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Critical Chain Project Management Second Edition
Lawrence P. Leach Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Lawrence P. Leach
ISBN(s): 9781580539036, 1580539033
Edition: 2
File Details: PDF, 1.64 MB
Year: 2004
Language: english

Critical Chain
Project Management
Second Edition

For a listing of recent titles in the Artech House Effective Project
Management Library, turn to the back of this book.

Critical Chain
Project Management
Second Edition
Lawrence P. Leach
artechhouse.com

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Leach, Lawrence P.
Critical chain project management/Lawrence P. Leach.—2nd ed.
p. cm. — (Artech House effective project management library)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-58053-903-3 (alk. paper)
1. Project management. I. Title. II. Series.
T56.8.L34 2004
658.5—dc22
2004046244
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Leach, Lawrence P.
Critical chain project management. —2nd ed. —(Artech House project management library)
1. Project management
I. Title
658.4′04
ISBN 1-58053-903-3
Cover design by Gary Ragaglia
© 2005 ARTECH HOUSE, INC.
685 Canton Street
Norwood, MA 02062
All rights reserved. Printed and bound in the United States of America. No part of this book
may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, includ-
ing photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publisher.
All terms mentioned in this book that are known to be trademarks or service marks have
been appropriately capitalized. Artech House cannot attest to the accuracy of this informa-
tion. Use of a term in this book should not be regarded as affecting the validity of any trade-
mark or service mark.
International Standard Book Number: 1-58053-903-3
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2004046244
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii
CHAPTER 1
Begin in the Beginning 1
1.1 Project Success 2
1.2 Defining the Problem 4
1.2.1 How Good Is the Current Project System? 4
1.2.2 But Some Companies Make a Lot of Money Running Projects 9
1.2.3 Problem Cause, or Better Defining the Problem 10
1.2.4 Right Solution 13
1.2.5 Right Execution 17
1.3 Success with Critical-Chain Project Management 18
1.4 Honeywell DAS [16] 19
1.5 Lucent Technologies [17] 20
1.6 Israeli Aircraft Industry 20
1.7 U.S. Navy Shipyards 20
1.8 Summary 20
References 21
CHAPTER 2
TOC, PMBOK™, Lean and Six Sigma 23
2.1 Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK™) 24
2.1.1 Project Integration Management 25
2.1.2 Project Scope Management 25
2.1.3 Project Time Management 26
2.1.4 Project-Risk Management 26
2.1.5 Other PMBOK™ Areas 26
2.1.6 Organizational Project Maturity Model 26
2.2 Lean 27
2.3 Agile, or Light, Project Management 29
2.4 Six Sigma 31
2.5 System of Profound Knowledge 32
2.5.1 Appreciation for a System 33
2.5.2 Understanding Variation and Uncertainty 37
2.5.3 Psychology 40
v

2.5.4 Theory of Knowledge 43
2.6 Theory of Constraints 44
2.6.1 The Throughput World 47
2.6.2 The Production Solution 48
2.6.3 Five Focusing Steps 52
2.7 Change Management 57
2.8 The Grand Synthesis 58
2.9 Summary 59
References 59
CHAPTER 3
The Direction of the Solution 61
3.1 Deciding What to Change 61
3.1.1 Defining the Project-Management System 61
3.1.2 Project Failure as the Undesired Effects 61
3.2 Identify the Constraint 62
3.3 Exploit the Constraint 66
3.3.1 Projects’ Durations Get Longer and Longer 66
3.3.2 Projects Frequently Overrun Schedule 68
3.3.3 Multitasking 72
3.3.4 The Core Conflict Leads to Undesired Effects 73
3.4 Toward Desired Effects 74
3.4.1 Resolving the Core Conflict 74
3.5 Solution Feasibility (Evidence) 77
3.6 Determine What to Change To 79
3.7 Summary 79
References 80
CHAPTER 4
The Complete Single-Project Solution 81
4.1 From System Requirements to System Design 81
4.1.1 Requirements Matrix 81
4.1.2 Summary of Single-Project Critical Chain 83
4.2 Developing the Critical-Chain Solution 84
4.2.1 Identifying the Project Constraint 84
4.2.2 Exploiting the Constraint 86
4.2.3 Subordinating Merging Paths 95
4.2.4 Task Performance 97
4.2.5 Early Start versus Late Finish 99
4.3 Exploiting the Plan Using Buffer Management 100
4.4 Features (More or Less) from PMBOK™ 102
4.4.1 Project Charter 102
4.4.2 Project Work Plan 102
4.4.3 Project Measurement and Control Process 104
4.4.4 Project Change Control 104
4.4.5 Project-Risk Management 104
4.5 Summary 104
vi Contents

References 105
CHAPTER 5
Starting a New Project 107
5.1 Project-Initiation Process 107
5.2 The Project Charter 108
5.3 Stakeholder Endorsement 108
5.4 The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 109
5.4.1 TOC Approaches 109
5.4.2 The Conventional WBS 110
5.4.3 Project Organization 111
5.5 Responsibility Assignment 112
5.6 Milestone Sequencing 112
5.7 Work Packages 113
5.7.1 Assumptions 114
5.7.2 Project Network 115
5.7.3 Activity Duration Estimate 120
5.7.4 Uncertainty Revisited 120
5.8 Need for Cost Buffer 123
5.9 Basis for Cost Estimates 124
5.10 The Project Work Plan 124
5.11 Change Management 125
5.12 Project Closure 125
5.13 Summary 125
References 126
CHAPTER 6
Developing the (Single-Project) Critical-Chain Plan 127
6.1 Process 127
6.2 Good Enough 128
6.3 Examples and Practice 128
6.3.1 Small Example 128
6.3.2 Large Example 131
6.3.3 Large Exercise 134
6.4 Buffer and Threshold Sizing 135
6.4.1 Statistical Background 135
6.4.2 Project and Feeding Buffer Size 137
6.4.3 Buffer Trigger Points 138
6.4.4 Resource Buffers 139
6.5 Cost Buffer Sizing 140
6.6 Methods to Create the Plan 141
6.6.1 Manual 141
6.6.2 Critical-Path Software 142
6.6.3 Critical-Chain Software 143
6.7 External Constraints 143
6.8 Reducing Planned Time (a.k.a. Dictated End Dates) 144
Contents vii

6.8.1 Acceleration without Cost Impact (Exploit and Subordinate
6.8.1 to the Constraint) 144
6.8.2 Acceleration with Increased Raw Material Cost (Elevate the
6.8.2 Constraint) 144
6.9 Enterprise Wide Resource Planning 145
6.10 Frequently Asked Planning Questions 145
6.11 Key Points 148
CHAPTER 7
Developing the Multiproject Critical-Chain Plan 149
7.1 Identify the Multiproject Constraint 149
7.2 Exploit the Multiproject Constraint 153
7.3 Multiproject Critical-Chain Features 154
7.3.1 Project Priority 154
7.3.2 Select the Drum Resource 154
7.3.3 The Drum Schedule (a.k.a. Pipelining the Projects) 156
7.3.4 The Capacity-Constraint Buffer 157
7.3.5 The Drum Buffer 159
7.3.6 Project Schedules 160
7.4 Another View of a Multiproject Constraint 160
7.5 Introducing New Projects 161
7.6 Frequently Asked Multiproject Questions 162
7.7 Summary 162
CHAPTER 8
Measuring and Controlling to the Plan 165
8.1 Project Roles 166
8.1.1 Task Manager Role 166
8.1.2 Project Manager Role 167
8.1.3 Resource Manager Role 170
8.2 Buffer Management 171
8.2.1 Project Meetings 171
8.2.2 The Buffer Report 172
8.3 Cost Buffer 174
8.3.1 Cost Buffer Status 174
8.3.2 Earned-Value Basics 175
8.3.3 Cost-Buffer Penetration 175
8.3.4 The Problem 176
8.3.5 Labor Costs 176
8.3.6 Material Costs 177
8.3.7 Peaceful Coexistence of Buffer Reporting and Earned Value 178
8.3.8 The So-called Schedule Variance 179
8.4 Quality Measurement 179
8.5 Responding to the Buffer Signals 180
8.5.1 Schedule Buffer Exceeds Yellow Threshold 180
8.5.2 Cost Buffer Exceeds Yellow Threshold 180
8.5.3 Dollar Days’ Quality Increasing 181
viii Contents

8.5.4 Schedule Buffer Exceeds Red Threshold 181
8.5.5 Cost Buffer Exceeds Red Threshold 182
8.5.6 Schedule or Cost Buffer Exceeds 100% 182
8.6 Milestones 182
8.7 Change-Control Actions 182
8.8 Frequently Asked Measurement-and-Control Questions 183
8.9 Summary 184
References 185
CHAPTER 9
Implementing the Change to CCPM 187
9.1 Implementation Model 187
9.1.1 Endorse the Implementation Project 188
9.1.2 Charter the Implementation Project 188
9.1.3 Begin with the End in Mind (Vision) 188
9.1.4 Create the Implementation Project Work Plan 190
9.1.5 Plan to Prevent or Mitigate Implementation Risks 193
9.1.6 Just Do It! or Fake It Until You Make It 195
9.1.7 Measure-and-Control Implementation 197
9.1.8 What if Implementation Progress Stalls? 198
9.2 Organization Change Theory 198
9.2.1 Seven S Model 199
9.2.2 3–4–3 200
9.2.3 Appreciation for a System 202
9.2.4 Resistance to Change 203
9.2.5 Paradigm Lock 204
9.3 Goldratt’s Resistance Model 205
9.4 To Pilot or Not to Pilot? 206
9.5 Example Objections 207
9.6 Key Points 208
References 208
CHAPTER 10
Project-Risk Management 209
10.1 Defining Project-Risk Management 210
10.2 Risk-Management Process 210
10.2.1 The Risk Matrix 211
10.2.2 Incorporating Risk Assessment into the Project Process 213
10.3 Identifying Risks 214
10.3.1 Risk List 214
10.3.2 Classifying Risk Probability 215
10.3.3 Classifying Risk Impact 217
10.4 Planning to Control Risks 217
10.4.1 Risk Monitoring 217
10.4.2 Prevention 217
10.4.3 Mitigation Planning 217
10.5 Key Points 218
Contents ix

References 218
CHAPTER 11
The Theory of Constraints Thinking Process Applied to
Project Management 219
11.1 Synthesizing the Principles 219
11.2 Applying Goldratt’s Thinking Process to Project Management 220
11.3 Current Reality Tree 222
11.3.1 Policies, Measures, and Behavior 225
11.3.2 Feedback Loops 225
11.3.3 Scrutiny 226
11.3.4 Buy-in 227
11.4 Future Reality Tree 227
11.4.1 Desired Effects 227
11.4.2 Injections 227
11.4.3 The FRT as a Guide for Change 229
11.4.4 Feedback Loops 230
11.4.5 Unintended Consequences (a.k.a. Negative Branches) 230
11.5 Prerequisite Tree 233
11.6 Transition Tree 233
11.7 The Multiproject Process 235
11.7.1 Multiproject CRT Additions 235
11.7.2 Multiproject FRT Additions 236
11.7.3 Multiproject PRT Additions 236
11.8 Future Directions 237
11.9 Summary 238
11.10 Conclusion 239
11.9 References 239
Glossary 241
List of Acronyms 251
About the Author 253
Index 255
x Contents

Preface
When critical chain was first introduced, I was fortunate to be able to see instantly
how it constructively added to the Project Management Body of Knowledge
(PMBOK™), and worked to define Critical Chain Project Management (CCPM) as
the marriage of these two knowledge areas. There was not much overlap between
people familiar with the Theory of Constraints (TOC) and people in the formal
project management community, in part because TOC started in the domain of
production.
When the formal project management community first became aware of CCPM
(in part due to my 1998 presentation to a PMI annual meeting in Long Beach, CA),
they seemed to take one of two views. The majority was excited about a new
approach, eager to learn it, and willing to apply it. A small but vocal minority put
forth a resistance movement, generally voicing the view that “It’s nothing new.”
Many letters crossed path in the PMI’s publications PM Network and PM Journal,
and several articles (including my own) helped define some key issues. I was eager
for constructive critical thinking, but am unimpressed by arguments such as “it has
been done before.” Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed in the Project Management
Institute (PMI). PMI agreed to sell my book in the bookstore, and sponsored my
2-day seminar, which played to full houses and received high praise from the
attendees.
Now, several of the world’s largest companies and major government organiza-
tions have proven the unprecedented project results achievable with CCPM. Letters
to the editor of the PM Network have dwindled away, and the 2004 edition of the
PMBOK™ Guide due out in a month promises to formally include critical chain as a
scheduling method. Most of the new project management books contain critical
chain, and I have been invited to contribute chapters to a few. PM Journal articles
continue, but now present some real critical thinking that helps the process of con-
tinuous improvement. Although some old school project managers still confuse
buffers with float, seemingly failing to appreciate the probabilistic thinking underly-
ing CCPM, critical chain seems to have crossed the chasm into the mainline of
project management.
Despite thousands of successful CCPM projects in a wide variety of project
types and industries, CCPM has yet to become the standard in industry. It still quali-
fies as a new technology introduction. My consulting practice over the last decade
has revealed a surprising lack of understanding basic project management in many
companies. For some of those companies, CCPM has been the key to unlocking the
entire world of professional project management. Others, already well versed in
xi

conventional project management, have moved to reap the rewards of CCPM. But,
CCPM is still in the early adoption stage of a new technology.
I invite you to consider CCPM as step towards improving your quality of life,
and that of all of your project stakeholders. I invite you to partake of the benefits
CCPM offers, including more predictable project success, shorter project duration,
greatly improved organizational project throughput, and, most importantly,
reduced stress and increased success for all. As you do so, I ask you to share your
experiences with others so they can partake of the benefits, and help all develop even
better ways to enhance project success.
xii Preface

Acknowledgments
Most of all I extend my appreciation to the early adopters of CCPM, who often
went against conventional wisdom and their own organizational culture to create
remarkable results. Although their organizations achieved great benefits, in many
cases it required a major struggle to make to make the transition.
The credit and my appreciation for inventing the Theory of Constraints (TOC)
and single-project critical chain goes to Dr. Eliyahu Goldratt. My gratitude also
extends to Dee Jacob of the Avraham Goldratt Institute for introducing me to it in
the mid-1990s. I am also thankful to Tony Rizzo for recognizing the multiple proj-
ect approach, and for inviting me to work with him on some of the early implemen-
tations of CCPM.
xiii

