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36. with the former. The pronoun us is very properly in the objective
case, after the verb let; I and thou should therefore be in the same
case, according to Rule vii. of Syntax. The expression is in fact
elliptical, and when completed proceeds thus, “Let us make a
covenant: let me and thee make.”
“Though he were a son, yet learned he obedience by the things
which he suffered.” The first clause is intended to express a fact, not
a hypothesis; the verb, therefore, should be in the indicative mood.
Conjunctions have no government, either of cases or moods.
IMPROPRIETY.
“If in case he come, all will be well.” If and in case are
synonymous, the one meaning “suppose,” and the other, “on the
supposition.” One of them, therefore, is redundant.
“The reason of my desiring to see you was, because I wanted to
talk with you.” Because means “by reason;” the expression,
therefore, is chargeable with redundancy. It should be, “that I
wanted to talk with you.”
“No sooner was the cry of the infant heard, but the old gentleman
rushed into the room.”—Martinus Scrib. The comparative is here
improperly followed by but, instead of than.
“Scarce had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, than it was
attacked.” Than is employed after comparatives only, and the word
other. It ought to be “scarce,” or, for reasons formerly given,
“scarcely had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, when it was
attacked,” or “no sooner—than.”
“The resolution was not the less fixed, that the secret was as yet
communicated to very few, either in the French or English court.”
This passage from Hume I have not been able to find. Priestley
observes, that it involves a Gallicism, the word that being used
instead of as. If the meaning intended be, that some circumstances,
previously mentioned, had not shaken the resolution, because the
secret was as yet known to few, then Priestley’s observation was
37. correct, and the word as should be substituted for that, to express
the cause of the firmness. But, if the author intended to say, that the
very partial discovery of the secret had not shaken the resolution,
the clause is then perfectly correct. According to the former
phraseology, the circumstance subjoined operated as a cause,
preventing the resolution from being shaken: according to the latter,
it had no effect, or produced no change of the previous
determination. In other words, “the less fixed that,” implies that the
subject of the following clause did not affect that of the preceding;
“the less fixed as” denotes, that the latter circumstance contributed
to the production of the former. As it is obvious, that, in such
examples, the definite article may refer either to the antecedent or
the subsequent clause, the distinction, here specified, should, for the
sake of perspicuity, be carefully observed[148].
“His donation was the more acceptable, that it was given without
solicitation.” That the word that is frequently used for because
cannot be questioned; thus, “I am glad that you have returned safe,”
that is, “because you have returned safe.”
“’T is not that I love you less
Than when before your feet I lay.”—Waller.
Here that is equivalent to because. English writers, however, after a
comparative, employ as or because, to denote that the circumstance
subjoined was the cause of the preceding one. The use of that in
such examples is accounted a Scotticism; it should, therefore, be,
“his donation was the more acceptable, as” or “because it was given
without solicitation.”
“His arguments on this occasion had, it may be presumed, the
greater weight, that he had never himself entered within the walls of
a playhouse.”—Stewart’s Life of Robertson.
“A mortification, the more severe, that the joint authority of the
archduke and the infanta governed the Austrian Netherlands.”—
Thomson’s Continuation of Watson’s History.
38. These sentences are chargeable with the same error; and, it is not
a little remarkable, though the impropriety has been pointed out
again and again, that there is scarcely a Scotch writer, not even
among those of the highest name, who is not chargeable with the
frequent commission of this error.
“On the east and west sides, it (America) is washed by the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans.”—Robertson. This mode of expression is
incorrect; and, though to the geographer intelligible, it strictly
conveys a conception not intended by the author. The copulative
joins the two sides, which ought to be separated; and combines the
two seas, instead of the two facts, implying, that both sides are
washed by the same two oceans. It should be rather, “On the east
side it is washed by the Atlantic, and on the west (is washed) by the
Pacific ocean.”
“Will it be believed, that the four Gospels are as old, or even older
than tradition?”—Bolingbroke. Here there is a faulty omission of the
particle corresponding to as; for the positive and comparative cannot
be followed by the same conjunction. It ought to be, “as old as, or
even older than tradition;” or, perhaps, better, “as old as tradition, or
even older.”
“The books were to have been sold as this day.” This is a most
offensive vulgarism. The conjunction as can have no regimen; nor
can it be properly used as equivalent to on. It ought to be, “sold this
day,” or “on this day.”
“It is supposed, that he must have arrived at Paris as yesterday.”
This sentence is chargeable with the same error. Construed strictly, it
is, “he must have arrived at Paris as, or in like manner as, he arrived
yesterday.”
“The duke had not behaved with that loyalty, as he ought to have
done.” Propriety of correspondence here requires with that to be
followed by with which, instead of as. The sentence, even thus
corrected, would be still inelegant and clumsy. “The duke had not
behaved with becoming loyalty,” would be much better.
39. “In the order as they lie in his preface.” This involves a similar
impropriety. It should be, “in order as,” or “in the order, in which
they lie in his preface.”
“No; this is not always the case neither.”—Beattie.
“Men come not to the knowledge of ideas which are thought
innate, till they come to the use of reason; nor then neither.”—Locke.
In old English two negatives denied; hence, perhaps, this
phraseology originated. Johnson remarks, that the use of neither,
after a negative, and at the end of a sentence, though not
grammatical, renders the expression more emphatic. Analogy,
however, is decidedly in favour of the affirmative term; I, therefore,
prefer the word “either.” Were Johnson’s argument admitted, such
expressions as these, “I forbade you not to go;” “I won’t suffer no
such thing;” “He would not have none of my assistance,” might, I
apprehend, be justified on the same principle. Those who employ
them, doubtless, believe them to be more emphatic, than if they
included a single negative.
“This I am the rather disposed to do, that it will serve to illustrate
the principles above laid down.”—Campbell on Rhetoric. This
sentence involves an error, on which I have already animadverted.
“The rather” should be followed by as, not that.
“This is another use, that in my opinion contributes rather to make
a man learned than wise: and is neither capable of pleasing the
understanding, or imagination.” Lowth justly observes, that or is
here improperly used for nor, the correlative words being neither,
nor. In addition to this observation, I remark, that the word neither
is erroneously placed. To render this collocation of the conjunction
correct, there should be another attributive opposed to the word
“capable,” as, “neither capable of pleasing the understanding, nor
calculated to gratify the imagination.” But, as the author intended to
exclude two subjects, these should have been contrasted by the
exclusive conjunctions, thus, “is capable of pleasing neither the
understanding, nor the imagination.”
40. A similar error occurs in the following sentence: “Adversity both
taught you to think and reason.”—Steele. The conjunction, which is,
in truth, the adjective both, is improperly placed. It should be,
“taught you both,” i.e. the two things, “to think and reason.”
It has been already observed, that the conjunction or is used
disjunctively, and subdisjunctively, sometimes denoting a diversity of
things, and sometimes merely a difference of names. Hence often
arises ambiguity, where the utmost precision of expression is
necessary[149]. When Ruddiman delivers it as a rule, that “verbal
adjectives, or such as signify an affection of the mind, require the
genitive,” I have known the scholar at a loss to understand, whether
there be two distinct classes of adjectives, here intended, or one
class under two designations. The ambiguity might here be avoided,
by using and or with instead of or. It may also be prevented in many
cases, by more forcibly marking the distinction by the use of either.
Thus, if we say, “whosoever shall cause, or occasion a disturbance,”
it may be doubtful, whether the latter of the two verbs be not
designed as explanatory of the former, they, though their meanings
be distinct, being often used as synonymous terms. If we say, “shall
either cause or occasion,” all doubt is removed. Sometimes
ambiguity may be precluded either by the insertion, or the omission,
of the article. Thus, if we say, “a peer, or lord of parliament,”[150]
meaning to designate only one individual, or one order, the
expression is correct. But if it be intended to signify two individuals,
every peer not being a lord of parliament, and every lord of
parliament not being a peer, we should say, “a peer, or a lord of
parliament,” or “either a peer, or lord of parliament.”
