2014 defense-rd

The Challenges for America’s
Defense Innovation
BY DAN STEINBOCK
NOVEMBER 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................................. 3
The State of U.S. Defense Innovation ...........................................................4
U.S. Military Expenditures in International Perspective...........................................4
A (Very) Short History of U.S. Defense R&D.........................................................5
Key Defense R&D Actors..............................................................................9
Department of Defense ...........................................................................................9
Department of Energy...........................................................................................12
DOD Labs and University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs)..........................12
Department of Homeland Security........................................................................12
Defense Contractors .................................................................................... 14
Reconfiguration of Defense and Aerospace Industry..............................................14
Defense Contractors and Public/Private Partnerships ............................................14
New Public-Private Partnerships............................................................................15
Defense Innovation at the Crossroads .......................................................... 16
Sequestration and Limited Budgets........................................................................16
Bias for Short-Term Policies..................................................................................17
Challenges of Defense Acquisitions........................................................................19
From Defense Spin-Offs to Consumer Spin-Ons ..................................................20
Hollowing Out of the Defense Industrial Base.......................................................21
Erosion of Competitive Inter-Service Pressures......................................................23
Lower Defense Contractor R&D Intensity............................................................24
Rise of Foreign Competition........................................................................ 26
Conclusion.................................................................................................. 27
Endnotes..................................................................................................... 39
Acknowledgements...................................................................................... 35
About the Author ........................................................................................ 35
About ITIF ................................................................................................. 35
PAGE 2THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION | NOVEMBER 2014

INTRODUCTION
As he disclosed his new “defense innovation initiative” in mid-November
2014, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel hoped that it would invest money
in “cutting-edge technologies and systems, especially from the fields of
robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and advanced
manufacturing, including 3-D printing.”1
Hagel argued that “we must do
so by making new, long-term investments in innovation.” It was an
ambitious innovation plan for maintaining the military’s technological
edge, especially if tightening budgets are taken as a given.
Hagel compared this needed defense innovation initiative in scale to two past offset
programs, including the nuclear buildup in the 1950s, as well as the 1970s development of
precision-guided missiles, stealth aircraft and advanced intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance platforms. Hagel called the new initiative the “third offsets strategy.”2
In
each case, these initiatives sought substantial breakthroughs in strategy or technology that
could offset an adversary’s advantage in traditional military strength. But this time while
the goal may be the same — develop tranformative technology so our miltary has a decided
edge in any fight it engages in — the means may be quite different. For while in the past
these big innovation iniatives can with a big federal checkbook, Secretary Hagel’s “ask”
today is much more constrained. His initiative “will put new resources behind innovation,
but also account for today’s fiscal realities — by focusing on investments that will sharpen
our military edge even as we contend with fewer resources.” Whether this new model – big
goals, limited means — will succeed, remains to be seen.
Since the early days of the republic, U.S. innovation has been driven by federal support.
The majority of that support has not reflected a quest for productivity, innovation or
competitiveness. Rather, it has focused on the pursuit of military prowess. For example, the
development of the armory practice with its precise parts tolerances and the accompanying
machine tool industry paved the way for mass production, epitomized by the Ford Model
T.3
From WWII armaments production to the 1957 launch of the Soviet Sputnik, to the
1980s defense buildup, U.S. defense R&D investments not only led the world but made a
major but still under-appreciated contribution to U.S. innovation leadership. Yet since the
end of Cold War, federal funding for R&D, including defense R&D, has increased much
more gradually and recently has actually declined. Since the 2013 debt debacle, the
sequestration — automatic spending cuts — have compounded the challenges. Congress
failed to agree on a credible, bipartisan and medium-term debt-reduction program (one
that would have cut entitlements while increasing taxes on individuals), and, after a brief
government shutdown, the $1.2 trillion sequestration plan was activated.4
It came with a
A robust federal policy to
restore defense-related
innovation and
production in the United
States would pay
significant dividends on
two fronts: continued
U.S. defense strength
through superior
technology and broader
U.S. commercial global
competitiveness.

presidential report warning that the “sequestration would be deeply destructive to national
security.”5
This report takes a closer look at America’s defense innovation. First, it assesses the state of
U.S. defense innovation, including military expenditures in international perspective, the
history of defense R&D, the key defense R&D funders and defense R&D performers. It
then examines the crossroads of defense innovation, by assessing the impact of limited
budgets, the bias for short-term policies, challenges of defense acquisition, defense spin-offs
and commercial spin-ons, the hollowing out of the defense industrial base, the erosion of
competitive inter-service pressures, lower defense contractor R&D intensity and the rise of
foreign competition.
The U.S. defense system is still the most innovative in the world, but that leadership is not
assured, especially in the face of limited budgets. Moreover, U.S. defense innovation
leadership has long benefited from overall U.S. innovation leadership, while at the same
time robust defense innovation has spurred U.S. civilian innovation. But continued
relative decline in U.S. commercial innovation will negatively impact defense innovation
and capabilities, while declining investments in defense innovation will negatively impact
overall U.S. innovation and competitiveness. As such, a robust federal policy to restore
defense-related innovation and production in the United States would pay dividends on
two fronts: continued U.S. defense strength through superior technology and broader U.S.
commercial global competitiveness.
THE STATE OF U.S. DEFENSE INNOVATION
U.S. Military R&D Expenditures in International Perspective
Since World War II, U.S. defense R&D expenditures have been the highest in the world.
It was not until the late 1970s that the combined military spending of France, Germany,
Japan and UK exceeded that of the United States. Ironically, today their share is smaller
than that of the United States, again as Europe has reduced its role in defense in favor of
supporting its domestic welfare systems.
Figure 1: U.S. Military Expenditures as Percent of Global Military Expenditures
6

Figure 2: U.S. GDP as Percent of World Economy
7
*2013 figures in U.S dollars at current prices and exchange rates.
Despite America’s sixty year leadership in defense innovation, its position is evolving. In
2013, global military expenditure exceeded $1.7 trillion. U.S. military spending surpassed
that of the next nine nations combined (China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, UK,
Germany, Japan, India, and South Korea). (Figure 1)8
U.S. military expenditures
accounted for 37 percent of all such expenditures globally, even though American GDP is
only 24 percent of the world economy. (Figure 2)
Due to the continued sovereign debt crises, military spending is falling in the West —
North America, Western Europe, and Oceania — but increasing in other regions. In 2013,
the U.S. military spending fell by 7.8 percent, to $640 billion as Congress sought to reduce
the budget deficit.
While defense is a significant objective of government R&D funding in most major
advanced economies, its share varies widely. In the United States, it accounted for 57
percent of the federal R&D support in 2011; more than three times the share given to
defense in in South Korea and the UK and eight times more than in France, Germany, or
Japan, respectively.9
As a share of GDP U.S. government R&D expenditures on defense
are twice as high as that of France or Russia; three times as large as that of South Korea, or
the UK; nine times that of China, Germany, or Japan; and 14 times more than the
European Union nations combined.10
In contrast, the United States invests 40 percent less
on non-defense R&D than do the EU nations where more government R&D funding is
directed to areas with more direct commercial relevance to their economies.11
A (Very) Short History of U.S. Defense R&D
If World War II transformed the U.S. R&D system, the Manhattan Project ushered in the
age of “big science” as scientific progress came to rely increasingly on large-scale defense
projects financed by national governments, or groups of nations. In the postwar era, the
Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), a civilian agency led by Vannevar