C H A P T E R 1
Begin in the Beginning
Projects fail at an alarming rate. Quantitative evaluations show that as many as
30% of projects are canceled before completion, wasting all the time, money, and
effort spent on them. Surviving projects often fail to deliver the full initial project
scope, or they deliver late and/or overrun the budget. Project delays and overruns
frequently run to hundreds of percentage points. These failures consume billions of
dollars per year. They occur in all cultures and for all kinds of projects. Attempts
to improve project performance create personal and organizational pain and
paperwork, with little positive, or even with negative, impact on project perform-
ance. The field of project management has not kept pace with improvements in
other areas of human endeavor, such as technology and manufacturing. This
book seeks to put you and your organization on a path to radically improve
project success.
The first three chapters provide the background for Critical-Chain Project
Management (CCPM), so if you are anxious to understand what it will do different
for a single project, you can jump to Chapter 4. If you are even more anxious to
start a single project, you can start with Chapter 6 on developing a single-project
plan. Chapter 7 will guide you in planning multiple projects that share common
resources.
This chapter provides the context for CCPM, starting by defining the problem
and showing some data to assert that CCPM is proving to be an effective solution
in a wide range of project types and industries. The main point of this chapter
is to convince you that just working harder to execute conventional project
management is not likely to give you the results you want, and to prepare you for
Chapter 2, which develops a firm basis for change in solution direction offered by
CCPM.
The Project Management Institute’s (PMI) Guide to the Project Management
Body of Knowledge [1] (PMBOK™ Guide) defines a project as “a temporary
endeavor undertaken to create a unique product or service.” The word “tempo-
rary” distinguishes projects from production-like endeavors. “Unique” means that
projects are all different from one another. Project success means giving the project
customers what they want, when they want it, for a price they have agreed to, and
having a project team that is happy about creating that success.
Chapters 1 through 3 refer to the existing project system. Although change is
underway, most of the existing project-management literature still primarily
describes the Critical-Path Method (CPM) to define a project schedule. The
PMBOK™ Guide alludes to other methods, and the 2004 edition promises to
include critical chain, but CPM is the method used most, by a wide margin. Most
1

commercial software claims to implement CPM. The PMBOK™ Guide describes
methods to deal with uncertainty in projects through consideration of project risk.
It also describes the earned-value method of project measurement and control.
Many large projects use project-risk management and earned value, especially on
projects performed for the U.S. government. Although it is not a specific point of
guidance, most software and all of the applications we have seen apply CPM using
early-start schedules. This means that the software schedules activities as far to the
left (or as early as) possible. Figure 1.1 illustrates a typical project plan using
this method.
People sometimes also distinguish projects from production operations by the
quantity of the products produced and the relative amount of time on task. Projects
usually produce a one-of-a-kind result. Production operations produce many items,
all more or less similar. There is a gray area between custom-made production
operations (e.g., built-to-order automobiles) and projects. I have found that many
people consider production operations and projects as distinctly different. In the
mid-1990s, I first learned of a system theory called the Theory of Constraints
(TOC), first described by its inventor, Dr. Eliyahu Goldratt, in his book The Goal
[2]. I recommended this book to other program and project managers, only to find
that they could not see any relevance of the book or the theory to projects.
Subsequently, I discovered a method to break the paradigm. I draw Figure 1.2, and
ask people, “Which is this, a project or a production operation?” The reaction
is quite interesting. Most people look puzzled at first. They do not respond
immediately. Then, someone finally offers up, “Well, it could be either.” Others
then promptly agree. Indeed, it could be either. At this level, the similarity is more
striking than the differences. The primary similarity we are going to explore in this
book is the connection of dependent process steps with variation in the time it takes
to convert the input to the output of each step.
The actual time on task, or touch time, in production operations is usually a very
small part of the delivery time. Many people claim that the actual time on task deter-
mines the overall time of the project and, therefore, approaches 100% of the project
delivery time. Critical-chain questions this assertion.
1.1 Project Success
Successful projects meet the needs of everyone who has an interest in the project: the
stakeholders. All projects have a goal. Figure 1.3 illustrates that satisfying the goal
normally requires satisfying three necessary conditions. The scope sets a minimum
standard for the project results. Necessary cost and schedule conditions usually set
maximums. Figure 1.3 also illustrates resources in the center, with a relationship to
all three necessary technical conditions. Project resources influence all three neces-
sary conditions for success.
The three necessary conditions are interdependent. The longer a project takes,
the more is costs. The more a project costs, the longer it takes. The longer a project
takes, the more opportunities exist to change the scope. The more changes to the
scope, the more costs and schedule increase. Subsequent definition of the project sys-
tem explores these relationships in detail.
2 Begin in the Beginning

1.1 Project Success 3
Task
Name
23
22
21
20
19
18
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14
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11
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8
7
6
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3
2
ID
Plan
Permit
Site
Prep
Hole
Landscape
Drive
&
Walks
Foundation
Frame
Roof
Sheath
Trim
Plumbing
Electrical
Cabinents
Drywall
Paint
Trim
Complete
Duration
Start
Finish
5
days
Mon
6/2/97
Fri
6/6/97
5
days
Mon
6/9/97
Fri
6/13/97
10
days
Mo
n
6/16/97
Fri
6/27/97
10
days
Mon
6/30/97
Fri
7/11/97
15
days
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Fri
9/5/97
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days
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days
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days
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days
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days
Mon
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days
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days
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days
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days
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days
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8/3
8/10
8/17
8/24
8/31
9/7
9/14
May
June
July
August
September
Figure
1.1
A
typical
CPM
project
plan
identifies
the
critical
path
and
activity
early
and
late
start
and
finish
dates.
Most
of
the
time,
project
plans
default
to
an
early-start
schedule.

1.2 Defining the Problem
Most scientists agree that precise definition of a problem is the most important step
to a successful solution. Karl Popper [3], my favorite philosopher, notes, “science
begins with problems, and proceeds from there to competing theories which it evalu-
ates critically.” This text deals with the general problem of improving project suc-
cess. Following Popper, I invite you to evaluate critically what I have termed the
present system, or any system you presently use, as compared to CCPM. As you will
see, the problem definition “improve project success” is a bit too broad to guide
developing a systematic, effective solution.
1.2.1 How Good Is the Current Project System?
Ask yourself the following questions:
1. How often do you hear of projects taking longer than scheduled?
2. How often do you hear of projects completed much more quickly than
originally scheduled, without a lot of expediting and pressure on the project
team?
3. How often do you hear of projects going over budget?
Figure 1.2 Is this a project or a production process?
Schedule
Resources
S
c
o
p
e
C
o
s
t
Figure 1.3 Satisfying the project goal requires three necessary conditions.

4. How many projects do you know of that were completed for significantly
less than the original proposed budget?
5. Have you ever heard of projects having to redefine their scope or
specifications along the way because they cannot meet the original ones?
6. Are the customers usually delighted with these changes in scope?
1.2.1.1 Types of Projects
Table 1.1 illustrates four types of projects. The horizontal axis categorizes projects
by absolute deadline versus as soon as possible (ASAP). The vertical axis separates
internal projects, generally focused on improving operations, and external projects,
generally performed for profit. The answers to the above questions depend on proj-
ect type. Table 1.1 also lists some examples.
Type I projects are absolute-deadline-driven projects for an external cus-
tomer.Examples include proposals and major events. Requestors simply do not
accept proposals after the specified delivery time. Therefore, proposal teams rarely
deliver proposals late. Management usually responds surely and quickly to reward
proposal managers who spend the time and money on a proposal and deliver it late.
Sometimes, they provide the proposal manager an opportunity to seek employment
elsewhere. Likewise, although there may be much adjusting of scope and expedit-
ing, other deadline-driven projects usually happen on time. They do not delay the
Olympics; they finish the stadium (somehow). People seldom fail to have things
ready for a national meeting or prebooked trip. People rarely bow out of elections
because their campaign is behind schedule. In these types of projects, usually the
money and scope changes, while holding the schedule.
Type II projects do not have specific externally driven end dates (although man-
agement may set one internally.) Many projects performed to make money (e.g.,
new product launch or the construction of a hotel) and most government projects
fall into this category. You do not lose all of the benefits because of project delay.
You just lose the benefits for some time. (This loss is usually understated or
unknown.) In the case of projects that are not end-date driven, all three of the proj-
ect variables (scope, schedule, time) may change.
Type III and IV projects often compete with each other for funding within a
company. Type III projects frequently get higher placement on project priority lists
because whatever drives the date often has a penalty associated with overrunning it.
Finally, type IV project are the ones that often determine the future of the company.
Companies perform type IV projects to improve the company in the future. There-
fore, they are always better done sooner. Unfortunately, they often rank lowest in
project priority lists, getting starved for resources, and extend on and on.
Regardless of the position of a project in your priority list, I assert “any project
worth doing is worth doing fast,”The reason is that project benefits don’t start until
Table 1.1 Four Major Types of Projects Determine How You Should Plan
Absolute Deadline ASAP
External customer Type I:
Proposal, event, contract with penalties
Type II:
Construction
Internal customer Type III:
Y2K, regulatory
Type IV:
Product development, process improvement

a project completes, while investment starts at the beginning of a project. Therefore
you always increase return on investment by finishing as soon as possible once you
start a project.
1.2.1.2 Anecdotal Data
Project management has a long history, reflected in the man-made wonders of the
world. However, did they do it on schedule? Did they do it to an approved budget?
Did they comply with all specifications and regulations? More and more in recent
years, the answers to these questions are no. Most people are aware of major proj-
ects that have suffered from the problem; examples include the Denver, Colorado,
airport or the Chunnel, connecting England and France, the International Space Sta-
tion [6], and the Boston Big Dig. Besides being late and overbudget, they also experi-
enced scope problems. The Denver airport baggage system did not work for a long
time after the airport opened. The Chunnel had an opening ceremony but could not
transport passengers. In 2004 the space station is still mostly sitting on the ground.
Many are also aware of the “vaporware” problem in the software industry: almost
all software releases later than predicted, full of bugs, and sans many promised fea-
tures. Microsoft has raised this to a fine art form.
A newspaper article summarized the saga of the Denver airport. It was over two
years late. The cost rose from $3 billion to over $4.2 billion. The scope was not com-
plete when it opened. The newspaper wrote the report to give the good news that the
airport made a $28 million profit in 1996. Let us see, $28 million on a $4.2 billion
investment works out to a return on investment of 0.6% per year. How many inves-
tors would put their money in a project like that? Bond investors filed a lawsuit.
Table 1.2 is found throughout the project-management world and is now dis-
tributed worldwide across the Internet. It is only one example of many with similar
themes, attesting to the fact that projects often fail to achieve success. It is instructive
to note that these effects appear to transcend all cultures and national boundaries.
Many project-management books include a section why projects fail and offer reme-
dies to the various causes.
1.2.1.3 Quantitative Data
The government is most willing to compile and publish results of quantitative
reviews of project performance. Usually, they do not bother to publish good news on
contractors, so the published information may be biased. Here are just two quantita-
tive examples:
GAO [4], following a review of major systems acquisitions (Projects over $75 mil-
lion) by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) reports:
(1) from 1980 through 1996, DOE conducted 80 projects that it designated as major
system acquisitions;
(2) 31 of those projects were terminated prior to completion, after expenditures of
over $10 billion;
(3) only 15 of the projects were completed, and most of them were finished behind
schedule and with cost overruns;
(4) further, 3 of the 15 projects have not yet been used for their intended purpose;

(5) the remaining 34 projects are ongoing, many with substantial cost increases and
schedule slippage.
Recent updates note, despite sincere efforts to improve project performance [5]. In
September 2002, we reported that, based on a comparison of 25 major DOE proj-
ects in 1996 with 16 major projects in 2001, it did not appear that DOE’s contrac-
tors had significantly improved their performance over the period. In both sets of
Table 1.2 The Immutable Laws of Project Management
LAW 1: No major project ever completes on time, within budget, with the same staff that started it, and
the project does not do what it is supposed to do. It is highly unlikely that yours will be the first.
Corollary 1: The benefits will be smaller than initially estimated, if they made estimates at all.
Corollary 2: The system finally installed will be late, and will not do what it is supposed to do.
Corollary 3: It will cost more but will be technically successful.
LAW 2: One advantage of fuzzy project objectives is that they let you avoid embarrassment in estimating
the corresponding costs.
LAW 3: The effort required correcting a project that is off course increases geometrically with time.
Corollary 1: The longer you wait the harder it gets.
Corollary 2: If you wait until the project is completed, it is too late.
Corollary 3: Do it now regardless of the embarrassment.
LAW 4: Everyone else understands the project purpose statement you wrote differently.
Corollary 1: If you explain the purpose so clearly that no one could possibly misunderstand, someone
will.
Corollary 2: If you do something that you are sure will meet everyone's approval, someone will not
like it.
LAW 5: Measurable benefits are real. Intangible benefits are not measurable, thus intangible benefits are
not real.
Corollary 1: Intangible benefits are real if you can prove that they are real.
LAW 6: Anyone who can work effectively on a project part-time certainly does not have enough to do
now.
Corollary 1: If a boss will not give a worker a full-time job, you shouldn't either.
Corollary 2: If the project participant has a time conflict, the work given by the full-time boss will not
suffer.
LAW 7: The greater the project's technical complexity, the less you need a technician to manage it.
Corollary 1: Get the best manager you can. The manager will get the technicians.
Corollary 2: The reverse of corollary 1 is almost never true.
LAW 8: A carelessly planned project will take three times longer to complete than expected. A carefully
planned project will only take twice as long.
Corollary 1: If nothing can possibly go wrong, it will anyway.
LAW 9: When the project is going well, something will go wrong.
Corollary 1: When things cannot get any worse, they will.
Corollary 2: When things appear to be going better, you have overlooked something.
LAW 10:Project teams detest weekly progress reporting because it so vividly manifests their lack of prog-
ress.
LAW 11: Projects progress rapidly until they are 90 percent complete. Then they remain 90 percent com-
plete forever.
LAW 12: If project content is allowed to change freely, the rate of change will exceed the rate of progress.
LAW 13: If the user does not believe in the system, a parallel system will be developed. Neither system
will work very well.
LAW 14: Benefits achieved are a function of the thoroughness of the post-audit check.
Corollary 1: The prospect of an independent post-audit provides the project team with a powerful
incentive to deliver a good system on schedule within budget.
LAW 15: No law is immutable.

projects, over half had both schedule delays and cost increases. And the proportion
of projects with significant cost increases and schedule delays was actually higher in
2001 than in 1996. For example, 38 percent of the projects we reviewed in 2001 had
doubled their initial cost estimates, compared with 28 percent in 1996.
In another report evaluating management of a recent version of the space station
by NASA, GAO [5] noted that
(1) in its June 1997 testimony, GAO noted that the cost and schedule performance
under the prime contract had been consistently worsening for some time;
(2) GAO pointed out that between January 1995 and April 1997, the costs associ-
ated with the schedule slippage had increased from a value of $43 million to $129
million;
(3) during that same period, the variance between the actual cost to complete spe-
cific work and the budget for that work had gone from a cost underrun of $27 mil-
lion to a cost overrun of $291 million;
(4) as of July 1997, the costs associated with the schedule slippage had increased fur-
ther to $135 million and the cost overrun had increased to $355 million;
(5) the rate of decline for the cost variance is especially worrisome because it has
shown no particular inclination to lessen;
Your tax dollars at work! Consider the fact that these are two different govern-
ment agencies with very different projects and very different constraints. Yet, per-
formance on both is equally miserable.
The Department of Defense (DOD) shows similar tales of woe. James P. Lewis
[7] reports on the cancellation of the A-12 Avenger Program in 1991, causing the
loss of 9,000 jobs and entailing a lawsuit by the government for $1.35 billion in con-
tractor overpayments. Lewis notes, “It has been acknowledged by reliable DOD
sources that the C/SCSC [cost/schedule control system criteria] management systems
were implemented properly, and were functioning well at both the principal con-
tractors.” (Note: some would argue that the C/SCSC is the most sophisticated
project-management system currently available.)
One (now somewhat dated) study from Australia [8] found that construction
projects completed only one eighth of building contracts within the scheduled com-
pletion date, and that the average overrun exceeded 40%. Daniel Chun and Mohan
Kummaraswamy [9] reported this in a recent study of the causes of time overruns in
Hong Kong construction projects. The same study noted, “Delays in construction
projects are still very common in most parts of the world, even with the introduction
of advanced construction technologies and more effective management techniques.”
Software projects seem particularly prone to failure. The most recent quantita-
tive study [10] shows significant progress since 1994:
Project success rates have increased to just over a third or 34% of all projects. This is
a 100% plus improvement over the 16% rate in 1994. Project failures have declined
to 15% of all projects, which is less than half the 31% in 1994. Challenged projects
account for the remaining 51%.
Project success of one third remains a long way from my standard for success.
How about yours?

