![The navy failed to give any account of itself to the Greeks, who were
waiting outside of the Dardanelles. Finally, on December 16th, after the
people of the vicinity had openly cursed and taunted them, the fleet sailed
out to fight. An action at long range did little damage to either side. The
Turkish vessels refused to go beyond the protection of their forts. They
returned in the evening to anchor. The mastery of the sea remained to the
Greeks.[1]
[1] In this connection, it would be forgetting to pay tribute to a
remarkable exploit to omit mention of the raid of the Hamidieh during the
late winter. One Ottoman officer at least chafed under the disgrace of the
inaction of the Ottoman navy. With daring and skill, Captain Reouf bey
slipped out into the Ægean Sea on the American-built cruiser, the
Hamidieh. He evaded the Greek blockaders, bombarded some outposts on
one of the islands, and sank the auxiliary cruiser, the Makedonia, in a
Greek port. The Hamidieh next appeared in the Adriatic, where she sank
several transports, and bombarded Greek positions on the coast of
Albania. The cruiser was next heard of at Port Said. She passed through
the Suez Canal into the Red Sea for a couple of weeks, and then returned
boldly into the Mediterranean, although Greek torpedo-boats were lying
in wait. Captain Reouf bey ran again the gauntlet of the Greek fleet, and
got back to the Dardanelles without mishap. This venture, undertaken
without permission from the Turkish admiral, had no effect upon the war.
For it came too late. But it showed what a little enterprise and courage
might have done to prevent the Turkish débâcle, if undertaken at the
beginning of the war.
If the army and the navy were powerless, how about the people of the
capital? From the very beginning of the war, the inhabitants of
Constantinople, Moslem as well as Christian, displayed the most complete
indifference concerning the fortunes of the battles. Even when the
Bulgarians were attacking Tchatalja, the city took little interest. Buying and
selling went on as usual. There were few volunteers for national defence, but
the cafés were crowded and the theatres and dance-halls of Péra were going
at full swing. The refugees came and camped in our streets and in the
cemeteries outside of the walls. Those who did not die passed on to Asia.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25003117-250519220418-af003420/85/Understanding-Regression-Analysis-An-Introductory-Guide-Larry-D-Schroeder-David-L-Sjoquist-Paula-E-Stephan-37-320.jpg)
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- 6. Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Series Editor: Barbara Entwisle, Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Series Founding Editor: Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Political Science, University of lowa Editorial Consultants Richard A. Berk, Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles William D. Berry, Political Science, Florida State University Kenneth A. Bollen, Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Linda B. Bourque, Public Health, University of California, Los Angeles David Firth, Statistics, University of Warwick John Fox, Sociology, McMaster University Michael Friendly, Psychology,York University Jacques A. Hagenaars, Social Sciences,Tilburg University Ben B. Hansen, Statistics, University of Michigan Sally Jackson, Communication, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign William G. Jacoby, Political Science, Michigan State University Gary King, Government, Harvard University Roger E. Kirk, Psychology, Baylor University Tim Liao, Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign J. Scott Long, Sociology and Statistics, Indiana University Peter Marsden, Sociology, Harvard University Helmut Norpoth, Political Science, SUNY, Stony Brook Michael D. Ornstein, Sociology,York University Robert A. Stine, Statistics, University of Pennsylvania Yu Xie, Sociology, University of Michigan Publisher Sara Miller McCune, SAGE Publications, Inc
- 8. Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences A SAG E P U B L I CAT I O N S S E R I E S 1. Analysis of Variance, 2nd Edition Iversen/ Norpoth 2. Operations Research Methods Nagel/Neef 3. Causal Modeling, 2nd Edition Asher 4. Tests of Significance Henkel 5. Cohort Analysis, 2nd Edition Glenn 6. Canonical Analysis and Factor Comparison Levine 7. Analysis of Nominal Data, 2nd Edition Reynolds 8. Analysis of Ordinal Data Hildebrand/Laing/ Rosenthal 9. Time Series Analysis, 2nd Edition Ostrom 10. Ecological Inference Langbein/Lichtman 11. Multidimensional Scaling Kruskal/Wish 12. Analysis of Covariance Wildt/Ahtola 13. Introduction to Factor Analysis Kim/Mueller 14. Factor Analysis Kim/Mueller 15. Multiple Indicators Sullivan/Feldman 16. Exploratory Data Analysis Hartwig/Dearing 17. Reliability and Validity Assessment Carmines/Zeller 18. Analyzing Panel Data Markus 19. Discriminant Analysis Klecka 20. Log-Linear Models Knoke/Burke 21. Interrupted Time Series Analysis McDowall/ McCleary/Meidinger/Hay 22. Applied Regression, 2nd Edition Lewis-Beck/ Lewis-Beck 23. Research Designs Spector 24. Unidimensional Scaling McIver/Carmines 25. Magnitude Scaling Lodge 26. Multiattribute Evaluation Edwards/Newman 27. Dynamic Modeling Huckfeldt/Kohfeld/Likens 28. Network Analysis Knoke/Kuklinski 29. Interpreting and Using Regression Achen 30. Test Item Bias Osterlind 31. Mobility Tables Hout 32. Measures of Association Liebetrau 33. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Long 34. Covariance Structure Models Long 35. Introduction to Survey Sampling Kalton 36. Achievement Testing Bejar 37. Nonrecursive Causal Models Berry 38. Matrix Algebra Namboodiri 39. Introduction to Applied Demography Rives/Serow 40. Microcomputer Methods for Social Scientists, 2nd Edition Schrodt 41. Game Theory Zagare 42. Using Published Data Jacob 43. Bayesian Statistical Inference Iversen 44. Cluster Analysis Aldenderfer/Blashfield 45. Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models Aldrich/Nelson 46. Event History and Survival Analysis, 2nd Edition Allison 47. Canonical Correlation Analysis Thompson 48. Models for Innovation Diffusion Mahajan/Peterson 49. Basic Content Analysis, 2nd Edition Weber 50. Multiple Regression in Practice Berry/Feldman 51. Stochastic Parameter Regression Models Newbold/Bos 52. Using Microcomputers in Research Madron/ Tate/Brookshire 53. Secondary Analysis of Survey Data Kiecolt/ Nathan 54. Multivariate Analysis of Variance Bray/ Maxwell 55. The Logic of Causal Order Davis 56. Introduction to Linear Goal Programming Ignizio 57. Understanding Regression Analysis, 2nd Edition Schroeder/Sjoquist/Stephan 58. Randomized Response and Related Methods, 2nd Edition Fox 59. Meta-Analysis Wolf 60. Linear Programming Feiring 61. Multiple Comparisons Klockars/Sax 62. Information Theory Krippendorff 63. Survey Questions Converse/Presser 64. Latent Class Analysis McCutcheon 65. Three-Way Scaling and Clustering Arabie/ Carroll/DeSarbo 66. Q Methodology, 2nd Edition McKeown/ Thomas 67. Analyzing Decision Making Louviere 68. Rasch Models for Measurement Andrich 69. Principal Components Analysis Dunteman 70. Pooled Time Series Analysis Sayrs 71. Analyzing Complex Survey Data, 2nd Edition Lee/Forthofer 72. Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression, 2nd Edition Jaccard/Turrisi 73. Understanding Significance Testing Mohr 74. Experimental Design and Analysis Brown/Melamed 75. Metric Scaling Weller/Romney 76. Longitudinal Research, 2nd Edition Menard 77. Expert Systems Benfer/Brent/Furbee 78. Data Theory and Dimensional Analysis Jacoby 79. Regression Diagnostics Fox 80. Computer-Assisted Interviewing Saris 81. Contextual Analysis Iversen 82. Summated Rating Scale Construction Spector 83. Central Tendency and Variability Weisberg 84. ANOVA: Repeated Measures Girden 85. Processing Data Bourque/Clark 86. Logit Modeling DeMaris 87. Analytic Mapping and Geographic Databases Garson/Biggs 88. Working With Archival Data Elder/Pavalko/Clipp 89. Multiple Comparison Procedures Toothaker 90. Nonparametric Statistics Gibbons 91. Nonparametric Measures of Association Gibbons 92. Understanding Regression Assumptions Berry 93. Regression With Dummy Variables Hardy 94. Loglinear Models With Latent Variables Hagenaars 95. Bootstrapping Mooney/Duval 96. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Eliason 97. Ordinal Log-Linear Models Ishii-Kuntz 98. Random Factors in ANOVA Jackson/Brashers 99. Univariate Tests for Time Series Models Cromwell/Labys/Terraza 100. Multivariate Tests for Time Series Models Cromwell/Hannan/Labys/Terraza