Bush, was relatively small in financial terms, but it exemplified institutional innovation, by
contracting with the private sector (e.g., Western Electric) and relying heavily on
universities (e.g., MIT).12
Indeed, the increase in U.S. military funding of science and
technology after World War II was on a scale unprecedented in world history. Among
other accomplishments, the Department of Defense (DOD) supported research on
semiconductors and was an early key customer of the new technology. It pioneered
advanced aviation technologies, exemplified by its support of Lockheed Martin’s Skunk
Works. And in perhaps the iconic case of defense spinoffs, it laid the groundwork for the
development of the Internet.
If World War II dramatically mobilized and expanded the U.S. national innovation system,
the Cold War expanded the size and the central role of defense R&D in a way that
distinguished the U.S. national innovation system from its counterparts in Europe and
elsewhere. The Korean War fueled U.S. military embrace of high-technology and
associated R&D. In the 1950s, the focus was on new weapons, from jet-propelled fighters
and bombers to nuclear-powered submarines. After Sputnik, R&D spending soared,
particularly in defense. It also very quickly led to the launch of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which was set up to invest in high-risk, high-payoff
research. DARPA was designed to be a flexible non-bureaucratic agency that focused solely
on technology.13
Initially, the rise of the huge U.S. defense innovation engine was seen not as an unalloyed
blessing, but as a tradeoff between welfare and security. In his Farewell Address, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the dangers of the “military-industrial complex”
and the potential “domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project
allocations, and the power of money.”14
Eisenhower made his statement at a time when
U.S. global economic supremacy was at its peak. Since then it has become clearer that
defense expenditures, particularly for R&D, have played an important role in the U.S.
innovation system that in turn has supported U.S. global competitive advantage.
Through the Cold War era, defense R&D dominated the U.S. federal R&D budget.
Thereafter its share has fallen below 50 percent of the total federal R&D obligations only a
few times. In 1960, defense research accounted for 80 percent of federal R&D funds. Its
subsequent relative decline converged with the growth of the NASA space program, the
drawdown after Vietnam, and growing popular opposition to combat operations. Hovering
around 50 percent until the early 1980s, it was boosted dramatically by the Reagan-era
rearmament in both absolute and relative terms. (see Figure 3, Figure 4)
The DOD investment and military procurement in the 1970s and ‘80s contributed to the
technology boom and high growth rate in the 1990s. Indeed, the county most dependent
on defense contracts in the early 1990s was not in Texas or Mississippi but in California’s
Santa Clara County, Silicon Valley.
By providing a source of
demand for new
technologies that do not
have existing markets,
military spending
provides an important
impetus for R&D that
impacts broader
innovation.

Figure 3: Historical Outlays for R&D: Defense and Nondefense (in millions of current dollars)
15
Figure 4: Defense and Nondefense R&D Budget Authority: (as percentage of GDP, 1949-2013)
(Data from the National Science Foundation, 2002, 2014)
16
Nevertheless, the DOD’s commitment to advanced-technology prevailed even when the
Cold War ended, the Soviet Union collapsed and defense budgets plunged worldwide. As
Congress committed to doubling the NIH budget, the share of the defense R&D
expenditures shrank back to just over half of the total. If the U.S. success in the first
Persian Gulf War demonstrated U.S. superiority in military might and defense R&D, the
technology revolution in the late 1990s intensified efforts to move defense doctrines into
the networked Internet era.
However, things changed again after September 11, 2001, when defense R&D
expenditures rapidly increased. In 2003, military R&D exceeded $50 billion; it peaked at

$83 billion in 2009. During the Great Recession, defense R&D plunged to about $61
billion in 2014, but is anticipated to climb back to around $69 billion by 2015.
Of total federal obligations for R&D in the early 2010s, more than half were accounted for
by the DOD. The lion’s share of the rest can be attributed to the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), Department of Energy (DOE), and NASA (Figure 5).
Moreover, the composition of federal obligations for defense R&D differs substantially
from that in the civilian sector. The bulk (81 percent) of DOD R&D goes to development,
particularly to (6.3) advanced technology development (weapons systems, prototypes, etc.)
whereas (6.2) applied research accounts for 7 percent, and (6.1) basic research barely 3
percent (Figure 6). Development accounts for just 15 percent of nondefense R&D,
whereas basic and applied research account for 45 percent and 40 percent, respectively.
(Figure 7)
Figure 5: Federal Obligations for R&D, FY 2011
17
Figure 6: Department of Defense R&D, DOD, FY 2011
18

Figure 7: Federal Obligations for R&D, Other than DOD, FY 2011
19
KEY DEFENSE R&D FUNDERS
R&D directed at national defense objectives is supported primarily by the Department of
Defense but it also includes R&D by the Department of Energy and, to a lesser degree, the
Department of Homeland Security.
Figure 8: Trends in Defense R&D Expenditures, FY 1976-2015
20
(billions of constant 2014
dollars)
Department of Defense
Defense R&D focuses on three main areas: DOD weapons development, DOD science &
technology, and DOE atomic defense. By 2015, DOD expenditures for weapons
development are expected to decrease to $52.6 billion (over 75 percent of the total defense
R&D), and DOD science and technology to $12 billion (17 percent), while DOE atomic
defense will rise to $5 billion (8 percent). (Figure 8)21
In other words, between 2005 and
2015, total defense R&D spending will have contracted by 21 percent (in inflation-
adjusted terms). In the same time period, DOD weapons development and DOD science
and technology will have contracted by 21 percent and 25 percent, respectively, whereas
DOE atomic defense will have increased by 6 percent. (Figure 9)
Between 2005 and 2015,
total defense R&D will
have contracted by 21
percent. In turn, DOD
weapons development and
DOD science and
technology will have
contracted by 21 percent
and 25 percent,
respectively.

Figure 9: Percentage Change in Defense R&D Expenditures, FY 2005-2015e
22
Based on DOD R&D expenditures by agency or department — that is, Army, Navy, Air
Force, Defense Agencies (Missile Defense Agency, DARPA) — the Air Force (36 percent
of expected DOD total R&D in 2015) and Navy (25 percent) have remained dominant.
Between 2005 and 2015, the Army, Missile Defense Agency and DARPA each have had a
minor role in DOD total R&D (less than 10 percent by 2015). (Figure 10) Through that
decade, DOD total R&D will have shrunk by 22 percent. The decline has been most
dramatic in Army and missile defense (over -47 percent each), while both the Navy and
DARPA suffered substantial decline (-20 percent and -18 percent, respectively). Even the
Air Force was no longer immune to decline (-4 percent). (Figure 11)
Figure 10: DOD R&D Expenditures by Agency/Department, FY 1991-2015e
23
(billions of constant
2014 dollars)

Figure 11: Percentage change in DOD R&D by Agency/Department Expenditures, FY 2005-
2015e
24
Looking at the role of DOD science and technology expenditures between 2005 and 2015,
the total is expected to decline from $16 billion to $12 billion. Advanced technology
development is likely to contract by 38 percent to $5 billion by 2015. Meanwhile, applied
research will decline to $4.4 billion (-23 percent), whereas basic research will climb to $2
billion (13 percent) (Figure 12). Total DOD science and technology spending is likely to
contract by 25 percent from 2005 to 2015. These allocations peaked at $17 billion already
in 1993, when advanced technology development accounted for 56 percent of the total. In
2015, the total will be a third less, while the share of advanced technology development
will be 41 percent of the total. (Figure 13)
Figure 12: DOD Science and Technology Expenditures, FY 1990-2015
25
(billions of constant
2014 dollars)
*Medical research is appropriated outside RDT&E; appropriated in ‘6.2’ accounts before 1999.

Figure 13: Changes in DOD Science and Technology Expenditures, FY 2005-2015e (%)
26
Department of Energy
In fiscal year 2011, the DOE obligated $9.9 billion for R&D with over 90 percent for
R&D and the rest for R&D plant.27
The DOE’s R&D activities are distributed among
domestic energy systems, defense (much of which is funded by the department’s National
Nuclear Security Administration), and general science, most of which is funded by the
department’s Office of Science.
DOE has focused its funding on nuclear weapons, energy, and nuclear clean-up. During
the oil crisis years, it spent equal amounts on defense and energy. During the 1980s defense
build-up, spending on nuclear weapons was about two-thirds of the DOE budget, while
energy got the rest. Since the Cold War, DOE has spent about equal amounts on nuclear
weapons, energy, and defense clean-up.28
DOD Labs and University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs)
In the Army, R&D and production proceeded alongside one another in the manufacturing
arsenals that had been in continuous operation since the 19th
century, despite actions taken
by some Army leaders to separate these functions organizationally. In contrast, the Navy
maintained a sharper organizational division of labor between R&D and production.
Established in 1923, the Naval Research Laboratory operates independently of the Navy’s
material bureaus, where, as in Army’s arsenals, technological innovation historically had
depended on close coordination of R&D, and production. Created in 1947, the Air Force
has relied more heavily than both the Army and the Navy on the private sector for new
knowledge and skills. However, it has also operated an extensive network of in-house
laboratories.29
At the same time, the DOD and the services have steered funds to multiple
competing technologies to support similar or identical missions, from long-range strikes on
Soviet territory to tactical defense of the Navy’s ships.30

DOD also funds University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) which are strategic
DOD research centers associated with universities. Starting with the creation of the
Applied Physics Lab at Johns Hopkins in 1942, the UARCs have sought to maintain
engineering and technology capabilities of particular importance to the DOD. UARCs are
nonprofit organizations considered vital to maintaining essential R&D and engineering
“core” capabilities. They have long-term strategic relationships with their DOD sponsors.
(Table 1)
Primary Sponsor University UARC
Army
Georgia Institute of
Technology
Georgia Tech Research
Institute (GTRI) Applied
Systems Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Institute for Soldier
Nanotechnologies
University of California,
Santa Barbara
Institute for Collaborative
Biotechnologies
University of Southern
California
Institute for Creative
Technologies
Navy John Hopkins University
Applied Physics
Laboratory
Penn State University
Applied Physics
Laboratory
University of Hawaii
Applied Physics
Laboratory
University of Washington
Applied Physics
Laboratory
Missile Defense Agency
(MDA)
Utah State University
Space Dynamics
Laboratory
DASD (Systems
Engineering)
Stevens Institute of
Technology
Systems Engineering
Research Center
National Security Agency
University of Maryland,
College Park
Center for Advanced Study
of Language
Strategic Command
(STRATCOM)
University of Nebraska
National Strategic
Research Institute
Table 1: Sponsors, Universities, and DOD UARCs (2014)
31
Department of Homeland Security
In fiscal 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) obligated $1.1 billion for
R&D and R&D plant, nearly all of which was focused on activities by the department’s
Science and Technology Directorate (the Department’s R&D arm).32
The four major areas
of activity are: acquisition and operations support; laboratory facilities; R&D and

innovation;33
and university programs.34
Of the obligations for R&D, 14 percent went to
basic research, 33 percent to applied research, and 53 percent to development.
In terms of defense R&D performers, there are three main groups: federal laboratories,
university-affiliated research centers (UARCs), and defense contractors. National defense
represented about 58 percent of the total budget authority for R&D in fiscal 2011.
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
In addition to significant outsourcing of research during the Cold War to entities like
UARCs, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force also support substantial in-house R&D as
well as a network of defense contractors that build and maintain weapons systems.35
Today, most government contractors, including defense contractors, are coping with
budget cuts, contract delays and uncertainty.
Reconfiguration of Defense and Aerospace Industry
The U.S. defense industry consists of almost 2,700 prime contractor companies operating
across nine program-level sectors ranging from aircraft and space systems to light arms,
ground vehicles, and services. However, six percent of companies employ over 70 percent
of the defense workforce. The aircraft sector is the largest and one of the few with both
civilian and defense interests. Further, ten percent of companies that receive 43 percent of
revenues are in the front end of the supply chain.
AT Kearney has argued that defense firms gain economic value in three ways.
Infrastructure-based companies are those with production asset bases to produce and
assemble their goods, especially in shipyard and aircraft manufacturing sectors. These firms
account for more than half of employment and revenues, although they represent just a
quarter of the number of firms. Knowledge-based companies tend to be smaller firms that
provide solutions, such as intelligence and software applications. Finally, standardized-
companies (59 percent of the firms in the industry) produce commodity-type products that
competitors can easily replicate and create the least value. These account for only 29
percent of employment and thirty percent of revenues. (Figure 14)36
Defense Contractors as Public-Private Partnerships
Among all government contractors, the top-ten companies account for $131 billion, or 29
percent of all contracts. Almost all are defense contractors that also operate in non-defense
industries. The industry leaders include the $46 billion Lockheed Martin Corp., which
operates in aerospace, IT systems, security and advanced technology; the $87 billion
Boeing, which designs, manufactures and sells fixed-wing aircraft, rotorcraft, rockets and
satellites; the $32 billion General Dynamics an aerospace and defense company; the $25
billion Raytheon, a major defense contractor with manufacturing in weapons, military and
commercial electronics; and the $25 billion Northrop Grumman, a global aerospace and
defense technology company.

Figure 14: Share of Defense Industry Based on Solution Value Added
37
The largest markets of these defense contractors consist of the Navy, Air Force, Army and
Defense Logistics, from which the top-ten companies receive between $10 billion to $54
billion in contract awards yearly. The top-ten companies have a major share (56 percent) in
each defense sub-market — from the Navy to Defense Security, but there is great variety.
In certain markets — e.g., missile defense and defense microelectronics, where there is
considerable advantage to scale and scope– the concentration is over 90 percent. In missile
defense, Lockheed Martin (49 percent) and Raytheon (23 percent) lead the marketplace,
whereas in defense microelectronics Raytheon (47 percent) and Northrop Grumman (23
percent) play large roles.38
New Public-Private Partnerships
As the defense industrial base becomes more focused on IT, the federal government has
sought to engage in stronger partnerships with non-defense firms. That’s what happened
amidst the 1990s technology revolution, when the CIA’s then-chief George Tenet
concluded that the nation’s intelligence community could no longer take on its enemies
alone. That led to In-Q-Tel (IQT), a CIA-backed technology early-stage investor, which
was created in 1999 as an independent, not-for-profit organization. As Tenet recalls, CIA
created IQT hoping to use its limited dollars “to leverage technology developed elsewhere.
CIA identifies pressing problems, and IQT provides the technology to address them.”39
Initially, IQT catered mainly to the needs of the CIA. Today it supports many of the 17
agencies within the U.S. intelligence community with a focus on the ICT sector, as well as
physical and biological technologies.
In 2007, Tenet argued that “the In-Q-Tel alliance has put the Agency back at the leading
edge of technology.”40
Over the years, IQT has invested in over 180 portfolio companies
and claims to have leveraged more than $3.9 billion in private-sector funds. The
importance of IQT should be seen in context, however. In the United States, there are
some nine hundred venture capital firms, which have $200 billion of venture capital under
management.41
That translates to an average of $240 million per firm. In global venture
capital, the CIA-backed firm is simply one among many in a globalizing industry.

DEFENSE INNOVATION AT THE CROSSROADS
From the launch of the Soviet Sputnik well into the Strategic Missile Defense program of
the 1980s, the perceived common enemy of Soviet communism is what kept Washington
united, and sustained federal funding and America’s commitment to technological
superiority in defense. This was reinforced by the reality that while the Soviets might field
more troops and weapons, the United States could prevail in any conflict only through
advanced technology. It was this “national mission” that persuaded Americans to defer
their current consumption for the higher goal of winning the Cold War.42
After the eclipse of the Cold War, America gradually shifted resources from Pentagon-led
innovation toward current consumption markets, especially in health care. At the same
time, many other nations have put in place aggressive policies to prevail in international
economic competition. As a result, U.S. defense, especially as it relates to innovation, now
faces key challenges:
 Cost pressures engendered by sequestration and limited budgets,
 Bias for short-term defense policies at the expense of investments in longer-term,
higher risk activities,
 Challenges of defense acquisitions,
 Shift from defense spin-offs to consumer-market spin-ons,
 Hollowing out of the defense industrial base,
 Erosion of competitive inter-service pressures,
 Lower defense contractor R&D intensity, and
 Rising foreign defense competition, including low cost competition.
Sequestration and Limited Budgets
Defense innovation has long served a dual use purpose. It has bolstered defense as well as
commercial innovation and U.S. competitiveness. Today’s budget cutting threatens both.
Analysts have shown that large-scale and long-term government investment has played a
key role in the development of general-purpose technologies and economic growth.43
This
is true of federal support for both civilian and defense R&D. Research on the impact of
military procurement spending on corporate innovation indicates that defense procurement
has a positive impact on private sector patenting and R&D investment. Indeed, in some
cases, according to one study, military spending can be better at stimulating innovation
than civilian spending because firms are given incentives to push the technological frontier
and develop new technologies.44
This is why military spending can have positive spillovers
for the rest of the economy. By providing a source of demand for new technologies that do
not have existing markets, military spending provides an important impetus for R&D that
impacts broader innovation. Thus, it is not surprising that through the Cold War, defense
R&D served as a key contributor to the nation’s growth through the large-scale
development of vital general-purpose technologies.45
Indeed, there is widespread recognition among technology policy scholars that defense
R&D was crucial to the development of the aircraft and space industries; nuclear power,
Defense procurement has
a positive impact on
private sector patenting
and R&D investment.