The only common thread is the project system! They all use the present theory
of the CPM. (They may not all use it the same way, and they may not all use it well,
but nearly all at least claim to use it.)
There are several precursor conditions that you should satisfy before starting
any project. You can make improving project management a project. The same nec-
essary conditions apply. You need to do the following:
• Be sure you are working on the correct problem (right problem).
• Assure that the overall objective of the project, when achieved, solves the cor-
rect problem with an implementable solution (right solution).
• Develop a scope and design that delivers the solution.
• Execute the project to deliver the designed scope, achieving the objective
within the planned time and budget (right implementation).
The last point reiterates the three necessary conditions for any project.
1.2.2 But Some Companies Make a Lot of Money Running Projects
Despite the gloom-and-doom reports above, many companies prosper in the busi-
ness of running projects. What do these companies do that the losers aren’t doing?
Much of the project literature would lead you to believe that they are the precious
few who follow the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK™) in the
most detail and that all you have to do to join the successful is more of what you are
doing, and do it faster.
Successful project-management companies have put in place systems that allow
them to win in their environment. This environment generally includes competitors
using a similar system. A competitive system does not require you to be great or even
good. It does not require that your theories be right. To do well, you just have to be
a little bit better than your competitors are. Often you can maintain this improve-
ment through operational excellence, even with a system that has fundamental
weaknesses. However, overcoming the fundamental system weakness provides the
opportunity to steal the market if the improvement is not easily, or at least rapidly,
matched by the competitors.
The present project systems must also allow some of the people in the company
to win, as they need people experienced in their system to make it work. I rarely hear
about the potential impact on the rest of the people in the company or of how their
suppliers get along. The model we develop of present performance predicts signifi-
cant expediting, exploiting, and stress among the project participants.
One feature seems common to the project systems of successful project compa-
nies. The PMBOK™ Guide considers it. Authors sometimes mention the lack of it
among the reasons projects fail, but perhaps not often enough. The answer is every
company that succeeds in the project-management business uses an effective
change-control process. This process allows them to account for changes that hap-
pen to the project along the way and to recoup any financial impact from such
changes. Many of the students that attend the project-management classes I teach
complain about “scope creep.” I tell them my projects never experience scope creep
and that I consider scope creep to be a self-inflicted wound for a project manager.
Successful project managers always control scope. Scope control is a primary job

function for a project manager. I tell the (sometimes wide-eyed) students that I love
proposed changes. But, I control them; assuring the requestor I will implement
them immediately after they are approved by the project customer (even if it is the
customer that is “directing” a change). I then solicit that approval after rigorously
estimating the scope, cost, schedule, and risk impact of each change, including the
impact of cumulative small changes. It is amazing how the frequency of scope
change requests reduces when you are serious about this.
An effective change process is one way to handle variation while applying the
present system. Subsequent chapters reveal why it is not the best way to handle some
project-performance variation. An effective change-control process is a necessary
part of an effective project system. The critical-chain method requires effective
change control, but dramatically reduces the number of changes.
1.2.3 Problem Cause, or Better Defining the Problem
Defining the problem at a high level is easy. Project managers must meet customer
needs on time, at or under budget, all of the time. Evidence presented above demon-
strates that the present theory does not produce this desired result. The problem is to
invent a better theory that does produce the desired effect (DE).
The Avraham Y. Goldratt Institute asks project-management students why it is
so difficult to meet the three necessary conditions for a successful project? The usual
answers include things like
• Unforeseeable bad weather;
• Unforeseeable difficulties at vendors who supply equipment;
• Longer-than-expected time in meeting government requirements;
• Unrealistic schedule;
• Unreliable (but cheaper) vendors or contractors;
• Difficulties in matching operators available with project needs;
• Unforeseen emergencies.
And so on. The lists usually have two things in common: whatever causes the
problem is outside the control of the project manager, and the cause is some type of
unexpected event.
Many project-management texts include lists of the reasons projects fail. One
remarkable aspect of these lists is that they list different things. Some of the lists
compare the reasons for project failure viewed by different people (e.g., viewed by
the project manager and upper management). These lists disagree on the importance
of various causes. A second remarkable aspect of these lists is that none of them sus-
pects the project system. Two assumptions underlie many of the evaluations leading
to these lists:
1. Project work is deterministic. The evaluations address reality as if it is
possible to get “accurate” or “precise” single-point estimates. Therefore,
they assume variation in the result must be caused by failure to define or
operate effectively.

2. The present project-management system is effective. This assumption leads
to solutions that identify the particular part of the existing system that did
not function well, causing a particular failure. None of these studies
questions the effectiveness of the assumed system (which is often poorly
defined in the studies themselves). None of these studies questions the
assumptions underlying the assumed effective system.
One way to begin to understand project success or failure better is to look at the
system and understand some of the assumptions that underlie it. Following Aldo
Leopold [11] (who was working in an entirely different problem domain), we can
identify factors and influences that affect the success of projects. Factors are things
that more-or-less directly affect project success in terms of the three necessary con-
ditions. Success factors include
1. Selection of the right problem;
2. Selection of the right solution;
3. Creation of a satisfactory plan;
4. Use of an effective project-control system;
5. Effective project execution;
6. Use of an effective method to manage uncertainty.
Further expansion of item 4, an effective project-control system identifies:
4.1 Resource quantity;
4.2 Resource skill;
4.3 Resource behavior;
4.4 The project-management process;
4.5 Project execution tools;
4.6 Project changes.
While this list of factors is certainly not complete, it captures many of the items
addressed in project-failure studies.
In addition to the factors that seem to directly influence project success, you can
also identify items that influence these factors. Project-success influences internal to
the project team may include
1. Management;
2. Measurement;
3. Rewards;
4. Policies;
5. Social norms;
6. Variation in the processes that produce project results.
Influences external to the project team may include
1. Competitors;
2. Suppliers;

3. Client;
4. Regulators;
5. The physical environment;
6. Other stakeholders (e.g., the public).
Influences may affect one or more of the factors that more directly affect project
success. Table 1.3 illustrates the relationship between the influences and the factors,
as well as the author’s indication of the stronger influences.
Note that the factors are not independent of each other. Likewise, the influences
are not necessarily independent of each other. Thus, there are relationships between
all of the variables. The project performance system is a complex system indeed.
This, combined with the sheer number of factors and influences, may explain why
people attribute project failures to such a wide range of causes.
System theory, described in Chapter 2, clarifies that influences (i.e., relation-
ships between the factors) can be more important than the factors themselves when
we seek to improve a system. Reasons for this include the fact that the influences
may affect many factors and that the influences may be more subject to direct inter-
vention (change) than the factors. This is certainly true for management-controlled
influences, such as the measurement and reward systems, and the policies of the
company.
Table 1.3 Factors and Influences Affecting Project Success
Influences on Project Success Factors
Internal External
Management Measurement Rewards Policies Social Competitors Suppliers Client Regulators
Factors
That
Determine
Project
Success
Right
Problem
X X X O
Right
Problem
X X X
Effective
Plan
X X X O O
Project
Control
System
X X X X O O
Project
Execution
Resource
quantity
X X O O
Resource
skill
X X X X X O
Resource
behavior
X O O
Work
processes
X O
Changes X X O
Uncertainty X O X O X
X Significant influence
O Some influence

The problem statement that Goldratt proposed in order to develop the critical-
chain method blamed poor project performance on the system. He asked, “What is
it about the current system that causes so many projects to fail?” He had a good hint
from his previous work with production systems and theorized that the project sys-
tems failed to manage uncertainty effectively.
1.2.4 Right Solution
People have posed many solutions to improve project management over the last
forty years. They attempt to better meet customer needs on time, at or under budget.
Solutions generally tend to provide more and more detail in the planning, measure-
ment, and control of the project. Improved availability of PC-based project-
management systems leads to defining more tasks on projects. The software helps to
automatically create a project network, define a critical path, allocate resources,
and measure project performance at any level of detail.
Goldratt begins Critical Chain [12] with a discussion of a company wanting to
reduce the time on critical development projects. They had an extensive analysis
performed by expert consultants, who looked at their project-management system
and recommended many changes. In discussing the amount of time saved by making
all of these changes, they conclude that they would save “Maybe five percent.
Maybe not even that.”
1.2.4.1 Do More Better
Earned-value and derivative cost-/schedule-control systems (CSCS, or CS
2
) [13] fre-
quently increase the detail of project plans and measures. The procedures that com-
panies put in place for people to use these systems often are many hundreds of pages
long. The number of activities in project schedules reach the tens of thousands. They
sometimes force activity durations to short times, such as “no more than two
weeks.”
The author worked with one government agency that followed the process of
requiring increasingly detailed planning over a period of twenty years. Each time
they had a project problem, they blamed some people, investigated the cause of the
problem, and put in more procedures. The minimum time to do a project crept up to
almost seven years, not including the time to do the project! That is, they built in
seven years of planning time before the start of any project. There were engineering
studies and conceptual design reports and independent cost estimates and validated
cost schedule control systems. Yet, the cost and schedule of projects continued to
rise, and more and more projects failed to meet technical requirements. In one case,
they canceled a project after spending over a billion dollars on it. Other projects are
tens of years late.
One study showed that it cost them four times as much per square foot as local
construction by nongovernment purchasers to build a simple office building. Pro-
jects were having larger and larger crises, where they would “rebaseline,” yielding
new cost and schedule estimates several times (usually three or more times) larger
than the original estimates. They cancelled larger and larger projects because the
need was gone before the project was over or because the newly projected cost and
schedule estimates changed the cost-benefit equation to where the project no longer

made sense. This is the problem they were trying to solve in the first place. Is the
world changing that much? On the other hand, could it be that our solutions are
actually making things worse, not better?
Let’s review the logic of the “do more better” approach. If your objective is to
reliably complete projects to scope, schedule, and cost, you must define those
requirements accurately. To define requirements accurately, you must add detail to
your project plans, because previous projects failed to deliver at the present level
of detail. This logic seems to make sense and is in line with literature that
attributes project failure to inadequate requirements or insufficient detail in the
project plan.
The “do more better” approach frequently leads to project plans with tens of
thousands of activities. We recently worked with a client who was rather proud of
the fact that his project plan contained over 30,000 activities.
Later on, I will go into the factors that will help you determine the size of activi-
ties you should have in your project. In some cases, this may lead to thousands of
activities for very large projects. But, to put it in perspective, consider a much more
modest project plan containing a mere 100 activities. The average size of an activity
(measured in dollars, or person-days, or even in task-days) is, by simple math, 1%
of the total project (by comparable measure.) Most project managers would be very
happy to have their project come in within 1% of plan. The problem with project
success must involve something that causes variations of far more than 1%. There-
fore, it seems to me that simply increasing plan detail beyond 100 activities is not
going to improve project success. Something else must be at work.
Sometimes people defend the more-detail method by suggesting that the prob-
lem, even though it is much bigger than 1%, is that they have missed something in
their plan. You are not likely to find the missing 20% inside the 1% chunks of the
project. Looking inside the 1% for the big hitters reminds me of the story about the
drunk who lost his car keys around the corner but is looking for them under the
street light because he can’t see anything over there in the dark. If you are worried
about missing big chunks, you are far better examining the spaces between the 100
activities that you have, rather than breaking the defined activities into greater and
greater detail.
Some of the literature that poses causes and solutions to project problems also
offers anecdotal evidence that a given solution worked to improve project success in
one or more subsequent projects. While this evidence is interesting, it does little to
prove that the writers have really solved the cause of lack of success in project sys-
tems. Reasons for this include the following:
1. Theory of knowledge: One or more successful cases do not prove a theory
(discussed in Chapter 2).
2. Environment: Their environment may have had very poor practices to begin
with and been one in which any degree of discipline is likely to cause an
improvement.
3. Regression to the mean: A particularly bad performance is likely to be
followed by a better performance.
4. The Hawthorne effect: This is a psychological effect whereby workers
singled out to try out new methods respond positively to any change,

including changing back to the conditions that existed before the
experiment.
In other words, the posed theories have not been subject to effective critical
thinking and experimental tests.
1.2.4.2 Variation and Uncertainty
Everyone knows that project tasks have a certain amount of inherent variation and
frequently uncertainty about the amount of that variation. The very definition of a
project says you have not done this task before; it is unique. At least, you have not
performed all of the tasks the same way you will in this particular project. In order
to complete the project successfully, you must account for this variation and uncer-
tainty. People’s ability to estimate accurately depends on a number of factors. There
is substantial evidence to indicate that people tend toward overconfidence in their
belief in the accuracy of their estimates [14]. It is unlikely that most project tasks can
be estimated more accurately than ±20%.
We have people estimate a very simple task as part of our training classes.
Nearly all of the participants in the exercise agree that the task is much simpler
than most of their project tasks. They also agree that the ability of the other people
in the room to estimate this task should be as good as, or better than, the ability of
their project estimators to estimate project estimates. The range of the estimates
usually is several hundred percent of the mean. The standard deviation is usually
on the order of 30% of the mean. Figure 1.4 illustrates combined results from sev-
eral of these exercises.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the expected general behavior of the accuracy of a single
task estimate as a function of the amount of effort put into creating the estimate.
The accuracy scale presents the accuracy as a percentage of the mean estimate, so a
perfectly accurate estimate has an uncertainty of zero. An estimate with no effort at
Activity duration estimates
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
20 40 60 80 100 120
Minutes
Low risk
Average
Number
Figure 1.4 Estimate uncertainty for a very simple project task illustrates the typical range of real
uncertainty.

