on the Senate side, with six Senate
hearings and only two in the newly Democratic House.99
Of the sixty-five witnesses who appeared before congressional
committees on privacy issues more than half were industry-related, with
twenty-two representing companies and thirteen representing industry
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325123956/https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/22/47-
attorneys-general-are-investigating-facebook-for-antitrust-violations.html].
95. See infra Appendix 2, p. 48; see also Kurt Wagner, Live updates from Mark
Zuckerberg’s testimony to Congress Tuesday, VOX (Apr. 10, 2018, 7:30 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/4/10/17216734/live-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-testimony-
senate-hearing-data
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325124105/https://www.vox.com/2018/4/10/1721673
4/live-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-testimony-senate-hearing-data].

associations or interest groups.100
Thirteen witnesses were from
government, primarily from either the FTC or FCC.101
Of the sixty-five
witnesses, only seven expressed the views of public interest groups, only
six were academics, and only one was an international witness.102
With respect to subject matter, the congressional hearings on privacy
addressed a number of issues and lacked a clear focus. For example, the
hearings covered Facebook’s development of a new cryptocurrency, Big
Data, privacy policies in major companies, Cambridge Analytica, the Uber
data breach, the Internet of Things, and data encryption.103
Only one
hearing was focused on FTC’s online privacy enforcement, while three
hearings addressed the FCC’s newer role with respect to privacy.104
Four
of the 2019 hearings in the Senate focused on more general issues
regarding privacy rights in the digital economy and possible policy
solutions.105
Despite the wide range of topics, the hearings generally fell into one
of three tracks. The first track concerned responding to new technological
changes, such as the Internet of Things and Big Data, and gathering
information on the status and implications of these changes.106
These
hearings appeared more narrowly focused on, and tended to call more
witnesses from, the sectors directly affected.107
For example, on July 29,
2015, the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Internet heard testimony from The App Association, the IT Industry
Council, the Consumer Electronics Association, and the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers.108
The subcommittee did not hear
accompanying testimony from privacy advocacy groups or academics.109
104. See infra Appendix 2 (noting the FTC hearing on May 8, 2019 and the FCC
hearings on August 16, 2018; June 14, 2016; and July 28, 2015).
105. See infra Appendix 2 (referencing hearings that occurred on September 26, 2018;
February 27, 2019; May 7, 2019; and December 4, 2019).
106. See infra Appendix 2, pp. 47–50 (referencing hearings that occurred on February
26, 2019; July 29, 2015; and February 11, 2015).
107. See infra Appendix 2, pp. 47–50 (referencing hearings that occurred on February
26, 2019; July 29, 2015; and February 11, 2015).
108. See Joshua New, What Congress Wants to Know About the Internet of Things,
CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION (July 29, 2015),
https://www.datainnovation.org/2015/07/what-congress-wants-to-know-about-the-
internet-of-things/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325124151/https://www.datainnovation.org/2015/07/
what-congress-wants-to-know-about-the-internet-of-things/]; see also infra Appendix 2,
p. 62.
109. Id.

This hearing, thus, fits a pattern of more pluralist interest group input with
testimony from those sectors directly affected by proposed policy changes
rather than testimony from experts or public interest groups.
The second track was concerned with responding to specific privacy
breaches.110
The February 6, 2018, hearing on the Uber breach and
coverup brought witnesses not only from Uber but also from security
experts and Consumer Union, creating a more balanced hearing.111
The
joint Senate Commerce and Judiciary Committee hearing on April 10,
2018, was in response to the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica breach.112
This hearing revealed the lack of knowledge on the part of many
Senators.113
The House Energy and Commerce Committee held a similar
hearing on April 11, 2018, and the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer
Protection followed suit with its June 19, 2018, hearing regarding
Cambridge Analytica, where it called witnesses who were again critical of
the activities.114
The third track was focused primarily on policy options. This track
drew a broad group of witnesses, as indicated above, but only in the last
hearing focused on particular legislative proposals.115
Other policy
proposals continue to be introduced, such as Senator Gillibrand’s proposal
to establish a Data Protection Agency.116
To provide a sense of the dynamics of congressional oversight for
online privacy, the three Senate Committee on Commerce hearings that
occurred in 2019 should be briefly reviewed. The Senate Commerce
Committee is chaired by Roger Wicker (R-MS) with Maria Cantwell (D-
110. See infra Appendix 2, p. 48 (referencing hearings that occurred on June 19, 2018;
April 11, 2018; April 10, 2018; and February 6, 2018).
113. See Kevin Roose & Cecilia Kang, Mark Zuckerberg Testifies on Facebook Before
Skeptical Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/politics/zuckerberg-facebook-senate-
hearing.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325124307/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/
politics/zuckerberg-facebook-senate-hearing.html].
114. See Cambridge Analytica and Other Facebook Partners: Examining Data Privacy
Risks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, Insurance,
and Date Security of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 116th
Cong. (2018) (statement of John Battelle, CEO, NewCo); see also infra Appendix 2, p. 48.
116. Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, The U.S. Needs a Data Protection Agency, MEDIUM (Feb.
12, 2020), https://medium.com/@gillibrandny/the-u-s-needs-a-data-protection-agency-
98a054f7b6bf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325124354/https://medium.com/@gillibrandny/the-u-
s-needs-a-data-protection-agency-98a054f7b6bf].

WA) as ranking member.117
The panel for the February 27, 2019, hearing
drew four representatives from more industry-oriented associations, one
representative from academia, and one representative from a privacy
advocacy group.118
The industry advocates cautioned against “overly
prescriptive methods.”119
The May 1, 2019, hearing was focused on policy
options—hence, the title “Consumer Perspectives: Policy Principles for a
Federal Data Privacy Framework”—and included four witnesses, three
from privacy advocacy groups and one from the Irish Data Protection
Agency.120
The four largely agreed that the current privacy framework is
ineffective and that stronger legislation is needed, but they voiced some
disagreement about federal preemption of state laws and the degree of
oversight and enforcement needed.121
The December 4, 2019, hearing was viewed as the culmination of the
work of the Committee; Chairman Wicker noted in his opening remarks:
For the past year, members of this committee have worked to
develop a strong, national privacy law that would provide baseline
data protections for all Americans. Given the 2018
implementation of the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation, the passage of the California Consumer Privacy Act,
and near-daily reports of data breaches and misuse, it is clear that
Congress needs to act now to provide stronger and more
meaningful data protections to consumers and address the privacy
risks that threaten the prosperity of the nation’s digital
economy.122
117. Committee Members, SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP. (2020),
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/members
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325124441/https://www.commerce.senate.gov/memb
ers].
119. Policy Principles for a Federal Date Privacy Framework: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of
Michael Beckerman, President and CEO, Internet Association).
120. See id. (statements of Helen Dixon, Data Protection Commissioner, Republic of
Ireland; Neema Singh Guliani, Senior Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties
Union; Jules Polonetsky, Chief Executive Officer, Future of Privacy Forum; and Jim
Steyer, Chief Executive Officer and Founder, Common Sense Media).
121. See id.
122. Examining Legislative Proposals to Protect Consumer Data Privacy: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 116th Cong. (2019)
[hereinafter December Hearing] (statement of Sen. Roger Wicker, Chairman, Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation).