Having now endeavoured to explain and illustrate the etymology
and syntax of the English language, I cannot dismiss the subject
without earnestly recommending to the classical student to cultivate
a critical acquaintance with his native tongue. It is an egregious, but
common error, to imagine, that a perfect knowledge of Greek and
Latin precludes the necessity of studying the principles of English
grammar. The structure of the ancient, and that of modern
41. languages, are very dissimilar. Nay, the peculiar idioms of any
language, how like soever in its general principles to any other, must
be learned by study, and an attentive perusal of the best writers in
that language. Nor can any imputation be more reproachful to the
proficient in classical literature, than, with a critical knowledge of
Greek and Latin, which are now dead languages, to be superficially
acquainted with his native tongue, in which he must think, and
speak, and write.
The superiority of Greek and Latin over the English language in
respect of harmony, graceful dignity, conciseness, and fluency, will
be readily admitted. Our language is, comparatively, harsh and
abrupt. It possesses strength, indeed; but unaccompanied with
softness, with elegance, or with majesty. It must be granted also,
that the Greek is, perhaps, a more copious, and is certainly a more
ductile[151] and tractable language. But though, in these respects,
the English be inferior to the languages of Greece and Rome, yet in
preciseness of expression, diversity of sound, facility of
communication, and variety of phrase, it may claim the pre-
eminence. It would be easy to evince the truth of this assertion, did
the limits, which I have prescribed to myself permit. The fact is, that
analogous languages almost necessarily possess a superiority in
these respects over those, which are transpositive.
It is to be remembered, also, that our language is susceptible of
high improvement; and though its abrupt and rugged nature cannot
be entirely changed, much may be done to smooth its asperities and
soften its harshness.
As a further inducement to the study of the English language, I
would assure the young reader, that a due attention to accuracy of
diction is highly conducive to correctness of thought. For, as it is
generally true, that he, whose conceptions are clear, and who is
master of his subject, delivers his sentiments with ease and
perspicuity[152]; so it is equally certain, that, as language is not only
the vehicle of thought, but also an instrument of invention, if we
42. desire to attain a habit of conceiving clearly and thinking correctly,
we must learn to speak and write with accuracy and precision.
It must, at the same time, be remembered, that to give our chief
attention to mere phraseology, or to be more solicitous about the
accuracy of the diction than the value of the sentiment, is a sure
indication of a nerveless and vacant mind. As we estimate a man,
not by his garb, but by his intellectual and moral worth, so it is the
sentiment itself, not the dress in which it is exhibited, that
determines its character, and our opinion of its author.
“True expression, like th’ unchanging sun,
Clears and improves whate’er it shines upon;
It gilds all objects, but it alters none.”—Pope.
In short, the precept of Quintilian should be studiously observed:
“curam ergo verborum, rerum volo esse solicitudinem.”—Inst. Orat.
lib. viii.
THE END.
G. Woodfall and Son, Printers, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London.
43. FOOTNOTES:
[1] Beattie seems to think that the antediluvians had an alphabet,
and that hieroglyphical was posterior to alphabetical writing. “The
wisdom and simple manners of the first men,” says he, “would
incline me to think, that they must have had an alphabet; for
hieroglyphic characters imply quaintness and witticism.” In this
reasoning I cannot concur. Alphabetic writing is indeed simple,
when known; so also are most inventions. But, simple and easy
as it appears to us, we have only to examine the art itself, to be
fully convinced, that science, genius, and industry, must have
been combined in inventing it. Nay, the learned author himself
acknowledges, “that though of easy acquisition to us, it is in itself
neither easy nor obvious.” He even admits, “that alphabetical
writing must be so remote from the conceptions of those who
never heard of it, that without divine aid it would seem to be
unsearchable and impossible.” I observe also that in passing from
picture-writing to hieroglyphical expression, and in transferring
the signs of physical to intellectual and invisible objects, fanciful
conceits would naturally take place. It is true also that the
manners of the antediluvians were simple; but it is not from
prudence nor simplicity of manners, but from human genius,
gradually improved, that we are to expect inventions, which
require the greatest efforts of the human mind.
[2] Cicero regards the invention of alphabetic writing as an
evidence of the celestial character of the soul; and many have
ascribed its origin to the inspiration of the Deity. To resort to
supernatural causes, to account for the production of any rare or
striking event, is repugnant to the principles of true philosophy.
And how wonderful soever the art of alphabetical writing may
appear, there can be no necessity for referring its introduction to
divine inspiration, if the inventive powers of man be not
demonstrably unequal to the task. Picture-writing is generally
believed to have been the earliest mode of recording events, or
communicating information by permanent signs. This was
44. probably succeeded by hieroglyphical characters. How these
pictures and hieroglyphical devices would, either through
negligence or a desire to abbreviate, gradually vary their form,
and lose their resemblance to the objects which they represented,
may be easily conceived. Hence that association, which existed
between the sign and the thing signified, being founded in
resemblance, would in process of time be entirely dissolved. This
having taken place, hieroglyphical characters would naturally be
converted into a mere verbal denotation, representative of words
and not of things. Hence, as Goguet, in his work, “De l’Origine
des Loix,” &c., reasonably conjectures, would arise by a partial
and easy analysis, a syllabic mode of denotation, which would
naturally introduce a literal alphabet. This conjecture must seem
highly probable, when it is considered, that both a verbal and
syllabic mode of notation are still practised by some Eastern
nations.
[3] I am aware, that in considering the letters y and w to be the
same with i and u (oo), I maintain an opinion, the truth of which
has been disputed. The reasons, however, which have been
assigned for rejecting it do not appear to me satisfactory.
[4] The mouth is not the proper organ for producing sound; but
merely the organ for modulating and articulating the specific
sounds.
[5] The sound of th in thin, is usually marked with a stroke
through the h, to distinguish it from its other sound; thus, tħick.
This distinction is by some writers reversed.
[6] Hutton’s Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, vol. ii.
p. 688.
[7] Plato and Aristotle, when they treat of prepositions,
considered the noun and the verb as the only essential parts of
speech; these, without the aid of any other word, being capable
of forming a sentence. Hence they were called τὰ ἐμψυχότατα
μέρη τοῦ λόγου, “the most animated parts of speech.” The latter
of these philosophers, in his Poetics, admits four, adding to the
noun and the verb the article and the conjunction. The elder
Stoics made five, dividing the noun into proper and appellative.
[8]
Noun, Nomen de quo loquimur.
Verb, Verbum seu quod loquimur.—Quint. lib. i. 4.
45. Horace has been thought by some to countenance this doctrine
when he says,
“Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenere.”—Lib. i. Sat. 3.
[9] The plural number, and the genitive singular, seem to have
been originally formed by adding er to the nominative singular, as
you, you-er, your; they, they-er, their; we, we-er, our. This
termination was afterwards changed into en, and then into es or
s. Thus we have still in provincial usage, though now almost
entirely obsolete, childer for the plural of child, and the double
plural in child-er-en, children, with the double genitive in west-er-
en, western.
[10] Brethren, in Scripture, is used for brothers.
[11] The obsolete plural occurs in the Bible. “These men were
bound in their hosen and hats.”—Dan. iii. 21.
[12] Baker inclines also to this usage in preference to the other;
but does not affirm it to be a plural noun.
[13] Much is sometimes joined with collective nouns; but these
denote number in the aggregate; thus, much company.
[14] The gender of mors, virtus, sol, θάνατος, ἀρετή, ἥλιος, was
unalterably fixed.