all should have an accuracy of at least 100% on the down side and could be orders of
magnitude (hundreds of percentage points) too low. The curve illustrates that the
accuracy should generally improve as more effort is put toward the estimate. A
lower limit usually limits improvement due to the inherent variation in the process
that will produce the task result. This lower limit, described further in Chapter 2, is
called common-cause variation. No matter how much more effort you put into the
estimate, you can never do better than the common-cause variation of the process
that produces the result of the task. You can only reduce common-cause variation by
changing the task process.
Consider two regions of Figure 1.5, divided by the vertical dotted line. To the
right of the line, adding more effort to the estimate does not significantly improve
the accuracy of the estimate. If you are far to the right of the line, reducing the effort
should not have much impact on uncertainty. Estimates to the left of the line show
increasing sensitivity to the amount of effort applied. Small reductions in the applied
effort will greatly increase the uncertainty of the estimate. Small increases in the
effort will significantly improve the estimate.
Assuming that the tasks you have identified in your project plan identify deliver-
ables (clean handoffs from one primary resource type to the next), the effect on over-
all plan uncertainty that will obtain from subdividing tasks to your project plan
depends on the region in which you are operating. With a fixed level of investment in
the estimate, if you are well to the right of the line, adding more tasks (which reduces
the effort per task) may increase the accuracy of the overall plan. The reason is that
the accuracy of the overall plan improves as the plan is divided into more equal-sized
pieces, if the accuracy of the individual pieces is the same.
If the amount of estimating effort you can afford puts you near, or to the left of,
the vertical line in Figure 1.5, adding more tasks to your plan can decrease the accu-
racy of the overall plan. The reason is that the increasing uncertainty in each task
estimate can be much greater than the statistical benefit of more individual tasks.
Estimate uncertainty
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.28
0.26
0.24
0.22
0.2 0.3
Estimate cost as a fraction of project cost
Figure 1.5 Estimated accuracy generally increases with the effort applied to the estimate, up to a
limit determined by the process involving the subject of the estimate.

Adding more tasks to a project plan increases the number of potential task con-
nections much faster than the number of tasks you add. For example, if you add 1
task to a plan with 100 tasks, you only add 1 task. You add the potential for 200
additional connections, however, as each task in the existing plan is a potential
predecessor and a potential successor to the task you just added. The additional
potential relationships greatly increase the probability of errors in the project-task
network as the number of tasks in the plan increases.
From the alleged causes of project failure posed so far, you might deduce that
uncertainty causes projects to fail. If this were the case, you should predict that all
projects with uncertainty will fail. Based on the definition of a project and our
understanding of the real world, all projects have uncertainty. Therefore, you might
predict that all projects would fail. Many do, but not all. Furthermore, there is evi-
dence that some projects succeed despite extreme uncertainty. Goldratt describes
one airplane project that defies this prediction in Critical Chain. The designers
developed an airplane with unprecedented capabilities in eight months instead of
the ten years such developments normally take. There are other cases. The United
States did succeed to meet President Kennedy’s objective to put a man on the moon
by the end of the decade. The moon project was one of the most uncertain projects
ever undertaken by man. Creation of the atomic bomb was a similarly uncertain
project completed in a remarkably short time.
There have been substantial efforts to reduce the uncertainty in project esti-
mates and the variation in performing project tasks. There are excellent tools for
estimating projects and project tasks that no doubt help improve the accuracy of
estimates and, more importantly, collect data to estimate the variation in project
tasks. There have been improvements in performing project tasks, using approaches
such as Six Sigma. Unfortunately, the project-failure data includes companies that
have applied such techniques to minimize variation. Collectively, they have not
made much difference.
A cornerstone of the scientific method is that scientists can never prove that any
scientific theory or law will continue to work in the future, but they can disprove a
theory with just one proper test. More than one instance proves that uncertainty
itself cannot be the cause of project failure.
If simple uncertainty does not meet the test of explaining project failure, can you
modify the theory to fit the known evidence? You know that some projects use dif-
ferent ways to manage uncertainty. For example, the Apollo project managed risk
by hiring three companies to produce three different solutions for high-risk develop-
ments. They chose one as the primary path, but had two backups in case the primary
path failed. They planned on much test and retest. (And they had plenty of spectacu-
lar failures along the way.) While this is an expensive way to manage uncertainty, it
worked. Goldratt used thinking like the above to pose the hypothesis that it is fail-
ure to effectively manage uncertainty that causes most project failures. Chapter 3
examines this hypothesis in depth. If he is right, the direction of the solution is to
create a different project system more able to manage uncertainty.
1.2.5 Right Execution
Right execution refers to execution of the solution to the problem. Improvement to
the project system is a project.

Goldratt noted in his pamphlet “My Saga to Improve Production” [15],
It took me some time to figure it out, but at last I couldn’t escape the simple explana-
tion: the efforts to install the software distracted the plant people from concentrat-
ing on the required changes—the changes in fundamental concepts, measurements
and procedures.
A similar phenomenon occurs in many efforts to improve the performance of the
project system, and I find I have to fight it almost every time a company chooses to
implement CCPM. Many people quickly focus on the software as the solution. Soft-
ware alone never is the solution, and if they focus on the software, they usually do
not get much benefit. In other cases, the usual solutions are along the line of doing
the present system better, which many people interpret as requiring more detail and
more documentation. This often involves installing new project or database soft-
ware. These solutions distract people further from performing the project. Such
efforts seldom seem to improve much. Of course, better implementation of a flawed
system is unlikely to improve much anyway. Chapter 10 provides an effective plan
to implement the CCPM system.
1.3 Success with Critical-Chain Project Management
Having defined the problem and substantiated the claim that the present theory is in
need of improvement, the next step requires creating a new theory (of the project
system): CCPM. Expectations for this theory are that it will, subject to critical
evaluation, demonstrate greatly enhanced and consistent success in achieving proj-
ect success. (We are looking for a 50% improvement, not 5%!) It should explain
both past success and failure and provide testable predictions of future performance.
Growing experience with the new theory shows benefits that far exceed the minimal
performance requirements for the new theory but that the theory can explain. These
benefits (compared to the present critical-path theory) are
• Improved project success:
• Projects complete on time all the time;
• Projects deliver full scope;
• Projects finish under budget;
• Projects result in improved market position and business growth.
• Reduced project duration:
• Projects complete in one half the time (or less) of previous similar projects;
• Individual project plans reduce by at least 25%;
• Multiple project durations reduce by larger amounts;
• There are reduced project changes;
• There are early returns for commercial projects;
• There are reduced payback periods for investment projects.
• Increased project team satisfaction:

• There is reduced confusion from multitasking;
• There is ability to focus on one task at a time;
• There are reduced changes;
• There is reduced rework;
• There is reduced pressure from multiple project managers;
• Win–lose task completion (date-driven task pressure) is eliminated;
• Individuals use the buffer report to decide their own task priorities;
• There is reduced insertion of new priority tasks;
• Project measurement is simplified;
• Plan status is quick and easy;
• Real-time project status is available, so there’s no need to wait for financial
reports;
• Status provides immediate focus by buffer, chain, and task;
• The buffer report defines decisions;
• Buffer reporting focuses decisions on management priorities (reflected in the
buffers by staggering project starts).
• Simplified project management:
• There is clear focus for project manager (critical chain, reduced early start);
• Simplified project plans reduce paperwork;
• Project status reporting is simplified;
• Measurement decides whether to plan or act;
• Measurement decides resource priorities.
• Increased project throughput with same resource:
• Resource-demand conflicts are reduced;
• More projects complete faster for the same level of resources;
• There is less need to hire new critical resources;
• There is less delay due to resources;
• Project cash flow is improved;
• Return on investment is improved.
Evidence of other users often gives people confidence to try new ideas. The pres-
ent CPM project paradigm has been in force for over forty years, making change
very hard for many people to accept. More and more companies, small and large,
are demonstrating success with CCPM. Several examples illustrate this success. (As
mentioned earlier, success examples do not prove a new theory. They only provide
confidence that it is not fatally flawed.)
1.4 Honeywell DAS [16]
The RNLAF team was asked by the customer to deliver something we originally
scheduled to take 13 months to deliver—and the team did it in six monthsKthe
1.4 Honeywell DAS 19

team is experimenting with a new way of scheduling the program using critical chain
concepts. Boeing has read the book, and is supporting the concept.
1.5 Lucent Technologies [17]
Lucent Technologies has adopted CCPM as their primary tool for project manage-
ment. (The author provided Lucent training and implementation assistance.)
In 1996, Lucent Technologies Advanced Technology Systems, now part of General
Dynamics, was told by a sister organization that the yearlong project being consid-
ered was an impossibilityKthe project was used as a pilot effort, to evaluate TOC
project management. The project was completed in June, 1997, with buffer to spare.
1.6 Israeli Aircraft Industry
The Israeli aircraft industry employs about 15,000 people. A major function is to
maintain jumbo jets used in passenger service. A particular type of maintenance,
called “type D,” normally takes 46 days in the industry. The penalty for nonper-
formance to schedule is very steep, $60,000 per day, because the airlines need the
planes back into scheduled service. The company had been paying up to $25 million
per year in penalties. A letter from the manager to Goldratt [18] notes, “[W]e suc-
ceeded to drop our average Turn Around Time per Aircraft Visit from three months
to two weeks and to increase our backlog from two months to one year.”
1.7 U.S. Navy Shipyards
The U.S. Navy has been implementing CCPM at a number of naval shipyards. One
of the greatest successes was with the 2001 maintenance of the U.S.S. Harry S. Tru-
man, one of the world’s largest ships. Adopting selected TOC and CCPM behaviors
alone (i.e., using existing legacy project software) enabled the project team to deliver
this very large project early and save over $20 million. Subsequent application at the
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard yielded a schedule performance increase of from 40%
to over 90% and a productivity increase of about 100% on more modest-sized proj-
ects performing maintenance on U.S. nuclear submarines. The U.S. Navy is in the
process of extending the use of CCPM to more and larger projects at the four public
shipyards and plans to extend the use to the private shipyards that support them.
1.8 Summary
This chapter has defined the problem that this book aims to resolve and identified
CCPM as the new theory (hypothesis) to resolve the problem. Key points are
• Project success rates using the existing critical-path paradigm, or CPM, is
improving but remains poor for all types of projects in all types of cultures.

• Hypothesized causes of project failure do not address potential causes outside
of the existing project system, most often leading to remedies that work
harder with the old system: the “do more better” approach. This does not
seem to address the right problem.
• Improvements using the “do more better” approach and efforts to reduce
variances in estimates or performance of individual project tasks show a low
return on investment (e.g., returns on the order of 5%), with large effort
invested.
• Growing evidence supports the assertion that the right problem is in the
design of the project system itself, specifically that the system fails to properly
manage the reality of uncertainty.
• The right solution requires a project system that has a much higher success
rate and that is simple to use.
• A growing body of evidence does not contradict the hypothesis that Goldratt’s
critical-chain method satisfies the necessary conditions for project success,
causing improvements on the order of 50% or more, with relatively small
investment.
Comparing the results of applying the critical-chain theory to the exist-
ing theory (i.e., the critical-path theory as described in the PMBOK™ Guide)
provides support for using the CCPM theory while we continue to review and
improve it.
References
[1] PMI, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, Upper Darby, PA: PMI,
2000.
[2] Goldratt, Eliyahu M., The Goal, Great Barrington, MA: North River Press, 1984.
[3] Popper, Karl R., Objective Knowledge, An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997, p. 144.
[4] GAO/T-RCED-97-92, “Department of Energy: Improving Management of Major System
Acquisitions,” Testimony, March 6, 1997.
[5] GAO-03-570T. Status of Contract and Project Management Reforms. Statement of Robin
M. Nazzaro, Director Natural Resources and Environment. March 20, 2003.
[6] GAO/T-NSIAD-97-262, “Space Station: Deteriorating Cost and Schedule Performance
under the Prime Contract,” Testimony, September 18, 1997.
[7] Lewis, James P., The Project Manager’s Desk Reference, Chicago: Irwin, 1995, p. 245.
[8] Bromilow, F. J., “Measurement of Scheduling of Construction Time and Cost Performance
in the Building Industry,“ The Chartered Builder, Vol. 10, 1974.
[9] Chun, Daniel W. M., and Mohan M. Kummaraswamy, “A Comparative Study of Causes of
Time Overruns in Hong Kong Construction Projects,” S)263-7863(96)0039-7, Interna-
tional Journal of Project Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, February 1997.
[10] Standish Group, “Latest Standish Group CHAOS Report Shows Project Success Rates
Have Improved by 50%,” available at http://www.standishgroup.com/press/arti-
cle.php?id=2 (accessed April 29, 2004).
[11] Leopold, Aldo, Game Management, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1933.
[12] Goldratt, Eliyahu M., Critical Chain, Great Barrington, MA: North River Press, 1997.
1.8 Summary 21

[13] Lambert, L. R. “Cost/Schedule Control Criteria (C/SCSC): An Integrated Project Manage-
ment Approach Using Earned Value Techniques,” The AMA Handbook of Project Manage-
ment, New York: AMACOM, 1993.
[14] Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Dlovic, and Amos Tvershky, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
[15] Goldratt, Eliyahu, “My Saga to Improve Production,” New Haven, CT: Avraham Y. Gol-
dratt Institute, 1994.
[16] Honeywell Defense Avionics Systems, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Horizons, Vol. 5, No. 2,
February 20, 1998.
[17] Rizzo, Anthony, “The TOC Solution of R&D and Multi-Projects Organizations,” Lucent
Technologies, Whippany, New Jersey, January 5, 1998.
[18] See http://www.Goldratt.com (Web site of the Avraham Goldratt Institute).