- 9. 101. Interpreting Probability Models: Logit, Probit, and Other Generalized Linear Models Liao 102. Typologies and Taxonomies Bailey 103. Data Analysis: An Introduction Lewis-Beck 104. Multiple Attribute Decision Making Yoon/Hwang 105. Causal Analysis With Panel Data Finkel 106. Applied Logistic Regression Analysis, 2nd Edition Menard 107. Chaos and Catastrophe Theories Brown 108. Basic Math for Social Scientists: Concepts Hagle 109. Basic Math for Social Scientists: Problems and Solutions Hagle 110. Calculus Iversen 111. Regression Models: Censored, Sample Selected, or Truncated Data Breen 112. Tree Models of Similarity and Association James E. Corter 113. Computational Modeling Taber/Timpone 114. LISREL Approaches to Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression Jaccard/Wan 115. Analyzing Repeated Surveys Firebaugh 116. Monte Carlo Simulation Mooney 117. Statistical Graphics for Univariate and Bivariate Data Jacoby 118. Interaction Effects in Factorial Analysis of Variance Jaccard 119. Odds Ratios in the Analysis of Contingency Tables Rudas 120. Statistical Graphics for Visualizing Multivariate Data Jacoby 121. Applied Correspondence Analysis Clausen 122. Game Theory Topics Fink/Gates/Humes 123. Social Choice:Theory and Research Johnson 124. Neural Networks Abdi/Valentin/Edelman 125. Relating Statistics and Experimental Design: An Introduction Levin 126. Latent Class Scaling Analysis Dayton 127. Sorting Data: Collection and Analysis Coxon 128. Analyzing Documentary Accounts Hodson 129. Effect Size for ANOVA Designs Cortina/Nouri 130. Nonparametric Simple Regression: Smoothing Scatterplots Fox 131. Multiple and Generalized Nonparametric Regression Fox 132. Logistic Regression: A Primer Pampel 133. Translating Questionnaires and Other Research Instruments: Problems and Solutions Behling/Law 134. Generalized Linear Models: A Unified Approach Gill 135. Interaction Effects in Logistic Regression Jaccard 136. Missing Data Allison 137. Spline Regression Models Marsh/Cormier 138. Logit and Probit: Ordered and Multinomial Models Borooah 139. Correlation: Parametric and Nonparametric Measures Chen/Popovich 140. Confidence Intervals Smithson 141. Internet Data Collection Best/Krueger 142. Probability Theory Rudas 143. Multilevel Modeling Luke 144. Polytomous Item Response Theory Models Ostini/Nering 145. An Introduction to Generalized Linear Models Dunteman/Ho 146. Logistic Regression Models for Ordinal Response Variables O’Connell 147. Fuzzy Set Theory: Applications in the Social Sciences Smithson/Verkuilen 148. Multiple Time Series Models Brandt/Williams 149. Quantile Regression Hao/Naiman 150. Differential Equations: A Modeling Approach Brown 151. Graph Algebra: Mathematical Modeling With a Systems Approach Brown 152. Modern Methods for Robust Regression Andersen 153. Agent-Based Models Gilbert 154. Social Network Analysis, 2nd Edition Knoke/Yang 155. Spatial Regression Models Ward/Gleditsch 156. Mediation Analysis Iacobucci 157. Latent Growth Curve Modeling Preacher/Wichman/MacCallum/Briggs 158. Introduction to the Comparative Method With Boolean Algebra Caramani 159. A Mathematical Primer for Social Statistics Fox 160. Fixed Effects Regression Models Allison 161. Differential Item Functioning, 2nd Edition Osterlind/Everson 162. Quantitative Narrative Analysis Franzosi 163. Multiple Correspondence Analysis LeRoux/Rouanet 164. Association Models Wong 165. Fractal Analysis Brown/Liebovitch 166. Assessing Inequality Hao/Naiman 167. Graphical Models and the Multigraph Representation for Categorical Data Khamis 168. Nonrecursive Models Paxton/Hipp/ Marquart-Pyatt 169. Ordinal Item Response Theory Van Schuur 170. Multivariate General Linear Models Haase 171. Methods of Randomization in Experimental Design Alferes 172. Heteroskedasticity in Regression Kaufman 173. An Introduction to Exponential Random Graph Modeling Harris 174. Introduction to Time Series Analysis Pickup 175. Factorial Survey Experiments Auspurg/Hinz Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences A SAG E P U B L I CAT I O N S S E R I E S
- 10. To our children, Leanne Nathan Meghan Jennifer David SAGE was founded in 1965 by Sara Miller McCune to support the dissemination of usable knowledge by publishing innovative and high-quality research and teaching content. Today, we publish over 900 journals, including those of more than 400 learned societies, more than 800 new books per year, and a growing range of library products including archives, data, case studies, reports, and video. SAGE remains majority-owned by our founder, and after Sara’s lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures our continued independence. Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne
- 11. UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS An Introductory Guide Second Edition Larry D. Schroeder Syracuse University David L. Sjoquist Georgia State University Paula E. Stephan Georgia State University
- 12. Copyright 2017 by SAGE Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printed in the United States of America ISBN 978-1-5063-3288-8 This book is printed on acid-free paper. 16 17 18 19 20 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Acquisitions Editor: Helen Salmon Editorial Assistant: Chelsea Pearson Production Editor: Kelly DeRosa Copy Editor: Cate Huisman Typesetter: CM Digitals (P) Ltd. Proofreader: Jennifer Grubba Indexer: Will Ragsdale Cover Designer: Candice Harman Marketing Manager: Susannah Goldes FOR INFORMATION: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 E-mail: order@sagepub.com SAGE Publications Ltd. 1 Oliver’s Yard 55 City Road London, EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd. B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044 India SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd. 3 Church Street #10-04 Samsung Hub Singapore 049483
- 13. CONTENTS Series Editor’s Introduction ix Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii About the Authors xv 1. Linear Regression 1 Introduction 1 Hypothesized Relationships 2 A Numerical Example 3 Estimating a Linear Relationship 8 Least Squares Regression 10 Examples 13 The Linear Correlation Coefficient 15 The Coefficient of Determination 17 Regression and Correlation 20 Summary 20 2. Multiple Linear Regression 21 Introduction 21 Estimating Regression Coefficients 21 Standardized Coefficients 23 Associated Statistics 25 Examples 26 Summary 29 3. Hypothesis Testing 31 Introduction 31 Concepts Underlying Hypothesis Testing 32 The Standard Error of the Regression Coefficient 36
- 14. The Student’s t Distribution 39 Left-Tail Tests 44 Two-Tail Tests 46 Confidence Intervals 47 F Statistic 49 What Tests of Significance Can and Cannot Do 51 Summary 52 4. Extensions to the Multiple Regression Model 53 Introduction 53 Types of Data 53 Dummy Variables 55 Interaction Variables 58 Transformations 61 Prediction 63 Examples 64 Summary 68 5. Problems and Issues Associated With Regression 69 Introduction 69 Specification of the Model 70 Variables Used in Regression Equations and Measurement of Variables 73 Violations of Assumptions Regarding Residual Errors 75 Additional Topics 78 Conclusions 84 Appendix A: Derivation of a and b 85 Appendix B: Critical Values for Student’s t Distribution 87 Appendix C: Regression Output From SAS, Stata, SPSS, R, and EXCEL 89 Appendix D: Suggested Textbooks 96 References 98 Index 100
- 15. ix SERIES EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION Regression analysis is the “bread and butter” of social science research. A scan of the American Economic Review, American Political Science Review, American Sociological Review, and American Educational Research Journal shows that at least half of the articles published in the most recent issue of these flagship journals involve regression analysis. The same can be said about many journals in these fields. Social science research, as well as research in many other fields, including business, law and public policy, is largely inaccessible without at least some working knowledge of regression analysis, the logic that underlies it, and the basics of interpretation. For readers new to regression, it is difficult to know where to start: applications motivate interest in the statistics; yet without some working knowledge of the statistics, it is difficult to understand and appreciate the applications. Understanding Regression Analysis: An Introductory Guide, Second Edition provides an accessible, easy-to-read, and non-technical introduc- tion to multiple regression analysis. It is appropriate for upper-division undergraduate and introductory graduate courses needing a concise but thorough coverage of linear regression. Because of its emphasis on applica- tion, graduate students will find it a useful resource as they are mastering the technical details of regression. Trained researchers wanting a quick refresher on the core ideas of regression will also benefit from this volume. It is short, well-organized, and for those with prior familiarity with regres- sion, can be read in an evening. Understanding Regression Analysis covers what is needed to understand applications of regression analysis. It begins with a clear exposition of a lin- ear relationship and linear regression, then proceeds to multiple regression, hypothesis testing, and extensions. It concludes with problems and issues associated with linear regression. The authors cover an impressive number of topics: least squares regression; correlation and regression coefficients; sampling; goodness of fit; standard deviations, hypothesis testing, Type
- 16. x I and Type II error; standard errors; statistical significance; Student’s t distribution; right-, left- and two-tail tests; confidence intervals; cross- sectional, longitudinal, and panel data; micro and aggregate data; dummy variables; and interactions. The final chapter of the volume touches on the kinds of issues that may arise in actual application and the ways analysts typically respond. It discusses in a pragmatic and accessible way some of the problems associated with omitting a relevant variable, including an irrelevant variable, incorrectly specifying functional form, measurement error, selection bias, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and endogeneity. In doing so, it briefly introduces more advanced topics such as fixed effects models, interactions, time series analysis, simulta- neous equations, regression discontinuity designs, instrumental variables, and limited dependent variables. With grounding in the basics, readers can understand key results from these more sophisticated analyses, even if they are not in a position to undertake these analyses themselves. The first edition of Understanding Regression Analysis, published thirty years ago, remains one of the most popular “little green covers” in the QASS series. The second edition retains all of the strengths of the first: it is well-orga- nized, concise, and thorough. The authors have also made improvements. They haveupdatedsymbols and terminology to correspond with current usage.They include an appendix showing what regression output looks like from four dif- ferent statistical software packages (SAS, Stata, SPSS, R) and also from the Excel spreadsheet program. Importantly, the second edition of Understanding Regression Analysis draws a wide array of examples from the current litera- ture, selecting ones that will appeal to a broad audience. These include the relative position of states in educational performance, the impact of the great recession on volunteering, gender-based discrimination and maternity leave policies, the impact of winning the Nobel Prize on the number of times a scientist’s work is cited, the effect of copyright laws on the composition of new operas, the effects of immigration attitudes on political party identifica- tion, and the impact of the great recession on lightweight vehicle sales, among others. The examples include different levels of measurement in explanatory variables, from nominal to ratio. They illustrate diverse units of analysis, from individuals to states to countries. They also demonstrate the use of both cross- sectional and times series data and some of the issues that arise in the analysis of each. In short, the authors pair interesting examples with clear explanations of critical concepts and issues, making the volume accessible to readers at all levels from a broad range of social science disciplines. I am pleased to see an already successful monograph made even better. Barbara Entwisle Series Editor
- 17. xi PREFACE The revised version provides, as did the first edition of this volume, a short, nontechnical explanation of linear regression analysis. We illustrate how regression coefficients are estimated, how they are interpreted, and how they are used in a variety of settings within the social sciences, business, law, and public policy. The techniques used to test hypotheses about the regression coefficients and what the test results do and do not mean are explained. The book also discusses how linear regression techniques can be applied to a variety of different types of data, including data that represent specific groups or time periods, and also how forecasters can use regression analysis to make predictions. Finally, we acknowledge and explain some of the limitations to linear regression analysis. Our intent is to provide a non-technical understanding of regression anal- ysis, its meaning, and uses. The book is not intended to be a substitute for a course in elementary or applied statistics; however, students enrolled in such courses may find it a useful supplement to their regular textbook. Students in undergraduate or graduate courses that rely on articles that use regression techniques may find this volume useful in interpreting the reported results. Likewise, those who previously took a course or two in statistics may find the book to be a good review of the basic concepts they studied. Readers of the previous edition of our Sage “Green Book” will find this edition to be equally understandable and accessible. As with the first edition, we assume the reader has no background in statistics and only a limited background in mathematics. The second edition was edited to make the discussion even clearer and to provide improved explanations of vari- ous concepts. Boxes were added to highlight basic concepts and to augment text material. All examples are new and are taken from current books and articles. The examples, as well as the discussion in the chapters, also have been broadened substantially to encompass additional areas of the social sciences, business, law, and public policy. We have made the discussion of hypothesis testing in Chapter 3 more in line with the current approaches.