[15] It seems, however, to be more applicable to the English
language than to any other with which I am acquainted.
[16] These observations will sufficiently explain the reason why
we cannot concur with Dr. Johnson in thinking that there is “an
impropriety in the termination,” when we say of a woman, “She is
a philosopher.” The female termination in such examples is not
wanted; it would be pleonastic and improper. The meaning is,
“She is a person given to the study of nature.” If we had been
speaking of a lady devoted to philosophy, and had occasion
afterwards to mention her by an appellative, we should feel the
want of the appropriate termination; and instead of saying “the
philosopher,” we should wish, for the sake of discrimination, to be
able to say, “the philosophress,” or to employ some equally
distinctive term. In the example adduced by the learned
lexicographer, the female termination is superfluous; and would
intimate a distinction of philosophic character, instead of a
distinction of sex, the latter being denoted by the female
pronoun.
46. [17] We remark, in some instances, a similar phraseology in
Greek and Latin. Θεὸς and θεὰ, deus and dea, are
contradistinguished as in English, god and goddess; the former of
each pair strictly denoting the male, and the latter the female.
But the former, we find, has a generical meaning, expressing “a
deity,” whether male or female; and is frequently used when the
female is designed, if divinity in the abstract be the primary idea
without regard to the sex, thus,
... “τὸν δ’ ἐξήρπαξ’ Ἀφροδίτη,
Ῥεῖα μάλ’ ὥστε θεός.”—Hom. Il. iii. 380.
Here the term θεός is applied to Venus, the character of divinity,
and not the distinction of sex, being the chief object of the poet’s
attention. Θεός is, therefore, to be considered as either masculine
or feminine.
“Ἀλλά μ’ ἁ Διός γ’ ἀλκίμα θεός.”—Soph. Aj. 401.
“Μήτε τις οὖν θήλεια θεός.”—Hom. Il. Θ. 7.
“Descendo, ac ducente deo, flammam inter et hostes
Expedior.”—Virg. Æn. ii. 632.
Here, also, deo is applied to Venus, as likewise in the following
passage, “deum esse indignam credidi.”—Plaut. Pœn. 2, l. 10.
[18] Πτῶσις γενική: general case. It has been supposed by some
that the Latins, mistaking the import of the Greek term, called
this the genitive case. See Ency. Brit., Art. Grammar.
[19] Amor Dei denotes either amor quo Deus amat, or quo Deus
amatur. Reformatio Lutheri, either qua reformavit, or qua
reformatus est. Injuria patris, desiderium amici, with many other
examples which might be produced, have either an active or
passive sense. ἡ ἀγαπὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ, יהוה אהבת, l’amore de Dio,
l’amour de Dieu, severally involve the same ambiguity with “the
love of God.”
[20] Of the six declensions, to one or other of which the learned
Dr. Hickes conceives the inflexion of almost all the Saxon nouns
may be reduced, three form their genitive in es, as, word,
wordes; smith, smithes. In the Mœsogothic, a kindred language,
the genitive ends in s, some nouns having is, some ns, and others
as, as, fan, fanins; faukagagja, faukagagjis.
[21] It must be obvious, that the terms general and universal
belong not to real existences, but are merely denominations, the
47. result of intellect, generalising a number of individuals under one
head.
[22] Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere
curandum.—Inst. lib. viii. cap. 4.
I am inclined to think that our language possesses a superiority in
this respect over the Greek itself. Ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος
ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ may signify either “man in the
species, or an individual, was sent from God.” The author of the
article Grammar, in the Encyc. Brit., observes, “that the word
ἄνθρωπος is here restricted to an individual by its concord with
the verb and the participle.” If he mean by this that the term
must be significant of only one individual, (and I can annex no
other interpretation to his words,) because a singular verb and
participle singular are joined with it, he errs egregiously.
Numberless examples might be produced to evince the contrary.
Job. v. 7. ἄνθρωπος γεννᾶται κόπῳ “man (mankind) is born unto
trouble;” where the subject is joined to a verb singular. Psal. xlix.
12. ἄνθρωπος ἐν τιμῇ ὢν οὐ συνῆκε, “man being in honour
abideth not.” Here also man for mankind is joined with a participle
and verb singular. And here it may be pertinently asked, would
not the term one for a in the first example somewhat alter the
meaning, and convey an idea different from that intended by the
evangelist?
[23] They are the Saxon words this or thes, “hic, hæc, hoc,” that
or thæt, “ille, illa, illud,” which were frequently used by the
Saxons for what we term the definite article, as, send us on thas
swyn, “send us into the swine.” Mark v. 21, tha eodon tha
unclænan gastas on tha swyn, “then the unclean spirits entered
into the swine.”
The Saxon definites are se, seo, thæt, for the three genders
severally; and tha in the plural, expressing the or those, as, thæt
goed sæd, the good seed. Thæt is also joined to masculine and
feminine nouns, as, thæt wif, the woman; thæt folc, the people.
Thæ (pronounced they) still obtains in Scotland, as, “thæ men”
for “these men.”
[24]
ץאר
ץהאר
.
[25]
האיש אשרי.
48. [26] Horne Tooke appears to me to have erred in deriving odd
from ow’d. His words are these: “Odd is the participle ow’d. Thus,
when we are counting by couples or pairs, we say, ‘one pair,’ ‘two
pairs,’ &c., and ‘one ow’d,’ ‘two ow’d,’ to make up another pair. It
has the same meaning when we say, ‘an odd man,’ ‘an odd
action,’ it still relates to pairing; and we mean ‘without a fellow,’
‘unmatched.’” Now, I must own, this appears to me a very odd
explanation; for, in my apprehension, it leads to a conclusion the
very reverse of that which the author intends. The term odd is
applied to the one which stands by itself, and not to that which is
absent, or ow’d, to complete the pair. If I say, “there are three
pairs, and an odd one,” the word odd refers to the single one,
over and above the three pairs, and not to the one which is
wanting; yet Mr. Tooke refers it to the latter. His explanation
seems at once unnatural and absurd. Had he substituted,
according to his own etymology, add for and, saying, “three pairs,
add an ow’d one,” he must, I think, have perceived its inaccuracy.
It is the odd and present one, of which the singularity is
predicated, and not the absent or ow’d one.
[27] “Quivis seu quilibet affirmat; quisquam, quispiam, ullus, aut
negat aut interrogat,” are the words of an ancient grammarian. It
is observable also, that in Latin, ullus, any, is a diminutive from
unus, one; as any in English is from ane, the name of unity, as
formerly used.
[28] In Anglo-Saxon ic, in German ich, in Greek ἐγὼ, in Latin ego.
Mr. Webb delivered it as his opinion, that the pronoun of the first
person was derived from the Hebrew ech or ach, one, used by
apocope for achad or ahad, he added, “oned,” or “united.” It is
doubtless true, that ech occurs in one or two passages for one:
see Ezek. xviii. 10, and Ps. xlix. 8; in which latter passage it is
rendered in our translation, brother, and by R. Jonah, one; but
we apprehend that this fact will by no means justify his
conclusion. And as he considered that the pronoun of the first
person radically denoted one, he imagined that the pronoun of
the second person came from the numeral duo, du, tu, thu. Now,
it must be granted that there is an obvious resemblance between
ic and ech, and also between duo, tu, and thu; but were we to
draw any conclusion from this similarity, it would be the reverse
of that which the author has deduced. It seems quite
preposterous to suppose, that the necessity for expressing a
number would present itself, before that of discriminating
between the person speaking and the person addressed. The
49. rude savage could not converse with his fellow without some sign
of this distinction; and if visible signs (as is probable) would be
first adopted, we may reasonably presume, on several grounds,
that these would soon give place to audible expressions.
