2015-08-12 CTP Update and Assessment

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
August 12, 2015

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
3
1. Anti-al Houthi forces, including Saudi and Emirati troops, have rolled back the al Houthis’ gains in
Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition is seeking to reinstall the exiled government.
2. The Ethiopian military is operating against al Shabaab outside of the AMISOM mandate in southern
Somalia. It has conducted airstrikes against al Shabaab targets in Bay, Galgudud, and Hiraan.
3. ISIS appears to be strengthening its positions in Sirte, Libya, and maintains a foothold in Derna.
Senior ISIS operatives are reported to have traveled to Libya.
2

ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Three al Qaeda affiliates, Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, issued a
eulogy for Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Jabhat al Nusra’s social media accounts released the eulogy, which made no
mention of the new leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in East Africa, was not included
on the joint statement and has not eulogized Mullah Omar, which may be an indicator of the strength of the African affiliate’s
communications with Jabhat al Nusra or possibly that the rumors that al Shabaab is considering defecting to ISIS have some
truth. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent has also not issued a eulogy for Mullah Omar, nor has al Qaeda leader Ayman al
Zawahiri, who has not released a public statement since September 2014.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will need to show that its network remains strong following Mullah Omar’s death.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
AQIS may be conducting a targeted assassinations campaign against secular bloggers in Bangladesh. Ansar al Islam, a group
in Bangladesh affiliated with AQIS, killed Niloy Chatterjee, a popular secular blogger in Goran, Dhaka, Bangladesh. This is the
fourth such killing of secular bloggers by AQIS in Bangladesh since February 2015. Previously, Ansar al Islam only claimed
killings on behalf of AQIS but this time the group also claimed to be an affiliate of AQIS.
India captured its first Pakistani militant since Ajmal Kasab, one of the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Indian Border
Security Forces (BSF) arrested Mohammad Naved, responsible for the August 5 attack on an Indian military convoy, which
killed 2 Indian soldiers in Kashmir. Naved is suspected to be associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
Outlook: Bangladesh has vowed to take action against the individuals responsible for the killing of Niloy Chatterjee and as
such, might increase crackdowns on militancy. Separately, Pakistan might try to dispel claims that Mohammad Naved is a
citizen to avoid any state connections to the attack. The current Indian government might take stronger actions to reprimand
Pakistan, unlike the previous one.
3
AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:
Political
Yemeni political and international actors are continuing efforts to negotiate a solution to the current conflict. An al Houthi
delegation traveled to Muscat, Oman, on August 7 to meet with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Sheikh Ahmed.
Separately, Egypt appears to be backing the reinstatement of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as Yemen’s president. Egyptian
President Abdel Fatah al Sisi reached an agreement with Hadi to have Egyptian naval forces guard ports controlled by pro-Hadi
military units. Hadi’s government also announced that Hadi would visit the liberated port city of Aden in the coming days.
Outlook: The al Houthis are likely feeling pressure to negotiate a political settlement as they continue to lose territory
throughout south-central Yemen to anti-al Houthi forces. It is possible, however, the al Houthis would withdraw from
negotiations should Saudi Arabia decide to launch another military offensive during negotiations.
Security
Anti-al Houthi forces backed by Saudi-led Operation Golden Arrow coalition forces made significant territorial gains in southern
and central Yemen. Anti-al Houthi forces announced they had nearly liberated Lahij governorate and have reportedly liberated
Abyan after seizing Abyan’s capital, Zinjibar, on August 9. Anti-al Houthi forces also made gains in Taiz and Ibb, central Yemen,
and established a Council of Resistance to support Operation Golden Arrow forces.
Outlook: Anti-al Houthi forces will continue to push northward into al Houthi-controlled territory and will likely seek the complete
liberation of Taiz, Ibb, Abyan, and Lahij.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continues to exploit Operation Golden Arrow’s success. Militants reportedly seized three towns near Aden city on August
5, though the account is disputed. AQAP fighters are also continuing to carry out offensives against the al Houthis in al Bayda,
central Yemen. Separately, ISIS Wilayat al Bayda militants announced they were preparing to mount a siege on Rada’a, al
Bayda, in what appears to be an attempt to undermine AQAP’s dominance in the governorate.
Outlook: Both AQAP and ISIS will benefit from the al Houthis’ weakness and the coalition’s success to launch more attacks
and expand territory control.
4
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
3
4
2
5
1) 08 AUG: Operation
Golden Arrow forces
seized Zinjibar, capital
of Abyan province.
2) 06 AUG: AQAP
militants seized three
small towns outside
of Aden city.
3) 10 AUG: Anti-al
Houthi Popular
Resistance forces
seized four districts in
Ibb, central Yemen,
from the al Houthis.
4) 09 AUG: The
AQAP-led Sons of
Hadramawt militant
group blew up an
intelligence
headquarters in al
Mukalla, Hadramawt.

