BIOTERRORISM AND BIOWEAPONS
- 1. BY - MAITREYEE DAS ( BBT 3RD
- 3. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS THAT MAY BE UTILISED AS WEAPONS AGAINST HUMANS , ANIMALS OR PLANTS. AFFECTS LIVING ORGANISMS ONLY.
- 6. HOW ARE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USED???
- 7. INTENTIONAL USE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS, AND TOXINS, GENERALLY OF MICROBIAL, PLANT OR ANIMAL ORIGIN TO PRODUCE DISEASE AND DEATH IN HUMANS, LIVESTOCK AND CROPS. “BANNED” BY THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON CONVECTION ,1972
- 10. • MORTALITY / MORBIDITY / FEAR HUMANS • FOOD SUPPLY / ECONOMY / FEAR ANIMALS • FOOD SUPPLY / ECONOMY PLANTS
- 11. ANTIPERSONNEL - PEOPLE ANTIANIMAL – LIVESTOCK OR PACK ANIMALS ANTIPLANT – PLANTS AND CROPS ANTIMATERIEL – PETROLEUM, MODERN ALLOYS, PLASTICS
- 13. EASILY DISSEMINATED. HIGH MORTALITY RATES. POTENTIAL FOR MAJOR PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT. POSSIBLY CAUSE PUBLIC PANIC AND SOCIAL DISRUPTION. REQUIRE SPECIAL ACTION FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS.
- 14. BACTERI A VIRUSE S TOXINS BACILLUS ANTHRACIS (ANTHRAX / MILTZBRAND) YERSINIA PESTIS (PLAGUE / PEST) FRANCISELLA TULARENSIS (TULAREMIA / HASENPEST) VARIOLA MAJOR (SMALLPOX / POCKEN) FILOVIRUSES (e.g. EBOLA, MARBURG) ARENAVIRUSES (e.g. LASSA, MACHUPO) CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUS TOXIN (BOTULINISM/ BOTULISMUS)
- 15. MODERATELY EASY TO DISSEMINATE. MODERATE MORBIDITY RATES AND LOW MORTALITY RATES. REQUIRE ENHANCED DISEASE SURVEILANCE.
- 16. VIRUSE S TOXINSBACTERI A BRUCELLA SPECIES (BRUCELLOSIS) COXIELLA BURNETTI ( Q- FEVER) SALMONELLA SPECIES, SHIGELLA, E. COLI ( FOOD SAFETY THREATS) RICKETTSIA PROWAZAKII (TYPHUS) ALPHAVIRUSE S ( ENCEPHALITIS ) EPSILON TOXIN OF CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS RICIN TOXINS OF RICINUS COMMUNIS (CASTOR BEANS) ENTEROTOXIN B (STAPHYLOCOCC AL)
- 18. VIRUSES
- 20. 1. MAJOR CATEGORIES – BACTERIA, VIRUSES, TOXINS. 2. PERSISTENT (ANTHRAX) VS NON- PERSISTENT (INFLUENZA). 3. LETHAL (BOTULISM) VS INCAPACITATING (Q- FEVER). 4. CONTAGIOUS (SMALLPOX) VS NON-
- 21. PERSISTENCE: SPORES OR LOCAL ANIMAL RESERVOIR. HIGHLY LETHAL , WITH LITTLE IMMUNITY. NO EFFECTIVE TREATMENT. FACTORS ENCOURAGING EPIDEMIC FORMATION COMMUNICABLE BETWEEN PEOPLE. RELATIVELY LONG INCUBATION PERIOD. ASYMPTOMATIC INFECTION. VAGUE ONSET SYMPTOMS. WIDESPREAD DISPERSAL. LOW ID50 : AMOUNT NEEDED TO INFECT 50% OF PEOPLE.
- 22. Agent Persist / Animal Host? Lethality If Not Treated Treat- ment? Commun- icable? Incuba- tion? Asymp- tomatic Infection? Anthrax Yes > 90% Lim No 1-6d No Smallpox No 20-40 No Yes 12d No HIV No 100% Yes Lim 9 yrs Yes Ebola Yes 80-90 No Lim 5-10d No West Nile Yes 10% No No 5-15d No Plague Yes 100% Yes Yes 2-6d No Tularemia Yes 30-60 Yes No 2-10d No Marburg Yes 25-90 No Lim 3-9d No Typhus Yes 10-60 Lim No 6-16d No CCHF Yes 15-30 No Yes 1-6d No? Influenza Yes .1-3% Lim Yes 1-4d Yes
- 25. TWO KEY CHOICES : COMMUNICABILITY LETHALITY
- 26. BIOWEAPONS : DESIGN CHOICES Pathogens Contagious Lethal Nonlethal Non- Contagious Lethal Nonlethal
- 29. HISTORY OF CURRENT THREAT RESEARCH AS A BIOWEAPON STARTED >80 YEARS AGO. TODAY 17 NATIONS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE WEAPONRY. IRAQ HAS ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCING AND WEAPONISING ANTHRAX BETWEEN 1955 AND 1991. 1970 : WHO ESTIMATE : AN AIRCRAFT RELEASE OF 50 KG OVER 5 MILLION POPULATION WOULD KILL 2,50,000 – 100,000 WITHOUT TREATMENT. 1979 : ACCIDENTAL AEROSOLISED RELEASE IN SOVIET UNION CAUSED 79 CASES AND 68 DEATHS.
- 30. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Cases
- 31. 20,000 – 1,00,000 CASES ESTIMATED GLOBALLY/YEAR
- 32. MOST DEATHS OF ANY INFECTIOUS DISEASE ONLY TWO STOCKS REMAINING , OFFICIALLY (U.S. AND RUSSIA) FRENCH AND INDIAN WARS (1754-1767) ALLEGATIONS OF USE IN U.S. CIVIL WAR ALLEGED USE BY JAPANESE IN CHINA IN
- 33. FEATURES MAKING SMALLPOX A LIKELY AGENT
- 34. 1781-82 : AFFLICTS BETWEEN 67-75% OF WESTERN EUROPE 1789 : EPIDEMIC HITS CANADA 1829-32 : 1889-90 :
- 35. EMERGENCE OF HUMAN INFLUENZA STRAINS 1918 1957 1968 1977 1997 2003 H1 H1 H3 H2 H5,7,9 Spanish Influenza Asian Influenza Russian Influenza Avian Influenzas Hong Kong Influenza “Swine Flu” 2009 Novel H1N1
- 36. ADVANTAGE OVER OTHER AGENTS OCCUR NATURALLY – EPIDEMIC HAS MORE TIME TO SPREAD BEFORE CREATING A MAJOR HEALTH RESPONSE POSTEXPOSURE IMMUNISATION IS INEFFECTIVE, AS INCUBATION PERIOD IS SHORT HARDER TO ERADICATE AS IT HAS ANIMAL AND AVIAN RESERVOIRS DISAVANTAGE : LOW LETHALITY BUT , HAS MORE THAN 50% FATALITY RATE – AN ENGINEERED VERSION COULD BE AS DEADLY AS SMALLPOX IF CULTURED NOT ENGINEERED, COULD BE AN
- 39. BIOSAFETY
- 40. BIOSECURITY
- 41. BIODEFENSE SHORT TERM, LOCAL , USUALLY MILITARY MEASURES RESTORE BIOSECURITY TO A GIVEN GROUP OF PERSON WHO ARE , OR, MAY BE SUBJECT TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE