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Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information. (2015). Liu, Qingmin.
In: Journal of Economic Theory.
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:49-75.

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  1. Incomplete Information Robustness. (2025). Ui, Takashi ; Morris, Stephen.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2502.19075.

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  2. Private disclosure with multiple agents. (2023). Zhu, Shuguang.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:212:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123001011.

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  3. First best implementation with costly information acquisition. (2022). Zhu, Shuguang ; Yamashita, Takuro ; Pham, Hien ; Larionov, Daniil.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zewdip:22064.

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  4. First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition. (2022). Zhu, Shuguang ; Yamashita, Takuro ; Pham, Hien ; Larionov, Daniil.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:126165.

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  5. Informational robustness of common belief in rationality. (2022). Ziegler, Gabriel.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:592-597.

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  6. Informational Robustness of Common Belief in Rationality. (2022). Ziegler, Gabriel.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2103.02402.

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  7. Counterfactuals with Latent Information. (2021). Morris, Stephen ; Brooks, Benjamin ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2162r2.

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  8. Incomplete Information Robustness. (2020). Morris, Stephen ; Ui, Takashi.
    In: Working Papers on Central Bank Communication.
    RePEc:upd:utmpwp:019.

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  9. Counterfactuals with Latent Information. (2019). Morris, Stephen ; Brooks, Benjamin ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2162r.

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  10. Counterfactuals with Latent Information. (2019). Morris, Stephen ; Brooks, Benjamin ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2162.

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  11. A Unique and Stable $$\hbox {Se}{\mathcal {C}}\hbox {ure}$$ Se C ure Reversion Protocol Improving Efficiency: A Computational Bayesian Approach for Empirical Analysis. (2018). Wanko, Cedric.
    In: Computational Economics.
    RePEc:kap:compec:v:52:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10614-017-9646-z.

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  12. Information Design: A Unified Perspective. (2018). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075r3.

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  13. Information Design: A Unified Perspective. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:metric:089_2017.

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  14. Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:744-759.

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  15. Information Design: A Unified Perspective. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075r2.

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  16. Information Design: A Unified Perspective. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075r.

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  17. Information Design: A Unified Perspective. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075.

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  18. Information Design: A Unified Perspective. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11867.

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  19. Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. (2016). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:1808.

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  20. Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness. (2016). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:metric:086_2016.

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  21. Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness. (2016). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2066.

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  22. Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution. (2015). Tang, Qianfeng.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:111-116.

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  23. Interim partially correlated rationalizability. (2015). Tang, Qianfeng.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:36-44.

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  24. Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. (2015). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909rrr.

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References

References cited by this document

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  17. Liu, Qingmin Representation of belief hierarchies in games with incomplete information. 2005 Graduate School of Business, Stanford University:
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  18. Martin F. Hellwig, Incomplete-information models of large economies with anonymity: existence and uniqueness of common priors, Working paper, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2011.

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  21. Qianfeng Tang, The Bayesian solution and hierarchies of beliefs, Working paper, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 2013.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

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  68. EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION. (2003). Bonanno, Giacomo ; Nehring, Klaus.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cda:wpaper:248.

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  69. Correlated Equilibrium in Quitting Games. (2001). Solan, Eilon ; Vohra, R V.
    In: Mathematics of Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:26:y:2001:i:3:p:601-610.

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