ASSESSMENT:
Political
Al Shabaab militants are a growing problem for the governments and armed forces of Somalia’s breakaway states. Forces
allied with the Somali government continue to drive the militants from their strongholds in southern and central Somalia.
Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali stated during an interview with Reuters on August 6 that Puntland needs supply and
technological support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the fight against al Shabaab, as AMISOM does
not currently operate in the breakaway state.
Outlook: Al Shabaab is likely to continue to be a growing problem for the Puntland government as forces allied with the Somali
government drive the group from its strongholds in the Galgudud and Hiraan regions, but it is unlikely that AMISOM will have
the manpower to extend through Puntland.
Security
Local reports confirmed Ethiopian forces are operating outside of their AMISOM mandate in southern and central Somalia. The
Ethiopian Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting al Shabaab in the Bay, Galgudud, and Hiraan regions and were seen at a
Baidoa, Bay region, airfield. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) were linked to several clashes with al
Shabaab in the Galgudud and Hiraan regions.
Outlook: ENDF and Ethiopian Air Force presence in Somalia outside of the AMISOM authorization not approved by the Somali
government may cause tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab militants continue to clash with forces allied with the Somali government as they lose territory in central Somalia.
The group clashed with ENDF troops in the Hiraan and Galgudud regions before retreating from their base in Halgan, Hiraan
region. Separately, a Somali National Army (SNA) commander claimed on August 6 that over 100 al Shabaab militants
surrendered to SNA forces in the Bakool region.
Outlook: Al Shabaab militants are likely to conduct asymmetrical attacks in Mogadishu and Puntland as well as clashing with
forces allied with the Somali government as the group loses its foothold in central Somalia.
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
6

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
7777
2
4
3
7
1
1) 06 AUG: Al
Shabaab militants
withdrew from their
base in Halgan,
Hiraan region.
2) 10 AUG: Al
Shabaab militants
attacked an SNA base
in Dinsoor, Bay
region.
3) 10 AUG: Ethiopian
troops and local
forces captured Bur
Aqable and Luq
Jeelow, Hiraan
region, from al
Shabaab militants.
4) 10 AUG: Al
Shabaab militants
attacked a jail in
Beledweyne, Hiraan
region.
HORN OF AFRICA SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 04 AUG – 10 AUG