The pronoun ic is in Saxon declined thus:
Sing. Nom. Ic Gen. Min Dat. Me Acc. Me
Plur. Nom. We Gen. Ure Dat. Us Acc. Us.
[29] The pronoun of the second person is thus declined:
Sing. Nom. Thu Gen. Thin Dat. The Acc. The
Plur. Nom. Ge (hard) Gen. Eower Dat. and Acc. Eow.
[30] The Anglo-Saxon he is declined thus:
Sing. Nom. He Gen. His Dat. and Acc. Him.
[31]
Sing. Nom. Heo Gen. Hire Dat. Hire. Acc. Hi.
[32] This pronoun is from the Anglo-Saxon hyt or hit, “i” or “that.”
[33] In Anglo-Saxon hi, in Teutonic die.
[34] In Anglo-Saxon, hwa, hua; Gen. hwæs; Dat. hwam; Acc.
hwæne, hwone. Also hwilc, whence, says Hickes, proceeded
which, the letter l being elided.
[35] Mr. Tooke contends, that this part of speech is properly
termed adjective noun, and “that it is altogether as much the
name of a thing, as the noun substantive.” Names and
designations necessarily influence our conceptions of the things
which they represent. It is therefore desirable, that in every art or
science, not only should no term be employed which may convey
to the reader or hearer an incorrect conception of the thing
signified, but that every term should assist him in forming a just
idea of the object which it expresses. Now, I concur with Mr.
Tooke in thinking, that the adjective is by no means a necessary
part of speech. I agree with him also in opinion, that, in a certain
sense, all words are nouns or names. But, as this latter doctrine
50. seems directly repugnant to the concurrent theories of critics and
grammarians, it is necessary to explain in what sense the opinion
of Mr. Tooke requires to be understood; and in presenting the
reader with this explanation, I shall briefly state the objections
which will naturally offer themselves against the justness of this
theory. “Gold, and brass, and silk, is each of them,” says Mr.
Tooke, “the name of a thing, and denotes a substance. If, then, I
say, a gold-ring, a brass-tube, a silk-string; here are the
substantives adjectivè posita, yet names of things, and denoting
substances.” It may be contended, however, that these are not
substantives, but adjectives, and are the same as golden, brazen,
silken. He proceeds: “If again I say, a golden ring, a brazen tube,
a silken string; do gold, and brass, and silk, cease to be the
names of things, and cease to denote substances, because
instead of coupling them with ring, tube, and string, by a hyphen
thus (-), I couple them to the same words, by adding the
termination en?” It may be answered, they do not cease to imply
the substances, but they are no longer names of those
substances. Hard implies hardness, but it is not the name of that
quality. Atheniensis implies Athenæ, but it is not the name of the
city, any more than belonging to Athens can be called its name.
He observes: “If it were true, that adjectives were not the names
of things, there could be no attribution by adjectives; for you
cannot attribute nothing.” This conclusion may be disputed. An
adjective may imply a substance, quality, or property, though it is
not the name of it. Cereus, “waxen,” implies cera, “wax;” but it is
the latter only which is strictly the name of the substance.
Pertaining to wax, made of wax, are not surely names of the
thing itself. Every attributive, whether verb or adjective, must
imply an attribute; but it is not therefore the name of that
attribute. Juvenescit, “he waxes young,” expresses an attribute;
but we should not call juvenescit the name of the attribute.
It may be asked, what is the difference between caput hominis,
“a man’s head,” and caput humanum, “a human head?” If
hominis, “man’s,” be deemed a noun, why should not humanum,
“human,” be deemed a noun also? It may be answered, that
hominis does, in fact, perform the office of an adjective,
expressing not only the individual, but conjunction also; and that
Mr. Wallis assigns to the English genitive the name of adjective.
Besides, does not Mr. Tooke himself maintain, “that case, gender,
and number, are no parts of the noun”? and does it not hence
follow, that the real nouns are not hominis, but homo,—not
51. man’s, but man? for such certainly is their form when divested of
those circumstances which, according to Mr. Tooke, make no part
of them. If the doctrine, therefore, of the learned author be
correct, and if the real noun exclude gender, case, and number,
as any part of it, neither hominis nor humanum, man’s nor
human, can with consistency be called nouns.
But let Mr. Tooke’s argument be applied to the verb, the τὸ ῥῆμα,
which he justly considers as an essential part of speech. “If verbs
were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by
verbs, for we cannot attribute nothing.” Are we then to call sapit,
vivit, legit, names? If so, we have nothing but names; and to this
conclusion Mr. Tooke fairly brings the discussion; for he says, that
all words are names.
Having thus submitted to the reader the doctrine of this
sagacious critic, with the objections which naturally present
themselves, I proceed to observe, that the controversy appears to
me to be, in a great degree, a mere verbal dispute. It is agreed
on both sides, that the adjective expresses a substance, quality,
or property; but, while it is affirmed by some critics, it is denied
by others, that it is the name of the thing signified. The
metaphysician considers words merely as signs of thought, while
the grammarian regards chiefly their changes by inflexion: and
hence arises that perplexity in which the classification of words
has been, and still continues to be, involved. Now, it is evident
that every word must be the sign of some sensation, idea, or
perception. It must express some substance or some attribute:
and in this sense all words may be regarded as names.
Sometimes we have the name of the thing simply, as person.
Sometimes we have an accessary idea combined with the simple
sign, as “possession,” “conjunction,” “action,” and so forth, as
personal, personally, personify. This accessary circumstance, we
have reason to believe, was originally denoted by a distinct word,
significant of the idea intended; and that this word was, in the
progress of language, abbreviated and incorporated with the
primary term, in the form of what we now term an affix or prefix.
Thus frigus, frigidus, friget, all denote the same primary idea,
involving the name of that quality, or of that sensation, which we
term cold. Frigus is the name of the thing simply; frigidus
expresses the quality in concreto, or conjunction. Considering,
therefore, all words as names, it may be regarded as a complex
name, expressing two distinct ideas,—that of the quality, and that
of conjunction. Friget (the subject being understood) may be
52. regarded as a name still more complex; involving, first, the name
of the quality; secondly, the name of conjunction; thirdly, the sign
of affirmation, as either expressed by an appropriate name, or
constructively implied, equivalent to the three words, est cum
frigore. According, then, to this metaphysical view of the subject,
we have first nomen simplex, the simple name; secondly, nomen
adjectivum or nomen duplex, the name of the thing, with that of
conjunction; thirdly, nomen affirmativum, the name of the thing
affirmed to be conjoined.
The simple question now is, whether all words, not even the verb
excepted, should be called nouns; or whether we shall assign
them such appellations as may indicate the leading circumstances
by which they are distinguished. The latter appears to me to be
the only mode which the grammarian, as the teacher of an art,
can successfully adopt. Considering the subject in this light, I am
inclined to say with Mr. Harris, that the adjective, as implying
some substance or attribute, not per se, but in conjunction, or as
pertaining, is more nearly allied to the verb than to the noun; and
that though the verb and the adjective may, in common with the
noun, denote the thing, they cannot strictly be called its name. To
say that foolish and folly are each names of the same quality,
would, I apprehend, lead to nothing but perplexity and error.
It is true, if we are to confine the term noun to the simple name
of the subject, we shall exclude the genitive singular from all right
to this appellation; for it denotes, not the subject simply, but the
subject in conjunction—the inflexion being equivalent to
“belonging to.” This indeed is an inconsistency which can in no
way be removed, unless by adopting the opinion of Wallis, who
assigns no cases to English nouns, and considers man’s, king’s,
&c., to be adjectives. And were we to adopt Mr. Tooke’s definition
of our adjective, and say, “It is the name of a thing which is
directed to be joined to another name of a thing,” it will follow,
that king’s, man’s, are adjectives. In short, if the question be
confined to the English language, we must, in order to remove all
inconsistency, either deny the appellation of noun to the
adjective, and, with Wallis, call the genitive case an adjective; or
we must first call man’s, king’s, &c., adjectives; secondly, we must
term happy, extravagant, mercenary, &c., nouns, though they are
not names; and thirdly, we must assign the appellation of noun to
the verb itself.