C H A P T E R 2
TOC, PMBOK™, Lean and Six Sigma
This book approaches the problem of improving project management from the per-
spective of synthesizing two domains of knowledge: the PMBOK™ [1] and the
TOC. We consider this synthesis with perspectives from two other knowledge areas:
Lean Manufacturing and Six Sigma. This chapter addresses each of these knowledge
areas in order and illustrates their relationship to the overall CCPM approach.
These knowledge areas provide different reality filters, or paradigms, to under-
stand the project system. Multiple perspectives enable deeper understanding of the
theory underlying CCPM, which I define as the synthesis of Dr. Eliyahu Goldratt’s
critical-chain approach to schedules and the rest of the PMBOK™. The underlying
theory enables you to deal with issues unique to your environment or project.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the multiple perspectives on the project system might
look at problems in project performance. The PMBOK™ perspective compares
actual project system performance to the PMBOK™ model, which it assumes to be
correct. Therefore, the PMBOK™ perspective is unlikely to blame elements of the
PMBOK™ project system as the cause of the problems. It is much more likely to
23
Project system
PMBOK Lean Six Sigma
TOC
System definition
Knowledge areas
Framework
Processes
System
Focusing steps
Thinking process
Value stream
- System
Psychology
Variation
Theory of
knowledge
-
-
-
Waste elimination
Customer focus
Profound knowledge
Figure 2.1 Multiple knowledge areas increase perspective on the project system.

blame performance problems on failure to execute properly the (assumed) effective
system. This is indeed the nature of much of the project-management literature, as
described above. Dr. W. Edwards Deming has noted that you should not expect sig-
nificant system changes to come from within the system. A natural consequence of
solutions based on the PMBOK™ perspective is to “do more better.”
Some people have fed back to me a misperception of my view of the PMBOK™
Guide, based in part on the previous paragraph. They asserted that I must not sup-
port the PMBOK™ Guide and/or all of the supporting literature. This view is incor-
rect. I believe that the PMBOK™ Guide represents the combined best knowledge of
how to execute projects effectively, and I strongly encourage project managers to
become expert in its use, including becoming project-management professionals
(PMPs). I strongly support continuous improvement of the PMBOK™ Guide and
have contributed to the last two versions. I view this book as part of my ongoing
effort to improve project-management systems, and I expect the PMBOK™ Guide
to embody some of the methods I describe here as they become more common. I also
believe many of the elements of the PMBOK™ Guide are necessary conditions to
successfully deploying CCPM and will identify them in the appropriate places.
Six Sigma and its predecessor, Total Quality Management (TQM), seek to con-
tinually improve every process, the later through projects that demonstrate a return
on investment. These perspectives therefore tacitly assume that the best way to
improve a system is to improve every process. A leading consideration in TQM (pro-
found knowledge) provides four subperspectives leading to deeper understanding of
the potential causes of project problems. TQM provides specific tools to perform
root-cause analysis to identify the causes of problems and develops strategies to
remove these causes.
The TOC perspective identifies the system constraint and works to improve its
throughput. It provides a system view of projects and a specific theory to predict
project performance and the impact of changes to the system. This perspective dif-
fers from the PMBOK™ view by considering the project system as a dynamic
process to create completed projects. TOC looks at individual project tasks as the
operation of a system for producing the result or output of the tasks. It focuses on
the fact that the task-performance process includes natural variation and that indi-
vidual project tasks interrelate.
2.1 Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK™)
Project management made a great leap forward in the 1950s and 1960s with the
advent of the CPM and the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT).
PERT was developed in 1958 as a joint effort between the United States Navy and
the Booz, Allen, Hamilton consulting firm for the Polaris submarine project. These
methods were enabled by the advent of computers and were successful in managing
the Apollo project to put people on the moon (surely one of mankind’s finest hours),
as well as many large defense projects.
PCs have brought sophisticated computer-scheduling techniques to everyone’s
desk. Cost-schedule control systems have increased the complexity of these systems.
However, there has been little progress in improving the success rate of projects and
24 TOC, PMBOK™, Lean and Six Sigma

less innovation in the underlying basis and system. People continue to work with
project-management assumptions conceived forty years ago.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the related knowledge areas identified in the PMBOK™
Guide. This text focuses on and proposes changes to the project-management
knowledge elements to impact the necessary conditions for project success. These
are project integration management, project scope management, project time man-
agement, and project-risk management. You must address the other knowledge
areas to varying degrees, depending on your projects and the environment in which
you work.
The PMBOK™ Guide describes general processes for each of the knowledge
area, collected into five types of processes:
1. Initiating;
2. Planning;
3. Controlling;
4. Executing;
5. Closing.
These process phases roughly correspond to phases of projects, but there is con-
siderable overlap. The PMBOK™ Guide emphasizes that there are relationships
and interactions between most of the project system processes.
2.1.1 Project Integration Management
Project integration management includes project plan development and execution
and overall change control through the life of the project.
2.1.2 Project Scope Management
Project scope management includes the process leading to the initiation of the
project and scope planning, definition, verification, and change control. Primary
2.1 Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK™) 25
Project
management
1
Integration
2
Scope
3
Time
4 5
Cost Quality
6
Human resources
7
Communications
8
Risk
9
Procurement
*Critical chain impacts
shaded blocks.
*
Figure 2.2 The PMBOK™ areas identify the project system.

outputs of the scope-management processes include a project charter, the project
work breakdown structure (WBS), detailed statements of work (SOWs), functional
and operational requirements (F&OR) or other definitions of the deliverable scope,
the project assumptions, and a process for scope change control.
Project assumptions assist planners to develop a deterministic project plan. The
plan and control processes defined by the PMBOK™ do not include a way to handle
decision branches in a project plan. Assumptions define uncertainty sufficiently to
permit defining a deterministic scope, cost, and schedule.
2.1.3 Project Time Management
Project time management includes defining the activities necessary to produce the
project scope, sequencing the activities, estimating activity duration, developing the
project schedule, and keeping the project on schedule. Schedule preparation requires
the WBS and scope statements as inputs. The schedule-development process identi-
fies the activity resource requirements and other potential project constraints. The
PMBOK™ Guide notes that activity duration estimates should specify uncertainty
and refers the reader to discussions on project-risk management to handle this
uncertainty. The guide also discusses the need to level resources in the plan. It
does not differentiate between common-cause variation and special-cause variation
(see 2.5.2).
The PMBOK™ Guide addresses cost management as a separate topic from time
management, but the processes are identical. The schedule-and-cost-control process
includes updating the project schedule and budget estimate, planning and executing
corrective action, and assessing the lessons learned at the close of the project.
2.1.4 Project-Risk Management
Project-risk management includes identifying and quantifying risks and planning and
controlling response to risk. Risk includes both the likelihood and consequences of
adverse impacts to the project. The PMBOK™ Guide does not distinguish between
common-cause and special-cause variation (see 2.5.2) but appears to lump them
together in the performance of risk management. (By the way, I have never heard
Goldratt use this distinction either and find that he and many of his followers lump
them together under variation, or “Murphy.” For reasons I will clarify later, I feel
that dumbing-down the understanding of uncertainty in this way is a mistake.)
2.1.5 Other PMBOK™ Areas
The other PMBOK™ knowledge areas, including quality, human resources, com-
munications, and procurement management, are all important, in varying degrees,
to projects. They are important to any type of business. In the interest of focus, how-
ever, this text will not cover these areas.
2.1.6 Organizational Project Maturity Model
The PMI published the Organizational Project Maturity Model (OPM3) [2] in 2003.
The purpose is to “describe a Standard for organizational project management and
organizational project management maturity.” It appears to me to follow the

Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) Capability Maturity Model
TM
(CMM
TM
) [3].
The team developing OMP3 reviewed 27 alternative maturity models and assigned
teams of three to assess 17 of them in greater depth before designing the OPM3
model. OPM3 contains exhaustive checklists to evaluate an organization against
characteristics of high-performance project organizations.
OPM3 takes a significant step beyond the PMBOK™ Guide by including the
entire organizational system, as compared to the elements necessary for a single
project. It extends the domain of the process groups in the PMBOK™ Guide to the
domains of program management and portfolio management, each comprising five
process groups. The process groups identify core and facilitating processes. The
process-group development does not explicitly consider TOC and CCPM.
It is too early to judge the utility of OPM3. My experience applying the SEI
CMMTM
to develop a project-management office in an information-technology
organization led me to believe that models have utility when focused on the ele-
ments that make a difference to the organization’s current constraints. One must be
cautious to not get lost in the complexity of detail to which such an approach might
lead. I suspect one can use OPM3 the same way (i.e., to help apply the TOC focus-
ing steps).
The development of OPM3 revealed an interesting aspect that may relate more
to the topic of this book than OPM3 itself. OPM3 notes:
The strategy, up to this point in Q1 2000, had reflected largely a classic “waterfall”
development approach: initial research was to feed into design, design into build
and test, and so on. But, there were difficulties associated with the analysis of the
qualitative research, and PMI asked the team to do everything possible to accelerate
the project timetable.
The OPM3 Guidance Team modified its strategy in two ways: to move away from
the “waterfall” development model towards a strategy that aligns more to “rapid
prototype development.” (p. 55)
Although the PMBOK™ Guide addresses alternative development cycles,
including the spiral development cycle inferred above, many organizations struggle
with the problem of incomplete or unknown requirements at the outset of projects. I
learned long ago to apply the “rolling-wave” planning approach in such situations.
The rolling-wave approach develops plans as far ahead as you can develop a realis-
tic known scope and includes tasks to replan further as your project develops the
new information to do so. Section 2.3 describes this in a little more detail.
2.2 Lean
J. Womack, D. Jones, and D. Roos introduced the world to Lean thinking with The
Machine That Changed the World [4]. They defined the principles of Lean produc-
tion to include
• Teamwork;
• Communication;
2.2 Lean 27

• Efficient use of resources and elimination of waste;
• Continuous improvement.
Womack and Jones [5] expand on these principles to emphasize the Lean focus
on waste:
• Specify value.
• Identify the value stream.
• Focus on flow of work.
• Implement customer pull.
• Strive for perfection.
These principles align very nicely with TOC by simply aligning value with the
company goal. They also align with Six Sigma, but they put more emphasis on the
system by focusing on the value stream and emphasize the ideas of customer pull and
flow in a way that differs from Six Sigma. The U.S. Navy has defined their synthesis
of Lean and Six Sigma as Lean Sigma.
Lean approaches have been finding their way into the world of project manage-
ment with a delay similar to that experienced by TOC, perhaps in part for one of the
same reasons: categorizing Lean as a production approach versus a project-
management approach.
W. Dettmer [6] provides an excellent comparison and contrast of TOC
and Lean approaches, concluding, “TOC provides a useful system-level frame-
work for directing lean thinking efforts where they will do the most good (the
system constraint) and avoiding the pitfalls of applying them where they will
do harm.”
Dettmer also identifies some significant advantages to synthesizing Lean and
TOC, including the following Lean tools:
• Poka-yoke (mistake-proofing operations);
• Statistical process control;
• Continuous improvement;
• Failure modes and effects analysis for both product and process;
• Line stop;
• Cell design (meaning, in this case, establishing work centers around natural
work groups);
• Team roles, responsibilities, and rules;
• Graphic work instructions;
• Visual controls;
• Five “Ss.” (The “five Ss” are seiri, seiton, seiso, seiketsu, and shitsuke, which
roughly translate into English as “sifting,” “sorting,” “sweeping,” “standard-
izing,” and “sustaining.” The first three terms refer to general housekeeping in
the work cell. The last two terms refer to the self-discipline of workers to make
the first three happen and the responsibility of management to see that
they do.)

Most of these Lean tools have a direct application to project management, and
TOC will help us identify which one to focus on for a particular project system.
Dettmer also identifies the primary challenge of synthesizing Lean and TOC as
related to two factors of Lean thinking: “Specifically, the overarching emphasis on
cost reduction and maximizing local efficiency everywhere in the system needs to be
rethought as Lean’s focus on improving local optima.” Our approach to CCPM
builds on the strengths, while avoiding these obstacles.
2.3 Agile, or Light, Project Management
There has been quite a bit of attention paid to light, or agile, methods as a solution
to the specific problems of projects involving information technology. The Wikipe-
dia [7] notes, “Agile Methods evolved in the mid 1990s as part of the reaction
against high ceremony methods, like Rational Unified Process (RUP), Prince and
ISO 9000. The processes [that] originated from those methods were seen as bureau-
cratic, slow, demeaning, and contradicted the ways that software engineers actu-
ally work.” Proponents sometimes characterize these approaches as Lean project
management. The symptoms of the problems leading to these approaches were
those described in Chapter 1: extensive cost and schedule overruns and failure to
deliver error-free scope on most information-technology projects. Light methods
for information-technology projects include such methods as
1. Rapid application development;
2. Joint application development;
3. Extreme programming;
4. SCRUM.
Detailing these methods is beyond the scope of this text.
I can’t avoid a certain skepticism about some of the claims that lead to propos-
ing the light or agile methods, such as “conventional project management does not
work for information technology projects.” I have not heard people objectively
skilled in professional project management (e.g., certified PMPs) make these claims.
For example, David Anderson [8, p. 55] notes,
The traditional project management model focuses on locking the scope for a proj-
ect and negotiating or varying the budget (including people and resources) and the
delivery date. The PMI and ISO-9000 models for project management are based on
this paradigmK[and] created the worst possible environment for managersKThe
result was heavyweight, traditional software methodsKThe existing PMI/ISO
model for project management is obsolete. (p. 60)
Although Anderson goes on to present a masterful approach to deploying
CCPM on information-technology projects, my own observations of information-
technology organizations struggling with projects is that many do not understand
and do not apply conventional project management well, if at all. Major short-
comings include poorly defined initial scope (e.g., lack of a WBS) and using ineffec-
tive change-management processes, or lacking them all together. Some of the
2.3 Agile, or Light, Project Management 29

methods posed as alternatives to heavy project management, as characterized by
the PMBOK™ Guide, are actually included in the PMBOK™ Guide processes, per-
haps most notably the spiral-development rapid-prototyping approach. While the
agile methods seem to provide effective approaches for leading small teams through
small development efforts, I think of them more as supportive approaches to parts
of larger projects than replacements for comprehensive approaches such as the
PMBOK™ Guide and OMP3.
The following offers several perspectives on the issues of undefined require-
ments and agile approaches. First, standards such as the PMBOK™ Guide and
OPM3 are not intended to be followed prescriptively in their entirety for all proj-
ects in all organizations. They represent menus to choose from and adapt to specific
organizational needs. Although there is a natural human tendency to apply such
standards prescriptively, and thereby to get bogged down in detail, that is not a
fault in the standard: it is a problem with the application of the standard. I was
fortunate to learn early in my career a simple way to adapt such standards to each
project by specifying in the project plan the specific procedures that apply to each
project. I learned to use checklists to quickly adapt the overall process to each
project. Small, quick, inexpensive projects require very little formality and very
simple planning and communication tools. Large, long-term, expensive projects
involving multiple organizations require much more formal and extensive planning
and control.
The second perspective deals with projects in which the requirements cannot be
explicitly defined at the outset. Many information-technology projects fall into this
category. Many other projects are not able to define all requirements at the outset,
such as maintenance and repair projects or drug-development projects. In these
cases, results from the early stages of the project change the tasks that must be
accomplished later in the project. For such projects, the rolling-wave planning
approach applies. You create specific project plans for that which you can plan with
the information you have at hand (including assumptions), and you include in your
plan the activities to update as new information comes available. Some organiza-
tions apply the rolling-wave approach with a long-term program plan, containing
very little long-term detail and uncertain long-term projections to the end of the
program. The program plan captures the major project-plan updates as a series of
projects. These approaches exemplify the Lean maxim of eliminating the waste of
planning that will not be used.
All projects require an effective change-control process to deal with the changes
that will arise, including better definition of requirements. Change management is
an essential part of agile project management. Key sections of the PMBOK™ Guide
address change management. Information-technology project managers frequently
complain about scope creep. I explain to them that my projects never experience
scope creep and that I consider scope creep a self-inflicted wound by an inexperi-
enced project manager who does not effectively apply change management. Most
admit to not applying change management, frequently because they did not define
the project assumptions or scope well enough initially or because they did not clarify
the change-management procedures with project stakeholders at the outset. Once
they start applying change management, they find that they are able to be more agile
and achieve project success.