the computer, semiconductor and software industries; the Internet and many other tech
sectors.46
Those innovations were powered by robust defense budgets. But sequestration challenged
that. Indeed, DOD senior officials suggest in the recent Strategic Choices and Management
Review that the budget sequestration would result in serious challenges: “Significant
reductions beyond the President's plan would require many more dramatic cuts to force
structure…Under sequester-level cuts, our military options and flexibility will be severely
constrained.”47
As the $1.2 trillion sequestration plan was activated, the White House did
express concern that it would also be “deeply destructive to national security.”48
Yet, the
administration made no serious proposals to limit or reform entitlement spending to free
up budget resources, nor did Republicans make a serious effort to raise revenues, especially
by raising taxes on individuals. True, the Obama administration has made a variety of
proposals to reduce the defense budget, including cuts to big-ticket weapons programs like
the F-22 or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. But these proposals would also cut defense
R&D.49
Because of these budget limitations, the Pentagon’s investment in research, development,
testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) has fallen 28 percent since its peak in 2009, adjusting for
inflation. In 2012, the Air Force spent $26.3 billion on R&D, as much as the Navy and
Marine Corps ($17.7 billion) and the Army ($8.7 billion) together. Those numbers
remained fairly flat in the President’s 2013 budget request, but dropped for 2014 to $25.7
billion (Air Force), $16 billion (Marine Corps) and $8 billion (Army). According to the
Pentagon, R&D spending will continue to bear the brunt of defense budget cuts. As a
result, senior Pentagon leaders have tried to protect R&D funding in the fiscal 2015
budget plan from sequestration budget caps.50
These senior leaders also express concern that the continued pinch on R&D could threaten
U.S. technology superiority and harm the U.S. defense industrial base. Further, cuts to
defense and civilian R&D will reduce overall U.S. economic growth and global
competitiveness. As ITIF has shown, the projected decline in federal R&D will reduce U.S.
GDP by at least $203 billion and up to $860 billion over 2013-2021, depending upon the
pre-sequestration baseline.51
In theory, austerity can serve as mother of innovation. But when the pie itself is shrinking,
it is not entirely clear whether the services will think harder about security threats and how
the Armed Forces as a whole can meet them.
Bias For Short-Term Policies
Cost pressures are also contributing to a bias for short-term defense policies, including
changes in the focus on R&D. The economy as a whole has a bias for short-term
development, at the expense of long-term innovation, and not surprisingly this is affecting
defense as well.52
Recently, the Air Force
released an outline for its
30-year strategy. Central
to the plan is the pursuit
of “game changing”
technologies. But
whether, when push
comes to shove, these
longer term projects will
receive support remains to
be seen.

This bias for near term results is exemplified even by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), which has been responsible for funding the development of
many technologies that have had a major effect on the world. It was the technology race
with the Soviet Union that led to the launch of the DARPA, which was initially mandated
to invest in high-risk, high-payoff research. It was conceived and developed as an agile,
non-bureaucratic agency that focused on technology. It could fund R&D, but not
commercialize technologies. But by leveraging its linkages with the DOD, it could give a
push to innovations.53
This is how DARPA funded innovative ideas — from the Internet
to GPS, to advanced materials to pharmaceuticals — that have served the military and
civilians alike, including the early research of mass-market consumer products; until
recently.
The role of DARPA in seeding and encouraging new technology trajectories has shifted in
the past decade or two. On the one hand, it remains a uniquely adaptive organization. A
few years after Tony Tether became DARPA’s director in 2001, journalists suggested that
America’s old technology engine was sputtering. And yet, irrespective of organizational
adaptations within the agency, DARPA program managers continued to use the same five-
step process to seed and nurture new technology trajectories with academic and industrial
communities. As Erica Fuchs wrote in 2009, with those shifts, DARPA may have been
effectively narrowing the “valley of death”, coordinating innovation within a vertically
fragmented industry, and influencing innovation to serve military needs. At the same time,
Fuchs argued that the “new DARPA”, in focusing on bridging the gap from invention to
innovation, and working to solve near-term problems, may leave the U.S. technology
pipeline without new sources.54
Nevertheless, the question remains whether DARPA can boost disruptive innovation with
processes that focus more on current military requirements. Again, this relates to overall
levels of funding: when funding is tight, investments in longer term, more disruptive
innovation are often the first to be reduced. The DARPA’s current technology goals are
ambitious, but limited budgets, not just within DARPA but for DOD as a whole, mean
increased pressures for nearer-term results.55
Likewise while other services have ambitious technology goals, it’s not clear whether these
long-term and high-risk investments will survive pressures for near term results. Recently,
the Air Force, for instance, released an outline for its 30-year strategy, highlighting
technologies it plans to target. Central to the plan is the pursuit of “game changing”
technologies. Some of the more promising technologies include hypersonics,
nanotechnology, directed energy, unmanned systems, and autonomous systems.56
In other
words, technologies promising much faster, smaller, cheaper, dehumanized and robotized
defense innovations. But whether, when push comes to shove, these longer term projects
will receive support at the expense of near-term programs remains to be seen.
However, DOD has shown that it would like to preserve and keep spending on research,
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) at levels close to the $63 billion the
department will spend in 2014. This is about $36 billion less than the amount that will be

spent on procurement in 2014. This gap is anticipated to close to about $26 billion in
2015. Under the 2015 Future Years Defense Plan, DOD would halve spending on System
Development and Demonstration, from about $20 billion in 2009 to below $10 billion by
2018.57
The biases for short-term policies are also reflected by the challenges associated
with defense acquisitions.
Challenges of Defense Acquisitions
As John Alic has argued, the origin and nature of the U.S. “military-industrial complex”
continues to determine U.S. defense activities, including innovation.58
Historically, the
military-industrial complex originates from World War I, when the Army and Navy turned
to private firms for aircraft design. The complex took on its current shape during the 1950s
and the early days of the Cold War. Despite the broad government-to-industry shift in
responsibility for design, development, and production of military systems in the middle of
the last century, the armed forces remain the lead partners in the military-industrial
complex by reason of their control over the technical requirements that shape and constrain
weapons system design. This configuration, in turn, leaves the civilian defense industry a
junior partner.
This structure is driven by industrial innovation, yet dominated by the military. It
overshadows U.S. defense acquisitions, including innovation. That creates further
complications because management by government differs fundamentally from private
sector management. This is particularly true in the case of defense. It differs from other
U.S. government missions in that very large sums are spent on high-technology systems
and equipment to meet the unknowable contingencies of an uncertain future. Due to
technological complexity, the difficulties of program selection, contracting, and oversight,
and the absence of metrics for assessing the performance of military systems, “civilian
officials have been unable to exercise effective oversight of defense acquisition, leaving
discretionary choices by military leaders largely unchecked.”59
In this sense, six decades of attempts at defense acquisition reform have largely failed. True
reform would require increasing the influence of civilian officials over acquisition decisions
and reducing that of the armed forces. Instead, the current status quo seeks to achieve the
impossible. Armed forces must lead increasingly advanced systems that they do not
technologically control, while defense contractors are responsible for development of
systems they cannot lead.
The Defense Department spends $60 billion a year — nearly a third of its annual
purchases — on everyday products sold in the open market by commercial companies. It
also buys items that are not sold to the general public; these fall into the narrower category
of "commercial of a type." Today, government officials are pressing vendors to provide
detailed justification for their prices; suppliers view these actions as intrusive and
unwarranted. Some are contemplating whether to exit the military market.60
In the private sector, the armed services’ strategy of “low cost, but high innovation” would
be untenable. In private-sector competition most companies have to opt for one or
Six decades of attempts at
defense acquisition
reform have largely
failed. True reform
would require increasing
the influence of civilian
officials over acquisition
decisions and reducing
that of the armed forces.