The primary bill under discussion was the Consumer Online Privacy
Act, which would provide more rights to consumers and greater FTC
enforcement, and which was co-sponsored by Senators Cantwell, Schatz,
Klobuchar, and Markey.123
There was also discussion of a draft consumer
privacy bill, written by Republican Senator Roger Wicker’s staff, that
would pre-empt state laws but would not include a private right of
action.124
All the witnesses supported more effective privacy legislation,
though they quibbled over certain aspects—especially pre-emption of state
laws and private right of action.125
It is possible that legislation will receive
serious floor attention before the 2020 elections, given the relatively high
level of consensus on most issues and the work of the Commerce
Committee staff.126
For its part, the March 2019 Subcommittee on
Manufacturing, Trade, and Consumer Protection hearing was also focused
on policy options.127
C. Content Control
There were twenty-one hearings on content control for internet sites
from 2015 to 2019, with hearings only beginning in 2017.128
Hearings
were almost evenly split between the Senate and House, with the Senate
holding eleven hearings and the House holding ten hearings.129
The Senate
held two hearings in the Commerce Committee (March 22, 2017, and
September 18, 2019), and it held one in the Judiciary Committee (April
123. See Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019).
124. David Shepardson & Diane Bartz, Republican privacy bill would set U.S. Rules,
pre-empt California: senator, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2019, 5:03 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-privacy-congress/republican-privacy-bill-would-
set-us-rules-pre-empt-california-senator-idUSKBN1Y62EO
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325124557/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
privacy-congress/republican-privacy-bill-would-set-us-rules-pre-empt-california-senator-
idUSKBN1Y62EO].
125. See December Hearing, supra note 122 (statements of Julie Brill, Deputy General
Counsel, Microsoft; Maureen Ohlhausen, Co-Chair, 21st Century Privacy Coalition; Laura
Moy, Executive Director and Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center on
Privacy & Technology; Nuala O’Connor, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel, Digital
Citizenship at Walmart; and Michelle Richardson, Director of Privacy and Data, Center for
Democracy and Technology).
126. Cameron F. Kerry, Game on: What to make of Senate privacy bills and hearings,
BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 3. 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12/03/game-on-what-to-make-of-senate-
privacy-bills-and-hearing/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325124714/https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2019/12/03/game-on-what-to-make-of-senate-privacy-bills-and-hearing/].

10, 2019).130
The Senate held seven hearings in the Intelligence Select
Committee (January 10, 2017; March 30, 2017; June 21, 2017; November
1, 2017; June 20, 2018; August 1, 2018; and September 5, 2018).131
The
House held ten hearings with five committees or their subcommittees:
Foreign Affairs (July 16, 2019), Homeland Security (June 26, 2019),
Oversight and Reform (May 22, 2019), Energy and Commerce
(September 5, 2018; June 14, 2018; March 7, 2018; and November 29,
2017), and Judiciary (April 9, 2019; September 27, 2018; and July 17,
2018).132
As with the privacy and anti-competitive hearings, there was a
burst of activity in 2019, along with an earlier burst in 2018.133
Of the eighty-six witnesses who appeared before these congressional
committees, thirty-four were from industry and one was from an industry-
related interest group.134
Seventeen were academic, ten were from
government, ten were from think tanks, ten were from public interest
groups, and four were from a variety of other organizations (e.g., reporters
and victims).135
A range of topics were covered at these hearings. The 2019 hearings
focused on extremism and violent content, as well as election
interference.136
The 2018 hearings focused on alleged bias and censorship
of conservative viewpoints, social media’s filtering of content, and
behavioral advertising techniques.137
The 2017 hearings focused on cyber
threats and the use of algorithms to personalize content to consumers.138
Most of these hearings are classified as “fire-alarms” driven by specific
events, such as the 2016 elections or the terrorist attack in New Zealand.139
The hearings were less about oversight activities of an agency or the
effectiveness of existing policies and were more about gathering
information, such as how social media companies make decisions about
content, what technologies are used for these purposes, and how
companies can strengthen their efforts to identify disinformation while
remaining transparent.140
Like with the issues discussed above, it is important to review a few
of these hearings on content control to understand the dynamics at play. In

response to the New Zealand shooting and the role of social media
companies in the growth of white nationalism and hate crimes, the House
Judiciary Committee held hearings on April 9, 2019, to address the role of
social media in the proliferation of white nationalism.141
The hearing
included testimony from victims, civil and human rights groups, as well
as Facebook and Google.142
In member questioning, groups expressed
strong emotions along with a variety of opinions and partisan
differences.143
On April 10, 2019, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony
regarding whether technology companies enable the censorship of
different political perspectives.144
The hearing had two panels.145
The first
panel heard testimony from representatives of Twitter and Facebook,
while the second panel heard from academics, victims, and civil society
groups.146
Chairman Cruz began with the question of remedies for anti-
conservative bias—such as changing liability under Section 230 of the
Communications Act, anti-trust violations, and fraud.147
Chairman Cruz
also questioned the lack of data regarding the practices of social media
companies.148
Ranking Member Hirono took a different track,
emphasizing the importance of disinformation and election interference
and underlining the lack of evidence of anti-conservative bias.149
The
hearing continued to take a more partisan tone.150
One reporter summarized the difference between the April hearings in
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees as follows:
143. See Associated Press, The Latest: Facebook, Google Grilled on White Supremacy
Rise, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2019-04-
09/the-latest-lawmakers-criticize-social-media-for-hate-crimes
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325124810/https://www.usnews.com/news/business/a
rticles/2019-04-09/the-latest-lawmakers-criticize-social-media-for-hate-crimes].
145. See Stifling Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Apr. 10, 2019, 2:30 PM),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/stifling-free-speech-technological-censorship-
and-the-public-discourse
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325124850/https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meeting
s/stifling-free-speech-technological-censorship-and-the-public-discourse] (including
embedded video of hearing).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.