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— Te olette reipas tyttö!
— Mitä luulette minun kauinten muistavan?
— Tiedän ainakin, mitä tahtoisin että kauinten muistaisitte!
— No sanokaappa!
— Sen mitä keskustelimme elämän tärkeimmistä kysymyksistä.
— Sitä en ikinä unohda! vastasi tyttö. — Se on johtotähtenä
seuraava minua elämän läpi.
Hän oli tähän saakka kuunnellut Laurin opetusta lausumatta
sanaakaan kiitokseksi tai moitteeksi. Sentähden Lauri nyt suuresti
hämmästyi sekä hänen sanojaan että sitä kirkasta hymyä, joka
valaisi hänen kasvojaan, kun hän hänelle ojensi molemmat kätensä.

Lauri painoi niitä lämpimästi ja ilonkyyneleet välkkyivät hänen
silmissään.
— Jumala siunatkoon päätöstänne! lausui hän. — Lupaattehan
ettette heitä minua?
— Sanokaa, Elisabet, oletteko te yksin maailmassa?
— En, minulla on isä ja äiti!
— Ja matkustatte kuitenkin yksin? Hän punastui ja loi silmänsä
maahan.
— Minä kävin tervehtimässä erästä likeistä sukulaisperhettä
Lyypekissä; siellä tahdottiin pakoittaa minua avioliittoon henkilön
kanssa, jota en voinut kärsiä… Hyvä ystävä hankki minulle valepuvun
ja niin tulin tänne… loput te tiedätte.
Lauri piteli yhä käsissään hänen käsiään eikä tyttö ollut
yrittänytkään vetää niitä pois. Omituinen tunne oli vallannut heidät
molemmat, sielu hiveli sielua ja sanaton kieli kaiutteli säveliään,
jotka eivät kuuluneet siksi että henkinen yhteys oli voitolla. Hetkinen
vain vielä ja Lauri olisi unohtanut kaikki päätöksensä ja sulkenut
hänet syliinsä.
Mutta silloin avautui ovi ja ihastuneina syöksyivät vangit sisään.
— Täällä se kyyhkyspari nyt on!
— Nyt otamme tytön haltuumme!
— Mies saa hyyryn koko elämästään!

Nuija nostettiin Lauria kohti, mutta käsi, joka sitä piteli, oli niin
epävarma, että kun Lauri väistyi syrjään, isku kohtasikin erästä
ylioppilasta, joka kirkuen lankesi maahan eikä enään päässyt
nousemaan.
Kaksi ylioppilasta rupesi nyt kamppailemaan Laurin kanssa ja
kolmas koetti kuljettaa Elisabetia kajuuttaan, mutta hän puolustautui
urhoollisesti ja puri hyökkääjäänsä käsivarteen niin kovasti, että
tämän täytyi päästää hänet irti.
Laivuri näytti kokonaan kadonneen; luultavasti hän oli liitossa
ylioppilaiden kanssa.
— Käyköön kuinka tahansa! huudahti vanha Edvin, päästi
peräsimen kädestään ja karkasi, veitsi kourassa, miesten kimppuun,
jotka hurjasti taistelivat saaliistaan.
— Pidä hyvänäsi! ja veitsi vaipui varteen saakka ylioppilaan
reiteen.
Ulvoen kaatui tämä maahan.
Edvin heilutteli veristä veistään ja karkasi nyt sitä miestä vastaan,
joka piteli Elisabetia; hän päästi hänet silloin kiireesti käsistään ja
aikoi karata, mutta sai kasvoihinsa haavan, josta veri virtana alkoi
valua; siten oli hänen mahdoton puolustautua.
Sillaikaa taisteli Lauri kiivaasti neljännen ylioppilaan kanssa. Hän
oli kaatanut hänet maahan, painanut polvensa hänen rintaansa
vastaan ja vaati nyt, että hän tunnustaisi itsensä voitetuksi, mutta
saksalainen potki ja väitti, ettei voitto vielä ole ratkaistu.

— No, minäpä ratkaisen! huusi Edvin, ja ennenkuin Lauri ehti
pidättää häntä, oli hän pistänyt veitsensä saksalaisen olkapäähän.
Samassa sattui odottamaton tapaus: laiva tärähti kaikkia liitteitään
myöten… sitte se pysähtyi: oltiin karilla.
Laivuri astui paikalla esiin ja karkasi kiroten ja vannoen Edviniä
vastaan.
Ääneti kuunteli Edvin häntä, mutta kiiluvin silmin katseli hän
saalistaan; verinen veitsi oli vielä hänen kädessään: hän oli päässyt
veren makuun.
Heti jouduttuaan vapaaksi, kiirehti Lauri Elisabetin luo, joka
tainnoksissa makasi kajuutan oven edessä; hän otti hänet syliinsä ja
kantoi hänet kajuuttaan, jonka hän tästälähin katsoi oikeudekseen
ottaa haltuunsa.
Lukko oli aivan eheä, ilkityö oli siis tapahtunut laivurin
suostumuksella.
Elisabetin toinnuttua ilmoitti Lauri hänelle aikeensa, antoi hänelle
avaimen ja käski häntä sulkeutumaan kajuuttaan.
Sitte jätti hän hänet.
Haavoittuneet ylioppilaat vääntelivät vaikeroiden kannella, johon
olivat kaatuneet, neljäs pysytteli yhä kyökissä, uskaltamatta tulla
ulos ja laivuri koetti turhaan Edvinin kanssa saada laivaa
irtaantumaan karilta.
Lauri auttoi minkä taisi, mutta kun eivät heidän ponnistuksensa
näyttäneet onnistuvan, kysyi Lauri laivurilta, suostuuko hän

lähettämään saksalaiset veneellä maihin saamaan lääkärinapua, vai
suostuuko hän saattamaan pois hänet ja hänen kansalaisensa, sillä
he eivät enään tahdo matkustaa niin huonossa seurassa.
Turhaan esteli laivuri. Lauri näytti hänelle, ettei maa ole kaukana,
hänen on heti päätettävä, kenelle matkustajista hän luovuttaa
veneen.
Miehellä oli omantunnonvaivoja ja ruotsalaiseen satamaan oli pian
purjehdittava. Hän vastasi siis, että koska kerran ylioppilaat
tarvitsevat lääkärinapua ja sitäpaitsi ovat käyttäneet väkivaltaa, niin
lienee paras lähettää heidät pois laivalta.
Haavoittuneet kannettiin, heidän vastustuksistaan huolimatta,
veneeseen ja neljäs ylioppilas seurasi vapaehtoisesti; heidän
kapineensa koottiin niin tarkkaan kuin suinkin ja Edvin vei kaikki
tyynni veneeseen. Hänen piti soutaa ylioppilaat likeisimpään
valkamaan. Varmaan hän vielä ehtisi palata ennenkuin laiva olisi
päässyt irti.
Vene ei vielä ollut kadonnut näkyvistä, kun Lauri ja laivuri jo
palasivat työhönsä.
Laiva oli siirtynyt muutamia tuumia alemma karilta ja aallot
irroittivat sitä minkä ehtivät. Luultavasti se pian oli pääsevä
valloilleen, piti vain tarkasti katsoa, ettei se törmäisi toiselle karille
samassa hetkessä kuin se toiselta irtaantuisi.
Laivuri piti äänetönnä perää, mutta Lauri huomasi hänen
salavihkaa tarkastavan itseään. Hän päätti sentähden, ettei hän käy
kajuutassa.

Kokinvirkaa hän yhä hoiti ja antoi Elisabetille ruuan luukun kautta,
lausuen hänelle samalla muutamia lohdutuksen sanoja. Laivurin
syödessä seisoi hän perää pitämässä ja tarkasteli silloin veden
liikkeitä.
Seuraavana aamuna irtaantui laiva vihdoin karilta, mutta silloin oli
aivan tyyntä, joten laivurin, tahtoen tai vasten tahtoaan, täytyi
odottaa Edviniä.
Päivällisaikaan hän tulikin. Hän ei tietänyt kaupungin nimeä, mihin
oli jättänyt ylioppilaat. Lääketaiturin haltuun hän vaan oli heidät
antanut ja hyvin sairaina he olivat olleet.
Hän lausui tietonsa lyhyesti ja kun laiva oli saatu hinatuksi, palasi
hän peräsimen ääreen.
Samana iltana jatkettiin matkaa ja kolmen päivän perästä saapui
laiva
Tukholman satamaan.
Lauri oli jo äsken huomannut rannalla kaksi ihmistä, jotka tarkasti
katselivat laivaa. Samassa hypähti toinen kannelle ja kysyi:
— Mikä tämän laivan nimi on?
— Sven Conov!
— Onhan täällä eräs nuori henkilö, joka tilasi kajuutan itseään
varten?
Laivuri osoitti kajuuttaa.

Mies loi ylpeän katseen Lauriin, joka vaistomaisesti, kaihoavin
katsein silmäili samaan suuntaan.
Sinä hetkenä oli ääretön ikävän tunne vallannut Laurin mielen.
Viimeisen kerranko hän nyt näkee nuo suloiset kasvot, jotka näiden
merkillisten viikkojen aikana ovat käyneet hänelle rakkaammiksi kuin
mikään muu maailmassa?
Vieras herra koputti malttamattomasti oveen.
— Elisabet!
Ovi avautui paikalla.
— Veljeni!
Vanhempi herra oli myöskin tullut kannelle.
— Rakas, rakas lapseni! ja hän sulki hänet hellästi syliinsä.
— Isä, jos sinä tietäisit, mitä olen saanut kokea!
— Ehkä ollut merikipeänä! naurahti veli.
Tytön silmät hakivat Lauria.
— Isä, lausui hän, — häntä sinun on kiittäminen tyttösi elämästä.
— Onko sitte ollut vaaroja?
— Hän liioittelee! sanoi nuori herra.
— Pysyköön se asia meidän kesken, virkkoi Lauri, ojentaen
Elisabetille kätensä. — Jääkää terveeksi, neiti, ja älkää unohtako tätä

retkeä!
Hän kumarsi, otti pienen matkalaukun käteensä, lausui laivurille
jäähyväiset, pisti kultarahan Edvinin käteen ja läksi, taakseen
kääntymättä, astumaan Svartmankadulle päin, jossa hän tiesi Olavin
asuvan.
Sydämellisesti tervehtivät veljekset toisiaan; heillä oli paljon
puhelemista ja Olavi kehoitti veljeään heti käymään kuninkaan
kanslerin Lauri Antinpojan luona, joka monasti oli lausunut
haluavansa tavata häntä.
Mutta Lauri sanoi tarvitsevansa levätä muutamia päiviä
kootakseen ajatuksensa.
Sillä hänen ajatuksensa olivat kiihoittuneessa, levottomassa
tilassa, kovassa taistelussa itseään vastaan.
Ne sanoivat: "Tyttö rakasti sinua, sinä näit sen hänen silmistään,
kuulit sen hänen puheestaan… mikset tunnustanut rakkauttasi? Nyt
hän olisi sinun, eikä isällä eikä veljellä olisi valtaa teitä eroittaa…"
Oikeudentunto vastasi: "Jos olisit käyttänyt tilaisuutta hyväksesi,
ottanut häneltä maksoa siitä mitä hänen hyväksensä teit, antanut
hänen kuitata välinne, mistä hänen sitte olisi sinua kiittäminen?"
Intohimo huomautti: "Minä luulin häntä köyhäksi tytöksi ja aioin
pyytää häntä vaimokseni. Pitääkö minun päästää onni käsistäni siksi,
että hän on ylhäisempää säätyä, koska hänen sydämensä sentään jo
kuuluu minulle?"
"Sinä pyysit ettei hän unohtaisi saarnaamaasi oppia; eikö hän
paremmin täytä pyyntöäsi, kun hän huomaa, että menettelit

epäitsekkäästi etkä käyttänyt hyväksesi hänen heikkouttaan…?"
Taistelua kesti kauvan ja se oli kiihkeä, mutta nöyrä kristitty sen
voitti; tosin hänen sydämensä vuoti verta, mutta hän pysyi lujana
päätöksessään, ettei mistään hinnasta myy velvollisuudentuntoaan ja
vakaumustaan.
Joku meistä ehkä muistanee Sten Sture vanhemman ajoilta
nuoren arkkipiispa Jaakko Ulfinpojan ja Elsa Possen.
Arkkipiispan oli luovuttava rikollisesta rakkaudesta, mutta hänen
taistelunsa ja hänen mielentilansa taistelun jälkeen oli aivan
toisellainen kuin Laurin, ja molempien tulevaiseen kehitykseen
vaikutti tämä taistelu mahtavasti. Jaakko Ulfinpojan teki se
horjuvaksi ja mielisairaaksi; turhamaisuuden lippua heilutti hän
maailmalle; hänellä, niinkuin kaikilla muilla ihmisillä, oli valta valita,
tahtooko hän mennä myötä- vaiko vastavirtaa. Jaakko valitsikin ja
vaikka hän sirotteli helyjä ympärilleen, niin ei hän voinut ihmisiltä
peittää, että hänen retkensä kulki myötävirtaa, alituisesti
myötävirtaa, ja hän oli tyytymätön itseensä ja koko maailmaan.
Aivan toisin kävi Laurin. Tehtyään lujan päätöksen, ettei hän kysy
Elisabetin nimeä eikä perhesuhteita — senverran hän tiesi, ettei hän
enään häntä tarvitse — päätti hän olla häntä ajattelematta. Mutta
tämän päätöksen onnistumiseksi tarvittiin paljon työtä, varsinkin
ajatustyötä.
Hän kiirehti kanslerin luo.
Kansleri otti hänet erittäin ystävällisesti vastaan ja pian vaipuivat
he vilkkaaseen keskusteluun Lutherin opinkappaleista.

