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@valenberg.deviantart.com
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The issue with targeted attacks
2
Highly targeted Many components “Grey” tools
and events
Evolve/change
over time
Regin: 75 modules
Duqu: 100+ modules
…
10 or less recipients
Specific forum users
…
Powershell, psExec
Suspicious logins
…
Right tools for the job
Learn and adapt
…
I like birthdays, but I think too many can kill you.
But attackers do leave traces
Network Server or
entry point
Endpoint
3Just because I don't care doesn't mean I don't understand
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Connecting the dots…
OUTPUT
INDICATORS (IOC)
• FILENAMES
• REGISTRY KEYS
• C&C SERVERS
• EMAILS
• ETC…
INDUSTRY VERTICALS
• HEALTHCARE
• MANUFACTURING
• FINANCE
• …
FROM A SINGLE IOC…
RELATIONSHIPS
• SOFACY
• ELDERWOOD
• HIDDENLYNX
• …
Many tools and IOC feeds, groups, etc. available
Brains are wonderful, I wish everyone had one. 4
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If a turtle doesn't have a shell, is he homeless or naked? 5
…and then the
guessing game
begins…
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@attributionDice
6My mind’s made up, don’t confuse me with facts
Example: HackingTeam hack
“I didn't want to make the police's work any easier by relating my
hack of Hacking Team with other hacks I've done or with names I
use in my day-to-day work as a blackhat hacker.
So, I used new servers and domain names, registered with new emails,
and payed for with new bitcoin addresses. Also, I only used tools that
are publicly available, or things that I wrote specifically for this attack,
and I changed my way of doing some things to not leave my usual
forensic footprint.”
7I always learn from mistake of others who take my advice.
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Parachute for sale, used once, never opened!! 8
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Threat intelligence sources
Free Community Commercial Internal
Costs: Free Free/$ $$/$$$ Free/$
Typology: Generic Generic/Specific Generic/Specific Very specific
Based on: Public systems
Public, mailinglists,
private researchers
products,
research
Internal logs
Different format & tools out there:
openIOC, STIX/TAXII, OSTrICa, MISP, YARA,…
9I'm on a whiskey diet. I've lost three days already.
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Threat hunting with IOCs
Most commonly shared indicators:
• IP addresses / domain names
• File hashes / file names
• Still some hits on reused infrastructure. Do they care?
• Each hash is on average in <3 companies
• Bad with scripts and dual-use tools
• Where is the line between APT & common malware?
10I’m not arguing, I’m simply explaining why I’m right.
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Now you see me - now you don’t
• Are you hunting IOCs in real time or on snapshots?
• Many APT groups clean up after the attack
• Wipe files, admin account is enough for later
• Delete emails, browser history,... to hide incursion vector
• Do nation-state APTs really care if they get traced back?
• At the latest since Snowden, everyone knows that everyone spies
• Unlikely that they get arrested in their own country
• Taunt opponent - show force
11Stress is when you wake up screaming and you realize you haven't fallen asleep yet.
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Trust issues?
• Early sharing is often done only in private groups
• If the group is too small you might not see much, but it can be high quality
• If the group is too large you might not trust everyone
• Do you trust the Uber-NG-ATP-vendor XY?
• Do you double check any IP address before blacklisting?
• What is the motivation for sharing?
IoCs are good if you need context
or when fighting common malware
12hmm... I didn’t tell you... Then It must be none of your business...
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Improved IoCs
• Following threat families instead of variants
• Better, but they might use common tools like PoisonIvy, Meterpreter,…
• Follow TTPs and behavior patterns
• Better, but different companies might require different TTPs
• Apply them to your company, as the attackers would do too
Go higher in the pyramid of pain, track exploits,…
… but that’s what your security software should do too
13Always remember you're unique, just like everyone else.
Integrate the IoC consumption
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• Use context for IOCs, patterns of behavior where available
• If possible correlate it with in house information
• Check which IoCs you can actually ingest internally
• It is still better to prevent the incursion, instead of hunting it later
Rate the effectiveness of different types for you (and drop bad ones)
• Why spend resources on external IOC feeds, when not even the
internal basics are monitored properly yet?
14A day without sunshine is like, night.
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Of course I don't look busy...I did it right the first time. 15
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Oversharing? How much is too much?
• The bad guys can learn how much you know
• Learn how they can improve their attacks
• Example: Zeroaccess P2P botnet, started to sign their commands
• Most APT crews are not dumb, they could adapt if they want to
• Some indicators might contain sensitive information
• Internal IP addresses
• Stolen passwords hardcoded in 2nd-wave malware
• Spear phishing emails, e.g. myYellowCompany.exe
16Happiness does not buy you money.