another, but not both which would be seen as a “stuck-in-the-middle” position. And yet,
this is precisely what the DOD is increasingly signaling to its contractors and vendors.
From Defense Spin-Offs to Consumer Spin-Ons
Between World War II and the early 1980s — prior to the restructuring and globalization
of the IT sector — defense spin-offs were prevalent. The Reagan-era rearmament, for
example, occurred in a government-led, top-down, and non-networked R&D
environment, which was fueled by advanced economies in the West. In that paradigm, new
civilian goods were generated by military or governmental research. Typically, such spinoffs
included new technologies that were commercialized through DOD or NASA funding,
research, licensing, facilities, or assistance. This era may have peaked in the early 1990s
when Alic and his colleagues published Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial
Technologies in a Changing Era.61
In the past decade or two, this environment has morphed into a civilian-led, bottom-up
and networked R&D environment, which is also fueled by increasing activity taking place
in large emerging economies in Asia. Within the IT industry, the old, rigid and vertical IT
value chains that used to be concentrated in one country have morphed into flexible,
horizontal value networks that are dispersed in multiple countries. At the same time, the
old U.S. IT dominance has been surpassed by polycentric IT dispersion; hence, the
increasing role of assembly plants and factories and, more recently, R&D hubs in large
emerging economies. Among other things, this transition has contributed to the
transformation of the old defense spin-off paradigm.
The shift from one environment to the other parallels the transition from the spin-off
paradigm to the spin-on in the consumer mass markets. After World War II, it was initially
taken for granted that defense-related R&D and military procurement would result in
substantial spin-offs (from military applications to civilian usage) of technology. The spin-
off paradigm prevailed as long as the U.S. technology development enjoyed superiority in
cutting-edge technology and defense markets; that is, until the eclipse of the Cold War.62
In the early 1980s, the huge Reagan era rearmament boosted the nation’s defense
significantly. It gave rise to the idea of the dual use technology with both military and
commercial dimensions.63
And as time went on, commercial leadership in IT innovation
led to the idea of a reverse spin-on (movement of commercial technology to the defense
sector). On the one hand, the new paradigm became the tacit way to cope with rising costs
after the Cold War. On the other hand, it reflected the industry transformation, from
concentrated government markets to mass consumer markets, as evidenced by the
information and communication technology sector and its shift from the mainframes to
minicomputers, PCs, laptops, and, eventually, smart phones.64
In this new environment, however, government policies no longer shape industry
environment as much as they did in the past. As with the CIA-backed IQT in the venture
capital universe, these policies are now more at the mercy of market forces. In the
immediate postwar era, defense R&D fueled nation’s civilian innovation. Today, the roles

have reversed. It is the nation’s innovation system that is driving defense R&D. The
implications are vital. As long as the nation’s predominance in the global advanced
technology sector is under relative erosion, the U.S. will no longer be able dominate entire
global value chains, not to speak of vital nodes of these activities.65
When U.S.-based companies do dominate critical value activities, the latter tend to rely on
strategic alliances with foreign corporations. Thus, any adequate defense innovation
strategy for the 21st
century has to engage in supporting dual use systems, as do the current
DOD and DOE funded National Network of Manufacturing Innovation centers focused
on additive manufacturing, digital manufacturing, lightweight materials, and power
electronics.
Furthermore, intriguing innovation opportunities exist in defense innovation involving
sustainability. The DOD seeks to foster innovation in biofuels by holding out the promise
of volume purchases of alternative fuels, should suppliers begin to market drop-in biofuels
that are interchangeable with petroleum. With fossil fuels relatively plentiful and
inexpensive, demand for biofuels will continue to hinge on government policies and
climate mitigation will provide the only compelling justification for change.66
The Defense
Department could have a central role in U.S. efforts to narrow the uncertainties concerning
sustainability, building on existing policies to encourage procurement of alternative e fuels
and with the overall intent of replicating some features of past episodes of spinoff from
military R&D and procurement.67
Hollowing Out of the Defense Industrial Base
America’s ability to defend its national interests depends on its ability to maintain a strong
defense industrial base. It’s one thing to invent new weapons systems, but if we can’t build
them, including by accessing first, second and third tier suppliers domestically, U.S.
defense capabilities will be limited, especially in the face of a prolonged conflict. America
can rely on allies for some of these inputs, but not all.
A number of reports have warned about the loss of the U.S. industrial base and its high-
tech capabilities, arguing that these trends have the potential to profoundly impact the
military.For example, a 2005 Defense Science Board Task Force on High Performance
Microchip Supply said the country was losing its high-tech industrial capability and that
“urgent action is recommended.” It warned that America's most strategic industries were
not in a position to change the competitive dynamics that had emerged globally to shift the
balance of production and markets away from the United States. As the National Defense
Industrial Association sums up the situation, “If we lose our preeminence in manufacturing
technology, then we lose our national security.”68
This is because as the U.S. industrial base
moves offshore, so does the defense industrial base.
Over the last decade and half, U.S. manufacturing capabilities have been significantly
reduced, in large part because of the rise of competition from China and other large
emerging economies. Indeed, America lost over one-third of its manufacturing jobs in the
2000s and when measured properly, over 10 percent of manufacturing output during a
As long as the nation’s
predominance in the
global advanced
technology sector is under
relative erosion, the U.S.
will no longer be able
dominate entire global
value chains, not to speak
of vital nodes of these
activities.

period when GDP grew by 11 percent.69
The impending emergence of other large
economies — especially those in which industrialization will accelerate and rely on low-cost
manufacturing — is only likely to reinforce this trend of erosion in U.S. manufacturing
capabilities in the future. As Joel Yudken explains in Manufacturing Insecurity, “ontinued
migration of manufacturing offshore is both undercutting U.S. technology leadership while
enabling foreign countries to catch-up, if not leap-frog, U.S. capabilities in critical
technologies important to national security.”70
If the U.S. defense industrial base is to retain its ability to develop the most technologically
sophisticated defense platforms, the United States will need to be at the forefront of
advanced technology manufacturing capabilities in many areas, such as nanotechnology,
advanced batteries, semiconductors, sensors, etc. Unfortunately, U.S. vulnerabilities in
advanced technology manufacturing capability span a number of technologies. The mission
of the Defense Production Act Title III is to target and bolster areas of high-tech
manufacturing where the United States has diminishing or no capability.71
As Title III
makes clear in the defense context, “dependence on foreign manufacturers…is not an
option in some cases.”72
Additional examples of defense-critical technologies where domestic sourcing is endangered
are said to include propellant chemicals, space-qualified electronics, power sources for space
and military applications (especially batteries and photovoltaics), specialty metals, hard disk
drives, and flat panel displays (LCDs).”73
In fact, Michael Webber, an engineering
professor at the University of Texas, has studied the economic health of sixteen industrial
sectors within the manufacturing support base of the U.S. defense industrial system that
“have a direct bearing on innovation and production of novel mechanical products and
systems,” and finds that, since 2001, thirteen of those sixteen industries have shown
“significant signs of erosion.”74
In addition, an increased reliance on foreign manufacturers increases vulnerability to
counterfeit goods. According to a study conducted by the Bureau of Industry and Security
(BIS), in 2008 there were 9,356 incidents of counterfeit foreign products making their way
into the Department of Defense supply line, a 142 percent increase over 2005.75
Counterfeit materials can and have hampered the military’s ability to maintain weapon
systems in combat operations—a major vulnerability. Moreover, many distributors
surveyed in the BIS study cited insufficient steps taken by foreign governments to disrupt
counterfeiting operations within their own border. More recently the Governmental
Accountability Office issued a report detailing the risk of counterfeit parts in U.S. weapons
systems.76
Absent a strong, dual-use industrial base, future defense capabilities are at risk. With the
diffusion of defense R&D and advanced technology R&D worldwide and increasing
economic competition from other nations, these structural trends will only increase in the
future. Thus, policies like the proposed Renewing America’s Manufacturing Act (RAMI),
the expanded R&D tax credit and capital investment incentives, tougher trade enforcement
and smart multilateral alliances are now not just domestic economic policies, but integral

to maintaining a strong defense industrial base. Ultimately, as Yudken concludes, “Only a
comprehensive strategy aimed at reversing the erosion of the nation’s overall manufacturing
base will be sufficient for preserving and revitalizing the nation’s defense industrial base in
the coming decades.”77
It is a tall order. But in the absence of adequate manufacturing capabilities, innovation
benefits cannot be sustained.
Erosion of Competitive Inter-Service Pressures
In the civilian economy, competition should stimulate innovation. In the defense sector,
competition within and among different military services and between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union drove R&D expenditures to very high levels during the Reagan years of the
1980s. Defense R&D spending was 0.67 percent of GDP in the Reagan years, but just 0.5
percent of GDP in the two Bush terms. As the threat of the Soviet Union diminished, the
‘competitive stimulation’ that had fueled military R&D during the Cold War era ebbed. In
the 2000s, the threat of terrorism seemed to fill the vacuum and defense spending soared.
However, these allocations focused more on weapons development than on true R&D,
which stresses innovative activities.
While some observers argue that competition between services can be wasteful, three
commands fought independently in the Pacific during World War II, just as they
developed ballistic missiles in the 1950s. Inter-service competition can offer several major
advantages. First, it may generate critical information. If one service will not tell civilian
leaders about its vulnerabilities, others might. Also, it provides civilian leadership leverage
in efforts to control defense policy, by allowing them to play one service against another in
the case of preferred policies. Third, competition spurs innovation. In the 1950s for
example, the Navy’s fear of losing the nuclear deterrent mission to the Air Force resulted in
the Polaris submarine.78
Innovation tends to threaten current market dominance and attention can be diverted from
important and profitable customers in the quest to do new things.79
In the civilian
economy, innovation has often not been welcomed because it tends to destabilize the
incumbents. In the defense sector, innovation is defined as revolutionary change that alters
significantly military doctrine, the combat role of certain technologies and the status of
military groups that specialize in the use of the technology.80
In the civilian economy, one
solution is to create an independent subsidiary to take up the new product and compete
against the parent (think of IBM Personal Computer in 1981). In the military economy, it
translates to an endorsement of inter-service rivalry and a call to reject joint projects.
In one school of thought, the military’s attachment to current technology and doctrine is
so significant that revolutionary change occurs mainly through the intervention of civilians.
At the start of World War II, the Royal Air Force initially sought to use its limited
resources to build bombers for attacking the continent. It was the vigorous intervention of
political leaders that led to a switch to fighter productionin time to defeat the Germansin
the Battle of Britain.81
A second school of thought argues that significant change tends to
In the 2000s, the threat
of terrorism seemed to fill
the vacuum and defense
spending soared; however,
these allocations focused
more on weapons
development than on true
R&D, which stresses
innovative activities.