Kansleri oli hyvin tyytyväinen saamiinsa tietoihin ja vei Laurin
kanssansa kuninkaan luo.
Kustaa kuunteli tarkasti, teki muutamia kysymyksiä ja sai niihin
selvät ja viisaat vastaukset.
Hän pyysi molempia miehiä syömään päivällistä kanssaan ja tuli
sattumalta kysyneeksi, millä laivalla Lauri oli palannut Ruotsiin.
Lauri mainitsi laivan nimen, mutta ei puuttunut kertomaan mitään.
Hyvästi jättäessä kysyi kuningas, tahtooko Lauri ruveta
koulumestariksi Upsalaan.
Silloinen koulumestari vastasi nykyistä teologian professoria.
Lauri kiitti ja vastasi, että hän koettaa tulla kuninkaan suuren
luottamuksen arvoiseksi.
Hän jätti Tukholman miltei heti ja hänelle alkoi niin kova työ, että
sen, jos minkään, olisi pitänyt saada hänen sydänsurunsa
haihtumaan.
Kirkolliset asiat olivat mitä kamalimmassa epäjärjestyksessä…
Lutherin opilla oli aivan vähän ystäviä ja vaikka kuningas oli
käskenyt, että sitä piti saarnattaman ja opetettaman kouluissa, niin
hänen käskyjään ainoastaan muodollisesti noudatettiin. Osaksi
pelättiin vielä katolisen opin yliherruutta, osaksi vähensi uusi oppi
papin omaa valtaa siihen määrään, että tuskin kukaan pappi tahtoi
siihen suostua.

Lauri sai käyttää koko kaunopuheisuutensa lahjaa osoittaakseen
opettajille ja nuorille papeille, että Lutherin oppi johtaa valistukseen,
parannukseen ja Jumalan oikeaan tuntemiseen, kun sitävastoin
katolisuus pitää ihmiset pimeydessä ja panee papit, ei opettajina,
vaan herroina ja mahtimiehinä hallitsemaan orjallisia, pimittyneitä
ihmisiä.
— Ajatelkaa, sanoi Lauri, — kuinka Kristus opetuslastensa kanssa
kulki ympäri maata, opettaen kansaa ei yksin sanoilla, vaan ennen
kaikkea töillä.
— Rakkaus Jumalaan ja ihmisiin oli hänen oppinsa perustus.
Kuinka tätä oppia noudatetaan?
— Kaikista sodista ovat uskonsodat olleet verisimmät.
— Jumala on antanut ihmiselle järjen; saattaako kukaan
inhimillinen olento ymmärtää, että syntein anteeksiantamista
voitaisiin ostaa rahalla?
— Salliko Kristus sellaista, kun hän opetuslapsillensa sanoi: "joille
te synnit anteeksi annatte, niille ne ovat annetut?"
— Hän ravitsi isoovaiset ruumiillisella ravinnolla, ilman että he
häneltä sitä pyysivät.
— Meidän aikanamme nylkevät papit ja munkit kansaa, itse eläen
ylellisesti.
— Meidän täytyy palata Kristuksen totiseen oppiin; en tarjoa teille
kultaa enkä hopeaa, vaan itsekieltäymystä, työtä ja vaivaa
Kristuksen tähden; mutta täällä maan päällä on meillä tieto siitä, että

olemme velvollisuutemme täyttäneet ja tuolla ylhäällä odottaa meitä
palkka, jonka Herra itse on luvannut uskollisille työmiehilleen.
Laurilla oli erittäin sointuisa ääni; sitäpaitsi käytti hän kieltä, joka
oli "niin täydellisen kaunista", sanoo Svedberg, "etten edes luule että
patriarkkojen kieli, jota Jumala puhui heille ja jota he puhuivat
Jumalalle, ja jolla kielellä Jumalan sana ensinnä kirjoitettiin, oli
täydellisempää".
Sentähden sai Lauri aluksi paljon seuralaisia ja uskonpuhdistuksen
asia näytti tämän uuden koulumestarin kautta edistyvän nopein
askelin.
Lauri teki työtä hiljaisuudessa, mutta väsymättömänä, joutumatta
epätoivoon ja liikoja toivomatta.
— Jumala yksin antaa sadon, sanoi hän. — Me olemme vain aseita
hänen kädessään.
Kyösti kuninkaan herkkä mieli kiintyi heti uuteen koulumestariin.
Hän kutsui häntä leikillä arkkipiispakseen ja arveli, että Lauri
Pietarinpoika oikeastaan on ainoa pappi, johon täydellisesti saattaa
luottaa, sillä hän on tyyni ja maltillinen, mutta juuri siitä syystä ei
hän koskaan heitä kesken, mitä on päättänyt viedä perille.
* * * * *
Jos joku helläsydäminen lukijatar tahtoo tietää, miten äkillinen ero
matkatoverista vaikutti Elisabetiin, niin olemme pakoitetut
vastaamaan: erittäin pahasti. Jo ne kolme päivää, jotka hän yksin
vietti kajuutassa, tuntuivat hänestä sietämättömiltä; hänen ainoana
ilonaan oli ollut kuunnella Laurin ääntä, kun hän puheli laivurin

kanssa tai kun hän, tuodessaan hänelle ruokaa, huomautti, ettei se
nyt ole niin hyvää kuin silloin kun Elisabet oli mukana sitä
valmistamassa.
Hän oli hänen äänensä väreistä kuulevinaan, että hän yhtä paljon
kuin Elisabetkin kaipasi tuota pelon ja tuskan mennyttä aikaa, mutta
nyt kun he yhtämittaa olisivat saaneet olla yhdessä, karttoi hän
häntä; Elisabet kyllä ymmärsi, että se tapahtui juorujen
välttämiseksi, mutta mitä hän nyt oli niin varovainen, kun ei Elisabet
ollenkaan pelännyt.
Ja sitte tuo niukka hyvästijättö!
Hän tosin iloitsi kotiintulosta, mutta sekään ei korvannut
kaipauksen tuskaa, vaikka hän alussa koetti taistella sitä vastaan.
Nuori Elisabet oli rikkaan, korkeasti kunnioitetun Matias
Pietarinpojan ja hänen vaimonsa Brigitta Vaasan ainoa tytär,
kuningas Kustaan serkku. Heillä ei, paitsi häntä, ollut kuin yksi poika
ja he olivat Elisabetin tähden olleet hyvin huolissaan aina siitä
saakka, kun he saivat kirjeen, jossa hän heille ilmoitti, millä tavalla
hän aikoo tulla kotiin.
Mutta nyt oli rakas lapsi kotona ja kaikki surut olivat unohdetut.
Hän kertoi kaikista vaaroistaan ja kuinka nuori maisteri, nimeltä
Lauri Pietarinpoika oli hänet pelastanut.
Nuoreen maisteriin ei kukaan kiinnittänyt huomiota, hän oli vaan
alhaisempi henkilö, joka sai iloita siitä, että oli voinut auttaa. Mutta
Elisabetin vaivat he kaikki ymmärsivät, he kärsivät hänen kanssaan
ja sadattelivat ylioppilaita.

Brigitta rouva sanoi tahtovansa puhua asiasta kuninkaalle.
Mutta se ei lohduttanut Elisabetia, sillä hän ei sydämessään
tuntenut mitään vihaa heitä kohtaan.
Rakastetun tyttären kunniaksi vietettiin kaikellaisia tuliaisjuhlia,
mutta itse ei hän ensinkään iloinnut; hän vaan kehoitti veljeään
hankkimaan tietoa siitä, missä hänen pelastajansa oli, mutta veli
vastasi nauraen:
— Ole huoleti, kyllä hän tulee, kun hän meitä tarvitsee.
Mutta häntä ei kuulunut.
Kaikkien hämmästykseksi alkoi nuori, hemmoteltu Elisabet neiti
viettää suurimman osan päivää yksin huoneessaan; hän kalpeni,
laihtui, kävi harvapuheiseksi ja itki usein.
Häntä luultiin sairaaksi, jonka tähden kysyttiin neuvoa
lääketaitoisilta henkilöiltä.
He antoivat neuvoja, määräsivät eri lääkkeitä ja läksivät tiehensä.
Mutta neiti ei parantunut.
Silloin rouva Brigitta salaa kutsui luokseen kuuluisan noitaämmän
ja lupasi hänelle suuren summan rahaa, jos hän saattaisi sanoa,
mikä hänen tytärtään vaivaa.
Kaisa muori tahtoi kahdenkesken puhutella neitiä; näkymättömänä
Brigitta rouva kyllä saisi olla läsnä, mutta ei muuten.
Elisabet oli Laurilta saanut lainaksi useita Lutherin kirjoituksia. Hän
ei ollut jättänyt niitä takaisin ja siitä hän iloitsi; sillä ne olivat

ikäänkuin yhdyssiteenä heidän välillään ja salaa hän niitä lueskeli
päiväkaudet.
Siinä työssä hän oli silloinkin, kun vieras ääni kysyi, saako tulla
sisään.
Kysymys oli hänelle odottamaton, sentähden hän kiireesti piiloitti
kirjat pöydällä seisovaan rasiaan.
Ovi avautui ja nainen astui sisään.
Polttava puna Elisabetin poskilla ja liike, jonka hän oli tehnyt
rasiaan päin, kyllä herätti Kaisa muorin huomion, mutta hän oli viisas
eikä lausunut sanaakaan.
— Saanko tulla? kysyi hän epävarmasti.
Elisabet tunsi naisen ja käsitti, että Brigitta rouva oli lähettänyt
hänet.
— Istukaa, lausui hän, osoittaen penkkiä ja istuutui itse
vastapäiselle penkille.
Sillaikaa olivat hänen poskensa taas kalvenneet ja heikosti
hymyillen sanoi hän:
— Tuletteko, Kaisa muori, minulle ennustamaan?
— Jos neiti kulta tahtoo!
— En, se olisi synti.
— Olkoon sitte tekemättä, tahtoisinkin vaan saada teidät terveeksi.

— Minulle ei kukaan voi mitään.
— Kai toki joku? Elisabet pudisti päätään.
— Enkö minä, eikö kukaan nainen?
Taas nousi tytön poskille arveluttava puna.
— Terveyden täytyy pian palata.
— Miksi?
— Sairaus kuluttaa nuoruutta. Tyttö säpsähti.
— Neiti on ollut kipeänä aina syksystä asti, siitä kun palasitte
kotiin?
— Taitaa olla niin.
— Siis noin kahdeksan kuukautta?
— Niin, syksy on pian käsissä!
— Teillä kuului olleen niin vaikea matka?
— Eipä juuri.
— Eikö ole kamalaa sitä ajatella?
— Ei, kuin suloista!
— Neiti on kai monasti toivonut sitä tekemättömäksi?
— En, antaisin elämäni, kun saisin tehdä sen uudestaan.

— Samassa seurassako?
— Niin, samassa seurassa.
— Ehkä se olisikin paras lääke!
— Ehkä.
— Niin, sitte en minä mahda mitään.
Muori niiasi ja läksi huoneesta. Ulkopuolella odotti Brigitta rouva.
— Kuka se saattaa olla?
— Matkatoveri!
— Kuuluu alhaisoon!
— Ei neidin mielestä.
Kaisa muori sai kotiin lähtiessään runsaat lahjat ja Brigitta rouva
meni tyttärensä luo.
— Olen ajatellut, alkoi hän, — että meidän pitäisi ottaa selvää
siitä, kuka tuo henkilö oli, joka niin miehekkäästi sinua puolusti
matkalla.
— Tahdotteko tehdä sen, äiti? kysyi tyttö kiivaasti, nousten
istualtaan.
— Elisabet, sinä rakastat häntä!
— Kyllä, olette oikeassa! huudahti tyttö intohimoisesti, — ja minä
kuolen, jos te vielä meidät eroitatte.

— Mutta ajattele, onneton…
— Äiti, minä rakastan häntä!
Elisabet oli niin kalpean ja onnettoman näköinen, että Brigitta
rouvan täytyi sulkea hänet syliinsä ja itkeä hänen kanssaan.
Tietoja rakastetustaan ei hän voinut antaa; he olivat kai ikipäiviksi
eroitetut toisistaan.
Brigitta rouva ja hänen miehensä joutuivat asiasta kiivaaseen
sanakiistaan ja seuraavana päivänä läksi rouva Tukholmaan
puhuttelemaan kuningasta.
Kaikki Kustaan sukulaiset, niinkuin yleensä koko maan kansa,
kääntyivät tavallisesti sekä yleisissä että yksityisissä asioissa
kuninkaan puoleen kysymään neuvoa. Jollei hän voinut auttaa, silloin
ei voinut kukaan.
Ystävällisesti, niinkuin aina, otti Kustaa vastaan Brigitta rouvan ja
kuunteli tarkkaavasti hänen valitustaan.
Nuori mies oli pelastanut Elisabetin hengen ja vanhemmat
tahtoivat rehellisesti palkita hänet, mutta eivät he tahtoneet hänelle
antaa tytärtään vaimoksi. Brigitta rouvan varsinaisena asiana oli
vihdoin kysyä kuninkaalta neuvoa, mitä hänen piti tehdä
tyttärelleen?
— Mikä miehen nimi on? kysyi kuningas.
— Lauri Pietarinpoika!
— Lauri, minun oma arkkipiispani!

— Teidän… arkkipiispanne?
— Tiedätkö varmaan, että se on hänen nimensä?
— Aivan varmaan!
— No, matkusta sitte kotiin ja valmista pidot; kymmenen päivän
perästä saapuu Kyösti kuningas suurine seurueineen.
— Mutta Elisabet…
— Hänen tulee ruokapöydässä istua vasemmalla puolellani ja
hänen äitinsä oikeallani.
— Tuleeko meidän kutsua vieraita?
— Talon täydeltä. Mitä enemmän, sitä parempi.
— Sanonko herroille…
— Et mitään, sillä koska et mitään tiedä, niin kai sinun vaitioloosi
voin luottaa?
— Voitte, armollinen herrani! ja syvästi niiaten lausui Brigitta rouva
jäähyväiset ja läksi kiireesti kotiin.
Tyytyväisenä hieroskeli kuningas käsiään. Sitte kirjoitti hän Laurille
ja käski hänen kiireesti tulla Tukholmaan ja valmistua olemaan
vähinten neljätoista päivää poissa Upsalasta.
Kuudentena päivänä saapui Lauri, kiireellisten töiden takia ei hän
aikaisemmin ollut voinut tulla.
Tutkivasti Kustaa häntä katseli, kun hän esitti syyt viipymiseensä.

— Olet laihtunut, Lauri, sanoi hän. — Oletko sairas vai ehkä
rakastunut?
Laurin kasvoille lensi ikäänkuin pilvi. — Ehkä rasittunut, teidän
armonne!
— Mitä hulluja, sinun iälläsi! Mutta keventääkseni kuormaasi,
nimitän sinut nyt yliopiston rehtoriksi ja johtajaksi. No, mitä sinä
siinä töllistelet?
— Se on minulle liian suuri kunnia, sitä en ole ansainnut.
— Siitä asiasta saattaa olla eri mieliä, mutta yhden ehdon minä
liitän lupaukseeni.
— Minkä ehdon?
— Että menet naimisiin minun tahtoni mukaan.
— Siinä tapauksessa luovun paikalla lupauksesta.
— Mitä kummaa! Etkö sinä tahdo?
— En, teidän armonne!
— Vai puolustatko sinä selibaattia?
— Itseni puolesta, mutta en muitten.
— Mistä syystä?
— Sydämeni ei enään ole vapaa.
— Kenelle sinä sitte olet antanut sen?

