An Analysis Of The Differences Between Language Ideology And Language Practice Essay

Student ID: 51121100
Introduction
To analyse the differences between language ideology and language practice we must first recognise
that the relationship between language ideology and language practice is a complex one at best and how
to interpret them depends on how we choose to define the two terms. We must necessarily define both
the terms and the implications of these individual definitions before beginning to analyse the
relationships which exist between them.
To illustrate this, the question ‘what are the primary differences between language ideology and
language practice’ presupposes that the two are separate from one another. Language and ideology here
are two distinct objects which may be studied independently and to which individual characteristics
which differentiate them may be respectively assigned. While perhaps the default view, not all scholars
are in agreement over this dichotic relationship between ideology and practice. Eagleton, for example,
takes the approach that ideology may be defined only in terms of its relationship to practice as a
fundamental influence for ideology. In his view, practice forms the bedrock for ideology, which is ‘a
particular organization of signifying practices that goes to constitute human beings as social subjects’
(2006: 18). Practice and ideology are, in this instance, mutually dependent.
Assuming that ideology and practice are separate entities, it is still the case that several definitions of
each exist. This is especially true of definitions of language ideology, which seem to take more issue
with the definition of what ideology is than of what language is, since ideologies may be nonlinguistic.
Language as a form of communication is at least in some way tangible as opposed to ideologies which
may go completely unknown unless communicated, so that while fish may well have deep
philosophical insights without a form of communication these go undiscovered. When approaching

definitions of ‘ideology’ one must draw an immediate distinction between three definitions of language
ideology which may be applicable:
1. supralinguistic ideology: ideology about language in general
2. innerlinguistic ideology: ideology within language(s)
3. language policy: ideology about individual languages
Each of these is a separate ‘language ideology’ in its own right and will be examined in the following
sections. For the sake of maintaining focus throughout, my own vague definition of language practice
as ‘any actualisation of any kind of language use’ is perfectly appropriate.
Supralinguistic ideology
Fig. 1 Supralinguistic ideology
When discussing supralinguistic ideology (Fig. 1) we are talking about various theories regarding the
origin, nature and use of language as a system of communication on the whole. We may use Cameron’s
definition of ideology as:
“[a collection of] ideas and beliefs about what a language is, how it works and how it should
work, which are widely accepted in particular communities and which can be shown to be

consequential for the way languages are both used and judged in the actual social practice of
those communities” (2006: 143).
For Cameron, ideologies which affect language generally may also affect the way these individual
languages are practiced. Everett’s Language: The Cultural Tool (2012) offers a very insightful
perspective from what he describes as an “anthropological linguistic” approach to the definition and
origin of language itself. While conceptualising language as a tool whose primary purpose is
communication he also views language more holistically as either the substance from which
nonlinguistic ideologies are formed or as the means by which these ideologies are expressed.
However, as Cameron notes, “these are both idealizations of language which overlook the fact that
[language] is itself shaped by the same social and ideological processes it is often invoked to explain”
(Cameron 2006: 143). Cameron takes further issue with this view of the origin of language as merely a
tool and in the abstract to her paper Ideology and Language (2006) by stating that “discussions of
[language’s] relationship to ideology often fail to acknowledge that language is not simply a vehicle for
other ideological processes but is itself shaped by ideological processes”. Her particular view of
ideology about language sees language as the party affected which is shaped by the speaker’s
nonlinguistic beliefs of that language. In any definition, it is clear to the point of selfevidency that
ideology about language is shaped by language practice only to the extent to which the language is
practiced. A language which does nothing can change nothing and thus both ideology and practice
critically hinge on any given language’s continued use.

Innerlinguistic ideology
Fig. 2 Innerlinguistic ideology
Moving on from ideology of language as a general concept we may now concern ourselves with
innerlinguistic ideologies in individual languages. By innerlinguistic ideology I mean that while
language as a whole contains no specific ideology this does not have to be true for individual
languages. These may have their own systems of belief contained within the vocabulary and
grammatical structure of individual languages which will necessarily affect the perception of those
languages’ speakers to a far greater extent. This is the main premise of the SapirWhorf hypothesis; a
theory which proposes that “an intellectual system embodied in each language shapes the thought of its
speakers in a quite general way” (Kay & Kempton 1984: 66). The theory may seem nonsensical at first,
after all the idea that a language as an nonsentient entity has beliefs at all seems about as absurd as to
say rocks hold opinions about the weather, but the theory demonstrates clear falsifiability by allowing
for comparisons of the nonlinguistic cognitive behaviours of speakers of different languages since
“structural differences between language systems will, in general, be paralleled by nonlinguistic
cognitive differences, of an unspecified sort, in the native speakers of the two languages”. These
differences are, it is argued, ab initio affected by those speakers’ native languages (Brown 1976: 128).

