Secure routing for wireless NANs
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The document discusses smart grid communications, focusing on Neighbor Area Networks (NAN) and Home Area Networks (HAN), and the security challenges associated with wireless mesh networks. It details various attacks, such as selective forwarding and routing attacks, and emphasizes the need for robust security mechanisms like identity-based cryptosystems for protecting against these threats. Additionally, the document includes simulation analysis and references related to smart grid communication protocols.
![Mainly focus on three attacks
Selective forwarding—With this active attack, an internal
malicious node intentionally drops frames of other nodes that
actually should be forwarded by the malicious node. This attack
may aim at disrupting a certain communication, a specific node,
or just the communication of the wireless network.
Routing Attacks—Incase of routing attacks, an internal
malicious node tries to influence the routing protocol in a way
that incorrect forwarding paths are used. A wormhole attack [6],
for example, aims at establishing a route to a victim node even
if there are shorter routes. This enables gaining information of
specific communications in the network or selectively
forwarding frames. 29](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/secureroutingforwirelessnans-150805175324-lva1-app6891/85/Secure-routing-for-wireless-NANs-29-320.jpg)
![Mainly focus on three attacks
Eavesdropping—If no cryptographic protection is applied within a
wireless network, external and internal malicious nodes are able to
eavesdrop on the traffic. If some protection like Robust Secure
Network (RSN) [2] or IEEE 802.11s security mechanisms is
present,
. External attackers, however, are precluded
from eavesdropping.
30](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/secureroutingforwirelessnans-150805175324-lva1-app6891/85/Secure-routing-for-wireless-NANs-30-320.jpg)
Secure routing for wireless NANs
- 1. Student: Reza Sadeghi Advisor: Dr. Mazinani Course: Smartgrid My email: reza.sadeghi@imamreza.ac.ir im_rezasadeghi@yahoo.com November & December 2013
- 2. Smart Grid Common Networks Neighbor Area Network (NAN) Home Area Network (HAN) Power Generation Power Transmission Grid Power Distribution Grid Power Consumption Smart MeterSubstationSubstation Customer Microgrid Microgrid (a) Power System Layer (b) Communications Layer Wireless Backhaul Base Station Control Center Wired Backhaul Network Wide Area Network (WAN) Smart Meter Data Aggregation Point (DAP) Electric Vehicle Solar EnegyWind Enegy Non-renewable Enegy Concentrator Smart Home Device 2
- 3. NAN is first of the war New houses produce their supply 3
- 4. Materials of NANs in ??IEEE802.11s?? MP-> A mesh point (MP) is an IEEE 802.11s entity that mainly acts as a relay node. MAP-> A mesh access point (MAP) is an MP but can also work as an access point MPP-> A mesh portal (MPP) is a logical point and has a bridging functionality and connects the mesh network to other networks STA-> Legacy wireless mobile stations (STA) are connected to an MAP through generic WLAN protocols. Thus, configuration of an MAP allows a single entity to logically provide both mesh functionalities and AP functionalities simultaneously. 4
- 5. 5
- 6. Security in SG in routing perspective Security in NANs Routing protocols Routing in WMN Routing discovery Routing maintenance Data passing 6
- 7. HWMN for IEEE 802.11s 7
- 8. Most of Mutable filed are dangerous 8
- 11. Routing Loop 11
- 13. Key Establishment procedure in IEEE 802.11s 13
- 14. SHWMN 14
- 16. Securing on demand mode F1 F2 In action! 16
- 17. Markle Tree for S->B->C 17
- 19. Securing hybrid mode Proactive mode Tree On-demand Security analyses? Flooding/Rout disruption/ Rout diversion/Routing Loop 19
- 21. Analysis 21
- 22. IBC-HWMP IBC(Identity based Cryptosystems) IBC Algorithm Encryption Setup Extract Encrypt Decrypt Digital signature Setup Extract Encrypt Decrypt 22 Solve external nod problems Solve internal nods problem
- 23. Encryption 23
