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27th September 2012

                      Abraham Aranguren
                              @7a_
                      abraham@cure53.de
                        http://cure53.de
VSA: The Virtual Scripted Attacker, Brucon 2012
Review JavaScript code on the page:

    <script>
    document.write("Site is at: " + document.location.href + ".");
    </script>

    Sometimes active testing possible in your browser
    (no trip to server = not an attack = not logged):
    http://target.com/...#vulnerable_param=xss



http://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2010/09/twitter-domxss-wrong-fix-and-something.html
Top security aware companies …
with DOM XSS reported via bug bounty programs:

• Google
• PayPal
• Facebook
• Etsy
• Yandex
•…
Are they searching for DOM XSS without pants like this?
                                                  this?




  Phil Stevens - http://www.strengthguild.com/ http://www.ironradio.org/
The Problem
Websites have a LOT of JavaScript and DOM XSS is hard to find because:
                                                              because:

• DOM XSS happens on the client-side
                              client-
• Traditional HTTP fuzzing does not work for DOM XSS
• Traditional tools are unaware of client-side logic
                                    client-
• Most tools cannot verify the DOM XSS exploit worked
• Most tools cannot find DOM XSS in a 100% automated way
• Even DOMINATOR Pro is only a manual testing tool for the Pro

DOM XSS often requires:
                  requires:
• User interaction: Click buttons, drag items, etc
• Timing constraints

A HARD problem to SOLVE
Created by
• Mario Heiderich (XSS PhD!)
• Gareth Heyes
• Abraham Aranguren
• Alfred Farrugia
• Frederik Braun
What are we doing differently?
                    differently?
• VSA is 100% automated
• We have tested we find MANY more DOM XSS vulnerabilities
• We can verify that the DOM XSS payload worked
• We are finding DOM XSS on the BROWSER -where JavaScript runs-
• We are verifying DOM XSS on the BROWSER -where JavaScript runs-
• We can tell you the line of code that is vulnerable
• We can tell you the JavaScript file where the vulnerability is
• We have the means to implement VIRTUAL PATCHING
          Do you want us to scan YOUR site? ☺
                                      site?
Demo Time
Q&A


 Abraham Aranguren
         @7a_
 abraham@cure53.de
   http://cure53.de

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VSA: The Virtual Scripted Attacker, Brucon 2012

  • 1. 27th September 2012 Abraham Aranguren @7a_ abraham@cure53.de http://cure53.de
  • 3. Review JavaScript code on the page: <script> document.write("Site is at: " + document.location.href + "."); </script> Sometimes active testing possible in your browser (no trip to server = not an attack = not logged): http://target.com/...#vulnerable_param=xss http://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2010/09/twitter-domxss-wrong-fix-and-something.html
  • 4. Top security aware companies … with DOM XSS reported via bug bounty programs: • Google • PayPal • Facebook • Etsy • Yandex •…
  • 5. Are they searching for DOM XSS without pants like this? this? Phil Stevens - http://www.strengthguild.com/ http://www.ironradio.org/
  • 6. The Problem Websites have a LOT of JavaScript and DOM XSS is hard to find because: because: • DOM XSS happens on the client-side client- • Traditional HTTP fuzzing does not work for DOM XSS • Traditional tools are unaware of client-side logic client- • Most tools cannot verify the DOM XSS exploit worked • Most tools cannot find DOM XSS in a 100% automated way • Even DOMINATOR Pro is only a manual testing tool for the Pro DOM XSS often requires: requires: • User interaction: Click buttons, drag items, etc • Timing constraints A HARD problem to SOLVE
  • 7. Created by • Mario Heiderich (XSS PhD!) • Gareth Heyes • Abraham Aranguren • Alfred Farrugia • Frederik Braun What are we doing differently? differently? • VSA is 100% automated • We have tested we find MANY more DOM XSS vulnerabilities • We can verify that the DOM XSS payload worked • We are finding DOM XSS on the BROWSER -where JavaScript runs- • We are verifying DOM XSS on the BROWSER -where JavaScript runs- • We can tell you the line of code that is vulnerable • We can tell you the JavaScript file where the vulnerability is • We have the means to implement VIRTUAL PATCHING Do you want us to scan YOUR site? ☺ site?
  • 9. Q&A Abraham Aranguren @7a_ abraham@cure53.de http://cure53.de