occur gradually in the military, requires the replacement of one generation with another,
and is relatively impervious to civilian intervention, due to the strength of platform
communities within services. Typical examples are inter-war development of amphibious
warfare by the Marines and of carrier aviation by the Navy.82
According to a third school of
thought, major innovation occurs through competition among services for missions against
the incumbent innovation communities. In this case, decisive civilian interventions can
force innovation over otherwise resistant military.83
At the end of the day, organizational
innovation in the military has its price in internal conflicts among the services.
Lower Defense Contractor R&D Intensity
In the decade since 9-11, defense and security expenditures increased significantly, yet
increases in R&D investments failed to keep pace. As a result, R&D spending as a share of
sales by top defense contractors declined by nearly a third in percentage terms between
1999 and 2012. In 1999, Boeing’s defense unit, L-3 Communications, Lockheed Martin,
Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon spent a combined $2.4 billion on R&D, which
represented 3.3 percent of sales (Figure 15). By 2012, that combined figure had grown by
approximately 50 percent as sales more than doubled and R&D share fell to 2.3 percent of
sales (Figure 16). This was in part due to the rapid increase in sales, which boosted the
denominator.
Figure 15: Defense Contractors*: R&D Expenditures (in thousands of dollars)
84
*Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed, Northrop, L-3
The decline of defense contractors’ R&D ratio can be contrasted to the commercial
technology sector.85
Indeed, there is a large discrepancy between what the defense leaders
and technology leaders are spending in R&D. In 2012, the five large defense companies —
Boeing Defense, L-3 Communications, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and
Raytheon — spent a total of $5.1 billion on R&D projects.86
During the same time
period, the leading five technology companies – Microsoft, Intel, Google, Cisco and IBM
— invested almost $38 billion on R&D.87

Figure 16: Defense Contractors*: R&D Intensity (R&D/Sales, %)
88
Changes in Pentagon procurement policy to give greater emphasis to low-cost procurement
appear to have played a role as well. Industry executives argue that Pentagon’s focus on
purchasing low-cost products, especially the introduction of concepts like Lowest Price
Technically Acceptable bid analysis, is encouraging companies to keep R&D spending low
in order to win contracts.89
With R&D intensity (R&D/sales), the discrepancy is equally significant. In 2013, this ratio
varied from around 1.3 percent to 3.6 percent among the five large defense companies. The
corresponding ratio of the technology giants was around 19 percent to 5.3 percent (Figure
17). In part this is because R&D expenditures in the commercial technology sector can and
do lead to significantly increased revenues from growing markets. In contrast, in an era of
declining defense procurement, R&D expenditures for defense at best let a firm get a
slightly larger slice of a smaller pie-- hardly a compelling proposition for shareholders.
Defense contractors also often cite uncertainty about the DOD’s plan as a central reason
why R&D spending remains relatively low. With little certainty about what future
weapons systems will be purchased or even how much money will be allocated to them,
R&D investments become riskier.
In the past, major defense contractors could count on the government to fund much of
weapons system research, but that arrangement has been crumbling, in large part because
of budget pressures and the prioritization of acquiring current weapon systems, rather than
developing the next ones. While the DOD often advocates innovation, it has relatively few
cutting-edge, major programs starting in the coming years. Due to decreasing defense
spending, the Pentagon, too, has been forced to slow, defer or cancel new programs.
In 2013, the R&D
intensity varied from 1.3
percent to 3.6 percent
among the five large
defense companies. The
corresponding ratio of the
technology giants was
around 19 percent to 5.3
percent.

Figure 17: R&D to Sales Ratio for Top-5 Defense Contractors* and Technology Leaders**)
90
**Microsoft, Intel, Google, Cisco, IBM
These trends in defense R&D contractor investment have potentially adverse implications
for defense innovation. The benefits of defense R&D have been historically realized during
a drawdown of forces because the majority of R&D investment is made during buildups.
However, since the ratio of investment in R&D to the rest of defense contract spending has
been lower over the past two decades than in prior decades, the benefits that could be
reaped from a drawdown in the coming years are likely to be fewer.
Rise Of Foreign Competition
In the past, the leaders of the global defense sector originated primarily from the major
advanced economies in the West. In one way or another, most were affiliated with the U.S.
Department of Defense and America’s NATO allies. The rest of the world was on the
fringes. This is no longer the case.
Today, new challengers may not offer the world’s best technology, but their cost-efficient
technology may suffice in the international arms market. In this regard, the recent success
of China’s unmanned aviation exports, including Yilong by Aviation Industry Corp., is
only a foretaste of the future. Further, not all new challengers originate from the emerging
world. Sweden’s Saab Gripen fighter is a typical example.91
Other examples include offsets
in which regional sales can de facto close out opportunities for a U.S. or European
company.92
According to Avascent and Reishman Hillard’s June 2014 survey of nearly 350 senior
aerospace and defense leaders on global competitiveness, eighty percent of executives
believe the competitive landscape will increase outside their home markets in the next year,
while only six percent believe their company is adequately prepared for the global
competitive market.93
The executives also believe that U.S. continues to have the most
competitive markets, but emerging competitive threats reflect the future. (Figures 18 and
19)
In the past, the leaders of
the global defense sector
originated primarily from
the major advanced
economies in the West.
The rest of the world was
on the fringes. This is no
longer the case.

Figure 18: Global Aerospace and Defense Industry: Current Competitive Pressures
94
*
* % represents the share of executives indicating the country is 1 of 3 markets they view as an
emerging competitive threat.
The U.S. defense industry may also be vulnerable in strategically vital markets where
America has enjoyed leadership in the past, including unmanned aerial platforms,
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, missiles, and satellites. What these emerging
threats really represent is “cost innovation”: not the world’s best technologies, but cost-
efficient world class technologies.95
In the coming years, several countries can also be
expected to gradually shift from cost innovation toward original technology innovation.
Figure 19: Global Aerospace and Defense Industry, Emerging Threats
96
* % represents the share of executives indicating the country is 1 of 3 markets they view as an
emerging competitive threat.
The new threats are not restricted to cost, but also include technology innovation as
emerging and transitional economies are getting better in it. The U.S. defense industry may
The U.S. defense industry
may be vulnerable in
strategically vital markets
where America has
enjoyed leadership in the
past.