[T]he stark contrast between the two hearings demonstrates how
this industry has become embroiled in yet more culture wars
between the right and the left. That’s not to say that holding social
media platforms accountable for the spread of white nationalism
and other hate speech is not important, or that policing one’s
platforms can’t be tricky to enact fairly, but it’s a sign that of all
the meaty and potentially bipartisan issues Congress could choose
to focus on, they’re choosing the ones their respective bases are
most invested in at this moment.151
At the June 26, 2019, hearing before the House Homeland Security
Committee, there were four witnesses—three from social media
companies and one from a law school.152
The Facebook representative
noted the difficulties of identifying terrorist content but stated that the
company relied on both artificial intelligence and 30,000 human
examiners to review content reported by users as violating Facebook’s
policies.153
She also mentioned the Global Internet Forum to Counter
Terrorism (GIFCT), a partnership among Google, Facebook, YouTube,
Microsoft, and Twitter to share information.154
Twitter’s representative
reported a similar strategy of machine learning and human review, which
was successful in suspending more than 1.5 million accounts for violations
related to the promotion of terrorism between August 1, 2015, and
December 31, 2018.155
Google’s representative likewise described Google
and YouTube’s efforts to combat terror content and misinformation.156
Professor Nadine Strossen, a former president of the ACLU, cautioned that
the discretion that companies have in controlling content could violate free
speech, and she further warned Congress that content control methods may
be ineffective in light of alternate avenues like the dark web.157
She also
emphasized that, while the public does not have the right to speech on
social media sites, the companies are entitled to choose what they will post
151. Li Zhou, Republicans and Democrats have completely different priorities on tech,
VOX (Apr. 9, 2019, 7:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/9/18300659/facebook-
google-congress-hearing-white-nationalism-censorship
/facebook-google-congress-hearing-white-nationalism-censorship].
153. Examining Social Media Companies’ Effort to Counter Online Terror Content and
Misinformation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of Monika Bickert, Head of Global Policy Management, Facebook).
154. Id.
155. Id. (statement of Nick Pickles, Senior Public Policy Strategist, Twitter).
156. Id. (statement of Derek Slater, Director of Information Policy, Google).
157. Id. (statement of Nadine Strossen, John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law, New
York Law School).

on their platforms under Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act.158
Members questioned why different platforms took down different
content and pointed out the inconsistencies in policies.159
Republican
members queried whether there was a cultural or political bias in decisions
about suppressing content.160
In general, members were quite critical of
the ability of companies to deliver on effective control of terrorist content
and misinformation and were frustrated by the amount of apologizing that
the companies do.161
The House hearings were instrumental in drafting the National
Commission on Online Platforms and Homeland Security Act, which the
House Homeland Security Committee unanimously voted to advance for
floor consideration on October 23, 2019.162
The bill would create a twelve-
member bipartisan commission of experts to research “how online
platforms have been exploited to carry out mass-casualty targeted
violence”—including acts of domestic and international terrorism as well
as “covert foreign state influence campaigns.”163
Privacy and civil liberties
groups, however, are not supportive of the bill due to concerns that
government intervention in online speech would constitute censorship and
violate the First Amendment.164
Under the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s mandate to
oversee the government’s intelligence activities and programs, including
the effectiveness of its counterintelligence function, the Committee held
seven high-profile hearings on Russian interference and the general issue
of disinformation in the 2016 election.165
Additionally, because of the
158. Id.
159. See Examining Social Media Companies’ Efforts to Counter Online Terror Content
and Misinformation, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY (June 26, 2019, 10:00
AM), https://homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/examining-social-media-companies-
efforts-to-counter-online-terror-content-and-misinformation
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325125013/https://homeland.house.gov/activities/hear
ings/examining-social-media-companies-efforts-to-counter-online-terror-content-and-
misinformation] (including embedded video of hearing).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Emily Birnbaum & Chris Mill Rodrigo, House Homeland Security Committee
advances online extremism bill, THE HILL (Oct. 23, 2019, 10:40 AM),
https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/467076-house-homeland-committee-
advances-online-extremism-bill,
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325125107/https://thehill.com/policy/national-
security/467076-house-homeland-committee-advances-online-extremism-bill].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See infra Appendix 3, pp. 52–55 (referencing hearings that occurred on September
5, 2018; August 1, 2018; June 20, 2018; November 1, 2017; June 21, 2017; March 30,
2017; and June 10, 2017).

classified nature of the issue, the Committee conducted closed-door
interviews of a number of witnesses.166
The Committee also worked with
its Technical Advisory Group, an external group of experts with whom the
Committee consults for substantive technical advice, which issued two
public reports.167
As a result of these hearings and investigations, the
Committee itself issued a two-volume report (July 25 and October 8,
2019).168
The report included among its findings that “[Russian operatives]
sought to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election by harming Hillary
Clinton’s chances of success and supporting Donald Trump at the
direction of the Kremlin.”169
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
From 2015 to 2019, there was serious and sustained congressional
oversight of all three issues—anti-competitive behavior, privacy, and
content control—with a total of at least fifty-six hearings that drew a total
of 221 witnesses, most of whom represented industry or industry-related
groups.170
The three major social media platforms—Facebook, Google,
and Twitter—appeared as witnesses on all three issues.171
Congressional
oversight in all three cases is best characterized as “fire-alarm” oversight.
In all three cases, there were “bursts” of activity—in 2019 for anti-
trust and privacy, and in both 2019 and 2018 for content control.172
Half
166. Karoun Demirjian, Senate Intelligence Committee to start Russia probe interviews
next week, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017, 5:15 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/gop-lawmaker-senate-should-take-lead-on-
congresss-russia-investigation/2017/03/29/c31d0fb0-1485-11e7-ada0-
1489b735b3a3_story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405203650/https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerp
ost/gop-lawmaker-senate-should-take-lead-on-congresss-russia-
investigation/2017/03/29/c31d0fb0-1485-11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html].
167. Renee DiResta et al., The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency, NEW
KNOWLEDGE (2018),
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=senatedocs
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405204043/https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewc
ontent.cgi?article=1003&context=senatedocs]; Phil Howard et al., The IRA, Social Media
and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012–2018, COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
RES. PROJECT (2018), https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/93/2018/12/The-IRA-Social-Media-and-Political-Polarization.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200405204551/https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/93/2018/12/The-IRA-Social-Media-and-Political-Polarization.pdf].
168. S. REP. NO. 116-XX (2019) (Comm. Report).
169. Id. at 4.
170. See infra Appendices 1, 2, & 3. As noted earlier, although efforts were made to
identify all hearings, this number is likely an undercount of the number of hearings.
171. See infra Appendices 1, 2, & 3.