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I need a six month vacation, twice a year. 16
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Debug Strings – Fake or Real?
Turla/Waterbug
Stuxnet
Strider
17If brute force doesn’t solve your problems, then you aren’t using enough.
«CloudAtlas» is clearly messing with us:
• Arabic strings in the BlackBerry version
• Hindi characters in the Android version
• “God_Save_The_Queen” in the BlackBerry version
• “JohnClerk” in the iOS version Thx BlueCoat/Kaspersky
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Commands from Taidoor
[Ping]
[Set sleep interval to 1 second]
cmd /c net start
cmd /c dir c:docume~1
cmd /c dir "c:docume~1<CurrentUser>recent" /od
cmd /c dir c:progra~1
cmd /c dir "c:docume~1<CurrentUser>desktop" /od
cmd /c netstat –n
cmd /c net use
Commands from Sykipot
ipconfig /all
netstat –ano
net start
net group "domain admins" /domain
tasklist /v
dir c:*.url /s
dir c:*.pdf /s
dir c:*.doc /s
net localgroup administrators
type c:boot.ini
systeminfo
Commands from HoneyPot sessions
18An error? Impossible! My modem is error correcting.
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Following the red hering
• Sometimes you have multiple infections on same machine
• Which IOC came from which actor?
• “Everyone” uses common tools: Mimikatz, psExec,…
• Attackers can easy plant some files from other APT groups
• Example: Equation group/shadow brokers
• Do you trust the compilation times, timestamps, language settings?
• Most companies do not really care who it was
• They just want to prevent it from happening again
• Or do you plan to hack back or sue them?
19Sometimes you succeed and other times you learn.
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©tarantula
20My therapist says I have a preoccupation with vengeance. we'll see about that
Conclusion
• Do your internal homework first
• Be smart in what you share
• We need to be effective in checking IoC
• Try them and rate effectiveness
• Mistakes do happen, but they still get in

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Introduction Database Management System for Course Database

Why huntung IoC fails at protecting against targeted attacks

  • 2. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ ──┐ │▒│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▒│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▒│ The issue with targeted attacks 2 Highly targeted Many components “Grey” tools and events Evolve/change over time Regin: 75 modules Duqu: 100+ modules … 10 or less recipients Specific forum users … Powershell, psExec Suspicious logins … Right tools for the job Learn and adapt … I like birthdays, but I think too many can kill you.
  • 3. But attackers do leave traces Network Server or entry point Endpoint 3Just because I don't care doesn't mean I don't understand ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ ──┐ │▒│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▒│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▒│
  • 4. Connecting the dots… OUTPUT INDICATORS (IOC) • FILENAMES • REGISTRY KEYS • C&C SERVERS • EMAILS • ETC… INDUSTRY VERTICALS • HEALTHCARE • MANUFACTURING • FINANCE • … FROM A SINGLE IOC… RELATIONSHIPS • SOFACY • ELDERWOOD • HIDDENLYNX • … Many tools and IOC feeds, groups, etc. available Brains are wonderful, I wish everyone had one. 4 ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ ──┐ │▒│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▒│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│
  • 5. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ ──┐ │▒│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▒│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│ If a turtle doesn't have a shell, is he homeless or naked? 5 …and then the guessing game begins…
  • 6. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ ──┐ │▒│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│ @attributionDice 6My mind’s made up, don’t confuse me with facts
  • 7. Example: HackingTeam hack “I didn't want to make the police's work any easier by relating my hack of Hacking Team with other hacks I've done or with names I use in my day-to-day work as a blackhat hacker. So, I used new servers and domain names, registered with new emails, and payed for with new bitcoin addresses. Also, I only used tools that are publicly available, or things that I wrote specifically for this attack, and I changed my way of doing some things to not leave my usual forensic footprint.” 7I always learn from mistake of others who take my advice. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ ──┐ │▒│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│
  • 8. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│ Parachute for sale, used once, never opened!! 8
  • 9. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│ Threat intelligence sources Free Community Commercial Internal Costs: Free Free/$ $$/$$$ Free/$ Typology: Generic Generic/Specific Generic/Specific Very specific Based on: Public systems Public, mailinglists, private researchers products, research Internal logs Different format & tools out there: openIOC, STIX/TAXII, OSTrICa, MISP, YARA,… 9I'm on a whiskey diet. I've lost three days already.
  • 10. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│ Threat hunting with IOCs Most commonly shared indicators: • IP addresses / domain names • File hashes / file names • Still some hits on reused infrastructure. Do they care? • Each hash is on average in <3 companies • Bad with scripts and dual-use tools • Where is the line between APT & common malware? 10I’m not arguing, I’m simply explaining why I’m right.