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- 19. even these eighty thousand soldiers of the nizam (active army) could have done wonders in the Thracian campaign, if they had been allowed to go ahead to meet the Bulgarians, and to form the first line of battle. But this was not done. There are three time-honoured principles that cannot afford to be neglected at the beginning of a campaign. The army used for initial offensive action against the enemy should be composed wholly of soldiers in active service. The army should be concentrated to meet the attack, or to attack one opposing army first, leaving the others until later. Armies must be kept mobile, and not allow themselves to be trapped in fortresses. The fortresses in the portions of territory which may have to be abandoned temporarily to the invasion of the enemy may easily be overstocked with defenders, but never with provisions and munitions of war. In spite of the instructions of von der Goltz pasha, the Turks showed no regard for the first two, at least, of these elementary principles. The mobile army in Macedonia, outside of the fortresses, was not recalled to Thrace, and redifs (reservists) were mixed with nizams (actives) in the first line of battle. The neglect of these principles was the direct cause of the Turkish disasters. After the nizams, most of whom were already in Thrace, came the redifs from Asia Minor. They arrived at Constantinople and at San Stefano in huge numbers, and without equipment. I saw many of them with their feet bound in rags. There were no tents over them or other shelter; there was no proper field equipment for them, and, even while they were patiently waiting for days to be forwarded to the front, they lacked (within sight of the minarets of Stambul!) bread to eat, shoes for their feet, and blankets to cover them at night. More than that, among them were many thousands who did not know how to use the rifles that were given to them, and who had not even a rudimentary military education. In defensive warfare, as they proved at Adrianople and at Tchatalja, they could fight like lions. But for an offensive movement in the field the great majority of the redifs were worse than useless. The Turks were absolutely sure of victory. The press of the capital, on the day that war was declared, stated that the army of Thrace was composed of four hundred thousand soldiers, and that it was the intention to march direct to Sofia. Turkish officers of my acquaintance told me that they were all
- 20. taking their dress uniforms in their baggage for this triumphal entry into Sofia, and that the invasion of Bulgaria would commence immediately. On the 19th of October, the Bulgarian army appeared in force at Mustafa Pasha, the first railway station after passing the Turkish frontier on the line from Sofia to Constantinople, and about eighteen miles north-west of Adrianople. It was the announced intention of the Bulgarians to attack immediately the fortress of Adrianople, whose cannon commanded the sole railway line from Bulgaria into Thrace. Two of the Bulgarian armies were directed upon Adrianople, and the third army under General Dimitrieff received similar orders. In Bulgaria, as well as in Turkey, every one expected to see an attack upon Adrianople. Had not General Savoff declared openly that he would sacrifice fifty thousand men, if necessary, as the Japanese had done at Fort Arthur, in order to capture Adrianople? A strict censorship was established in Bulgaria. No one, native or foreigner, who by chance saw just what the armies were doing, could have any hope of sending out the information. Postal and telegraphic communications were in the hands of the military authorities. No one, who happened to be in the region in which the troops were moving forward, was allowed to leave by train, automobile, bicycle, or even on foot. Never in history has the world been so completely in the dark as to the operations of the army. But the attacks of the outposts of Adrianople, and the commencement of the bombardment of the forts, seemed to indicate the common objective of the three Bulgarian armies. Adrianople had the reputation of being one of the strongest fortresses in the world. This reputation was well justified. Some miles to the east of Adrianople, guarding the mountains of the south-eastern frontier of Bulgaria, was Kirk Kilissé, which was also supposed to be an impregnable position. Here the Ottoman military authorities had placed stores to form the base of supplies for the offensive military operation against Bulgaria. Shortly before the war, a branch railway from the sole line between Constantinople and Adrianople, going north from Lulé Burgas, was completed. It furnished direct means of communication between the capital and Kirk Kilissé.
- 21. The General Staff at Constantinople wisely decided to leave in Adrianople only a sufficient garrison to defend the forts and the city. It was their intention to send the bulk of their Thracian army north-west from Kirk Kilissé, using that fortress as a base, in order to cut off the Bulgarians from their supplies, and throw them back against the forts of Adrianople. In this way they intended to put the Bulgarians between two fires and crush them. Then they would commence the invasion of Bulgaria. The plan was excellent. If Turkey had actually had in the field a half million men well trained and well equipped, well officered and with a spirit of enthusiasm, and—most important of all—properly fed, it is probable that the Bulgarians could have been held in check. But this army did not exist. The millions spent for equipment had disappeared—who knows where? There were not enough horses, even with the requisitions in Constantinople, for the artillery, and for the cavalry reserves. That meant that there were no horses at all for the commissary department. The only means of communication with the front was a single railway track. Roads had never been made in Thrace since the conquest. The artillery and the waggons had to be drawn through deep mud. Beyond the needs of the nizam (active) regiments, there were hardly any officers. The wretched masses of redifs (reservists) were without proper leadership. Not only was this all important factor for keeping up the morale of the soldiers lacking, but, from the moment they left Constantinople—even before that—there was insufficient food. Nor did the soldiers know why they were fighting. There was no enthusiasm for a cause. The great mass of the civil population, if not, like the Christians, hostile to the army, was wholly indifferent. I do not believe there were ten thousand people in the city of Constantinople, who really cared what happened in Thrace. Since I have been in the midst of a mobilization in France, and have seen how the French soldiers are equipped for war and fed, and how they have been made to feel that every man, woman, and child in the nation was ready to make any sacrifice—no matter how great—for the little soldiers of France, I feel more deeply the tragedy of the Turkish redifs. My wonder is that they were able to fight as bravely as they did. The world has no use for the government —for the system—which caused them to suffer as they did, and to give their lives in a wholly useless sacrifice.
- 22. The story of the Thracian campaign I heard from the lips of many of those who had taken part in it, when the events were still fresh in their memory. It is fruitless to go into all the details, to discuss the strategy of the generals in command, and to give a technical description of the battles, and of the retreat. Turkish and Bulgarian officers, as well as a host of foreign correspondents, have published books on this campaign. Most of them hide the real causes of the defeat under a mass of unimportant detail, and seem to be written either to emphasize the writer's claim as a first-hand witness, to take to task certain generals, or to prove the superiority of French artillery, and the faultiness of German military instruction. When all these issues are cast to one side, the campaign can be briefly described. We have already anticipated the débâcle of the military power of Turkey by giving the causes. This is not illogical. For these causes existed, and led to the inevitable result, before the first gun was fired. On October 19th, the Bulgarians began the investment of Adrianople from the north and west. There was no serious opposition. The Turkish garrison naturally fell back to the protection of the forts, for the Turks had not planned to oppose, beyond Adrianople, the Bulgarian approach. The Ottoman advance-guard, composed of the corps of Constantinople and Rodosto, under the command of Abdullah and Mahmud Mukhtar pashas, was ordered to take the offensive north of Kirk Kilissé. They were to be followed by another army. This movement was intended to cut off the Bulgarians from their base of supplies, and throw them back on Adrianople. The remainder of the Turkish forces in Thrace were to wait the result of this movement. If the Bulgarians moved down the valley of the Maritza, leaving Adrianople, they would meet these imposing forces which covered Constantinople, and would have behind them the garrison of Adrianople, and the army of Abdullah and Mahmud Mukhtar threatening their communications. If they besieged Adrianople, the second army would take the offensive and the Bulgarians would be encircled. The outposts of the Turkish army came into contact with the Bulgarians on October 20th. Believing that they had to do with the left of the army investing Adrianople, Mahmud and Abdullah decided to begin immediately their encircling movement. On the 21st and 22d, the two columns of the Turkish army were in fact engaged with the advance-guards of the first and
- 23. second Bulgarian armies. But, in the meantime, General Dimitrieff and the third army (which they believed was on the extreme Bulgarian right, pressing down the Maritza to invest the southern forts of Adrianople) had quietly crossed the frontier almost directly north of Kirk Kilissé, and fell like a cyclone upon the Turks. The Turkish positions were excellent, and had to be taken at the point of the bayonet. From morning till night on October 23d, the Bulgarian third army captured position after position, without the help of their artillery, which was stuck in the mud some miles in the rear. In the evening, during a terrible storm, two fresh Bulgarian columns made an assault upon the Turkish positions. It was not until then that the Turks realized that they were fighting another army than that charged with the investment of Adrianople. A wild panic broke out among the redifs, who were mostly without officers. They started to retreat, and were soon followed by the remainder of the army. At Uskubdere, they met during the night reinforcements coming to their aid. Two regiments fired on each other, mutually mistaking the other for Bulgarians. The reinforcements joined in the disorderly retreat, which did not end until morning, when, exhausted and still crazed by fear, what remained of the Turkish army had reached Eski Baba and Bunar Hissar. The army was saved from annihilation by the darkness and the storm. For not only were the Bulgarians ignorant of the abandonment of Kirk Kilissé, but, along the line where they knew the enemy were retreating, their cavalry could not advance in the darkness and mud, nor could their artillery shell the retreating columns. On the morning of the 24th, when General Dimitrieff was preparing to make the assault upon Kirk Kilissé, he learned that the Turkish army had fled, and that the fortress was undefended. By the capture of Kirk Kilissé the Bulgarians gained enormous stores. They had a railway line open to them towards Constantinople. The only menace to a successful investment of Adrianople was removed. The victory, so easily purchased, was far beyond their dreams. But it would not have been possible had it not been for the willingness of the Bulgarian soldiers to charge without tiring or faltering at the point of the bayonet. The victory was earned, in spite of the Turkish panic. For the Bulgarian steel had much to do with that panic.
