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Ch 5: Mobile Malware
CNIT 128:
Hacking Mobile
Devices
Updated 3-7-17
Increase in Mobile Malware
• From
link Ch
5h
Early Malware
• LibertyCrack (2000)
– Trojan masquerading as pirated software
for Palm OS
– Restored device to factory defaults
Early Malware
• Cabir (2004)
– First phone worm
– Infected Symbian
phones
– Spread via Bluetooth
• Image from link Ch 5a
Android Malware:
New Reports
• Link Ch 5i
CNIT 128 5: Mobile malware
CNIT 128 5: Mobile malware
CNIT 128 5: Mobile malware
• Ch 5j
CNIT 128 5: Mobile malware
CNIT 128 5: Mobile malware
Android Malware:
From Textbook
DroidDream (2011)
• Was primarily distributed by the Google Play
store
• Legitimate apps were repackaged to include
DroidDream and then put back in the Play store
Excessive Permissions
• App trojaned by
DroidDream asks for
too many permissions
Information Theft
• When it is installed, DroidDream launches
a "Setting" service
• Steals private information and sends it to
a remote server
– International Mobile Station Equipment
Identity (IMEI)
– International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
Botted
• DroidDream then roots the device
• Hijacks the app downloading and
installing code
• Makes it a bot under remote control
Google's Response
• Google removed the repackaged apps
from the Play Store
• But 50,000 – 200,000 users were already
infected
NickiSpy
• Packaged into other
software
• At next reboot, it launches
the services shown to the
right
• Steals IMEI, location, SMS
messages and records voice
phone calls
• Records sound when phone
is not in use
Google's Response to NickiSpy
• Android 2.3 removed the ability for an
application to change the phone state
without user interaction
• So an app could no longer turn on the
microphone as stealthily
SMSZombie
• Packaged inside live wallpaper apps in a
Chinese marketplace named Gfan
• Makes fraudulent payments using China
Mobile SMS Payment
• No permissions are requested during
installation, because it starts as a
wallpaper app
– No clue to warn the user
Malicious App
• It then downloads
another app and
shows the user a box
with only one option
"Install" to get "100
points!"
• That installs another
app that does ask for
permissions
Becoming Administrator
Payload
• SMSZombie sends all SMS messages
currently on the device to a target phone
#
• It then scans all SMS messages to
stealthily steal and delete ones that are
warning the phone user about fraudulent
SMS transactions
Banking Malware
Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) Attack
• A Trojan installed on a PC hooks Windows
API networking calls such as
HttpSendRequestW
• Allows attacker to intercept and modify
HTTP and HTTPS traffic sent by the
browser
• Can steal banking credentials and display
false information to the user
Two-Factor Authentication (2FA)
• This was the response by banks to resist
MITB attacks
• Use an SMS to a phone as the second
factor for 2FA
– Message contains a mobile transaction
authentication number (mTAN)
• Customer types mTAN into the banking
web app on the PC
Zeus and Zitmo Defeat 2FA
• Zeus malware on the PC
– Manipulates HTTPS
traffic to encourage user
to install fake Trusteer
mobile security software
– Looks like legitimate
security software on the
phone
– Steals SMS messages from
the phone to defeat 2FA
FakeToken
• User is tricked into
installing TokenGenerator
app
• It requests suspicious
permissions, including
– Install and delete apps
• An error by the malware
designers: only system apps
can have that permission
– Send and receive SMS
messages
Payload
• TakeToken steals SMS messages to defeat
2FA
• Can also steal contact list
CNIT 128 5: Mobile malware
How Bouncer was Hacked
• Researchers submitted an app containing a
remote shell
• When Bouncer ran the app in a virtual
machine, it phoned home to the
researchers
• They explored the VM and exploited
Bouncer itself
• With a remote shell inside Bouncer, they
explored it and found ways to defeat it
Google Application Verification Service
• Launched in 2012
• Tries to detect malicious apps
• Much less effective than 3rd-party AV
– Link Ch 5e
Moral: Get Real AV
• Avast! won in a review
from Feb., 2015
– Link Ch 5g
• There are plenty of
others, including
– Lookout
– AVG
– Kaspersky
– Norton
– McAfee
iOS Malware
What iOS malware?
Risk is Very Small
• Very few items of malware, very few users
actually infected, no real harm done
• An academic exercise in theoretical
computer security, not a real risk for users
Fake Update
• "iPhone firmware 1.1.3 prep software"
• Only for jailbroken devices
• Supposedly written by an 11-year-old
• Broke utilities like Doom and SSH
• A minor annoyance
Jailbroken iPhones with Default SSH
Password
• Dutch teenager scanned for iPhones on T-
Mobile's 3G IP range
– Pushed ransomware onto phones in Nov. 2009
• Australian teenager wrote the iKee worm
to Rickroll iPhones in 2009
– A later version made an iPhone botnet
iOS Malware in the Apple App Store
• "Find and Call"
– First seen in 2012
– Also in Google Play
– Uploads user's contacts to a Web server
– Sends SMS spam to the contacts with install
links
– Spreads but does no other harm
Malware Security:

Android v. iOS
Why the Huge Difference?
• Market share
• App approval process
– $25 to register for Google Play
• Apps appear within 15-60 min.
– $99 to register for Apple's App Store
• A week of automated & manual review before app
appears in the store
• Third-party app stores
– Allowed on Android, but not on iOS (unless you
jailbreak)

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CNIT 128 5: Mobile malware

  • 1. Ch 5: Mobile Malware CNIT 128: Hacking Mobile Devices Updated 3-7-17
  • 2. Increase in Mobile Malware • From link Ch 5h
  • 3. Early Malware • LibertyCrack (2000) – Trojan masquerading as pirated software for Palm OS – Restored device to factory defaults
  • 4. Early Malware • Cabir (2004) – First phone worm – Infected Symbian phones – Spread via Bluetooth • Image from link Ch 5a
  • 14. DroidDream (2011) • Was primarily distributed by the Google Play store • Legitimate apps were repackaged to include DroidDream and then put back in the Play store
  • 15. Excessive Permissions • App trojaned by DroidDream asks for too many permissions
  • 16. Information Theft • When it is installed, DroidDream launches a "Setting" service • Steals private information and sends it to a remote server – International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) – International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
  • 17. Botted • DroidDream then roots the device • Hijacks the app downloading and installing code • Makes it a bot under remote control
  • 18. Google's Response • Google removed the repackaged apps from the Play Store • But 50,000 – 200,000 users were already infected
  • 19. NickiSpy • Packaged into other software • At next reboot, it launches the services shown to the right • Steals IMEI, location, SMS messages and records voice phone calls • Records sound when phone is not in use
  • 20. Google's Response to NickiSpy • Android 2.3 removed the ability for an application to change the phone state without user interaction • So an app could no longer turn on the microphone as stealthily
  • 21. SMSZombie • Packaged inside live wallpaper apps in a Chinese marketplace named Gfan • Makes fraudulent payments using China Mobile SMS Payment • No permissions are requested during installation, because it starts as a wallpaper app – No clue to warn the user
  • 22. Malicious App • It then downloads another app and shows the user a box with only one option "Install" to get "100 points!" • That installs another app that does ask for permissions
  • 24. Payload • SMSZombie sends all SMS messages currently on the device to a target phone # • It then scans all SMS messages to stealthily steal and delete ones that are warning the phone user about fraudulent SMS transactions
  • 26. Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) Attack • A Trojan installed on a PC hooks Windows API networking calls such as HttpSendRequestW • Allows attacker to intercept and modify HTTP and HTTPS traffic sent by the browser • Can steal banking credentials and display false information to the user
  • 27. Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) • This was the response by banks to resist MITB attacks • Use an SMS to a phone as the second factor for 2FA – Message contains a mobile transaction authentication number (mTAN) • Customer types mTAN into the banking web app on the PC
  • 28. Zeus and Zitmo Defeat 2FA • Zeus malware on the PC – Manipulates HTTPS traffic to encourage user to install fake Trusteer mobile security software – Looks like legitimate security software on the phone – Steals SMS messages from the phone to defeat 2FA
  • 29. FakeToken • User is tricked into installing TokenGenerator app • It requests suspicious permissions, including – Install and delete apps • An error by the malware designers: only system apps can have that permission – Send and receive SMS messages
  • 30. Payload • TakeToken steals SMS messages to defeat 2FA • Can also steal contact list
  • 32. How Bouncer was Hacked • Researchers submitted an app containing a remote shell • When Bouncer ran the app in a virtual machine, it phoned home to the researchers • They explored the VM and exploited Bouncer itself • With a remote shell inside Bouncer, they explored it and found ways to defeat it
  • 33. Google Application Verification Service • Launched in 2012 • Tries to detect malicious apps • Much less effective than 3rd-party AV – Link Ch 5e
  • 34. Moral: Get Real AV • Avast! won in a review from Feb., 2015 – Link Ch 5g • There are plenty of others, including – Lookout – AVG – Kaspersky – Norton – McAfee
  • 36. Risk is Very Small • Very few items of malware, very few users actually infected, no real harm done • An academic exercise in theoretical computer security, not a real risk for users
  • 37. Fake Update • "iPhone firmware 1.1.3 prep software" • Only for jailbroken devices • Supposedly written by an 11-year-old • Broke utilities like Doom and SSH • A minor annoyance
  • 38. Jailbroken iPhones with Default SSH Password • Dutch teenager scanned for iPhones on T- Mobile's 3G IP range – Pushed ransomware onto phones in Nov. 2009 • Australian teenager wrote the iKee worm to Rickroll iPhones in 2009 – A later version made an iPhone botnet
  • 39. iOS Malware in the Apple App Store • "Find and Call" – First seen in 2012 – Also in Google Play – Uploads user's contacts to a Web server – Sends SMS spam to the contacts with install links – Spreads but does no other harm
  • 41. Why the Huge Difference? • Market share • App approval process – $25 to register for Google Play • Apps appear within 15-60 min. – $99 to register for Apple's App Store • A week of automated & manual review before app appears in the store • Third-party app stores – Allowed on Android, but not on iOS (unless you jailbreak)