of the hearings about anti-competitive behavior occurred in 2019, under
the new Democratic leadership in the House.173
These hearings were
designed to investigate the scope of the problem.174
A bit less than half of
the hearings regarding online privacy occurred in 2019, but the burst in
oversight activity was more prominent on the Senate side.175
Further, in
comparison to the hearings regarding anti-competitive behavior, those
regarding privacy were more bipartisan in tone and approach and were
more focused on serious consideration of legislation rather than
ascertaining the scope of the problem.176
The 2018 and 2019 bursts in
content control hearings were focused on three discrete problems:
disinformation, violent content, and election interference.177
The
investigations of disinformation and violent content were quite partisan in
tone and approach, while the investigations of election interference were
more bipartisan.178
Although there are no agreed-upon measures of congressional
effectiveness, two suggested measures are: first, the degree of
bipartisanship represented in hearings; and second, the impact of
bipartisanship on policy.179
I would suggest a third measure that involves
the number of different venues and narratives of oversight as measured by
the number of congressional committees involved in oversight—the idea
being that more fragmented oversight will actually be less effective.
In terms of the degree of bipartisanship, we see variation across the
three issues. On issues of anti-competitive behavior, one might expect the
Democrats to be more skeptical of market concentration and more
concerned about consumers and smaller companies, and this is evident by
the fact that antitrust became a hearing subject after the Democrats took
178. See Eric Geller, ‘Get your act together’: Tech companies face bipartisan
congressional uproar over encryption, POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2019, 2:09 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/10/tech-companies-bipartisan-congress-
encryption-080704
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325125257/https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/1
0/tech-companies-bipartisan-congress-encryption-080704]; see also Julian E. Barnes,
Senate Report Criticizes Response to Russian Meddling and Blames Partisanship, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/politics/russian-
interference-mcconnell.html
politics/russian-interference-mcconnell.html].
179. Levin & Bean, supra note 30, at 17–18.

control of the House.180
However, the tone of these hearings is quite
bipartisan, with members of both parties probing similar concerns.181
This
may be the result of the more investigatory nature of these hearings.
Additionally, it is possible that partisanship may become more pronounced
as committees move from identifying the nature of the problem to
formulating policy solutions. The exception to bipartisanship is when the
discussions involved net neutrality, a policy that Democrats support and
Republicans oppose.182
With respect to online privacy, both parties agree
on the general principles of the matter and believe that more regulation is
needed.183
However, both sides disagree with respect to how much
regulation is appropriate, though this disagreement is largely confined to
federal preemption and a private right of action.184
On these two questions,
Democrats respond “no” and “yes,” respectively, while Republicans
respond “yes” and “no.”185
On issues of content control, there was more
partisanship, except in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, where
members seemed to take a more bipartisan approach.186
On questions of
disinformation and control of controversial content, while there tended to
be finger-pointing in terms of what kind of content was controlled by
“liberal” internet platforms, both parties seemed to share concerns
regarding proposals that would censor and potentially violate the First
Amendment.187
180. Cf. Cristiano Lima, House lawmakers open antitrust probe into tech industry’s
biggest players, POLITICO (June 3, 2019, 5:03 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/03/antitrust-tech-industry-google-facebook-
1352388
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325125438/https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/0
3/antitrust-tech-industry-google-facebook-1352388].
181. Id.
182. Cf. Tony Romm, Democrats in Congress are promising to do everything they can
to stop the FCC from gutting net neutrality, VOX (July 12, 2017, 1:34 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2017/7/12/15958990/democrats-republicans-net-neutrality-day-of-
action-congress-fcc-pai
0/democrats-republicans-net-neutrality-day-of-action-congress-fcc-pai].
183. See Brian Naylor, Targeting Online Privacy, Congress Sets A New Tone With Big
Tech, NPR (Mar. 13, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/03/13/702619020/targeting-online-privacy-congress-sets-a-
new-tone-with-big-tech
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325125613/https://www.npr.org/2019/03/13/7026190
20/targeting-online-privacy-congress-sets-a-new-tone-with-big-tech].
184. Id.
185. Cf. id.
186. See Zhou, supra note 151.
187. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Why Conservatives Allege Big Tech Is Muzzling Them,
THE ATLANTIC (July 28, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/conservatives-pretend-big-tech-

There is also some variation in terms of impact on policy. The hearings
on industry concentration and anti-competitive behavior, which were
designed to be more information-gathering, have teed up an issue that will
likely be the focus of policy actions if the Democrats gain seats in the 2020
elections.188
The five-part congressional hearing by the House
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law was
particularly well-organized and designed to yield information that would
be useful in formulating policy. It is still possible that these hearings will
set the stage for a significant impact on policy. With respect to online
privacy, it is likely that the congressional hearings have facilitated policy
agreement and policy action of some kind, though it may not go as far as
Democrats advocate. Finally, with respect to content control, the
congressional hearings have increased public awareness and concern, but,
given the complicated nature of the issue, the current White House’s
stance on the media and Russian election interference,189
and the First
Amendment issues, it seems unlikely that any real impact on policy will
occur.
The level of fragmentation in congressional oversight also varies by
issue. On the issue of anti-competitive behavior, there is a concentration
of congressional oversight in judiciary and commerce committees, which
is likely to lead to more effective oversight.190
On the issue of online
privacy, there has been more fragmentation of congressional oversight,
with commerce, banking, judiciary, and government oversight
committees, as well as a number of subcommittees, exercising
oversight.191
At this point, however, oversight appears to be coalescing in
commerce committees.192
On the issue of content control, there is the
highest level of fragmentation, with commerce, foreign affairs, homeland
biased-against-them/594916/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325125700/https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive
/2019/07/conservatives-pretend-big-tech-biased-against-them/594916/].
188. See Leah Nylen & Cristiano Lima, Big Tech’s ‘bully’ tactics stifle competition,
smaller rivals tell Congress, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2020, 6:23 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/17/big-tech-competition-investigation-100701
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325125745/https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/1
7/big-tech-competition-investigation-100701].
189. See Roberta Rampton & David Shepardson, Trump rips tech firms at ‘free speech’
summit, REUTERS (July 11, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/trump-rips-tech-firms-
free-100445334.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325125938/https://finance.yahoo.com/news/trump-
rips-tech-firms-free-100445334.html] (describing President Trump’s allegation that “big
tech firms” are “suppress[ing] conservative voices”).
190. See Appendix 1.