— En tiedä hänen nimeään.
— Etkö sitte kysynyt sitä häneltä?
— En, sillä luulin ettei hän tahtonut sitä sanoa.
— Tuo kuuluu aika epäilyttävältä, mutta vaadin ainakin, että ensin
näet sen naisen, jonka olen aikonut morsiameksesi.
— Mutta, teidän armonne…
— Älä estele, Lauri ystävä, sinä ja kansleri menette yhdessä, se on
päätetty asia; minä lähden jo huomenna ja te tulette seuraavana
päivänä. Jollet sinä huoli serkustani, niin, ole huoleti, minä en sinua
pakoita avioliittoon, mutta pitää sinun toki nähdä hänet. Ja nyt
Jumalan haltuun!
Kustaan suurimpia huveja oli solmia naimiskauppoja ja hän oli
lähtiessä mitä parhaimmalla tuulella.
Mieluinten olisi Lauri heti palannut Upsalaan, mutta kunnioitetun
kanslerin ja rakkaan veljen tapaaminen houkutteli sekin niin, että
Tukholman matka pian täytti hänen ajatuksensa. Tosin kuninkaan
kummallinen tuuma häntä hämmästytti, mutta hän ei edes tullut
ajatelleeksi, että rikkoisi lupaukset, jotka sydämessään oli antanut
Elisabetille. Sillä hänen kuvansa eli yhä hänen sielussaan.
Kustaa oli seuralaisikseen valinnut vain nuoria, ylhäisiä miehiä.
Suurella loistolla otettiin hänet vastaan herra Matiaksen talossa.
Oli myöhäinen ilta ja tervatynnörejä ja soihtuja oli asetettu tien
varsille valaisemaan. Kovasta syksytuulesta huolimatta oli isäntäväki

molempine lapsineen portaiden juurella ottamassa vastaan ylhäistä
vierasta.
Kustaa oli iloinen ja ystävällinen, kuten aina; hän jutteli reippaasti
Matiaksen kanssa, kiitteli Brigitta rouvaa komeista valmistuksista ja
nipisti Elisabetin poskia, sanoen, että hän kyllä hankkii niihin
enemmän väriä.
Samana iltana hän yksityisessä keskustelussa kysyi isäntäväeltään,
suostuvatko he siihen, että hän rupeaa heidän tyttärensä naittajaksi.
Molemmat vastasivat, että tyttö on antanut rukkaset usealle
ylhäiselle kosijalle, vaikka he niin mielellään soisivat, että hän joutuisi
onnelliseen avioliittoon.
— Minäpä rupean ajamaan asiaa, sanoi Kustaa hymyillen, —
toivottavasti saan sen päättymään kaikkien tyytyväisyydeksi.
Illalla olivat hauskat tanssiaiset ja nuori kuningas tanssitti neitosia
ilolla ja riemulla. Tanssin aikana sai hän myöskin kuiskatuksi
Elisabetille, että hän pyytää häntä seuraavana aamuna kl. 8
tulemaan luokseen.
Siihen aikaan noustiin tavallisesti kl. 4, joten kahdeksan aikaan
päivä jo oli kulunut koko pitkälle.
Sykkivin sydämin noudatti Elisabet käskyä, käsittämättä mitä
kuningas tarkoitti. Mutta hetkisen istuttuaan hänen rinnallaan, oli
hän jo kertonut hänelle merkillisestä matkastaan ja että hänen Lauri
Pietarinpoikaa oli kiittäminen elämästään ja hengestään.
Tarkkaavasti kuunteli kuningas hänen kertomustaan, se näytti häntä
liikuttavankin, mutta hetkisen perästä hän virkkoi:

— Tänään minä kauniille serkulleni ojennan hänen tulevan
puolisonsa käden.
— En ikinä ota sitä! huudahti tyttö. — En mene naimisiin.
— Mutta kun minä tahdon.
— Minun sydämeni tunteita ei kukaan voi pakoittaa. Elisabetia
kummastutti, ettei kuningas häntä käsittänyt, vaikka hän tiesi, että
hän jo oli lahjoittanut pois sydämensä.
— En tahdo pakoittaa sinua, sanoi hän hymyillen, — mutta anna
hänelle rukkaset minun läsnäollessani.
Samassa tuli palvelija ilmoittamaan, että kansleri ja hänen
seuralaisensa ovat saapuneet.
— Kansleri saa odottaa, mutta hänen seuralaisensa tulkoon
paikalla tänne.
Palvelija läksi ja Elisabet silmäili pelästyneenä ja kysyvänä
kuninkaaseen.
— Minuun kovasti koskee, jos annat hänelle rukkaset, lausui
kuningas vakavasti.
— Anteeksi, mutta minä en voi menetellä toisin, vastasi tyttö,
tuskallisesti vavisten.
Samassa avautui ovi ja vieras mies astui sisään.
Elisabet oli kääntynyt pois, mutta joko hän tunsi askeleet tai
aavisti kuka tulija oli; henkeä pidätellen seisoi hän, liikkumattomana
tuijottaen eteensä.

Laurin hämmästys oli yhtä suuri. Hän tunsi hänet paikalla, mutta
hän luuli joutuneensa näköhäiriön valtaan.
Kustaa tarttui Elisabetin käteen.
— No, katso toki häntä, sanoi hän.
— Elisabet!
— Lauri!
Lauri avasi jo sylinsä, mutta antoi samassa kätensä vaipua,
ikäänkuin peläten.
Mutta Elisabet karkasi hänen kaulaansa ja purskahti itkuun. Silloin
likeni Kustaa heitä.
— Ota hänet vaimoksesi, puhui hän, — minä annan hänet sinulle.
Lauri ei kysellyt, hän vain sulki häntä syliinsä, ikäänkuin hän koko
elämänsä ajaksi olisi tahtonut kiinnittää hänet siihen.
Hiljaa läksi Kustaa huoneesta, sulki oven ja pisti avaimen
taskuunsa.
— Antaa heidän olla rauhassa, sanoi hän itsekseen, — heidän
onnensa ei kuulu tähän maailmaan.
Kun Brigitta rouva sitte rupesi kyselemään tytärtään, niin Kustaa
vastasi:
— Antaa hänen olla, hän on kihlattunsa kanssa.
— Hän on siis suostunut?

— Kyllä, niinkuin alamaisen tulee.
Itse kuninkaan täytyi muistuttaa Elisabetille, että hän menisi
pukeutumaan päivällisille.
— Sillaikaa juttelen minä Laurin kanssa, virkkoi hän, — jos hän
vaan on tavattavissa.
Lauri oli ylen onnellinen.
— Melkein pelkään, etten oikein voi kantaa onneani, sanoi hän.
— Tyttö sen tekee paremmin kuin sinä.
— No, minä opin sitte häneltä.
Mutta hetkisen perästä hän jo vilkkaasti puhui siitä miten yliopisto-
oloja olisi kehitettävä, sillä tästälähin aikoi hän ryhtyä työhön koko
voimallaan.
— Pelkään, että tähän saakka olen ollut itsekäs, lausui hän, —
vastoin tahtoani olen ajatellut häntä.
Ennen päivällistä esitteli kuningas tytön vanhemmille vävyn, jonka
hän heille oli määrännyt. Varmaankaan eivät he itse olisi häntä
valinneet, mutta kuninkaan valintaa ei käynyt moittiminen.
Pöydässä istui kuningas kihlatuiden välissä ja esitti itse heidän
maljansa, toivomuksella, että kaikki morsiamet Ruotsissa
kunniapäivänään näyttäisivät niin onnellisilta kuin Elisabet
Matiaksentytär.
Seuraavana keväänä piti kuningas itse heille häät. Lauri olisi
tahtonut viettää ne kaikessa hiljaisuudessa ja vaatimattomuudessa,

mutta kuningas arveli, että alettakoon vain ajoissa puhua tulevasta
arkkipiispasta.
Lauri ja monet muut pitivät sitä vaan leikintekona.
— Jumalan kiitos, ettet ole arkkipiispa, sanoi hänelle Elisabet; —
yliopiston rehtorilta voi riittää jokunen vapaa hetki vaimon osaksi;
arkkipiispa ehkä saisi salata vaimonsa maailmalta.
4.
PETTYMYS.
Niinkuin tiedämme ei kuningas Kustaa itse pitänyt kiirettä naima-
asioissa. Hän ei ollut kehenkään rakastunut ja jos kotielämän sulo
joskus väikkyikin hänen mielessään, niin oli hänellä siksi paljon työtä,
että se työnsi syrjään kaikki hänen yksityiset toiveensa.
Mutta hän ei enään ollut nuori ja hänen täytyi ajatella
perintöjärjestystä.
Tulla uuden kuningassuvun kantaisäksi! Siinä oli suuri viehätys.
Kustaa tunsi, että hänellä on paljon suuria ajatuksia ja suunnitelmia,
jotka hän voi jättää perinnöksi pojilleen.
Hän olisi mielellään valinnut kuningattarekseen jonkun maan
omista sinisilmäisistä neitosista; joskus muistui hänen mieleensä
nuori tyttö, jonka hän välistä oli nähnyt, mutta hän ei muistanut
missä. Mutta jos hän valitsee morsiamensa kotimaisesta perheestä,

niin siitä syntyy kateutta ja eripuraisuutta ja sellaista hän on nähnyt
tarpeeksi.
Sitäpaitsi oli hän vastatehty kuningas, jonka arvoa maailman
silmissä piti korottaa muiden Euroopan ruhtinaiden tasalle; mutta
liian ylhäistä morsianta ei hänen tehnyt mieli, eikä morsian
myöskään saisi olla riippuvainen liian mahtavista sukulaisista.
Kuningas Sigismundin tyttären hän olisi ottanut, mutta ne kaupat
teki arkkipiispa tyhjiksi; piti ruveta etsimään uutta morsianta.
Eräänä päivänä tuli hänen luokseen vanha tuttu — vuoroin ystävä,
vuoroin vihamies, — Herman Israel.
Aina hänet nähdessään synkistyi kuningas ja hänen
kulmakarvansa rypistyivät.
— Armollinen herra, alkoi viekas saksalainen, — tänäpänä en tule
luoksenne raha-asioissa.
— No minkätähden sitte?
Herman Israel katsahti ympärilleen nähdäkseen, oliko hän kahden
kuninkaan kanssa, ja virkkoi sitte:
— Tulen toimittamaan kuninkaalle morsianta. Kustaa säpsähti.
— Mistä se on kotoisin? kysyi hän.
— Onko teidän armonne koskaan ajatellut Lauenburgin
ruhtinashuonetta?
— En muistaakseni.

— Se on haara vanhaa saksilaista sukua, joka jo likelle kolmesataa
vuotta on hallinnut Lauenburgissa.
— Herttuan nimi on Maunu, muistaakseni.
— Naimisissa Katarina Braunschweigiläisen kanssa.
— En tunne heitä.
— Vanhin tytär kantaa äidin nimeä.
— Kuinka vanha hän on?
— Kahdenkymmenen.
— Onko hyvin kasvatettu?
— Mainiosti.
— Hyvä. Minä ajattelen asiaa.
— Ja minä voin taata, että hän suostuu.
— Kuinka niin?
— Minulla on kauvan ollut kunnia olla kirjevaihdossa herttuan
kanssa ja kerran minä sattumalta mainitsin tietäväni nuoren,
naimattoman kuninkaan, joka pian hakee morsianta.
— No, kauppasiko hän minulle tytärtään?
— Taivas varjelkoon! Hän vaan mainitsi, että hänellä on kolme
tytärtä ja että prinsessa Katarinasta tulisi erinomaisen viisas ja
toimellinen emäntä.

— Niin, politiikkaan ei hän saa sekaantua.
— Siihen ei hänellä ole haluakaan. Hetkiseksi vaipui kuningas
mietteisiin.
— Tule muutaman päivän perästä luokseni, ystävä Israel.
Ymmärrät, että minun pitää ajatella asiaa.
Israel kumarsi ja läksi.
Kuningas ei voinut neuvotella asiasta kenenkään kanssa, hän vaan
mainitsi ehdotuksen Lauri Antinpojalle ja tämä vastasi, että koko
maassa odotettiin ja toivottiin, että kuningas menisi naimisiin.
Kun Israel palasi, loi hän kuninkaaseen tutkivan katseen, ikäänkuin
arvatakseen hänen ajatuksensa.
Kustaa nauroi.
— Mitä sinä näet?
— Että armollinen herra suostuu ehdotukseeni.
— Oikein arvasit!
— Se on tuottava onnea ja siunausta!
— Suokoon Jumala! Mutta koska sinä olet alkanut kaupat, niin
saat jatkaakin.
— Suurimmalla mielihyvällä.
— Jos pyyntööni suostutaan, niin paikalla lähetän laivoja
noutamaan morsianta.

— Niinkö pian?
— Niin.
Israel kumarsi ja riensi pois.
Mutta Kustaa vaipui syviin mietteisiin; ratkaiseva askel oli otettu.
Oliko se tuottava onnea maalle ja hänelle itselleen?
— Johtakoon Jumala! ajatteli hän. Paljon puuhaa oli sillä kertaa
maassa. Kiireellisintä oli arkkipiispan asettaminen sekä kahden
piispanistuimen täyttäminen.
Näistä asioista oli kuningas joutunut riitaan Lauri Antinpojan
kanssa.
Kansleri tahtoi nimittäin, että virat heti täytettäisiin, mutta
kuningas ei pitänyt kiirettä; hän muisti miten paljon häiriötä edelliset
arkkipiispat olivat saaneet aikaan ja arveli, että vastaiseksi tultaisiin
toimeen ilman heitä, varsinkin koska pappeja oli yllin kyllin.
Mutta helsinglantilaiset nurisivat jo äänekkäästi siitä, että heidän
hiippakuntansa niin kauvan oli saanut olla piispatonna.
Vihdoin päätti kuningas ottaa rohkean askeleen: kauvan
keskusteltuaan Lauri Antinpojan kanssa, kutsui hän maan etevimmät
papit Tukholmaan valitsemaan arkkipiispaa. Vaali tapahtui
tuomiokirkossa juhannuspäivänä; ehdokkaina olivat: Strängnäsin
piispa Maunu Sommar, Upsalan dekaani Jöns ja sikäläinen rehtori
Lauri Pietarinpoika, mestari Olavin veli ja kuninkaan suosikki.
Itse asetti kuningas neljänneksi ehdokkaaksi kansleri Lauri
Antinpojan. Mutta kaikki tiesivät, ketä kuningas tahtoi ja niin suuri oli

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