Certain studies seem to provide at least some evidence of this theory that our perception of the world is
affected by language (Gilbert et al. 2006; Ekkehart 1983), however the validity of methodology and
interpretation of results is still very much open to debate (Kay & Kempton 1984). Furthermore, under
this it is maintained that it is the way a language forms itself and is actualised that affects any
supralinguistic ideology. Ideologies as ‘systems of separate beliefs’ are themselves shaped by the
language through which they are pronounced, thus any ideology is inlinguistic (Fig. 2).
Socialindexical theory
Socialindexical theory (SIT) has important explanatory power for this mutually affective relationship
between language ideology and practice. In environments where multiple variants are available and
individual language variation is noted Silverstein (2008) proposes that it is the individual’s recognition
and manipulation of the social field, rather than the individual’s social standing itself, which marks the
bedrock for use of that variant. He posits this as n+1: that for any language variant x which arises in a
community n that community is the firstorder index. However, it is perfectly possible, and
demonstrably the case, that x may be used by a second community, the secondorder index, by which
point it has repositioned itself in the socialindexical field and thus takes on new socialindexical
semantic properties. This may continue to happen to variant x indefinitely through successive
communities, each time accumulating social meaning +1 dependent on community n. Eckert (2009)
offers a great exposé of the real implications of SIT, foremost of which being that SIT reaffirms the
importance and status of the individual’s ontological awareness as the focal point for language variation
and change. When a secondorder index individual adopts x they are not doing so by virtue of their
social situation, since x is a nonnative variant. Rather, the individual ascribes some desirable social
advantage to use of x over any other variants and thus adopts it into their own speech. This has huge
potential to explain language change overall because synchronic, and by extension diachronic, change

thus fundamentally become the result of a myriad of individuals’ choices to use variants which position
themselves to meet their needs, whatever they may be, more advantageously.
Under SIT it is individual choice and active decision on the basis of alreadyexisting language practices
and ideologies which advance language practices and ideologies. The two are, according to SIT,
inextricably linked. In this way SIT may offer some explanations to the relationship between ideology
and practice because by highlighting the individual’s perception and choice of their own being as an
aspect of an ideology which governs ideolectical practice.
‘Bad’ language
There are other examples demonstrating the interplay of ideology and language. Ideally, any example
where ideology acts as the major governor by way of rules and restrictions on language use may be
used as an example of this relationship. This is certainly the case between religious and political
ideologies, which have often been a major influence on language use. Classical Arabic, for example, is
still today the holy language of Islam, Hebrew of Judaism and the Kivi dialect of the Arizona Tewa
people (Kroskrity 1998). Blasphemy, which is still a crime in the UK to some extent, is after all the use
of a particular language form which violates its religiouslypermitted domain.
The use of swear words is also a great limiter on general language use by appealing to notions of ‘bad
words’. While certain forms, such as ‘I have went’ may be considered ‘incorrect’, swearing is off limits
because the language forms are described as possessing some inherent moral value. This is blatantly
untrue since to be moral implies some ability of choice. Swearing is simply the product of cultural
taboo and ideological dissonance, rather than of any innate moral action on behalf of a particular word.
Traditional religious observance and sensitivity to sexuality within UK society make several popular

swear words such as Jesus Christ, f*ck and c*nt permissible expletives simply because they break
cultural taboos. It is on that basis of not wishing to violate such cultural taboos to use them in an
academic domain that I justify my previous uses of an asterisk. One can see this effect of ideology and
practice as an explanation for variation in swearing in Thewall’s (2008) examination of the effect of
age and gender on swearing in online social media. Thewall concludes that while gender plays a
statistically significant role in the frequency of socalled ‘strong’ swear words for online US teenagers,
the same is not true of UK users. Males in both countries use roughly the same frequency of strong
swear words, however US females use significantly less than their UK counterparts. Thewall concludes
that this indicates deeper ideological changes regarding gender roles within the two societies; an
example of ideology explaining changes in practice. While he admits that online swearing may not
necessarily reflect the frequencies of offline conversations the point still stands that ideas about oneself
in relation to culture may influence language practice within given domains. This supports Woolard &
Schieffelin’s position that “what most researchers share, and what makes the term useful in spite of its
problems, is a view of ideology as rooted in or responsive to the experience of a particular social
position” (1994: 58).
What SIT and these previously mentioned issues have in common is that they all conform to Oyama’s
(2000) notion of “constructive interaction”, which posits that language variables themselves, and by
extension all language use, are associated with and determined by nonlinguistic variables. In the case
of SIT it is individual ontological awareness which governs language manipulation, while in taboo and
religious cases it is an awareness of a larger system of ideological thought which places restrictions on
what may and may not be said.
Language policy