53. From this view of the subject the reader will perceive that the
whole controversy depends on the meaning which we annex to
the term noun. If by this term we denote simply the thing itself,
without any accessary circumstance, then nothing can be called a
noun but the name in its simple form. If to the term noun we
assign a more extensive signification, as implying not only the
thing itself simply and absolutely, but also any accessary idea, as
conjunction, action, passion, and so forth, then it follows, that all
words may be termed names.
[36] The Saxons formed their comparative by er or ere, ar or
ære, er, or, ur, yr, and their superlative by ast, aste, est, ist, ost,
ust, yst. Now ar means before; hence the English words ere and
erst. Thus, in Saxon, riht wisere means “righteous before,” “just
before,” or “more than.” The suffix is equivalent to the Latin præ,
and the Hebrew preposition min, signifying also before; the only
difference being this, that what is a suffix to the Saxon adjective
is in Hebrew a prefix to the consequent subject of comparison,
and that in Latin the preposition following the positive stands
alone.
Mr. Bosworth, in his “Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” a work
displaying sound philological principles, has remarked, that the
Gothic superlative in itsa bears an obvious resemblance to some
of the Greek superlatives, as, ἄριστος, κάλλιστος, βράδιστος.
[37] Up and in are now used as adverbs and prepositions.
[38] This phraseology is Hebraistic—“more than all his children” is
the literal translation of the original, ְּמכל־בניו præ omnibus filiis,
seu, magis omnibus filiis suis.
[39] See a valuable little volume on English Grammar, by Mr.
Grant. The “Institutes of Latin Grammar,” by the same author, we
would recommend to the attention of every classical student.
[40] I, hi, hie, “to go,” he considers to be from Ἰ-έναι, the Greek
verb; and hence to be derived the Latin verb I-re, “to go,” “to
hie.”
[41] Intransitive verbs sometimes are used transitively, as, when
we say, “to walk the horse,” “to dance the child.” They also admit
a noun of their own signification, as, “to run a race.”
[42] Conformably to general opinion I here consider the English
language as having a passive voice. How far this opinion is well
founded shall be the subject of future inquiry.
54. [43] Mr. Bosworth seems to think, that the word tense is derived
from the Latin tensus, “used to denote that extension or inflexion
of the word, by which difference in time is implied, or difference
in action is signified.” I am rather inclined to consider it as derived
from the French tems or temps, and that from tempus.
[44] “Some,” says Dr. Beattie, “will not allow anything to be a
tense, but what, in one inflected word, expresses an affirmation
with time; for, that those parts of the verb are not properly called
tenses, which assume that appearance, by means of auxiliary
words. At this rate, in English, we should have two tenses only,
the present and the past in the active verb, and in the passive no
tenses at all. But this is a needless nicety; and, if adopted, would
introduce confusion into the grammatical art. If amaveram be a
tense, why should not amatus fueram? If I heard be a tense, I
did hear, I have heard, and I shall hear, must be equally entitled
to that appellation.”
How simplicity can introduce confusion I am unable to
comprehend, unless we are to affirm that the introduction of
Greek and Latin names, to express nonentities in our language, is
necessary to illustrate the grammar, and simplify the study of the
language to the English scholar. But the author’s theory seems at
variance with itself. He admits, that “we have no cases in English,
except the addition of s in the genitive;” whence we may infer,
that he considers inflexion as essential to a case. Now, if those
only be cases, which are formed by inflexion, those only should,
grammatically, be deemed tenses, which are formed in the same
manner. When he asks, therefore, if amaveram be a tense, why
should not amatus fueram be a tense also? the answer on his
own principles is sufficiently obvious, namely, because the one is
formed by inflexion, the other by combination. And, I would ask,
if king’s be a genitive case, why, according to this theory, is not of
a king entitled to the same appellation? I apprehend the answer
he must give, consistently with his opinion respecting cases, will
sufficiently explain why amaveram, and I heard, are tenses, while
amatus fueram, and I had heard, are not.
Nay, further, if it be needless nicety to admit those only as tenses,
which are formed by inflexion, is it not equally a needless nicety
to admit those cases only, which are formed by varying the
termination? And if confusion be introduced by denying I had
heard to be a tense, why does not the learned author simplify the
doctrine of English nouns, by giving them six cases, a king, of a
55. king, to or for a king, a king, O king, with, from, in, or by a king?
This surely would be to perplex, not to simplify. In short, the
inconsistency of those grammarians, who deny that to be a case,
which is not formed by inflexion, yet would load us with moods
and tenses, not formed by change of termination, is so palpable,
as to require neither illustration nor argument to expose it. If
these authors would admit, that we have as many cases in
English, as there exists relations expressed by prepositions, then,
indeed, though they might overwhelm us with the number, we
should at least acknowledge the consistency of their theory. But
to adopt the principle of inflexion in one case, and reject it in
another, precisely parallel, involves an inconsistency which must
excite amazement. Nil fuit sic unquam impar sibi. Why do not
these gentlemen favour us with a dual number, with a middle
voice, and with an optative mood? Nay, as they are so fond of
tenses, as to lament that we rob them of all but two, why do they
not enrich us with a first and second aorist, and a paulo post
future? and, if this should not suffice, they will find in Hebrew a
rich supply of verbal forms. We should then have kal and niphal,
pihhel and pyhhal, hiphhil and hophhal, hithpahhel and
hothpahhel, and numerous other species and designations. What
a wonderful acquisition this would be to our stock of moods,
tenses, and voices!
One of these grammarians, indeed, reverencing the old maxim
est modus in rebus, observes, that “it is necessary to set bounds
to this business, so as not to occasion obscurity and perplexity,
when we mean to be simple and perspicuous.” This is so far
good; because, though it vindicates the impropriety, it modestly
would confine it within decent bounds. But surely it cannot be
necessary to remind this writer, that when the boundary between
right and wrong, propriety and impropriety, is once passed, it is
extremely difficult to prescribe limits to the transgression; and
that arbitrary distinctions, resting on no other foundation than
prejudice or fashion, must ever be vague, questionable, and
capricious. These are truths of which, I am persuaded, the author
to whom I allude needs not to be reminded. But it may be
necessary to impress on his attention another truth equally
incontestable, that no authority, how respectable soever, can
sanction inconsistency; and that great names, though they may
be honoured by ignorance and credulity with the most obsequious
homage, will never pass with the intelligent reader, either for
demonstration or for argument. This author, in defence of his
56. theory of cases and tenses, observes, “that the proper form of a
tense, in the Greek and Latin languages, is certainly that which it
has in the grammars of these languages.” On what evidence is
this assumption founded? Here is exhibited a petitio principii, too
palpable to escape the detection of the most inattentive reader.
He proceeds: “But in the Greek and Latin grammars we uniformly
find that some of the tenses are formed by variations of the
principal verb, and others by the addition of helping verbs.” It is
answered that the admission of these forms in Greek and Latin
grammars is a question of mere expediency, and nowise affects
the doctrine for which we contend, any more than the admission
of six cases in all the Latin declensions affects the doctrine of
cases; though in no one declension have all the cases dissimilar
terminations. This position it would be easy to demonstrate: it
would be easy likewise to show why, notwithstanding this
occasional identity of termination, six cases are admitted in all the
declensions; but the subject is foreign to our present purpose. It
is important, however, to observe, what has escaped the notice of
the author, that the principle, on which the admission just
mentioned may be expedient in a Latin grammar, has no
existence whatever in the English language.