security, government oversight and reform, judiciary, and intelligence
committees all holding hearings.193
Given the complexity of these issues
and the number of lines of policy discourse, oversight here is likely to
remain somewhat scattered and ineffective.
Finally, this review of congressional oversight reveals two important
aspects of social media oversight more generally—the heavy reliance on
industry input and the relative lack of expertise outside of industry and in
Congress itself. As noted above, in all three arenas of congressional
oversight, the largest number of witnesses came from industry or industry-
related groups.194
Given that it is the activities of these companies that is
at issue, the large presence of industry representatives is not surprising.
Even so, this large presence affords companies an opportunity to control
and dominate policy discussions.195
Although members can and do
question and probe witnesses in challenging ways, their ability to extract
real information or concessions is quite limited.196
A common refrain among members at these hearings is why media
companies have seriously increased their Washington presence and
invested millions of dollars in lobbying.197
In 2018, Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, and Google combined spent $55 million on lobbying, doubling
their combined spending of $27.4 million in 2016.198
The Center for
Responsive Politics lists both Amazon and Facebook among the top ten
lobbying organizations in 2019, with Amazon at number nine, spending
$16,790,000, and Facebook at number 10, spending $16,710,000.199
Although congressional committees have tried to counter this industry
dominance by including witnesses from public interest groups, think
tanks, and academic researchers, these groups cannot match the deep
195. Cf. Issie Lapowsky, The Sundar Pichai Hearing Was a Major Missed Opportunity,
WIRED (Dec. 11, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/congress-sundar-pichai-
google-ceo-hearing/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200325130015/https://www.wired.com/story/congress-
sundar-pichai-google-ceo-hearing/]
196. See id.
197. Cecilia Kang & Kenneth P. Vogel, Tech Giants Amass a Lobbying Army for an
Epic Washington Battle, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/us/politics/amazon-apple-facebook-google-
lobbying.html
politics/amazon-apple-facebook-google-lobbying.html].
198. Id.
199. Top Spenders, OPENSECRETS (2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-
lobbying/top-spenders
[http://web.archive.org/web/20200405211609/https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-
lobbying/top-spenders] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).

pockets or the deep knowledge that the industry has. Moving forward, this
may be the greatest barrier in terms of effective congressional oversight of
social media companies.
APPENDIX ONE: ANTITRUST/NET NEUTRALITY
Date Committee Purpose Witnesses
Jan. 17,
2020
House Committee
on the Judiciary –
Subcommittee on
Antitrust,
Commercial, and
Administrative
Law
Online Platforms and
Market Power, Part 5:
Competitors in the
Digital Economy
 David Barnett,
PopSockets LLC
 Kirsten Daru, Tile
 David Heinemeier
Hansson, Basecamp
LLC
 Patrick Spence,
Sonos
Nov. 13,
2019
House Committee
Subcommittee on
Antitrust,
Commercial, and
Administrative
Law
Examine impact of
dominant digital
platforms
on competition, and to
review FTC and
Department of
Justice antitrust
enforcement activities
and policies to
promote competition
 Makan Delrahim,
DOJ
 Joseph Simons, FTC
Oct. 18,
2019
House Committee
Subcommittee on
Antitrust,
Commercial, and
Administrative
Law
Examine impact of
data and privacy on
online platforms and
digital marketplace
competition, and to
review related policy
and antitrust
enforcement issues
 Rohit Chopra, FTC
 Tommaso Valletti,
Imperial College
London
 Jason Furman,
Harvard University
 Dr. Roslyn Layton,
Ph.D., The American
Enterprise Institute
Sept. 24,
2019
Senate Committee
Subcommittee on
Antitrust,
Competition
Policy, and
Consumer Rights
Examine competition
and antitrust enforcem
ent in digital
technology markets
 Bruce Hoffman, FTC
 Diana Moss,
American Antitrust
Institute
 John Yun, George
Mason University
 Patricia Nakache,
National Venture
Capital Association

July 16,
2019
House Committee
Subcommittee on
Antitrust,
Commercial, and
Administrative
Law
Examine impact of
dominant digital
platforms on
innovation, businesses,
and digital
marketplace
competition, and to
ent issues
 Adam Cohen,
Google
 Matt Perault,
Facebook
 Nate Sutton,
Amazon
 Kyle Andeer, Apple
 Timothy Wu,
Columbia University
 Fiona Scott Morton,
Yale University
 Stacy Mitchell,
Institute for Local
Self-Reliance
 Maureen Ohlhausen,
attorney
 Carl Szabo,
NetChoice
 Morgan Reed,
ACT/The App
Association
June 11,
2019
House Committee
Subcommittee on
Antitrust,
Commercial, and
Administrative
Law
Examine impact of
dominant digital
platforms on news
industry and digital
marketplace
competition, and to
ent issues
 David Chavern,
News Media
Alliance
 Gene Kimmelman,
Public Knowledge
 Sally Hubbard, Open
Markets Institute
 Matt Schruers,
Computer and
Communications
Industry Association
 David Pitofsky,
News Corp.
 Kevin Riley, Atlanta
Journal-Constitution
Mar. 12,
2019
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce –
Subcommittee on
Communications
and Technology
Consider H.R. 1644,
the Save the Internet
Act of 2019, to repeal
FCC Dec. 2017 rule
and order that
overturned an FCC
2015 open Internet
order reclassifying
broadband Internet
access service as a
telecommunications
service
 Francella Ochillo,
National Hispanic
Media Coalition
 Matthew Wood, Free
Press
 Gregory Green,
Fatbeam
 Robert McDowell,
Hudson Institute