ASSESSMENT:
Political
UNSMIL, in partnership with the UN, announced that Geneva would host the upcoming Libyan peace negotiation conference on
10 AUG. The GNC agreed to send a delegation on condition that several undeclared amendments would be added to the 5th
Draft of the Libyan Political Accord. It remains unclear if HoR will accept these changes, but the immediate resignation of
General Hafter, who commands Libyan forces under “Operation Dignity,” continues to be a non-starter.
Outlook: The HoR and GNC will each cling to their red lines and attempt to force the other side to accept a compromise. The
negotiations will stall unless the U.S. and EU can apply enough diplomatic and economic pressure to convince each side to
accept less optimal terms.
Security
LNA operations against Ansar al Sharia and ISIS militants have stalled in Benghazi. Previously suppressed neighborhoods in
Laithi have seen a resurgence in militant activity, which has hampered LNA efforts to expand the scope of their efforts in Suq al
Hut and Sabri in northwest Benghazi.
Outlook: The LNA continues to state that Operation Dignity will be completed soon. However, recurrent militant resurgences
highlight the limits to military force in the city and appears to ensure that greater numbers of personnel will be shifted back to
the eastern districts in the city.
Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in Libya
Recent Ansar al Sharia ambushes refute the previous assessment that LNA pressure was limiting Ansar al Sharia’s ability to
conduct attacks. The LNA military cordon is ineffective in completely isolating the remaining militant forces. This conclusion
extends to Derna, where besieged ISIS members continue to stay on the offensive in Fatahia. As recent as 09 AUG, ISIS’s
Derna forces recaptured territory within Derna’s municipal zone following a complex attack, but the MSCD expelled them.
Outlook: The persistence of the militias in Derna and Benghazi continue to serve as a useful distraction for ISIS’s Sirte force,
which has shifted from territorial expansion to force development. The repeated arrivals of alleged ISIS officials and
reinforcements indicates long-term planning.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
Algeria’s political turmoil threatens to undermine its security operations in the region. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika dissolved
the Special Intervention Group, a special-forces unit designed to conduct counter-terrorism operations. He also dismissed three
influential military leaders in previous weeks. Algerian forces continued to arrest suspected terrorists and weapons smugglers
near the Malian border.
Outlook: Algeria’s political and security instability may increase militants’ opportunities to recruit and conduct small-scale
operations given the lack of experienced security forces.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Tunisia continued mass arrests in the wake of new security threats in the south. A group of terrorists reportedly split from
AQIM’s Saharan brigades and pledged allegiance to ISIS, calling themselves the Sons of the Desert. The offshoot reportedly
operates in Tunisia’s southern desert as well as Algeria and Libya. Separately, security forces continued to jail suspected
terrorists around the country.
Outlook: The inception of an ISIS-linked group in the northern Sahara may indicate an increase in weapons flow and support
to the isolated ISIS cells in Tunisia, increasing their operational capacity and possibly indicating future attacks.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Mali continues to see an increase of violence across the country from militant groups. Al Murabitoun attacked a hotel in Servare
on August 7, killing twelve and taking several foreign tourists hostage. Al Qaeda-linked militants carried out an attack on a
village near Timbuktu, killing ten civilians.
Outlook: Militant attacks will likely continue in northern and central Mali, as al Qaeda-linked groups will look to threaten the
peace accords and foster instability through attacks on civilian and security forces.
9
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1
2
3
4
10
1) 06 AUG: Ansar al
Sharia launched a
complex assault
against the LNA and
killed 9 IVO Benghazi.
2) 06 AUG: Alleged
Saudi ISIS military
officials arrived in
Sirte.
3) 07 AUG: ISIS
launched a surprise
complex attack on a
MSCD checkpoint in
eastern Derna. The
attack killed 8
militants and a
commander.
4) 09 AUG: Mortar
attacks killed 12
civilians in Sebha,
Libya.
Libya Significant Activity 04-10 AUG

11
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
1
3
2
MAGHREB SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 04 AUG – 10 AUG
1) 06 AUG: Algerian
authorities
discovered a terrorist
camp containing large
amounts of
explosives in Ain
Defla, Algeria.
2) 08 AUG: Tunisian
authorities
dismantled a terrorist
cell that planned to
join jihadist groups in
Libya in Ben
Guerdane, Tunisia.
3) 09 AUG: Tunisian
forces killed one
terrorist and arrested
others in a sweeping
operation on Mount
Samama, Tunisia.