- 24. As soon as he realized the extent of the victory of Kirk Kilissé, General Savoff ordered a general advance of the three Bulgarian armies. Only enough troops were left around Adrianople to prevent a sortie of the garrison. Notwithstanding the unfavourable condition of the roads, the Bulgarian armies moved with great rapidity. The cavalry in two days made reconnaissances on the east as far as Midia, and on the south as far as Rodosto. The main—and sole—armies of the Turks were thus ascertained to be along the Ergene, and beyond in the direction of the capital. On the left, the third army of General Dimitrieff, not delaying at Kirk Kilissé, was in contact with the Turks at Eski Baba on the 28th. On the afternoon of the same day the Bulgarians drove the Turks out of the village of Lulé Burgas, on the railway to Constantinople, east of the point where the Dedeagatch- Salonika line branches off. For three days, October 29-31, the Turkish armies made a stand along the Ergene from Bunar Hissar to Lulé Burgas. Since Gettysburg, Sadowa, and Sedan, no battle except that of Mukden has approached the battle of Lulé Burgas in importance, not only because of the numbers engaged, but also of the issue at stake. Three hundred and fifty thousand soldiers were in action, the forces being about evenly divided. For two days, in spite of the demonstration of Kirk Kilissé, the Turks fought with splendid courage and tenacity. Time and again the desperate charges of the Bulgarian infantry were hurled back with heavy loss. Not until the third day did the fighting seem to lean decisively to the advantage of the Bulgarians. Their artillery began to show marked superiority. From many points shells began to fall with deadly effect into the Turkish entrenchments. The Turks were unable to silence the murderous fire of the Bulgarian batteries. The soldiers, because they were starving, did not have it in them to attempt to take the most troublesome Bulgarian positions by assault. The retreat began on the afternoon of the 31st. On November 1st, owing to lack of officers and of central direction, it became a disorderly flight, a sauve qui peut. Camp equipment was abandoned. The soldiers threw away their knapsacks and rifles, so that they could run more quickly. The artillery- men cut the traces of their gun-wagons and ammunition-wagons, and made off on horseback. Everything was abandoned to the enemy. Nazim pasha, generalissimo, and the general staff, who had been in headquarters at Tchorlu, without proper telegraphic or telephonic communication with the
- 25. battle front, were drawn into the flight. The Turkish army did not stop until it had placed itself behind the Tchatalja line of forts, which protected the city of Constantinople. The battle of Lulé Burgas marked more than the destruction of the Turkish military power and the loss of European Turkey to the Empire. It revealed the inefficiency of Turkish organization and administration to cope with modern conditions, even when in possession of modern instruction and modern tools. With the Turks, it is not a question of an ignorance or a backwardness which can be remedied. Total lack of organizing and administrative ability is a fault of their nature. Courage alone does not win battles in the twentieth century. The Bulgarians were without sufficient cavalry and mounted machine- guns to follow up their victory. The defeat of the Turks, too, had not been gained without the expenditure of every ounce of energy in the army that had in those three days won undying fame. The problem of pursuit was difficult. There was only a single railway track. Food and munitions for the large army had to be brought up. The artillery advanced painfully through roads hub-deep in mud. It took two weeks for the Bulgarian army to move from the Ergene to Tchatalja, and prepare for the assault of the last line of Turkish defence. An immediate offensive after Lulé Burgas would have found Constantinople at the mercy of the victorious army. The two weeks of respite changed the aspect of things. For in this time the forts across the peninsula from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea were hastily repaired. They were mounted with guns from the Bosphorus defences, the Servian Creusots detained at Salonika at the beginning of the war, and whatever artillery could be brought from Asia Minor. The army had been reformed, the worthless, untrained elements ruthlessly weeded out, and a hundred thousand of the best soldiers, among whom the only redifs were those who had come fresh from Asia Minor, and had not been contaminated by the demoralization of Kirk Kilissé and Lulé Burgas, were placed behind the forts. The Turkish cruisers whose guns were able to be fired were recalled from the Dardanelles, and anchored off the end of the line on either side.
- 26. On November 15th, the Bulgarians began to put their artillery in position all along the Tchatalja line from Buyuk-Tchekmedje on the Sea of Marmora to Derkos Lake, near the Black Sea. At the same time, they entrenched the artillery positions by earthworks and ditches, working with incredible rapidity. For they had to take every precaution against a sudden sortie of the enemy. In forty-eight hours they were ready. The attack on the Tchatalja lines commenced at six o'clock on Sunday morning, November 17th, by machine-gun and rifle fire as well as by artillery. The forts and the Turkish cruisers responded. In the city and in the villages along the Bosphorus we could hear the firing distinctly. On the 17th and 18th, the Bulgarians delivered assaults in several places. Near Derkos they even got through the lines for a short while. These were merely for the purpose of testing the Turkish positions, however. Several of the assaults were repulsed. The Bulgarians suffered heavily on the 18th, when the first and only prisoners of the war were made. On the 19th, the artillery fire grew less and less, and there were no further attacks. Towards evening it was evident that the Bulgarians had abandoned their advanced lines, and did not intend to continue the attack. No general assault had been delivered. It seems certain that General Savoff had in mind the capture of Constantinople on November 17th. Turkish overtures for peace, opened on the 15th, had been repulsed. Every preparation was made for the attempt to pierce Tchatalja. Why was the plan abandoned before it was actually proven impossible? Did General Savoff fear the risk of a reverse? Was he short of ammunition? Had the Turkish defence of the 17th and 18th been more determined than he had expected? Was it fear of a cholera epidemic among his soldiers? Or was the abandonment of the attempt to capture Constantinople for that is what a triumph at Tchatalja would have meant, dictated by political reasons? Perhaps there was a shortage of ammunition. But it is impossible to believe that General Savoff ceased the attack because he feared a failure, or because he paused before the heavy sacrifice of life it would involve. The Bulgarians were too fresh from their sudden and overwhelming victories to be halted by the unimportant fighting of the 17th and 18th. They were not yet aware of the terrible danger from cholera.