Fig. 3 Spolsky’s language policy
Our final language ideology is an ideology about individual languages. However, under Spolsky’s
(2004) definition this is a misnomer, since Spolsky argues that ideology forms a part of language policy
as opposed to being the sole governor of the language policy (Fig. 3). He distinguishes three central
factors which determine a language policy: selecting varieties which should constitute the linguistic
repertoire (practice); the beliefs about language held by the community (ideology); and any effect to
modify practice by intervention or management. This is perhaps similar to Eagleton’s definition but
places ideology and practice as coequal to implementation.
The possibility for variation between each of these ingredients naturally gives rise to several types of
language policy which may exist. Generally, language policy is discussed in the context of countries,
and so there are country policies which have the language of the geographical region as the only
official language of that country (eg. France), those which have a multitude of regional national
languages as official (eg. Bolivia) and those with no official languages but rather one or many de facto
language(s) whose status is not explicitly written down as part of any official constitution (eg. UK and
USA). It is through this lens of the official language policy that the validity of any other languages will
inevitably be treated. Foreign language instruction is the perfect domain to witness this in action as it is
influenced by several perspectives which exist for judging which languages should be taught, all of

which are centred around instructing speakers in languages which will be of use to them by regularity
of contact but differ with regard to what constitutes ‘regular contact’. The first perspective is what may
be called the ‘geographical proximity perspective’: that languages of geographically neighbouring
countries should be taught since these are the languages most likely to be encountered. As an example,
the UK and USA both have English as a de facto official language. The USA borders Mexico, a
Spanishspeaking country, and most foreign language instruction in the USA is thus geared towards
Spanish. A situation occurs in the UK where the main secondary languages of instruction are French
and German. A proverbially poor academic record in second language instruction compared with that
of The Netherlands, which has instruction in four languages, serves as evidence that emphasis on
geographical proximity is wellplaced. The second perspective may be called the ‘global perspective’:
this argues that due to everincreasing globalisation languages which are spoken by a majority of the
world’s population should be taught. This perspective is evident in the form of Glasgow children
learning simplified Chinese whose use is paradoxical at first, since China is geographically estranged
from Scotland. I am not personally persuaded by this argument because the idea that it is necessary to
speak languages which will place oneself at the best possible place within a global society due to the
blurring of boundaries implies regular contact, and as much as I am warmed by the sentiment I have yet
to find a serious use in my day to day interactions for Chinese.
Australia, however, has a more problematic situation and does not easily fit in either perspective. By
virtue of being a former British colony and subject to major recent immigration, Australia has a wide
number of immigrant languages which are spoken by a large number of speakers bilingually with
English. In a similar situation to Gaelic speakers in Scotland, within only a few generations speakers
have become bilingual with a preference towards the regional language.

Conclusion
In this essay I have examined a variety of examples where language practice and ideology intersect.
While the definition of ideology is important, to become too embroiled with particular concrete
definitions can very easily detract from the fluidity and complexity of language ideology as it relates to
the individuals who practice it. One could argue that a variation of both SIT and exemplar theory
(Foulkes & Docherty 2006) may be used to more broadly explain the relationship between ideology
and practice from the perspective of awareness of nonlinguistic ideologies (Fig. 4). Exemplar theory
posits that language categories, whether they be the lexical category of cats or the phonological
category of what constitutes an acceptable /i/ in French, are formed by compromising the shared
characteristics of every individual exemplar already encountered. Every entity met in reality imprints
upon the mind and is thus an exemplar. Because new exemplars are constantly encounter the categories
themselves are constantly in the process of redefining themselves. In the same way, every time a
language form is met in reality a certain ideological association is made. I find it interesting to conclude
that it is perfectly possible that this ideological exemplar idea, combined with our ideas of
innerlinguistic and language policy ideologies, may account for separate groups of individuals who
have different language policies as a result of the varying ideologies of their native languages. In
discussing their language policies the innerlanguage ideology may be influencing their view of
language policy overall, which then becomes an exemplar of nonlinguistic ideology which can then be
redefined indefinitely.
Fig. 4 Language policy exemplar theory

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