Public Lecture Presentatin Slide (6.11.2013): Jason Wheelock: Understanding the Asia Pivot
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The document discusses the US "Asia pivot" strategy announced in 2011 to increase diplomatic, military, and economic engagement with Asia. It notes rising budget deficits and declining public support for reducing the deficit and defense spending. The document also examines the "Air-Sea Battle" concept for ensuring US access to Asia in the face of challenges. It discusses the US Marine Corps' posture in the Pacific and challenges of distributed basing. The concluding section notes budget constraints could limit the Asia pivot unless defense strategy and funding are better aligned.
Public Lecture Presentatin Slide (6.11.2013): Jason Wheelock: Understanding the Asia Pivot
- 1. 1 Jason Wheelock Visiting Fellow, the National Institute for Defense Studies and Council on Foreign Relations-Hitachi International Affairs Fellow in Japan June 11, 2013 These views are the presenter’s and should not be interpreted as that of the Congressional Budget Office. Understanding the Asia Pivot
- 2. 2 Introduction to Asia Pivot • Fall of 2011 Obama Administration issued a series of announcements regarding an expanded diplomatic, military and economic focus on Asia. • Obama speech to the Australian Parliament and US as a Pacific nation (November 2011). • Clinton Foreign Policy Article-Cost Benefit Approach to US Engagement (November 2011). • Pivot Versus Rebalance-Politicians Pivot/Generals and Admirals Rebalance.
- 3. 3 Deficits Projected in CBO’s May 2013 Baseline and Under an Alternative Fiscal Scenario Total 2014- 2014- 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2018 2023 In Billions of Dollars CBO's May 2013 Baseline Revenues 2,813 3,042 3,399 3,606 3,779 3,943 4,103 4,280 4,494 4,732 4,959 17,769 40,336 Outlays 3,455 3,602 3,777 4,038 4,261 4,485 4,752 5,012 5,275 5,620 5,855 20,163 46,677 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ______ ______ Deficit -642 -560 -378 -432 -482 -542 -648 -733 -782 -889 -895 -2,394 -6,340 Debt Held by the Public at the End of the Year 12,036 12,685 13,156 13,666 14,223 14,827 15,537 16,330 17,168 18,118 19,070 n.a. n.a. Alternative Fiscal Scenario Revenues 2,813 2,988 3,305 3,519 3,696 3,862 4,022 4,198 4,409 4,643 4,864 17,369 39,505 Outlays 3,455 3,671 3,881 4,156 4,393 4,632 4,934 5,209 5,485 5,836 6,082 20,733 48,279 ____ ______ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ Deficit -642 -683 -577 -637 -697 -770 -912 -1,010 -1,076 -1,193 -1,219 -3,364 -8,774 Debt Held by the Public at the End of the Year 12,036 12,808 13,477 14,193 14,965 15,798 16,771 17,841 18,973 20,228 21,503 n.a. n.a. Fiscal Environment Source: Congressional Budget Office, Updated Budget Projections: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023 (May 2013)
- 4. 4 Deficit Reduction and Public Opinion • In January 2013 Pew Foundation Poll, 72 percent of respondents felt reducing the budget deficit was a top priority for the President and Congress.
- 5. 5 Defense Spending and Public Opinion • The wars are winding down and fewer people see defense spending as a high priority. China and other security problems are offset by domestic concerns.
- 6. 6 FY0 0 FY0 1 FY0 2 FY0 3 FY0 4 FY0 5 FY0 6 FY0 7 FY0 8 FY0 9 FY1 0 FY1 1 FY1 2 FY1 3 FY1 4 FY1 5 FY1 6 FY1 7 FY1 8 Other 9 6 3 8 3 7 1 War 0 23 17 73 91 76 116 166 187 146 162 159 115 81 88 37 37 37 37 Base 279 287 328 365 377 400 411 432 479 513 528 528 530 525 527 541 551 560 569 Total 287 316 345 438 468 479 535 601 666 666 691 687 645 574 615 578 588 597 606 Intial BCA Caps 527 540 551 563 576 Seq/Adj Caps 493 475 488 499 511 524 287 316 345 438 468 479 535 601 666 666 691 687 645 574 615 578 588 597 606 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 BudgetAuthorityin$Billions DoD Topline and Budget Control Act Other War Base Intial BCA Caps Seq/Adj Caps Data source for “Base,” “War,” and “Other” funding: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request and FY 2013 Update, April 2013. Amounts for “Initial BCA Caps” and “Seq/Adj Caps” based on presenter’s analysis of the Budget Control Act.