- 27. At the time it was the common belief in Constantinople—I heard it expressed in a number of intelligent circles—that the Great Powers—in particular Russia—had informed Bulgaria that she should halt where she was. A second San Stefano! This seems improbable. Even in the moment of delirium over Lulé Burgas, the Bulgarians had no thought of occupying permanently Constantinople. They knew that this would be a task beyond their ability as a nation to undertake. If there was a thought of entering Constantinople, it was to satisfy military pride, and to be able to dictate more expeditiously and satisfactorily terms of peace. The real reason for the halt of Tchatalja, and the willingness to conclude an armistice, must be found in the alarm awakened in Bulgaria by the Servian and Greek successes. Greece had settled herself in Salonika, and the King and royal family had come there to live. Is it merely a coincidence that on November 18th the Servians captured Monastir, foyer of Bulgarianism in western Macedonia, and on the following day, a telegram from Sofia caused the cessation of the Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja? At Adrianople, a combined Bulgarian and Servian army, under the command of General Ivanoff, which had been hampered during the first month of operations by the floods of the Maritza, and by daring sorties of the garrison, after receiving experienced reinforcements on November 22d, began a determined bombardment and narrow investment of the forts. Ten days later, a general attack was ordered, probably to hurry the Turks in the armistice negotiations. The investing army had made very little progress on December 2d and 3d, when the signing of the armistice caused a cessation of hostilities. But while the Bulgarians were vigorously pressing the attack upon Adrianople, they were inactive at Tchatalja. At the beginning of the Thracian campaign, a portion of the Turkish fleet started to attack the Bulgarian coast. The Bulgarians had only one small cruiser and six torpedo-boats of doubtful value. But their two ports, termini of railway lines, were well protected by forts. On October 19th, two Turkish battleships and four torpedo-boats appeared before Varna, and fired without effect upon the forts. Then they bombarded the small open port of Kavarna, near the Rumanian frontier. On the 21st, they succeeded in throwing a few
- 28. shells into Varna, but did not risk approaching near enough to do serious damage. This was the extent of the offensive naval action against Bulgaria. A short time later, the Hamidieh, which was stationed on the Thracian coast of the Black Sea to protect the landing of redifs from Samsun, was surprised in the night by Bulgarian torpedo-boats. Two torpedoes tore holes in her bow. She was able to return to Constantinople under her own steam, but had to spend ten weeks in dry-dock. The only service rendered by the Turkish fleet against the Bulgarians was the safeguarding of the transport of troops from Black Sea ports of Asiatic Turkey, and the co-operation at the ends of the Tchatalja lines during the Bulgarian assaults of November 17th and 18th. The Servian campaign was a good second to the astounding successes of the Bulgarians in Thrace. The third army entered the sandjak of Novi Bazar, so long coveted by Servia, and expelled the Turks in five days. A portion of this army next occupied Prisrend and Diakova, descended the valley of the Drin through the heart of northern Albania to Alessio, where it joined on November 19th the Montenegrins, who were already at San Giovanni di Medua. On the 28th, they occupied Durazzo. The Servians had reached the Adriatic! While the third army was in the sandjak of Novi Bazar, the second Servian army crossed into Old Servia, passed through the plain of Kossova, where the Turks had destroyed the independence of Servia in 1389, and occupied Pristina on October 23d. This gave them control of the branch railway from Uskub to the confines of the sandjak. The flower of the Servian fighting strength was reserved for the first army under the command of Crown Prince Alexander. This force, considerably larger than the two other armies combined, mustered over seventy thousand. Its objective point was Uskub, covering which was the strong Turkish army of Zekki pasha. Battle was joined outside of Kumanova on October 22d. After three days of fighting, during which the Turkish cavalry was annihilated by the Servian artillery and the Servian infantry took the Turkish artillery positions at the point of the bayonet, the army of Zekki Pasha evacuated Kumanova. No attempt was made to defend Uskub, which the Servians entered on October 26th. The Turkish army retreated to Küprülü on the Vardar, towards Salonika. When the Servians continued their march, Zekki pasha retreated to Prilip, where he occupied positions that could not
- 29. well be shelled by artillery. After two days of continuous fighting, the Servians' bayonets dislodged the Turks. They withdrew to Monastir with the Servians hot upon their heels. Together with Kumanova, in which the bulk of Prince Alexander's forces did not find it necessary to engage, the capture of Monastir is the most brilliant feat of an army whose intrepidity, agility, and intelligence deserve highest praise. Into Monastir had been thrown the army of Tahsin pasha, pushed northward by the Greeks, as well as that of Zekki pasha, harried southward by the Servians. The Servians did not hesitate to approach the defences of the city on one side up to their arm-pits in water, while on the other side they scaled the heights dominating Monastir—heights which ought to have been defended for weeks without great difficulty. The Turks were compelled to withdraw, for they were at the mercy of the Servian artillery. They tried to retreat to Okrida, but the Servian left wing anticipated this movement. Only ten thousand escaped into Epirus. Nearly forty thousand Turks surrendered to the Servians on November 18th. Monastir and Okrida were captured. The Turkish armies of Macedonia had ceased to exist. The Greeks were eager to wipe out the shame of the war of 1897. Fifteen years had wrought a great difference in the morale of the Greek army. A new body of officers, who spent their time in learning their profession instead of in discussing politics at café terrasses, had been created. The French military mission, under General Eydoux, had been working for several years in the complete reorganization of the Greek army. I had the privilege at Athens of enjoying the hospitality of Greek officers in their casernes at several successive Easter festivals. Each year one could notice the progress. They were always ready to show you how the transformation of their artillery, and its equipment for mountain service as well as for field work, would make all the difference in the world in the approaching war with the Turks. The results were beyond expectations. What the Greeks had been working for was mobility. This they demonstrated that they had learned. They had also an esprit de corps which, in fighting, made up for what they lacked of Slavic dogged perseverance. Neither in actual combat, nor in strategy, with the exception of Janina, were the Greeks put to the test, or called upon to bear the burden, of the Bulgarians and Servians. But, especially when we take into consideration the invaluable service of their fleet, there is no reason to
- 30. belittle their part in the downfall of Turkey. If the effort had been necessary, they probably would have been equal to it. The Greeks sent a small army into Epirus. The bulk of their forces, following a sound military principle, were led into Thessaly by the Crown Prince Constantine. They crossed the frontier without resistance, fought a sharp combat at Elassona on the 19th, in which they stood admirably under fire, and broke down the last Turkish resistance at Servia. The army of Tahsin pasha was thrown back upon Monastir. The battles of the next ten days were hardly more than skirmishes, for the Turkish stand was never formidable. At Yanitza, the only real battle of the Greek campaign was fought. The Turks fled. The way to Salonika was open. The battle of Yanitza (Yenidje-Vardar) was fought on November 3d. On October 30th, a Greek torpedo-boat had succeeded, in spite of the strong harbour fortifications, equipped with electric searchlights, and the mined channel, in coming right up to the jetty at Salonika during the night, and launching three torpedoes at an old Turkish cruiser which lay at anchor there. The cruiser sank. On his way out to open sea, the commander of the torpedo-boat did not hesitate to fire upon the forts!
- 32. Map—Africa in 1914 This daring feat, and the approach of the Greek army, threw the city into a turmoil of excitement. The people had been fed for two weeks on false news, and telegrams had been printed from day to day, relating wonderful victories over the Servians, Bulgarians, and Greeks. But the coming of the refugees, fresh thousands from nearer places every day, and the presence in the streets of the city of deserters in uniform, gave the lie to the official news. When the German stationnaire arrived from Constantinople, and embarked the prisoner of the Villa Allatini, ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, the most pessimistic suspicions were confirmed. Although he had thirty thousand soldiers, and plenty of munitions, Tahsin pasha, commandant of Salonika, did not even attempt to defend the city. He began immediately to negotiate with the advancing Greek army. When the Crown Prince refused to accept any other than unconditional surrender, and moved upon the city, Tahsin pasha yielded. Not a shot was fired. On November 9th, without any opposition, the Greek army marched into Salonika. In other places the Turks at least fought, even if they did not fight well. At Salonika their surrender demonstrated to what humiliation and degradation the arrogance of the Young Turks had brought a nation whose past was filled with glorious deeds of arms. The Bulgarian expeditionary corps for Macedonia, under General Theodoroff, had crossed the frontier on October 18th. Joined to it were the notorious bands of comitadjis under the command of Sandansky, who afterwards related to me the story of this march. General Theodoroff's mission was to engage the portion of the Turkish Fifth Army Corps, which was stationed in the valleys of the Mesta and Struma, east of the Vardar, thus preventing it from assembling and making a flank movement against the main Servian or Bulgarian armies. The Bulgarians were greeted everywhere as liberators, and, although they were not in great numbers, the Turks did not try to oppose them. Soldiers and Moslem Macedonians together fled before them towards Salonika.