also be vulnerable in strategically vital markets where America has enjoyed leadership in the
past, including unmanned aerial platforms, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance,
missiles, and satellites. What these emerging threats really represent is “cost innovation”:
not the world’s best technologies, but cost-efficient world class technologies.97
In the
coming years, several countries can also be expected to gradually shift from cost innovation
toward original technology innovation. The new threats are not restricted to cost, but also
include technology innovation as emerging and transitional economies are getting better in
it.
These changes are reflected by the international arms market in which the United States
may have lost its place as the world’s major weapons source. In the past decade, America
led the world in arms exports, shipping more than $7 billion a year in weapons annually.
But in 2013, Russian weapons exports surpassed the U.S. by more than $2 billion, marking
a 35 percent increase in Russian arms sales, whereas U.S. manufacturers witnessed an
average decline of over 6 percent in the top-100 defense companies’ list.98
These shifts no longer reflect just cyclical fluctuations but structural changes. Due to the
ongoing deleveraging in the advanced economies, defense spending has declined or
stagnated in most G7 economies, while a series of arms races is taking place in Africa, Asia
and the Middle East. Although the reasons for these accelerations are different in each
region, all are fueled by the rise of emerging economies. Many of these nations cannot
afford expensive, world class defense products and services. So they opt for affordable,
almost world-class offerings of the kind produced by a nation like Russia.
CONCLUSION
In brief, the American military remains superior in terms of its budget, global engagement
and technological capabilities. However, the state of U.S. defense innovation, despite its
resilience and superiority worldwide, exhibits structural erosion and relative decline.
Absent a change in course, it appears that the days of massive U.S. defense technology
leadership and significant impact of defense innovation on the U.S. economy and global
competitiveness are over.
A robust federal policy to restore defense-related innovation and production in the United
States would pay dividends on two fronts: continued U.S. defense strength through
superior technology and broader U.S. commercial global competitiveness. Continuing to
treat broader U.S. innovation as something driven only by private sector market forces
while at the same time cutting defense support for technology development will result in
continued loss of U.S. innovation-based competitiveness and relative erosion of U.S.
defense superiority.
Only a comprehensive national defense innovation and production strategy can reverse the
erosion of America’s military innovation.

ENDNOTES
1. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel (2014) Reagan National Defense Forum Keynote, Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, November 15. http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?
speechid=1903
2. Ibid.
3. P. Singer, Federally Supported Innovations: 22 Examples of Major Technology Advances that Stem from
Federal Research Support, (Massachusetts: MIT, January 2014).
4. The sequestration was to come into force on January 1, 2013 and was considered part of the fiscal cliff,
but the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 delayed it until March 1 of that year.
5. Andrew Bowman "Breaking – White House Releases Sequestration Report," The National Law Review.
((September 14, 2012). Retrieved December 1, 2012.
6. Ibid.
7. Data from IMF, World Economy Outlook Database, October 2014.
8. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military Expenditure Database, July 2014.
9. Science and Engineering Indicators 2014, p. 4-39. See also Rob Atkinson, et al, The Global Innovation
Policy Index (Washington, D.C.: Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and the Kauffman
Foundation, March), See Table 3-5, pp. 44.
10. Rob Atkinson, et al, The Global Innovation Policy Index (Washington, D.C.: Information Technology
and Innovation Foundation and the Kauffman Foundation, March), See Table 3-5, pp. 44.
11. Calculated on the basis of SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, July 2014; see also Rob Atkinson, et al,
The Global Innovation Policy Index, pp. 43.
12. See for example, “The Arsenal of Democracy” for a discussion of how federal funding of U.S. industry
was central in enabling the Allies to win WWII. (2013).
13. See P. Singer, Federally Supported Innovations: 22 Examples of Major Technology Advances that Stem from
14. "The Military–Industrial Complex; The Farewell Address of President Eisenhower" Basements
publications 2006.
15. Data from Budget of the U.S. Government; Office of Management and Budget.
16. National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators, 2014 (Appendix Tables, 4-26;
accessed November 20, 2014); http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/index.cfm/appendix; National
Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators, 2002 (Appendix Tables, 4-32; accessed
November 20, 2014); http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind00/append/appa.htm.
17. Data from Science and Engineering Indicators 2014.
20. Data from American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) reports and agency budget
data. Constant dollar conversions based on OMB's GDP deflators from the FY 2015 budget (budget
authority in billions of constant 2014 dollars).
21. After September 11, 2001 — almost $1.7 billion of DHS defense-related activities — were also included
in the defense account.

data.
data.
data.
27. The intramural laboratories and FFRDCs accounted for 76% of the total obligations. A fourth of
obligations to extramural performers went chiefly to businesses and universities and colleges. For the $9.1
billion obligated to R&D, basic research accounted for 41%, applied research for 33%, and development
for 26%, respectively.
28. Since 1978, energy R&D has declined by over 75% and its share of the DOE budget has gone from
around 45% to 18%, whereas the DOE budget itself has remained more or less constant at about 1% of
the federal budget.
29. Compare Thomas C. Lassman, Sources of Weapon Systems Innovation in the Department of Defense: The
Role of In-House Research and Development, 1945-2000, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History,
United States Army, 2008).
30. During the Cold War, these sub-optimal efficiencies were still tolerated in the name of the national
mission. Such a “mindset,” as one observer put it right before the global financial crisis, is “still evident
today in the more than 50 anti-armor weapons in the inventories of the four services or under
development, even though there is no prospect of confrontation with a tank-heavy army such as the
Soviet Union maintained through the 1980s.” See Alic, Trillions for Military Technology, pp 1-2.
31. Engagement Guide, Department of Defense, University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), Defense
Laboratories Office, April 2013.
32. Two-thirds of the total was for agency intramural and FFRDC activities. Just under 37 percent was
conducted by extramural performers; mainly businesses but also universities and colleges and other
nonprofit organizations.
33. These comprise APEX R&D; border security; chemical, biological, and explosive defense;
counterterrorism; cyber security; and disaster resilience, including the Department’s Advanced Research
Projects Agency.
34. These essentially support homeland security-related research and education at colleges and universities to
address high-priority, DHS-related issues and to enhance capabilities over the long term.
35. See the section on the “erosion of competitive pressures.”
36. Rene Quimet, et al.,“New Face of the A&D Industry: Victors, Victims, and Survivors,” (AT Kearney,
September 2013).
37 NAICS, OneSource, AT Kearney.
38. Other sub-segments also feature dominant companies, including Navy (Lockheed Martin 21 percent),
Air Force (Lockheed Martin 16 percent, Boeing 15 percent), DARPA (Lockheed Martin 17 percent),
Defense Security (Translang Ltd 17 percent), Defense Commissary (Tyson Foods 15 percent, Military

Produce Group 14 percent), and Defense Finance (Hewlett-Packard 16 percent, CACI International 11
percent).
39. G. Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper Press, 1997): p. 26.
40. Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm, p. 26
41. National Venture Capital Association Yearbook.
42. “Doing capitalism in the innovation economy,” as William H. Janeway has put it, required the
government to play its vital role to promote the basic research to fuel innovation; to stabilize the
economy when private demand failed to fully employ the country’s resources; and to limit the damage to
the economy caused by episodic financial bubbles that contribute to the creation of new technologies, but
also reflect false starts and dead ends. See Janeway, Doing Capitalism in the Innovation Economy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, W.H. 2012).
43. See for instance V. W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth?: Military Procurement and
Technology Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
44. Rob Atkinson, “Both Guns and Butter? New Study Shows Innovation Benefits from Military
Procurement,” The Innovation Files, April 23, 2014.
45. M. Draca, “Reagan’s Innovation Dividend? Technological Impacts of the 1980s U.S. Defense Build-
Up,” London School of Economics and Political Science, Feb 2, 2012.
46. V. W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and Technology Development,
(New York: OUP, 2006).
47. “The review showed that the ‘in-between’ budget scenario we evaluated would ‘bend’ our defense strategy
in important ways, and sequester-level cuts would ‘break’ some parts of the strategy, no matter how the
cuts were made.” See DOD press briefing by Secretary Hagel and Admiral Winnefeld, Washington, DC,
July 31, 2013.
48. Andrew Bowman, "Breaking – White House Releases Sequestration Report," The National Law Review.
(September 14, 2012). Retrieved December 1, 2012.
49. S. Ghoshroy,“Restructuring defense R&D,” Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists, (December 20, 2011).
50. M. Weisgerber and Z. Fryer-Biggs,“Pentagon Seeks To Protect R&D Funding in ’15 Budget,” Defense
News, (January 11, 2014).
51. J. Hicks and Rob Atkinson, Eroding Our Foundation: Sequestration, R&D, Innovation and U.S. Economic
Growth (Washington, D.C.: The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, September 2012).
52. Robert D. Atkinson, Understanding and Advancing America’s Evolutionary Economy (Washington, DC:
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, October 2014).
53. See P. Singer, Federally Supported Innovations: 22 Examples of Major Technology Advances that Stem from
54. See E.R.H Fuchs, The Role of DARPA in Seeding and Encouraging New Technology Trajectories: Pre- and
Post-Tony Tether in the New Innovation Ecosystem. Industry Studies Association (Working Paper Series,
January 2009). See also E.R.H. Fuchs, “Rethinking the role of the state in technology development:
DARPA and the case for embedded network governance,” Research Policy 39, (2010): pp. 1133-1147.
55. Department of Defense, “FY 2015 Budget Estimate; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency”
(Accessed October 3, 2014), http://www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Budget.aspx.
56. America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future, July 2014.
57. Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “DoD Reshapes R&D, Betting on Future Technology,” April 20, 2014.