“It is, therefore,” he continues, “indisputable, that the principal, or
the participle, and an auxiliary, constitute a regular tense in the
Greek and Latin languages.” This, as I have remarked, is a
palpable petitio principii. It is to say, that because amatus fueram
is a tense, therefore “I had been loved” is a tense also. The
author forgets that the premises must be true, to render the
conclusion legitimate. He forgets, that a circular argument is a
mere sophism, because it assumes as true what it is intended to
prove. Whether amatus fueram be or be not a tense, is the very
point in question; and so far am I from admitting the affirmative
as unquestionable, that I contend, it has no more claim to the
designation of tense, than ἔσομαι τετυφώς—no more claim than
amandum est mihi, amari oportet, or amandus sum, have to be
called moods. Here I must request the reader to bear in mind the
necessary distinction between the grammar of a language and its
capacity of expression.
In answer to the objection of inconsistency, in admitting tenses
where there is no inflexion, yet rejecting cases where there is no
change of termination, the author says, “that such a mode of
declension cannot apply to our language.” But why can it not
apply? Why not give as English cases, to a king, of a king, from a
57. king, with a king, by a king, at a king, about a king, &c. &c.? The
mode is certainly applicable, whatever may be the consequences
of that application. A case surely is as easily formed by a noun
and preposition, as a tense by a participle and auxiliary. But the
author observes, “the English language would then have a much
greater number of cases than the Greek and Latin languages.”
And why not? Is the number of cases in English, or any other
language, to be limited by the number in Greek or Latin? or does
the author mean to say, that there is any peculiar propriety in the
number five or six? The author, to be consistent with himself,
ought to acknowledge as many cases as there are prepositions to
be found in the English language. This, it may be said, would
encumber our grammar, and embarrass the learner. This is,
indeed, an argument against the expediency of the application,
but not against the practicability of the principle in question.
Besides, it may be asked, why does the author confine his love of
simplification to cases? Why not extend it to tenses also? Why
maintain, that inflexion only makes a case, and that a tense is
formed without inflexion? Why dismiss one encumbrance, and
admit another?
The author observes, that “from grammarians, who form their
ideas and make their decisions respecting this part of grammar,
on the principles and construction of languages, which in these
points do not suit the peculiar nature of our own, but differ
considerably from it, we may naturally expect grammatical
schemes that are neither perspicuous nor consistent, and which
will tend more to perplex than inform the learner.” Had I been
reprehending the author’s own practice, I should have employed
nearly the same language. How these observations, certainly
judicious and correct, can be reconciled with the doctrine of the
writer himself, I am utterly at a loss to conceive. His ideas of
consistency and simplicity are to me incomprehensible. He rejects
prepositional cases for the sake of simplicity, and he admits
various moods and tenses, equally foreign to the genius of our
language, in order to avoid perplexity. Surely this is not a
“consistent scheme.” Nay, he tells us, “that on the principle of
imitating other languages in names and forms (I beseech the
reader to mark the words), without a correspondence in nature
and idiom, we might adopt a number of declensions, as well as a
variety of cases, for English substantives: but,” he adds, “this
variety does not at all correspond with the idiom of our
58. language.” After this observation, argument surely becomes
unnecessary.
I have here, the reader will perceive, assailed the author’s
doctrine merely on the ground of inconsistency. It is liable,
however, to objections of a more serious nature; and were I not
apprehensive that I have already exhausted the patience of the
reader, I should now proceed to state these objections. There is
one observation, however, which I feel it necessary to make. The
author remarks, that to take the tenses as they are commonly
received, and endeavour to ascertain their nature and their
differences, “is a much more useful exercise, as well as a more
proper, for a work of this kind, than to raise, as might be easily
raised, new theories on the subject.” If the author by this intends
to insinuate that our doctrine is new, he errs egregiously. For
Wallis, one of the oldest, and certainly one of the best of our
English grammarians, duly attentive to the simplicity of that
language whose grammar he was exhibiting, assigned only two
tenses to the English verb. He says, Nos duo tantum habemus
tempora Præsens et Præteritum; and on this simple principle his
explanation of the verb proceeds. In the preface to his grammar,
he censures his few predecessors for violating the simplicity of
the English language, by the introduction of names and rules
foreign to the English idiom. Cur hujusmodi casuum, generum,
modorum, temporumque fictam et ineptam plane congeriem
introducamus citra omnem necessitatem, aut in ipsa lingua
fundamentum, nulla ratio suadet. And so little was he aware that
the introduction of technical names for things which have no
existence, facilitates the acquisition of any art or science, that he
affirms it in regard to the subject before us to be the cause of
great confusion and perplexity. Quæ (inutilia præcepta) a lingua
nostra sunt prorsus aliena, adeoque confusionem potius et
obscuritatem pariunt, quam explicationi inserviunt.
[45] Mr. Gilchrist, in his “Philosophic Etymology,” represents the
terminations ath, eth, ad, ed, et, en, an, as conjunctives,
equivalent to the sign +, denoting add, or join (see p. 162). In
another part of the same work, he considers did to be do
doubled, as dedi from the Latin do, which he believes to be the
very same word with our do. Repetition, he observes, is a mode
of expressing complete action. Hence we have do, do-ed, dede,
did, in English. This explanation is ingenious, and furnishes a
probable account of the origin of the word did, which he remarks
was formerly spelled dede.
59. [46]
I be Thou beest He, she, or it be
We be Ye or you be They be,
from the Saxon
Ic beo Thu beest He beeth,
are obsolete, unless followed by a concessive term. Thus, instead
of saying, “Many there be that go in thereat,” we should now say,
“Many there are.” For “to whom all hearts be open,” we should
now write, “to whom all hearts are open.” We find them, however,
used with the conjunctions if and though; thus, “If this be my
notion of a great part of that high science, divinity, you will be so
civil as to imagine, I lay no mighty stress upon the rest.”—Pope.
That this was his notion the author had previously declared; the
introductory clause, therefore, is clearly affirmative, and is the
same as if he had said, “As this is my notion.” “Although she be
abundantly grateful to all her protectors, yet I observe your name
most often in her mouth.”—Swift. “The paper, although it be
written with spirit, yet would have scarce cleared a shilling.”—
Swift. In the two last sentences the meaning is affirmative;
nothing conditional or contingent being implied.
In the following examples, it expresses doubt or contingency. “If
thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down:” i.e. “shouldst be.” “If
I be in difficulty, I will ask your aid;” i.e. “If I should be.”
[47] Though the authority of Milton, Dryden, Pope, and Swift, can
be pleaded in favour of wert, as the second person singular of
this tense, I am inclined to agree with Lowth, that in conformity
to analogy, as well as the practice of the best ancient writers, it
would be better to confine wert to the imperfect conditional.
[48] If the expression of time with an attribute “be sufficient to
make a verb, the participle must be a verb too, because it
signifies time also. But the essence of a verb consisting in
predication, which is peculiar to it, and incommunicable to all
other parts of speech, and these infinitives never predicating,
they cannot be verbs. Again, the essence of a noun consisting in
its so subsisting in the understanding, as that it may be the
subject of predication, and these infinitives being all capable of so
subsisting, they must of necessity be nouns.”—R. Johnson’s
Gram. Comment.
60. [49] The variety of form which this verb assumes, clearly shows
that it has proceeded from different sources.
Am is from the Anglo-Saxon eom, and is from the Anglo-Saxon ys
or is; and these have been supposed to have come from the
Greek εἰμὶ, εἶς.
The derivation of are is doubtful. It may, perhaps, have
proceeded directly from er or erum of the Icelandic verb,
denoting “to be.” By Mr. Gilchrist it is considered as “the same
with the infinitive termination are, ere, ire.” Mr. Webb conjectured,
that it might have some relation to the Greek ἔαρ, spring. Both
these explanations appear to us somewhat fanciful.