Feb. 7,
2019
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce –
Subcommittee on
Communications
and Technology
Examine issues
surrounding Internet n
etwork neutrality,
known as net
neutrality, and to
review concerns about
FCC 2017 repeal of
2015 open Internet
order reclassifying
broadband internet
access service as a
telecommunications
service
 Tom Wheeler,
Brookings Institution
 Jessica Gonzalez,
Free Press
 Denelle Dixon,
Mozilla Corp.
 Ruth Livier, writer
 Michael Powell,
NCTA - The Internet
and Television
Association
 Joseph Franell,
Eastern Oregon
Telecom
July 31,
2018
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation –
Subcommittee on
Communications,
Technology,
Innovation, and
the Internet
Review
international internet
policies that are
impacting the
competitiveness,
investment, and
innovation
opportunities of U.S.
businesses
domestically and
abroad in today’s
global digital economy
 The Honorable
Michael Chertoff,
The Chertoff Group
 Mr. James Bladel,
GoDaddy
 Dr. Roslyn Layton,
Ph.D., The American
Enterprise Institute
 Mr. Christopher
Painter, Global
Commission on the
Stability of
Cyberspace
 Ms. Denise Zheng,
The Business
Roundtable
May 16,
2018
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce –
Subcommittee on
Communications
and Technology
Examine methods to
expand
broadband Internet
access in a
technologically neutral
manner, while
promoting competition
in wire-line and
wireless markets and
protecting
telecommunications
infrastructure from
national security
threats
 Dr. Charles Clancy,
Virginia Polytechnic
Institute
 Clete Johnson,
Wilkinson Barker
Knauer, LLP
 Samm Sacks, Center
for Strategic and
International Studies

Apr. 17,
2018
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce –
Subcommittee on
Communications
and Technology
Examine elements and
components of Internet
data network models,
focusing on service
provider and network
operator methods to
manage and prioritize
Internet traffic
 Richard Bennett,
High Tech Forum
 Peter Rysavy,
Rysavy Research
LLC
 Paul Schroeder, Aira
Tech Corporation
 Matt Wood, Free
Press
Jan. 30,
2018
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
Examine the
implementation of
science and
technology policy and
program updates
enacted under the
American Innovation
and Competitiveness
Act, and will
specifically evaluate
progress made by the
National Science
Foundation and the
National Institute of
Standards and
Technology to
implement the act
 Dr. France Córdova,
National Science
Foundation
 Dr. Walter Copan,
National Institute of
Standards and
Technology
Mar. 21,
2017
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce --
Subcommittee on
Communication
and Technology
Examine challenges
facing broadband
infrastructure
deployment efforts,
review proposals to
promote broadband
infrastructure
development and
investment and efforts
to improve permitting
process
 Steven K. Berry,
Competitive Carriers
Association
 Michael Conners,
Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe
 Thomas Murray,
Community Wireless
Structures
 Joanne S. Hovis,
CTC Technology
and Energy
 LeRoy T. Carlson,
U.S. Cellular
 James W. Stegeman,
CostQuest
Associates
 Bryan Darr, Mosaik
Solutions

Sept. 8,
2016
Senate Committee
on Homeland
Security and
Governmental
Affairs --
Subcommittee on
Regulatory
Affairs and
Federal
Management
Examine Federal
independent agencies
regulatory review
activities and
processes, review
proposals for potential
improvements to
regulatory process
 Adam J. White,
Hoover Institution
 Cary Coglianese,
University of
Pennsylvania Law
School
Mar. 25,
2015
House Committee
on the Judiciary
Examine recent FCC
rulemaking actions to
protect Internet
neutrality
 Thomas Wheeler,
FCC
 Ajit Pai, FCC
 Joshua Wright, FTC
 Terrell McSweeney,
FTC
Jan. 21,
2015
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
Review potential
options for legislative
action to address net
neutrality concerns
and protect consumers,
considers bill to revise
FCC authority
 Meredith Baker, The
Wireless Association
 Gene Kimmelman,
Public Knowledge
 Robert McDowell,
Hudson Institute
 Paul Misener,
Amazon
 W. Tom Simmons,
Midcontinent
Communications
 Nicol E. Turner-Lee,
Telecom and Internet
Council
APPENDIX TWO: ONLINE PRIVACY
Dec. 4,
2019
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
Examine legislative
proposals to protect
consumer data privacy,
including giving FTC
more resources and
authority
 Julie Brill, Former
Commissioner of the
FTC, now at
Microsoft
 Maureen Ohlhausen,
Former Acting-
Chair of the FTC,
now at 21st Century
Privacy Coalition
 Laura Moy,
Georgetown Law

Center on Privacy &
Technology
 Nuala O’Connor,
Walmart
 Michelle
Richardson, Center
for Democracy and
Technology
July 16,
2019
Senate Committee
on Banking,
Housing, and
Urban Affairs
Examine Facebook,
Inc. proposed
development of a new
cryptocurrency, called
Libra, and a digital
wallet to store this
cryptocurrency, called
Calibra, and to review
implications for
consumers and
potential risks
associated with Libra
 David Marcus,
Facebook
May 8,
2019
House Energy and
Commerce
Committee
Oversight of the
Federal Trade
Commission:
Strengthening
Protections for
Americans’ Privacy
and Data Security
 Joseph Simmons,
FTC
 Noah Joshua
Phillips, FTC
 Rohit Chopra, FTC
 Rebecca Kelly
Slaughter, FTC
 Christine Wilson,
FTC
May 7,
2019
Senate Committee
on Banking,
Housing, and
Urban
Development
Privacy Rights and
Data Collection in a
Digital Economy
 Peter Chase,
German Marshall
Fund
 Jay Cline, PWC
 Maciej Ceglowski,
Pinboard
May 1,
2019
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science and
Transportation
Examine consumers’
expectations for data
privacy in the Digital
Age and how those
expectations may vary
based on the type of
information collected
and processed by
businesses
 Helen Dixon,
Republic of Ireland
 Neema Singh
Guliani, ACLU
 Jules Polonetsky,
Future of Privacy
Forum
 Jim Steyer,
Common Sense
Media
Mar. 26,
2019
Subcommittee on
Manufacturing,
Trade, and
Data privacy issues
that impact small
businesses and the
 Mr. Justin
Brookman,
Consumer Reports