58. For the full argument, see John A. Alic, “The Origin and Nature of the U.S. ‘Military-Industrial
Complex.’” Vulcan 2, (2014): pp. 63-97.
59. John A. Alic,“Managing U.S. Defense Acquisition.” Enterprise & Society, Vol. 14, No. 2, (March 2013):
pp. 1-36.
60. Sandra I. Erwin,“Pentagon Will Demand ‘Fair Prices’ From Commercial Vendors.” National Defense,
September 1, 2014.
61. See J. A. Alic, et al, Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World, (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, April 1992).
62. On the spinoff paradigm and the early efforts to go beyond it, see J. A. Alic, et al, Beyond Spinoff: Military
and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, April 1992).
63. See John A. Alic, Trillions for Military Technology: How the Pentagon Innovates and Why It Costs So Much,
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): particularly Chapter 1.
64. While the Clinton administration initially adopted the dual-use paradigm, its focus was primarily on
shifting resources to the nation’s civilian sector to foster technology development. Eventually, the dual-
use efforts grew underfunded facing resistance from a White House, which hoped to benefit from the
peace-premium, the DOD and the large defense contractors, which were more interested in the military
dimension of the dual-use concept, and the 1994 Republican Congress, which cut the budgets of most
federal technology programs.
65. On the ICT sector, innovation and global value chains, see D. Steinbock, "Globalization of wireless value
system: from geographic to strategic advantages," Telecommunications Policy, vol. 27, issue 3-4 ((2002):
pp. 207-235; "New Innovation Challengers", The National Interest, (Jan-Feb. 2007); "China as ICT
Superpower” China Business Review, US China Business Council, Mar 2007); Winning Across Global
Markets: How Nokia Creates Strategic Advantage in a Fast-Changing World (Wiley, 2010).
66. Megan Nicholson and Matt Stepp, Lean, Mean, and Clean II: Assessing DOD Investments in Clean
Energy Innovation (Washington, D.C.: The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 2012).
67. John A. Alic,“Biofuels: Politics, Policy, and the Pentagon.” Draft, July 2014.
68. National Defense Industrial Association, “Maintaining a Viable Defense Industrial Base,” August 1,
2008, http://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Manufacturing/Documents/MaintainingAViable
DefenseIndustrialBase.pdf.
69. Robert D. Atkinson and Luke Stewart, “Worse Than the Great Depression,” (Washington, DC: The
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 2010).
70. Joel S. Yudken, “Manufacturing Insecurity: America’s Manufacturing Crisis and the Erosion of the U.S.
Defense Industrial Base,” (working paper, High Road Strategies, April 14, 2011): 9.
71. Title III currently has active projects in lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery production, yttrium barium copper
oxide high-temperature superconductors, and photovoltaic solar cell encapsulants, among others.
Lithium-ion battery production is particularly troubling. According to Title III there is “at present no
domestic production capability for extremely long life Li-ion cells.” See Defense Production Act Title III,
“Lithium Ion Battery Production,” http://www.acq.osd.mil/ott/dpatitle3/projects/libp.htm.
72. Ibid.
73. Yudken, “Manufacturing Insecurity,” 5.
74. Ibid., p. 6
75. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation,
Defense Industrial Base Assessment: Counterfeit Electronics, January 2010, ii,

http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/defmarketresearchrpts/final_counterfeit_elec
tronics_report.pdf
76. DOD Supply Chain: Suspect Counterfeit Electronic Parts Can Be Found on Internet Purchasing
Platforms. GAO-12-375: Published: Feb 21, 2012. Publicly Released: Mar 26, 2012.
77. Yudken, “Manufacturing Insecurity,” p. 5
78. The Polaris, in turn, reduced the need to deploy hundreds of vulnerable and costly strategic bombers and
most liquid-fueled missiles that the Air Force was developing. See Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Interservice
Competition: The Solution, Not the Problem.” JFQ, (Spring 1997): pp. 50-53.
79. Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
80. Harvey M. Sapolsky,“On the Theory of Military Innovation.” Breakthroughs (Spring 2000): pp. 35-39.
The description of theories seeking to explain innovation in the military draws from Sapolsky as well.
81. See Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France. Britain. and Germany Between the World
Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
82. Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modem Military. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1994).
83. See Owen R. Cote Jr, The Third Battle: Innovation in The Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle With Soviet
Submarines (Newport Paper #16, U.S. Naval War College Press, 2003),; and Owen R. Cote Jr., Creative
Destruction: The Politics of Innovation in Military Doctrine, forthcoming.
84. Top-5 defense contractors, 1999-2012.
85. M. Weisgerber,“Tech giants Spend Billions More Than Defense Firms on R&D” Defense News (May 26,
2014).
86. Boeing was the greatest innovation player, investing over $2.9 billion in R&D, as against $369 million
by L-3 Communications.
87. Microsoft was the greatest innovation player, investing more than $10.3 billion in R&D, as against $5.5
billion by IBM.
88. Top-5 defense contractors, 1999-2012
89. See Zachary Fryer-Biggs and Marcus Weisgerber, “U.S. Giants Skimp on Research, Development,”
Defense News, August 19, 2013).
90. Top-5 defense contractors, 2012
91. After it was updated with advanced electronically scanned radar and electronic warfare systems that are
more typical to larger and costlier jets, it has been sold in the world markets at cheap prices, which has
left U.S. fighters at a strategic disadvantage.
92. Take, for instance, Abu Dhabi shipbuilding, which does not represent a global challenge, but has
cornered an important regional market with its Baynunah corvette. With the fall off in global economic
integration since 2008 and the decline of export-led growth, regional integration is likely to offer more
such opportunities in the future.
93. Typically, the surveyed executives cited China as the top challenger, but it is coupled with a list of both
emerging and advanced economies, including Israel, India, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, Turkey and
UAE.
94. Data from Avascent, Reishman, Hillard’s survey of A&D leaders on global competitiveness, June 2014.

95. As industry observers put it, they are redefining A&D competitiveness vis-à-vis “80 percent solutions at
20 percent cost.”
96. Data from Avascent and ReishmanHillard’s survey of A&D leaders on global competitiveness, June
2014.
97. As industry observers put it, they are redefining A&D competitiveness vis-à-vis “80 percent solutions at
20 percent cost.”
98. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, August 2014.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank the participants of the ITIF meeting in which the
topics of defense R&D were discussed and which offered valuable insights and
input to this report: Bill Bonvillian (MIT), Dorothy Robyn (formerly of DOD),
Richard Shippe (NDU), and Richard Van Atta (IDA). In particular, the author
would like to thank ITIF’s Rob Atkinson for valuable comments. Any errors or
omissions are the author’s alone.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Dan Steinbock is Research Director of International Business at India China
and America Institute (U.S.A) and Visiting Fellow at Shanghai Institutes for
International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more see:
http://www.differencegroup.net.
Since the 1990s, Dr Steinbock has examined innovation-led competitiveness in
multiple world regions and advised regions, countries, cities, and companies.
Parts of this paper and its companion piece, which focuses on the U.S. national
innovation system amid global headwinds, draw from a report that explores the
strengths of the U.S. national and entrepreneurial system and was funded by
Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation.
ABOUT ITIF
The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) is a Washington,
D.C.-based think tank at the cutting edge of designing innovation strategies and
technology policies to create economic opportunities and improve quality of life
in the United States and around the world. Founded in 2006, ITIF is a 501(c) 3
nonprofit, non-partisan organization that documents the beneficial role
technology plays in our lives and provides pragmatic ideas for improving
technology-driven productivity, boosting competitiveness, and meeting today’s
global challenges through innovation.
FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT ITIF BY PHONE AT 202.449.1351, BY EMAIL AT
MAIL@ITIF.ORG, ONLINE AT WWW.ITIF.ORG, JOIN ITIF ON LINKEDIN OR FOLLOW ITIF ON
TWITTER @ITIFDC AND ON FACEBOOK.COM/INNOVATIONPOLICY.

2014 defense-rd

More Related Content

What's hot (20)

Similar to 2014 defense-rd (20)

More from qaz wsx (6)

Recently uploaded (20)

2014 defense-rd