Art is from the Anglo-Saxon eart. “Thou eart,” thou art.
Was is evidently the Anglo-Saxon wæs; and wast, wert, probably
from the Franco-Theatisc, warst; and were from the Anglo-Saxon
wære, wæron.
Be is from the Anglo-Saxon Ic beo, I am, which, with the Gaelic
verb bi, to be, Mr. Webb considered to be derived from βίος, life,
as the Latin fui, from φύω, to grow. This conjecture he supports
by several pertinent quotations. See Mr. Bosworth’s “Elements of
Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” p. 164.
[50] The words did, hast, hath, has, had, shall, wilt, are evidently,
as Wallis observes, contracted for doed, haveth, haves, haved,
shall’st, will’st.
[51] This verb is derived from the Saxon magan, posse, the
present of which is Ic mæg, and the preterite Ic miht. Hence also
Ic mot.
“For as the fisshe, if it be drie,
Mote in defaute of water die.”—Gower.
[52] This verb is derived from cunnan, scire, posse, sapere.
Hence is derived the verb “to ken,” or “to know;” or more
probably, indeed, they were one and the same word: hence also
the word cunning. “To ken” is still used in Scotland; and in the
expression of Shakspeare, “I ken them from afar,” is erroneously
considered by some critics to mean, “I see them.”
[53] This verb is, unquestionably, a derivative from the Saxon
ꞅceal, I owe or I ought, and was originally of the same import. I
shall denoted “it is my duty,” and was precisely synonymous with
debeo in Latin. Chaucer says, “The faith I shall to God;” that is,
“the faith I owe to God.” “Thou shalt not kill,” or “thou oughtest
61. not to kill.” In this sense shall is a present tense, and denoted
present duty or obligation. But, as all duties and all commands,
though present in respect to their obligation and authority, must
be future in regard to their execution; so by a natural transition,
observable in most languages, this word, significant of present
duty, came to be a note of future time. I have considered it,
however, as a present tense; 1st, because it originally denoted
present time; 2dly, because it still retains the form of a present,
preserving thus the same analogy to should that can does to
could, may to might, will to would; and 3dly, because it is no
singular thing to have a verb in the present tense, expressive of
future time, commencing from the present moment; for such
precisely is the Greek verb μέλλω, futurus sum. Nay, the verb will
denotes present inclination, yet in some of its persons, like shall,
expresses futurition. I have considered, therefore, the verb shall
as a present tense, of which should is the preterperfect.
Johnson’s explanation of the meaning of this verb is so
perspicuous, that, as foreigners are apt to mistake its use, I shall
here transcribe his words. I shall love: “it will be so that I must
love,” “I am resolved to love.” Shall I love? “will it be permitted
me to love?” “will it be that I must love?” Thou shalt love: “I
command thee to love;” “it is permitted thee to love;” “it will be,
that thou must love.” Shalt thou love? “will it be, that thou must
love?” “will it be permitted thee to love?” He shall love: “it will be,
that he must love;” “it is commanded that he love.” Shall he love?
“is it permitted him to love?” The plural persons follow the
signification of the singular.
I transcribe also the same author’s explanation of the verb I will.
I will come: “I am willing to come,” “I am determined to come.”
Thou wilt come: “it must be, that thou must come,” importing
necessity; or “it shall be, that thou shalt come,” importing choice.
Wilt thou come? “hast thou determined to come?” importing
choice. He will come: “he is resolved to come;” or “it must be,
that he must come,” importing choice or necessity.
Brightland’s short rule may be of some service in assisting
foreigners to distinguish the use of these two verbs. It is this:
“In the first person simply shall foretels:
In will a threat, or else a promise, dwells;
Shall in the second and the third does threat;
Will simply then foretels the future feat.”
62. In addition to these directions for the use of shall and will, it is to
be observed, that, when the second and third persons are
represented as the subjects of their own expressions, or their
own thoughts, shall foretels, as in the first person, thus, “he says
he shall be a loser by this bargain:” “do you suppose you shall
go?” “He hoped he should recover,” and “he hoped he would
recover,” are expressions of different import. In the former, the
two pronouns necessarily refer to the same person; in the latter,
they do not.
[54] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb willan, velle, the
preterite of which is Ic wold.
[55] The preterite would is frequently employed, like the Latin
preterimperfect tense, to denote what is usual or customary.
Thus,
Quintilio si quid recitares, corrige, sodes,
Hoc, aiebat, et hoc; melius te posse negares,
Bis terque expertum frustra; delere jubebat,
Et malè tornatos incudi reddere versus:
Si defendere delictum quàm vertere, malles,
Nullum ultra verbum, aut operam insumebat inanem.
Horace.
where the verbs aiebat, jubebat, insumebat, may be translated,
“he would say,” “he would desire,” “he would spend.” Thus also in
English,
Pleas’d with my admiration, and the fire
His speech struck from me, the old man would shake
His years away, and act his young encounters:
Then having show’d his wounds, he’d sit him down.
[56] In Latin the imperfect potential is frequently employed in the
same manner to denote present time; thus, irem si vellem,
expresses present liberty and inclination. And the same analogy
obtains in Latin; for we say, either, tu, si hic sis, aliter sentias, or
tu, si hic esses, aliter sentires. In such examples, it is intended to
signify either the coexistence of two circumstances, or the one as
the immediate consequence of the other. An identity of tense,
therefore, best expresses contemporary events.
[57] If it should be said, that the participle may properly be
considered as a verb, since it implies an attribute with time, I
would ask, whether affirmation, the most important of all
circumstances, and without which no communication could take
place, should be overlooked in our classification of words
63. agreeably to their import, or the offices which they perform. If
the verb and participle be referred to one class, the principal part
of speech which has been pre-eminently distinguished by the
name of verb, or the word, is degraded from its rank, and
confounded with a species of words which are not even necessary
to the communication of thought. Surely, if any circumstance can
entitle any sort of words to a distinct reference, it is that of
affirmation.
If it should be objected that the participle, like the verb, governs
a case, I would ask, because lectio, tactio, and many other
substantives, are found sometimes joined with an accusative
case, were they ever on this account considered as verbs?
Besides, if the government of a case be urged as an argument,
what becomes of those participles which govern no case? Nay, if
the government of a case be deemed the criterion of a verb, what
name shall we assign to those verbs which have no regimen at
all? If any species of words is to be distinguished from another,
the characteristic difference must surely belong, not to part only,
but to the whole.
[58] The termination ing is from the Anglo-Saxon ande, ænde,
ende, ind, onde, unde, ynde, and corresponds to the termination
of the Latin gerunds in andum and endum, expressing
continuation, Amandum, Lufiande, Loving.
[59] Here I would be understood to reason on their own
principles; for the truth is, that each of these tenses admits a
definitive.
[60] See the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy, vol. iii.
[61] Dr. Beattie observes, “that the fundamental error of those
philosophers who deny the existence of present time is, that they
suppose the present instant to have, like a geometrical point,
neither parts nor magnitude. But as nothing is, in respect of our
senses, a geometrical point, (for whatever we see or touch must
of necessity have magnitude,) so neither is the present, or any
other instant, wholly unextended.” His argument amounts to this,
that as a mathematical point is not an object of sense, nor has
any real existence, so neither has a metaphysical instant. It is
granted. They are each ideal. But does this prove the author’s
position, that philosophers have erred in asserting their similarity?
or does it evince that no analogy subsists between them? Quite
the reverse. The truth is, a geometrical point is purely ideal; it is
necessary to the truth of mathematical demonstration, that it be
64. conceived to have no parts. Finding it convenient to represent it
to sense, we therefore give it magnitude. A metaphysical instant,
or present time, is in like manner ideal; but we find it convenient
to assume as present an extended space. The doctor observes,
that sense perceives nothing but what is present. It is true; but it
should be remembered that not time, but objects which exist in
time, are perceived by the senses. It may enable a person to
form a correct idea of this matter, if he will ask himself, what he
means by present time. If it be the present hour, is it not obvious
that part of it is past, and part of it future? If it be the present
minute, it is equally clear, that the whole of it cannot be present
at once. Nay, if it be the present vibration of the pendulum, is it
not obvious that part of it is performed, and part of it remains to
be performed? Nor is it possible to stop in this investigation, till
present time, strictly speaking, be proved to have no existence.