- 7. 7 Budget in Constant FY 2014 $ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Other 12 8 0 0 0 4 10 4 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 War 0 32 23 95 116 92 137 192 209 161 175 168 119 82 88 36 36 35 35 Base 401 398 445 480 480 488 486 497 537 567 569 558 550 501 527 533 535 533 530 Total 414 437 468 576 596 584 632 693 746 736 745 726 669 584 615 570 571 568 565 Intial BCA caps 527 533 534 536 537 Sequester/Adj Caps 475 481 484 486 489 414 437 468 576 596 584 632 693 746 736 745 726 669 584 615 570 571 568 565 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 BudgetAuthority Observation #1: Using DoD FY2014 deflators to adjust for inflation, DoD’s Base Budget grew in real terms by roughly 3.6% annually between 2000 and 2010. In 2000, DoD Base Budget was $401 billion in FY2014 dollars and grew to $569 billion in 2010, as measured in 2014 dollars. Observation #2: Using 2000 as the starting point, the cumulative increases in defense spending between 2001 and 2013 were approximately $1.2 trillion. In comparison, the cost of the war, measured in FY 2014 dollars, was approximately $1.5 trillion over the same period. Source data: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request and FY 2013 Update, April 2013.
- 8. 8 “Retrenchment” versus “Foreign Policy Begins at Home” • In foreign policy circles, the term word retrenchment is often associated with debates on reducing the size of US overseas commitments. The US has five allies who fall under security treaties (Japan, ROK, Thailand, Australia, and the Philippines). Prospects of a reduced military spending cause alarm and raise fears of abandonment amongst allies and other security partners. • Given the current fiscal environment, DoD is beginning the process to think about the size, rolls and operations in a peacetime environment. Secretary Hagel ordered a Strategic Choices and Management Review. • Many analysts are now advocating a “Foreign Policy Begins at Home” approach. Richard Haas states in his new book that “Core Defense Spending” can be reduced to slightly below $500 billion without jeopardizing American security.
- 9. 9 Air Sea Battle • First mentioned in 2010 QDR, but did not receive much widespread attention until an article in American Interest by General Schwartz and Admiral Greenert in February of 2012 that outlined the concept and need for Air Sea Battle (ASB). • Premise #1: Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) strategies and capabilities of potential adversaries will erode the ability of the US military to project power to “hot spots” and will erode security guarantees of the US, which will undermine US political influence. • Premise #2: US military must retain ability to ensure access to all areas of the globe because American interests are global and threats to US interests can develop from anywhere in the World. Evidence provided was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. • Premise #3: A fixed focus on a particular geography and reliance on large, expensive overseas installations is out of date. • Budget Question: What will it cost for the US to field the necessary capabilities to ensure access to critical regions, such as the Asia-Pacific or Southwest Asia (i.e. the Middle East), and what tradeoffs, such as a much US ground forces, will be considered. The Air Sea Battle Office was established, in part, to ensure such funding for such capabilities is retained despite the constrained defense budget.
- 10. 10 First and Second Island Chains and Air Sea Battle Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. Greg Jaffe, Gene Thorp, Bill Webster/The Washington Post. Published on August 1, 2012.
- 11. 11 Other Threats to US Forces in Asia Pacific Source: “Kim Jong Un Reveals His ‘US Mainland Strike Plan’,” March 29th, 2013. Daily Mail. North Korean Missile Ranges (Max): Nodong: 1,000 km Taepodong-1: 2,200 km Musadan: 4,000 km Taepodong-2: 6,000 km Source: BBC News, North Korea Missile Program, April 12, 2013 How will capabilities of North Korea and China evolve? Will a move to Guam, which won’t be completed till at least 2020, provide significantly more protection than the current posture?
- 12. 12 USMC Pacific Posture • DoD’s stated policy is to have approximately 22,000 Marines west of the International Dateline, the vast majority of which are assigned to Japan. That was the goal before the pivot and will continue under the proposed rebalancing. • However, as of December 31, 2012, the number of Marines in East Asia and the Pacific was about 19,000, with 18,676 in Japan. Because of OCO deployments the number of units on Okinawa via Unit Deployment Plans is less than before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. • The current posture places the vast majority of the 22,000 Marines at bases in Okinawa and the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture. • The future posture calls for the 22,000 Marines to be in Okinawa, Iwakuni, Guam and Australia.
- 13. 13 USMC Posture Challenges • Command and Control because of the separation of HQ units at different locations. Current the III Marine Expeditionary Force, the III Division, and the III Marine Expeditionary Brigade HQs are all in Okinawa. Not the case under the proposed posture. • Tyranny of Distance in the Pacific and the effect on war plans and other operational considerations, especially in light of an amphibious sealift shortfall. • Breaking up USMC presence into small, geographically distributed pieces could result in a loss of economies of scale. • Long Construction Timetable • Costs
- 14. 14 Final Thoughts • DoD faces challenges if they are faced with flat or declining budgets. Real growth in the defense budget allowed for DoD to maintain personnel levels during a time of significant increases in personnel and operation and maintain costs. • DoD might be faced with significant reductions in personnel levels for ground forces that could affect basing plans for US forces. • The current law (the Budget Control Act), long-term budget situation, and diminished support for defense spending could significantly constrain defense spending over the next decade. • Although the Asia-Pacific is a region of great importance to the United States, much more work is needed to make sure the structure, strategy and funding of DoD is aligned if the “pivot” to Asia is to be successful.