- 25. Changes The digital signature is incorporated into PREQ and PREP messages by adding two new fields : IBC-Mac Size (digital signature size : 1 Byte) and IBC-MAC (digital signature). 25
- 26. Simulation Software:NS3 The side of the square cell is defined by m step (100m) parameter. We have used a UDP traffic, Packet Size=1024 and Packet Interval=0.1. Three metrics: Mean delay, control routing overhead and throughput. 26
- 27. Analysis 27
- 28. TOP(Type of protection) Possible attacks in mesh networks Nodes showing unintended behavior due to hardware or software failures: problems caused by such nodes should be solved by fault tolerance mechanisms instead of security mechanisms. Therefore, we will not consider such nodes within this work. External malicious nodes, which are intentionally not allowed to join the network. Internal malicious nodes, which legitimately are part of the network and show egoistic behavior or are compromised by an attacker. Egoistic behavior, e. g., intentionally dropping frames, aims at saving resources or gaining higher bandwidth. Attacks could be launched by dropping frames, by corrupting the routine 28
- 29. Mainly focus on three attacks Selective forwarding—With this active attack, an internal malicious node intentionally drops frames of other nodes that actually should be forwarded by the malicious node. This attack may aim at disrupting a certain communication, a specific node, or just the communication of the wireless network. Routing Attacks—Incase of routing attacks, an internal malicious node tries to influence the routing protocol in a way that incorrect forwarding paths are used. A wormhole attack [6], for example, aims at establishing a route to a victim node even if there are shorter routes. This enables gaining information of specific communications in the network or selectively forwarding frames. 29
- 30. Mainly focus on three attacks Eavesdropping—If no cryptographic protection is applied within a wireless network, external and internal malicious nodes are able to eavesdrop on the traffic. If some protection like Robust Secure Network (RSN) [2] or IEEE 802.11s security mechanisms is present, . External attackers, however, are precluded from eavesdropping. 30
- 31. Concept of TOP Main idea: Wireless mesh network can be as secure as VLAN in Ethernet network 31 VLANs allow for transport of different virtual networks over a single network by tagging the frames
- 33. TOP mapping 33
- 35. Ideas evaluation! 1. Insert a hole in Mesh network? 2. Broadcasting data in two ways time of money with Global broadcasting and … 3. Change from prime Galvani to binary Galvani? ((prime Galvani has simplest and better performing in software vs. binary Galvani has better performance in special hardware due to in our wireless mesh network we should use prime Galvani)) 4. Travel to secure protocol with less process consume ((bilinear map which is subroutine of discreet logarithm is most effectives strongest algorithm )) 5. Why we create SGN? 6. Find Trojans with HMM and etc. 7. What are NAN protocol and way we use them? 35 In field of creating loop and external nodes work is finished but the Trojans are alive to kill us and destroy our world; therefore, we should slaughter them as soon as possible.
- 36. References 1. A survey of routing protocols for smart grid communications written by Nico Saputro, Kemal Akkaya, Suleyman Uludag 2. Chapter 5: Smart Grid Communications Networks.ppt produced by Quang- Dung Ho and Tho Le-Ngoc;ECE Dept., McGill University, Montreal, Canada 3. M.S. Islam, Y.J. Yoon, M.A. Hamid, C.S. Hong, A secure hybrid wireless mesh protocol for 802.11s mesh network,2008 4. T. Gamer, L.Vlker, M.Zitterbart, Differentiated security in wireless mesh networks, Security and Communication Networks 4 (2011) 257–266. 5. On Securing HWMP using IBC(IEEE_05962921) 6. Dr. Nikoghadam prsentation 7. A New E-HWMP Routing Algorithm in Automatic Meter Reading Networks written by Li Li, Xiaoguang Hu and Ketai He, 2013 8.www.wikipedia.org 36
- 37. END 37
Editor's Notes
- #4: Pic comes from BBC movies