- 33. When General Theodoroff realized the demoralization of the Turks, and heard how the Greeks were approaching Salonika without any more serious opposition than that which confronted him, he hurried his column towards Salonika. The Bulgarian Princes Boris and Cyril joined him. They were not in time to take part in the negotiations for the surrender of the city. The cowardice of Tahsin pasha had brought matters to a climax on November 9th. But they were able to enter Salonika on the 10th, at the same time that Crown Prince Constantine was making his triumphal entry. Sandansky and his comitadjis hurried to the principal ancient church of the city, for over four hundred years the Saint Sophia of Salonika, and placed the Bulgarian flag in the minarets before the Greeks knew they had been outwitted. On the 12th, King George of Greece arrived to make his residence in the city that was to be his tomb. After the capture of Monastir, the Servians pressed on to Okrida, on November 23d, and from there into Albania to Elbassan, which they reached five days later. It was their intention to join at Durazzo the other column of the third Servian army, of whose march down the Drin we have already spoken. But the threatening attitude of Austria-Hungary necessitated the recall of the bulk of the Servian forces to Nish. This is the reason they were not able, at that stage of the war, to give the Montenegrins effective assistance against Scutari. The left wing of the Thessalian Greek army, after the capture of Monastir by the Servians, pursued towards Albania, the Turks who had escaped from Monastir. With great skill, they managed to prevent the Turks from turning north-west into the interior of Albania. After the brilliant and daring storming of the heights of Tchangan, what remained of the Turkish army was compelled to retreat into Epirus towards Janina. On October 20th, the Greek fleet under Admiral Koundouriotis appeared at the Dardanelles to offer battle to the Turks. Under the cover of the protection of their fleet, the Greeks occupied Lemnos, Thasos, Imbros, Samothrace, Nikaria, and the smaller islands. The inhabitants of Samos had expelled the Turkish garrisons on their own initiative at the outbreak of the war. Mitylene was captured without great difficulty on November 2lst. The Greeks landed at Chios on the 24th. Here the Turkish garrison of two thousand retired to the mountainous centre of the island, and succeeded in
- 34. prolonging their resistance until January. When he saw that no help was coming from Asia Minor, whose shores had been in sight during all the weeks of combat and suffering, the heroic Turkish commander surrendered with one thousand eight hundred starving men on January 3d. It was only because Italy, by a clause of the Treaty of Ouchy, still held the Dodecanese, that all of the Ægean Islands were not gathered into the fold by Greece. There had been less than six weeks of fighting. The Balkan allies had swept from the field all the Turkish forces in Europe. The Turkish armies were bottled up in Constantinople, Adrianople, Janma, and Scutari, with absolutely no hope of making successful sorties. Except at Constantinople, they were besieged, and could expect neither reinforcements nor food supplies. The Greek fleet was master of the Ægean Sea, and held the Turkish navy blocked in the Dardanelles. No new armies could come from Asiatic Turkey. This was the situation when the armistice was signed. The Ottoman Empire in Europe had ceased to exist. The military prestige of Turkey had received a mortal blow. THE ARMISTICE AND THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF LONDON The hopelessness of the outcome of the war with Italy, the dissatisfaction over the foolish and arbitrary rule of its secret committees had weakened the hold of the Committee of Union and Progress over the army. Despite its success in the spring elections of 1912, its position was precarious. In July, Mahmud Shevket pasha, who was suspected of planning a military pronunciamento, resigned the Ministry of War. The Grand Vizier, Saïd pasha, soon followed him into retirement. The Sultan declared that a ministry not under the control of a political party was a necessity. Ghazi Mukhtar pasha, after much difficulty, succeeded in forming a ministry, in which a distinguished Armenian, Noradounghian effendi, was given the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The Unionist majority in the lower house of Parliament proved intractable. Its obstructionist tactics won for the Chamber of Deputies the name of the comic operahouse of Fundukli. (Fundukli was the Bosphorus quarter in which the House of Parliament was
- 35. located.) With the help of the Senate, and the moral support of the army, the Sultan dissolved Parliament on August 5th. Only the menace of the Albanian revolution prevented the Committee from attempting to set up a rival Parliament at Salonika. This was the unenviable internal situation of Turkey at the opening of the Balkan War. The disasters of the Thracian campaign led to the resignation of the Ghazi Mukhtar pasha Cabinet. The aged statesman of the old régime, Kiamil pasha, was called for the eighth time to the Grand Vizirate. He retained Nazim pasha, generalissimo of the Turkish army, and Noradounghian effendi, in the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. The most influential of the Young Turks, who had opposed bitterly the peace with Italy and were equally determined that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Balkan States, were exiled. Kiamil pasha saw clearly that peace was absolutely necessary. His long experience allowed him to have no illusions as to the possibility of continuing the struggle. Before the Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja, he began pourparlers with General Savoff. After the repulse of November 17th and 18th, he was just as firm in his decision that the negotiations must be continued. He won over to his point of view the members of the Cabinet, and notably Nazim pasha. The conditions of the armistice, signed on December 3d, were an acknowledgment of the complete débâcle of the Turkish army. Bulgaria forced the stipulation that her army in front of Tchatalja should be revictualled by the railway which passed under the guns of Adrianople, while that fortress remained without food! Greece, by an agreement with her allies, refused to sign the armistice, but was allowed to be represented in the peace conference. The allies felt that the state of war on sea must continue, in order that Turkey should be prevented during the armistice from bringing to the front her army corps from Syria and Mesopotamia and Arabia; while Greece, in particular, was determined to run no risk in connection with the Ægean Islands. The peace delegates were to meet in London. Orientals, Christian as well as Moslem, are famous for bargaining. Nothing can be accomplished without an exchange of proposals and counter- proposals ad infinitum. In the Conference of London, the demands of the allies were the cession of all European Turkey, except Albania, whose boundaries were not defined, of Crete, and of the islands in the Ægean Sea.
- 36. A war indemnity was also demanded. Turkey was to be allowed to retain Constantinople, and a strip of territory from Midia on the Black Sea to Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora, and the peninsula of the Thracian Chersonese, which formed the European shore of the Dardanelles. The boundaries of Albania, and its future status, were to be decided by the Powers. I had a long conversation with the Grand Vizier, Kiamil pasha, on the day the peace delegates left for London. He was frank and unhesitating in the statement of his belief that Turkey could not continue the war. He denounced unsparingly the visionaries who were clamouring for a continuance of the struggle. It is because of them that we are in our present humiliating position, he said. They cry out now that we must not accept peace, but they know well that we cannot hope to win back any portion of what we have lost. There were a number of reasons why the position of Kiamil pasha was sound. First of all, the army organization was in hopeless confusion. Although the Bulgarians were checked at Tchatalja, the conditions on the Constantinople side of the forts was terrible. The general headquarters at Hademkeuy were buried in filth and mud. Although the army was but twenty-five miles from the city, there were days on end when not even bread arrived. Cholera was making great ravages. Soldiers, crazed from hunger, were shot dead for disobeying the order which forbade their eating raw vegetables. There were neither fuel, shelter, nor blankets. Winter was at hand. At San Stefano, one of the most beautiful suburbs of Stambul, in a concentration camp the soldiers died by the thousands of starvation fever. It was one of the most heart-rending tragedies of history. All the while, in the cafés of Péra, Galata, and Stambul, Turkish officers sat the day long, sipping their coffee, and deciding that Adrianople must not be given up. Even while the fighting was going on, when the fate of the city hung in the balance, I saw these degenerate officers by the hundreds, feasting at Péra, while their soldiers were dying like dogs at Tchatalja and San Stefano. This is an awful statement to make, but it is the record of fact. Notices in the newspapers, declaring that officers found in Constantinople without permission would be immediately taken before the Court-Martial, had absolutely no effect.