Consumer
Protection of
Senate Commerce
Committee
unique challenges they
face with laws
designed for larger
companies
 Ms. Nina Dosanjh,
National Association
of Realtors
 Mr. Jefferson
England, Silver Star
Communications
 Mr. Evan Engstrom,
Engine Advocacy
and Research
Foundation
 Mr. Ryan Weber,
KC Tech Council
Feb. 27,
2019
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science and
Transportation
Examine what
Congress should do to
address risks to
consumers and
implement data
privacy protections for
all Americans
 Jon Leibowitz,
21st
Century Privacy
Coalition
 Michael Beckerman,
Internet Association
 Brian Dodge, Retail
Industry Leaders
Association
 Victoria Espinel,
The Software
Alliance
 Woodrow Hartzog,
Professor,
Northeastern
University
 Randall Rothenberg,
Interactive
Advertising Bureau
Feb. 26,
2019
House Energy and
Commerce
Committee
Protecting consumer
privacy in an era of
Big Data
 Brandi Collins-
Dexter, Media,
Democracy 7
Economic Justice
 Dave Grimaldi, IAB
 Rosalyn Layton,
AEI
 Nuala O’Connor,
CDT
 Denise Zheng,
Business Roundtable

Sept. 26,
2018
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
Examine current
privacy policies in top
companies, review
current privacy laws,
discuss possible new
safeguards
 Len Cali, AT&T
 Andrew DeVore,
Amazon
 Keith Enright,
Google
 Damien Kieran,
Twitter
 Guy Tribble, Apple
 Rachel Welch,
Charter
Communications
Aug. 16,
2018
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
Examine policy issues
before the
Commission and
review the FCC’s
ongoing duties and
activities
 Ajit Pai, FCC
 Michael O’Rielly,
FCC
 Brendan Carr, FCC
 Jessica
Rosenworcel, FCC
June 19,
2018
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation --
Subcommittee on
Consumer
Protection,
Product Safety,
Insurance, and
Data Security
follow-up to
Zuckerberg hearing,
focused on privacy
concerns in the wake
of Cambridge
Analytica
 John Battelle,
NewCo
 Aleksandr Kogan,
University of
Cambridge
Department of
Psychology
 Ashkan Soltani,
Soltani LLC
(formerly FTC)
Apr. 11,
2018
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce
Facebook:
Transparency and Use
of Consumer Data
(Cambridge Analytica)
 Mark Zuckerberg,
Facebook
Apr. 10,
2018
Senate
Commerce,
Science and
Transportation
and Judiciary
Committees
(joint)
Facebook, social
media, privacy and the
use and abuse of data
(Cambridge Analytica)
 Mark Zuckerberg,
Facebook
Feb. 6,
2018
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation --
Subcommittee on
Consumer
Protection,
Product Safety,
Insurance, and
Data Security
Examine the Uber
breach including
coverups, review the
value of “bug bounty”
programs
 Justin Brookman,
Consumers Union
 John Flynn, Uber
 Mårten Mickos,
HackerOne
 Katie Moussouris,
Luta Security

June 14,
2016
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce --
Subcommittee on
Communication
and Technology
Reviewing FCC
proposed rules to
establish consumer
privacy requirements
for broadband internet
access service
providers
 Doug Brake,
Information
Technology and
Innovation
Foundation
 Jon Leibowitz, 21st
Century Privacy
Coalition
 Paul Ohm,
Georgetown
University Law
Center
July 29,
2015
House Committee
on the Judiciary --
Subcommittee on
Courts,
Intellectual
Property, and the
Internet
Examine the Internet
of Things, focusing on
privacy issues and
government regulation
 Gary Shapiro,
Consumer
Electronics
Association
 Dean D. Garfield,
Information
Technology Industry
Council
 Mitch Bainwol,
Alliance of
Automobile
Manufacturers
 Morgan Reed,
ACTThe App
Association
July 28,
2015
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce --
Subcommittee on
Communication
and Technology
Summarizing current
FCC activities and
policy issues
 Tom Wheeler, FCC
 Ajit Pai, FCC

Apr. 29,
2015
House Committee
on Oversight and
Government
Reform --
Subcommittee on
Information
Technology
Examine digital data
encryption and options
to maintain proper
balance between
public safety and
privacy
 Amy Hess, FBI
Science and
Technology Branch
 Daniel F. Conley,
Suffolk County
District Attorney
 Kevin D. Bankston,
New America Open
Technology Institute
 Jon Potter,
Application
Developers Alliance
 Matthew Blaze,
University of
Pennsylvania
Department of
Computer and
Information Science
Feb. 11,
2015
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
Examine Internet of
Things (IoT) Internet-
connected devices,
focusing on concerns
over privacy and
network security
 Mike Abbott,
Kleiner Perkins
Caufield and Byers
 Douglas Davis, Intel
Corp.
 Lance Donny,
OnFarm Systems
 Adam Thierer,
George Mason
University
Center for
Democracy and
Technology
APPENDIX THREE: CONTENT REGULATION
Sept. 18,
2019
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
Examine the
proliferation of
extremism online and
explore the
effectiveness of
industry efforts to
remove violent content
from online platforms
 Ms. Monika Bickert,
Facebook
 Mr. Nick Pickles,
Twitter
 Mr. George Selim,
Anti-Defamation
League
 Mr. Derek Slater,
Google

July 16,
2019
House Committee
on Foreign
Affairs –
Subcommittee on
Europe, Eurasia,
and the
Environment
Examine Russia
alleged systematic
attempts to influence
and undermine
election processes of
Western democratic
countries, including
2016 U.S. presidential
election and recent
elections in European
countries
 Daniel Fried,
Atlantic Council
 Jessikka Aro,
investigative
journalist
 Jakub, Kalensky,
Atlantic Council
 Frederick Kagan,
American Enterprise
Institute for Public
Policy Research
June 26,
2019
House Committee
on Homeland
Security
Examine efforts by
social media
companies to combat
terrorist and extremist
content on social
networking platforms,
in light of Mar. 2019
terrorist attack in
Christchurch, New
Zealand, as well as
misinformation on
platforms
 Monika Bickert,
Facebook
 Nick Pickles,
Twitter
 Derek Slater, Google
 Nadine Strossen,
New York Law
School
May 22,
2019
House Committee
on Oversight and
Reform –
Subcommittee on
National Security
Examine cybersecurity
threats to U.S. election
infrastructure, and to
review Federal and
State efforts to
improve election
system security and
private sector activities
to protect integrity of
elections and
democratic process
 Christopher Krebs,
DHS
 Adam Hickey, DOJ
 Christy McCormick,
Election Assistance
Commission
 Ellen Weintraub,
Federal Election
Commission
 William Gavin,
Massachusetts
Secretary of State
 Nathaniel Gleicher,
Facebook
 Kevin Kane, Twitter
 Richard Salgado,
Google