Did it exist, it must be extended; and if extended, it cannot be
present, for past and future must necessarily be included in it. If
it should be answered, that this proves time, like matter, infinitely
divisible, and that the most tedious process will still leave
something capable of division, I reply, that as whatever may be
left in the one case must be figure, and not a point, so the
remainder, in the other, must be a portion of extended time, how
minute soever, and not an instant. The process, therefore, must
be continued, till we arrive in idea at a point and an instant,
incapable of division, being not made up of parts.
[62] When we say, God is good, I would ask Dr. Browne whether
the verb be definite or indefinite, whether it denote perfection or
imperfection, or have no reference to either. It appears to me that
neither of the terms is in his sense applicable; for that the verb
denotes simple affirmation with time; or, if applicable, that the
tense is, contrary to his opinion, indefinite, the idea of completion
or imperfection being entirely excluded.
[63] These phraseologies, as the author last quoted justly
observes, are harsh to the ear, and appear exceedingly awkward;
but a little attention will suffice to show that they correctly exhibit
the ideas implied by the tense which we have at present under
consideration.
[64] See Encyc. Brit., Art. Grammar.
[65] I consider that no language, grammatically examined, has
more cases, tenses, or moods, than are formed by inflexion. But
if any person be inclined to call these forms of expression by the
65. name of imperative mood, I have no objection. Only let him be
consistent, and call “Dost thou love?” an interrogative mood,
adopting also the precative, the requisitive, the optative, the
hortative, &c., together with the various cases in nouns, and
tenses in verbs, which are formed by prepositions and auxiliary
verbs: I should only apprehend, that language would fail him to
assign them names.
If it should be asked, “Agreeably to your doctrine of the verb, as
implying affirmation, what part of speech would you make the
verbs in the following sentences, Depart instantly, improve your
time, forgive us our sins? Will it be said that the verbs in these
phrases are assertions?” I should answer that all moods,
metaphysically considered, are, in my apprehension, equally
indicative. Every possible form of speech can do nothing but
express the sentiment of the speaker, his desire, his wish, his
sensation, his perception, his belief, &c. Whatever form,
therefore, the expression may assume, it must be resolvable into
assertion; and must be considered as expressing, in the person of
the speaker, what he desires, wishes, feels, thinks, and so forth.
No one surely will deny, that “thou oughtest not to kill,” “thou
shalt not kill,” “thou art forbidden to kill,” are affirmations. And
are not these expressions so nearly equivalent to “do not kill,”
that in Greek and Latin they are rendered indifferently either by
οὐ φονεύσεις, or, μὴ φόνευε; non occides, or ne occidito? If then
we say, “kill thou,” will it be contended that, though the
prohibition implies an affirmation of the speaker, the command
does not? The expression I conceive to be strictly equivalent to
“thou shalt kill,” “thou art ordered to kill.” Hence ave and jubeo te
avere, are deemed expressions of the same import. If the
question be examined grammatically, or as a subject of pure
grammar, I am inclined to think that where there is no variety of
termination, there cannot be established a diversity of mood.
[66] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb Ic most, ego
debeo.
[67] It belongs not to my province to inquire, how amarem came
to signify I might or could love, or whether it be strictly in the
potential or the subjunctive mood. I here take it for granted that
amarem does, without an ellipsis, signify, I might, could, would,
or should love, implying licet, possum, volo, debeo.—See
Johnson’s Comment.
66. [68] Why this verb forms an exception, it would be easy to
explain.
[69] See Webster’s Dissertations, p. 263.
[70] A similar phraseology in the use of the pluperfect indicative
for the same tense subjunctive, obtains in Latin, as
“Impulerat ferro Argolicas fœdare latebras.”—Virgil.
[71] The Latins used si in both cases: and though their poets did
not attend to this distinction, their prose writers generally
observed it, by joining si for quoniam with the indicative mood.
[72] Where r is added, the verb follows also the general rule.
[73] Some have excluded bore as the preterite of this verb. We
have sufficient authority, however, for admitting it; thus,
“By marrying her who bore me.”—Dryden.
[74] Beholden is obsolescent in this sense.
[75] “So kept the diamond, and the rogue was bit.”—Pope.
“There was lately a young gentleman bit to the bone.”—Tatler.
[76] Brake seems now obsolescent.
[77] Though Johnson has not admitted the regular form of the
participle in this verb, I think there is sufficient authority for
concurring with Lowth in receiving builded as the participle as
well as built, though it be not in such general use.
[78] Chode, which occurs twice in the Bible, is now obsolete.
[79] Lowth has given clomb as the preterite of climb. I can find,
however, no authority later than Spenser, and am inclined to think
it is now obsolete.
[80] The irregular preterite clad is obsolescent.
[81] I know no example in which the preterite, which analogically
would be forwent, is to be found. It may be here remarked that
this verb, in violation of analogy, is generally spelled forego, as if
it meant “to go before.” This is equally improper as it would be to
write forebid, foresake, foreswear, for forbid, forsake, forswear.
[82] Fraught is more properly an adjective than participle.
[83] This verb, Lowth says, when employed as an active verb,
“may perhaps, most properly be used in the regular form.” Here
the learned author appears to me, if he be not chargeable with
67. error, to have expressed his meaning incorrectly; for it cannot be
disputed that the irregular form of this verb is frequently, and
with unquestionable propriety, used in an active sense. Thus we
say, “the servant hung the scales in the cellar;” and passively,
“the scales were hung by the servant.” I should, therefore, rather
say that, when this verb denotes suspension, for the purpose of
destroying life, the regular form is far preferable. Thus, “the man
was hanged,” not “hung.”
[84] The irregular preterite and participle of this verb are
employed in sea language; but the latter rarely.
[85] Lowth has given holpen as the participle; it is now
obsolescent, if not obsolete. It belonged to the verb to holp,
which has been long out of use.
[86] Several grammarians have rejected hid as a participle. It
rests, however, on unquestionable authority; but hidden is
preferable.
[87] Holden, which was some years ago obsolescent, is now
returning into more general use.
[88] Laden, like fraught, may be deemed an adjective.
[89] Priestley, I apprehend, has erred in giving lain as the
participle of this verb.
[90] Lien, though not so generally used as lain, is not destitute of
unexceptionable authority. I have, therefore, with Johnson and
Lowth, given it as the participle. Murray has omitted it.
[91] Some grammarians have rejected lit. It can plead, however,
colloquial usage in its favour, and even other authority. “I lit my
pipe with the paper.”—Addison.
[92] With Priestley and Lowth, I have given this verb a regular
participle; for which, I believe, there is sufficient authority,
without adducing the example of Shakspeare. Most other
grammarians have rejected it.
[93] Quitted is far more generally used as the preterite than quit.
[94] Priestley has rejected rid, and Murray ridden, as the
participle, while Johnson makes rid the preterite of ride. As rid is
the present and preterite of another verb, it would, perhaps, be
better to dismiss it entirely from the verb to ride, and conjugate,
with Priestley, ride, rode, ridden.
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