- 37. The navy failed to give any account of itself to the Greeks, who were waiting outside of the Dardanelles. Finally, on December 16th, after the people of the vicinity had openly cursed and taunted them, the fleet sailed out to fight. An action at long range did little damage to either side. The Turkish vessels refused to go beyond the protection of their forts. They returned in the evening to anchor. The mastery of the sea remained to the Greeks.[1] [1] In this connection, it would be forgetting to pay tribute to a remarkable exploit to omit mention of the raid of the Hamidieh during the late winter. One Ottoman officer at least chafed under the disgrace of the inaction of the Ottoman navy. With daring and skill, Captain Reouf bey slipped out into the Ægean Sea on the American-built cruiser, the Hamidieh. He evaded the Greek blockaders, bombarded some outposts on one of the islands, and sank the auxiliary cruiser, the Makedonia, in a Greek port. The Hamidieh next appeared in the Adriatic, where she sank several transports, and bombarded Greek positions on the coast of Albania. The cruiser was next heard of at Port Said. She passed through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea for a couple of weeks, and then returned boldly into the Mediterranean, although Greek torpedo-boats were lying in wait. Captain Reouf bey ran again the gauntlet of the Greek fleet, and got back to the Dardanelles without mishap. This venture, undertaken without permission from the Turkish admiral, had no effect upon the war. For it came too late. But it showed what a little enterprise and courage might have done to prevent the Turkish débâcle, if undertaken at the beginning of the war. If the army and the navy were powerless, how about the people of the capital? From the very beginning of the war, the inhabitants of Constantinople, Moslem as well as Christian, displayed the most complete indifference concerning the fortunes of the battles. Even when the Bulgarians were attacking Tchatalja, the city took little interest. Buying and selling went on as usual. There were few volunteers for national defence, but the cafés were crowded and the theatres and dance-halls of Péra were going at full swing. The refugees came and camped in our streets and in the cemeteries outside of the walls. Those who did not die passed on to Asia.
- 38. The wounded arrived, and crowded our hospitals and barracks. The cholera came. The soldiers starved to death at San Stefano. The spirit of Byzantium was over the city still. The year 1913 began as 1453 had begun. The Government tried to raise money by a national loan. It could get none from Europe, unless it agreed to surrender Adrianople and make peace practically on the terms of the allies. An appeal must be made to the Osmanlis. For how could the war be resumed without money? There are many wealthy pashas at Constantinople. Their palaces line both shores of the Bosphorus. They spend money at Monte Carlo like water. They live at Nice, as they live at Constantinople, like princes—or like American millionaires! One of the sanest and wisest of Turkish patriots, a man whom I have known and admired, was appointed to head a committee to wait upon these pashas, many of them married to princesses of the imperial family, and solicit their contributions. The scheme was that the subscribers should advance five years of taxes on their properties for the purposes of national defence. The committee hired a small launch, and spent a day visiting the homes of the pashas. On their return, after paying the rental of the launch, they had about forty pounds sterling! Was it not two million pounds that was raised for the Prince of Wales Fund recently in London? Was not the French loan for national defence, issued just before the present war, subscribed in a few hours forty-three times over the large amount of thirty-two million pounds asked for? In the face of these facts, the Young Turks were vociferous in their demand that the war be continued. Adrianople must not be surrendered! Kiamil pasha decided to call a Divan, or National Assembly, of the most important men in Turkey. They were summoned by the Sultan to meet at the palace of Dolma-Baghtche on January 22, 1913. I went to see what would happen there. One would expect that the whole of Constantinople would be hanging on the words of this council, whose decision the Cabinet had agreed to accept. A half-dozen policemen at the palace gate, a vendor of lemonade, two street-sweepers, an Italian cinematograph photographer, and a dozen foreign newspaper men—that was the extent of the crowd. The Divan, after hearing the exposés of the Ministers of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, decided that there was nothing to discuss. The decision was inevitable. Peace must be signed. That night Kiamil pasha telegraphed
- 39. to London to the Turkish commissioners, directing them to consent to the reddition of Adrianople; and, the other fortresses which were still holding out, and to make peace at the price of ceding all the Ottoman territories in Europe beyond a line running from Enos on the Ægean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River, to Midia on the Black Sea. On the following day, January 23d, a coup d'état was successfully carried out. Enver bey, the former hero of liberty, who had taken a daring and praiseworthy part in the revolution of 1908, had been ruined afterwards by being appointed military attaché of the Ottoman Embassy at Berlin. There was much that was admirable and winning in Enver bey, much that was what the French call elevation of soul. He was a sincere patriot. But the years at Berlin, and the deadening influence of militarism and party politics mixed together, had changed him from a patriot to a politician. He went to Tripoli during the Italian War, and organized a resistance in Benghazi, which he announced would be as long as he lived. But it was a decision à la Turque. The Balkan War found him again at Constantinople—not at the front leading a company against the enemy—but at Constantinople, plotting with the other Young Turks how they could once more get the reins of government in their hands. The decision of the Divan was the opportunity. Enver bey led a small band of followers into the Sublime Porte, and shot Nazim pasha and his aide-de-camp dead. The other members of the Cabinet were imprisoned, and the telephone to the palace cut. Enver bey was driven at full speed in an automobile to the palace. He secured from the Sultan a firman calling on Mahmud Shevket pasha to form a new Cabinet. The Young Turks were again in power. The bodies of Nazim pasha and the aide-de-camp were buried quickly and secretly. For one of Enver's companions, a man of absolutely no importance, who had been killed by defenders of Nazim, a great military funeral was held. Mahmud Shevket pasha, who had been living in retirement at Scutari since the war began, accepted the position of Grand Vizier. I heard him, on the steps of the Sublime Porte, justify the murder of Nazim pasha, on the
- 40. ground that there had been the intention to give up Adrianople. The new Cabinet was going to redeem the country, and save it from a shameful peace. When the news of the coup d'état reached London, it was recognized that further negotiations were useless. The peace conference had failed. THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR It is very doubtful if Mahmud Shevket, Enver, and their accomplices had any hope whatever of retrieving the fortunes of Turkish arms. They had prepared the coup d'état to get back again into office. This could not be done without the tacit consent of the army. At the moment of the Divan the army was stirred up over the surrender of Adrianople. It was the moment to act. At any other time the army would not have acquiesced in the murder of its generalissimo. The Sultan's part in the plot was not clear. His assent was, however, immediately given. Living in seclusion, and knowing practically nothing of what was going on, he signed the firmans, accepting the resignation of the Kiamil pasha Cabinet and charging Mahmud Shevket with the formation of a new Cabinet, either by force or by playing upon his fears of what might be his own fate, should the agreement to surrender Adrianople lead to a revolution. On January 29th, the allies denounced the armistice, and hostilities reopened. The Bulgarians at Tchatalja had strongly entrenched themselves, and were content to rest on the defensive. They did not desire to capture Constantinople. But the Turks wanted to relieve Adrianople. The offensive movement must come from them. The Young Turks had killed Nazim pasha, they said, because they believed Adrianople could be saved. The word was now to Mahmud Shevket and Enver. Let them justify their action. Enthusiastic speeches were made at Constantinople. We were told that the army at Tchatalja had moved forward, and was going to drive the Bulgarians out of Thrace. The Turks did advance some kilometres, but, like their fleet at the Dardanelles, not beyond the protection of the forts! They did not dare to make a general assault upon the Bulgarian positions. The renewal of the war,
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