Apr. 10,
2019
Senate Judiciary
Committee
Stifling Free Speech:
Technological
censorship and the
public discourse
 Carlos Monje, Jr,
Twitter
 Neil Potts, Facebook
 Chuck Konzelman,
Director
“Unplanned”
 Francesca Tripodi,
James Madison
University
 Marilyn Musgrave,
Susan B. Anthony
List
 Robbie Parker,
Father of Sandy
Hook Victim
 Eugene
Kontorovick,
George Mason Univ
Law
Apr. 9,
2019
House Judiciary
Committee
Role of social media
companies in white
nationalism and hate
crimes
 Mohammad Abu
Salha
 Kristen Clark,
National Lawyers’
Com for Civil
Rights under Law
 Mort Klein, Zionist
Org of America
 Candace Owens,
Turning Point, USA
 Eva Paterson, Equal
Justice Society
 Neil Potts, Facebook
 Alexandria Walden,
Google
Sept. 27,
2018
House Committee
Subcommittee on
the Constitution
and Civil Justice
Examine issues
regarding intellectual
freedom and freedom
of speech, including
alleged bias against
and censorship of
conservative
viewpoints at higher
education institutions
and by Internet and
social media providers
 Mike Adams,
University of North
Carolina –
Wilmington
 Peter Wood,
National Association
of Scholars
 Michael, Simkovic,
University of
Southern California
 Tim Groseclose,
George Mason
University
 James Hoft,
Gateway Pundit

 Adriana Cohen,
columnist
 Jeremy Tedesco,
Alliance Defending
Freedom
 Ari Waldman, New
York Law School
 Harmeet Dhillon,
attorney
Sept. 5,
2018
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce
Examine Twitter, Inc.,
activities to manage
and filter content on its
social media platform
 Jack Dorsey,
Twitter, Inc
Sept. 5,
2018
Senate
Intelligence
Committee
Foreign Influence
Operations’ Use of
Social Media
Platforms – Company
witnesses
 Sheryl Sandberg,
Facebook
 Jack Dorsey –
Twitter
 Larry Page – Google
(invited)
Aug. 1,
2018
Senate
Intelligence
Committee
Foreign Influence
Operations’ Use of
Social Media
Platforms – Third
party experts
 Todd Helmus,
RAND
 Renee DiResta, New
Knowledge
 John Kelly,
Graphica
 Laura Rosenberger,
German Marshall
 Philip Howard,
Oxford Internet
Institute
July 17,
2018
House Committee
on the Judiciary
Examine social media
companies activities to
filter content on their
platforms, including
rationale behind
content filtering
decisions
 Monika Bickert,
Facebook, Inc.
 Juniper Downs,
Google, Inc.
 Nick Pickles,
Twitter, Inc
June 20,
2018
Senate
Intelligence
Committee
Policy Response to
Russian Interference in
2016 Elections
 Victoria Nuland,
Center for a New
American Security
 Michael Daniel,
Cyber Threat
Alliance
June 14,
2018
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce –
Subcommittee on
Digital
Examine complexities
of digital advertising,
and to review privacy
issues regarding
collection of data
Consumers Union
 Rachel Glasser,
Wunderman

Commerce and
Consumer
Protection
detailing consumers
Internet behavior and
preferences to enable
targeted advertising
 Michael Zaneis,
Trustworthy
Accountability
Group
 Howard Beales,
George Washington
University
Mar. 7,
2018
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce –
Subcommittee on
Digital
Commerce and
Consumer
Protection
Examine electronic
commerce sales
impact on retail
industry and supply
chain logistics related
to online shopping
 Dan Sanker,
CaseStack
 Rob Taylor, Convey
 Jonathan Johnson,
Overstock.com
 David Borris, Main
Street Alliance
Nov. 29,
2017
House Committee
on Energy and
Commerce --
Subcommittee on
Communication
and Technology --
Subcommittee on
Digital
Commerce and
Consumer
Protection
Discuss companies’
use of algorithms to
personalize content,
review concerns about
protecting consumer
information, outlining
platform privacy
policy disclosures
 Catherine Tucker,
MIT School of
Management
 Omri Ben-Shahar,
University of
Chicago Law School
 Kate Klonick, Yale
Law School
 Michael Kearns,
University of
Pennsylvania
Department of
Computer and
Information Science
 Laura Moy,
Georgetown Law
Center on Privacy
and Technology
 Frank Pasquale,
University of
Maryland Law
Nov. 1,
2017
Senate
Intelligence
Committee
Social Media influence
in the 2016 elections
 Colin Stretch,
Facebook
 Sean Edgett, Twitter
 Kent Walker,
Google
Oct. 31,
2017
Senate Judiciary
Committee,
Crime and
Terrorism
Subcommittee
Extremist Content and
Russian
Disinformation
Online: Working with
Tech to Find Solutions
 Colin Stretch,
Facebook
 Sean Edgett, Twitter
 Richard Salgado,
Google

June 21,
2017
Senate
Intelligence
Committee
Russian Interference in
the 2016 US Elections
 Samuel Liles, DHS
 Jeanette Manfra,
DHS
 Bill Priestap, FBI
 Michael, Nat’l
Assoc of State
Elections Directors
 Alex Halderman,
Univ of Michigan
 Connie Lawson,
Nat’l Assoc of Secs
of State
 Steve Sandvoss,
Illinois State Bd of
Elections
Mar. 30,
2017
Senate
Intelligence
Committee
Disinformation: A
Primer in Russia
Active Measures and
Influence Campaigns
 Kevin Mandia,
FireEye
 Keith Alexander,
IronNet
Cybersecurity
 Thomas Rid, King’s
College, London
 Eugene Rumer,
Carnegie
Endowment
 Roy Godson,
Georgetown Univ
 Clint Watts, Foreign
Policy Research
Institute, National
Security
Mar. 22,
2017
Senate Committee
on Commerce,
Science, and
Transportation
Examine benefits and
risks of innovative
technologies to combat
cyber threats and
secure critical
infrastructure
 Caleb Barlow, IBM
Security
 Venky Ganesan,
National Venture
Capital Association
 Steve Grobman,
Intel Security Group
 Malcolm Harkins,
Cylance Corp.
 Eric Rosenbach,
DOD
Jan. 10,
2017
Senate
Intelligence
Committee
Intelligence
Community’s
Assessment of Russian
Activities in the 2016
Elections
 James Clapper, DNI
 John Brennan, CIA
 Michael Rogers,
NSA
 James Comey, FBI

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