  • 11. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│ Now you see me - now you don’t • Are you hunting IOCs in real time or on snapshots? • Many APT groups clean up after the attack • Wipe files, admin account is enough for later • Delete emails, browser history,... to hide incursion vector • Do nation-state APTs really care if they get traced back? • At the latest since Snowden, everyone knows that everyone spies • Unlikely that they get arrested in their own country • Taunt opponent - show force 11Stress is when you wake up screaming and you realize you haven't fallen asleep yet.
  • 12. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│ Trust issues? • Early sharing is often done only in private groups • If the group is too small you might not see much, but it can be high quality • If the group is too large you might not trust everyone • Do you trust the Uber-NG-ATP-vendor XY? • Do you double check any IP address before blacklisting? • What is the motivation for sharing? IoCs are good if you need context or when fighting common malware 12hmm... I didn’t tell you... Then It must be none of your business...
  • 13. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ │▓│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │▓│ Improved IoCs • Following threat families instead of variants • Better, but they might use common tools like PoisonIvy, Meterpreter,… • Follow TTPs and behavior patterns • Better, but different companies might require different TTPs • Apply them to your company, as the attackers would do too Go higher in the pyramid of pain, track exploits,… … but that’s what your security software should do too 13Always remember you're unique, just like everyone else.
  • 14. Integrate the IoC consumption ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │█│ • Use context for IOCs, patterns of behavior where available • If possible correlate it with in house information • Check which IoCs you can actually ingest internally • It is still better to prevent the incursion, instead of hunting it later Rate the effectiveness of different types for you (and drop bad ones) • Why spend resources on external IOC feeds, when not even the internal basics are monitored properly yet? 14A day without sunshine is like, night.
  • 15. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │█│ Of course I don't look busy...I did it right the first time. 15
  • 16. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡▓│ ░│ ╚═╝ │█│ Oversharing? How much is too much? • The bad guys can learn how much you know • Learn how they can improve their attacks • Example: Zeroaccess P2P botnet, started to sign their commands • Most APT crews are not dumb, they could adapt if they want to • Some indicators might contain sensitive information • Internal IP addresses • Stolen passwords hardcoded in 2nd-wave malware • Spear phishing emails, e.g. myYellowCompany.exe 16Happiness does not buy you money.
  • 17. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡█│ ░│ ╚═╝ │█│ I need a six month vacation, twice a year. 16
  • 18. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡█│ ░│ ╚═╝ │█│ Debug Strings – Fake or Real? Turla/Waterbug Stuxnet Strider 17If brute force doesn’t solve your problems, then you aren’t using enough. «CloudAtlas» is clearly messing with us: • Arabic strings in the BlackBerry version • Hindi characters in the Android version • “God_Save_The_Queen” in the BlackBerry version • “JohnClerk” in the iOS version Thx BlueCoat/Kaspersky
  • 19. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ ──┐ │▓│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡█│ ░│ ╚═╝ │█│ Commands from Taidoor [Ping] [Set sleep interval to 1 second] cmd /c net start cmd /c dir c:docume~1 cmd /c dir "c:docume~1<CurrentUser>recent" /od cmd /c dir c:progra~1 cmd /c dir "c:docume~1<CurrentUser>desktop" /od cmd /c netstat –n cmd /c net use Commands from Sykipot ipconfig /all netstat –ano net start net group "domain admins" /domain tasklist /v dir c:*.url /s dir c:*.pdf /s dir c:*.doc /s net localgroup administrators type c:boot.ini systeminfo Commands from HoneyPot sessions 18An error? Impossible! My modem is error correcting.
  • 20. ┌─┐ │ │ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ ──┐ │█│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡█│ ░│ ╚═╝ │█│ Following the red hering • Sometimes you have multiple infections on same machine • Which IOC came from which actor? • “Everyone” uses common tools: Mimikatz, psExec,… • Attackers can easy plant some files from other APT groups • Example: Equation group/shadow brokers • Do you trust the compilation times, timestamps, language settings? • Most companies do not really care who it was • They just want to prevent it from happening again • Or do you plan to hack back or sue them? 19Sometimes you succeed and other times you learn.
  • 21. ┌─┐ │ │ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │░│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▒│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ │▓│ │█│ ──┐ │█│ ░╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╦═╦═══╡█│ ░│ ╚═╝ │█│ ©tarantula 20My therapist says I have a preoccupation with vengeance. we'll see about that Conclusion • Do your internal homework first • Be smart in what you share • We need to be effective in checking IoC • Try them and rate effectiveness • Mistakes do happen, but they still get in