12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
1) 07-08 AUG: Al
Murabitoun-linked
militants attacked a
hotel in Servare,
Mali. Seven tourists
and five Malian
soldiers were killed.
Malian forces
recovered the hotel
on August 8.
2) 09 AUG: Al Qaeda-
linked militants killed
ten civilians in an
attack on the village
of Gaberi, Mali.
3) 10 AUG: An IED
blast killed three
Malian soldiers in
Tenekou, Mali.
2
13
SAHEL SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 04 AUG – 10 AUG

ASSESSMENT:
Nuclear Talks
Iranian leadership continued disagreements over whether the Parliament must approve the JCPOA. The day after AFGS Chief
Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi said the Parliament does not need to approve the JCPOA, 160 parliamentarians signed a
petition requiring the government to send the JCPOA to them in bill format. Both Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and Assembly
of Experts member Ayatollah Ahmad Alam ol Hoda said in the past week that it is Parliament’s responsibility to approve or
reject the deal. Assembly of Experts Chairman Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi stated that both the Supreme National Security
Council (SNSC) and the Parliament have the right to review it.
Outlook: The domestic debate over Parliament’s role in approving the JCPOA will continue, barring any definitive statements
from senior officials such as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The outcome of the disagreement is unlikely to change
Iran’s overall policy regarding the JCPOA.
U.S.-Iran Relations
Several senior Iranian officials couched the possibility of future improvement in U.S.-Iran relations in terms of a perceived
change in Washington’s recent behavior in the nuclear negotiations. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif complimented the
current U.S. administration for working to regain the trust of the Iranian people, but he added that Iranians still have historical
memory of past U.S. policies, ranging from the CIA-orchestrated coup in 1953 to support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-
Iraq War. Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, meanwhile, said the U.S. must
“compensate” for its past policies but added that the nuclear negotiations make it seem as if the U.S. is distancing itself from its
past behavior. Hardliners pushed back against such a thaw; Parliamentarian Gholam Ali Haddad Adel stated, “There will be
conflict between the U.S. and Iran for as long as the [Islamic] Revolution is strong.”
Outlook: While not an insurmountable obstacle to cooperation, past grievances in U.S.-Iran relations will play a prominent role
in the Iranian leadership’s rhetoric on future ties with the U.S.
13
IRAN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
14
04 AUG: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that “the structure of sanctions that America established in the
UN has fallen apart,” and dismissed concerns about snapback sanctions.
04 AUG: The Supreme Leader’s Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati downplayed Hamas Political Bureau Head
Khaled Meshaal’s trip to Saudi Arabia, stating that Iran-Hamas relations are “cordial.”
04 AUG: Kurdish media outlet Rudaw, reported that IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani met
with senior officials from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
05 AUG: Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Ahmad Alam ol Hoda claimed that the JCPOA violates the Supreme
Leader’s redlines.
05 AUG: Deputy Foreign Minister Abdollahian stated that Iran’s four-part plan to resolve the crisis in Syria will be
submitted to the UN, as Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani met with Syrian Foreign Minister
Walid Muallem.
05 AUG: Foreign Minister Zarif met with his Syrian and Russian counterparts in Tehran.
06 AUG: Assembly of Experts Chairman Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi stated, “The Parliament ought to review the nuclear
deal as a sign of understanding and commitment.”
06 AUG: In a response to a speech by U.S. President Barack Obama, Foreign Minister Zarif stated that the “memory of
the U.S. support for the [1953] coup d’état [overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh]… [is] alive in the
historical memory of the Iranian people.”
07 AUG: Gunmen ambushed a bus carrying Iranian tourists in a Turkish town near the Iranian-Turkish border. One Iranian
citizen was killed and three others were injured.
07 AUG: Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani stated, “America must
somehow compensate for the past and clean the minds of the people of Iran.”
08 AUG: Foreign Minister Zarif dismissed allegations that Iran is covering up illicit activity at the Parchin military site
ahead of IAEA inspections.
09 AUG: Armed Forces Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi lent his support for the nuclear deal in a letter
outlining sixteen advantages of the agreement.
10 AUG: Two Russian warships entered the Iranian port of Bandar-e Anzali; Iran and Russia are scheduled to conduct
joint naval exercises.
04 AUG – 10 AUG 2015

ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16

2015-08-12 CTP Update and Assessment

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2015-08-12 CTP Update and Assessment